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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 11 June to 5 December 1966)

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INTRODUCTION

1. This report on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus covers developments from 11 June to 5 December 1966 and brings up to date the record of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to the mandate laid down in the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Council relating to Cyprus.
2. During the period under review the military situation as regards positions and strength has remained relatively stable. The truce, though often disturbed by shooting incidents and work on fortified positions, has been generally observed.

I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

A. Composition and deployment

5. Near the end of the period covered by my last report, the strength of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was 4,687 military personnel and 174 civilian police (S/7550, para. 3). On 5 December 1966, the composition of the Force was as follows:

<u>Military</u>			<u>Total</u>
Austria	- Field Hospital		49
Canada	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	66	
	- Battalion and reconnaissance squadron	700	
	- Contingent HQ and administrative support group	<u>110</u>	876
Denmark	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	29	
	- Battalion	<u>644</u>	673
Finland	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	22	
	- Battalion	<u>586</u>	608
Ireland	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	15	
	- Battalion	<u>505</u>	520
Sweden	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	16	
	- Battalion	<u>602</u>	618
United Kingdom	- HQ UNFICYP and Military Police	153	
	- Battalion and reconnaissance squadron	736	
	- Helicopter support	39	
	- UNFICYP logistic support units	<u>164</u>	<u>1,092</u>
Total military personnel:			4,436

<u>Civilian Police</u>	<u>Total</u>
Australia	40
Austria	34
Denmark	40
New Zealand	20
Sweden	40
<u>Total Civilian Police:</u>	<u>174</u>
<u>TOTAL UNFICYP:</u>	<u>4,610</u>

4. The following changes took place during the period of this report:

Rotations

(a) Canada: A rotation between 2 and 13 October 1966 involved 831 all ranks. At the same time there was a reduction in strength of 106 all ranks.

(b) Denmark: A rotation between 9 and 24 November 1966 involved 309 all ranks.

(c) Finland: A rotation between 27 and 29 June 1966 and between 23 and 30 September involved 519 all ranks.

(d) Ireland: A rotation between 28 September and 12 October 1966 involved 515 all ranks.

(e) Sweden: There was a reduction in strength between 6 July and 17 August 1966 of 138 all ranks. A rotation between 24 and 29 October 1966 involved 550 all ranks.

(f) United Kingdom: A rotation between 25 October and 6 November 1966 involved 570 all ranks.

5. The Force continues to be deployed as follows (see attached map):

HQ UNFICYP, including HQ UNKIVPOL: international

Nicosia West District

Danish Contingent

Danish Civilian Police

Austrian Civilian Police

Nicosia East District

Finnish Contingent
Austrian Civilian Police

Famagusta Zone

Swedish Contingent
Swedish Civilian Police

Limassol Zone

British Contingent
New Zealand Civilian Police
Australian Civilian Police

Lefka District

Irish Contingent
Australian Civilian Police

Kyrenia District

Canadian Contingent
Danish Civilian Police

6. The Force remains under the command of Major-General A.E. Martola.
Mr. C.A. Bernardes continues as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus.

B. Function and guiding principles

7. The function of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus was defined by the Security Council, in its resolution of 4 March 1964, in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions".

8. That resolution was reaffirmed by the Council in its subsequent resolutions of 13 March, 20 June, 9 August, 25 September and 18 December 1964, 19 March, 15 June, 10 August and 17 December 1965, 16 March 1966, and in its resolution of 16 June 1966.

9. The guiding principles governing the operation of the Force, as summarized in my report of 10 September 1964 (S/5950, para. 7), remain in effect. The duties of the civilian police element of the Force are outlined in my report of 2 May 1964 (S/5679, para. 4).

10. The Political Liaison Committee meets regularly to deal with the problems of implementation of the mandate and questions involving relationships between the Government and the Turkish Cypriot community. The UNFICYP Deputy Chief of Staff, the Senior Political and Legal Adviser and his staff, and the Police Adviser have continued to meet in the Committee separately with Liaison Officers representing the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

11. Between 10 June and 5 December 1966 the Committee held twenty-four meetings with the Government Political Liaison Officer and twenty-four with the Turkish Cypriot Political Liaison Officer.

Casualties and discipline

12. During the period of this report, UNFICYP suffered no casualties as a result of intercommunal incidents. However, eight men died from various causes and twenty-seven men were admitted to hospital as a result of traffic accidents.

13. In November 1966 UNFICYP authorities apprehended five soldiers of the Force who had attempted to transport a load of explosives handed over to them by certain Turkish Cypriot personnel of Micosia for delivery to a Turkish Cypriot village in the Iefka district. The Force Commander ordered an immediate investigation, as a result of which the five men were repatriated in custody for appropriate action by their national authorities. The Government of Cyprus was promptly and fully informed. A communication was sent by the Commander to the office of the Vice-President drawing attention to the incident, pointing out that it was not the first time that attempts had been made by certain Turkish Cypriots to suborn UNFICYP soldiers, and requesting the Turkish Cypriot leadership to take every possible step to ensure that such grave malpractices by personnel under their control were not repeated.

14. This incident is an isolated one. The discipline, understanding and bearing of the officers and men of the United Nations Force continue to be of a high order.

C. Relations with the Government and with the
Turkish Cypriot leadership

15. UNFICYP has continued to maintain close liaison at all levels with both the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

16. Negotiation and good offices are still proving to be the methods of dissuading one side or the other from taking action which might have serious consequences for the peace and tranquillity of the island. Cases still occur, however, where measures are taken by one side or the other either without prior consultation with UNFICYP, or in disregard of its advice. This is particularly so in the case of the action taken by both sides to improve and extend fortifications throughout the island (paras. 46-48).

D. Freedom of movement of the United Nations Force

17. During the period covered by this report UNFICYP personnel have been denied freedom of movement on twenty-six occasions, in ten of which they were threatened with weapons.

18. Most of these incidents occurred in areas of confrontation, where both sides were building up or improving their positions, and the UNFICYP soldiers involved were mostly members of routine patrols operating between the forward defence lines of the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters.

19. The most serious of these incidents occurred on 15 October, when a two-man UNFICYP patrol was intercepted and beaten by four Turkish Cypriot fighters while carrying out a routine patrol. The Force Commander made a strong protest to the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which expressed its deep regret at the incident and assured him that proper disciplinary action would be taken against those responsible.

20. A second serious incident occurred on 5 November 1966, when the members of a two-man UNFICYP patrol were manhandled by Turkish Cypriot fighters and kicked. The Force Commander again lodged a strong protest with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which, while replying that there was no justification for the incident and that it would see that disciplinary action was taken, alleged at the same time that the UNFICYP patrol had provoked the fighters by marking a map near one of their positions and acting in a suspicious and threatening manner. The Force Commander thereupon sent a further letter to the leadership stressing that the

patrol had acted in accordance with its peace-keeping functions and that if there had been any complaint about the patrol's actions the matter ought to have been reported to UNFICYP through the proper channels so that it could have been investigated and, if necessary, discussions held between UNFICYP and the leadership. Under no circumstances could the use of physical violence against UNFICYP patrols be condoned.

21. In October UNFICYP patrols were prevented from coming close to National Guard forward positions in the Kyrenia Range and were also prevented by the National Guard from using a track linking Lefka and Ambelikou. In addition, the National Guard screened off construction work south of Larnaca and did not allow UNFICYP access to the site. UNFICYP expressed its concern and protested to the Government, as such obstruction was contrary to the provisions of the agreement of 10 November 1964 on freedom of movement of the Force (S/6102, para. 127), which has by and large worked very well. It was emphasized to the Government that this agreement should continue to be respected, as any attempt to curtail UNFICYP's freedom of movement could only reduce its effectiveness in the discharge of its mandate. Discussions with the Government are continuing; in the meantime, the Lefka/Ambelikou track has again been opened to United Nations patrols.

II. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS PREVENTING A RECURRENCE OF FIGHTING
AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF
LAW AND ORDER

A. Military situation

(i) Armed forces in Cyprus other than UNFICYP

(a) Government armed forces

22. The numerical strength of the National Guard has been significantly reduced during the period covered by this report. The conscripts of the 1940-1946 age-groups have been released, so that the active strength of the National Guard now mainly consists of the young conscripts of the 1947 and 1948 age-groups, the latter having reported for duty on 4 July 1944, following a decision taken by the Council of Ministers earlier this year (S/7350, para. 17). A total of nine age-groups have thus been conscripted into the National Guard since June 1964 for various periods.

23. According to an official announcement by the Government, the Council of Ministers decided on 28 July 1966 to call up for service in the National Guard all Greek Cypriots living abroad who come within the nine age-groups mentioned above, except those who emigrated before the enactment of the Conscription Law of 1964 and who are permanent residents in a foreign country.

24. No precise information is available to UNFICYP regarding the number of Greek officers and other categories of military personnel from Greece now in Cyprus, although their presence in the Island as members of the National Guard has been confirmed (S/7350, para. 19).

25. In addition to a normal training and instruction programme, the National Guard has stayed, during the period covered by this report, a series of large-scale exercises embracing considerable areas of the Island.

26. The National Guard is in a state of readiness. In particular, they have mobile armoured groups which appear to be organized on a permanent stand-by basis and have at times been supplemented by elements of the Cyprus Police.

27. To the best of UNFICYP's knowledge, no significant supplies of arms or warlike material have arrived on the Island during the period under review, and the shipments received seem to have been mainly for maintenance purposes. UNFICYP is not in a position to verify the type and quantity of military goods introduced into the Island, however, as it is not able to inspect such goods. Although the Agreement of 10 September 1964 provides for UNFICYP to be given advance notification of the expected arrival of ships carrying military goods (S/6162, para. 129), there have been occasions in recent months when such notification has not been given. On 14 September the Force Commander brought this matter to the attention of the Cyprus Minister of the Interior and requested assurances from him that in future due notification would be given, but no reply has been received to date.

(b) Turkish Cypriot armed elements

28. The structure of the Turkish Cypriot fighter organization has not, so far as UNFICYP knows, undergone any substantial changes since my last report.

29. Apart from the fact that there has been continued instruction and training, combined with service under field conditions over a long period of time, there has been no evidence of any build-up of Turkish Cypriot military strength.

30. Although occasionally new weapons of the small arms type have been seen, UNFICYP has no reason to believe that Turkish Cypriot fighting elements have received weapons or other categories of military equipment from outside the Island during the past six months.

31. In UNFICYP's judgement, the total number of fighters constantly under arms or employed on a permanent basis for special duties within the various fighter organizations remains about the same as that given in my last report (S/7350, para. 21).

(c) The Greek and Turkish National Contingents

32. UNFICYP has no information of any change in the total strength of either of the National Contingents, which have remained in the locations occupied by them since the end of 1963 (S/5950, para. 26).

33. A rotation of part of the Greek National Contingent took place on 17-18 June 1966 through the Port of Famagusta. UNFICYP was notified in advance that about half the contingent was to take part in this rotation.

34. In early August 1966 the Government of Turkey informed the Government of Cyprus, through the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia, of its intention to rotate approximately half the Turkish National Contingent towards the end of September. Once again UNFICYP was approached and requested to extend its good offices and facilities for this operation as it had done in the past (S/7350, paras. 24-25).

35. The Government of Cyprus, while maintaining its position regarding the Treaty of Alliance, did not oppose the rotation. It objected, however, to some items and quantities on the list of stores and ammunition to be imported for the maintenance of the Turkish National Contingent in Cyprus. After negotiations by UNFICYP with both sides, most of the problems were eventually resolved and the rotation took place on 28 September 1966 through the Port of Famagusta. The incoming Contingent consisted of 39 officers, 29 NCOs and 261 other ranks, plus approximately 150 tons of stores and ammunition, while 38 officers, 30 NCOs and 258 other ranks departed for Turkey. UNFICYP provided 35 vehicles to help transport the Turkish troops and stores between Orta Keuy and Famagusta. The dockside arrangements worked well.

