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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 11 June to 8 December 1965)

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INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus covers developments from 11 June to 8 December 1965 and brings up to date the record of United Nations activities in the Island pursuant to the mandate laid down in the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964.
2. During the period under review, the military situation in general remained quiet and the cease-fire was by and large maintained through the month of October. The recurrence of fighting in Famagusta on 2 November 1965, to which the Security Council's attention was drawn in my report of 5 November (S/6881 and Add.1 and 2) has shown the continuing potential danger of the situation, which, as previously pointed out, is little short of an uneasy truce with opposing armed elements facing each other at several points in the Island.

I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE

A. Composition and deployment

3. At the beginning of the period under review, the strength of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was 6,171 military personnel and 175 civilian police. On 1 December 1965, the composition of the Force was as follows:

<u>Military</u>		<u>Total</u>
Austria	- Field Hospital	52
Canada	- HQ UNFICYP.....	44
	Battalion plus reconnaissance squadron	846
	Contingent HQ and Administrative Support Group	104
		994
Denmark	- HQ UNFICYP.....	33
	Battalion.....	963
		1016
Finland	- HQ UNFICYP.....	8
	Battalion.....	979
		987
India	- HQ UNFICYP.....	2
Ireland	- HQ UNFICYP.....	23
	Battalion.....	501
		524
Sweden	- HQ UNFICYP.....	20
	Battalion.....	933
		953
United Kingdom	- HQ UNFICYP.....	156
	Battalion plus reconnaissance squadron.....	673
	Light aircraft and helicopter support.....	64
	UNFICYP logistic support units....	170
		1063
	<u>Total military personnel:</u>	5591

Civilian Police

Total

Australia	40
Austria	34
Denmark	41
New Zealand	20
Sweden	40

Total Civilian Police:

175

175

TOTAL UNFICYP:

5,766

4. The following changes took place during the intervening period:

(a) Austria: Personnel of the Austrian Field Hospital were rotated on 26 September 1965. Transport was by BEA/Cyprus Airways.

(b) Canada:

(i) The Canadian Brigade HQ which formed HQ Nicosia Zone was withdrawn on 1 September 1965.

(ii) The 2nd Battalion Canadian Guards (strength 731) relieved the 1st Battalion Queen's Own Rifles (strength 728) and B Reconnaissance Squadron Royal Canadian Dragoons (strength 95) relieved A Reconnaissance Squadron Royal Canadian Dragoons (strength 103) during the period 1-9 October 1965. Transport was by Royal Canadian Air Force.

(c) Denmark: Dancon 4 relieved Dancon 3 during the period 13-20 November 1965. The rotation involved the arrival of 674 and departure of 713 all ranks. The present strength of Dancon 4 is 1016, the balance being made up of those extending for a further period of duty. Transport was by Transair Airline.

(d) Finland: YKSP 4 relieved YKSP 3 during the period 19 September-2 October 1965. The rotation involved the arrival of 335 and departure of 289 all ranks. The present strength of YKSP 4 is 987, the balance being made up by those extending for a further period of duty. Transport was by JAT and Adria Airlines.

(e) Ireland: The 5th Infantry Group (strength 526) relieved the 42nd Infantry Battalion (strength 641) during the period 14 September-24 October 1965. The 4th Infantry Group was withdrawn without replacement during the period 20-24 July 1965. Transport was by JAT and Adria Airlines.

(f) Sweden: The 32nd Swedish Battalion relieved the 30th Swedish Battalion during the period 15-22 October 1965. The rotation involved the arrival of 877 and departure of 849 all ranks. The present strength of the 32nd Swedish Battalion is 955, the balance being made up of those extending for a further period of duty. Transport was by JAT and Adria Airlines.

(g) United Kingdom: 1st Battalion Royal Highland Fusiliers (strength 529) relieved 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards (strength 551) during the period 4-8 October 1965. During the period 11 June-1 December 1965, 21 Flight Army Air Corps relieved 6 Flight; the UNFICYP transport Platoon was relieved and individuals of all other United Kingdom support detachments were rotated.

5. During the period under review, it was necessary to redeploy parts of the Force three times owing to (a) the withdrawal of the Irish 4th Infantry Group and 42nd Infantry Battalion, (b) the subsequent arrival of the Irish 5th Infantry Group, and (c) the closing down of HQ Nicosia Zone, which required the formation of independent commands (Kyrenia Zone, the Nicosia East District and Nicosia West District).

6. Since 1 November 1965 the Force has been deployed as follows (see also the attached map):

HQ UNFICYP (international) including HQ UNCIVPOL

Nicosia West District

Danish Contingent
Danish Civilian Police

Nicosia East District

Finnish Contingent
Austrian Civilian Police

Famagusta Zone

Swedish Contingent
Swedish Civilian Police

Limassol Zone

British Contingent
New Zealand Civilian Police
Australian Civilian Police (two detachments)

Leika District

Irish Contingent
Australian Civilian Police

Kyrenia Zone

Canadian Contingent
Danish Civilian Police (one detachment)

/...

7. The Force remains under the command of General K.S. Thimayya.

Mr. C.A. Bernardes continues as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus.

B. Function and guiding principles

8. The function of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus was defined by the Security Council in its resolution of 4 March 1964, in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions".

That resolution was reaffirmed by the Council in its subsequent resolutions of 13 March, 20 June, 9 August, 25 September and 18 December 1964, and 19 March, 15 June and 10 August 1965.^{1/}

9. The guiding principles governing the operation of the Force which were summarized in the report of 10 September 1964 (S/5950, para. 7) remain in effect. As regards the civilian police element, its duties are set forth in the reports of 2 May 1964 (S/5679, para. 4) and 11 March 1965 (S/6228, paras. 112-113) as well as in the present report (see para. 91 below).

10. As in the past, problems arising in connexion with the implementation of the mandate, especially practical problems involving relations between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot community, have been dealt with regularly by the Political Liaison Committee. The UNFICYP Senior Political and Legal Advisers and the Deputy Chief of Staff have continued to meet in this Committee separately with liaison officers representing the Government and the Turkish Cypriots. Between 11 June and 2 December 1965, the Committee held 47 meetings; 25 with the Government Political Liaison Officer and 24 with the Turkish Cypriot Liaison Officer.

Casualties and discipline

11. During the period covered by this report, UNFICYP suffered no casualties as a result of inter-communal fighting. Two UNFICYP soldiers were killed, one by the

^{1/} Documents S/5575, S/5605, S/5778, S/5368, S/5987, S/6121, S/RES/201, S/RES/206 and S/RES/207.

accidental discharge of his own weapon and the other in a traffic accident. One UNFICYP soldier was seriously injured in a traffic accident and another was shot and wounded by a Greek Cypriot civilian following a personal quarrel. Both have recovered.

12. The discipline, understanding and bearing of the officers and men of the United Nations Force in Cyprus have continued to be of a high order, reflecting great credit on their commanders and on the countries that contribute contingents to the Force.

C. Relations with the Government and with the communities

13. Throughout the period covered by this report, UNFICYP continued to maintain close liaison at all levels with the Government of Cyprus and with the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community.

14. UNFICYP continued to face problems in the implementation of its task of preventing a recurrence of fighting owing to measures of a military nature which are taken from time to time either by the National Guard or by the Turkish Cypriots without consultation with UNFICYP or in disregard of its advice. In many cases, personal inspections and negotiations by the Force Commander undoubtedly prevented the development of serious incidents in certain areas, but the basic problem remains to be solved.

15. Liaison between UNFICYP and the Command of the National Guard has improved but relations have not yet reached the point where all incidents can be prevented by negotiation. Examples are described in Chapter II.

D. Freedom of movement of the United Nations Force

16. It has been reported previously that local National Guard commanders had occasionally tried to establish their own "restricted areas", in addition to those mutually agreed upon between HQ UNFICYP and HQ National Guard (S/3426, para. 1). A few similar incidents occurred during the period covered by this report. In July and August 1965, UNFICYP patrols were stopped several times in areas of the Famagusta Zone which were not restricted. At the request of UNFICYP the boundaries of agreed restricted areas have since been recorded on "master" maps, copies of which are held by both headquarters. This has led to a decrease in the number of incidents.

17. Reference was previously made to increased militancy and aggressiveness by Turkish Cypriot fighter elements which caused some interference with UNFICYP's freedom of movement (S/6426, para. 20). During the period of this report, there were several cases in which local fighter leaders, especially in the Turkish Cypriot enclave north of Nicosia, stopped UNFICYP patrols. Fighter leaders at higher level usually apologized afterwards and promised to correct the situation.

18. In September 1965, when UNFICYP tried to investigate an allegation by the Cyprus Police that fortifications had been constructed in the Turkish Cypriot village of Mari, access to the village was refused. The local mukhtar alleged that it had been agreed that UNFICYP should not patrol Mari. However, after lengthy negotiations, the local UNFICYP company commander was permitted to make an inspection, which revealed no new fortification.

19. In general, denials of freedom of movement to UNFICYP have been the result of local decisions by subordinate commanders. At higher levels, there has been little disagreement on this subject and any incidents have usually been followed by apologies from the competent National Guard Commanders or Turkish Cypriot leaders.

II. ACTIVITIES TOWARD PREVENTING A RECURRENCE OF FIGHTING AND
CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF LAW
AND ORDER

A. Military Situation

(i) Armed forces in Cyprus other than UNFICYP

(a) Government armed forces

20. Official sources of the Cyprus Government announced in mid-July that the 1947 age-group would be called up in November, but those wishing to join the National Guard earlier could do so in August. On 2 August 1965, the members of the age-group who had elected to start their service early reported for military training. The reporting date of the remainder, who had been due for call-up on 15 November 1965, was postponed for an unspecified period. No specific reason was given for the postponement. On 3 November 1965, it was announced that the Council of Ministers had decided on the creation of a Technical Service, to be formed from persons having the requisite education and experience, who could be called up from any age-group to serve for up to nineteen months. No date was given for the formation of this Service.

21. On the other hand, the 1943 age-group was officially stated to have been demobilized during the first part of November. In addition, since June 1965, other members of the National Guard have been released, namely those who completed twelve months' service and who for family or occupational reasons were exempted from doing the full term of service (S/6426, para. 23).

22. The total number of age-groups that so far have been conscripted for the National Guard is seven. Although no precise figures have been made public regarding the present strength of the National Guard, it may be estimated that the reductions indicated have been of the order of a few thousand men. Further significant reductions in National Guard manpower could occur in the near future when some age-groups will have completed their full term of service as laid down in the amended conscription law (S/6426, para. 22). Their demobilization would mean a considerable reduction of the regular strength of the National Guard in the first part of 1966. However, as men leave the National Guard, they swell the ranks of the Reserve, which can be mobilized very quickly. There have been frequent complaints by the Turkish Cypriots about the clandestine entry of Greek national military personnel into Cyprus. It is believed that there are still a

significant number of such personnel - apart from members of the Greek National Contingent - who are integrated with the National Guard, but UNFICYP has no new information as to the actual number involved (S/6102, para. 134).

23. Training continued at an increased tempo during the summer months, when the National Guard carried out a series of large-scale exercises including the employment of armour and artillery. The main aim of these exercises, which embraced large areas of the Island, was to practice coastal defence and anti-invasion drill. During the exercises the Militia (Home Guard), various kinds of supporting units, and civil defence organizations based in the areas concerned were also mobilized (S/6228, para. 32). Reservists were usually called up by radio broadcasts.

24. The construction of new fortifications had continued in coastal areas, and already existing positions have been repaired and maintained (S/6426, para. 26). No new war materials of special significance appear to have been introduced into the Island during the period under review.

25. As to the regular Cyprus Police, official sources now give the strength at 2,000 all ranks (S/6426, para. 28). In addition, there is the para-military Police Tactical Reserve of about 500 men.

