



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2471)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
Letter dated 1 September 1983 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15947);	
Letter dated 1 September 1983 from the Permanent Observer for the Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15948);	
Letter dated 1 September 1983 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15949);	
Letter dated 1 September 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15950);	
Letter dated 2 September 1983 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15951)	1

NOTED 2140

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2471st MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 6 September 1983, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. Noel G. SINCLAIR (Guyana).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2471)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Letter dated 1 September 1983 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15947);
Letter dated 1 September 1983 from the Permanent Observer for the Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15948);
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Letter dated 2 September 1983 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15951)

The meeting was called to order at 12.10 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

- Letter dated 1 September 1983 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15947);
- Letter dated 1 September 1983 from the Permanent Observer for the Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15948);
- Letter dated 1 September 1983 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15949);

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Letter dated 2 September 1983 from the Acting Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15951)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decisions taken at the 2470th meeting, I invite the representative of Canada and the Observer for the Republic of Korea to take places at the Council table. I invite the representatives of Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and New Zealand to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Pelletier (Canada) and Mr. Kin (Republic of Korea) took places at the Council table; Mr. Joseph (Australia), Mr. Jelonek (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Kuroda (Japan) and Mr. Harland (New Zealand) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Bangladesh, Belgium, Italy, Liberia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Portugal, Sierra Leone, Spain and Sweden, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Chowdhury (Bangladesh), Miss Dever (Belgium), Mr. La Rocca (Italy), Mrs. Jones (Liberia), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Moreno Salcedo (Philippines), Mr. Syder (Portugal), Mr. Koroma (Sierra Leone), Mr. de Piniés (Spain) and Mr. Amneus (Sweden) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT: I should like to draw the attention of members of the Council to the following documents: S/15954, containing a letter dated 2 September from the representative of Thailand addressed to the President of the Council, and S/15955, containing a note verbale dated 2 September from the Mission of Chile addressed to the Secretary-General.

4. Mrs. KIRKPATRICK (United States of America): Most of the world outside the Soviet Union has heard by now of the Korean Air Lines flight 007 carrying 269 persons between New York and Seoul, which strayed off course into Soviet airspace, was tracked by Soviet radar, was targeted by a Soviet SU-15, whose pilot coolly, and after careful consideration, fired two air-launched missiles which destroyed the Korean air liner and apparently its 269 passengers and crew.

5. This calculated attack on a civilian air liner, unarmed, undefended, as civilian air liners always are, has shocked the world. Only the Soviet people have still not heard about this attack on Korean Air Lines flight 007 and the death of the passengers because the Soviet Government has not acknowledged firing on the Korean air liner. Indeed, not until 5 September did Soviet officials acknowledge publicly that Korean Air Lines flight 007 had disappeared in its icy waters. The Soviet Government has not been silent about the plane, however. It has merely lied.

6. On 1 September, Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gromyko, announced:

"An unidentified plane, coming from the direction of the Pacific Ocean entered the airspace of the Soviet Union over Kamchatka Peninsula, and for the second time violated the Soviet airspace over the Sakhalin Island. The plane did not have navigation lights, did not respond to queries and did not enter into contact with the radio control service. Fighters of the anti-aircraft defence, which were sent aloft towards the intruder plane, tried to give it assistance in directing it to the nearest air field, but the intruder plane did not react to the signals and warnings from the Soviet fighters and continued its flight in the direction of the Sea of Japan."

7. The next day, 2 September, TASS repeated Mr. Gromyko's charge that Soviet airspace had been rudely violated by "an unidentified plane" which, "in violation of international regulations . . . flew without navigation lights". TASS referred to efforts to establish contacts with the plane, "using generally accepted signals, and to take it to the nearest airfield in the territory of the Soviet Union". They also said:

"Over the Sakhalin Island, a Soviet aircraft fired warning shots with tracer shells along the flying route of the plane.

"Soon after this the intruder plane left the limits of Soviet airspace and continued its flight towards the Sea of Japan. For about 10 minutes, it was within the observation zone of radio location means, after which it could be observed no more". [2470th meeting, para. 48.]

8. Yesterday, when Soviet General Romanov finally admitted that the Korean plane had crashed, killing numerous people, he again asserted the jet liner was flying with its lights out. That is what TASS said. That is what Soviet officials said. But we do not have to wonder about what really happened, to the air liner or to its passengers,

or when it happened, or what Soviet officials knew about its fate. We know, because we know what the Soviet pilots, who intercepted the Korean air liner over the Sakhalin Island, said to their ground controllers during the 50-minute period from 1756 to 1848 hours on 31 August while they tracked, discussed and destroyed the Korean air liner and its passengers.

9. The United States Government, in co-operation with the Government of Japan, has decided to spread the evidence before the Council and the world. It is available on the video tape which will be played. On this tape you will hear the voices of pilots of Soviet interceptors, which included three SU-15 Flagons and one MiG-23 Flogger, including the SU-15 pilot who pulled the trigger which released the missiles that destroyed Korean Air Lines flight 007.