36. The only matter remaining unresolved from this rotation concerns forty-one new field telephones for which no unserviceable ones were produced at the dockside. These new Turkish telephones are being held in UNFICYP custody pending the outcome of discussions between UNFICYP, the Cyprus Government and the Turkish authorities.

(ii) General assessment of the situation with regard to preventing a recurrence of fighting

37. The over-all situation on the Island has remained virtually unchanged during the past six months. There have been a number of incidents which required prompt action by UNFICYP to prevent dangerous situations from developing. Some of the more important incidents where UNFICYP action within the terms of its mandate prevented a recurrence of fighting, are detailed in section B of this chapter.

38. In those areas where there is armed confrontation, the situation has not improved. UNFICYP has managed to maintain peace in these areas, but its efforts have not been helped by the construction and improvement of fortifications in certain parts of the Island. UNFICYP's representations aimed at halting these activities have not been heeded and the work has continued (see para. 47).
39. There have been many breaches of the cease-fire, and it will be seen from paragraph 79 that there have been considerably more shooting incidents in the period covered by this report than in the previous six months. This can be accounted for by the heightened tension in the areas of confrontation, where fortification work has been on the increase.
40. UNFICYP has continued its efforts to persuade the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to take steps to eliminate confrontation and reduce tension in various places throughout the Island.
41. As in the past, UNFICYP has had little success in eliminating already existing areas of armed confrontation. Moves have been made in a number of cases, however, to bring about total or partial defortification in areas where confrontation could lead to fighting. Although it has seldom been possible to induce either side to withdraw completely from the line of close confrontation in such cases, UNFICYP has had some measure of success in persuading both sides not to continue shooting when outbreaks of firing have taken place.
42. The situation in Trypimeni, although not yet resolved, is less dangerous than it was in July 1966 (S/7418). UNFICYP's plan for the defortification of this area, however, has not so far met with success (see para. 62).
43. In the recent incidents at Mora, Melousha and Arsos (see paras. 49-61), where there was a danger of a direct armed conflict and a possible recurrence of fighting, it was only the swift action taken by the UNFICYP troops on the spot that prevented extremely dangerous situations from developing.
44. The situation created by the shooting in the areas of Peristeronari, Ambelikou and Limnitis during the first two weeks of August (see para. 82) has been brought under control by vigorous UNFICYP action.
45. UNFICYP will continue to use its good offices to try and persuade both sides to eliminate lines of direct confrontation.

B. Specific developments and action taken by UNFICYP

(i) Extension and improvement of fortifications

46. There has been a marked increase in fortification construction during the period covered by this report. Up to September 1966 this activity was confined largely to the extension and improvement of existing positions, and UNFICYP was able to control the situation to a considerable extent. The main areas concerned were the Kyrenia and Lefka Districts and Larnaca, where some of the new diggings were filled in either at the request of UNFICYP or by UNFICYP itself. In the middle of September, however, it became apparent that extensive new defence works were being constructed by the National Guard opposite the Turkish Cypriot defence lines in Kyrenia District. This fresh attempt to improve their defence lines in an area of acute confrontation was naturally viewed with deep concern by the Force Commander, and at his request arrangements were made for senior UNFICYP staff officers to visit and inspect the work in progress. The inspections were carried out early in October and the UNFICYP officers were left in no doubt that the National Guard had embarked upon a definite programme of defence works. Prefabricated concrete units were being used to convert existing earthworks into bunkers, while in other places similar units were being used to construct new positions. Turkish Cypriots have reacted by improving positions which had fallen into disrepair and by undertaking the construction of new positions, especially in the Pileri area, which has been the scene of a series of incidents over the past twelve months because of similar defence work construction (S/7350, paras 64 and 65, and S/7191, paras. 61-64).

47. UNFICYP considered the work carried out by both sides to be contrary to the hitherto accepted understanding that any extension of existing positions was undesirable and detrimental to the interests of peace in the Island, as it could do nothing but increase tension. Any escalation in defence construction brings dangers in its wake, and the Force Commander therefore felt it necessary to draw the attention of both the Cyprus Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to

these potential dangers and to urge that all work on defences should be halted. A number of meetings were held between the Force Commander and officials of the Government in order to try to solve the problem, but the Government was not inclined to accede to the Force Commander's request, as it considered that the defences were necessary for the security of the Island. National Guard defence construction has continued and has spread to other parts of the Island, mostly coastal areas where anti-invasion defences have been reinforced, while the Turkish Cypriots are also continuing with the construction and improvement of their own defence positions.

48. UNFICYP will continue to strive for the solution of this recurring problem, impelled by the knowledge that every attempt to extend military fortifications promotes uneasiness and tension and can lead to a recurrence of fighting.

(ii) Mora/Melousha

49. Over the weekend of 23/24 July two potentially dangerous situations developed at Mora (GR S 217676) and Melousha (GR S 2458), two villages some 15 miles east of Nicosia. These incidents are dealt with together in this report as they immediately followed one another and could in a sense be considered as related. On 23 July the National Guard protested that the Turkish Cypriots were constructing new positions south of the village of Mora which could threaten freedom of movement along the old Famagusta Road. UNFICYP inspected the positions, found that no new digging was taking place but that old positions were being cleaned out, and informed the National Guard of this fact. The National Guard refused to accept this explanation, however, and gave notice to UNFICYP that if the United Nations was unable to stop the work, the National Guard would use force to do so itself.

50. In the early afternoon of 23 July, units of the National Guard and Cyprus Police began to concentrate in the area of Tymbou Airfield (GR S 1766). This combined force included ten armoured cars and one company of infantry. At the

same time, Turkish Cypriots manned their own positions around Mora. In order to prevent an armed clash, United Nations troops were interposed between the National Guard force and the Turkish Cypriot positions, and as a result of representations by the local United Nations commander the advance of the National Guard/Cyprus Police was halted while he persuaded the Turkish Cypriots to withdraw from their positions back into the village of Mora. He then informed the National Guard that he intended to deploy sufficient forces in the area to ensure that there was no reoccupation or extension of the positions, whereupon the National Guard agreed to withdraw their troops and did so, beginning in the early evening of 23 July.

51. On the same afternoon, a Cyprus Police patrol coming from Athienou (GR S 2056) moved through the Turkish Cypriot village of Melousha on its way to Tremethousha (GR S 2658). Reports alleged that this was not the normal patrol that moved along this route two or three times a day and had been accepted by the villagers of Melousha, but a special patrol which displayed its weapons and acted in an aggressive manner. In addition it dismounted just east of the village and set up a road block. The immediate result was that Turkish Cypriot fighters in the village occupied their positions on its outskirts, and when the police patrol attempted to pass through on its return journey, it was prevented from doing so. The National Guard protested that the Turkish Cypriots' action was openly menacing and was a direct threat to normal freedom of movement of police patrols. UNFICYP immediately undertook negotiations with the Turkish Cypriot Mukhtar (headman) of Melousha and arranged for the patrol to move through the village under the protection of United Nations troops deployed to ensure its safe passage, but the patrol refused to move without permission from higher authority, which was not forthcoming.

52. At 0055 hours on 24 July, the National Guard took over operations in the Melousha area and a combined force, similar to that used against Mora, moved forward from Athienou towards Melousha. Throughout the night negotiations went on between the local United Nations commander and the National Guard commander, whose forces were some 600 yards west of Melousha. At the same time additional troops and some armoured scout cars of the Force Reserve were moved in to strengthen United Nations forces outside the village.

53. At 0235 hours, without previous notice to the United Nations, the Cyprus Police patrol ran the gauntlet through Melousha and there was an exchange of fire in which no one was hurt but the Cyprus Police vehicle was hit. By this time the United Nations troops had been redeployed on the outskirts of the village in order to interpose themselves between the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriots, and were no longer lining the road inside the village. UNFICYP's negotiations with the local National Guard commander came to a halt when he told the local United Nations commander that he was going to clear the village, and proceeded to move his troops forward to within 500 yards of the United Nations troops.

54. Meanwhile, talks were being held in Nicosia between the Chief of Staff UNFICYP and National Guard Headquarters to avert what could only develop into a full scale assault on Melousha. The result of these talks was not conclusive, but in fact, after the small National Guard advance referred to in the preceding paragraph, no further attempt was made to move forward. Negotiations continued throughout the morning of 24 July, including a visit to Melousha by a member of the Vice-President's office, accompanied by the UNFICYP Chief of Staff, to try to persuade the Turkish Cypriot fighters to stand down and return to their homes, and to persuade the Mukhtar and village leaders to accept the resumption of normal Cyprus Police patrolling as before the incident. The on-the-spot negotiations were supplemented by discussions between the Force Commander and Government authorities which resulted in the National Guard's withdrawal of all its forces by 1900 hours on the evening of 24 July.

55. UNFICYP kept some forces in the village for the next ten days to ensure that the situation returned to normal. Since then Cyprus Police patrols have passed unimpeded through Melousha as before, and there have been no further incidents.

56. While UNFICYP was successful at both Mora and Melousha in preventing outbreaks of fighting, it is regrettable that in both instances UNFICYP's initial offers to negotiate a solution were not accepted and that the National Guard acted before it had given the United Nations a reasonable opportunity to settle the matter peacefully.

(iii) Arsos

57. Arsos (GR S 2859) is a mixed Greek and Turkish Cypriot village a few miles east of Melousha. It differs from most mixed villages in that the houses of Greek and Turkish Cypriots are intermingled and not located in separate quarters. The villagers have hitherto lived in peace and harmony, and there is no previous record of trouble there. Until the incidents described below, Arsos, like Melousha, was visited occasionally - usually not more than twice a week - by a mobile Cyprus Police patrol.

58. On the night of 9 September, a Turkish Cypriot villager was shot dead while cycling home. No motive was immediately apparent, nor has one come to light since. Tension rose as a result of this shooting, and a small UNFICYP force moved into the village. On 11 September, however, there was a further shooting incident, in which one Greek Cypriot was killed and two wounded, one seriously. This second shooting incident, which appears to have been in revenge for the first one, resulted in an immediate outbreak of firing throughout the village. This firing, at times heavy but mostly sporadic, continued throughout the morning. At 1330 hours the United Nations commander in the village, concerned at the increasing danger not only to UNFICYP soldiers but also to innocent villagers from sniper fire coming from a number of houses, gave orders for UNFICYP soldiers to enter the houses in question and call upon the occupants to lay down their arms. This was done successfully in every case, with the result that by 1415 hours all firing had ceased and did not restart. UNFICYP posted sentries in the sniper houses, and the occupants were asked to lay down their arms in a central room in each house where they could be supervised by the UNFICYP sentry.

59. During the night of 17/18 September a further outbreak of shooting took place in the village, but it was quickly contained by the prompt deployment of UNFICYP forces and there were no casualties. A meeting between the Greek and Turkish Mukhtars to discuss ways and means of bringing back normality to the village took place the next morning as scheduled. A definite measure of agreement was reached

at that meeting, with the result that during the following week increasing activity was seen in the village and within ten days people were going about the fields, opening their shops and sitting in their coffee houses. The village is still tense, however, and is bound to remain so for some time, since the impression made by such incidents in a locality where intercommunal strife was previously unknown cannot be effaced in a matter of days or weeks. One further incident occurred on 4 October, when Turkish Cypriots raided the rooms where the arms had been kept ever since the Turkish Cypriot fighters had laid them down on 11 September and took away all the arms despite the efforts of UNFICYP soldiers to prevent this. UNFICYP made a strong protest to the Turkish Cypriot leadership, pointing out that such ill-considered action could only increase the tension in Arsos. UNFICYP continues to work for the reduction of tension by striving to secure the demolition of all sandbagged positions in the village, its ultimate aim being to restore to Arsos the peaceful existence it enjoyed before 9 September.