(b) Turkish Cypriot armed elements

26. With the passage of time the various Turkish Cypriot fighter organizations have become increasingly professional. Turkish Cypriot fighters are now usually uniformly dressed, and wear badges of rank. A conventional military organization and command structure is becoming apparent. This is especially the case in the Turkish Cypriot controlled area of Nicosia, and the enclave north of the city. Continued training, including combat leadership courses, has been organized, and this has doubtlessly improved the combat effectiveness of Turkish Cypriot fighters.

27. The state of morale among the fighters is regarded as generally high, although there have been a few cases of defection. In the narrow enclave of Kokkina, living conditions are worse than in other Turkish Cypriot controlled areas, and in the last months there has been a significant number of cases of nervous disorder amongst the fighters.

28. The number of Turkish Cypriot fighters under arms at a given time varies according to local conditions and fluctuations in the political climate. It is therefore not possible to estimate precisely the total strength of the Turkish

Cypriot armed elements throughout the Island, although it would appear that the estimate of 12,000 previously arrived at by UNFICYP is still valid (S/6223, para. 43).

29. To UNFICYP's knowledge, no military equipment has been received by the Turkish Cypriots from outside the Island during the period under review.

(c) The Greek and Turkish national contingents

30. No change in the total strengths or locations of the two national contingents has occurred since my report of 10 June last (S/6426, para. 31).

31. The relief of about one half of the Greek National Contingent was carried out on 2-3 July 1965 through the port of Famagusta. UNFICYP had been informed in advance.

32. In the middle of August 1965, the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in Nicosia informed the Government of Cyprus that Turkey intended to rotate part of its Contingent during the middle of September. UNFICYP was also informed, and was asked as before to extend its good offices, as well as its assistance and facilities, in carrying out the operation. The Government of Cyprus, while maintaining its legal position regarding the Treaty of Alliance, did not oppose the rotation but it objected to items on the list of stores and ammunition to be brought in by the incoming troops. The problem was resolved after negotiations in which UNFICYP's good offices were employed. The rotation took place on 14 September without incident. The outgoing and incoming parties were of equal strength, namely, forty-four officers and 286 other ranks. Two jeep engines, intended for incorporation in field refrigerators, were retained in the custody of UNFICYP pending further discussion. This matter was finally settled on 15 November 1965 when the disputed items were handed over to the Turkish National Contingent.

(ii) General assessment of the situation with regard to preventing a recurrence of fighting

33. Chronologically, the general situation on the Island can be divided into two periods, i.e., one before and the other after the outbreak of open fighting in Famagusta on the night of 2-3 November (S/6931 and Add.1 and 2).

34. During the first period, apart from the fighting at Limnitis on the night of 13-14 October (see paras. 62 to 63 below), the Island was mainly calm, disturbed

only by comparatively minor incidents. Even the events at Limnitis did not lead to any lasting increase in tension.

35. There were no real changes in the general situation during the first period. Any attempt by either side to change or improve its positions led to prompt complaints by the other, sometimes backed, in the case of the Government, by the movement of troops to the area. An example of this occurred at Polis, where in early August an attempt by the Turkish Cypriots to occupy a house forward of their positions was countered by the mobilization of local reserves, and the arrival of armoured cars dispatched from Nicosia. Fortunately, UNFICYP negotiations were successful and fighting was averted (see para. 72 below).

36. During the same period the National Guard patrolled vigorously in furtherance of the Government's intention of not relinquishing its right to exercise authority anywhere in the Island. This gave rise to temporary increases in tension where such patrolling led them into places where there were Turkish Cypriot fighters, e.g., at Ayios Theodoros and Kophincu. Measures taken outside the major Turkish Cypriot enclaves to prevent the illegal possession of arms also caused some disturbance, as in Kato Polemidhia, where an arms raid by the Police and National Guard on 25 September was strongly resented by the Turkish Cypriots (see paras. 74 to 78 below).

37. Government forces also constructed new coastal defence positions round the Island, some of which were in confrontation areas. Sometimes these constructions caused tension, as at Mandria, although here UNFICYP negotiation, and a happy willingness on both sides to compromise, resulted in a peaceful solution (see para. 53 below).

38. At Famagusta, however, the Government's decision to build beach defences between the Turkish Cypriot village of Karaolos and the sea, against the Force Commander's advice, had a bearing on events leading to the open fighting that took place in November. Elsewhere, willingness to accept UNFICYP negotiation, and usually to await the outcome with patience, enabled UNFICYP to arrange temporary settlements of most problems and so to avert fighting.

39. During the second period, after the outbreak of shooting in Famagusta, tension throughout the Island increased sharply. Simultaneously with the trouble at Famagusta, the construction of positions by Turkish Cypriots near Pileri, well forward of their previous lines, has resulted in some shooting, and led to the

National Guard's threatening to take further armed action if UNFICYP negotiations for the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots are not successful (see paras. 79 to 95 below). Meanwhile, the rest of the Island is gradually returning to its previous outwardly calm appearance.

(iii) Developments toward reducing areas of tension

40. UNFICYP has continued its efforts to persuade the Government and the Turkish Cypriot community to take steps to eliminate the lines of armed confrontation in the Island but there has been little progress in this field.

41. As a first measure, an effort was made to arrange for the removal of all armed posts along the "green line" in Nicosia and thus establish a neutral zone in which there would be no military presence other than UNFICYP. Initially, it was proposed to limit the plan to the area within the Walled City, where, along much of the line, there is muzzle-to-muzzle confrontation.

42. Discussions were held with the Government and letters were exchanged on the subject. However, despite the co-operative attitude adopted by the Government, objections arose to the UNFICYP proposals for policing the neutral zone, and as a result the arrangement could not be accepted.

43. In September 1965, there were negotiations at the local level in Famagusta aimed at securing agreement to an UNFICYP plan for demilitarization within Famagusta District. For the first time in many months the Government's District Officer met the local Turkish Cypriot leader and discussions were held in a friendly atmosphere. At the end of September, however, the National Guard began its construction of the coastal defence positions which had a bearing on the subsequent fighting in early November (see S/6381) and the negotiations collapsed.

44. Subsequently, discussions took place at the Government level with the object of resolving the very difficult situation that existed at Famagusta (see paras. 55 and 56 below).

45. In Limassol, where there is no "green line" as such, no real progress has been made in the reduction of military posts. The National Guard still man a few positions overlooking the Turkish Cypriot quarter, and the Turkish Cypriots maintain a large number of small concealed posts which are not always manned. Although neither side has in any way lowered its guard, it is possibly a measure of UNFICYP's influence in the area that no new defences have been constructed. There were no significant changes in Larnaca District (S/6426, para. 50).

46. In Ktima, efforts to persuade the Government to withdraw their police post from the Turkish Cypriot area of Mavroli have been unsuccessful. This post is a long-standing source of friction in the area (see S/6426, para. 53).

47. The situation in and around the three major Turkish Cypriot enclaves of Nicosia, Limnitis and Kokkina remains unchanged; it is unlikely that it will prove possible to introduce any measures to reduce fortifications in these areas unless and until there is major improvement in the Island as a whole. Meanwhile, particularly in the Nicosia enclave west of the Kyrenia road, every move by one side is viewed with suspicion and hostility by the other and there is constant danger of a recurrence of fighting.

B. Specific developments and action taken by UNFICYP

(i) National Guard coastal defences

48. In May 1965, the National Guard announced its intention of constructing further coastal positions in the areas of Kyrenia, Famagusta and the Turkish Cypriot village of Mandria.

49. In July 1965, joint surveys of the locations of the proposed positions were carried out by representatives of UNFICYP and the National Guard who subsequently submitted reports to their respective headquarters on the necessity, suitability and provocative potential of the positions.

50. In September 1965, after personally visiting the sites in the Kyrenia and Famagusta areas, the Force Commander discussed the question with General Grivas and subsequently recommended that the National Guard should not proceed with the construction of those positions which would be in close proximity to Turkish Cypriot villages and whose purpose might therefore be open to misinterpretation.

51. In Famagusta, the UNFICYP forecast of the danger of a serious incident materialized when on 2 November 1965 there was an outbreak of fighting between the National Guard and Turkish Cypriot fighters. The series of events has already been described in detail in another report to the Council (S/6881).

52. In the Kyrenia area, no attempts have been made to develop the two originally proposed positions, one in the vicinity of the Turkish Cypriot village of Temblos and the other further east, close to positions manned by Turkish Cypriot fighters.

53. In Mandria, where the local inhabitants expressed considerable anxiety over the National Guard's intention to construct five coastal defence positions, one position only has been completed. During its construction the local UNFICYP element was reinforced in order to reassure the villagers. No action has been taken to start work on a second position, against whose construction the Force Commander had advised because of its proximity to the village. General Grivas had previously agreed not to proceed with the construction of the further three posts originally proposed.

54. It is the opinion of UNFICYP that, while the right of the Government to construct defence positions against outside attack is undeniable, there is a continual risk of further incidents arising from the construction of such defence works in areas adjacent to Turkish Cypriot villages.

(ii) The situation at Famagusta

55. The incidents which occurred at Famagusta at the beginning of November have been described in an earlier report (S/6881 and Add.1 and 2). These incidents resulted in a particularly close confrontation near the old city walls and the Turkish Cypriot localities of Baikal, Karaolos and Sakharis, with opposing armed elements in places only a few yards away from each other. The tension was dangerously high during the first part of November but eased somewhat by the middle of the month; in particular, the Turkish Cypriots began to move again freely in and out of the walled city, the Turkish Cypriot longshoremen returned to work in the harbour and a Turkish vessel docked at Famagusta on 13 November for four days and unloaded Red Crescent supplies (see para. 151). However, despite marked restraint shown by both sides, the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriots continued to prepare new positions and fortifications.

56. Throughout the month of November, my Special Representative and the Commander of the United Nations Force in Cyprus held a number of discussions with a view to alleviating the tense situation obtaining in the area. In the light of these discussions and following a detailed study by the Commander of the positions on the ground, Mr. Bernardes and General Thimayya proposed that certain measures designed to reduce tension, prevent inter-communal friction and the recurrence of fighting, should be undertaken forthwith. In substance, these measures provided for the removal of all fortified positions in the area outside the walls of the old city

of Famagusta (with the exception of ground positions in the harbour), as well as the dismantling of Turkish Cypriot positions on top of the walls of the old city; provision was also made for UNFICYP to ensure, pursuant to its mandate, the implementation of the measures concerned. After further consultation and clarification of a number of details with both sides, the Government agreed, on 6 December, to implement the measures UNFICYP proposed to them. A similar acceptance of the same measures proposed to the Turkish Cypriot leadership having been received from the Vice-President, immediate arrangements were made to proceed with the de-fortification.

(iii) The Kyrenia Road

57. The Kyrenia Road arrangements (S/6102, annex I) has continued to work well as attested to by the increased use of the convoy by Greek Cypriots, and the absence of serious incidents on the road - other than the case of a foreign national, not using the convoy, who was shot at (see para. 107 below). During the month of August, the traffic count reached a peak of over 3,300 vehicles and 11,000 persons.

58. Most of the incidents on the Kyrenia road during the period under review were minor in nature (see para. 107 below).

59. Because of the reduced number of incidents and tension on the road, and in order to achieve greater economy in the use of troops, functional control of the Kyrenia Road was passed from the military to the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) on 1 November 1965. Previously, UNCIVPOL responsibilities had included only the right to search and to carry out investigations into accidents and other incidents on the road. UNCIVPOL now became responsible for (a) the operation of checkpoints at both ends of the road during daylight hours; (b) security and traffic control duties in the villages of Orta Keuy and Guenyeli; and (c) the marshalling of Kyrenia Road convoys.

60. So far, the change has worked well. Operational control of the road remains the responsibility of the Commander, Kyrenia Zone, and, at night, checkpoints are still manned by military personnel.

61. On 1 October 1965, arrangements were made which permitted access to the land adjoining the northern end of the Road during daylight hours by persons having legitimate business there. These arrangements, which apply to unarmed Greek Cypriots, are designed to facilitate more extensive cultivation of agricultural land, and contribute towards a gradual return to normality in the area.

