

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA

Workshop on Iraq and the Region after the War:
Issues of Economic and Social Reconstruction
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**CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS**



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I. INTRODUCTION

The Workshop was organized by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) to complement international and regional initiatives being taken for the social and economic reconstruction of Iraq.

The main objective of the Workshop was to bring together different Arab and international experts and academics, with a special emphasis on Iraqi expertise, in order to assess the impact of the war and sanctions on Iraq's society and economy. The Workshop served as a forum for the exchange of ideas and past experiences of the United Nations and other entities in dealing with war torn countries, and their direct interaction with Iraqi experts.

The Workshop also complemented previous initiatives by examining the impact of the war on the Arab region as a whole. To this end, the Workshop provided a comprehensive appraisal of the challenges and problems facing development in the Middle East arising from the war and occupation of Iraq.

The discourse resulting from the workshop serves as a starting point for proposals on working strategies for socio-economic reconstruction and development of Iraq. Special emphasis on the humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq were made. Moreover, political and cultural ramifications pertaining to the war were tackled.

II. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Preamble

The Workshop on Iraq and the Region after the War: Issues of Economic and Social Reconstruction took place at United Nations House from 9 to 11 July 2003 and was attended by participants from Canada, Egypt, Iraq, Germany, Lebanon, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

The Workshop's main objective was to deliberate on alternative courses of action to be undertaken by Governments and people in the region, including Iraq, and possible courses of action open to intellectuals and NGOs in facing the challenges of economic, social, cultural and humanitarian reconstruction and development efforts in a war-torn country within a region plagued by wars and instability.

The stated objective of the Workshop was met through the presentation of papers and reports and the subsequent discussion of different perspectives and proposals by the various participants. The subjects chosen for discussion were organized under a number of headings and discussed over three days. The focus on the first day was on the impact of war in Iraq and the region, the second day was concerned with issues of reconstruction, rehabilitation and development, while the third day was largely devoted to analysis of the future prospects for Iraq. Each session was followed by general discussions relating to the points raised in the presentations, allowing the audience to express their opinions and pose questions and the speakers to actively engage in a meaningful dialogue.

Prominent experts were invited by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) to present their views in the Workshop, which was co-sponsored by the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Every effort was made to ensure the participation of a large number of Iraqi experts, currently residing inside and outside Iraq.

The Workshop was an attempt by ESCWA to generate a concerted effort to tackle the current situation on the ground and to examine feasible alternatives that could improve socio-economic conditions in Iraq. The Workshop also aimed to address the prospects for the future and the role ESCWA could play.

The Workshop concluded its proceedings with a number of recommendations, some of which were wide-ranging and general in nature while others were more specific, addressing both socio-economic and legal aspects of the situation in post-war Iraq.

A. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

There was consensus at the Workshop that, in addition to the obligations of the occupying Power under the Geneva conventions, the United Nations Charter and Security Council resolution 1483 (2003), the Iraqi "rehabilitation and development project" must have total Iraqi ownership. The rehabilitation and reconstruction of Iraq should be initiated, formulated, implemented and managed by a legitimate and internationally recognized entity, independent from the occupying Power.

Participants agreed that no serious economic reform or reconstruction could succeed in the absence of an internationally recognized Iraqi Government. Notwithstanding the provisions of Security Council resolution 1483 (2003), there is currently an almost total legal void in Iraq that is detrimental to the economic well-being of its people and very likely to create many additional economic and social problems.

Rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts will also fail if the basic issues of the physical and psychological rights of Iraqi citizens are not addressed. Those rights should be placed at the very core of a future democratic State of Iraq. Therefore, it is of vital importance that a seminar on human rights in Iraq be

held in cooperation with the Regional Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ESCWA, UNDP and the World Bank, in addition to other concerned regional and international organizations.

Participants urged all host countries of the Iraqi diaspora to facilitate participation in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Iraq. That participation can be channelled through the United Nations and other international organizations, NGOs, family ties and personal relationships.

The coordinators of the workshop were called upon to assist the Center for Developing Freedom of Journalists to hold a specialized seminar for Iraqis aspiring to become good journalists, which could be held in cooperation with other relevant Arab and international parties.

The coordinators of the Workshop must continue in their joint efforts to cooperate with the relevant regional and international entities and Arab and international civil society institutions in implementing those recommendations. Additional studies, conferences, workshops and operational activities and projects should be undertaken with the objective of promoting and supporting rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

B. LEGAL DIMENSION

There was consensus among the participants of the Workshop that, while the United Nations was required under resolution 1483 (2003) to coordinate its activities with the occupying Power, the organization should not be perceived as working directly under its jurisdiction.

It was thought that the United Nations would only be given a meaningful role in Iraq if the international community demonstrated that such a role was indispensable. The success of that will depend on re-enforcing United Nations independence vis-à-vis the occupying Power.

In this regard, the critical importance of United Nations neutrality as an international actor was emphasized, as was the unique part it could play in enhancing the legitimacy of any new Iraqi political order in the view of the people of Iraq, the Arab world and the international community.

Actors on the rehabilitation and development scene in Iraq and, in particular, the occupying Power, should take stock of United Nations expertise and experience in conflict and post-conflict situations. It was emphasized that the United Nations should play a critical role in the political, social and economic reconstruction process in Iraq, and that its role should not be limited to the provision of humanitarian relief. More specifically, the United Nations could undertake the following:

- (a) Facilitate the establishment of a representative and inclusive Government;
- (b) Supervise the election of a constitutional assembly;
- (c) Share its experience in helping to design new political institutions in post-conflict situations;
- (d) Assist in rebuilding Iraqi civil society by offering special programmes through international, governmental or regional organizations;
- (e) Ensure that the prosecution of the former Iraqi regime's war crimes and violations of human rights remains in conformity with international law and requirements of due process;
- (f) Provide technical assistance on community participatory development based on human rights and gender equality.

C. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DIMENSIONS

The "Authority" as defined by Security Council resolution 1483 (2003) should not make any financial commitments on behalf of Iraq other than paying salaries and re-establishing Government services. It should not authorize any type of borrowing, especially based on mortgaging or securitizing future oil receipts.

It was stressed that the problems of reconstruction should be well defined and kept distinct from the needed transition of the Iraqi economy from a centrally-controlled economy to a market economy.

It was recommended that a major transformation of the economy should be instituted by reforming and promoting productive activities in all sectors, with the aim of reducing the rentier character of the previous economy. A strategy for transition to the new economy that can employ the talents of Iraqis at home and abroad was regarded as critical.

Participants cautioned that, in the transition to a market economy, the mistakes made in some countries, where privatization was conducted outside any clear legal framework and amounted to the looting of the main assets of the country and, in particular, oil assets, should be avoided.

It was recommended that in the endeavours to stabilize the economy of Iraq, priority should be given to the following:

- (a) The pursuit of monetary reform and creation of a new dinar, possibly employing the decimal system, in order to prevent the dollarization of the economy and the pegging of the new currency to the United States dollar, thereby avoiding the Argentinian or Lebanese model. The importance of stabilizing the Iraqi dinar was emphasized, and it was suggested that such stabilization could be facilitated through the establishment of a well-endowed stabilization fund, to which the International Monetary Fund and donor community could contribute. In the absence of a diversified and viable production structure and in view of the high indebtedness of Iraq, a fixed exchange regime should be maintained in order to anchor future transactions without the inflation and debilitating high interest rates that would thwart investment and production;
- (b) The enactment of competition law that would put the development of the local private sector in the context of a real market economy, thereby preventing the emergence of monopolies or oligopolies;
- (c) The dismantling of foreign exchange control regulations. The Iraqi dinar could either be floating or pegged to a basket of the currencies of its main trading partners with a sufficient margin of fluctuation;
- (d) The preservation of the unity of the Iraqi budget, which should not be separated from the reconstruction budget;
- (e) The pursuit of fiscal reform that would secure financial decentralization;
- (f) The modernization of the central bank and of laws governing commercial banks, commerce and the judicial apparatus.

