

United Nations Oral History Project

**Gladwyn Jebb
21 June 1983**

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HISTORY
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Lord Gladwyn Jebb

21 June 1983

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Movshon

~~QUESTION:~~ Reading your book - which has been at my hand for some months - it says that the first reference to a Foreign Office assignment pointing in the UN's direction seems to have come in the summer of 1942 when you were assigned to something called Economic and Reconstruction Department. Do you have any memory of that and did you have any sense at the time of where it might lead?

Lord GLADWYN: I was Secretary to the Head of the Foreign Office when the war broke out, and after the collapse of France I was seconded to the Ministry of ^{Economic} Warfare to help run the special operations as executive of Dr. Dalton. That went on until Dr. Dalton went to the Board of Trade in April 1942 and I returned to the Foreign Office. After a time - two or three months - they put me in charge of a new department called the Economic and Reconstruction Department, which was supposed to cope with various post-war problems, notably economic. After a time it became apparent that the economic future could not be dissociated from the political one and it therefore became more and more obvious that what was needed and what actually took place was a kind of planning department in the Foreign Office of which I was the head. I recruited more or less the staff and after a time I obtained the services of Professor Webster, who at that time was working in Chatham House as a great expert on the League of Nations. I made friends with him - with some difficulty - and got him inserted into the department. That must have been approximately a year later. But even before then we had been thinking about what might happen after the war in the way of an international organization, and he was of course very useful in preparing documents to that effect.

As you know, it is all down on paper of course and there is no particular reason for me to rehearse it, don't you agree?

MOVSHON:

~~QUESTION:~~ I am listening because I am really going to ask about your own temperament.

That duty put you in touch not only with Lord Webster but also with Caines -

Lord GLADWYN: Oh no.

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Lord GLADWYN: Oh no.

QUESTION: I am sorry. He was already Lord Caines, wasn't he?

Lord GLADWYN: Caines I saw only once or twice.

QUESTION: And Barry White later on?

Lord GLADWYN: No, I have never met him.

QUESTION: Never?

Lord GLADWYN: No.

QUESTION: But that initiative eventually led to Bretton Woods, did it not?

Lord GLADWYN: No, I don't do Bretton Woods.

QUESTION: Really? It didn't go that way?

Lord GLADWYN: No.

QUESTION: Do you feel yourself to have been an economic animal basically or a political one?

Lord GLADWYN: Political, of course.

QUESTION: I always thought so.

Lord GLADWYN: Political is the impression that others have received.

QUESTION: Another aspect of the work eventually resulted in UNRWA, the rehabilitation and reconstruction agency. Do you recall some of the arguments and concepts around that? Was it a big Foreign Office issue?

Lord GLADWYN: Well, the Foreign Office had a say and it was mostly the work of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, I seem to remember. Yes, we knew about it, encouraged it and thought it was a proud beginning of some kind of United Nations organization. It was the first United Nations organization to be formed really. But it was evident that it could not work except with some political background, and it was so evident that we then passed on from there to the political background that was necessary.

QUESTION: The big political cluster of issues during wartime. This emerges from your book; it emerges also from the Cadogan diaries and others. Was it your fault, or Foreign Office fault - I must say it was echoed also in Washington and Moscow - that the three Powers, US, UK and the Soviet Union, and perhaps added to that a revived France would lay down the post-war law for everybody, or did you frankly foresee a day when other countries would share the responsibilities?

Lord GLADWYN: There wasn't such a thing as a Foreign Office view. The people of the Foreign Office were quite divided, I think, on all these issues quite often. We tried to get a Foreign Office consensus, it is true, in order to find a Secretary of State; and I suppose I was fairly successful in getting such a consensus, probably. No one thought originally, I think, the four-Power plan should be a basis of four-Power agreement without which agreement it was unlikely that they would have an international organization at all. Naturally, nobody thought that the other Powers would be excluded, but it was thought that unless there was harmony between the greater Powers the future was pretty dim - which indeed it has proved to be.

QUESTION: You have just really, in a way, mapped out the idea of permanent membership of the Security Council, haven't you?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, that was the original idea.

QUESTION: But did it grow from there? Did the veto and the five permanent members of the Security Council grow out of this?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, I suppose so. Yes, undoubtedly, they did become partners.

QUESTION: Who were the other personalities who worked - at that point perhaps less interestedly - in the day-to-day conduct of the war, whether things were going badly or not and who were really caring about the shape of the post-war world? You were foremost among them, but you must have had somebody to argue with.