10. While it is obvious that the pilots are acknowledging instructions from ground controllers, those instructions are not audible. What we are about to play back for you is the intercepted tape of the actual air-to-ground reports. It is, of course, in Russian. On the monitor screens you will see simultaneously the original Russian and the English translation. Through your audio system you will listen to these voices in translation into all the working languages of the United Nations. Immediately following my presentation the Russian-to-English transcript will be made available to all who may wish to study it. After this meeting of the Security Council an audio cassette, on which voices are still clearer, will be provided to any interested Mission. Nothing was cut from this tape. The recording was made on a voice-actuated recorder and, therefore, it covers only those periods of time when conversation was heard. Let us now listen to the tape.

The following is a transcript of the tapes as played aloud and displayed in the Security Council chamber. The tapes and transcript were furnished by the United States delegation.

"VOICE: Soviet radar began tracking the Korean air liner at 1551 GMT. At 1635 GMT, the Soviets noted the 747 actually was flying over their land mass. At 1728 GMT, a Korean air liner was flying over the Sea of Okhotsk the same time a US reconnaissance flight RC-135 was landing at a base on the Aleutian Islands. The RC-135 had been flying a routine mission in support of the SALT compliance agreements¹ off the Kamchatka Peninsula. At 1826 GMT, a full hour after the US reconnaissance flight had landed, the Korean air liner was destroyed near the Soviet Sakhalin Island 1,200 miles away.

"The tape you are about to hear begins at 1756 GMT, one hour before the Korean air liner was shot down. The communication in from four Soviet fighter pilots talking to their ground controllers while tracking the Korean air liner."

*(interpretation from Russian)**

* Due to the poor sound quality of the tapes, which were unintelligible, this interpretation was made not from the tapes, but on the basis of the transcript furnished in Russian and English by the United States delegation.

"Course 100 in a climb to 8 (000 metres).
 "I didn't understand. What course? My course is 100.
 "I am executing.
 "Course 50.
 "(Answer)
 "On course 240.
 "I see it.
 "Roger. Understood. I'm flying behind.
 "Course 30 — 8,000 (metres).
 "Executing course 100.
 "Roger.
 "Distance to airfield?
 "Roger.
 "Altitude 4,900.
 "I'm executing.
 "I didn't understand.
 "I am executing.
 "Fuel remainder, three metric tons.
 "Roger. Repeat the course.
 "To the left, probably. Or to the right.
 "Carry out course 260.
 "On course 260.
 "Understood.
 "Course 220 — 7,500 (metres).
 "Roger.
 "Should I turn on the weapons system?
 "Understood.
 "163 needs to drop his wing tanks.
 "Yes, it has turned.
 "The target is 80 degrees to my left.
 "Executing (course) 240.
 "Course 240.
 "Roger.
 "Executing (course) 220.
 "Executing.
 "(Course) 245 (degrees) for 163? Executing.
 "Course 220.
 "I didn't understand.
 "Roger. (The target's strobe) light is blinking.
 "Course 245 — 7,500 (metres).
 "8,000 (metres).
 "Roger.
 "Course 280.

"4,500 (metres).
 "Course 280.
 "Executing.
 "Executing.
 "I see it visually and on radar.
 "Roger.
 "Executing 10 (degrees) left.
 "I have dropped my tanks.
 "I dropped them.
 "Executing.
 "I see it. I'm locked on to the target.
 "Roger.
 "The target isn't responding to IFF.
 "The target's course is 240 degrees.
 "(The weapons system) is turned on.
 "Roger. It's still on the same course for now.
 "Roger.
 "Roger. I have (enough) speed. I don't need to turn on my after-burner.
 "My fuel remainder is 2,700.
 "I've dropped my tanks: one at 4,000, one at 3,800.
 "Course 230.
 "the target's course is still the same — 240.
 "Executing.
 "I am in lock-on.
 "Course 240.
 "The target's course is 240.
 "Yes.
 "Repeat the azimuth.
 "1001 (Take control of me) from Karnaval. Azimuth 45, distance 60.
 "Roger.
 "Deputat sees me (on radar).
 "Deputat is inquiring: Do you see the target or not?
 "Do you see (it)?
 "Are you calling 805?
 Who's calling 805?
 "I see it.
 "Karnaval does not see (unspecified).
 "Repeat.
 "Executing.
 "The ANO (air navigational lights) are burning. The (strobe) light is flashing.
 "Roger. I'm at 7,500, course 230.

"I am closing on the target.
 "I have enough time.
 "Repeat.
 "Executing.
 "I am flying behind the target at a distance of 25. Do you see me?
 "(Call)
 "Fiddlesticks. I'm going, that is, my Z.O. (indicator) is lit. (The missile warheads are already locked on.)
 "Answering.
 "I answered.
 "I need to approach it (closer).
 "I'm turning lock-on off and I'm approaching the target.
 "(For) 163?
 "I have broken off lock-on.
 "(Right now) I can't see it.
 "Exactly. I have executed (unspecified).
 "Executing.
 "Yes, I'm approaching the target. I'm going in closer.
 "The target's (strobe) light is blinking. I have already approached the target to a distance of about two (kilometres).
 "The target is at 10,000 (metres).
 "I see both, distance 10 (and) 15 kilometres.
 "What are the instructions?
 "Roger.
 "The target is decreasing speed.
 "I am going round it. I'm already moving in front of the target.
 "I have increased speed.
 "No. It is decreasing speed.
 "It should have been earlier. How can I chase it? I'm already abeam of the target.
 "Now I have to fall back a bit from the target.
 "Repeat.
 "The target's altitude is 10,000 (metres).
 "From me it is located 70 degrees to the left.
 "I'm dropping back. Now I will try a rocket.
 "12 (kilometres) to the target. I see both.
 "I'm in a right turn on a course of 300.
 "Executing.
 "Roger. I am in lock-on.
 "I am turning to a course of 30.
 "Roger.