As for the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy, the following issues and priorities were suggested:

- (a) Reconstruction activities should be linked to making the widest possible use of Iraqi industries and services, in order to stimulate growth and productivity in the domestic economy. To that end, a depackaging of large contracts should be considered in order to enhance and maximise the local contribution;

(b) Costs should be contained and the utilization of Iraqi human resources, whether resident in Iraq or abroad, should be the rule at all stages of reconstruction. The international and Arab communities should not be considered as alternatives in that regard;

(c) Reconstruction activities should not be centralized in one entity, and the planning and identification of projects should be kept separate from execution. However, a comprehensive national plan may be developed through direct dialogue between all the stakeholders, with particular emphasis on the involvement of civil society institutions and, in particular, the private sector institutions and major actors;

(d) Execution or direct supervision should be entrusted to the relevant Government entities, namely, technical ministries or public enterprises. In that regard, the regulatory role of the State and of policy-making institutions should be enhanced, in order to enable them to draw up appropriate policies on fiscal, financial and taxation matters and develop policies related to employment, education, health and social services;

(e) The rehabilitation of the infrastructure should be linked to local procurement to the maximum capacity of the local market, and to the support of productive activities that can finance its operations and maintenance.

Iraqi indebtedness to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries could be manageable provided interest accrued on such debts since 1990 is cancelled on the grounds that the sanctions regime that was imposed on the country prevented Iraq from servicing its debts. In that regard, it was noted that oil is a finite and non-renewable resource. It belongs to all present and future generations, and no generation should be allowed to benefit at the expense of other generations. It is inconceivable that the privatization of oil could protect and balance intergenerational claims. A fund for all generations should be established and run by an independent public body that is transparent and accountable to the people of Iraq, in order to oversee production and investment in this vital sector.

A regional integration plan should guide the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy, taking into account the interests of neighbouring countries.

D. THE SOCIAL DIMENSION

Participants agreed that if the immediate needs of the Iraqi people are to be met, law and order must be established within the context of a new social contract based on iron-clad guarantees for all of human security, human rights and gender equality.

A new social contract should not only serve as the main framework for the overall reconstruction of Iraq, but should safeguard against the development of nepotism and a polarized society. It should also support the middle classes and human resources, and assist in restoring ethical working codes and such social values as productivity, integrity, professional capability and solidarity and assist in protecting marginalized social groups. Efforts should be made to reform the social services network and rehabilitate safety nets, in order to be able to respond to the needs of marginalized and impoverished groups.

Concern was expressed over the implementation of a sound privatization policy that would promote the Iraqi people's interests, while minimizing the negative aspects that are usually associated with privatization, including unemployment and inflation.

As part of a stabilizing campaign, people need immediate food and cash supplements. Over the past decade, Iraqis have relied heavily on the Government for food and income, which have largely been provided through the oil-for-food programme. This dependency cannot be rapidly phased out without creating major hardship for the local population.

Well-studied and carefully executed plans for capacity-building and the rehabilitation of the economy and society are vital. The linkage between the short- and long-term should be maintained throughout the transition period. The immediate needs of the people should be met while long-term developmental objectives are kept in view.

The Workshop regarded the participation of international, including Arab, organizations as essential in providing the requisite human and financial resources in the rehabilitation and development of Iraq. The United Nations, through the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Iraq, ESCWA, UNDP and others, should cooperate with the League of Arab States, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and the World Bank in this regard.

Overall rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts should not be confined to the public sector, but should also include the whole of civil society, with special emphasis given to NGOs, including those dealing with gender equality, women, older persons, children, youth, disabled persons and people with special needs, whose numbers have been increasing.

Human security, human rights and gender equality must be safeguarded. Special emphasis must be placed on the role that women can play in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Women must be empowered to become equal partners with men in this process.

In regard to the foregoing, the following were seen as essential:

- (a) The provision of security as the basic and most significant right for all citizens, without which no other right can be practiced;
- (b) The removal and elimination of all remaining arms, landmines and unexploded ordinance;
- (c) The provision of assistance to war victims and their families through the foundation of a central committee that would address their immediate needs and establish official records for all cases, including missing persons;
- (d) The establishment of a special ministry or council for women's affairs, responsible for the management of special programmes for women as victims of war, violence against women and rape and abduction;
- (e) The provision of assistance to victims of forced migration and displacement, particularly women and children, who are estimated to number two million, through the establishment of a special programme, entity or ministry which would support their social and economic reintegration. Such a body should also address the social problems caused by enforced migration, including those relating to residence and employment.

A judicial body should be established with a specific mandate for dealing with cases of "missing victims" who were detained by Iraq's previous regime. In addition to supervising mass graves and former detention centres, the body should prevent any tampering at those sites, which constitute legal evidence of crimes against humanity.

The following recommendations were made relating to basic needs and general services:

- (a) A food-rationing programme similar to the oil-for food programme should be maintained until such time as a macro-economic framework and balanced labour market are restored;
- (b) Child malnutrition must be eradicated and the relevant preventative measures undertaken;

(c) National health programmes and hospitals must be rehabilitated. Doctors and medical staff must be properly and fairly paid;

(d) Contagious diseases and, in particular, cholera, typhus and tuberculosis must be eradicated;

(e) Clean drinking water and sanitation must be made available. The swift recovery of the general utilities and services sector and, in particular, the water sector, must be assisted by establishing an emergency plan for the rehabilitation of distribution networks and treatment stations and by developing a medium- and long-term national plan for water management;

(f) A multi-dimensional drug-control programme must be established in order to counteract drug abuse, which has risen significantly since the war;

(g) Such special mechanisms as a hotline for women victims of domestic violence, abduction and rape should be established;

(h) Legislation should be enacted in order to empower women who have lost their husbands and women heads of household, through training and rehabilitation.

With respect to resources and family income, participants identified the following priorities:

(a) The protection of the Iraqi family's source of income, particularly when salaries from the public sector are in question. This issue should be considered in tandem with the projected rehabilitation, restructuring and privatisation programmes;

(b) The maintenance of the pension system, which is a major source of income for retirees.

Pertaining to education, the following measures were seen as vital:

(a) The review of all curriculums with new consideration given to human rights and gender equality;

(b) The removal of all obstacles to the resumption of regular scholastic programmes by the following measures:

(i) Providing security and facilitating the transportation of students and teachers;

(ii) Filling teaching and management vacancies;

(iii) Repairing school buildings and providing them with water and electricity;

(iv) Providing refugees with alternative safe-havens to the educational facilities they currently occupy.

(c) The provision of employment stability for teachers and ending of the arbitrary dismissal policy that is applied to teaching staff on the pretext of their having a Baathist background. Legal indictment should be restricted to those responsible for human rights abuses and crimes;

(d) The rehabilitation and modernization of the education system and improvement of the quality of education;

(e) The establishment of links with external labour markets;

(f) The removal from education programmes of any vestiges of the former regime, through a specialized national committee, in coordination with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. It is of vital importance that any external or foreign assistance in this respect should be limited to financial and technical support.

III. ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS DISCUSSED IN WORKSHOP*

A. IDENTIFYING THE MAIN ECONOMIC AND RECONSTRUCTION ISSUES IN IRAQ

by

George Corm

Identification of problems

Three wars and 13 years of sanctions have impoverished the Iraqi population, not causing the private sector to disappear totally. Nevertheless, the economy was largely centralized with the public sector, playing a leading role in managing and controlling the economy, with a minor role played by the private sector.

There are currently four main tasks. These are the following:

1. Fight against poverty and the creation of the foundations for sustainable development.
2. Transition from a centrally controlled economy to a market economy.
3. Reconstruction plans and financing mechanisms.
4. Rebuilding a monetary and financial system and avoiding a debt trap.

The main obstacles to the fulfillment of these tasks are the following:

- (a) The non-existence of an internationally recognized Iraqi Government;
- (b) The status of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, its relations with both the Iraqi population and the United Nations;
- (c) International competition to get "reconstruction contracts";
- (d) The multiplicity of actors;
- (e) The high dependence of the Iraqi economy on oil.

Central issues in planning economic transition

1. Privatization.
2. Subsidies.
3. Freeing foreign exchange market.
4. Developing the stock market.

Central issues in reconstruction policies

1. Damage assessments.
2. Planning and execution of Reconstruction works.
3. Linking reconstruction to the stimulation of the domestic economy.
4. Linking reconstruction to a global vision.

The Iraq reconstruction process should not be viewed as solely as a channel to bonanza profits for foreign or Arab companies and Iraqi businessmen. Lessons from failures of reconstruction and transition policies in many countries should guide Iraqi, American, United Nations and World Bank/IMF planners and decision makers in securing the proper framework and institutions so that the billion of dollars that will flow into the Iraqi economy will profit the Iraqi people that have suffered from twenty five years of hardship and economic deprivation.

* The opinions expressed in this part are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ESCWA.