Lord GLADWYN: The great leader, Mr. Churchill, eventually had some ideas about world government, but most of the time he was much too preoccupied with winning the war to think seriously of other matters.

QUESTION: I think he was also bored with the whole United Nations thing, don't you?

Lord GLADWYN: No, I think he had an idea. His own ideas, of course, as I say in my book, were laid down in thoughts. But that was later on. First of all, he did not really pay much attention to these things, I don't think.

QUESTION: You served under various foreign secretaries, including Halifax, Eden and, I suppose, Bevin afterwards. Do you remember any of the personality differences or concords with them? Did you get on well with Halifax, for example?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes. I did not work all that closely with Halifax because I was Secretary for the Foreign Office and . I did not really advise Halifax directly at all. I suppose I got along well with him, but that ended. He was succeeded by Eden, with whom I never really got along very well because he was, I thought, not very interested in the future. He was a very good negotiator and interested in what was going to happen the day after tomorrow and how to get hold of .

QUESTION: (inaudible)

Lord GLADWYN: No, away in some conference. He was a very good negotiator and a very good in many ways, but he was and never really contemplated it that much or seriously. Certainly he never really paid very much attention to our views on world government. He accepted it as a principle, but (inaudible).

QUESTION: That's an interesting phrase you just used, because there are many people who feel that the UN Charter as written at San Francisco is in entirely the opposite direction from world government; it reinforces sovereignty to a tremendous degree. Do you agree with that or not?

Lord GLADWYN: I never thought that world government was a possibility at all.

QUESTION: I know, but you used the phrase and that's why. You meant the Governments of the world, did you?

Lord GLADWYN: world organization, yes.

QUESTION: Of the interesting things that come up in the correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt one is the question whether or not China is a world Power. I am talking about 1943, 1944, 1945. Did you have any feelings on that subject?

Lord GLADWYN: We in the Foreign Office generally, I think, never thought that China had any chance of being a real world Power for a very long time, but we had to imagine it was a world Power in order to please President Roosevelt. The whole object was to get agreement with the Americans, and that was one of the reasons we agreed with the idea that China should come in as a great Power.

QUESTION: But you had no illusions about the -

Lord GLADWYN: None whatever. We thought it was very unlikely that it would emerge as a world Power for a very considerable time.

QUESTION: They have, of course, haven't they?

Lord GLADWYN: After 30 years, yes.

QUESTION: Interestingly - incidentally, I am leaping forward now - in the period 1950-1954 when you were the United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the Security Council, you had the rather difficult task of treading a path between your country's recognition of Peking and the US abhorrence of the very idea. You must have have found that to be -



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Lord GLADWYN: I don't know about that. The United States very nearly recognized Communist China soon after Mr. Bevin did. That was when Acheson came to London at the beginning of 1948 - I think it was, wasn't it? He was just on the point of recognizing them when there was some incident in Peking - someone was murdered or something - and the China lobby got up in arms and then they went right back against the idea. It was a pity, but that was so. When I was in New York in 1950 I did, when President of the Security Council, succeed in getting the Americans to agree, by abstaining, to the Red Chinese sending a mission to New York.

QUESTION: General Woo. I remember him.

Lord GLADWYN: General Woo, yes.

QUESTION: That was towards the end of the year. I was in Korea at that time - UN information officer. Still, it must have been not easy for the principal ally of the United States to hold, especially when China came into the fighting, a view so entirely opposite to that of the Americans.

Lord GLADWYN: It wasn't entirely opposite - I suppose some Americans anyway.

QUESTION: But this was the physical enemy, armed and horrible on the battlefield.

Lord GLADWYN: The Red Chinese, yes. Well, we did our best and we succeeded in modifying the American policy to some extent, I should have thought.

QUESTION: What about India? Were you convinced that the American attitude to India, as certainly a country that should be spoken about as independent now, whatever the technicalities remaining to be accomplished, and as a potential Power of importance in the United Nations, was an incursion or a violation of -

Lord GLADWYN: What year are you referring to?

QUESTION: I am talking about the war years, when America -

Lord GLADWYN: The end of the war? India wasn't independent until 1949, was it?

QUESTION: That's right. On the other hand, she had a separate UN vote as early as -

Lord GLADWYN: As a member of the Commonwealth, yes.

QUESTION: Did you hold that American encouragement of Indian independence was an intrusion into British affairs?

Lord GLADWYN: I didn't personally, no.

QUESTION: I am interested in you personally. The whole interview is pitched at what you felt, because it's all in the open now, isn't it?