"I am closing on the target. I am in lock-on. Distance to target is 8 (kilometres).
 "I have already switched it on.
 "On a course of 30.
 "ZG. Missile warheads locked on.
 "I have executed the launch.
 "The target is destroyed.
 "I am breaking off attack.
 "What are (my) instructions?
 "(Call)
 "(The indicator/s for) my wing tanks lit up. The fuel remainder differs by 600 litres for now.
 "Fuel remainder 1,600.
 "I am executing. What is the distance to the airfield?
 "Roger."

The speaker continued:

11. The transcript that we have just heard needs little explanation. Quite simply, it establishes that the Soviets decided to shoot down a civilian air liner, shot it down, murdering the 269 persons on board, and lied about it. The transcript of the pilot's cockpit conversations illuminates several key points. The interceptor pilot who shot down Korean Air Lines flight 007 had the air liner in sight for over 20 minutes before firing his missiles. Contrary to what the Soviets have repeatedly stated, the interceptor pilot saw the air liner's navigation lights and reported that fact to the ground on three occasions. Contrary to Soviet statements, the pilot made no mention of firing any warning shots—only the firing of the missiles, which he said struck the target. Contrary to Soviet statements, there is no indication whatsoever that the interceptor pilot made any attempt either to communicate with the air liner or to signal it to land in accordance with accepted international practice. Indeed, the Soviet interceptor planes may be technically incapable of communicating by radio with civilian aircraft, presumably out of fear of Soviet pilot defections.

12. Perhaps the most shocking fact learned from the transcript is that at no point did the pilots raise the question of the identity of the target aircraft, nor at any time did the interceptor pilots refer to it as anything other than "the target". The only activity bearing on the identity of the aircraft was a statement by the pilot of the attacking interceptor that "The target isn't responding to IFF." That means that the aircraft did not respond to the electronic interrogation by which military aircraft identify friends or foes. But of course neither the Korean air liner nor any other civilian air liner could have responded to IFF, because commercial aircraft are not equipped to do so.

13. We know that the interceptor pilot who shot down Korean Air Lines flight 007 flew behind, alongside and in front of the air liner, coming at least as close as two

kilometres before dropping back behind the plane to fire his missiles. At a distance of two kilometres under the conditions prevailing at that time it was easily possible to identify a 747 passenger air liner. Either the Soviet pilot knew what he was firing at, or he did not know his target was a civilian passenger air liner. If the latter, then he fired his deadly missiles without knowing or caring what they would hit. Though he could easily have pulled up to within some number of metres of the air liner to assure its identity, he did not bother to do so. In either case, there was shocking disregard for human life and international norms.

14. In the days following the destruction of Korean Air Lines flight 007, Soviet leaders and the Soviet press have said repeatedly that they do not understand what all the fuss is about. They began by accusing the United States of creating a hullabaloo about nothing, and more recently they have accused us of a provocation, implying, though never quite saying, that we provoked them into shooting down an air liner that strayed into their space, provoked them into violating the internationally agreed upon standards and practices of behaviour. They have spoken as though a plane's straying off course is a crime punishable by death. They have suggested that "like any self-respecting State" they are doing no more than looking after their sovereignty, which they shall permit no one to violate. They have claimed, still without acknowledging that they shot down the Korean air liner, that "Our anti-aircraft defence has fulfilled its duty for the defence of the security of our motherland." They have suggested that they may have mistaken the Korean air liner for an American reconnaissance plane, but still do not admit that they attacked and destroyed it.

15. But none of these lies, half-lies and excuses can withstand examination. Straying off course is not recognized as a capital crime by civilized nations. No nation has the sovereign right to shoot down any person or vehicle that may stray across its border in peace time. It is interesting in this regard to refer to the statements made by the Soviet Government at the time that it was strenuously rejecting the complaint of the Government of Sweden of an encroachment into Swedish territorial waters. At that time the note addressed to the Government of Sweden by the Soviet Union said:

"What sober-minded person, to say nothing of military specialists, can suppose that a submarine in a surface run with running lights on and running diesels, the noise of which was heard over a large distance, in night time and in poor visibility conditions could engage in 'impermissible' activities?"

16. There are internationally agreed upon standards for intercepting unwelcome aircraft. Those internationally agreed upon standards call for serious efforts at identification, verification and warning and—if the case is serious—for intercepting the intruder and forcing it to land or to leave one's airspace. Sovereignty neither requires nor permits shooting down air liners in peacetime.