60. Immediately after the second shooting incident the Government set up a Cyprus Police post in the village in order to maintain order and investigate the murders which had been committed. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has repeatedly complained about this post in the Political Liaison Committee and through other channels, asserting that far from maintaining order and bringing back peace to the village it is bound to have the very opposite effect. The Turkish Cypriot fighters in the village have remained constantly on the alert and the situation has remained too tense to permit the complete withdrawal of UNFICYP forces, although it has eased sufficiently to allow UNFICYP strength in Arsos to be reduced to one platoon.

61. UNFICYP has discussed the question of the Cyprus Police post in Arsos with the Government on several occasions, but while the Government has repeatedly stated that the post is only a temporary one it has also pointed out that it bears responsibility for maintaining law and order in Cyprus and must be the sole judge of when the time is ripe for the removal of the post. The number of Cyprus Police

stationed at the post was initially thirteen but has since been reduced to eight. For a short period immediately after the incident of 11 September a number of villagers were enrolled by the Cyprus Police as auxiliaries but were subsequently disbanded.

(iv) Trypimeni

62. In my report of 20 July 1966 (S/7418) I gave a full account of developments in the Trypimeni situation. I have to state with regret that since the publication of that document no further progress has been made towards settling the Trypimeni problem and the situation remains unchanged. The Turkish Cypriots still occupy three positions and all efforts by UNFICYP to arrange for their withdrawal have proved unsuccessful. It has thus not been possible to implement the UNFICYP plan which would in my judgement neither impair the security of the inhabitants of the area nor affect the positions of principle of either side (S/7418, para. 21).

63. At the same time, however, the area around Trypimeni has remained quiet and no incidents have occurred. It is hoped that continued restraint will be shown over this prolonged stalemate so that UNFICYP can pursue its efforts to find a solution.

(v) Ktima

64. On 12 August 1966 a seventeen-year-old Turkish Cypriot sentry was mortally wounded by a Cyprus special police constable in Ktima (see para. 95). The situation very quickly became dangerous and explosive. As an immediate reaction to the shooting, the Turkish Cypriots in Ktima erected barricades across all streets into the Turkish Cypriot quarter and manned their positions. The local UNFICYP commander immediately began consultations with the District Officer and the Turkish Cypriot leader aimed at reducing the tension, securing the removal of the barricades and bringing the situation back to what it had been before the shooting. He

persuaded the District Officer to suspend the joint Cyprus Police and UNCIVPOL patrolling of the Turkish Cypriot quarter, to withdraw all foot patrols from Aphrodite Street and Fellah Oghlou Street for the time being, and to arrange for the relief and supply of the police post at Mavrali by the alternative route which did not involve passing through the edge of the Turkish Cypriot quarter. He persuaded the Turkish Cypriots, for their part, to withdraw from their positions around the perimeter of their quarter and to remove the barricades. Initially the barricades were only moved to the side of the streets, but they were removed altogether on 18 August.

65. Once these measures had been taken, the tension in Ktima eased, though it did not disappear altogether. It was clear to United Nations observers that a few days of quiet would be needed before the normal patrolling which had been the rule before 12 August could restart. The Cyprus Government, however, insisted that patrolling should begin again on 18 August, on which date some Cyprus Police patrols recommenced and the supply and relief of the Mavrali post was effected once more by the original route. Thereafter, patrolling was progressively increased until it was fully restored on 22 August, when the first joint Cyprus Police/UNCIVPOL patrols re-entered the Turkish Cypriot quarter. No incident took place as a result.

66. The settlement of the police patrol crisis does not mean that the over-all problem of Ktima has been solved. The state of close confrontation which exists and the fact that the Turkish Cypriots are not prepared to reoccupy their homes in Mavrali so long as the Cyprus Police post remains there, continue to be a cause of friction (A/6426, para. 53, and S/7001, para. 46). UNFICYP has long been concerned at the continuing failure to achieve a settlement of this problem despite the efforts of successive UNFICYP local commanders and the unremitting work of UNFICYP headquarters towards a solution. Negotiations for a settlement were, in fact, in progress when the incident of 12 August occurred.

67. On 20 August a request was received from the Turkish Cypriot leadership that the Ktima agreement of 11 March 1964 be fully implemented as a preliminary to possible further negotiations.

68. This agreement reached before UNFICYP became operational, was concluded in the presence of Government and Turkish Cypriot leadership representatives, the British High Commissioner, the Commander of the Joint Peace Force and the Commander-designate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus, General Gyani, and provided in essence for a cease-fire, removal of fortifications, control of the area around the market place by the "Greek Cypriot police", patrolling of the Turkish Cypriot area after 14 March by joint patrols of "regular armed Greek Cypriot police and British troops", withdrawal of all other "armed Greek Cypriots" to the area east of Fella Oghlou Street and Aphrodite Street, and for "Turkish Cypriot policemen" in Ktima to be unarmed.

69. The Turkish Cypriot proposal to re-implement the agreement was brought to the attention of the Government by UNFICYP and discussed on a number of occasions, and towards the end of November the Government made known to UNFICYP its considered position on the proposal in a note reading:

"1. The purpose of the Ktima arrangement, made on 11 March 1964, was, at the time, to bring an end to the fighting (and to eliminate any danger of recurrence), which the Turkish Cypriots had started by unprovokedly and calculatedly attacking unarmed and innocent Greek Cypriot shoppers and by taking hundreds of Greek Cypriots as hostages.

"2. The Government fully implemented the provisions of that arrangement. It is the Turkish Cypriot side which did not implement it, by not only failing to demolish their fortifications and trenches existing at the time, but also by subsequently erecting new ones. This is also proved, beyond any doubt, by the Turkish Cypriot offer of June 1966, (more than two years later) through UNFICYP, 'to dismantle finally and permanently all fortified positions within the Turkish Cypriot sector'.

"3. The Mavrali Police Station, which was set up almost simultaneously with the making of the arrangement, had no connexion with it. Indeed, it could not possibly have had any relation. Its establishment, like the establishment of any other Police Station in the Republic, is an undisputed right of the Government consonant with its responsibility to maintain law and order, a right falling within the sovereign powers of the Government, also asserted by the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964.

"4. The isolated shooting incident of 12 August 1966, can have absolutely no bearing to the afore-mentioned arrangement.

Nicosia, 26 November, 1966."

70. The Government's views were communicated by UNFICYP to the Turkish Cypriot Leadership, which rejected the Government's assertions in a note dated 2 December 1966. According to the Turkish Cypriot leadership the troubles in Ktima were started by armed Greek Cypriots who had unlawfully occupied a building in the Mavrali section of the Turkish quarter of Ktima and had intimidated Turkish Cypriots under the pretext that the building was a "police station." After skirmishes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Ktima, General Gyani of the United Nations had arranged a cease-fire, but it had immediately been broken by the Greek Cypriots, who had launched an all-out offensive against the Turkish Cypriot population, in the course of which bazookas, mortars, and other heavy arms had been used. The bloodshed had finally been stopped by the signing of the Ktima agreement, but while the Turkish Cypriots had implemented and observed their part of the agreement in full, the Greek Cypriots had implemented only those parts which were in their own interest and, by continuing to man the Mavrali "police station" they had failed to comply with that paragraph of the agreement which provided that "all other armed Greek Cypriots" should be "withdrawn to the area east of Fella Oghlou Street and Aphrodite Street". They were thus preventing the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of the Mavrali section from going back to their homes. The assertions of the "Greek Cypriot Administration" regarding its "responsibility to maintain law and order" and its "sovereign powers" were nothing but a smoke-screen for the acts of barbarism committed against Turkish Cypriots all over the Island since December 1963. Its ideas of what maintaining law and order meant could best be appreciated by taking a look at the two Turkish Cypriots schools, eighty-five houses and seventy-eight shops completely or partially destroyed by Greek Cypriots in Ktima. Steps should therefore be taken to implement the Ktima agreement in full as a matter of urgency in order to check any further escalation of tension in the area.

71. UNFICYP continues to keep a close watch on the situation in Ktima and is pursuing its efforts at both the local and Headquarters level to reduce tension and find a satisfactory solution.

(vi) Larnaca

72. The Larnaca situation has given rise to much concern, and throughout the period under review there has been a constant atmosphere of tension in the area. I have drawn attention to the situation in Larnaca/Scala in my previous report (S/7350, paras. 31-38); since then there has been little reduction in the sensitivity of this area, undoubtedly because of the continued construction of fortifications by both the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriots.

73. On more than one occasion United Nations troops have had to be deployed in the area to prevent an armed clash between the two sides; so far, these interventions have been successful and have prevented any outbreaks of shooting. The main points of contention are the National Guard bunker construction activities in the Patsalo Hill area and the manifold Turkish Cypriot activities in the vicinity of the Artemis Road, such as the construction of fire positions, the establishment of sentry posts and the undisguised presence of armed fighters within sight of the road and of the National Guard. UNFICYP has so far been unsuccessful in halting the defence works on Patsalo Hill, but it has succeeded from time to time in restraining Turkish Cypriot fighters from indulging in undue provocation along the Artemis road. Despite these efforts, however, the over-all situation remains unsettled and uneasy and has to be constantly watched to ensure that it does not deteriorate further.

74. The restriction of the Turkish Cypriots' access to the Hala Sultan Tekke mosque remains a constant source of irritation to them. Cyprus Police elements still occupy positions around the mosque and insist that all Turkish Cypriots entering the area to visit the mosque or to harvest their crops are subject to search; in addition a National Guard mobile force has recently been deployed in the area while construction work on Patsalo Hill continues. UNFICYP believes that if the Tekke mosque problem were resolved satisfactorily by allowing free access to this historic Moslem shrine and freedom of movement in the surrounding area for all persons, a great deal of the tension and disquiet which render the situation there so potentially dangerous would disappear.

(vii) The Kyrenia Road

75. The hope was expressed in the last report (S/7350, paras. 55-58) that it would not be necessary for UNFICYP to re-establish military posts along the

Kyrenia Road in order to ensure full compliance with the Kyrenia Road Agreement (S/6102, annex I). Because of an increase in violations of the Agreement, however, consisting mainly of cases where Turkish Cypriot fighters with prominently displayed weapons were observed either on the road or travelling along it in vehicles, it became necessary in August to re-establish three of the UNFICYP static military posts along the road. This had the desired effect, since within a month of the re-establishment of the posts the daily number of violations fell from about fifty to no more than two or three, and it therefore became possible in September to stand down the three posts once more, without prejudice, of course, to their re-establishment if necessary.

76. In addition to violations on the Kyrenia Road itself, further cause for concern has been given by military exercises, punctuated by battle noises, carried out by Turkish Cypriot fighters in immediate proximity to the Kyrenia Road when the UNFICYP-organized convoys were due to pass. Since such exercises could cause considerable alarm to Greek Cypriots travelling in the convoy, UNFICYP sought and obtained from the Turkish Cypriots assurances that no further exercises would take place at convoy times or in areas immediately adjacent to the road. UNFICYP maintains continual vigilance over the Kyrenia Road and will take all necessary action to ensure continued observance of the Kyrenia Road Agreement.

(viii) Ghaziveran

77. Some tension arose in Ghaziveran (Lefka district) in November, when Turkish Cypriots carried out some work on their old positions, which had not been used or maintained for a long time. At the same time, local shepherds and villagers were prevented by the National Guard from grazing their flocks or working their land in the vicinity of National Guard defences. The Government contended that the Turkish Cypriot positions posed a threat to freedom of movement along the Morphou Road. The positions were fully inspected by the UNFICYP Chief of Staff, who was able to confirm the local United Nations Commander's opinion that they did not constitute a threat to freedom of movement; nor could they be described as having been improved, but had rather been winterized.

78. UNFICYP had discussions with both sides and tension in the area was considerably reduced as a result of local agreement that the Turkish Cypriots should stop working on their positions and manning them. At the same time, the new restrictions placed on Turkish Cypriot shepherds and villagers were withdrawn.

UNFICYP is pursuing negotiations in the matter.