Lord GLADWYN: No. I thought they would have to recognize India as completely independent, yes. But it needed some time for India to settle down as a considerable Power, and eventually it did, certainly. Whether she should have been a member of the Security Council as a permanent member is a different matter. I think that would have been difficult really with Pakistan and before the Indians had found their feet.

QUESTION: But you had no misgivings yourself about the idea of India as a separate nation?

Lord GLADWYN: None whatever, no.

QUESTION: Interesting. I was trying to work out - very hard to find out; I checked a few references - but how did the Indian separate vote come about? Have you any ideas?

Lord GLADWYN: Separate vote?

QUESTION: I mean India was the only non-Dominion - to use the term of the time - which had a separate vote in the United Nations. It is interesting. I must check it. The Indians don't know; I asked them. If we could look at the war for a bit, when 1944 came and we had all got certain that the Germans were going to be beaten there was a debate about the future of Germany: should it be partitioned; should it be a single country; unconditional surrender? You remember the Morgenthau business. What was your own view about the future of Germany at that time? Do you remember?

Lord GLADWYN: I think there was a division of opinion in the Foreign Office. I can't remember exactly what it was. But the official view was that at all costs Germany should be reunited as a democracy. I never thought that was very likely, because the Russians being in possession of part of Germany would not agree. Whether we thought it was a good thing or not, I thought the only thing to do was to count on the likelihood that half of Germany or three quarters or two thirds would be in the Western camp and the other would be in the Eastern camp. I thought that was something that would be unfortunate but would be inevitable, and that the idea of always saying that we had to have the Wiederrereinigung Deutschlands as the principal objective was probably mistaken.

QUESTION: Do you remember anything about other opinions in the Foreign Office?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes. I think I said so. I can't remember the name of the chap -

QUESTION: Vansittart, of course, was -

Lord GLADWYN: Who?

QUESTION: Robert Vansittart.

Lord GLADWYN: He didn't have anything -

QUESTION: He was out by this stage. He was the great pre-war hater of Germany, wasn't he?

Lord GLADWYN: Oh, no. There was nothing to do with that at the end of the war. But there were people who thought that the idea was that we must have a united democratic Germany, and that was the principal objective of our foreign policy. But I didn't think myself it would be so.

QUESTION: Tell me on a different level what working for Cadogan was like, or working with him.

Lord GLADWYN: I thought I worked very well with him.

QUESTION: No doubt you did. The diaries, of course, reveal that under the urbane exterior there were banked fires of fury.

Lord GLADWYN: I never knew anything about that myself - very odd.

QUESTION: Really?

Lord GLADWYN: No, nothing whatever.

QUESTION: I thought that to his close colleagues he would occasionally explode.

Lord GLADWYN: No. He was always very calm, I assure you - most extraordinary

QUESTION: It is amazing, isn't it? You must have read the book with some astonishment then.

Lord GLADWYN: I did really, yes. But he was an extremely able operator and very astute and very charismatic I thought in all his judgements. I thought he was a very good man.

QUESTION: He says "That swine Samuel Hoare going to Madrid as Ambassador. Good riddance to bad rubbish."

Lord GLADWYN: Well, he couldn't bear Sam Hoare.

QUESTION: There were a few others he couldn't bear either. If you look at the diaries carefully he seems to have started out with an initial resistance to Churchill and then a slow acceptance.

Lord GLADWYN: That's true. He became rather dominated by Churchill eventually, I think. But he always tended to criticize him, too, yes.

QUESTION: He was your predecessor, of course, in New York, wasn't he?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes. He had left by the time of the Korean War. He was on his way back on a ship when the Korean War broke out. Otherwise, they might have asked him to stay on, I suppose. Anyhow, he was on his way back on a ship, so I had to go out on a moment's notice and I got there two days after the war had broken out.

QUESTION: And the day after that I took off for Korea. I left New York bound for Korea with Colonel Catton, who was Trygve Lie's representative. I remember those two Security Council meetings and I was back in October for some where you had some fun with -

Lord GLADWYN: No. The principal decisions had been taken before I got there.

QUESTION: Yes - 25 and 27 June were the main ones. Then when the Chinese came in and General Woo arrived and so on -

Lord GLADWYN: Well, he went back without any satisfaction. He spoke to the Russians and went straight home.

QUESTION: Yes, I remember. But you became at that stage something of a national figure really in the next year on television in America, because -

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, in August/September 1950, and to some extent afterwards.