17. Recently the Soviets have implied that Korean Air Lines flight may have been mistaken for a United States aerial reconnaissance flight, but that is no more persuasive. The Boeing 747 was on a routine, scheduled flight. At the time it was shot down the United States reconnaissance plane referred to by the Soviets had been on the ground for more than one hour, more than 1,500 miles away. Moreover, the United States does not fly reconnaissance missions in Soviet airspace. We do regularly operate aircraft in international airspace to monitor Soviet compliance with SALT¹ and other arms control agreements. The Soviet Government knows what our usual flight patterns are and can readily identify these missions.

18. Finally, neither the United States nor any other country upset about the slaughter of the 269 passengers on Korean Air Lines flight 007 is creating a hullabaloo or exaggerating the importance of the event. We are protesting very important violations of the norms of civilized conduct on which international aviation rests and without which it will not be possible for any of us to board air liners and fly across continents and oceans without fear of becoming the object of a murderous attack.

19. To a degree we rarely consider, international air travel depends on networks of mutual trust that we will not shoot down one another's air liners, kidnap, jail or poison passengers and crews. Why did the Soviet Union violate these norms? Why have they lied about it? The reason most often advanced to explain why the Soviet pilot shot down the air liner is that it was a mistake, the mistake of a trigger-happy pilot who, with his ground controller, followed a philosophy of shoot now, identify later; but if pilot error was responsible for this tragic mistake, why has the Soviet Government not said so? Why has it lied? And why is it complementing its murderous attack on Korean Air Lines flight 007 with a lying attack on the United States for provocation and aggression?

20. As I considered this question, my mind returned to a debate that took place in the Security Council some 21 years ago, when my predecessor, Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois, called the attention of the Council to the unmistakable evidence that a series of facilities for launching offensive nuclear missiles were being installed in the western hemisphere. The Soviet representative, Mr. Zorin, flatly denied those charges and, as Soviet representatives so often do, coupled his denial with a vicious attack on the United States. Calling our attention to threatening Soviet behaviour, Zorin asserted, only masked the United States own aggression and piracy. But Adlai Stevenson too had evidence to back up his charge, photographic evidence as irrefutable as the audio tapes we have heard today. The fact is that violence and lies are regular instruments of Soviet policy. Soviet officials regularly behave as though truth were only a function of force and will; as if the truth were only what they said it is; as if violence were an instrument of first resort in foreign affairs. They occupy Afghanistan and accuse the United States of interference in its internal affairs; they create massive new European vulnerabilities with their SS-20s and accuse the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of seeking to upset the balance of power.

the truth were only what they said it is; as if violence were an instrument of first resort in foreign affairs. They occupy Afghanistan and accuse the United States of interference in its internal affairs; they create massive new European vulnerabilities with their SS-20s and accuse the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of seeking to upset the balance of power.

21. We think otherwise. We believe that truth is as vital to co-operation and peace among nations as among people. It is depressing to consider seriously our global prospects if those prospects must be built on relations devoid of truth, devoid of trust. It is depressing to consider a world in which a major nation, equipped with the most powerful modern weapons, believes it has a sovereign right to fire on a commercial air liner lost over its territory.

22. These Soviet actions and claims illuminate the Soviet conception of appropriate relations among nations in peace-time. They illuminate the world in which we live and work and make policy. Of course, some sophisticated observers believe that the destruction of flight 007 was neither the work of an isolated Strangelove unconcerned about human life—nor of that Strangelove and his ground controller—but was instead a deliberate stroke designed to intimidate: a brutal, decisive act meant to instil fear and hesitation in all who observed its ruthless violence, much as the destruction of an Afghan village or the imprisonment of the monitors of the Helsinki Final Act are intended to secure compliance through terror. Whichever the case—whether the destruction of flight 007 and its passengers reflects only utter indifference to human life or whether that destruction was designed to intimidate—we are dealing here not with pilot error, but with decisions and priorities characteristic of a system. Not only did Soviet officials shoot down a stray commercial air liner and lie about it, they have callously refused offers of international participation in search-and-rescue efforts, in spite of clearly stated international standards and recommended practices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which call on States to “grant any necessary permission for the entry of such aircraft, vessels, personnel or equipment into its territory and make necessary arrangements with a view to expediting such entry”.

23. We are reminded once again that the Soviet Union is a State based on the dual principles of callousness and mendacity dedicated to the rule of force. Here is how Lenin described the dictatorship of the proletariat in 1920. He said: “The scientific concept of dictatorship means nothing more than unrestricted power, absolutely unimpeded by law or regulations and resting directly on force”.

24. It is this principle of force, this mentality of force, that lies at the root of the Korean Air Lines tragedy. This is the reality revealed to the world by the tragedy. It is a reality we must all ponder as we consider threats to peace and human rights that face us today.

25. The United States deeply believes that immediate steps should be taken, here in the United Nations, to decrease the likelihood of any repetition of the tragedy of

flight 007. We ask our colleagues to join with us in the coming days in the effort to wrest from this tragedy new clarity about the character of our world and new, constructive efforts to render us all more secure, in the air and on the ground.

26. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The Soviet delegation has already had occasion to express its view of the unworthy attempts of the American Administration to involve the Council in a provocative anti-Soviet spectacle. It should be perfectly obvious to one and all that the representatives of the United States are motivated not by any feelings of humanitarianism or concern about the security of civil aviation, but primarily by their own anti-Soviet instincts and their desire to step up their psychological warfare against the Soviet Union.

27. With a stubbornness that would really be worthy of a better cause, the United States has quite openly tried to make political capital out of the incident which occurred with the South Korean air liner by making unpardonable speculations about the human tragedy which took place, thus casting aspersions upon the Soviet Union and its peace-loving foreign policy. The United States is attempting to make use of this incident in order to give fresh impetus to the arms race.

28. A typical example was yesterday's televised statement by the United States President. The burden of that statement was an appeal for new military allocations, a further spiralling of the arms race. It even made direct reference to such specific types of weapons of mass destruction as MX missiles.

29. It is well known that American propaganda has no equal when it comes to the job of disinformation. However, through this curtain of propaganda new facts are daily emerging, and these facts do not fit in with Washington's original version of the incident involving the South Korean plane.

30. Today's statement by the representative of the United States is simply a further deliberate attempt to put the discussion on the wrong course. It is an attempt to avoid an answer to certain central questions.

31. It is an irrefutable fact—and indeed, it has not been denied by American representatives—that the intruder plane had been in Soviet airspace for some considerable time. It penetrated 500 kilometres inside Soviet territory. It ignored every attempt made by the Soviet ground services and air forces to identify it. It was unwilling to land at the nearest Soviet airfield. At the same time, as the Japanese Kyodo News Service indicated, that plane was in radio communication with Japanese ground-control services up to the very moment it disappeared.

32. The version that suggests that the plane's radio equipment was out of order and that its crew was unable to reply to the signals being sent to it obviously does not stand up under critical examination. This is borne out by the Soviet planes to establish contact with flight 007, a

communication was sent from that plane stating that the navigational equipment on the plane was working normally. The South Korean air liner was equipped with a triple system of autonomous navigational computers which gave the crew all possible data on the flight of the plane, including a tracing of the coastline. The possibility of a simultaneous failure of even two of those three computers is extremely small. That being the case, why did the plane stubbornly continue to fly inside Soviet airspace?

33. This fundamental question entails a whole concatenation of other questions involving a gross, lengthy and obviously pre-planned violation of the airspace of the Soviet Union. That raises the following very important question which requires clarification: Why did the United States authorities and Japan, whose ground services were directing the flights of planes on that route, knowing that that plane had been for some time in Soviet airspace, fail to take the necessary steps to put an end to that gross violation of the Soviet Union's sovereignty? Why did the ground services of the United States and Japan do nothing at all to warn the crew that the plane had violated the Soviet Union's air boundaries and, furthermore, in an area closed to overflights by foreign aircraft? Why did they not make an attempt to contact the Soviet authorities in this connection? Why was there such criminal casualness and such obvious readiness to risk human lives?

34. The American side originally tried to answer these questions by saying that the relevant United States services knew about the South Korean plane's change of course only from a subsequent analysis of data received from monitoring posts. That assertion, however, has also turned out to be invalid. As we have learnt from the American press the United States was closely following the actions of the intruder plane with the help of information satellites and other technological means.

35. The American Administration has very reluctantly admitted that there was an American RC-135 reconnaissance plane in the same area which was, at a certain stage, following a course exactly parallel to that of the South Korean aircraft and that, in at least one instance, it did intersect that course. This American reconnaissance plane, by the way, could indeed have been used to turn the South Korean Boeing 747 back to international airways in time, or at least to inform the Soviet side through the relevant American services as to the reason for its being within Soviet airspace. However, the appearance of that American reconnaissance plane close to the South Korean air liner suggests something else: it may in fact have been determining the co-ordinates and the nature of the activities of the radar stations of the Soviet air defence services, which had been set in motion to observe the behaviour of the South Korean air liner in Soviet airspace. In this connection, the following fact is also significant: American and Japanese authorities have avoided publicizing any recordings they have of conversations between the South Korean pilot and the ground services, although the South Korean plane was over the territory of the Soviet Union and in contact with those services for some time.

36. Something further should be said about the general circumstances in which this gross violation of Soviet airspace by the South Korean air liner occurred. Contrary to what has been suggested here by the representative of the United States, there have recently been deliberate violations of Soviet State borders by American planes. Such violations, committed with assumed impunity, have become more and more systematic: such violations occurred in 1982 on 22 February, 13 March and 4 and 7 May. There have been 12 similar violations so far this year—including one on 4 April by planes from the aircraft-carriers *Midway* and *Enterprise*. In those instances the Soviet Union made official protests. There was, however, no response from the United States. On the contrary, the activities of American reconnaissance planes near the air borders of the Soviet Union have increased.

37. On 31 August, on the eve of the South Korean plane's invasion of the airspace of the Soviet Union, and in that same area, seven flights by American reconnaissance planes of the RC-135 type were recorded. From 1745 to 2049 hours, Moscow time, in an area directly contiguous to the point at which the South Korean plane entered Soviet airspace and at a height of 8,000 metres, a reconnaissance plane of that type was observed carrying out manoeuvres. At the same time three United States warships appeared very close to Soviet waters.