B. SAMPLES OF IRAQI RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS DURING THE PERIOD 1991–2002

by

J.D. Jafar

The war during Jan./Feb. of 1991, followed by the upheavals in twelve of the eighteen governorates of Iraq, resulted in enormous damage to both public and private property. Coalition missiles and air forces that flew over 100,000 sorties during the 42 days of the war delivered more than 100 kilotons of high explosive ordnance. Anglo-American air forces attacked Iraqi industrial facilities with missiles on a number of subsequent occasions during the period 1992–1998; the largest of these attacks was during a four-day period in Dec. 1998, when a large number of industrial establishments were substantially damaged.

Reconstruction was hampered by the following factors: Imposed sanctions by the Security Council (SC) August 1990, recently lifted; a lack of foreign currency that made the importation of goods, spare parts and services almost impossible until the “Oil for Food” program was implemented late in 1996; poor communications because all major telephone networks were bombed and microwave links were put out of service and remained so till the end of 1991.

Before the end of February 1991, the priorities for reconstruction were clearly established. The first priority was assigned to the oil refineries at Daura and the North. The second priority was assigned to electricity generation, transmission and distribution. The third priority was assigned to the reconstruction of the transport and building sectors (e.g. cement production). Followed by communications and other industrial establishments

By mid May 1991, electricity was available from the national grid in all governorates of Iraq (including the three Kurdish ones). By July 1991, the countrywide demand for electricity was satisfied and more than 3000 MW were available. In July 1992, a peak load of 4500 MW was met and later in 1994 the load climbed to 5200 MW, which exceeded the peak load recorded in July/August 1990 (i.e. pre-war levels).

During the sanctions era, such projects as the North Jazira Irrigation Project, whose objective was to provide complementary irrigation for 160,000 donums (1 donum = 2500 m²) of arable land, received high priority in an effort to achieve self-sufficiency in strategic crops.

Under stable security conditions, the following may be concluded: any major reconstruction effort must commence by pooling all the resources of the industrial sector as a whole; priorities must be clearly defined; separate projects must be set-up and experienced managers designated; with sufficient motivation and good organization Iraqi personnel could implement any reconstruction project with little or no help on assistance from foreign contractors; essential spare parts and replacement items would have to be imported and foreign suppliers should strive to reduce the lead times before delivery; the overall cost of reconstruction is expected to be much lower when Iraqi personnel are primarily engaged. Moreover, a significant reduction in project execution time is also to be expected.

C. IDENTIFYING THE MAIN FINANCIAL AND MONETARY ISSUES IN IRAQ

by

George Corm

There have been numerous estimates of Iraq’s financial obligations and of the financial needs for reconstruction.

Estimates have been exaggerated for both issues reaching 400 billion dollars for claims on Iraq and 200 billion dollars for reconstruction needs.

The banking system in Iraq has crumbled down during the war as the Central Bank and the commercial banks have been looted. The Ministry of Finance apparently was also looted. A state of financial and monetary chaos has developed in Iraq since the beginning of April 2003.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 has outlined some basic institutional arrangements. The establishment of a *Development Fund for Iraq* (paragraphs 12,13,14) is at the core of the resolution. However, the resolution does not address the **functioning of a monetary system in Iraq** and especially the use of other currencies than the Iraqi dinar as legal tenders. In fact, Iraq is not cashless, but the problem is one of regrouping all of these amounts under a renovated Central Bank and re-establishing the overall **Iraqi Treasury function** where all payments and receipts should be centralized.

There are three types of financial claims on Iraq: debts, claims and contracts signed but not executed.

The present state of affairs is very detrimental to the Iraqi society. Iraq is in bad need of monetary and financial stability. However, without an internationally recognized government it will be difficult to create a new monetary and banking system.

D. ISSUES OF ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ: THE LARGER VIEW

by

Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil

Any future economic and social development, for post-war Iraq, will be severely limited by the **following constraints**: Severe lack of financial resources; excessive external public debt; heavy war reparations; mal-distribution of income and wealth; extensive loss of human resources and expertise, as a result of migration.

The Iraqi people's immediate needs are for law and order, electricity, food and medicine. The basic elements of a 'recovery program' in Iraq should focus on the following vital aspects: The provision of basic social services, especially in the fields of health and education; the reconstruction and rehabilitation, of power and water plants, sanitation, sewage facilities and telecommunications; and the institution of a new program of human development and technological rehabilitation and upgrading of the country's manpower.

Oil is the most valuable economic asset for Iraq. Hence it has to be managed to ensure the finance of 'maintenance imports', as well as financing reconstruction and development efforts. The Security Council resolution set up an international advisory board to audit income from Iraqi oil and put it into an **"Iraqi Development Fund"**, to be held at the Iraqi central Bank until "a new Iraqi government is properly constituted".

The optimal solution is to put Iraq's oil under **international trusteeship** until an elected Iraqi government manages the country's economic and political affairs.

It is suggested that the UN should have a **supervisory role**, which would enhance the legitimacy and credibility of the political and economic reconstruction process in Iraq. ESCWA, together with other UN and Arab specialized agencies should cooperate to establish a **"monitoring unit"** to oversee the transparency and fairness of **reconstruction contracts** awarded to foreign and American companies in particular.

E. REBUILDING IRAQ STRATEGIES OF DEVELOPMENT UNDER CRISIS CONDITIONS

by

Atif Kubursi and Ali Kadri

The specific strategy for Iraq today is dictated by a tight time frame and a sequence of connected steps fashioned by crisis conditions. It is also, a development-oriented strategy. The real issues are those of choosing a development strategy under crisis, where development is about unleashing human potentialities and broadening the choices of people. The development strategy by necessity requires a phasing out of the occupation; it simply cannot coexist with it.

There can be no alternative to beginning with the establishment of law and order. It is the first action from which and upon other choices can be made. No economy or society can function and develop in their absence. However, law and order cannot be sustained without strong and healthy economic measures that address immediate economic dysfunctions, hardships and dislocations.

To establish an adequate stable fund, to back up the Iraqi Dinar, all immediate and future transactions should come immediately from the international community and institutions, particularly the IMF and AMF.

The urgent creation of employment and gainful sources of income is imperative for cementing law and order.

The rehabilitation program in the electricity, water, transportation and communication sectors should ultimately be put in place. On a priority basis, the productive infrastructure should be the first claimant of any funds for this rehabilitation of infrastructure. It is also instructive to tie the rehabilitation of this infrastructure to local procurement of goods and services. In this way building the infrastructure will be tied to creating effective demand for local industry and the employment creation effort.

Iraq, unlike many Arab Gulf States and other Arab oil producers, has the potential to build a diversified economic base. There is a great potential for efficient agricultural activities once agricultural land could be reclaimed, rehabilitated and water rights secured. There are strong arguments for moving into the new economy and into ICT based activities given the proven talents of the Iraqis and the changes in the basis of success in the new and highly competitive international environment. While this transition strategy would take a long period of time to implement, it should start immediately.

There is a substantive need for immediate debt relief. By suspending payments on old debt until it is rescheduled and re-evaluated and some of it is forgiven, without penalizing old lenders by sharing the burden of debt relief, will remove the massive debt overhang that can straddle kick starting the economy.

Revocation of the stringent and imbalanced allocation formulas governing the existing distribution of oil revenues is of crucial importance at this stage. Iraqi's should immediately exercise their exclusive right to govern the use of their oil revenues and determine the volume of their oil production. This underscores the need to empower Iraqis to govern themselves.

F. WINDING DOWN OIL FOR FOOD: PRIORITIES FOR IRAQ

by

Dr Kamil Mahdi

The Oil-for-Food (OFF) programme was always envisaged as a temporary measure during the period of economic sanctions and as an exception to the comprehensive nature of the sanctions. Given that UN sanctions remained effective for nearly thirteen years, the OFF programme and its modes of implementation have become a part of the institutional framework of economic policy and have resulted in a high level of

dependency of the Iraqi economy and of the welfare of the population on the arrangements established under sanctions.

The programme's effectiveness in delivering humanitarian relief and in regenerating Iraq's economy were thus under continuous strain. A series of crises between the United States and Iraq after the introduction of the programme disrupted the smooth flow of goods.

Whereas the United States gave priority to the deduction of war reparations from Iraq's oil revenues, the former Iraqi regime, for its part, continuously tried to use the OFF programme in order to break out of international political isolation.

The insistence on an extremely restrictive interpretation of sanctions was probably designed for maximum economic impact rather than for preventing the leakage of resources to military activities.