QUESTION: And you became a considerable folk hero.

Lord GLADWYN: So I believe.

QUESTION: You must have found that, for a Foreign Office chap, to be an unusual -

Lord GLADWYN: Very odd.

QUESTION: We march on. Anonymity in documents: you look at something like the Atlantic Charter and you wonder. Was it really the work of Cadogan?

Lord GLADWYN: I suppose so, but it all happened on a ship, I seem to remember and I wasn't there.

QUESTION: He must have taken copious files aboard with him, I am sure.

Lord GLADWYN: I don't think so.

QUESTION: Really?

Lord GLADWYN: No, I think he drafted it, but under the influence of Churchill and Roosevelt, of course. It was rather vague.

QUESTION: Yes, freedom from want and freedom from -

Lord GLADWYN: It was all right, but the Atlantic Charter didn't really have much effect on the future, I don't think.

QUESTION: Rather interestingly, I was looking at it: eight main points, of which one looked to the establishment of a peace that would permit all nations "a means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, free from fear and want". Then I was going to ask whose ideas were they; do you think they were Churchill's as put down by Cadogan?

LORD GLADWYN: Well, Roosevelt's, I dare say - I don't know; I wasn't there.

QUESTION: And as you say, there was no guess work...

LORD GLADWYN: On, none at all. It was just done, I think, as a matter of consciousness - I don't think they had any files much on the ship.

QUESTION: Article 7 of that Charter called for the right to cross the high seas and oceans without hindrance...

LORD GLADWYN: That was Roosevelt, of course.

QUESTION: That was Roosevelt. The British view - historically, at least - has been that they were entitled to seize and search in war time...

LORD GLADWYN: Yes, I think that was so.

QUESTION: Interestingly, the Charter of the United Nations seems to have nothing about freedom of navigation. . (inaudible)

Tell me, as you look at the unfolding of things since, do you believe that if things had been done differently back then the world might be different today?

LORD GLADWYN: It's like saying what would have happened if Napoleon had won the Battle of Waterloo...

QUESTION: It's an entertaining game, and you can interpret...enter in with a very small stake. So, you have no...

LORD GLADWYN: Well, I don't think it's very likely that things would have turned out very differently, given the fact that there was always bound to be clash between the Americans and the Russians.

QUESTION: Let's analyse that for a moment: the Russians has this hedgehog fear of being assaulted from the West, and they had some reason historically to have such an outlook. Do you think there was American-British insensitivity

to this psychological need of theirs, or...

LORD GLADWYN: No, I think the British were very conscious of it.

QUESTION: But couldn't sell the Americans?

LORD GLADWYN: The Americans...I think were much more keen on... Well the Americans were under Harry Hopkins...Well, I beg your pardon, I've got it wrong - the Americans were absolutely keen on getting agreement with the Russians at all costs, yes. And the British were more doubtful that that would work.

QUESTION: And eventually of course what happened was the Americans - I mean it was the worst possible outcome, wasn't it, I mean it really...the worst possible - war would have been worse - but there was the greatest suspicion on both sides and a kind of mounting temperature...

LORD GLADWYN: I think the Russians were largely responsible for that, of course, too, but perhaps it was inevitable...

QUESTION: Well, tell me why, if you know why. Why would it have been in the Russian interest to set up this wall or to project hostility and suspicion and dislike? Do you have any views on this, do you have any...

LORD GLADWYN: The Russians haven't solved their empire, and I daresay they were frightened that it would be disrupted by American action or Western action. And they still are.

QUESTION: Yes, I suppose so. We have and we hold, like Fafner in the Ring... Churchill notes that at Teheran, in December 1943, "there I sat with the Great Russian Bear on one side of me with paws outstretched, and on the other side the great American Buffalo" - I guess he must have thought a little while before coming up with the Buffalo as a symbol of America - "and between the two sat the poor little English Donkey who was the only one who knew the right way home." What do you feel about that?

LORD GLADWYN: I think that's rather an exaggerated way of putting it. But I think that at Teheran it was evident that the Russians and the Americans

between themselves were going to dominate the scene, and we had less and less influence than we had before.

QUESTION: You were - no, you weren't actually in - you were in London when the atomic thing happened and the Baruch-Lilienthal plan and the Russian rejection and what not... A lot of people today feel that the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan as presented to the Council in -

LORD GLADWYN: The Baruch plan...

QUESTION: - it was really Lilienthal's initially, as amended by Acheson and finally put up by Baruch...we had to make a choice...we are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead...that that was calculated to bring about a Russian rejection because it ensured an American monopoly of control...

