



GENERAL

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NOTE DATED 10 SEPTEMBER 1951 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
UNITED STATES TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING
THE TWENTY-SIXTH REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
COMMAND OPERATIONS IN KOREA IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
OF 7 JULY 1950 (S/1588)

The Representative of the United States to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to Paragraph 6 of the Resolution of the Security Council of July 7, 1950, requesting the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the United Nations Command.

In compliance with this Resolution, there is enclosed herewith, for circulation to the members of the Security Council, the Twenty-sixth report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period July 16 to 31, 1951

26TH REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND OPERATIONS
IN KOREA FOR THE PERIOD 16 - 31 JULY 1951

I herewith submit report number 26 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 July, inclusive. United Nations Command Communiques numbers 946-961, inclusive, provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Progress in the armistice negotiations was marked on 26 July by joint agreement upon subjects to be included on the formal agenda. The armistice conferences, since 15 July, have met each day except 20, 22, 23 and 24 July under the conditions of neutrality in the conference area which I demanded of the Communist leaders and to which their representatives agreed in the meeting of 15 July. Poor flying weather and flash floods on 20 July prevented the procession of United Nations Command Delegates to Kaesong. The conference recessed on 22-24 July at the request of the Communist Chief Delegate, General Nam Il.

The United Nations Command fully appreciates the great consequences which would derive from the early termination of hostilities in Korea. This Command's Delegates are acutely aware of the responsibilities they bear to all those peoples of the world who, abhorring the lust that led the North Korean leaders to launch and since to sustain their brutal aggression against the Republic of Korea, have elected of their own free will to stop the aggressor through sacrifice of their sons upon the field of battle. To terminate this sacrifice at the earliest possible moment is the paramount aim of the United Nations Command Delegates, qualified solely by their determination that the previous United Nations sacrifices shall not have been in vain. Each day's delay in concluding an armistice is gravely weighed in terms of human lives. That the negotiations have been so unnecessarily drawn out is a source of great concern.

Much time has been wasted in this momentous conference in irrelevant argument on the part of the Communists. Both the United Nations Command and the Communist Delegates had accepted at the initial meetings that their first objective was to adopt an agenda, and that the detailed discussion of any topic should be deferred until after the adoption. Repeatedly, however, the Communist Delegates have discussed the substance of proposed items and have endeavored to draw the United Nations Command Delegates into substantive discussions, many of them of an essentially political nature.

One of the agenda items proposed by the Communists and supported by lengthy discussions was "to establish the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides and the establishment of a demilitarized zone, as basic conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Korea." It is quite evident that the actual location of a line of demarcation between the forces is a proper subject for military armistice negotiations; however, the inclusion of the specific location of that line in the wording of the agenda item inevitably and obviously gave rise to the very type of substantive discussion which both sides had agreed to exclude until the agenda was adopted.

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Greater delays were occasioned by the insistence of the Communist Delegates that the armistice agenda include "the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea." This subject unquestionably is of great moment in any future political settlement of the Korean disputes; but, as was forcefully presented many times by Vice Admiral Joy, it is a matter for political settlement upon the highest governmental levels, and discussion of it far exceeds the authority and prerogatives of the CINCUNC.

The agreed agenda is:

Item 1. Adoption of Agenda.

Item 2. Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for a cessation of hostilities in Korea.

Item 3. Concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority, and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of a cease fire and armistice.

Item 4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.

Item 5. Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides.

The substantive discussions began immediately after adoption of the agenda on 26 July. As of 31 July, the Communists had maintained their insistence that the 38th parallel shall be the line of demarcation of forces during an armistice period. Inasmuch as the 38th parallel bears only a coincidental relationship to the present position of the ground forces, and none at all to the operations of Air and Naval Forces, the United Nations Command Delegates have refused to accept this view and have made unmistakably clear that a military armistice must be premised upon the prevailing military situation. It is evident that the enemy will attempt by negotiations to recoup the losses that his thwarted military aggression has brought upon him. The United Nations Command Delegation is sparing no effort to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea in conformance with the high ideals and principles of the United Nations, but the good faith of the Chinese and North Korean Communists remains to be proved.

Hostile reaction to vigorous United Nations patrolling is in the pattern experienced since 15 June. Nearly all contacts consisted of brief clashes between small units of platoon or company size. On the western front from Munsu to Kumhwa, contacts were scattered, some patrols advancing up to 10,000 yards without eliciting hostile response. However, the enemy contested every advance on the Otan-Amhvon front and in the area west of Chorwon. His forward positions in these sectors were well supported with artillery and mortar fire and his reaction suggested substantial strength. Front lines, however, remain essentially unchanged.

On the eastern front from Kumhwa to Pohang, contacts within 1 or 2 miles

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of the United Nations lines were continuous. Fighting with determination from well organized positions, the enemy bitterly contested all United Nations thrusts and provided his forces uniformly strong mortar and artillery support. The most intense fighting took place to the east of Pia from 27 to 29 July, where strong battalion strength United Nations probing forces invariably met prompt and stubborn resistance. Contacts were particularly numerous to the south of Haso, Hoegok, and Changjong, where the enemy undertook limited probing action.

The enemy has continued to stockpile supplies in extreme forward areas of the eastern front, generally within 5 miles of United Nations lines. Here, he has also expanded his strong defensive installations including barbed wire obstacles, minefields, and earth works, in addition to the well organized system of tank traps noted in the preceding report. These defenses are particularly well developed to the south of Hoegok and Pia.