The decision to end sanctions under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 removed a highly unsatisfactory arrangement ending the restrictions that had been in place since August 1990. However, in abolishing the OFF programme, Resolution 1483 has also removed any effective monitoring by the UN of the Iraqi economy while the country is under occupation and its cancellation raises the question of what is to replace it

To effectively address the acute social and economic problems of Iraq, there is a need for a proper and effective economic administration that is answerable to the people of Iraq and that is able to negotiate the country's international obligations effectively on the people's behalf. In the meantime, tampering with the comprehensive food ration programme, the budgetary support for basic public services and the provisions of cheap fuel supplies would be at high social, humanitarian and political costs.

G. "OIL FOR FOOD" AND "OIL FOR RECONSTRUCTION"

by

Ramzi Salman

Oil for Food

The Oil-For-Food-Program was intended to be a *"temporary measure to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, until the fulfillment by Iraq of the relevant Security Council resolutions"*.

In spite of the massive life-supporting needs, which were to be met rapidly, the program, initially allowed the sale of only two billion dollars worth of oil every six months. Only about two thirds of that amount was allocated to meet Iraq's humanitarian needs; 25% being allocated for a compensation fund for war reparation payments; 2.2% for United Nations administrative and operational costs; and 0.8% for the weapons inspection program.

With the lifting of civilian sanctions on May 22, 2003, the Oil for Food program will be terminated within six months. Responsibility for the administration of any remaining program activity, including funds, will be transferred to the occupying powers.

Oil for Reconstruction

Oil was one of the prime building blocks of the Saddam regime and it will be one of the prime building blocks of any new Iraqi Government, it will constitute a major foundation for the reconstruction of Iraq. The post war development of Iraqi oil will impact on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC) and on regional and global producers and markets. Oil will also have sweeping consequences for regional geopolitics.

The present state of the Iraqi oil industry and bringing production levels to recent pre-war levels then to 1990 levels is a lot more complex than many seem to realize. The issue is more of replacement, at least of substantial parts of the existing facilities, rather than repairs. Repairs and rehabilitation of the old infrastructure and equipment might be more costly and time consuming than building a new parallel production system in some areas and fields.

What is destroyed in Iraq during the three wars since 1980 and the inter war periods needs immediate attention. The destruction and downgrading was not limited to the industrial infrastructure, it covered all aspects of life. Reconstruction transcends the physical sectors to cover fiscal, monetary and all social sectors.

H. LESSONS LEARNED FROM UNDP INVOLVEMENT IN CRISIS AND POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS

by

Walid Mehalaine

Based on **UNDP** experience in 17 countries, it has developed a recovery approach to enable UNDP to support communities to recover and reconcile from conflict by linking recovery activities to long-term development processes and outcomes.

UNDP carries out recovery programs that focus on the following:

- (a) Economic and social assistance for the recovery of war-affected communities;
- (b) Reintegration of returning refugees, internally displaced person and ex-combatants;
- (c) Capacity building of governance structures and systems that provide essential services and of civil society at local and national levels.

UNDP has recognized strengths, shown clearly in country presence and outstanding global reputation, as an impartial objective development partner. The ability of **UNDP** to build capacities for improving governance, mobilize donor resources and engage civil society and local NGO's help in immediate structure formation.

Iraq tentative reconstruction process would begin with an immediate rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, institutional reforms decentralization, market – friendly regulations, democratic governance and participatory processes, and capacity building of new constitutions.

Assessment would also be necessary to obtain reliable information for planning and budgeting recovery and development activities. A clear mandate clarifying responsibilities would be needed in order to restore civil order and legal systems.

Nevertheless, the main challenges facing **UNDP** in accomplishing target would be transition from a centralized to a decentralized and democratic state and to market economy/private sector development, macro-economic stabilization and employment generation, and settlement of the debt issue.

I. SOCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS IN IRAQ: CHALLENGES - PRIORITIES – NECESSITIES

by

Antoine Haddad

The suffering of the Iraqi people both social and humanitarian, may not improve in the near future due to the fall of the former regime and the structural imbalances generated from it, along with international sanctions and successive wars for the last quarter century. The war introduced chaos, insecurity and lawlessness in the country. Attacks against US troops, delays in launching the country's political reconstruction, security problems such as shootings, murder, robberies, kidnappings and revenge killings, and the formation of private militias are all significant delay factors in the establishment of a stable and secure a political system in Iraq.

Other than the harm caused by the invasion or war, threats to the safety of the Iraqis also originated from land mines, the presence of radioactive materials in some nuclear facilities. Another priority involves dealing with problems resulting from property disputes. The use of firearms in some of these disputes has caused dozens of casualties. Despite the efforts made by the Coalition forces to help restore security and order and begin forming local authorities and a police force, daily social and humanitarian suffering still continue.

For the foreseeable future, until the country's macroeconomic framework and the system of incomes and family budgets are re-stabilized, there will be a tremendous need for an interventionist program to secure basic nutritional needs for the overwhelming majority of the population.

On the health front, there are two priorities. The first involves preventing the spread of epidemics, especially cholera, of which some cases were reported in the south after the war, particularly in the city of Basra and its surroundings. The second priority involves rehabilitating and restarting the national health care system and hospital sector. The health sector suffered a painful blow with the collapse of the old regime, as a number of hospitals were subjected to looting, theft and fire; some of them remain completely closed today.

Currently, Baghdad receives approximately 40% of its electricity needs, which means that power supplies remain intermittent and subject to rationing, while some neighborhoods are completely without electricity due to damage to the network. Telephone service remains non-operational in most of Baghdad neighborhoods.

As for water, many parts of Iraq, particularly the South, suffer from chronic problems of insufficient supplies of clean potable water, especially during the summer. Many rural areas lack domestic water networks and are limited to obtaining water from rivers, ponds and canals.

The collapse of the former Iraqi government raises considerable doubts about the fate of sources of income for a very wide segment of the Iraqi population.

The CPA has not issued a final, detailed policy on the issue of public sector salaries and pensions.

There is an urgent need for the Central Bank to resume operations as soon as possible because of the huge impact that inflation, price stabilization and real income stabilization have on the cost-of-living and living conditions for the overwhelming majority of Iraqis.

There are five issues connected to education and the education system, some of which are structural and chronic, and others emerged during and after the last war. These are the following: resuming studies and the fate of the current academic year; emergency conditions for the teaching staff; amending the curricula; rehabilitating the infrastructure of schools and universities; total reform of the educational system along the concept of sustainable development.

J. OIL FOR FOOD AND THE AFTERMATH- THE ALTERNATIVES

by

Saadalla Fathi

Resolution 986 of 14 April 1995: Commonly referred to as the 'Oil- for- Food' Program; Iraq to sell \$2 billion worth of oil every 180 days.

The programme improved the overall socio-economic conditions and prevented the further degradation of public services and infrastructure.

Performance under the UN Oil-For-Food Program

(a) The Program, under the insistence of Iraq, was expanded beyond its initial emphasis of food and medicines to include infrastructure rehabilitation and other sectors: such as electricity, agriculture and irrigation, education, transport and telecommunications etc. But the results were questionable;

(b) On 29 May 2003, UNICEF reported that child malnutrition in Iraq almost doubled from 4 per cent to 7.7 per cent between 20 March 2003 (the onset of war) and 29 May 2003;

(c) The oil for food program, never allowed fresh investment, curtailed government spending and prevented other exports from Iraq. Therefore, it contributed to the GDP remaining at a low level while the population increased.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003: Lifts economic sanctions on Iraq; grants interim governance powers to the Coalition and confers on them the status of an 'occupying power'; and creates an Iraq Development Fund held by the Central Bank of Iraq, which will receive all oil revenue and other designated funds. It will have an international advisory and monitoring board, and reduce the oil revenue paid to the UN Compensation Commission to 5%. In addition, it dismantles the Oil For Food Program.

The Alternative

(a) Another oil for food program? Certainly not;

(b) UN Security Council Resolution 1483- 22 May 2003? Not likely;

(c) The current chaos and trail and error of the occupation forces? Definitely no;

(d) The deliberate policy of forced unemployment? A recipe for disaster;

(e) The only alternative is the end of occupation, the independence of Iraq, a government of national unity and reconciliation, democracy and elections, the rule of law and respect of human rights;

(f) The UN and the international community to revitalize, reform and modernize its economy, cancel its debts and allow the expansion of its oil industry for the benefit of its people in the way they see fit;

(g) The attempt to force certain economic models on Iraq, particularly in the oil industry, will only spell trouble and scare vitally need investment;

(h) Iraq's oil resources, as it did in the past, can make the major contribution to Iraq's recovery. However, other economic sectors must be developed to reduce gradually dependence on oil and gas.