(iv) Incident at Limnitis

62. The situation in no-man's land surrounding the Limnitis bridgehead, where the opposing lines of forward defended localities were separated by about 500 yards, had been quiet for some months except for isolated, often accidental, shots. However, on 1 October 1965, the National Guard moved forward at Loutros, on the south-east perimeter of the bridgehead, and started to dig a new position. A similar attempt in April 1965 had been stopped at UNFICYP's request but this time the National Guard refused to withdraw.

63. On 10 October 1965, in reprisal for the National Guard's action, Turkish Cypriot fighters also moved forward of the cease-fire line in the area of the coast road, whereupon the National Guard protested to UNFICYP.

64. In the early hours of 14 October, the National Guard advanced past an UNFICYP observation post into the neutral zone. Turkish Cypriots reacted by also sending a patrol forward into the neutral zone. The local National Guard commander refused to withdraw. Between 0400 hours and 0518 hours an exchange of small arms and machinegun fire, opened by the National Guard, took place and the local UNFICYP commander withdrew the observation post in order to avoid casualties. The UNFICYP observation post was immediately occupied by members of the National Guard who, although no further firing took place, declined to allow UNFICYP to reoccupy it.

65. On the same day, the Force Commander visited the site of the incident and on the following day called on the Minister of the Interior and informed him that in his opinion the original responsibility for the incident rested with the members of the National Guard; they should therefore withdraw from their new forward position before any consideration could be given to a plan for simultaneous withdrawal by both sides from the other disputed positions.

66. On 19 October, the Force Commander discussed the incident with General Grivas and, as a number of points in dispute appeared to require clarification, a joint investigation at the scene of the incident was agreed to. The joint investigation was carried out by the Force Commander and a representative of National Guard headquarters together with local UNFICYP and National Guard commanders, and it was agreed that further talks were needed to bring about a possible withdrawal on both sides.

67. The National Guard argued that the position which they had occupied had previously been used as a listening post and in consequence there had not been any actual advance in the area. This contention was not acceptable to UNFICYP, which can recognize only the formal positions that were firmly manned at the time of any original cease-fire agreement. Thus in the opinion of UNFICYP, the action of the National Guard in attempting to establish a new formal position constituted a breach of the cease-fire agreement. The action of the Turkish Cypriots was also a breach of the agreement that served to aggravate the situation and undoubtedly contributed to the subsequent outbreak of fighting.

68. The Limnitis incident is a good example of the dangers inherent in both sides alternately "creeping forward". Eventually, one side loses control and shots are fired. These are almost certainly returned and what starts as an apparently minor "improvement" of an existing position quickly develops into a serious exchange of fire. The situation in Limnitis is now potentially more troublesome than before for the simple reason that the opposing forces are so much closer to each other. A number of shots have been fired in the area more recently but efforts to resolve the situation are continuing.

(v) Incidents arising from the refugee problem

69. The main incidents stemmed from attempts by Turkish Cypriot refugees, who continue to live under conditions of hardship in overcrowded premises (see para. 161), to occupy Greek Cypriot-owned houses in Turkish Cypriot areas, or houses in areas of confrontation such as the "green line" in Nicosia. Such attempts almost invariably met with protest and reaction by the National Guard. Attitudes tended to harden on both sides and threats of removal by force were averted only by UNFICYP's mediation.

70. One such incident occurred on 31 July 1965, when a Turkish Cypriot family moved into a Government-owned house in the Baikal section of Famagusta. The Turkish Cypriots claimed that the ownership of the house was in dispute. There was an armed confrontation between ten National Guardsmen and twenty-four Turkish Cypriots and the family was ordered to evacuate by noon the following day. The local UNFICYP commander intervened and, by negotiation, secured an extension of the time-limit and ultimately the evacuation of the family.

71. In Nicosia City, on 4 August 1965, the Turkish Cypriots declared their intention of occupying four Greek Cypriot-owned houses in the Turkish sector. This provoked strong National Guard reaction and gave rise to lengthy negotiations, during which Turkish Cypriots moved into an apartment in the Chappas Building overlooking the "green line" on the Turkish Cypriot side and requested permission to occupy a Turkish Cypriot-owned house in Athens Street, on the other side of the "green line". All of these proposals cited the urgent need to relieve congestion in refugee accommodation but because they tended to aggravate tension in a sensitive area, they could not be accepted by UNFICYP. A potentially dangerous situation was averted only by negotiations at high level.

72. On 13 August 1965, National Guard headquarters protested to UNFICYP that Turkish Cypriot families had occupied a Greek Cypriot-owned house in Polis. The refugee problem in Polis was acute: several hundred refugees were housed mainly in the local school, in a corrugated iron building and in tents. UNFICYP's initial investigation suggested that the move was originally made to alleviate genuine hardship, but the situation in the area rapidly deteriorated when armed fighters joined the families and subsequently, on 14 August, occupied two more Greek Cypriot-owned houses. A series of meetings at the local level failed to find a solution and the National Guard threatened to evict the new occupants by force. They gave every indication of being in earnest and again negotiations had to go to a very high level before the matter could be resolved. This was achieved by the complete evacuation of the houses concerned and the promise of UNFICYP material assistance and technical advice in the matter of alternative housing. This promise was implemented at a local level by the immediate provision of two tents, but further offers of tentage by headquarters UNFICYP were refused by the Turkish Communal Chamber. Some technical advice was rendered and one large temporary building was built of mud bricks to house ten families. Tension remained high in the area for some time afterwards. The refugee problem in Polis is still most acute and on 12 October a similar situation was developing when a Turkish Cypriot family again occupied a Greek Cypriot-owned house, but UNFICYP mediation secured its evacuation by 18 October 1965.

73. Another factor which has tended to aggravate the refugee problem has been the National Guard policy of asserting Government authority by establishing a military presence in Turkish Cypriot areas. One such instance occurred at the mixed village of Alamirou on 14 September 1965. The National Guard occupied a house adjoining

the Turkish Cypriot sector, thereby provoking a threat by the local leader to evacuate all of Turkish Cypriot villagers to the nearby Turkish Cypriot village of Kophinou. The problem was resolved on 12 October, when the National Guard voluntarily withdrew from their new positions.

(vi) Incident at Kato Polemidhia

74. At 0930 hours on the morning of 25 September 1965, a group of Cyprus Police and armed National Guardsmen entered the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Kato Polemidhia in Limassol District, and began a search for arms.

75. The National Guardsmen and Cyprus Police caused some damage to the Turkish Cypriot premises in Kato Polemidhia and it was claimed by the Turkish Cypriots that considerable money and clothing was stolen. The National Guardsmen and Cyprus Police were also alleged to have fired three shots in the area. An UNFICYP investigation subsequently revealed that at least one shot was fired but there were no casualties. Three Turkish Cypriots were arrested by the Cyprus Police and seven weapons plus a quantity of ammunition were seized. The National Guardsmen and the Cyprus Police withdrew from Kato Polemidhia at 1030 hours the same morning.

76. Tension in the area quickly mounted and remained high for several days. The Turkish Cypriots threatened to take action elsewhere in the Island if necessary and insisted that they had the right to keep arms to defend themselves against Greek Cypriot attacks. UNFICYP intervened to keep the incident from escalating. The three arrested Turkish Cypriots were released - although one was rearrested eight weeks later. The Cyprus Police admitted that there had been some unavoidable damage of less than £C25 value but denied all the other charges. On 4 October, UNFICYP tried to arrange for the Government Assistant District Officer at Limassol to assess the damage done in Kato Polemidhia with a view to compensation, but the Turkish Cypriots would not permit this.

77. During the investigation of the incident by UNFICYP, it transpired that the local Government authorities had apparently received information that there was a large cache of arms in Kato Polemidhia and considered that quick and vigorous action was justified. No large quantity of arms was found, however. After UNFICYP

negotiation, the local authorities concerned agreed to inform UNFICYP before any action would be taken in the future to seize suspected arms dumps.

78. The situation in Kato Polemidhia has remained **calm** since 4 October.

(vii) Incidents at Pileri

79. On 24 September 1965, the National Guard reported that Turkish Cypriot fighters had built and occupied a new post 2,000 metres west of the village of Pileri and 1,000 metres west (i.e. forward) of their established defence line on the western edge of the Turkish Cypriot enclave north of Nicosia.

80. UNFICYP investigation revealed that the post was situated on a small, isolated hill at a point of no real tactical value but was clearly provocative by reason of its position in what had previously been a neutral area between the opposing forward defence lines.

81. The Turkish Cypriot contention that the position had previously been used as a listening post could not be accepted by UNFICYP as a justification for establishing a formal permanently manned post, and attempts were therefore made to persuade the Turkish Cypriots to vacate it.

82. Partial success was achieved when an agreement was reached under which the position would be reduced to a small observation post of two or three men. However, on the evening before the agreement was to be implemented (21 October), two mortar bombs, allegedly fired by the National Guard, exploded near the position, and since that time the Turkish Cypriots have refused to vacate or reduce the post in any way. Indeed, the post was subsequently reinforced with more men and further fortified.

83. The Force Commander requested the Vice-President's Office to intervene in order to avert the danger of a serious incident but no response has been forthcoming. The local Turkish Cypriot leader stated that he would not reduce the strength of the post because of the increased activity of the National Guard in the area and claimed he was supported in this attitude by his superiors.

84. There could be no doubt, however, that the reason for any increased activity by the National Guard was the continued refusal of the Turkish Cypriot leadership to vacate this provocative position. As a result, the situation was becoming increasingly tense.

85. The Force Commander visited the area on 18 November and met the local Turkish Cypriot leaders. He satisfied himself that UNFICYP's stand on the matter was fully justified. The Force Commander referred the problem again to the Vice-President, repeating UNFICYP's proposals, requesting him to adjust the Turkish Cypriot positions in order to avert an outbreak of fighting in this area. Between 18 November and 1 December 1965 there have been three outbreaks of shooting caused by the Turkish Cypriots.

(viii) Observance of the cease-fire

86. In general, there has been a decline in the number of shooting incidents in the Island. The Famagusta incident in November was the first of its kind in some twelve months.

87. The shooting incidents are summarized below; comparative figures from previous reports are also given. The changes of UNFICYP's zone and district boundaries during the period make somewhat difficult a breakdown of the incidents in the western part of the Island, but they do not, of course, affect the totals.

<u>Zone or District</u>	<u>11 June to 1 December 1965</u>	<u>8 March to 10 June 1965</u>	<u>9 December 1964 to 7 March 1965</u>	<u>9 September to 8 December 1964</u>	<u>9 June to 8 September 1964</u>
Nicosia Zone	17	89	97	124	191
Nicosia West District	3	Not operative during these periods			
Nicosia East District	3	Not operative during these periods			
Kyrenia Zone	10	Not operative during these periods			
Famagusta Zone	14	10	44	16	10
Limassol Zone	9	5	7	6	5
Paphos District	5	2	7	4	53 }
Morphou District	4	153	67	10	
Lefka District	3	Not operative during these periods			
TOTAL	69	259	222	160	259

88. Twenty-two of the shooting incidents, in the opinion of UNFICYP, constituted breaches of the cease-fire. This figure, covering a period of approximately six months, is only a little more than half the number of such breaches during the three-month period covered in the report of 10 June 1965 (S/6426, para. 92). Eleven of these occurred in Kyrenia Zone, six in Limassol Zone, two in Nicosia East District, and three in Famagusta Zone. Nine were attributed to the National Guard, and thirteen to the Turkish Cypriots.

89. The following casualties occurred during the period under review (the figures in parentheses are for the period covered by the report of 10 June 1965 (S/6426, para. 93)).

<u>Killed</u>	<u>Greek Cypriots</u>	<u>Turkish Cypriots</u>	<u>Total</u>
Deliberate	0 (3)	1 (1)	1 (4)
By accidental discharge of weapon	1 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)
<u>Total:</u>	1 (3)	2 (1)	3 (4)
<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Greek Cypriots</u>	<u>Turkish Cypriots</u>	<u>Total</u>
Deliberate	2 (3)	6 (0)	8 (3)
By accidental discharge of weapon	0 (0)	2 (0)	2 (0)
<u>Total:</u>	2 (3)	8 (0)	10 (3)

90. There have been no instances confirmed by UNFICYP observation, of unauthorized overflights of Cyprus by Turkish aircraft during the period covered by this report, but it was alleged by the Government that two Turkish F-84 aircraft violated Cyprus air space in a flight over the northern area of the Island on 8 September 1965.