(ix) Observance of the cease-fire

79. Shooting incidents during the period covered are summarized below. The figures for previous periods are given for purposes of comparison. It will be seen that there has been a very marked increase in the number of shooting incidents.

	7 June to 5 Dec. 1966	8 Mar. to 7 June 1966	2 Dec. 1965 to 7 Mar. 1966	11 Jun. to 1 Dec. 1965	8 Mar. to 10 Jun. 1965	9 Dec. 1964 to 7 Mar. 1965	9 Sept. to 8 Dec. 1964	9 Jun. to 8 Sept. 1964
Nicosia Zone	Not operative			17	89	97	124	191
Nicosia West	8	2	0	3	Not operative			
Nicosia East District	11	3	1	3	Not operative			
Famagusta Zone	22	2	0	14	10	44	16	10
Limassol Zone	8	1	4	9	5	7	6	5
Paphos District	Not operative			6	2	7	4	53
Morphou District	Not operative			4	153	67	10	
Lefka District	76	7	1	3	Not operative			
Kyrenia District	164	19	11	10	Not operative			
TOTAL	289	34	17	69	259	222	160	259

80. UNFICYP is of the opinion that 54 shooting incidents out of the total of 283 were deliberate breaches of the cease-fire. Three of these occurred in Nicosia East District, nine in Famagusta Zone, three in Limassol Zone, fifteen in Lefka District and twenty-four in Kyrenia District. Twenty-nine were attributed to Turkish Cypriot fighters and twenty-five to the National Guard.

81. The increase in the number of shooting incidents reflects the frequent firing which has occurred in Lefka and Kyrenia Districts.

82. In Lefka District the shooting mainly took place in the areas of Peristeronari, Ambelikou and Limnitis, the peak period being 2 August to 9 August, when approximately 3,000 shots were exchanged. Three National Guard soldiers were wounded.

83. The shooting incidents in Kyrenia District have been spread more generally over the whole period and must to some extent be connected with attempts by both sides to build or improve their positions. A major incident occurred on 28 September when 300 shots were exchanged before the United Nations succeeded in arranging a cease-fire. UNFICYP investigations failed to reveal why this incident took place or which side opened fire first.

C. Developments relating to the maintenance of law and order

(i) The work of the UNFICYP Civilian Police

84. The United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) has continued to play a valuable part in UNFICYP's contribution to the maintenance of law and order by performing those duties which are primarily police functions rather than military ones. UNCIVPOL, detachments of which are deployed in the various military zones and districts of the Force and work in close co-operation with UNFICYP military personnel, is principally concerned with incidents, offences and crimes simultaneously involving both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which it investigates in liaison with both the Cyprus Police and the Turkish Cypriot police elements. Generally speaking, the Cyprus Police and Turkish Cypriot police elements alike have shown great willingness to avail themselves of UNCIVPOL's help in such cases, although as might be expected there have been some cases with political overtones where its offers to render assistance and participate in inquiries have been turned down. UNCIVPOL's duties also include the conduct of joint patrols with the Cyprus Police in Nicosia and at Ktima, the maintenance of police posts in sensitive areas, observation at static and mobile Cyprus Police checkpoints throughout the Island, observation at Nicosia Airport when Turkish Cypriots travel to or from Turkey, the marshalling and dispersal of the Kyrenia Road convoys, observation on the Kyrenia Road and security and traffic control in the Turkish Cypriot villages of Orta Keuy and Geunyeli at convoy times, and finally, investigations concerning the fate or whereabouts of missing persons.

85. Since 7 June 1966 UNCIVPOL has investigated more than 200 cases related to intercommunal strife. These include nineteen cases of homicide and attempted homicide, fifty-five cases of alleged shooting at persons working in fields or from vehicles travelling through villages, a number of cases of assault, many cases of larceny, and damage to property, twenty-four cases of bomb explosions, and twenty-two investigations into the origin of forest fires.

86. Inquiries were also made concerning twenty-two cases of alleged Turkish Cypriot defectors and ten cases of Greek Cypriots who inadvertently crossed into the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia.

87. Observations were made to the Cyprus authorities in connexion with the arrest of three Turkish nationals and 124 Turkish Cypriots, the temporary detention of seventy-six Turkish Cypriots by Cyprus Police, and 306 confiscations of goods from Turkish Cypriots passing through Cyprus Police checkpoints.

88. UNCIVPOL has intensified its efforts to trace persons reported missing since the disorders in 1964. There has been no addition to the list of 211 unsolved cases of missing Turkish Cypriots referred to in my last report (S/7350, para. 76), while twelve cases have been closed and removed from the list, five of the persons concerned having been confirmed to have died during the early fighting and seven having been traced alive. Inquiries are by no means completed, however, and it is hoped that the list may be further reduced. Despite continued investigations there is no reduction in the list of forty-one Greek Cypriots, three British nationals, one German and one Greek national still reported as missing.

(ii) Investigation of crime and intercommunal strife

89. Two Greek Cypriots of Paralimni, who had been detained in the Turkish sector of Nicosia since 12 March because they were alleged to have carried explosives in their car (S/7350, para. 78) were released after UNFICYP intervention on 1 July and returned by UNCIVPOL to the Government-controlled area. On the same day, six Turkish Cypriots who had been arrested on the charge of preparing war against the Republic were released by the Cyprus Police and returned to the village of Mora by UNCIVPOL, while two Greek Cypriots held at Mora were also released. The arrest by the Cyprus Police of seven Turkish Cypriot poachers from Melousha and surrounding villages is believed to have been the principal reason for the situation which arose at Melousha when the Cyprus Police increased its patrols through that village (S/7350, para. 51).

90. UNCIVPOL investigated twenty-four bomb explosions within Government-controlled areas during the period under review. One such explosion resulted in the sealing-off of the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia from 21 June to 23 June (see para. 114), ostensibly as part of the Cyprus Police investigations into the incident. Arrests of Turkish Cypriots were made by the Cyprus Police in connexion with bomb explosions in two cases. One case occurred on 22 October at Kyrenia, where seven local Turkish Cypriot residents were detained by the Cyprus Police and remanded in custody but were all released within ten days without being prosecuted. A Turkish Cypriot was arrested at Famagusta following two explosions there on 24 November and, after being remanded for eight days, was released on 1 December.

91. There were also five booby-trap explosions in a Turkish Cypriot locality in the Lefka area. One of them mortally wounded a Turkish Cypriot man and another caused injuries to a Turkish Cypriot woman.

92. UNCIVPOL continues to remain in touch with both sides regarding a suspected murderer, a Greek Cypriot Adamos Panteli (S/7350, para. 82), who took refuge in the Turkish Cypriot village of Louroujina and, so far as is known, is still there.

93. On 13 June a Greek Cypriot civilian and a member of the Cyprus Navy were detained by Turkish Cypriots while travelling to Kyrenia ahead of the Kyrenia Road Convoy. They were released in the early morning of 21 June and allowed to find their own way back to the Government-controlled area.

94. A Turkish Cypriot, Halil Guneyt Civay, arrested by the Cyprus Police in connexion with a case of suspected arson and destruction of property by explosives, and said to have been an accomplice of the Frenchman Michel Weiss who was sentenced earlier this year to twelve years' imprisonment on charges of sabotage (S/7350, para. 83), was deported on 20 July to Turkey as an undesirable "alien".

95. On 12 August a seventeen-year-old Turkish Cypriot fighter while on watch duty on the roof of a building within the precincts of a Turkish mosque at Ktima was mortally wounded by a Cyprus special police constable (see para. 64). The shooting was observed by a United Nations sentry who stated that the fighter was unarmed at the time of the shooting and, so far as he could see, had not provoked the constable. The Cyprus Police claimed, however, that the constable had fired the shot in self-defence, and it is understood that no charge is pending against him.

96. During September and October seven persons were killed and two wounded in shooting incidents. On 8 September two Turkish Cypriots were shot dead near the village of Ayios Ioannis in an ambush in which a third Turkish Cypriot received head injuries and a fourth escaped unhurt. Three Greek Cypriots, whose motive is said to have been robbery, have been arrested by the Cyprus Police and charged with the murder of the two Turkish Cypriots.

97. On 9 September a Turkish Cypriot was shot dead in Arsos village, and two days later a Greek Cypriot was shot dead and two other Greek Cypriots seriously wounded, apparently as an act of revenge. General outbreaks of firing occurred in the village on the days of the murders and a temporary UNICIVPOL post had been set up in the village as a result of the disturbances (see paras. 57-61).

98. Two Turkish Cypriot shepherds have been found dead from gunshots some distance from their villages, one near Ambelikou on 21 September and another on 20 October near the village of Klavdhia. The shootings are still under investigation and the motives for them are uncertain. In the first case the murderer has not yet been traced, whilst a Turkish Cypriot suspect is being held in the second case, which is not believed to be of an intercommunal character.

99. On 17 October a Turkish Cypriot was found dead near his village of Angolemi. The motive for this killing is believed to have been robbery, although the murderer has not yet been traced.

(iii) Forest fires

100. A series of twelve separate forest fires which broke out between 11 and 14 September in the Paphos and Lefka districts caused considerable damage to Government forest land in the foothills of the Troodos Mountains and were only put out after several days of fire-fighting by forestry officers and National Guard troops. Another ten fires, some of them very small, were reported on 22 September but were soon put out by rain. The damage caused by these two series of fires was estimated by the Forest Department to amount to over £C165,000. UNFICYP participated actively in the fire-fighting and even provided helicopter transport for those leading the operations.

101. The Government claimed that all the circumstantial evidence, including the fact that the fires occurred in the vicinity of Turkish Cypriot villages and that Turkish Cypriots did not help to put them out, indicated that Turkish Cypriots had deliberately set the fires for the purpose of revenge. It

further claimed to possess information to the effect that the fires were the result of a concerted effort by Turkish Cypriot terrorists to "engage the Government in action against them and in this way to give a reasonable pretext for outside intervention" in Cyprus. The Government banned all movement of persons and goods into and out of a number of Turkish Cypriot localities situated in the general area of the fires (see para. 115). The fact that the second spate of fires, on 22 September, occurred within twenty-four hours of the removal of this ban from villages in the Paphos area was held by the Government to be further evidence of Turkish Cypriot guilt.

102. The Government later communicated to UNFICYP statements by forestry officials and a Turkish Cypriot shepherd in which certain named Turkish Cypriots were alleged to have removed forest telephones in an attempt to impede the fighting of the fires and were alleged to have actually been seen setting fires in the forest. National Guard soldiers helping the forest service to put out the fires were reported to have shot at and wounded a Turkish Cypriot surprised in the act of setting a fire, without, however, managing to catch him. In another case the remains of a seven-inch match of a type said to be imported by a Turkish Cypriot firm were stated by the Government to have been found at the scene of one of the fires.

103. In reply to the Government's accusations, the Turkish Cypriot leadership said that the Government was merely following its well established practice of blaming Turkish Cypriots for any misfortune which occurred in the Island and had used the fires as a pretext for more stringent and oppressive measures against the Turkish Cypriot community. It pointed out that forest fires, caused in most cases by careless or disgruntled woodcutters, shepherds or picnickers, happened every year in Cyprus. It recalled that in 1959 seventy-seven such fires had taken place and in 1961 fifty-five, and that a large number of persons, most of them Greek Cypriots, had been prosecuted in those years for careless or malicious burning of forests. The leadership rejected any suggestion that the location of the fires could in any way be construed as evidence of Turkish Cypriot guilt, pointing out that Turkish Cypriot property had been jeopardized by the fires in many places and asserting that Greek Cypriots had both better opportunities and greater reason for deliberately setting fires. As for the alleged Turkish Cypriot reluctance to help in extinguishing the fires, it asserted that it was entirely due to the presence of

armed National Guard soldiers in the burning forests. In any case, the leadership pointed out, it was not true to say that Turkish Cypriots had refused to help with the fire-fighting, for one fire had actually been extinguished by Turkish Cypriots and in another place Turkish Cypriot fire-fighters had withdrawn only when Greek Cypriots arrived on the scene.