K. THE SOCIO-POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON IRAQ AND THE ARAB REGION

by

Hani Faris

A principal outcome of the recent U.S. war on Iraq has been the collapse of the Iraqi order, as well as the Arab regional order. At both the national and regional levels the war had and continues to have far reaching effects.

The collapse of the former totalitarian regime should have provided Iraqis after decades of repression and violence with the challenge and the opportunity of rebuilding their civil society, and reforming their economic and political systems. The Occupation has thus far hindered this process. In this regard, the following issues need to be considered:

1. Most Iraqis either reject outright the presence of the American and the British in their country, or expect the forces and administrators of these two countries to have a short stay.
2. Like any occupation, the U.S. cannot rule the country directly. It has to have a local agent or interlocutor to deal with the population. The U.S. faces a predicament. The immigrant groups that returned with U.S. forces from Western countries and which the U.S. has promoted over the years lack a strong constituency and have no regional supporters.
3. There is a growing perception that American officials seem to be moving in the direction of establishing a confessional system.
4. In the modern history of Iraq, two institutions defined the country's character and fortunes – the army and the national oil industry. The American administrators moved to dissolve the former and are pushing for the privatization of the latter. In time, these two issues could place the country on a collision course with the U.S.
5. Finally, the rebuilding of civil society needs to be based on pluralism, tolerance and mutual trust.

A multilateral and transparent process is urgently needed in the establishment of a government. The United Nations needs to assume a leadership role and maintain a significant presence in Iraq. Without a UN role, there will be no legitimacy to any efforts at political and economic reforms, and stability will be far from assured.

At this juncture, it is not feasible to analyze with a measure of certainty what the regional effects of this war will be.

There remains much controversy with regard to the American objective(s) behind the war. Depending on what these objectives are, this will suggest, in turn, how long the US intends to stay, what measures it will adopt in Iraq and what form its presence will take. It is these issues that will determine the long-term socio-economic and political effects of the war on the region and how regional actors will respond.

Meanwhile, the Arab regional order is shattered. No rules remain to guide Arab State behavior, and the structures, programs and policies for joint Arab action are a thing of the past.

L. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN IRAQ

by

Faleh Abdel Jabber

Modern civil society in Iraq has evolved since the reforms of Medhat Pasha (1872) that continued during the royal era (1921-1957). It was a period of the renewal of agricultural society, which was transformed from being formed of tributes, noble houses and handworkers to a society adopting the criteria of wealth and education without forgetting its traditional past.

During that period a class of traders, industrialists, bankers and contractors emerged, in addition to a class of landowners. This evolutionary process stopped during the period of military governance (1958-1968) and became totally corrupted during the period of totalitarian governance (1968-2003).

The government affected all the domains of civil society in the totalitarian era (1968-2003): it dominated economic life as the sole owner and producer of the oil resources. Oil revenues enhanced the government's capacity to own vast resources independent of society and, enabled it to bribe some social groups, allowing it to restructure the marginalized classes of businessmen. Furthermore, the government has also dominated all the voluntary unions of the middle and working classes and has attached them to the one party regime.

Finally, the government controlled in the dissemination of culture and in the language of conversation and communication.

Iraqi society broke down, formed from a high class of businessmen and different middle and low classes with no link between them, no institutions to protect them and no unified cultural identity. It could be argued that the operation of building a new civil society has to begin from phase zero under a foreign occupation and without any internal support.

M. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN IRAQ: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL SAFETY NETWORKS

by

Faleh Abdel Jabber

This study will address some historical indicators of social development in Iraq that may form the basis of a more promising future.

Between 1970-1980, Iraqi society witnessed important progress in development. GDP grew by 11.3% and the social level developed by 5.8%, mainly in education and health. The oil revenues were estimated at 95 billion dollars and upon this national development, for the 1970s and 1980s were established.

Progress made was lost with the beginning of the Iraqi-Iranian war that lasted 8 years, increasing poverty which was coupled with the loss of the household heads and breadwinners not to mention the debts of the Iraqi government. The situation was further aggravated by the second Gulf War and United Nations imposed sanctions

However, the first element of failure was the totalitarian regime, which transformed the society into a tool for the act of development to help the authority in making publicity to itself. This authority never considered development as an act to fulfill the needs of a whole society.

The last ten years created a complete institutional paralysis threatening the livelihood of Iraqis and exposing society to a state of deprivation. The most dangerous consequence of war and sanctions is the spread of inflation in all levels of life, which had structural effects on Iraqi society.

The social structure of Iraq was not stable as a result of different factors such as rapid social transfer, the collapse of the middle class, the diminution of the levels of life and the increasing poverty rate.

Social safety networks were formed according to a group of programmes funded by the government and some funds related to NGOs or assistance programmes.

Development under the authority of the state failed but it has also failed without the government's interference. In other words we can say that to achieve a sustainable development on the economical and social levels Iraq needs an effective decisive government.

N. WHAT POSSIBLE ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS IN IRAQ?

by

Karim Makdisi and Nawaf Salam

Abstract*

The paper asserts that any role assigned to the United Nations (UN) following the collapse of the Iraqi government and the occupation of Iraq should be analyzed in the context of recent UN peace operations in the post-Cold War era, given that the role of the UN in securing peace in conflict areas has now evolved from simple 'peace-keeping' to multi-dimensional 'peace-building'. In other words, the UN experience has led to a recognition that only an increased and urgent focus on the political and institutional aspects of peace operations can allow it to succeed in building true peace in war torn countries. As such, this paper briefly examines the UN's role in four such 'peace-building' missions--Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Afghanistan--to draw from the lessons the UN has learned from them, and to better understand the options available to the UN in Iraq.

The paper then turns to the possible role of the UN in Iraq. It states that although required under resolution 1483 to coordinate its activities with the Occupying Powers, the UN should not be perceived as working under their 'authority'. A meaningful UN role depends on the international community demonstrating that such a role in Iraq cannot be dispensed with. The *success* of such a role will depend on re-enforcing UN "independence" vis-à-vis the Occupying Powers. According to the paper, what should be emphasized is: (1) The critical importance of UN *neutrality* as an International actor; (2) The *relevance* and the *value* of UN expertise and experience in conflict and post conflict situations; and (3) The uniqueness of UN role in enhancing the legitimacy of any new Iraqi political order vis à vis :the Iraqis themselves, the Arab world, and the International community.

The paper concludes by offering a number of ways that the UN could play a critical role in the Iraqi political reconstruction process. It could:

1. Promote dialogue and consensus building among the various Iraqi groups.
2. Facilitate the establishment of a representative and inclusive government.
3. Supervise the election of a constitutional assembly.

* Please note that this paper was delivered in July 2003, before the second UN resolution on Iraq.

4. Share its experience in helping to design new political institutions in post conflict situations.
5. Help in the rebuilding of Iraqi civil society by offering through UNDP and other relevant IGOs special programs to that effect.
6. Ensure that the conduct of transitional justice regarding the prosecution of Saddam's regime war crimes and violations of human rights remains in conformity with international law and requirements of due process.

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(ب) إزالة جميع العقوبات التي تعترض استئناف البرامج الدراسية العادية النظامية عن طريق اتخاذ التدابير التالية:

- (١) توفير الأمن وتسهيل نقل الطلاب والأساتذة؛
- (٢) ملء الوظائف التدريسية والإدارية الشاغرة؛
- (٣) إصلاح المدارس وتزويدها بالماء والكهرباء؛
- (٤) توفير ملاذ آمن بديل للاجئين (بدلاً من المرافق التربوية).

(ج) توفير الاستقرار الوظيفي للأساتذة، ووضع حد لسياسة الطرد التعسفي للأساتذة بحجة أن لديهم خلفية بعثية. وينبغي أن تقتصر الملاحقة القانونية على الأشخاص المسؤولين عن انتهاكات لحقوق الإنسان وعن جرائم؛

(د) إصلاح وتحديث نظام التعليم وتحسين نوعية التعليم؛

(هـ) إنشاء روابط مع أسواق العمل الخارجية؛

(و) تنقيح البرامج التعليمية من أي آثار للنظام السابق، وذلك من خلال لجنة وطنية متخصصة، بالتنسيق مع منظمة الأمم المتحدة للتربية والعلم والثقافة (اليونسكو). ومن الأهمية بمكان أن تقتصر أية مساعدة خارجية أو أجنبية في هذا الصدد على الدعم المالي والتقني.