LORD GLADWYN: Well, you couldn't get over the question of control, really...that was the basic difficulty.

QUESTION: There was no one willing to trust an independent international authority...

LORD GLADWYN: No, I don't think the Russians were willing to trust...

QUESTION: Or the Americans?

LORD GLADWYN: ...nor the Americans either, no.

QUESTION: Then it was a problem, obviously.

QUESTION: Cadogan - I don't know where this goes - Cadogan observed in 1944 that he didn't trust "A nice complete logical charter which won't mean what it says. Much better frankly say that for five years the three Powers must own the world, they're the only people who can." Do you really believe that even then decisions affecting all the continents could be made by this trio of deciding Powers, or were you sceptical - more particularly about the U.K.'s economic future, if not of her imperial influence?

LORD GLADWYN: Well, I thought that if there was going to be any success for the United Nations the Americans and the Russians would have to be in broad agreement, otherwise it wouldn't work.

QUESTION: But you weren't very sanguine about there being such an agreement, even then?

LORD GLADWYN: Not after 1947, no.

QUESTION: What changed?

LORD GLADWYN: Well, it's quite evident that the Russians were not going to play that game.

QUESTION: I'm really interested and will put questions - unless you can find me a shortcut - I am interested in some of the personalities of the time. Do you have any outstanding...I mean, you gave me a little insight into Eden's priorities when he took over the Foreign Secretaryship. Now, what about Halifax? You didn't have too much to do with him personally...you worked through Cadogan...

LORD GLADWYN: Yes...

QUESTION: ...and Cadogan is rather reticent on Halifax.

LORD GLADWYN: Is he?

QUESTION: I'm having an argument with Robert Rhodes-James - do you know him?

LORD GLADWYN: I hardly know him - I know of him...

QUESTION: He says that Eden was going to be Secretary-General. I can't believe that for a moment...

LORD GLADWYN: No...no.

QUESTION: He believes it, apparently; there's a reference to it in his printed memoirs -

LORD GLADWYN: I don't think there was any question of it - I don't think that Eden wanted it...

QUESTION: He wanted Churchill to go away so that he could be Prime Minister, didn't he?

LORD GLADWYN: Of course, at the time...

QUESTION: And the other thing which someone must have realized is that the last British Secretary-General of the League, Eric Drummond, having finished his spell in Geneva was brought home, ennobled...

LORD GLADWYN: No, no, he inherited it...

QUESTION: Oh, I see... and sent to Rome to be Ambassador.

LORD GLADWYN: Yes.

QUESTION: Where they'd just been visiting sanctions...

LORD GLADWYN: That's right - a very silly thing to do.

QUESTION: Wasn't it? Hold on, I've got to turn this thing over... are you distressed at this procedure?

...

QUESTION: Pasvolsky was in some ways your opposite number before...

LORD GLADWYN: Yes, I suppose he could be said - rather he was a combination of me and Professor Webster. Pasvolsky was a dominant element on the American side in the preparation of the Charter, undoubtedly. At Dumbarton Oaks and also at San Francisco...

QUESTION: As we move towards Bretton Woods and Yalta, with the U.N.

LORD GLADWYN: I had nothing to do with Bretton Woods.

QUESTION: Nothing to do with Bretton Woods?

LORD GLADWYN: No, no.

QUESTION: But someone in the Foreign Office must have?

LORD GLADWYN: Nigel Ronald. He's alive...I think...

QUESTION: He's alive...I see. Well that's a good name to note down.

LORD GLADWYN: I think he must be pretty old, but I think he's still alive. He must be in the nineties.

QUESTION: What about the idea of this U.N. army and enforcement measures? Did you ever believe that there was going to be a U.N. army with air force and navy and...

LORD GLADWYN: No, not really. But we have to go along with the idea because it was part of the general conception that there should be. I never believed that very likely it would happen, certainly not after the outbreak of the Cold War. But in principle we had to go along with it, as the Military Staff Committee - it was in the Charter, and in principle it was the thing to do. But it wouldn't really have worked. I can't think.

QUESTION: Even by Bretton Woods, it says here Roosevelt was growing nervous about providing soldiers to the U.N. without the constitutional steps...

but do you know to this day the Military Staff Committee holds a meeting each month?

LORD GLADWYN: Is this true?

QUESTION: I may be wrong, but it did a couple of years ago...

LORD GLADWYN: Oh, it did until fairly recently, I know. Utterly ridiculous...