38. On 31 August at 2000 hours, 800 kilometres north-east of the town of Petropavlovsky-on-Kamchatka, a Soviet radar station discovered an unknown plane with radar characteristics similar to those of the RC-135 that was on course towards the Kamchatka Peninsula also at the height of 8,000-9,000 metres. Subsequently the Soviet ground stations tried to establish communication with it regarding the violation. However, the aircraft did not reply and continued on the same course, going even deeper into the Soviet airspace. So as to identify the aircraft and give it assistance, air defence planes were launched to meet it. There was no reaction by the intruder to their commands. It continued on its flight with its navigation lights turned off, which was characteristic of flights by American reconnaissance planes. The intruder flew over the Kamchatka territory and in fact directly over the Soviet naval base and other military sites. When the intruder approached Sakhalin Island, another group of air defence planes was sent aloft to meet it which once again tried to establish contact with it and to conduct it to the nearest Soviet airport. However, the intruder not only continued on the same course without responding to the warning manoeuvre carried out by the Soviet planes, but also changed its course entering the airspace directly over the southern part of Sakhalin Island and flew over the Soviet naval base while at the same time altering its altitude. It was only thereafter that a warning shot was fired with tracers from the Soviet plane.

39. All these facts in aggregate suggest strongly that the course and nature of the flight carried out by the South Korean air liner was not fortuitous, but rather a scenario that had been prepared for this tragic event long before.

40. The actual state of affairs, which is apparent to all, despite efforts to distort it, clearly indicates who bears responsibility for the downing of the South Korean air liner and who sacrificed the lives of many people. Those people lost their lives not because of the Soviet Union, as is so loudly proclaimed in the West: they are additional victims of the cold war whose apologist and pursuer is the present United States Administration.

41. The Soviet delegation takes this opportunity to repeat that regret has been expressed in the ruling circles of the Soviet Union concerning the victims of this tragic event. At the same time, we vigorously condemn those who planned and executed this inhuman act of provocation and who now are not only trying to rid themselves of the guilt but are also using this occasion for unsavory political purposes.

42. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Japan, whom I invite to take a place at the Council chamber and to make his statement.

43. Mr. KURODA (Japan): My delegation made a statement on this item at the Council's meeting on 2 September [2470th meeting]. We are compelled, however, to make this urgent intervention in the light of the extremely regrettable attitude of the Soviet Union following the shooting down of a Korean aircraft.

44. As my delegation has already made clear at the meeting on 2 September, after thoroughly examining the available data the Government of Japan is convinced that Korean Air Lines flight 007 was shot down by a missile fired by a Soviet jet fighter off the shore of Sakhalin, near Kaiba Island, on 1 September. But despite our repeated demands, the Soviet Union has not admitted that the Korean Air Lines aircraft was shot down by a Soviet fighter and it has failed to offer a satisfactory explanation based on concrete data to the countries concerned, including Japan, of what actually took place. Moreover, the Soviet Union has not replied in a responsible manner to Japan's repeated request that it co-operate in search operations. This failure to respond constitutes a disregard of humanitarian principles and a violation of the Chicago Convention of International Civil Aviation.² Furthermore, the Soviet Union, through TASS, its official press agency, has been trying to shift its responsibility to other countries, including Japan, by distorting the facts and falsely denying that it bore any responsibility at all for the downing of the plane. In so doing, it totally disregards the feelings of the bereaved families of the passengers aboard the Korean aircraft and grossly offends the sentiments of the people of all the countries concerned. This Soviet attitude is utterly deplorable and should be strongly denounced.

45. Under these circumstances, the Japanese Government decided to make public the evidence it has obtained in order to prove to the world that the Korean aircraft was in fact shot down by a Soviet fighter plane. The Japanese Government has presented the evidence to the Council through the United States of America, which is a

member of the Council, so as to contribute to fair discussions of the matter in the Council.

46. The Japanese Self-Defence Forces recorded the uncoded communications between the Soviet fighter plane and its ground control station before and after it fired on the Korean aircraft in the early dawn of 1 September. That recording contains the communications transmitted by the pilot of the Soviet fighter plane which are at the crux of the incident. The transcription which the United States delegation presented a little while ago provided us with the communications extensively, so I will refer only to the crucial parts. The time is Japanese Standard Time.

"3.21 35' The target's (strobe) light is blinking. I have already approached the target to a distance of about two (kilometres).

"3.25 11' I am closing on the target. I am in lock-on. Distance to target is 8 (kilometres).

"3.25 16' I have already switched it on.

"3.26 20' I have executed the launch.

"3.26 21' The target is destroyed."

That piece of evidence demonstrates the truth beyond any doubt. There is only one truth. We once again demand that the Soviet Union candidly acknowledge the facts and deal with this incident in a forthright and responsible manner.

47. In a series of statements issued by TASS, the Soviet Union has made accusations against Japan, charging that although the Japanese air traffic control authorities were aware that the plane

"had been for some time in Soviet airspace, [*they had failed*] to take the necessary steps to put an end to that gross violation of the Soviet Union's sovereignty."