وقدّمت التوصيات التالية المتعلقة بالاحتياجات الأساسية والخدمات العامة:

(أ) ينبغي الإبقاء على برنامج لتوزيع الأغذية، مشابه لبرنامج الغذاء مقابل النفط، إلى حين استعادة إطار للاقتصاد الكلي وسوق عمل متوازن؛

(ب) يجب القضاء على سوء التغذية لدى الأطفال وينبغي اتخاذ التدابير الوقائية اللازمة؛

(ج) يجب إصلاح برامج الصحة الوطنية والمستشفيات. كما يجب أن تدفع للأطباء والموظفين الطبيين مرتبات كافية ومناسبة؛

(د) يجب القضاء على الأمراض المعدية، وخاصة الكوليرا والتيفوس؛

(هـ) يجب توفير المياه الصالحة للشرب والمرافق الصحية. ويجب أن يقتصر الإسراع في إعادة تشغيل المرافق العامة وقطاع الخدمات، وخصوصاً قطاع المياه، بوضع خطة طوارئ لإصلاح شبكات التوزيع ومحطات المعالجة، وبوضع خطة وطنية متوسطة وطويلة الأجل لإدارة المياه؛

(و) يجب إنشاء برنامج متعدد الأبعاد لمكافحة إدمان المخدرات الذي ازداد بشكل ملحوظ بعد الحرب؛

(ز) ينبغي إنشاء آلية خاصة، مثل خدمة هاتفية دائمة، لصالح النساء من ضحايا العنف العائلي والخطف والاعتصاب؛

(ح) ينبغي سن قوانين لتمكين النساء اللاتي فقدن أزواجهن أو اللاتي يقمن بإعالة أسرهن، وذلك من خلال التدريب وإعادة التأهيل.

وفيما يتعلق بالموارد ودخل الأسرة، حدد المشاركون الأولويات التالية:

(أ) حماية مصادر دخل الأسرة العراقية، خاصة عندما يتعلق الأمر بمرتبات القطاع العام. وينبغي النظر في هذه المسألة إلى جانب برامج إعادة التأهيل والهيكلية والخصخصة؛

(ب) الإبقاء على نظام المعاشات التقاعدية الذي يمثل مصدراً مهماً للدخل بالنسبة للمتقاعدين.

وفيما يخص التعليم، ارتئي أن التدابير التالية ذات أهمية حيوية:

(أ) إعادة النظر في جميع المناهج الدراسية مع إيلاء الاهتمام لحقوق الإنسان والمساواة بين الجنسين؛

ويستلزم بناء القدرات وإعادة تأهيل الاقتصاد والمجتمع وضع خطط تُدرس وتُنفَّذ بعناية. وينبغي الإبقاء على الربط بين الأجل القصير والأجل الطويل طوال الفترة الإنتقالية. إذ ينبغي تلبية الاحتياجات العاجلة للشعب دون أن تغيب عن الأذهان الأهداف الإنمائية طويلة الأجل.

ورأت ورشة العمل أن مشاركة المنظمات الدولية، ومنها العربية، أمر ضروري لتوفير الموارد البشرية والمالية اللازمة لعملية إعادة التأهيل والتنمية في العراق. وينبغي أن تتعاون الأمم المتحدة، من خلال مكتب الممثل الخاص للأمين العام في العراق، والإسكوا، وبرنامج الأمم المتحدة الإنمائي وغيره، مع جامعة الدول العربية ومع الصندوق العربي للإنماء الاقتصادي والاجتماعي والبنك الدولي في هذا الصدد. ولا ينبغي أن تقتصر جهود إعادة التأهيل والإعمار على القطاع العام، بل ينبغي أن تشمل أيضاً المجتمع المدني بكامله، مع التركيز بصفة خاصة على المنظمات غير الحكومية، بما في ذلك تلك التي تهتم بالمساواة بين الجنسين، وبالمراة والمسنين والطفل والشباب والمعوقين والأشخاص ذوي الاحتياجات الخاصة الذين يتزايد عددهم باستمرار.

ويجب حماية أمن الإنسان وحقوقه كما يجب صون المساواة بين الجنسين. وينبغي التركيز بصفة خاصة على الدور الذي يمكن للمراة أن تؤديه في جهود إعادة الإعمار بعد الصراع. ويجب تمكين المراة لتصبح شريكاً للرجل في هذه العملية.

وفيما يتعلق بما سبق، ارتئي أن الأمور التالية بالغة الأهمية:

(أ) توفير الأمن، باعتباره الحق الأساسي والأهم لجميع المواطنين، الذي لا يمكن بدونه ممارسة أي حق آخر؛

(ب) إزالة جميع الأسلحة والألغام الأرضية والذخائر غير المتفجرة والتخلص منها؛

(ج) توفير المساعدة لضحايا الحرب وأسره، من خلال إنشاء لجنة مركزية تعالج احتياجاتهم العاجلة ووضع سجلات رسمية لجميع الحالات، بما فيها حالات الأشخاص المفقودين؛

(د) إنشاء وزارة خاصة أو مجلس لشؤون المراة، يكون مسؤولاً عن إدارة البرامج الخاصة للنساء من ضحايا الحرب والعنف والاعتصاب والخطف؛

(هـ) توفير المساعدة لضحايا التهجير والترحيل والتشريد، خصوصاً النساء والأطفال، الذين يقدر عددهم بمليوني نسمة، من خلال إنشاء برنامج خاص أو هيئة أو وزارة تعمل على تيسير إعادة إدماجهم اجتماعياً واقتصادياً. وينبغي لهذه الهيئة أن تعالج أيضاً المشاكل الاجتماعية التي يسببها التهجير، بما في ذلك المشاكل المتعلقة بالسكن والعمل.

وينبغي إنشاء هيئة قضائية محددة الاختصاص لمعالجة حالات "الضحايا المفقودين" الذين كانوا محتجزين لدى النظام السابق في العراق. وبالإضافة الى مراقبة المقابر الجماعية ومراكز الاعتقال السابقة، ينبغي لهذه الهيئة أن تمنع أي عبث بتلك المواقع التي تشكل أدلة قانونية على الجرائم المرتكبة ضد البشرية.

(د) ينبغي إسناد التنفيذ أو الإشراف المباشر إلى الكيانات الحكومية الملائمة، أي الوزارات الفنية أو المؤسسات العامة. وفي هذا الصدد، ينبغي تحسين دور الدولة كمنظم وكذلك مؤسسات تقرير السياسات، من أجل تمكينها من وضع السياسات الملائمة بشأن المسائل الضريبية والمالية، ووضع السياسات المتعلقة بالعمالة والتعليم والصحة والخدمات الاجتماعية؛

(هـ) ينبغي ربط إصلاح الهياكل الأساسية بالشراء من السوق المحلية تحقيقاً للطاقة القصوى للسوق المحلية، كما يجب ربطه بدعم الأنشطة الإنتاجية التي يمكن أن تمول عملياته وأنشطة صيانتها.

ويمكن إدارة مديونية العراق لبلدان منظمة التعاون والتنمية في الميدان الاقتصادي بشكل ناجح، شريطة إلغاء الفائدة المترتبة على تلك الديون منذ عام ١٩٩٠، على أساس أن نظام العقوبات الذي فرض على العراق منعه من خدمة ديونه. وفي هذا الصدد، أشير إلى أن النفط مورد محدود وغير متجدد، وهو ملك للأجيال الحالية والمقبلة ولا ينبغي السماح لأي جيل بأن يستفيد منه على حساب الأجيال الأخرى. ولا يمكن التفكير أن تؤدي خصخصة قطاع النفط إلى تحقيق توازن المطالب بين الأجيال. وينبغي إنشاء صندوق لجميع الأجيال تديره هيئة عامة مستقلة شفافة ومسؤولة أمام الشعب العراقي، من أجل الإشراف على الإنتاج والاستثمار في هذا القطاع الحيوي.

كذلك ينبغي أن تستند إعادة بناء الاقتصاد العراقي إلى خطة للتكامل الإقليمي تراعي مصالح البلدان المجاورة.

دال - البعد الاجتماعي

اتفق المشاركون على أنه إذا أريد تلبية الاحتياجات العاجلة للشعب العراقي، فإنه يجب أن يستتب الأمن في سياق عقد اجتماعي جديد يستند إلى ضمانات قوية فيما يتعلق بأمن الإنسان وحقوقه والمساواة بين الجنسين.