104. Both independently and on the basis of the information communicated to UNFICYP by the Government, UNCIVPOL investigated the causes of the fires as thoroughly as circumstances permitted. It was noted from official Forest Department records that forest fires do tend to occur every year. As far as the forest fires in September of this year are concerned, members of UNCIVPOL with long experience of fire investigations made on-the-spot examinations of the fire areas and found strong evidence, in certain cases, of deliberate fire-raising - a conclusion supported by the fact that there had been a spate of fires over a period of only a few days. UNCIVPOL's investigations failed, however, to reveal any conclusive evidence as to who had been responsible for setting the fires.

III. ACTIVITIES TOWARDS A RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS

A. General assessment

105. As I have stated in my previous reports to the Council, it would seem that both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership are reluctant to agree to a full return to normal conditions before a political solution to the Cyprus problem has been found. UNFICYP has none the less pursued its efforts in this field, and during the past six months it has achieved an appreciable measure of success by securing agreements on such long-standing and difficult questions as the restoration of postal services in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia and in Lefka (paras. 145-148) and the land records problem (paras. 149-155). Apart from these two major achievements, UNFICYP has endeavoured to promote agreements on birth certificates (paras. 158-160), on the operation of the social insurance scheme (paras. 156-157), on the continuation of government subsidy payments to Turkish Cypriot grain producers (para. 134) and on the reactivation of idle factories (paras. 128-130). In addition, it has extended its good offices in such matters as facilitating the movement of individuals, helping to obtain clearance for the importation of goods destined for Turkish Cypriot areas, and improving the lot of Turkish Cypriot refugees and displaced persons. Some of the main prerequisites for a return to normal conditions, however, such as the restoration of full freedom of movement, the resettlement of displaced persons, the abolition of economic restrictions and the resumption of common public services, remain absent.

106. On 25 July 1966 the Government of Cyprus passed a bill, similar to that enacted the year before (S/6569), extending the terms of office of the President of the Republic and the members of the House of Representatives for another twelve months in order to ensure the unhindered functioning of the State in conditions which precluded the holding of general elections. As in 1965, the Turkish Cypriot leadership denounced the measure on the grounds that it violated the Constitution of Cyprus by unilaterally withdrawing from the Turkish Cypriot members of the House the legislative powers vested in them by the Constitution. In order to uphold what they considered to be their rights the Turkish Cypriot members accordingly met separately on 28 July and extended their own terms of office and that of the Vice-President.

107. In another bill, denounced by the Turkish Cypriot leadership for similar reasons (S/7527), the Government has made certain provisions regarding the future functioning of the Public Service Commission, which deals with such matters as the appointment, promotion, retirement, conditions of service and disciplining of members of the public service. Before the events of 1963 the Commission consisted of seven Greek Cypriot and three Turkish Cypriot members, appointed jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. In December 1965, however, a law was passed establishing on a temporary basis a five-member Public Service Commission appointed by the President alone, and the new bill, if enacted, would make the temporary provisions of that law permanent.

B. Freedom of movement of the population

108. The extent to which the population can move freely within the island is a prime consideration in evaluating the progress of normalization. As in the past, freedom of movement is restricted or in some cases denied altogether, and it remains one of the basic issues.

109. Except in rare and special cases, the Turkish Cypriot leadership denies entry into areas under its control to all Greek Cypriots, whether government officials or private individuals. This ban appears to be enforced as a matter of political principle with little attempt at justification on practical grounds, and with the exception of the Kyrenia Road convoy and Limnitis (para. 118) entry is usually firmly denied even where Greek Cypriots would be escorted by UNFICYP personnel and security factors could not possibly be at stake. On a number of occasions Greek Cypriots unintentionally strayed into Turkish Cypriot enclaves and were detained, questioned and searched. In all these cases the detainees were released within a short time, following intervention by UNFICYP. In addition, the Turkish Cypriot leadership strictly regulates even brief visits by residents of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves to government-controlled areas, claiming that such regulation is designed to protect Turkish Cypriot travellers from arbitrary treatment at the hands of the Cyprus police. The Government, for its part, imposes systematic checks on persons and goods entering or leaving Turkish Cypriot enclaves, justifying such checks as national security measures made necessary by what it considers to be the Turkish Cypriots' rebellion against established order. Certain incidents, such as a bomb

explosion in June and a series of forest fires claimed to have been set by Turkish Cypriots, led not only to the temporary intensification of checks at established posts and/or the establishment of additional checkpoints but also to the imposition of virtual blockades for several days on Turkish Cypriot enclaves and villages.

110. During the period under review, the Turkish Cypriots have regularly lodged complaints of intensive searches, harassment and arbitrary seizures of personal belongings and have pointed out that such practices cannot be reconciled with the Government's assertion that there is full freedom of movement in all government-controlled areas of the island. Complaints have been particularly numerous in respect of the Famagusta Gate checkpoint in Nicosia, through which some 800-900 Turkish Cypriots, the great majority of them residing outside the principal enclave, pass daily in both directions, and through which practically all the goods and persons entering or leaving the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia are channelled. Considering the volume of traffic through this checkpoint, the number of substantiated complaints outside periods of unusual tension and strictness is relatively small, but the Turkish Cypriots nevertheless insist that the close searches made by the Cyprus police and the delays caused to Turkish Cypriot vehicles awaiting clearance at the checkpoint remain serious grievances.

111. Intensified searching of persons, vehicles and goods in containers was begun on 13 July. As there were not enough policemen and labourers on duty to carry out such searches expeditiously, delays resulted and caused prolonged exposure of Turkish Cypriot automobile and bus passengers to the hot sun and considerable damage to vegetables and other perishable food-stuffs by the heat. Waiting time at the checkpoint averaged one to two hours, but in many cases it was as much as four or five hours. This, in addition to the many cases of what appeared to be unusually slow searches and rough handling of produce during unloading and reloading, resulted in numerous complaints. Turkish Cypriots also complained that the searches to which women were subjected were highly objectionable, even though carried out by policewomen in an enclosed place.

112. The Cyprus police stated at the time that the intensified search procedures had become necessary because there was evidence of arms smuggling and movements of Turkish Cypriot fighters and military supplies through the checkpoint. The Turkish Cypriot leadership emphatically denied that charge.

113. As a result of these difficulties, movement through the checkpoint dropped significantly during the next few days, and in a communication to the Minister of the Interior on 18 July the Force Commander expressed deep concern at the effect the intensified search procedures were having. As of 23 July a considerable improvement was observed in the manner of carrying out searches at the checkpoint, and the situation reverted more or less to normal. The searching of women still aroused resentment among the Turkish Cypriots, however, and on 27 July Turkish Cypriot women staged a silent protest demonstration against the treatment accorded to them at police roadblocks, while the Turkish Cypriot Women's Association sent protest telegrams to various national and international bodies.

114. Several restrictions on the freedom of movement of the Turkish Cypriot population, similar to those imposed on 1 June and lifted three days later (S/7350, paras. 100-102), were put into effect by the Government on 21 June following a further bomb explosion which it alleged to be the work of Turkish Cypriots. Although the Government described the restrictions as "intensified police action" undertaken in order to discover and apprehend the person or persons responsible for planting the bomb and affirmed that food supplies were not affected, the Turkish Cypriot quarter was almost completely sealed off for two days until the restrictions were lifted at noon on 23 June. On this occasion, my Special Representative and the Commander of the Force drew the Government's attention to the widespread ill-feeling and tension provoked by the restrictions among Turkish Cypriots.

115. Following the outbreak of a series of forest fires, alleged to have been deliberately started by Turkish Cypriots, in the Troodos mountains on 11-14 September and again on 22 September (paras. 100-104), the Government sealed off a number of Turkish Cypriot villages in the Paphos District, as well as the town of Lefka and the village of Ambelikou, permitting only the entry of food shipments. At Lefka and Ambelikou the situation was aggravated by the fact that the dams and pipelines supplying those localities with domestic and irrigation water were blown up at several points and for ten days UNFICYP had to supply drinking water in tank trucks at the rate of 9,000 gallons per day. The Turkish Cypriot leadership disclaimed all responsibility for the fires or knowledge of their origin and asserted that they were merely a convenient pretext for repressive action against the Turkish Cypriot community. The Force Commander expressed concern to

the Ministry of the Interior at the imposition of the blockades, questioning the value of this type of collective measures in general and pointing out that some of the villages affected were a considerable distance from the fire areas. The blockade of the villages in the Paphos District was lifted on 21 September but re-imposed after the second outbreak of fires, and all the blockades were finally lifted on 28 September. The domestic water supply to Lefka and Ambelikou was restored on 2 October and the Government undertook to repair the damaged dams.

116. In communications addressed to the Secretary-General and circulated among the members of the Council (S/7375, S/7439 and S/7505) the Permanent Representative of Turkey has protested against the above-mentioned search procedures and blockades as liable to increase tension. The Permanent Representative of Cyprus has rebutted these protests and defended the Government's actions (S/7467 and S/7499).

117. Although rigid policies have prevailed on both sides as regards freedom of movement, they are not uniformly applied throughout the island. Thus, as a result of the Famagusta defortification agreement reached at the end of 1965 (S/7001, para. 56), Turkish Cypriot residents of the walled city of Famagusta are not subjected to searches when entering or leaving their quarter, while in the Limassol, Famagusta and Paphos Districts the Cyprus police have relatively few stationary checkpoints at Turkish Cypriot localities, and control is mostly effected by means of mobile police posts.

118. Greek Cypriots travelling between Nicosia and Kyrenia by the direct route, which runs through the main Turkish Cypriot enclave, do so under the protection of UNFICYP convoys, organized twice daily in each direction. They can travel through the Limnitis enclave, on the other hand, without escort and without having their vehicles searched by Turkish Cypriots, thanks to an agreement under which UNCIVPOL spot-checks cars to ensure that they are not carrying military equipment. There has been no change regarding the road through the small Kokkina enclave, which has been closed to Greek Cypriot traffic for more than two years and which the Turkish Cypriots refuse to open unless the Government withdraws military and police posts from the neighbouring villages to make way for the return of the Turkish Cypriot refugees at present overcrowding Kokkina itself. Because of the closure of this road, the Government refuses to allow normal movement of Turkish Cypriots into and out of Kokkina, and each request for entry or exit is considered individually.

Thus, while eleven schoolgirls from Kokkina were recently permitted to travel to Nicosia to attend a secondary boarding school there, the granting of the same facility to nineteen schoolboys in the 12-14 age group was made conditional upon the re-opening of the road through Kokkina. A request that one male nurse be allowed to leave Kokkina and be replaced by another one from Nicosia has so far not been granted.

119. The Government has maintained its ban on the return of Turkish Cypriot male students from Turkey (S/7001, para. 114), contending that such students receive military training during their stay there. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, while maintaining that the ban on the students' return to their home country is unlawful and inconsistent with universally accepted principles, has requested on a number of occasions that the students be at least allowed to visit Cyprus during their vacations, and has suggested that their return to Turkey at the end of their vacations could be ensured through the good offices of UNFICYP. The Government has rejected such requests for reasons of security, stating that there would be no way of preventing vacationing students from taking part in military activities while in Cyprus. A recent demand that some forty Turkish Cypriot high school graduates who had travelled to Turkey in the summer but failed to secure admission at any Turkish university be allowed to return to Cyprus is still being considered by the Government, which has made it clear that the case of each of the youths must be considered individually.

120. I have repeatedly stressed in my previous reports the beneficial effects that, in my view, liberalization of personal movement would have in Cyprus, and it is regrettable that the contending sides have not found it possible to follow such a course. UNFICYP is prepared to offer every assistance in the implementation of any measures designed to facilitate the movement of the civilian population.