C. Developments relating to the maintenance of law and order

(i) The work of UNCIVPOL

91. The United Nations Civilian Police have continued to carry out their duties as set out in previous reports (see, for example, S/6426, paras. 95 and 96). In addition, UNCIVPOL has undertaken the following new tasks: observation at Nicosia Airport of movement of Turkish Cypriots travelling to or from Turkey; marshalling and dispersal of UNFICYP convoys on the Kyrenia road and security of the Kyrenia

road during daylight, including control and security in the Turkish Cypriot villages of Geunyeli and Orta Keuy during convoy times (see para. 59 above); liaison with police stations in Nicosia in connexion with duties which in the past had been performed by military personnel of UNFICYP.

92. Between 11 June and 6 December 1965, UNCIVPOL conducted forty-four major investigations of incidents in which aspects of inter-communal strife appeared to be of significance, including twenty cases of homicide and attempted homicide, and seventeen cases of shooting from vehicles passing through villages. Inquiries were carried out concerning forty-three cases of damage to property, twenty-nine of which were at the expense of Turkish Cypriots and fourteen of Greek Cypriots. Observations were made in connexion with the arrest by the Cyprus Police of thirty-one Turkish Cypriots, and 160 seizures at Cyprus Police checkpoints of items belonging to Turkish Cypriots.

93. In conjunction with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the appropriate authorities, UNFICYP continued investigations to trace missing persons. A total of 210 Turkish Cypriots are still reported missing; this is an increase of two since my previous report (S/6426, para. 98). One of the two has been missing since 18 July 1965; the other had been reported missing on 24 March 1964, and later had wrongly been reported as having been located. As previously indicated (S/6426, para. 98), 41 Greek Cypriots, 3 British nationals and 1 German national are also missing. Efforts to trace these persons have been unavailing. Since my last report, 11 Greek Cypriots and 2 Arabs of British nationality were detained by Turkish Cypriots for varying periods; all were subsequently released.

(ii) Investigation of crime and inter-communal strife

94. The perpetrators of the murders of Mr. Costas Mishaolis, a Greek Cypriot, and Mr. Dervish Gavazoglou, a Turkish Cypriot, who were found murdered in a car on the Larraca road, thirteen miles from Nicosia, on 11 April 1965 (S/6426, paras. 99 to 101), have so far not been brought to justice. Further points connected with the investigation have, however, been followed up by UNCIVPOL, and all co-operation has been extended to the law enforcement bodies of the Cyprus Government.

95. As already stated (para. 92 above), UNCIVPOL conducted during the period under review additional investigations of crimes within the context of UNFICYP's mandate to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order.

96. On 15 July 1965, a Greek Cypriot named Kyrialos Savva Tsiattos was shot dead near the village of Mathiati, in Nicosia District. UNCIVPOL co-operated with the Cyprus Police in the investigation but the offender has not been arrested. The Cyprus Police have no access to the area where the alleged offender has moved, nor is there any Turkish Cypriot police element in that area.

97. On 8 August 1965, a Turkish Cypriot named Ismael Hussein was shot dead in the Turkish Cypriot village of Artemi, in Famagusta District. Shortly thereafter, the Cyprus Police arrested the alleged offender, a Turkish Cypriot, on a public road. The Police, however, were unable to proceed with the case in Court because they could not investigate the scene of the crime owing to its being situated in a Turkish Cypriot controlled area. UNCIVPOL co-operated with the Cyprus Police within the limits of UNFICYP's mandate.

98. On 17 August 1965, a Turkish Cypriot named Mehmet Kadir was shot dead at Chatos, a Turkish Cypriot village in Famagusta District; his assailant was said to be another Turkish Cypriot from the same village. Following this shooting, Turkish Cypriot elements in the Chatos area were reported to be "out of control" and efforts were made by the Turkish Cypriot leadership in Famagusta to have UNFICYP escort Turkish Cypriot police elements to the area. The Government objected to such escort. No arrest has been made in connexion with the crime.

99. On 19 August 1965, a Greek Cypriot named Kyriakos Solomou was shot dead near the mixed village of Gouphe, in Famagusta District. The Cyprus Police, accompanied by UNCIVPOL, investigated this murder but to date no arrest has been made. While it is not impossible that the murderer was a person from the village, it could well be that outsiders might have perpetrated the crime for their own purposes, thus upsetting the harmonious inter-communal relations prevailing in Gouphe. After the crime was committed there were certain problems concerning the villagers' own freedom of safe movement outside the immediate vicinity of Gouphe, and UNCIVPOL temporarily established a post in the area to improve the situation.

III. ACTIVITIES TOWARD A RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS

A. General assessment

100. In a previous report to the Council, I pointed out that "ultimate responsibility for a return to normal conditions in Cyprus must, obviously, rest primarily with the authorities and people of Cyprus themselves, since normality can come about only as a result of a determination by the two communities to lay down their arms and seek to live again in peace" (S/5671, para. 2). As indicated in chapters I and II of this report, arms have not been laid down; the map of the Island is still dotted with military posts and police checkpoints; the military confrontation persists; only a tenuous quiet prevails in the Island.

101. The efforts of UNFICYP towards a return to normal conditions, confronted with many difficulties, nevertheless continued unabated during the period under review. In the absence of progress towards a political settlement, the advance towards normalization has been modest, but by no means insignificant, especially in the economic sector. The state of the Island's economy, taken as a whole, is almost back to normal. There has been some easing of economic restrictions. Governmental subsidies on agricultural products are now being paid to Turkish and Greek Cypriots alike. There have been further improvements in local situations.

102. In other fields, such as freedom of movement of the population, the normalization of the public services, and the refugee problem, matters have remained at a standstill. In these, and other areas as well, UNFICYP could do no more than continue to carry out its day-to-day task of trying to mitigate all sorts of hardships arising from the division between the two communities and preventing the creation of new difficulties between them.

103. The efforts toward a return to normal conditions are hampered by the mistrust which continues to prevail between the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. In this connexion, it may be recalled that the Turkish Cypriot leadership reacted very strongly, at the end of July, to the enactment by the Cyprus Government of legislation extending the terms of office of the President of the Republic and the members of the House of Representatives and amending the electoral law. I drew the Security Council's attention, in my report of 29 July 1965 (S/6569), to the developments which took place in the Island at the time and the action taken by UNFICYP in this regard. The question was considered

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by the Council, which adopted on 10 August 1965 a resolution calling upon all parties, in conformity with its resolution of 4 March 1964, to avoid any action which was likely to worsen the situation.

104. Another example of the mistrust between the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leadership is the controversy arising from the declaration of intention made by the Government on 4 October 1965 regarding the measures it proposed to adopt with regard to "the rights and safeguards of the minorities in Cyprus" (A/6039). The Turkish Cypriot leadership quickly and strongly objected to this declaration of intention, which they alleged was an attempt by the Greek Cypriots to deprive the Turkish Cypriots of their constitutional rights (A/6052 and A/6053).

105. Thus, almost two years after the beginning of the disturbances, the stalemate remains although there is widespread in Cyprus a longing for a return to normal conditions.

B. Freedom of movement of the population

106. As indicated in my previous reports, UNFICYP has always sought the maximum degree of freedom of movement for the civilian population. It has done so in the belief that freedom of movement is the first prerequisite for a return to normal conditions in general. During the period under review, progress as regards freedom of movement has been very limited.

107. Since my report of 10 June 1965 (S/6426), UNFICYP has continued to operate convoys for Greek Cypriots between Nicosia and Kyrenia twice daily in each direction. Considering the large number of Greek Cypriots who make use of the convoy (see para. 57 above) and the fact that they have to pass through two populous Turkish Cypriot villages, there have been remarkably few incidents, and these have been mostly pranks committed by young people. One of the incidents occurred on 15 July 1965. The motor car of a foreign national using the Kyrenia road outside convoy hours, at night time, was struck by bullets fired by Turkish Cypriots when the driver apparently failed to notice signals to stop when approaching the Turkish Cypriot position on the crest of the Kyrenia pass. UNFICYP took appropriate steps with the Turkish Cypriot leadership to ensure that there would be no recurrence of such a serious incident.

108. In many areas, the extent of freedom of movement varies in keeping with the degree of tension generated by particular incidents. A distressing case occurred

on 5 December 1965, when a British woman travelling with her husband and two children in a private car escorted by UNFICYP through the village of Stavrokono was seriously wounded by shots wantonly fired by a Turkish Cypriot. Earlier in the day a Turkish Cypriot of that village had been killed in an exchange of fire with Greek Cypriots, while hunting.

109. The prohibition against the entry of Greek Cypriots into all areas completely under Turkish Cypriot control continues to be rigorously enforced. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has rejected almost all requests for such entry, even in cases where there could be no question of any risk to the security of the Turkish Cypriot community. The few Greek Cypriots who have inadvertently penetrated into Turkish Cypriot areas have usually been detained and interrogated closely for some time before being released to UNFICYP for return.

110. The measures adopted by Turkish Cypriot leaders to discourage members of their community from moving freely outside areas under their control (S/6424 para. 115) continue to be applied. The number of Turkish Cypriots living in those areas who have moved out of them without their leaders' authorization is relatively small. For some who have done so, the Government has asked for UNFICYP's good offices in arranging for the movement of their families and in some cases this has been achieved.

111. The Government has continued to allow Turkish Cypriots freedom of movement subject to identification and search, which it considers necessary in order to prevent the build-up of Turkish Cypriot fighter strength and control the movement of strategic materials into Turkish Cypriot areas. UNFICYP, however, regards the measures still being taken by Cyprus police as not likely, in general, to encourage persons living in the Turkish Cypriot areas to travel on roads outside their enclaves.

112. The number of Cyprus police checkpoints have not been significantly reduced during the period under review. Turkish Cypriot persons and vehicles wishing to enter or leave an area under Turkish Cypriot control are usually searched. Identity cards must be produced and if they do not bear a recent likeness of the holder, he is required to obtain a new one at once. Complaints by the Turkish Cypriot leadership that there is a deliberate policy of issuing some Turkish Cypriots new cards showing them to be "Greek", do not seem well-founded. The few cases in question appeared to be clerical errors that were promptly corrected when the mistakes were pointed out.

113. There have been many complaints by the Turkish Cypriot leadership concerning rudeness by Cyprus policemen, but in the context of the hundreds of searches that are carried out daily, they must be regarded as a relatively small number.

114. During the month of June 1965, the Cyprus Government began implementing a policy of prohibiting the return to Cyprus of Turkish Cypriot male students over the age of fifteen years who had been studying in Turkey. The Government asserted that it had information that such students were being given military training in Turkey to fit them as officers of the Turkish fighter forces in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot leadership denounced the prohibition as contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a flagrant breach of article 14 of the Cyprus Constitution, which laid down that "no citizen shall be banished or excluded from the Republic under any circumstances".

115. Turkish Cypriots of fighting age returning from Turkey after medical treatment have also been subjected to careful scrutiny by Government authorities. Most have been allowed to enter after varying periods of interrogation. In two of these cases there were complaints of violence during interrogation but the Cyprus police denied responsibility.

116. It will be recalled that one of UNFICYP's recommendations to the Government, in October 1964, was for measures to ensure "that Cypriots travelling on the Island should not be arbitrarily arrested or detained on charges relating to alleged past offences connected with the disturbances following the events of December 1963" (S/6102, annex II, para. 6). In his reply, President Makarios agreed "subject to minimum necessary checks to ensure that no transportation of arms takes place" (S/6102, annex III, page 2). During the period under review, ten Turkish Cypriots have been arrested at checkpoints for past or recent offences analogous to rebellion against the Government. In five cases the accused were found in possession of arms and ammunition, and in three cases they were identified as having participated in warlike acts in the past. There were two Turkish Cypriots who were arrested when found in possession of a large quantity of steel helmets bought from a Greek Cypriot, who subsequently was also arrested. One of the ten men arrested was discharged for lack of evidence; one was released from custody conditional on his leaving Cyprus; and a third was released on bail.