وأي عقد اجتماعي جديد لا ينبغي أن يكون الإطار الرئيسي لعملية إعادة بناء العراق فحسب، بل ينبغي أن يحول دون محاباة الأقارب وتمحور المجتمع في فئات متعارضة. وينبغي أيضاً أن يدعم الطبقات المتوسطة والموارد البشرية وأن يساعد في إقرار قواعد السلوك في العمل، والقيم الاجتماعية، مثل الإنتاجية والنزاهة والكفاءة المهنية والتضامن، وأن يساعد في حماية الفئات الاجتماعية المهمشة. وينبغي بذل جهود لإصلاح شبكة الخدمات الاجتماعية وشبكات الأمان الاجتماعي، من أجل إيجاد القدرة على تلبية احتياجات الفئات المهمشة والفقيرة.

وجرى الإعراب عن قلق إزاء تنفيذ سياسة خصخصة سليمة تخدم مصالح الشعب العراقي وتقلل في الوقت نفسه من الجوانب السلبية التي ترتبط عادة بالخصخصة، بما في ذلك البطالة والتضخم.

وكجزء من الحملة الرامية إلى تحقيق الاستقرار، ينبغي تلبية الاحتياجات العاجلة للشعب العراقي من حيث توزيع الأغذية ورفع الأجور. فخلال العقد الأخير، اعتمد العراقيون اعتماداً شديداً على الحكومة في تأمين احتياجاتهم من الأغذية والدخل، من خلال برنامج الغذاء مقابل النفط. ولا يمكن إلغاء هذا الاعتماد بسرعة دون أن يسبب ذلك معاناة كبيرة للسكان المحليين.

وأوصي بإعطاء الأولوية لما يلي في إطار الجهود الرامية الى تحقيق استقرار الاقتصاد العراقي:

(أ) متابعة الإصلاح النقدي واستحداث دينار جديد، ربما باستخدام النظام العشري، من أجل منع دولرة الاقتصاد وربط العملة الجديدة بدولار الولايات المتحدة، وبذلك تفادي النموذج الأرجنتيني أو اللبناني. وتم التأكيد على أهمية تثبيت الدينار العراقي، واقترح تسهيل هذه العملية من خلال إنشاء صندوق للتثبيت ذو موارد وافرة، يمكن لصندوق النقد الدولي ومجتمع المانحين المساهمة فيه. ونظراً لعدم وجود هيكل إنتاج متنوع وقابل للاستمرار، وبالنظر إلى المديونية المرتفعة للعراق، ينبغي الإبقاء على نظام ثابت لأسعار الصرف من أجل تثبيت المعاملات المستقبلية دون حدوث تضخم وارتفاع في أسعار الفائدة، ما من شأنه أن يعيق الاستثمار والإنتاج؛

(ب) استصدار قانون للمنافسة، يضع تنمية القطاع الخاص المحلي في سياق اقتصاد سوقي حقيقي، مما يحول دون ظهور احتكارات أو احتكارات القلة؛

(ج) تفكيك أنظمة مراقبة الصرف الأجنبي. ويمكن أن يكون الدينار العراقي إما عائماً أو مربوطاً بسلة من عملات شركائه التجاريين الرئيسيين، مع توفير هامش كاف للتقلب في أسعار صرفه؛

(د) ينبغي الحفاظ على وحدة الميزانية العراقية، وعدم فصلها عن ميزانية إعادة الإعمار؛

(هـ) متابعة إصلاح مالي يضمن اللامركزية المالية؛

(و) تحديث البنك المركزي، والقوانين التي تحكم المصارف التجارية والقوانين التجارية والجهاز القضائي.

وفيما يخص إعادة بناء الاقتصاد العراقي، اقترحت القضايا والأولويات التالية:

(أ) ينبغي أن تتطوي أنشطة إعادة الإعمار على أوسع استخدام ممكن للصناعات والخدمات العراقية، وذلك من أجل تنشيط النمو والإنتاجية في الاقتصاد المحلي. ولهذا الغرض، ينبغي النظر في إمكانية تجزئة العقود الضخمة من أجل تحسين المساهمة المحلية وزيادتها الى أقصى حد.

(ب) ينبغي التحكم في التكاليف، وأن يكون إعطاء الأولوية لاستخدام الموارد البشرية العراقية - سواء خبرات المقيمين في العراق أو في الخارج - هو القاعدة في جميع مراحل إعادة الإعمار. ولا ينبغي اعتبار المجتمعين الدولي والعربي بديلين في هذا الصدد؛

(ج) لا ينبغي تركيز أنشطة إعادة الإعمار في كيان واحد، كما ينبغي أن يكون تخطيط المشاريع وتحديداتها مستقلاً عن تنفيذها. غير أنه يمكن وضع خطة وطنية شاملة من خلال حوار مباشر بين جميع أصحاب المصلحة، مع التركيز بصفة خاصة على إشراك مؤسسات المجتمع المدني، وبخاصة مؤسسات القطاع الخاص والأطراف الفاعلة الرئيسية؛

وينبغي للأطراف المشاركة في عملية إعادة التأهيل والتنمية في العراق، ولا سيما سلطة الاحتلال، أن تستفيد من خبرة الأمم المتحدة في حالات الصراع والحالات اللاحقة للصراع. وجرى التشديد على أنه ينبغي للأمم المتحدة أن تؤدي دوراً حاسماً في عملية إعادة الإعمار السياسي والاجتماعي والاقتصادي في العراق، وأن دورها ينبغي أن لا يقتصر على تنسيق الإغاثة. وبشكل أكثر تحديداً، يمكن للأمم المتحدة القيام بما يلي:

(أ) تيسير إنشاء حكومة تمثيلية تشمل جميع فئات الشعب؛

(ب) الإشراف على انتخاب جمعية دستورية؛

(ج) توفير خبرتها للمساعدة على إنشاء مؤسسات سياسية جديدة في الظروف السائدة بعد الصراعات؛

(د) المساعدة في إعادة بناء المجتمع المدني العراقي بتوفير برامج خاصة من خلال المنظمات الدولية أو الحكومية أو الإقليمية؛

(هـ) ضمان أن تكون محاكمة النظام العراقي السابق على ما ارتكبه من جرائم حرب وانتهاكات لحقوق الإنسان مطابقة للقانون الدولي والأصول القانونية؛

(و) توفير المساعدة التقنية في مجال التنمية المجتمعية التشاركية القائمة على حقوق الإنسان والمساواة بين الجنسين.

جيم - البعدان الاقتصادي والمالي

لا ينبغي لـ "السلطة" - كما هي محددة في قرار مجلس الأمن ١٤٨٣ (٢٠٠٣) - أن تدخل في أي التزامات مالية نيابة عن العراق، فيما عدا دفع المرتبات وإعادة الخدمات الحكومية. ولا ينبغي لها أن تسمح بأي نوع من الاقتراض، وخاصة الاقتراض القائم على رهن الإيرادات النفطية المقبلة أو تحويلها إلى أوراق مالية.

و جرى التأكيد على أن مشاكل إعادة الأعمار ينبغي تحديدها بشكل جيد، كما ينبغي التمييز بينها وبين الحاجة إلى تحويل الاقتصاد العراقي من اقتصاد مخطط مركزياً إلى اقتصاد سوقي.

وأوصي بإجراء تغيير جوهري للاقتصاد من خلال إصلاح وتشجيع الأنشطة الإنتاجية في جميع القطاعات، بهدف الحد من الطابع الريعي للاقتصاد السابق. وارتئي أن من الأهمية بمكان اعتماد استراتيجية للتحويل إلى الاقتصاد الجديد تستطيع استخدام مهارات العراقيين في الوطن وفي الخارج.

ونوه المشاركون إلى أنه أثناء عملية الانتقال إلى اقتصاد سوقي ينبغي تفادي الأخطاء التي ارتكبت في بعض البلدان، حيث تمت عملية الخصخصة خارج أي إطار قانوني واضح وأدت إلى نهب الموارد الأساسية للبلد، وبخاصة الموارد النفطية.

واتفق المشاركون على أنه لا يمكن لأي إصلاح اقتصادي أو إعادة إعمار أن ينجح في غياب حكومة عراقية معترف بها دولياً. وبدون إغفال أحكام قرار مجلس الأمن ١٤٨٣ (٢٠٠٣)، يمكن القول أن هناك حالياً في العراق شبه فراغ قانوني يضر بالرفاه الاقتصادي لشعبه، ومن شأنه أن يخلق العديد من المشاكل الاقتصادية والاجتماعية الإضافية.