C. Efforts to restore normal economic activities

Introduction

121. Thanks to bumper cereal harvests and generally good prices, the gross national product of Cyprus increased spectacularly in 1965 to a record level almost 25 per cent higher than the previous year: an impressive result, even allowing for the fact that 1964 had been a year of decline. Although cereal harvests have been below average in 1966, agricultural production is varied enough to avoid over-dependence on a single crop, and vegetables, carobs, citrus fruits and wine products have all had a good year. Export figures for each of the first six months of 1966 show substantial increases over the corresponding period last year, indicating that the upward surge in the economy continues unabated, and there has consequently been a slight improvement in the relatively large negative trade balance. As in previous years, the substantial Cyprus trade deficit has been amply covered by earnings from such "invisible exports" as foreign military spending (especially by the British Sovereign Base Areas), tourism and a net inflow of private capital, and currency reserves have continued to mount. Bank credit has expanded, reflecting a higher pitch of economic activity and investment in the construction and processing industries. At the same time the relative price stability of recent years has come under strain, with new wage demands put forward by the trade unions, who have hitherto practised a policy of voluntary restraint. Tourism, of great potential importance to Cyprus, is slowly reviving, the number of tourists visiting the island during the summer months of 1966 being almost double that of last year.

122. Economically isolated, the Turkish Cypriot community has found itself in a backwater as far as trade, industry and employment are concerned, and does not participate in the economic expansion of the country or the development of its resources. Many of the estimated 20,000 refugees and displaced persons in the Turkish Cypriot enclaves are unemployed, and their enforced idleness emphasizes the isolation of the community, whose economy is sustained by financial assistance

and relief supplies from Turkey. The Turkish Cypriots in public employment are paid from external sources, and about one-third of the Turkish Cypriot population is estimated to need some form of welfare relief.

Economic restrictions and movement of goods

123. A major grievance of the Turkish Cypriots is the rigorous restriction by the Government of the movement into Turkish Cypriot areas of items which it considers to be of actual or potential strategic value. These items include not only arms and explosives but also a wide range of construction materials, articles such as tape recorders, plastic hoses or dry batteries - anything, in fact, which the Government feels might be used to strengthen the military capacity of Turkish Cypriot fighters. Government policy on construction materials is further influenced by the consideration that displaced Turkish Cypriots should not be encouraged to settle more permanently in the areas where they are sheltering and thus lose an incentive to return to their old villages, where the Government is prepared to offer financial assistance for the repair or rebuilding of houses damaged during the disturbances.

124. Government policy on the movement of restricted items has not been relaxed during the period under review, and the official list of restricted items (S/7001, paras. 121-124) has not been modified in substance. A number of these, however, such as fuel oil and fertilizers, are released under permit by district administrators, and UNFICYP has recently engaged in negotiations with the Government with a view to increasing the number of items on the list restricted only conditionally. No automobile spares or gasoline deliveries are allowed into the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, and only properly licensed Turkish Cypriot vehicles can enter government-controlled areas to undergo repairs or to buy gasoline there. The purchase of gasoline by Turkish Cypriot owners of licensed automobiles who reside in the principal enclave of Nicosia has recently been subjected to rigorous controls in order to prevent the accumulation of fuel or its transfer to unlicensed vehicles.

125. Although not officially restricted, a number of articles which resemble items on the list of restricted goods are often confiscated at checkpoints. In many cases they are later released through the good offices of UNFICYP. This was notably the case with electrical household appliances such as refrigerators, toasters and water-heaters, which have been refused entry at the Famagusta Gate checkpoint. Following UNFICYP representations, the Government decided not to prohibit the entry of such items, although it expressed concern at the increased consumption of electricity by the Turkish Cypriots, who do not pay for the electricity they use. Turkish Cypriot arrears in the payment of electricity bills, as of 14 July 1966, were stated by the Government Political Liaison Officer at the Political Liaison Committee meeting on 8 September 1966 to total £C232,000.

126. As many restricted items have extensive civilian applications, the Turkish Cypriots find the restrictions onerous, particularly in the case of building materials. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has repeatedly urged UNFICYP to use its good offices to obtain the release of building materials to be used for the repair of civilian housing, repairs to public buildings such as schools and hospitals, and the construction of temporary accommodation for refugees. UNFICYP has raised the matter with the Government on a number of occasions, but the Government has so far failed to take any action; in particular the materials enumerated in a list prepared by the Turkish Cypriot leadership towards the end of 1965 have not been released (S/7001, para. 125).

127. The Government usually makes the granting of clearance for building materials for the repair of Turkish Cypriot public buildings or installations conditional upon the inspection and supervision of the repair work by officials of the Public Works Department - a condition which is unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The Government is disinclined to allow UNFICYP engineers to carry out such inspection and supervision, partly on principle and partly because it believes that it is very difficult to ensure that materials, especially cement, are not diverted from the project for which they have been cleared. Nevertheless, UNFICYP has been successful from time to time in obtaining clearance for building materials

requested by the Turkish Cypriots for specific projects to be carried out under UNFICYP supervision, such as timber for floors in the new tents (para. 141) erected at Kokkina and the repair of cracked water mains in the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia, which were in danger of causing contamination of the water supply. On the other hand, a request for clearance for a quantity of pre-mixed macadam to be used for emergency repairs to the Kyrenia Road was refused, although endorsed on road safety grounds by UNFICYP as one of the principal users of the road, the Government's position being that it could not assist with the repairs as long as the road, which passes through the main Turkish Cypriot enclave, was not open to the general public. Other requests for construction materials, such as one for materials to repair storm-damaged houses in the village of Mandres Hamid and another for materials to enlarge school buildings in the villages of Stavrokono and Mandria and the town of Ktima, have not been approved, while the authorities ruled that clearance for building materials to repair the St. Sophia mosque, an important Gothic monument in the Walled City of Famagusta, could be granted only if officials of the Antiquities Department were allowed to inspect the building and subsequently supervise the repair work.

Industry

128. The question of the industrial enterprises which have been idle since the disturbances in 1964 is linked with the issues of the restrictions on certain materials and on freedom of movement, and although UNFICYP has been trying to secure the reactivation of these enterprises, which would benefit trade and employment, no progress has been achieved on this matter (S/7350, paras. 115-117).

129. In the main Turkish Cypriot enclave three relatively large Greek Cypriot-owned enterprises, namely, a limekiln and stone quarry, a flour mill and a textile plant, cannot operate as Greek Cypriots do not have access to the enclave, while two Turkish Cypriot-owned enterprises, namely, a steel wool company and a tyre retreading plant, remain inactive because the raw materials which they use are not allowed into the enclave by the Government. In the government-controlled areas of

the island a Turkish Cypriot-owned likekiln at Ambelikou and two Turkish Cypriot-owned brick and tile factories have not been granted clearance to operate, largely as a result of having been included in the now-deadlocked negotiations on industrial reactivation.

130. It would seem that progress in this field can best be achieved within the context of a relaxation of current economic restrictions. The Turkish Cypriot leadership contends that the de-restriction of raw materials and some equipment for the two Turkish Cypriot plants is an inadequate offer by the Government in return for authorizing the reopening of the Greek Cypriot factories and the entry of Greek Cypriot staff into the enclave to operate them.

Agriculture

131. Most Cypriots, especially Turkish Cypriots, earn their living from agricultural pursuits. A great many of the problems which arise in connexion with agriculture concern cases where land belonging to a member of one community is situated either in an area controlled by the other community or in a sensitive area of confrontation, and therefore cannot be cultivated. UNFICYP tries to solve these problems, wherever possible, by helping to promote leasing and share-cropping arrangements, lending its good offices in the negotiation and implementation of harvesting agreements for sensitive areas, and providing observers to watch over harvesting work by both Greek and Turkish Cypriot farmers in such areas.

132. Although it is estimated that about half of the abandoned Turkish Cypriot-owned land is leased to Greek Cypriots, the total area of such land is much larger than that which Greek Cypriot farmers are prevented from cultivating. The Government denies that there is anything to stop Turkish Cypriots from cultivating their land, since they are free to return to their villages and resume work on their land at any time, and points out that unlawful cultivation of Turkish Cypriot land by Greek Cypriots is a punishable offence. To this Turkish Cypriots reply that they hesitate to report such offences or alleged breaches of leasing agreements with Greek Cypriots, for fear of reprisals against their property.

133. Much of the Greek Cypriot-owned land located inside the main Turkish Cypriot enclave is being farmed by displaced Turkish Cypriots under a leasing arrangement with the leadership, which has offered to compensate the Greek Cypriot owners of the land either directly or through the Government. The owners refuse to accept compensation in the form of rent, however, arguing that unhindered access to their fields is worth much more to them than the rental payments offered.

134. It was partly in consequence of disagreement over compensation that the Grain Commission, on the Government's instructions, withdrew its initial offer to implement in toto the grain concentration agreement which was reached with Turkish Cypriot co-operative societies in 1965 and which governed the payment of subsidies to grain producers (S/7350, para. 119). Under the terms of the Grain Commission's revised offer, subsidies paid to Turkish Cypriot farmers outside the main enclave north of Nicosia would be subject, as in the past, to a deduction of 20 per cent of the official cereal price to amortize outstanding loans to the Turkish Cypriot Co-operative Bank. Subsidies to Turkish Cypriot farmers and co-operative societies in the main enclave, however, would be subject to an additional 30 per cent deduction in order to set up a compensation fund for Greek Cypriots prevented from cultivating or harvesting their land. The Turkish Cypriots opposed this provision on the grounds that it constituted a collective penalty and maintained that the question of land encroachment and related compensation should be dealt with separately. Agreement on the concentration of cereals in 1966 was eventually reached on the understanding that grain deliveries from the enclave were not to be a prerequisite for the payment of the subsidized price to Turkish Cypriot producers in other areas. The grain harvest from the enclave was consequently not delivered to the Commission.

135. Generally speaking, Turkish Cypriot farmers have been able to continue to operate their agricultural machinery, although they frequently complain that the quantities of diesel fuel, lubricants and spare parts released to them by the Government authorities are insufficient for their needs. Conditions vary in in different parts of the Island. Some Turkish Cypriot villages receive monthly quotas of diesel oil, but elsewhere fuel is released against individual application and farmers find this system a severe handicap. No permits for fuel or spare parts at all are granted to owners of unlicensed tractors in the main Turkish Cypriot enclave. Although there is no licence charge for tractors, they can only be licensed after Government officials have inspected them to make sure that they are exclusively for agricultural work, and such Government inspection is not acceptable to the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

D. Measures to assist refugees and other distressed persons

136. There seems no prospect of any significant development in connexion with the problem of the some 20,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees and displaced persons in Cyprus so long as a political settlement remains out of reach. These persons left their homes and most of their property during the disturbances of 1963 and 1964, and are now living as best they can in refugee camps or other villages and towns.

137. The refugees need housing and employment rather than education and food, which are provided by local co-operative efforts and the Turkish Red Crescent Society, respectively. In some areas, such as the main enclave north of Nicosia and the Louroujina and Lefka areas, many refugees seem to have adjusted to some extent to the changed conditions, but in other areas such as Kokkina, Polis and Ktima adjustment is difficult or impossible because of lack of space, the absence of employment opportunities and the shortage of cultivable land.

138. The housing situation has improved since 1964 in that the number of people living in tents has decreased considerably. A great many people live in primitive conditions in other structures; in Polis, for example, over 200 people are accommodated in an overcrowded school, in Kokkina about 100 people live in stables, and in Ktima there are many cases where two families are obliged to share one small room.

139. Some attempts have been made by the Government to persuade Turkish Cypriot refugees to return to their villages, and in certain villages such as Potamia and, more recently, Skylloura, the Government has rebuilt and repaired Turkish houses in the hope that their owners will return to their former homes. But the Turkish Cypriot leadership does not favour the return of refugees to their homes and deters them from going back to their villages on the grounds that the basic political problems must be solved and the safety of their lives and property must be guaranteed. Mistrust and fear of further outbreaks of violence also cause individual families to put off returning to their villages.