117. UNFICYP's good offices were solicited on a number of occasions on behalf of particular Turkish Cypriots who wanted to travel outside Turkish Cypriot areas, but the Cyprus police declined to say whether any charges were outstanding against

them. The Turkish Cypriots insist, on the other hand, that there is a "blacklist" of wanted persons to which police at checkpoints have ready access.

118. As a step towards a return to normal conditions and with a view to conserving manpower for more urgent duties, UNFICYP has discontinued the escort services that had regularly been provided for Turkish Cypriot doctors, lawyers and political leaders. It has relied, instead, on its military and civilian police posts along intended routes to check on safe passage after informing the Government in advance of the intended journey, especially to and from Limnitis and Kokkina. In August 1965, it stopped escorting the daily milk truck from Louroujina to the Turkish sector of Nicosia and during last October it ceased regular escorts for shipments of supplies to Kokkina, when Cyprus police discovered a large quantity of ammunition in a Turkish Cypriot lorry carrying relief goods. In general, the results of the new policy have been satisfactory, but UNFICYP has made it clear that it will review the policy if conditions dictate it. UNFICYP has continued to provide escort whenever there were special circumstances which increased the danger of interference, as in certain cases of farmers cultivating land or harvesting crops in sensitive areas.

C. Efforts to restore normal economic activities

(i) Introduction

119. I have pointed out in previous reports that as a result of the political disturbances not only did the rapid growth which the Cyprus economy experienced in the three-year period following independence (1961-63) come to a halt, but the trend was reversed. Official statistics relating to economic developments in Cyprus in 1964 indicate that the gross national product (GNP) declined by about 12 per cent, whereas in the preceding three years it had increased at the average annual rate of well over 7 per cent. Nevertheless, the economy of the Island held up well under the strain of the circumstances. Since the end of 1964, there have been many encouraging signs of revival in the economy of the Island taken as a whole. The question is whether the 1965 recovery will be of sufficient magnitude to bring the GNP back to its 1963 level.

120. The economic situation of the Turkish Cypriot community, on the other hand, continues to be bad for reasons I have already described (see, for instance, S/6426, para. 117). In spite of some positive elements during 1965, such as

increased agricultural production due to very favourable weather conditions, and a return to generally normal conditions in the sector of local and export markets (see paras. 133-137 below) the economy of the Turkish Cypriot community remains stagnant. The number of displaced persons is still estimated to be about 20,000 and the total number of persons in need of some assistance at least twice as large.

(ii) Economic restrictions

121. In accordance with its mandate to contribute to a return to normal conditions in Cyprus, UNFICYP has spared no effort in encouraging a relaxation of economic restrictions and in helping to restore normal economic activities. As regards the government list of restricted materials, i.e. of materials whose entry into Turkish Cypriot areas is prohibited, UNFICYP has repeatedly made suggestions for its liberalization (S/6102, paras. 70-75; S/6228, paras. 135-137; S/6426, paras. 118-120).

122. On 5 August 1965, my Special Representative in Cyprus addressed to the President of the Republic an aide-memoire on the question of restricted materials, recommending that items on the list having only marginal military significance should be de-restricted. UNFICYP stated that, without questioning the security considerations underlying the Government's policy in this matter, it found that the list contained a number of specific items, such as clothing, which, if de-restricted, were most unlikely to produce any significant effect on the military situation in Cyprus. At the same time, their de-restriction would meet legitimate civilian needs, reduce tension and contribute to a return to normal conditions. Furthermore, UNFICYP contended that there was another group of items, such as building materials, which, though of some military significance, could safely be released in quantities large enough to meet essential civilian needs, and UNFICYP suggested that this be done. Adequate measures could be taken with UNFICYP assistance to prevent stockpiling.

123. On 18 September, the President of the Republic replied that the Government had decided to remove the following items from the list of restricted materials: woollen materials (including knitting wool), mackintoshes (including plastic raincoats), gloves, socks, boots, boot-studs, leather laces, rubber soles, leather jackets, thermos flasks, fire-fighting devices, steel wool, circuit testers (galvanometers), imported coal (type used in blacksmiths' forges), sulphur,

ammonium nitrate, fuel in large quantities, and tyres. The removal of the last four items was conditional, however. Special arrangements were envisaged for sulphur and ammonium nitrate, to ensure that these items would not be used for military purposes; the past arrangements for the release of fuel (S/6102, paras. 72-75) would continue; and tyres would be issued only to duly licensed vehicles.

124. As a result of this government decision, which met in part UNFICYP's recommendations, the number of restricted items has been reduced from forty-three to thirty-one (including the four items only partially de-restricted). While several of the remaining items appear to have military significance, there are still a number of them that could be removed without materially affecting the military situation in the Island.

125. Among the thirty-one items still on the restricted list there are several building materials, such as cement, timber, stone, sand and gravel. Other building materials, although not on the list, in most cases continue to be denied to Turkish Cypriots (see paras. 127 and 128 below). The Turkish Cypriot leadership strongly urged UNFICYP to use its good offices to obtain the release of at least some quantities of building materials to be used strictly for the repair of private civilian premises and public buildings such as schools and hospitals, and also to build temporary accommodation for the refugees (on refugee housing, see paras. 161 and 162 below). On 25 October, the Government suggested that the Turkish Cypriot leadership should submit through UNFICYP a list showing, on an Island-wide basis the types and quantities of building materials needed, as well as how they would be used. On 28 October, the Turkish Cypriot leadership submitted estimates of the building materials required for dwelling houses and other premises owned by private individuals, for certain specified public buildings and for the construction of an annex to the Turkish General Hospital in Nicosia to house an X-ray unit. These estimates were promptly conveyed to the Government for its consideration. Up to the date of the writing of this report no reply has been received.

(iii) Movement of supplies

126. Supplies moving into Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas continue to be subjected to inspection by the Cyprus police at checkpoints. UNFICYP personnel have regularly observed the inspection process. On several occasions, UNFICYP discussed various aspects of this question with the competent government authorities, in an effort to expedite matters and facilitate the movement of supplies.

127. The Turkish Cypriots have continued to object to the presence of checkpoints and to the manner in which the inspections are carried out (frequent and minute searches, long delays, damage to goods, confiscation of certain goods, etc.). The Turkish Cypriot leadership has strongly complained that on many occasions goods which were not on the Government's list of restricted materials were nevertheless seized at police checkpoints. UNFICYP drew the Government's attention to this complaint and received assurances that corrective action would be taken.

128. As a result of UNFICYP's interventions, many of the seized items were subsequently released. Nevertheless, several items, including brick, tiles and other construction materials, have continued to be withheld from the Turkish Cypriots, in spite of the fact that they were not on the official list of prohibited materials. This practice has tended to undermine the value of the list as a guide to what may be brought into the Turkish Cypriot areas.

(iv) Agriculture

129. The overall situation in the sphere of agriculture continued to be satisfactory. There are very few crops for which the 1965 production was not substantially higher than in 1964. Harvesting took place under improved and safer conditions, and the number of complaints on either side concerning cases of illegal harvesting was limited.

130. The main problem has been that most of the Turkish Cypriot lands around the abandoned villages has remained unattended. In some areas, Turkish Cypriot fields were leased to Greek Cypriot farmers. The Government, for its part, made clear (23 August 1965) that it would take all necessary measures against those individuals who cultivated abandoned fields without the consent of the owner. This position of the central authorities should tend to encourage the further leasing of Turkish Cypriot abandoned lands. However, the Turkish Cypriot owners complain that, in the present situation, they are often forced to accept unduly low rents. In some cases, Greek Cypriot farmers have been denied access to their fields behind or near Turkish Cypriot defensive positions.

131. UNFICYP continued to provide assistance to farmers of both communities along the lines indicated in previous reports (see e.g. S/6426, paras. 125-127). The requests for assistance came mainly from sensitive areas, i.e. areas where Greek Cypriot villages or fields adjoin Turkish Cypriot villages or fields. At the request of farmers of either community, observation patrols were provided for such

operations as inspection of orchards, ploughing and sowing, cultivation, fertilizing, and harvesting.

132. The Turkish Cypriot co-operative societies were allowed by the Government to import several thousand tons of fertilizer, including 500 tons of nitrate fertilizer which will be distributed under UNFICYP supervision. The ploughing and sowing of wheat and barley in the Island was almost complete at the time of the writing of this report. In general, adequate quantities of gasoil and lubricants were released by the competent Government authorities for ploughing and sowing in the Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas. However, some difficulties were encountered with respect to the Turkish Cypriot enclave north of Nicosia, owing to the fact that the authorities took the position (see S/6426, para. 128) that the clearance for gas, oil and lubricants could be given only to licensed tractors, and the tractors could be licensed free of charge only after government officials had been allowed to inspect them in the villages. The Turkish Cypriots insist on inspection by their own qualified personnel; this is not acceptable to the Government.

(v) Local and export markets

133. Considerable progress has been made towards a return to normal conditions in this sector, since agreements were finally reached, with the assistance of UNFICYP, on the question of the Government's resuming the payment of a subsidy to Turkish Cypriots for their grain and vine products. This was possible thanks to the spirit of understanding and co-operation shown in the matter by both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leaders.

134. After protracted negotiations, in which UNFICYP representatives actively participated (see S/6426, para. 120), agreement was reached on 5 July 1965, on the sale of the 1965 Turkish Cypriot grain crop to the Government Grain Commission. Under this agreement, the Turkish Cypriot farmers were again to be paid subsidized prices for wheat and barley delivered to the Government Grain Commission, whereas in 1964 they had been obliged to sell their wheat and barley crops through commercial channels, at prices that were lower than the Government's subsidized prices.

135. Several obstacles had to be overcome before the grain agreement could be concluded. First, there was the question of clearing the liabilities of the Turkish Cypriot Co-Operative Societies in connexion with the 1963 crop, the last before the beginning of the disturbances (see S/5950, para. 168; S/6102, para. 84;

S/6228, para. 145). The Government authorities insisted that before the 1965 crop was accepted, the grain balances of the 1963 crop still due from the Turkish Cypriot Co-Operative Societies should be delivered to the Grain Commission, or their equivalent value paid in cash. It should be noted that in normal times, including 1963, the Government advanced money to the Co-Operative Societies before the grain was actually delivered to the stores of the Grain Commission. Secondly, the Government authorities asked that various outstanding debts of the Cyprus Turkish Co-Operative Central Bank, the Turkish Cypriot Co-Operative Societies and other organizations to the Government and to autonomous governmental bodies, should be settled in conjunction with the deliveries of the 1965 crop. Thirdly, there was the question whether the Turkish Cypriot Co-Operative Societies would be allowed to act as agents of the Grain Commission, as they had done in the past.

136. Ultimately, agreement was reached on the following basis: (a) The liabilities of the Turkish Cypriot Co-Operative Societies in connexion with the 1963 crop would be paid off either in cash or in grain at the official (subsidized) prices, before deliveries of the 1965 grain crop would be started; (b) 1965 grain would be accepted by the Grain Commission at the official prices, less 20 per cent, which would be retained by the Government and applied to the outstanding debts of the Cyprus Turkish Co-Operative Central Bank, etc.; (c) payment would be in cash against the delivery of grain, which could be made by Co-Operative Societies, other bodies, or individual farmers; (d) payment for grain deliveries made in the name of the Cyprus Turkish Co-Operative Central Bank would be made direct to the Bank. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot Co-Operative Societies were not re-appointed as agents of the Grain Commission for 1965.