وستتعرّض جهود إعادة التأهيل والإعمار إذا لم تعالج القضايا الأساسية المتعلقة بالحقوق المادية والنفسية للمواطنين العراقيين. وينبغي أن تكون تلك الحقوق في صميم دولة العراق الديمقراطية المقبلة. وبالتالي فمن الأهمية بمكان عقد حلقة دراسية حول حقوق الإنسان في العراق، بالتعاون بين الجهات المعنية بحقوق الإنسان في العراق والمكتب الإقليمي لمفوضية الأمم المتحدة لشؤون اللاجئين والإسكوا وبرنامج الأمم المتحدة الإنمائي والبنك الدولي، بالإضافة إلى المنظمات الإقليمية والدولية المعنية الأخرى.

وحدث المشاركون جميع البلدان التي تستضيف عراقيين مغتربين أن تيسر مشاركتهم في إعادة تأهيل وإعمار العراق. ويمكن أن تتم هذه المشاركة من خلال الأمم المتحدة، ومنظمات دولية أخرى، ومن خلال المنظمات غير الحكومية، وكذلك من خلال الروابط الأسرية والعلاقات الشخصية.

ودُعي منسقو ورشة العمل الى مساعدة مركز النهوض بحرية الصحفيين في عقد حلقة دراسية متخصصة لصالح العراقيين التواقين إلى أن يصبحوا صحافيين أكفاء، يمكن عقدها بالتعاون مع الأطراف العربية والدولية المعنية الأخرى.

كذلك يتعين على منسقي ورشة العمل أن يواصلوا تعاونهم مع الهيئات الإقليمية والدولية المعنية ومع مؤسسات المجتمع المدني العربية والدولية في تنفيذ هذه التوصيات. وينبغي الاضطلاع بمزيد من الدراسات والمؤتمرات وورش العمل والأنشطة والمشاريع التنفيذية بهدف تشجيع ودعم جهود إعادة التأهيل والإعمار في العراق.

باء - البعد القانوني

اتفقت آراء المشاركين في ورشة العمل على أنه مع أن الأمم المتحدة طُلب منها بموجب القرار ١٤٨٣ (٢٠٠٣) أن تتسق أنشطتها مع سلطة الاحتلال، فلا ينبغي أن تبدو المنظمة الدولية وكأنها تعمل تحت ولاية مباشرة لهذه السلطة.

وارتئي أن الأمم المتحدة لن يسند لها دور ذو مغزى في العراق إلا إذا ثبت للمجتمع الدولي أن مثل هذا الدور لا غنى عنه. وسيتوقف نجاح ذلك على تعزيز استقلالية الأمم المتحدة إزاء السلطة القائمة بالاحتلال.

وفي هذا الصدد، جرى التأكيد على الأهمية البالغة لحياد الأمم المتحدة كطرف دولي فاعل، وعلى الدور الفريد الذي يمكن أن تؤديه في تعزيز شرعية أي نظام سياسي عراقي جديد في نظر الشعب العراقي والعالم العربي والمجتمع الدولي.

استنتاجات وتوصيات

مقدمة

عقدت ورشة العمل عن العراق والمنطقة ما بعد الحرب: قضايا حول إعادة الإعمار الاقتصادي والاجتماعي في بيت الأمم المتحدة في الفترة من ٩ إلى ١١ تموز/يوليو ٢٠٠٣ وحضرها مشاركون من كندا ومصر والعراق وألمانيا ولبنان والمملكة المتحدة والولايات المتحدة.

وكان الهدف الرئيسي لورشة العمل هو بحث سبل العمل البديلة التي يمكن أن تعتمد عليها الحكومات والشعوب في المنطقة، ومنها العراق، وسبل العمل المتاحة للمفكرين والمنظمات غير الحكومية في مواجهة تحديات إعادة الإعمار الاقتصادي والاجتماعي والثقافي والإنساني والجهود الإنمائية في بلد مزقته الحرب في منطقة تعاني من الحروب وعدم الاستقرار.

وتم تحقيق الهدف المعلن لورشة العمل من خلال تقديم ورقات وتقاير ثم مناقشة وجهات النظر المختلفة والمقترحات التي قدمها المشاركون. وقد نُظمت الموضوعات المختارة للمناقشة تحت عدد من العناوين ونوقشت على مدى ثلاثة أيام. وانصب التركيز في اليوم الأول على آثار الحرب على العراق وعلى المنطقة. ونوقشت في اليوم الثاني قضايا إعادة الإعمار وإعادة التأهيل والتنمية. أما اليوم الثالث، فقد خصص بوجه عام لتحليل آفاق المستقبل بالنسبة للعراق. وأعقبت كل جلسة مناقشات عامة حول النقاط التي أثّرت في العروض، مما أتاح للحضور أن يعبروا عن آرائهم ويطرحوا أسئلة كما أتاح للمتحدثين أن يشاركوا مشاركة فعالة في حوار ذي مغزى.

ودعت اللجنة الاقتصادية والاجتماعية لغربي آسيا (الإسكوا) خبراء بارزين لتقديم آرائهم في ورشة العمل، التي شارك في رعايتها البنك الدولي وبرنامج الأمم المتحدة الإنمائي والمركز اللبناني للدراسات ومؤسسة فريديرش إيبيرت. وقد بُذل كل جهد ممكن لضمان مشاركة عدد كبير من الخبراء العراقيين المقيمين حالياً في العراق أو خارجه.

وكانت ورشة العمل محاولة من جانب الإسكوا لبذل جهود متضافرة لمعالجة الحالة الراهنة في العراق وبحث البدائل المتاحة لتحسين الأوضاع الاجتماعية الاقتصادية في العراق. وكانت ورشة العمل تهدف أيضاً إلى بحث آفاق المستقبل والدور الذي يمكن للإسكوا أن تقوم به.

واختتمت ورشة العمل أعمالها بعدد من التوصيات بعضها واسع النطاق وذو طابع عام والبعض الآخر أكثر تحديداً يتناول الجوانب الاجتماعية الاقتصادية والقانونية للوضع في العراق ما بعد الحرب.

ألف - التوصيات العامة

كان هناك إجماع في ورشة العمل على أنه بالإضافة إلى التزامات سلطة الاحتلال بموجب اتفاقيات جنيف وميثاق الأمم المتحدة وقرار مجلس الأمن ١٤٨٣ (٢٠٠٣)، يجب أن يكون "مشروع إعادة التأهيل والتنمية" العراقي ملكاً للعراقيين بالكامل. فمهمة صياغة وتنفيذ خطة إعادة تأهيل وإعمار العراق ينبغي أن يقوم بها كيان شرعي معترف به دولياً ومستقل عن سلطة الاحتلال.

مقدمة

قامت اللجنة الاقتصادية والاجتماعية لغربي آسيا (الإسكوا) بتنظيم ورشة العمل عن إعادة الإعمار في العراق، كجزء من المبادرات العربية والدولية في هذا المجال. وقد كان الهدف الأساسي لهذه الورشة جمع الخبراء والمختصين العرب والدوليين لمناقشة القضايا المتعلقة بعنوان الورشة - مع تركيز خاص على مشاركة الخبرات العراقية، من داخل العراق وخارجه - لتقدير تأثيرات الحروب والحصار على المجتمع العراقي واقتصاده. وقد جاءت هذه الورشة إكمالاً للمبادرات السابقة التي كانت الإسكوا تقوم بها حول تأثيرات الحرب على العراق وعلى المنطقة. وفي هذا المجال ناقشت ورشة العمل تقييماً شاملاً للتحديات والإشكالات التي تواجه التنمية في المنطقة العربية نتيجة الاحتلال العسكري المباشر للعراق.

وهذا التقرير الصادر عن الورشة يمكن أن يكون نقطة بداية لمقترحات عملية في وضع استراتيجيات اقتصادية واجتماعية لإعادة الإعمار في العراق. وقد ركز هذا التقرير على الاحتياجات الإنسانية للشعب العراقي. كما تعرض للتشعبات السياسية والثقافية للنتائج المتوقعة من الحرب والاحتلال.

المحتويات

الصفحة

١ مقدمة
٢ استنتاجات وتوصيات

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ورشة العمل عن العراق والمنطقة ما بعد الحرب:
قضايا حول إعادة الإعمار الاقتصادي والاجتماعي
بيروت، ٩-١١ تموز/يوليو ٢٠٠٣

استنتاجات وتوصيات



الأمم المتحدة
نيويورك، ٢٠٠٣

ملاحظة: طبعت هذه الوثيقة بالشكل الذي قدمت به دون تحرير رسمي.

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