140. Consequently, Turkish Cypriot refugees and displaced persons continue to suffer from overcrowding, lack of proper sanitation and insufficient employment. The Government's policy is clearly one of discouraging them from settling permanently where they now live, by denying them the materials they need to improve their housing. The policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership is exactly the opposite as mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The Turkish Cypriots endeavour to alleviate the situation with the few resources at their disposal, for example, by building houses out of mud bricks. The question of building materials (para. 125) is therefore directly connected with the refugee problem.

141. A particularly serious housing problem developed this year at Kokkina, where refugees from several neighbouring villages are concentrated. Over a hundred families at Kokkina have now lived for almost three years in tents, but over that time the tents have deteriorated to such an extent that they would not have provided adequate shelter in the coming winter. The Turkish Communal Chamber asked UNFICYP to use its good offices by approaching certain Governments with a request for new tents. Following this request the United States Government provided eighty-five large tents and the United Kingdom Government fifty medium-sized tents. Most of the tents contributed were delivered to Kokkina, but thirty-five were sent to other refugee centres. The Government gave clearance for the delivery of the tents and also agreed to permit the delivery to Kokkina of wooden floors for the eighty-five large tents sent there.

142. During the period under review, there was no new Red Crescent relief shipment, but the Government was requested by the Turkish Embassy to give clearance for the twelfth shipment, which is due to arrive in Cyprus towards the end of the year and will include, as in the past, foodstuffs, medicines, clothing and blankets. No difficulties have been experienced in securing Government clearance for the despatch of Red Crescent supplies from the last shipment to Kokkina and Limnitis; deliveries to other villages do not require special clearance.

E. Normalization of the public services

Introduction

143. As stated in my previous report (S/7350, paras. 131-133), failure to reach political agreement has had serious effects on public administration. A number of public services which were previously more or less integrated are now organized and administered separately by the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership in the areas under their respective control, and there is little prospect of their reintegration until political issues come nearer a solution. UNFICYP's role has therefore been confined to assisting in attempts to bring back into operation, even if only partially, certain services which cannot readily be segregated.

144. The supply of essential utilities such as water and electricity has continued without interruption despite the fact that no payment is made for them by Turkish Cypriots. In endeavouring to bring about the restoration of other important common services, UNFICYP has sought to negotiate practical ad hoc arrangements that would not prejudice the political positions of the parties. While this has usually involved long and painstaking efforts, some successes have been achieved during the period under review.

Postal services

145. In the Turkish sector of Nicosia and in Lefka, some 65,000 people had been deprived of postal services since December 1963. After another determined effort by UNFICYP to solve this problem, an arrangement covering both the restoration of postal services and the return of Post Office property was concluded with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership and entered into force on 15 October.

146. Under the terms of the arrangement the Director of the Department of Posts appointed two Turkish Cypriot postal agents for the Turkish sector of Nicosia and one for Lefka and issued to them, subject to existing law and practice, ordinary and registered mail for distribution or dispatch to addressees as well as stamps, postal orders, stores, forms, stationery and other supplies. All mail detained anywhere in the Island was released for distribution. The postal agents,

for their part, handed over to the Director all stocks of postage and other stamps as well as postal orders and sums of money which had remained in the Turkish sector of Nicosia since December 1963. They also handed over parcels, safes and other items and agreed to provide accounts of past and future transactions and to abide by all instructions from the Director concerning postal matters.

147. Implementation of the arrangement in Nicosia began within a few days of its conclusion, and for the first few days UNFICYP vehicles transported various postal items between the Government-controlled and Turkish sectors of Nicosia.

Measures to restore postal services in the town of Iefka followed a few weeks after the restoration of postal services in the Turkish sector of Nicosia.

148. The solution of the postal services problem has mitigated a serious hardship which had contributed to intercommunal tension in Cyprus for nearly three years. Like the land records arrangement, the postal services arrangement reflects a sense of realism on the part of both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership and may, I hope, set an example for the solution of other outstanding questions.

Land records

149. Also during the period under review an ad hoc arrangement concerning the Nicosia District land records was negotiated by UNFICYP with both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership and has been successfully implemented. This arrangement has removed the main obstacle to carrying out transactions involving immovable property by making available to the District Lands Office the land records located in the Turkish sector of Nicosia.

150. In essence, the arrangement represents an extension and modification of earlier practice whereby land records located in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia were made available to the Department of Lands and Surveys through the intermediary and on the premises of the United Nations (S/7350, para. 141).

151. Under the arrangement, all registers not containing any currently valid Turkish Cypriot registrations, together with all auxiliary records and documents, would be transferred from the Turkish quarter to the Department through UNFICYP. Mixed registers would be microfilmed under UNFICYP supervision, all registers in which the number of currently valid Turkish registrations being handed over to

the Department and an UNFICYP-certified microfilm copy of the Turkish registrations therein handed over to the Turkish Cypriots. The Department would also receive a certified microfilm copy of all registers and books not transferred to it.

152. United Nations premises at Kolsey Barracks would continue to be made available to Turkish Cypriots for the purpose of making declarations or executing other actions needing to be performed before an officer of the Department of Lands and Surveys, and the Turkish Cypriots would have unhindered access to those premises. All registers, records and documents remaining in the Turkish quarter would be made available to the Director of the Department at those premises as and when required by him. Similarly, the Director of the Department would make available on United Nations premises any required record or document transferred to him which affected Turkish Cypriot property.

153. The conclusion of this ad hoc arrangement made it unnecessary for the Government to enact the proposed law for the establishment of new land registers (S/7191, para. 128).

154. Under this ad hoc arrangement a total of 5,012 registers and other substantive books pertaining to 165 villages and urban quarters were transferred to the Department, as were 1,043 auxiliary books and 8,481 files, while 232 films with a total of 150,000 pictures were taken at United Nations premises, 172 certified films being delivered to the Department and 60 films to the Turkish Cypriots. The cost of microfilming was borne by the Government.

155. The land records arrangement negotiated by UNFICYP is sure to benefit Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike and has also helped to avert further complications. The spirit of realism which prevailed during the negotiations should serve as an example to be followed in the solution of other outstanding problems.

Payment of social insurance benefits

156. With the outbreak of disturbances in 1963, the national social insurance scheme ceased to pay benefits to Turkish Cypriots, who likewise stopped paying contributions to the scheme. As indicated in my last report (S/7350, paras. 142-143), the Government resumed the payment of old age and widows' pensions, as of 1 March 1966, to eligible beneficiaries in the Turkish sector of

Nicosia District whose entitlement had been established before December 1963. It was not prepared, however, to pay arrears of benefits for the period December 1963-February 1966 or to resume payments to beneficiaries in areas other than Nicosia where the basic conditions of the scheme are not fully met: i.e., where social insurance inspectors do not have free access and from which regular contributions to the scheme are not made. Nor was the Government willing, for the same reasons, to pay pension benefits to applicants from such areas whose entitlement had arisen after December 1963 or to pay Turkish Cypriots any other benefits of the scheme, such as maternity grants, sickness and unemployment benefits.

157. The Government's view is that unless contributions are paid in full by the Turkish Cypriots, normal benefits cannot be disbursed to them without jeopardizing the finances of the scheme. While eager to restore Turkish Cypriot participation in the scheme and to fulfil all concurrent obligations in respect of contributions, the Turkish Cypriot leadership is not prepared to modify its attitude concerning access by Government inspectors, who, the Government insists, must be enabled to verify, among other things, whether or not applicants for benefits are still in employment. In an attempt to surmount this hurdle, UNFICYP has requested the leadership to submit a proposal for the Government's consideration, whereby reasonable guarantees would be provided to ensure that contributions are paid in compliance with social insurance regulations.

Birth certificates

158. UNFICYP has pursued its efforts to promote an agreement regarding the issue of birth certificates (S/7350, para. 144). The Turkish Cypriots require birth certificates when applying for passports, identity cards, etc., but the Government has not been prepared to provide the Turkish Cypriots with official blank birth certificate forms as long as the Turkish Cypriot leadership refuses to hand over the official registers of births for the Nicosia District which are still located in the former administrative offices in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia.

159. The prospects for successful negotiations on this matter looked promising when in August the leadership declared itself ready to surrender the all-Greek Cypriot and predominantly Greek Cypriot registers in its possession (in all about 800 books), while retaining the all-Turkish Cypriot and predominantly

Turkish Cypriot registers. After consultation with Government officials and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, UNFICYP put forward certain proposals providing for the transfer of the registers, the microfilming of mixed registers, the supply of blank birth certificate forms and the submission of proper accounts to the Government in respect of fees collected by the Turkish Cypriot officer responsible for the issue of birth certificates to Turkish Cypriots.

160. The Government now feels, however, that it cannot empower an officer who does not owe allegiance to it to issue and sign an official document, and it proposes instead that all registers be transferred to the District Office in the Government-controlled area, where Turkish Cypriots would be able to obtain birth certificates as required.

Problems of public revenue

161. Previous reports have given an account of the exchange between the Government and Evkaf, the Turkish Cypriot religious trust, concerning their mutual claims and obligations, in particular those relating to the Bekir Pasha water system, whose management Evkaf maintains has been illegally taken over by the municipal authorities of Larnaca (S/7350, paras. 147-148). Latterly, the Government invited Evkaf to take the matter before a court of law if it still disputed the Government's case.

162. In a letter dated 3 November 1966, Evkaf restated its previous claims and pointed out that although it was a non-political institution its claims were treated by the Government in the context of the political controversy. As for the Government's invitation to take the matter before a court of law, Evkaf declared that if an agreed settlement of outstanding claims and liabilities were not reached in the meantime, it would have recourse to a court of law "when constitutionally constituted courts are established". The substance of Evkaf's communication was transmitted to the Government, which replied on 19 November that although the question of the Bekir Pasha water system concerned the Water Board of Larnaca, and not the Government, a settlement between Evkaf and the Water Board whereby the latter, as the sole water authority in Larnaca, would take over Evkaf's liabilities in respect of the water system would be acceptable to the Government.

Kyrenia Pass Borehole

163. There were water shortages in many areas of the Island during the summer months because of poor rainfall in the winter. In particular, the flow from springs supplying two or three villages in the northern part of the main Turkish Cypriot enclave with domestic water diminished so much that the Turkish Cypriots were led to draw water from a borehole owned by the municipality of Kyrenia and located in a confrontation area in the Kyrenia Pass. The Turkish Cypriots contended that they were entitled to lay piping from it to supply the neighbouring villages with water for domestic use.

164. Following complaints by the Government and the Kyrenia municipal authorities, UNFICYP negotiated an arrangement whereby the Turkish Cypriots would draw an agreed quantity of water from the borehole and take it away in tank trucks. The Kyrenia Municipal Council initially agreed to an allowance of ten tons of water daily, later increasing the allowance to thirty tons. As the borehole was located in a sensitive area, UNFICYP established an observation post nearby.

Payment of rent to Turkish Cypriot owners of property occupied by UNFICYP

165. Definite progress has been made regarding the settlement of rent claims by Turkish Cypriot owners of UNFICYP-occupied property (S/7350, para. 150). Government departments have been able to verify ownership of some of the property by consulting the relevant land and tax registers, and have made offers of rent to the owners concerned. Up to the end of November 1966, ten owners had visited the Public Works Department, accepted the rent offered and received payment. One difficulty which remains to be solved, however, is that of the assessment of rent for property located in so-called "sensitive" areas. The Government is now considering several alternative ways of approaching this problem.

F. The functioning of the law courts and the administration of justice

166. In my last report to the Security Council (S/7350, para. 155) I deplored the fact that all the Turkish Cypriot judges had discontinued attending their offices after having worked in full harmony with their Greek Cypriot colleagues

since early in 1964. I also expressed the hope that their decision to withdraw from their functions was only a temporary one and that they would find it possible to resume their duties in the near future.