137. The agreement outlined above was implemented smoothly and, as a result, a high percentage of the 1965 Turkish Cypriot grain crop was sold to the Grain Commission through the Cyprus Turkish Co-Operative Central Bank. Following the conclusion of the grain agreement, the Government responded positively to representations by UNFICYP concerning the payment of the subsidies on vine products (fresh grapes, raisins, raw alcohol) to Turkish Cypriots (see S/6102, para. 85). The Government indicated that (a) Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would receive exactly the same treatment; (b) the procedures for the payment of the subsidies would be simple and businesslike; and (c) the products would be inspected when actually delivered. At the time of the writing of this report, it appeared that at least in this sector of the economy normal practices had been restored.

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(vi) Industry

138. As pointed out in previous reports, one consequence of the disturbances in the Island has been the paralysis of several industrial plants in Nicosia and Kyrenia districts. The restrictions applied to the movement of persons and goods have prevented, almost without exception, the functioning of plants owned by members of one community but situated in a sector controlled by the other community.

139. Moreover, some Turkish Cypriot plants situated in the part of Nicosia controlled by the Turkish Cypriots have not been able to operate owing to the lack of raw materials that are still on the Government's list of restricted materials. This is the case, for instance, with the Cypro-Steelwool Company (S/6228, para 153) which uses steel wire as a raw material, an item that is still on the restricted list. The fact that steel wool itself has now been de-restricted (see para. 123 above), is a step that falls short of the desired goal as the re-activation of the plant is frustrated by lack of raw material.

140. The Turkish Cypriot limekilns in Ambelikou which have been idle for months (S/6426, para. 132) represent a different case altogether. There, the main obstacle to the resumption of normal activities is the military situation prevailing in the area.

141. UNFICYP has persisted in its endeavours to facilitate a return to normal conditions in the industrial sector and has discussed all the relevant aspects of the problem with the competent Government authorities and the Turkish Cypriot leadership. In the course of these contacts, the Government requested UNFICYP's good offices for the re-opening of the Greek Cypriot-owned plants in Turkish Cypriot areas. For their part, the Turkish Cypriot leaders intimated that they were desirous of re-opening idle Turkish Cypriot factories in Government controlled areas and elsewhere. UNFICYP then suggested that talks under its sponsorship should be held at the technical level between representatives of the two communities.

142. As this suggestion was accepted by both sides, technical talks began on 9 October 1965 in an atmosphere of reciprocal understanding and goodwill. At the outset, each side indicated the requirements which would have to be met in order to re-activate its own factories. There are indications that further meetings may be held in the near future.

D. Measures to assist refugees and other distressed persons

143. Basically, the refugee situation has remained unchanged. There are still some 20,000 Turkish Cypriot displaced persons who, to a large extent, depend on relief from abroad, chiefly from Turkey, for their subsistence. Their housing or other accommodation remains very deficient in many respects. As in the past, UNFICYP has continued to assist in humanitarian relief activities for the benefit of all displaced and other distressed persons. In spite of the increased efforts of the Government to promote the return of Turkish Cypriot displaced persons to their abandoned villages (see para. 157 below), the number of those who went back to their homes during the period under review was negligible.

(i) Red Crescent relief

144. As stated in a previous report (S/6426, paras. 135-138), the Government authorities confiscated over 5,000 pairs of boots and 4,000 pairs of woollen socks from the eighth Red Crescent shipment, which arrived at Famagusta on 3 December 1964, on the grounds that they could be of military value. After lengthy negotiations by the Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Cyprus - the official recipient of the Red Crescent supplies - the Government agreed to pay, as compensation for the confiscated items, £27,355.3.11, i.e. the amount requested by the Red Crescent Society of Turkey. On 1 October 1965, the Government paid this compensation to the International Committee of the Red Cross for transmittal to the Society.

145. The ninth Red Crescent shipment from Turkey, containing food, clothing and other supplies for Turkish Cypriots in need of assistance (S/6426, para. 143), which arrived at Famagusta port on 24 May 1965, was subsequently distributed all over the Island on the basis of a scheduled programme. UNFICYP supervised all aspects of the storage and distribution of these supplies. Transport from the ship to a central warehouse in Famagusta was provided by the Turkish Cypriots. UNFICYP then transported the supplies from the central warehouse to Zone and District warehouses. From there, the transport and distribution of supplies to the villages was managed by Turkish Cypriots, under the supervision of UNFICYP. A few items which had not been cleared by Customs because the competent authorities considered them to be of a military nature (S/6426, para. 143) were returned to Turkey on 20 August 1965.

146. On 3 September 1965, the Turkish Embassy in Cyprus informed UNFICYP that the Red Crescent Society of Turkey was preparing a tenth shipment of relief supplies for needy Turkish Cypriots, and that notification to this effect had been made to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus and to the delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Cyprus. The Embassy requested UNFICYP's good offices in facilitating the unhindered import of the Red Crescent supplies at an early date. The Supplies to be imported consisted of 874 tons of food, later reduced to 824 tons; 54 tons of soap and cleaning powder; 200,000 metres of woollen and cotton materials; 50,000 items of woollen and cotton underwear; 20,000 pairs of woollen socks; 75,000 items of clothing; 5,000 towels; 5,000 metres of tent material for camp beds; 27,000 pairs of men's, women's and children's shoes; 10,000 blankets; miscellaneous clothing (124 kg); and itemized quantities of drugs. As in the past, the International Committee of the Red Cross would be the recipient of the relief shipment.

147. On 13 September, the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations requested the Secretary-General to use his good offices to facilitate the import of the Red Crescent supplies duty-free and their unhindered distribution. A similar request was made by the Vice-President, Dr. Kuchuk, on 27 October.

148. By notes verbales of 8 and 25 October, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic informed the Turkish Embassy that, of the items and quantities indicated above, (a) some could be imported free of duty; (b) for others the Government would relinquish the import duties payable under the law; and (c) still others could be imported on payment of applicable customs duties. Under category (a) the following items would be allowed in free of duty: all the drugs, as per the itemized list, and 568 tons of food. Under category (b) the Government would relinquish import duties on 137 tons of food, 60,000 metres of woollen materials, the 50,000 items of woollen and cotton underwear, the 5,000 metres of material for camp beds, the 10,000 blankets, and 1,000 pairs of children's shoes. Under category (c), customs duty would have to be paid on the remaining 119 tons of food, the remaining 140,000 metres of woollen and cotton materials, the 75,000 items of clothing, the miscellaneous clothing (124 kilos), the 20,000 pairs of woollen socks, the 5,000 towels and 26,000 pairs of civilian shoes.

149. The Turkish Embassy in Cyprus informed UNFICYP that for the Government of Turkey it was a matter of principle that the Red Crescent supplies should be allowed to be imported in full, without the imposition of any duties; the refugees were in great need of all the supplies to be included in the shipment and, for

humanitarian reasons, they should be allowed to enter unimpeded. Therefore, it was to be hoped that, with UNFICYP's good offices, the request for the payment of duty would not be pressed.

150. The Government, however, took the position that the supplies to be included in the tenth Red Crescent shipment far exceeded in quantity and value those of previous shipments, and their duty-free import would not only mean the loss of a very substantial amount of revenue but also might adversely affect the Island's economy. The Government also observed that the affected items were available in sufficient quantities in Cyprus and could be purchased at the local market.

151. The Red Crescent shipment arrived from Turkey at Famagusta port on 15 November 1965, on the S.S. Mehmet Kaptanoglu, with the total consignment of food, clothing and medicines. Only the duty-free items, i.e. all the medicines, 705 tons of food, 60,000 metres of woollen materials, 50,000 items of woollen and cotton underwear, 5,000 metres of material for camp beds, 10,000 blankets, and 1,000 pairs of children's shoes were unloaded. The remainder of the shipment was returned to Turkey by the same ship, on 17 November, because customs would not clear them unless duty was paid. All the items unloaded were cleared by customs. On 1 December, UNFICYP began transporting the Red Crescent supplies from Famagusta to the various zone and district warehouses in the Island. From there, the distribution of supplies will be carried out by the Turkish Cypriots, under UNFICYP supervision.

(ii) Relief and commercial shipments to Kokkina

152. What is stated under this heading in a previous report (S/6426, para. 148) still applies: since the end of the fighting in Tylliria in August 1964, the situation at Kokkina has remained static. Although the Government forces have continued their close confrontation of the Turkish Cypriots there, violations of peace and tranquillity in the area are more or less at the same level as those prevailing elsewhere in the Island.

153. In spite of UNFICYP's suggestions to the Government regarding freedom of movement into, out of and through Kokkina (S/6426, para. 150), Kokkina has continued to be a restricted area to which freedom of movement of persons does not apply. The Turkish Cypriots, for their part, continue to prevent any traffic by Greek Cypriot civilians through the enclave.

154. As regards the flow of food and other supplies, the situation has improved following the Government's decision, on 10 June 1965 (S/6426, para. 151), that there would be no restrictions as to the quantities of foodstuffs to be allowed for the Turkish Cypriots living in the enclave, and that normal supplies, excluding materials which might be used for military purposes, would likewise be permitted to enter. Fortnightly Red Crescent relief shipments are still the main source of supply; in addition, there are weekly fruit and vegetable shipments from Limnitis. Since October 1965, UNFICYP has no longer been escorting these shipments (see para. 118 above) but members of UNFICYP continue to be present at checkpoints along the route to observe search procedures.

155. An auxiliary water system (S/6426, para. 151), consisting of a long pipe running along the main road of the village, with taps at regular intervals, was installed in Kokkina and has been operating since 11 June 1965. At the end of October, UNFICYP obtained from the competent Government authorities the release of additional piping for a second auxiliary system, which will run parallel to and approximately 150 yards south of the present pipe. All costs of purchase and construction will be borne by the Turkish Cypriots. At the end of November 1965, the Government released some cement, mortar and bricks for the construction of a new communal bakery at Kokkina; its construction will be supervised by UNFICYP.

(iii) Problem of resettlement of Turkish Cypriot refugees

156. There has been no substantial change in the general situation, as described in a previous report (S/6426, paras. 152-154).

157. On 23 September 1965, President Makarios made a statement on the question of the Turkish Cypriot refugee problem, in which he repeated that the problem had been created and existed only by design of the Turkish Cypriot armed leadership, which had forcibly compelled many Turkish Cypriots in the Island to abandon their villages and move into certain areas, where they were kept by force, in an attempt to create conditions favouring the partition of the Island. If the Turkish Cypriot leadership really wished to solve the problem, President Makarios said, the Government was prepared to provide concrete assistance as follows: (a) to repair or totally reconstruct all Turkish Cypriot houses which might have been damaged or destroyed in any village; (b) to give financial assistance for the rehabilitation of all the Turkish Cypriots who had been forced by their leadership to abandon their villages; (c) to provide them with the means for the exercise of their profession or vocation

and to assist them in finding work, as well as to give financial assistance to those who, owing to incapacity, were unable to work; and (d) to take all the necessary measures for their complete safety and protection.

158. The Turkish Cypriot leadership replied that the Turkish Cypriots would return to their homes only if the Government security forces - the National Guard and police - were withdrawn, and the areas concerned put under UNFICYP control. Priority should be given to important areas such as the Nicosia suburb of Omorphita, whose empty houses could accommodate thousands of their former occupants now in refugee camps.

159. UNFICYP conveyed the views of the Turkish Cypriot leadership to the Government, which replied that it had no objection in principle to the reoccupation by Turkish Cypriot displaced persons of their houses in Omorphita and elsewhere. However, the Government would have to remain responsible for the maintenance of law and order and there could be no question of the Government's relinquishing that **responsibility** in favour of UNFICYP.

160. After prolonged negotiations, twelve refugee families which had been removed from the Mansoura-Kokkina area in August 1964 (S/6426, para. 156), were allowed by the Government to return to their homes early in August 1965.

161. In September 1965, the Turkish Cypriot leadership drew UNFICYP's attention to the general question of housing for refugees. In a letter addressed to my Special Representative, dated 18 September 1965, the Acting President of the Turkish Communal Chamber stated that, in an endeavour to save the refugees from spending a third winter in poor, uncomfortable, unhygienic, and often crowded shelters of all kinds, a building scheme had been prepared for providing the refugee families with improved accommodations in the area where they were now living, and that a great part of the materials for the scheme would be provided by the Turkish Government. However, as building materials were denied to the Turkish Cypriots, the good offices of UNFICYP were requested with a view to the lifting of the ban imposed by the Government of Cyprus on the shipment of such materials. The Acting President of the Turkish Communal Chamber added that UNFICYP supervision would be accepted in order to ensure that the building materials required for the housing scheme would be used solely for the purpose for which they were intended.