48. Furthermore, the Soviet Union would have the world believe that the Korean aircraft violated Soviet airspace for the purpose of conducting spying and reconnaissance activities. However, at the core of this incident is the fact that the Soviet Union shot down an unarmed and defenseless civilian aircraft carrying crew members and 269 passengers of many nationalities, including 28 Japanese. The various assertions made by the Soviet Union are entirely groundless and simply skirt this central issue. They are nothing but an attempt to conceal the essential nature of the incident. Its statements are unfriendly and detrimental to the efforts of the international community to determine the facts and bring about a settlement of this tragic incident.

49. The Soviet action is inhuman and outrageous. It contravenes international law and internationally accepted norms for the safety of international civil aviation, and has impaired the order regarding its safety. It must never be condoned and deserves our denunciation.

50. The evidence Japan provided today makes it clear that the five-point demand which the representative of the

Republic of Korea made to the Council on 2 September [*ibid.*] against the Soviet Union is a legitimate one. That legitimate demand will doubtless gain the support of the entire world.

51. The Government of Japan once again strongly denounces the unlawful and barbarous act of the Soviet Union. We call upon the Soviet Union to fulfil its obligations under international law and observe humanitarian principles by acting promptly and in good faith. This includes presenting to the countries concerned a full report of the facts.

52. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of the Philippines. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

53. Mr. MORENO SALCEDO (Philippines): Mr. President, I wish to thank you and, through you, the members of the Council for giving my delegation the opportunity to speak on the very grave issue before us. I would have spoken on 2 September had the structures of time not prevented me from doing so. Before proceeding, let me, first of all, felicitate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency. Your eminent qualifications ensure that the work of the Council will be in good hands.

54. May I also extend our appreciation to your predecessor, the representative of France, whose handling of the work of the Council during his term reflected his great diplomatic skills and leadership.

55. In the early hours of Thursday, 1 September, a civilian aircraft of the Korean Air Lines, with 240 passengers and 29 crew members on board, disappeared. It is now established that the aircraft had been flying in Soviet airspace. It is also established that a Soviet fighter plane fired in the direction of the ill-fated aircraft.

56. All the information presented to this body and to the world by different sources up to now indicates that the Korean plane went down from a missile fired by a Soviet military aircraft, thus sending to their deaths 269 hapless and innocent victims. We therefore voice our outrage, condemnation and protest over this wanton act.

57. My Government and people, like the rest of the international community, await a satisfactory explanation of the loss of so many innocent lives. Twenty-four of the unfortunate passengers on board the plane were Filipino citizens or persons of Filipino origin, including women and children, who were on their way to visit the land of their birth.

58. Apart from the resulting tragic loss of human lives, this incident brings into focus the nature of innocent passage of commercial aircraft throughout the world, and to what extent prohibitions or sanctions and penalties should be imposed on transgressions against national airspace. In this particular case, although the Korean commercial aircraft had entered Soviet airspace, the action taken against it was unjustifiably disproportionate to the act objected to.

What is more, it was exacted upon people who were innocent of any wrongdoing.

59. My Government, therefore, strongly urges that an immediate investigation of this incident be undertaken. Among other things, the inquiry should determine exactly what happened, pinpoint where the responsibility lies, demand an accounting from those responsible, as well as ensure appropriate and adequate redress for the families of the victims. Moreover, measures should be taken to ensure that similar acts of violence are prevented or avoided in the future.

60. We trust that this body, and the whole international community, will agree to conducting this inquiry, with the full co-operation of those directly concerned.

61. To the families of the victims we extend our sincere and profound condolences. My Government, for its part, is extending every possible assistance to the relatives of the Filipinos who perished under such tragic circumstances.

62. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Liberia, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make her statement.

63. Mrs. JONES (Liberia): The delegation of Liberia, Sir, is pleased to see you presiding for the month of September. Your proven skills as a negotiator are a good augury, and we wish you success in your leadership of the Council during its present meetings. We also extend our appreciation to your predecessor for his leadership during the month of August.

64. At a time when the whole world, on the eve of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly, was calmly looking forward to peaceful deliberations, our hopes were dashed by the baser instincts of man—by his instinct to disturb the peace.

65. The wilful, calculated shooting down of an unarmed civilian aircraft carrying 269 helpless, hapless passengers has aroused the concern and anger of all peace-loving peoples. The delegation of Liberia, accordingly, registers in this public manner the anger, concern and outrage of the Government and people of Liberia over the loss of the lives of those people. We also extend sympathy to the Korean people in their period of mourning and sadness.

66. This wanton, brutal act of killing helpless people has created a puzzle in the minds of millions. My delegation wishes to inquire and to demand an explanation as to how a nation can express its desire and yearning for peace and human understanding and at the same time shoot down an aircraft carrying helpless civilians.

67. As long as all nations, large and small, rich and poor, super-Power and lesser Power, share a common living space, we also share a responsibility to the world community regarding our actions and conduct. If we are truly and sincerely working for peace how can the Soviet

action be convincingly explained? Peace is not achieved by bullets or grandiose statements issued in the assemblies, congresses and presidiums of the world, but rather on the level of daily human interaction. The Soviet Union owes the entire world, and the Korean people in particular, a factual explanation of the incident, in the name of human decency and dignity.