167. The reasons given for that decision at the time and subsequently reiterated by the Turkish Cypriot leadership were the non-compliance of the Cyprus Government with the Vice-President's appeal of 28 September 1964 to the President to repeal as unconstitutional the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law of 1964, and an incident on 2 June 1966 when the Turkish Cypriot judges were prevented by the Cyprus Police from attending their offices (S/7350, paras. 153-154).

168. Following the incident of 2 June, the President publicly stated that what had happened on that date had been due to a regrettable misunderstanding and that there had not been any intention whatsoever of causing the Turkish Cypriot judges any embarrassment or inconvenience, as was borne out by the fact that the matter had been rectified within minutes of its being reported to higher authority and that on the day in question the Turkish Cypriot judges had sat in the courts as usual. The President went on to say that he had no doubt that the judges, responding to the call of their judicial duties, would resume their functions and nobody had the right to prevent them from doing so.

169. In reply the Vice-President stated that the Turkish Cypriot judges had agreed to continue to perform their duties subject to certain reservations and expectations but had subsequently come to the conclusion that they could no longer continue to discharge the duties of their high office properly, because of the hindrance placed in their way by the Greek Cypriots and the unacceptable circumstances and conditions created by the latter for political reasons. He added that the Turkish Cypriot judges would no doubt have responded to the call to resume their functions, had President Makarios shown willingness to ensure that the Courts functioned in conformity with the Constitution, under which the Turkish Cypriot community could not, as had been the case for the last two years, be deprived of judicial service. He stated, in conclusion, that it was not yet too late to act upon the appeal which he had addressed to the President in 1964 and that he would welcome any endeavour in that direction.

170. Dr. Kuchuk also referred to the unanimous decision by all the Turkish Cypriot judges, made public on 18 June, that they could not continue to try to discharge their duties under the present circumstances.

171. On 17 June 1966 Justice Lekia, the Turkish Cypriot President of the Supreme Court, tendered his resignation from his post, and on 9 September 1966 the Acting President of the Republic appointed an Acting President of the Supreme Court, as well as one permanent and two acting judges. These appointments, it was stated, represented the least that could be done to ensure the proper administration of justice while preserving at the same time the independence of the judiciary. It was also stated that while the arrangements made did not in any way prejudice the return of the Turkish Cypriot judges, temporary appointments tended to jeopardize the independence of the judiciary and could therefore only continue for a limited period. The Government later announced a number of other appointments and transfers in the judiciary at the District Courts level.

172. In September it was announced by the Government that three Turkish Cypriot judges had resumed their duties in the District Court of Limassol some time previously, but that after consultations held in the Turkish sector of Nicosia one of the judges had left the Island and the two others had advised the Government that they would be unable, for the time being, to continue to attend the courts. The Government made it known that there was every reason to believe that when the judges had gone to the Turkish Cypriot quarter for the consultations they had been kept there against their will and subjected to pressure, particularly in the case of two of the judges who had entered the quarter on the morning of 19 September and, although expected to return to Limassol the same day, had only come out the next morning. The temporary disappearance of the two judges, which created such concern that UNFICYP was informed of it by the Government and asked to make inquiries, caused the Government to renew its earlier assertion that the Turkish Cypriot leadership was doing everything in its power to prevent the Turkish Cypriot judges from resuming their duties.

173. At present, therefore, no courts of the Republic are attended by Turkish Cypriot judges and Turkish Cypriots are still reluctant to make use of the courts or take part in litigation. The non-availability of the court records (including

wills and administration files and records) and the law reports and books, which have remained in the Turkish Cypriot sector of Micosia, continues to hamper the work of the courts of the Republic (S/6426, para. 171).

174. There is no doubt that the recent most regrettable developments regarding the functioning of the law courts and the administration of justice have been a serious setback to the efforts to maintain order and tranquillity and to restore normal conditions in Cyprus, and I must therefore repeat my appeal to those concerned to make it possible, in the interests of the future of the Island, for the courts to resume normal functioning. UNFICYP will, of course, keep the situation under constant review and do everything it can to help to overcome the present stalemate in this field.

IV. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL IN CYPRUS

175. It will be recalled that in March 1966 (S/7180 and S/7191, para. 158) I broadened the scope of activity of my Special Representative in Cyprus and asked him to use his good offices and make such approaches to the parties directly concerned in the Cyprus situation as might lead, in the first instance, to discussions at any level of problems and issues of a purely local or a broader nature.

176. The consultations held by Mr. Bernardes in the context of his broadened responsibilities with the interested parties both inside and outside the Island were described in my last report to the Security Council (S/7550, paras. 161-164), and it was made clear that his good offices would continue to be available to promote and facilitate any negotiations that might contribute to a solution of local problems or of the Cyprus question as a whole.

177. As also noted in my last report (S/7550, para. 179), in May 1966 Greece and Turkey decided to hold discussions on the question of Cyprus and on Greco-Turkish relations as a whole, with a view to facilitating a peaceful and agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem. These discussions are still in progress.

178. It was generally felt that no useful initiative could be taken by my Special Representative within the scope of his broadened responsibilities pending the outcome of these discussions. Consequently, Mr. Bernardes was not approached on any matters except those coming within the original scope of his responsibilities.

179. My Special Representative and his staff have therefore concentrated in the period under review on finding a solution for various problems of a substantially non-political nature. As indicated earlier in that report, a measure of success has been achieved in the field of normalization of the public services, especially in connexion with the restoration of postal services in the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia and in Lefka (paras. 145-148) and the conclusion of an ad hoc arrangement on land records (paras. 149-155).

V. MEDIATION EFFORT

180. In my report of 10 March 1966 (S/7191, para. 156), I informed the Council that my efforts towards achieving a resumption of the mediation function, following the resignation of Mr. Galo Plaza from the position of United Nations Mediator on Cyprus, had been unavailing, due primarily to the widely differing and firmly held views on the matter of the three Governments most directly concerned.

181. The situation regarding the mediation function has remained unchanged since that report. During the period under review I have not found the prevailing circumstances to be conducive to an attempt at a resumption of the mediation function.

VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

182. My present estimate of the operating costs of the Force to be paid by the United Nations and the estimated amounts to be claimed by governments providing contingents to the Force as reimbursement of part of their extra costs from the United Nations, for the thirty-three month period from the inception of the Force on 27 March 1964 through 26 December 1966, total \$59,430,000. This estimate makes no provision for the costs of the final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs which together may total \$610,000.

183. The amount of voluntary contributions pledged by forty member and four non-member governments for the same period totals \$55,087,290 as at 6 December 1966. To the above amount may be added approximately \$215,000 which has been received from public contributions, income earned on investment of temporary surplus funds, and net gains on exchange. Accordingly, unless additional pledges are received, there will be a deficit on 26 December 1966 in an amount of \$4,128,000.

184. If the Security Council should decide to extend the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus for an additional six-month period from 27 December 1966 to 26 June 1967 it is estimated that the additional cost to the Organization, including an amount of \$610,000 as the cost for final repatriation of contingents and liquidation costs, assuming continuance of reimbursement commitments, would be approximately \$10,285,000 as follows:

UNFICYP Cost Estimates by Major Categories of Expense
for the period 27 December 1966 to 26 June 1967

(in thousands of U.S. Dollars)

I. Operating Costs incurred by the United Nations

A. Movement of Contingents	955
B. Operational Expenses	860
C. Rental of Premises	150
D. Rations	660
E. Non-Military Personnel Salaries, Travel, etc.	538
F. Miscellaneous and Contingencies	112
Total, Part I	<u>3,275</u>

II. Reimbursement of Extra Costs to Governments Providing Contingents

A. Pay and Allowances	5,950
B. Contingent-Owned Equipment	960
C. Death and Disability Awards	100
Total, Part II	<u>7,010</u>

Grand Total, Part I and Part II... 10,285

185. The above estimates do not reflect the full cost of UNFICYP to Member and non-Member states since they exclude the extra costs which Members providing contingents to the Force have agreed to absorb at their own expense rather than to seek as reimbursement from the United Nations. The estimated amount of such extra costs which certain of the governments providing contingents or police units to the Force have reported they will absorb in respect of the six-month period from 26 December 1966 through 26 June 1967, in the event of the mandate of UNFICYP being extended and the governments concerned agreeing to extend their participation to the latter date, are as follows: Austria: \$75,700; Australia: \$152,400; Canada: \$745,369; Denmark: \$223,575; Ireland: \$595,700; New Zealand: \$44,800; Sweden: \$360,000; United Kingdom: \$1,000,000. Finland is also absorbing certain UNFICYP costs at its own expense. Accordingly, the total costs for the Organization and for the Governments providing contingents would exceed \$13,124,000 for the six-month period ending 26 June 1967.

186. In order to finance the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force for an extended period of six months after 26 December 1966, and to meet all costs and outstanding claims up to 26 December 1966, it will be necessary for the Secretary-General to receive pledges totalling \$14,413,000.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

187. This report can only underscore how little significant change there has been in Cyprus in the past six months. The familiar pattern of an uneasy truce has continued, marked, in the period under review, by an increase in the number of incidents, including frequent breaches of the cease-fire, many of which are deliberate, bomb explosions and other terrorist acts, and establishment of new and provocative fortified positions and reinforcement of old ones. In general, the situation remains one in which, were it not for the presence of UNFICYP, several incidents could have developed into serious fighting.

188. Nor has there been any significant progress in breaking the deadlock over the future settlement of basic problems. Such a settlement would certainly be facilitated by a full return to normal conditions in everyday life, but it is precisely because of the deadlock over the nature of the ultimate settlement that such a return to normality has not been possible. Despite the prevailing deadlock, two important problems - land records and postal services - have at last yielded to UNFICYP's attempt to find a solution, and this may justify a limited degree of satisfaction. Apart from this small achievement, however, the prevailing attitude towards normalization continues to be one of pervasive caution and of apprehension lest any concession may affect disadvantageously the terms of the ultimate settlement.

189. During the period under review, the dialogue concerning Cyprus between Greece and Turkey has continued. I have been so advised by the delegations concerned, although no information whatsoever regarding the substance of the talks has been made available to me. I know, of course, the desire of the Governments of Greece and Turkey to keep the substance of their talks secret. For this reason I am unable to give any indication to the Council as to whether there has been any progress, what results may be expected from these talks over the past several months, or when they may come to an end. In order to avoid doing anything which might be interpreted as imperiling a successful outcome of the talks, all other efforts toward a solution have been temporarily suspended. Thus, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus has interrupted for the time being his efforts under his extended responsibilities, even as regards talks at the local level. Equally, as stated earlier in this report, I have not found during

the period under review the prevailing circumstances to be conducive to an attempt at a resumption of the mediation function. While reiterating my previously expressed hopes for the success of the Greco-Turkish talks, I feel impelled to say that in the interest of an ultimate solution such United Nations efforts as are mentioned above should not be suspended for too long.

190. As I have stated in previous reports, the method of financing UNFICYP has been far from satisfactory and remains so. Despite two appeals by me for further contributions in the period under review, there is, at the close of the period, still a serious deficit. Moreover, the inequity of the distribution of the financial burden among Governments remains.

191. Only if current operational commitments and responsibilities were reduced could consideration be given to a further reduction of the military strength of UNFICYP, and in the light of the events of the past six months I would not feel justified in recommending the reduction of UNFICYP's responsibilities and commitments at the present time. I wish, however, to assure the Council that the possibilities of reductions and economies are under constant consideration both by the Force Commander in Cyprus and by me in New York. I shall not fail to recommend further reductions should they prove to be feasible within the over-all responsibilities of UNFICYP.

192. The persistence of the unsettled situation in Cyprus points forcibly to a further extension of UNFICYP's mandate, for there can be little doubt that the removal of the Force at this time would create a quite unwarranted risk of a renewal of fighting in the island. From the point of view of economy and efficient planning, a six-month extension would, of course, be preferable. After consultation with the parties principally concerned, I therefore recommend the extension of UNFICYP's mandate for a period of six months.