162. The question of supplying the Turkish Cypriots with building materials for improving the accommodations of the refugees has repeatedly been taken up by UNFICYP with the highest authorities of the Republic, both as part of the general problem of the maintenance, repair and construction of houses and buildings in Turkish Cypriot

areas (see para. 125 above) and as a separate and special problem. Whatever the approach to the problem, the Government has not approved the release of building materials for the refugees, since the Government favours the return of refugees to their old homes and is frankly opposed to their settling on a permanent basis in the places where they now live.

E. Normalization of the public services

(i) Postal services

163. Despite the good offices of UNFICYP, the situation has remained as described in a previous report (S/6426, paras. 157-159) and a substantial number of Turkish Cypriots, in particular in Nicosia and Lefka, continue to be deprived of postal facilities.

164. The Government takes the position that the non-existence of house-to-house delivery of correspondence in the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia is not attributable to the refusal of the postal authorities to deliver the mail intended for the Turkish Cypriots, but to the non-co-operation of the Turkish Cypriot leaders, who did not allow the free circulation of postmen to effect the delivery of mail.

165. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, for its part, has drawn attention to the existing postal arrangements at Larnaca, where two or three times weekly Turkish Cypriots who had been employees of the postal service in December 1963, come to the Government's Post Office and pick up mail for distribution in the Turkish Cypriot quarter of the town, and it proposed that a similar system be applied in Nicosia. The Government considers, however, that conditions obtaining in Larnaca are different from those in Nicosia and that accordingly the Larnaca arrangements cannot be applied in Nicosia.

(ii) Payment of social insurance benefits

166. As stated in previous reports (S/5950, paras. 117-122, and S/6426, paras. 160-164), only a limited number of Turkish Cypriots have been receiving old-age pensions, widows' pensions and other benefits under relevant social insurance laws.

167. The Minister of Labour and Social Insurance had indicated on 31 May 1965 that payments to pre-1964 beneficiaries could be resumed, provided that the Turkish Cypriot leadership agreed to facilitate occasional visits of their areas by social insurance inspectors under UNFICYP escort, but without advance notice, so as to verify entitlements (S/6426, para. 162).

168. The Turkish Cypriot leadership replied to these proposals in August 1965. It felt that the verification required should be carried out on the basis of documentary evidence rather than by on-the-spot inspection and made some counter-proposals with respect to verification procedures.

169. These envisaged that the Government's insurance officers would send to each beneficiary letters of inquiry and pro forma life certificates for certification by the mukhtar; the documents would subsequently be verified by Turkish Cypriots who had been employees of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance in December 1963. If the documents so certified and verified were deemed unacceptable by the Ministry, they could then be referred either to UNFICYP or the International Committee of the Red Cross for verification.

170. The counter-proposals were not acceptable to the Minister of Labour and Social Insurance, who maintained his stand on the powers of his inspectors. However, in order to avoid penalizing old and infirm persons for reasons relating to the present inter-communal situation, he was prepared to consider favourably the resumption of payments to Turkish Cypriot beneficiaries who had been entitled to benefits prior to the outbreak of the disturbances, provided such beneficiaries would apply in person to the competent Government offices; on-the-spot inspections might be dispensed with in cases in which the Ministry might have sufficient information on file and could obtain additional details while interviewing the applicants. The Turkish Cypriot leadership is considering the Minister's new suggestion.

(iii) Public utilities

171. Throughout the period under review there was no great change in the situation as described in previous reports (S/6102, paras. 90 and 91; S/6228, paras. 171-173). Electricity and water continued to be supplied regularly to all quarters and whenever necessary UNFICYP helped to remove difficulties that arose mainly as a result of lack of communication between the two communities.

172. An auxiliary water supply system for Kokkina was constructed under UNFICYP supervision in June 1965 (see para. 155 above). Several cases in which the water supply to either Greek or Turkish Cypriot localities was interrupted were investigated by UNFICYP which then helped to eliminate the causes of the stoppage.

173. At the request of the competent Government authorities, UNFICYP used its good offices with the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reduce the consumption of city water

during the summer months in the Turkish Cypriot controlled areas of Nicosia. The leadership readily co-operated by encouraging the population to use well-water as much as possible. It announced that it would introduce a system of water rates; the funds collected would be credited to a special "frozen" account, as in the case of electricity (S/6102, para. 90).

174. On 12 September 1965, representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community in Larnaca complained that its water supply had been cut off. The cause was found to be a faulty pump and the supply was completely restored by 16 September. The stoppage revived a dispute over the ownership of the Larnaca water system: the Turkish Cypriots maintained that it belonged to Evkaf, the Turkish Cypriot religious trust, and that the local authorities were administering it illegally (S/6102, para. 91).

175. Water and electricity bills of Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia and in a few other places remained unsettled. According to Government authorities, the Turkish Cypriots were already £156,000 in arrears to the Electricity Authority alone, up to September 1965, even if consumption were to be reckoned at the lowest possible rate.

(iv) Problem of public revenue

176. There have been further exchanges of views between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership concerning a number of financial claims and counter claims (S/6228, paras. 174 to 176).

177. On 16 September 1965, in a letter addressed to my Special Representative, the Government re-stated its position on two questions: (a) the question of the annual grant of £400,000 to the Turkish Communal Chamber envisaged by article 88 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, which was withheld by the Government in 1964 and 1965; (b) sums claimed by Evkaf, the Turkish Cypriot religious trust, vis-a-vis the Government. As regards the question of the annual grant, the Government stated that, in view of the subversive actions promoted by a section of the Turkish Cypriot population, including the persons running the affairs of the Turkish Communal Chamber, the constitutional prerequisites for the grant have ceased to exist. Moreover, if the grant were to be paid, it would not be used for the purposes for which it was originally intended but would be diverted to support insurrectional activities. With regard to the claims of Evkaf, the Government held that as long as Evkaf was indebted either to the Government or the Loan

Commissioners, and Evkaf was for any reason unable or unwilling to meet such liabilities, the Government was entitled to withhold the payment of any amounts due Evkaf, pending a clarification of the situation and subject to any adjustments that might become necessary as a result of negotiations between the two parties.

178. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, having been informed by UNFICYP of these views of the Government, replied on 1 October that the position of the Turkish Cypriot community had always been the preservation of its rights under the Constitution and the implementation and enforcement of the Constitution and laws of the land. In the circumstances, (i) the allegation that the Turkish Cypriot community has been acting against the State, and (ii) the contention that, as a consequence, the constitutional prerequisites for the annual grant had ceased to exist were groundless. Furthermore, as the cost of maintaining and running the Turkish Cypriot schools in the Island was well over the annual subsidy of \$400,000 provided in the Constitution and as the Turkish Cypriot schools continued to function, any allegation that the subsidy could be diverted to support the struggle of the Turkish Cypriots had no substance. With regard to the claims of Evkaf, the Turkish Cypriot leadership stated that Evkaf had never denied its contractual obligations and was ready to meet them, if its claims were satisfied.

179. In that connexion, the Government asserted on 1 November that Evkaf owed instalments which had fallen due and the total amount of those instalments was far in excess of the claims of Evkaf, hence there was at present no valid reason for making any payment to Evkaf.

(v) Land records

180. There has been practically no change in the abnormal situation prevailing in Nicosia District with respect to land transactions. Despite continued efforts by UNFICYP to find a formula acceptable to both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership that would permit the Nicosia land records to be used pending a general solution of the Cyprus problem, the deadlock described in my report of 11 March 1965 (S/6228, paras. 186-191) continues to cause great hardship to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots wishing to buy, sell or mortgage immovable property. The adverse effects of this situation on the building industry and the economy as a whole are substantial.

181. Approximately 10,000 cases have accumulated at the new District Lands Office - situated in the Greek Cypriot sector of Nicosia - that require reference to, or registration in, the land records still reposing in the strong-room of the old office in the Turkish Cypriot sector. Similarly, approximately 2,000 land transactions in the Turkish Cypriot sector have not been completed because under the law they would not be valid unless registered and approved at the new District Lands Office.

182. Competent Government authorities again suggested as a temporary solution that a new strong-room be established at a convenient place on the "green line" where the land records could gradually be brought up to date by a combined Greek and Turkish Cypriot staff. Thereafter, they would remain in the new strong-room under UNFICYP control. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, however, continued in the opinion that the Greek Cypriots would not permit the return of the books to the Ataturk Square strong-room in the event of UNFICYP's withdrawal from Cyprus before a general political solution is reached. It insisted that there would be no problem if the Turkish Cypriot staff of the District Lands Office were reinstated and asked by telephone or through a messenger service to do all the necessary work on the records in the old office at Ataturk Square (S/5950, para. 112 and S/6228, para. 189). To this, the Government authorities replied that they could have no confidence in an arrangement that could be terminated at any moment for political reasons or that left the records in a place under the control of the Turkish Cypriot leadership where they might be tampered with.

183. UNFICYP has from time to time made suggestions aimed at a compromise that would still meet the basic objections of both parties. So far, neither side has agreed to modify its stated position. In the meantime, UNFICYP continues to provide its good offices in obtaining search certificates and copies of registration certificates from the office in Ataturk Square for Greek Cypriots who request them (S/6228, para. 190).

184. In October 1965, for the first time in over six months, the Turkish Cypriots agreed to permit Greek Cypriot staff to examine, at UNFICYP offices on the "green line", the land records required for a small number of cases involving foreign nationals and to record the relevant transactions. While such a gesture could not be regarded as a significant development in itself, it offered Government officers an opportunity to examine random samples of the land records; they confirmed that

the records were in good order. UNFICYP is hopeful that this, in conjunction with the fact that all facilities continue to be extended to Turkish Cypriots at the normally functioning District Land Office outside Nicosia, may help to promote the confidence necessary on both sides to permit at least some kind of interim solution to the land records problem to be found.

185. In the view of the Government, such a solution cannot be delayed much longer. The steady accumulation of pending cases is having an increasingly negative influence on economic activity, and in mid-November the Government indicated that it intended to enact amendments to the relevant land-registry laws that would provide a legal basis for transactions in Nicosia District.

F. The functioning of the law courts and the administration of justice

186. During the period under review, the situation regarding the judiciary has remained as described in my last two reports to the Council (S/6426, paras. 171-174 and S/6228, paras. 192-202). Judges of both communities have continued to attend the courts, but individual Turkish Cypriots have not made use of the courts and have not been available for litigation. The practical difficulties in the way of return to a normal administration of justice, in particular with regard to the investigation of crime, remain the same as before. In Turkish Cypriot controlled areas, there still appear to be instances of ad hoc judicial proceedings outside the normal system of courts of the Republic (S/6228, para. 203).

187. It will be recalled from my previous report (S/6426, para. 172), that some Turkish Cypriots detained pending trial for offences alleged to have been committed by them in connexion with the inter-communal disturbances of 1963-64 had appealed to the Government for permission to go abroad. On 6 October 1965, three of these detainees were released and left Cyprus the same day.

188. During the period under review, a number of Turkish Cypriots found to be in possession of military supplies have been arrested on charges of preparing war against the Government (see para. 116 above). The number of Turkish Cypriots at present in custody awaiting trial for offences allegedly connected with the inter-communal disturbances is twelve. In addition, there are twenty-nine other Turkish Cypriots in prison serving sentences in relation to serious offences unconnected with these disturbances.

189. Since 24 September, after certain technical objections had been overcome in the course of long negotiations through UNFICYP, a Turkish Cypriot priest, the Hoja, has been visiting the Central Prison weekly, unescorted, in order to minister to the needs of detained and imprisoned members of his community. The police are showing him every courtesy and he makes his weekly journey from the Turkish sector of Nicosia without any interference.