68. The delegation of Liberia further calls for the payment of adequate compensation to the bereaved families by the Soviet Union. We request that an investigation, by, *inter alia*, officials of ICAO should be undertaken. In the name of justice and humanity the Soviet Union must be called upon to punish those responsible for the shooting down of a passenger aircraft, because that act cannot be condoned.

69. The delegation of Liberia further requests that the Council spare no effort in condemning it, because it is our view that it would be unreasonable to contend that the violation of a nation's airspace by a civilian aircraft with clear markings and identification justifies the use of such excessive force. It would have been far better had the Soviets forced the aircraft to land, as they did in the case of another Korean airliner in 1978.

70. The shooting down of the Korean plane is in gross violation of international civil aviation regulations. It is an act which seriously affects the operations of international air services and undermines the confidence of people in the safety of civil aviation. We ask, was the aircraft identified as a civilian or military aircraft before the shooting? What happens if weather conditions cause an aircraft to go off course—which is not an international violation of a country's airspace? Must it be shot from the air?

71. The tendency of super-Powers to over-react when provoked should be checked. If it is not, such behaviour foreshadows dire events. More and more, future trends will reveal helpless and powerless civilians becoming casualties in super-Power rivalry. The rules governing the space age and space-age technology leave much to be desired. Such a peace-time calamity is as grotesque as any war-time calamity.

72. There have been peace-time disasters in land, sea and air transport, but none has been so calculated and so wilfully carried out as the recent grotesque, sadistic act, which should not have occurred in these so-called modern times.

73. It is sad to think that such an act could have occurred as if extraterrestrial beings from Saturn or Jupiter had been visiting Earth in an unfamiliar, unrecognizable spacecraft. The shooting down of a civilian aircraft as if it were from outer space, from another planet, is indeed regrettable. It illustrates the clear danger of the stockpiling of deadly armaments: given a confused set of variables and options, there may soon be a temptation to put those armaments to practical use. These creatures of man are intended not to be looked upon and admired as objects of arts, but to be admired for the devastating attacks they

can inflict on mankind. Everyone who has flown in an aircraft—including everyone in this chamber—can identify with the fate of the helpless air passengers, who may not even have been aware that they were in any kind of danger, with no warning having been given, so swift is the act of modern warfare. We are left behind to agonize over their fate and to hold our breath, wondering whether this will happen again.

74. In the name of our common humanity, in the name of international law and order, we ask the Soviet Union to give the world the whole story, realizing as we do from their own Tolstoy's *War and Peace* that the worst thing is for good men to keep silent when a wrong has been done.

75. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Sweden. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

76. Mr. AMNEUS (Sweden): I should like to thank the members of the Security Council for giving Sweden this opportunity to address the Council on the matter of the destruction of a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747.

77. Although the exact circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the civilian Korean air liner remain to be determined, we must now assume that the aircraft was shot down by Soviet interceptors. If this assumption is correct, my Government, as a Member of the United Nations and with one of its citizens among the passengers, condemns this unlawful and callous act causing the death of 269 innocent people. We also wish to express our sincere condolences to the many families of different nationalities who have suffered a heavy loss through this tragedy.

78. This act constitutes a violation of fundamental rules of international law, a violation of accepted humanitarian principles and a violation of agreements concerning civil air transportation.

79. It is of great importance that principles of international law are respected in the field of civil aviation. The air traffic system is based on the presumption that all States will protect the lives of innocent air passengers. A civilian aircraft should, in times of peace, under no circumstances be subjected to action that might imperil its safety. This principle is valid also in cases where navigation faults may lead the aircraft into restricted areas. In cases of interception of civilian aircraft the respect for human life should take precedence over the protection of territory.

80. It is a well-known fact that the Soviet Union has severe rules of its own for the protection of the State boundary, enabling Soviet units to use force even against civilian aircraft. Such rules and instructions are not in accordance with generally accepted norms of international law relevant to civilian transportation.

81. All countries having air traffic to and from the Soviet Union have a right to demand that Soviet authorities do not use force against their aircraft in cases of navi-

gational faults. All civilian aircraft must be treated in a manner that eliminates risks to the safety of the aircraft and its passengers. Interception routines must be applied in such a strict way as to eliminate any risk for mistake with regard to the identity of intercepted aircraft.

82. It is vital that incidents of this nature do not occur in the future. It is essential that the Soviet Union provide all information necessary to enable the international community to investigate the incident. No nation has a right to withhold information relevant to a matter of this nature.

83. It has been clearly demonstrated during the preceding meeting [*ibid.*] that this fatal incident threatens to worsen an already tense international climate.

84. There is an obvious risk that the destruction of the Korean aircraft will entail a setback for recent attempts to relieve tension in the world. It is the fervent hope of my Government that this should not happen.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.

NOTES

¹ Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms (SALT-I) (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 944, No. 13445) and Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-II) (see CD/53/Appendix III/Vol. I, document CD/28).

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 15, No. 102.

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