There are continuing indications that the enemy has made good use of the considerable period since his severe defeat in May to prepare for possible further offensive action. On the 18-mile front astride the Changdo-Kumsong axis, he has regrouped forces so as to dispose, in column confronting the X US Corps, 2 Chinese Communist force armies of 6 divisions believed to have been recently reorganized and reequipped. A depleted army which formerly held this sector was moved to the rear to refit. At the same time, in this area there were greatly increased troop activity and a continuing logistic buildup. The enemy has persisted in his determination to permit no penetration of the Otan-Amhyon area and, significantly, towards the close of the period he was filling tank traps on this front.

Additional troops are reportedly moving into northwestern Korea from Manchuria. During the past 6 weeks, the enemy has steadily increased the density and power of his artillery and mortar supply over the whole front. Prisoners of war have repeatedly referred to advanced plans for a 6th phase offensive and have quoted pronouncements of enemy commanders to the effect that they expect to participate in further offensive operations. Concurrent with the Communist-imposed delays in the armistice negotiations have been major efforts by hostile forces to recover from the effects of their last abortive major attack, and they must be considered prepared to attempt offensive action at any time. Such action might well consist initially of limited attacks to obtain local advantages followed by extension of piecemeal efforts into a general offensive.

Guerrillas in United Nations rear areas have made only isolated offensive forays in southeastern Korean apparently without relation to concurrent enemy activities on the front. There has been no marked change in guerrilla strength, and the dissident elements continue to operate in units of 50 to 500 men.

United Nations Naval forces conducted constant patrol and daily reconnaissance operations which continued to deny Korean waters to the enemy and to safeguard the movement of United Nations shipping in those waters.

United Nations carrier-based and Marine land-based aircraft divided their

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attention between close air support of United Nations ground forces and interdiction operations against enemy lines of communication with excellent results.

United Nations surface units continued to pound enemy railroads, highways and supply concentrations in the Wonsan-Songjin-Chongjin areas. Enemy shore batteries were active in the Wonsan area, but combined efforts of Naval gunfire and rocket ships and of carrier-based aircraft succeeded in silencing the enemy guns without material damage to our forces.

During the period of this report, United Nations surface units were active in providing gunfire support to United Nations ground units on the east coast sector of Korea.

Check minesweeping operations continued on both coasts of Korea mainly for the protection of ships engaged in shore bombardment. Drifting mines in substantial numbers continued to menace shipping in the Sea of Japan.

United Nations aircraft under the operational control of Far East Air Forces placed their major effort upon neutralization of enemy airfields and highly effective interdiction of communication and supply channels in the incessant campaign to reduce the flow of supplies and equipment to Communist forces at the front. Close air support of United Nations ground forces in the battle zone continued.

B-29 medium bombers, B-26 light bombers, and fighter bombers, including those of the South African Air Force and the land-based US Marine Corps, dropped load after load of high explosive bombs and napalm and fired thousands of rockets and rounds of machine gun ammunition on railroads, highways, airfields, bridges, marshalling yards, tunnels, motor vehicles and rail rolling stocks. The interdiction effort continued on a round the clock basis with the night sortie rate maintained at the highest level since the start of the conflict. On the night of 17-18 July a total of 122 effective sorties were flown, a new high for the campaign. During favorable weather, the nightly sorties averaged 106.

The military activities which the enemy has located in Pyongyang have impelled the United Nations Air Forces to undertake numerous attacks upon military objectives therein. An accumulation of facts attests to the importance of Pyongyang as a supply and command center essential to the conduct of the Communist forces operations along the entire front. In addition to the airfields in and around the city, one of which, as previously reported, the Communists have constructed by razing residences and office buildings in the town proper, the targets have been: carefully pin-pointed gun positions, supply buildings, troop billets, power and radio stations, motor vehicle parks and railroad yards and cars. Preliminary damage assessment of a comparatively large attack on 30 July indicates considerable damage to military installations.

The MIG-15's were conspicuous in their limited employment until the last few days of the period and were rarely contacted by sweeping F-86's and the newly operational Meteor jets of the Royal Australian Air Force. The enemy did send a

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few slow aircraft over United Nations lines during the night to harass our force. The strafing and bombing of these planes were very inaccurate and their task was made difficult by B-26's and United States Marine Corps night fighters that have provided continuous night cover over vital areas.

C-47's and crews of the Royal Thailand Air Force have added their support to United States Air Forces and Royal Hellenic Air Force efforts in the airlifting of personnel, supplies and equipment to forward to United Nations units. The personnel engaged in the armistice negotiations have been largely moved by air.

Throughout the preliminary armistice discussions at Kaesong, all concrete developments have been reported as rapidly and fully as possible throughout Korea by United Nations leaflets, loudspeaker, and radio broadcasts. The detailed reporting of the discussions in Korea language radio broadcasts designed primarily for civilian listeners has been extensively complemented with leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts to front line enemy troops and with leaflet airdrops to major civilian and military centers throughout northern Korea. The patent desire of the enemy to wring Communist propaganda value from the armistice negotiations has given these United Nations countermeasures unusual importance. In addition to these news reports which constitute the bulk of the information currently being disseminated in Korea by United Nations media, major attention is being given to the United Nations stand on the crucial issues of the armistice discussions.