190. The Government has also facilitated the travels about the Island of a Turkish Cypriot family court judge who adjudicates on disputes and applications arising from matrimonial and allied subjects based on Islamic Law. While this official, having not been appointed by the Government, does not enjoy the immunity from search conferred on the judges of the Republic (S/6426, para. 175), he has been accorded every facility and has been able to perform his duties unhindered. At the request of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, conveyed through UNFICYP, the Government has authorized him to proceed to Kokkina, together with his registrar.

191. The Turkish leadership has continued to complain that the manner in which property belonging to members of their community, and in particular to Evkaf, the Turkish Cypriot religious trust, has been taken over by the authorities of the Republic for the execution of public works, amounted to a denial of justice (S/6228, para. 205 and S/6426, para. 175). This is disputed by the Government. UNFICYP has continued to use its good offices to explore the facts of each case and, where appropriate, to draw the attention of the Government authorities to the complaints of the Turkish Cypriot community, as well as to all other relevant aspects of the question. As to the specific cases previously reported to the Council (S/6426, para. 175), no settlement of these cases has taken place although work on the properties taken over has continued. Attempts by the local authorities in Nicosia to discuss with Turkish Cypriot representatives the general question of protection and maintenance of Evkaf property situated in Government-controlled areas have so far been unproductive; and UNFICYP has been informed that Evkaf is not interested in either selling or leasing any property in Government-controlled areas. An offer by UNFICYP to arrange for a representative of Evkaf to inspect Evkaf property outside areas under Turkish Cypriot control has so far not been acted on.

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

192. Subsequent to the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution 206 (1965) on 15 June 1965, which extended the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force established under the Security Council's resolution of 4 March 1964 for an additional period of six months ending 26 December 1965, in my reports S/6702 of 23 September and S/6954 of 19 November 1965, I informed the Council (a) of the cost estimates for maintaining the Force to 26 December 1965, (b) of the financial pledges or payments made to support the Force to the end of its present mandate, and (c) of the deficit between the estimated costs to the Organization of continuing the Force to 26 December 1965 under existing commitments and the amount of financial support pledged for the maintenance of the Force up to that date.

193. In view of the wide gap between the estimated costs of maintaining the Force and the pledges of financial support for its maintenance, I addressed letters on 28 October and 2 November 1965 to all Member States, and to those non-Member States that had previously made pledges of financial support for the Force, urging them to make additional voluntary contributions. The texts of these letters were reproduced in document S/6863.

194. My report of 19 November 1965 indicated that the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force from its inception on 27 March 1964 until 26 December 1965, under present arrangements and previous commitments to Governments providing contingents to the Force, were estimated to total \$41.5 million and that the amount pledged to the UNFICYP Special Account in respect of the same twenty-one month period then totalled approximately \$34.6 million.

195. Since 19 November 1965 there has been no change in the estimated costs of maintaining the Force to the end of its present mandate, and only one additional pledge and payment of \$1,000 has been received, that being from a non-Member State.

196. As my repeated efforts to obtain voluntary contributions to cover past expenses and present commitments have resulted this year in steadily diminishing returns, I feel that I must repeat the observation which was first made in my report to the Security Council in June 1964 (S/5764), that the method of financing the Cyprus Force as defined in the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964 has proved to be unsatisfactory.

197. The failure to date to obtain sufficient voluntary contributions to finance the costs of the Force to the end of its present mandate is a matter of grave concern to me and to the Governments which have provided men, material and services to the Force on the understanding that they would be reimbursed by the Organization for such of their extra costs that they cannot bear at their own expense. Recently, the Permanent Representatives of a number of Governments providing contingents to the Force have formally reminded me of the conditions under which their Governments had agreed to participate in the Force and I deem it to be my duty to inform them in time whether the United Nations will be in a position to reimburse them for the extra costs their Governments cannot absorb on their own account.

198. Nevertheless, if the Security Council decides to extend the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus for an additional six-month period beginning 27 December 1965 and ending 26 June 1966, it is estimated that the additional costs to the Organization under existing reimbursement commitments would be approximately \$11.2 million.

199. The above estimate is based on the assumption that the military strength of the Force is to be reduced by approximately 740 officers and other ranks in the latter half of January 1966. This is in addition to the reduction of 556 already absorbed in July and October, 1965.

200. The estimated cost to the Organization of financing UNFICYP from its inception to 26 June 1966 would exceed by \$18.1 million the amount of voluntary contribution pledged or paid thus far for its support.

V. MEDIATION EFFORT

201. In paragraph 7 of its resolution of 4 March 1964, the Security Council recommended that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, a mediator, "who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security." The resolution also required the Mediator to report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts.

202. As indicated in my report on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus for the period 11 March to 10 June (S/6426 and Corr.1), the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus, Mr. Galo Plaza, submitted to me on 26 March 1965 a report on his activities to that date (S/6255 and Corr.1), which was transmitted to the members of the Security Council as well as to the parties referred to in the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964. Four of the parties concerned conveyed to me their observations on the Mediator's report, which were also transmitted to the Members of the Council (S/6267 and Add.1, S/6275 and Add.1, S/6279 and S/6280). Subsequently, the Mediator's report was circulated as a General Assembly document (A/6017) at the request of the Permanent Representative of Cyprus.

203. In their observations, two of the parties concerned, the Government of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community through its leadership, objected to certain sections of the Mediator's report, and the Government of Turkey expressed the view that, because the report contained sections which went beyond his terms of reference, Mr. Plaza's functions as a Mediator had come to an end upon the publication of his report. I could not accept this view, as reported in S/6267.

204. In these circumstances the Mediator has been unable to function, and consequently the search for a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem has been at a standstill. However, at my request, the Mediator has continued to be available to the parties for further efforts of mediation, in accordance with the provisions of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964.

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VI. OBSERVATIONS

205. The decision which must now be taken as to the peace-keeping role of the United Nations in Cyprus after the 26th of December of this year marks a crucial stage in the Organization's peace efforts in that Island. It has become something of a pattern in United Nations peace-keeping operations that although they are launched in the expectation that as emergency measures they will be of short duration, the harsh realities of the conflict situations in which they become involved quite often require them to be prolonged, more or less indefinitely.

206. The Cyprus operation now tends to conform to this pattern. The United Nations peace-keeping presence was established on 17 January 1964, when the Secretary-General's first Personal Representative arrived there. The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus became operational on 27 March 1964, in response to the Security Council resolution (S/5575-S/RES/186 (1964)) which recommended its stationing there "for a period of three months". It is not possible at this stage to make a realistic estimate of how much longer the Force may be needed in Cyprus to forestall a resumption of the bitter inter-communal war and its possible escalation into an international war. Thus, the question of the United Nations peace-keeping efforts in Cyprus begins to assume the dimensions of a dilemma for the Organization - indeed, several dilemmas.

207. The Force is needed in Cyprus. It may be no exaggeration to say that it has become almost indispensable for the time being. On the other hand, it would seem clear that it cannot be kept there indefinitely; possibly not even for very much longer. Financial stringencies alone would probably dictate this, although there are other considerations which would make such a prolongation undesirable - one of the latter being that over-reliance on the United Nations to prevent recourse to armed force and even to help maintain the status quo could be a factor in reducing the sense of urgency of the contending parties about seeking solutions for the underlying differences that caused the eruption of violence in the first place.

208. It is very much to the credit of the United Nations that the presence of its Force in Cyprus has brought a large measure of quiet to the Island. There is a striking contrast between conditions there in March 1964 and today. Armed Greek and Turkish Cypriots, civilian and military alike, are no longer shooting at each other across barricaded streets, from sandbag emplacements in gardens, windows and on rooftops; political kidnappings have virtually ended; belligerent searchings and other harassments on the roads have greatly diminished; economic life has been

restored in substantial degree; freedom of movement for persons and goods, though slowly, is being regained. External threats have become less frequent. But these are only surface manifestations. All of the causes of the conflict that broke out in December 1963 persist and are little, if at all, diminished - the diametrically opposed aspirations of the leaders of the two communities, the hatreds, the suspicions; the emotions; and the arms. And in some localities, the two communities continue to be as separated physically as they have been from the advent of hostilities. Overt warfare has been halted. But no one doubts that it could readily start up again with minor provocation. In a number of places, military elements of the two sides directly confront each other at dangerously close range. Tension goes up and down with specific events but never fails to mount quickly and menacingly in response to the slightest cause. The recent deplorable events at Famagusta demonstrated tragically how easily war could return, how inflammable are the relations between the two communities.

209. In view of prevailing conditions in the Island, all parties are agreed that the continuation of the United Nations Force there is necessary, without, however, indicating for how much longer.

210. Likewise, unhappily, there is no satisfactory answer as to how the Force, if continued in Cyprus, is to be paid for. There is already, as the Council knows from my Report of 19 November (S/6954), a very large deficit that must be made up. New sums in substantial amount would be needed to meet the cost of the Force for the period of its extension after 26 December, if such a decision is taken. Without adequate financial support, obviously, the Force cannot be maintained in Cyprus. In any case, it is to be reduced by some 740 officers and other ranks from its existing strength.

211. During the period of almost two years of United Nations activity in Cyprus, while a fragile quiet has been brought to the Island, making again possible some measure of normal existence for its people, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, no significant progress toward a solution of the basic conflict between the two communities has been registered. This can only be regarded as disappointing. The presence of the United Nations Force has beyond doubt saved many Cypriot lives; it has bought time and provided a climate of relative quiet in which a peaceful solution might be sought and found. But that effort has been in vain thus far. There is a pervasive fear that if the United Nations Force should be withdrawn, internecine strife would soon again engulf the Cypriots.

212. The Cyprus experience, of course, is by no means unique in this regard. The United Nations has learned from other experiences that time and even relative quiet alone do not necessarily in themselves induce or promote solutions of basic conflict situations. Persistent, determined effort is imperative on the part of the United Nations. But most of all, it is the parties themselves who have to show the necessary willingness to find an honourable and just solution.

213. It needs to be said of Cyprus, in full frankness, I believe, that it remains still to be demonstrated that there is a genuine will to peace among the leaders of the two communities of sufficient earnestness and intensity to lead them toward those mutual accommodations in viewpoint and position which are essential to pacific settlement. The international community can only help and assist. The key to a settlement, however, lies in the last analysis, with the parties. Unless they are prepared to move towards resolving their basic differences, the prospects of an early solution are dim indeed. It is not without significance that fruitful negotiations on agreements covering local situations in Cyprus, such as that recently achieved at Famagusta, have usually come on the heels of serious fighting.

214. The financial situation affecting the operation in Cyprus can only be described as acute. As I have indicated in my report to the Council of 19 November 1965 (S/6954), the voluntary contribution method of financing the Force provided for in the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964 (S/5575), has failed by far to provide adequate revenue. The Force has been supported up to now by the generosity of a relatively small number of Governments. This generosity from the same sources cannot be expected to continue indefinitely. Some of the donors have already begun to manifest reluctance and some have warned that their contributions in the future may depend upon evidence of an earnest attack on the causes of conflict and progress towards a solution.

215. Obviously, the ranks of the contributors should be considerably broadened. There is, to be sure, no legal obligation on any Member Government to make a voluntary contribution, but since the action was taken by unanimous vote of the Security Council, there is a moral obligation on all members, particularly on the members of the Security Council itself, and more especially on the parties directly concerned.

216. A political impasse has paralysed the mediation effort and present indications are that it cannot be easily broken. Yet, it must be clear that mediation in some

form offers the main hope for a breakthrough to future harmony and tranquility in that troubled isle.

217. My Special Representative, Mr. Carlos Bernardes, and the Commander of the Force in Cyprus, General K.S. Thimayya, all members of that Force, and all of the civilian personnel engaged in the mission are to be highly commended for their contributions to the remarkable success of the United Nations Operation in Cyprus. They have shown dedication, skill and courage in carrying out the functions of this quite unique operation.

218. It is my considered view that the Force in Cyprus should be extended after 26 December, preferably for a period of six months, but also that assurances of the necessary financial support to sustain it should be forthcoming in advance of a decision to extend the Force.