QUESTION: They used to meet - a general, an admiral, and an airforce commander from each of the Five...and grunt at each other and exchange a courtesy and...

LORD GLADWYN: And fix the date of the next meeting... It's actually been going on since 194...whenever it was...

QUESTION: But the idea that each of the five Powers would ... off a little army for the U.N. - you never took seriously?

LORD GLADWYN: I didn't think it very likely, no. We had to go along with the formalities, yes, but I never thought myself it was very likely it would happen, no.

QUESTION: Were you in on a proposal at one point that there should be a United Nations air force?

LORD GLADWYN: No, I thought that was nonsense to go and bombard everybody who was rebellious and...absurd...

QUESTION: Now, turning a little to the work after the San Francisco Conference, you were - I suppose - I mean, we think of you as a kind of pre-Secretary-General of the United Nations.

LORD GLADWYN: I was provisional Secretary-General, so described, I believe, yes.

QUESTION: And, I mean, chaps like Brian Urquhart wandered in and asked for work and you took them...

LORD GLADWYN: Well, he was my first recruit, actually.

QUESTION: Do you know about the Mohicans - do you know what they are?

LORD GLADWYN: No. Indians?

QUESTION: No, it's a club - well, of course, the novel, but there's a club at the U.N. of those who were on board - U.N. Secretariat - before the fifteenth of August 1946, and obviously this is a club with a dwindling future and eventually there will be the last of the Mohicans... But Brian is the first of the Mohicans.

LORD GLADWYN: I should have thought so. (Laughter) The first one in a sense was David Owen...

QUESTION: Yes.

LORD GLADWYN: ...who was more or less engaged - well, I didn't actually take him on, but it was agreed that he should be a sort of number two in command of the internal operations...

QUESTION: You mention him in the book as - he was I think Cripps's...

LORD GLADWYN: He was Cripps's private secretary.

QUESTION: ...and he was a charmer. We knew him well in the U.N. He was a great funny Yorkshireman...

LORD GLADWYN: But the first actual recruit was Brian Urquhart actually, he was my private secretary.

QUESTION: Who came to you after being Browning's personal assistant or something...

LORD GLADWYN: Yes.

QUESTION: ...and having various disagreeable adventures in the war...

LORD GLADWYN: Yes.

QUESTION: But Brian, of course, is, as you know, still, a stalwart and has run the peace-keeping side since Bunche's death for all the Secretaries-General...

LORD GLADWYN: I know.

QUESTION: And is as...

LORD GLADWYN: I suppose he'll retire soon, won't he, will he?

QUESTION: Well, he's been talking about retiring for about 30 years, but I think...

LORD GLADWYN: How old is he - sixty-five?

QUESTION: Something like that - not even.

LORD GLADWYN: Sixty-two?

QUESTION: Something...but marvellous. He's not only a man with all of that knowledge and skill on that peace-keeping side, but he has a sense of honour and propriety about the Secretariat...that is invaluable.

LORD GLADWYN: Yes.

QUESTION: ...if people seem to have had their rights as members of the Secretariat assailed, Brian is the -

LORD GLADWYN: I'm sure he is, yes, yes...

QUESTION: ... - the defender of the right. Now, you put together -

I see your report to the first London Assembly, the Report of the Preparatory Commission - I assume it was partly drafted by you -

LORD GLADWYN: Yes, entirely...

QUESTION: ...and you say that you put together the staffs of the various departments and they became in many cases...

LORD GLADWYN: The rules of procedure, that's even more interesting.

QUESTION: Which were revised afterwards by Committees headed by...

LORD GLADWYN: But they remained essentially the same. Except for the Security Council - it's never adopted its rules of procedure.

QUESTION: No.

LORD GLADWYN: They have provisional rules of procedure at the first meeting, of course...it has worked on that basis for a long time.

QUESTION: I'm interested in really - this is the nucleus of the Secretariat...and having been a member of the Secretariat for thirty-five years now myself -

LORD GLADWYN: Oh really?

QUESTION: Yes... - I'm interested in the extent to which you were aware or to which your behaviour was affected by the League experience...

LORD GLADWYN: The League of Nations?

QUESTION: Yes.

LORD GLADWYN: No, I don't think it was really.

QUESTION: It wasn't? You really thought you were sort of creating afresh?

LORD GLADWYN: Well...I thought we were creating a new version of the League, if you like, but it wasn't very much influenced by my experience of the United Nations. I did go to the United Nations ...a certain amount...but no, I can't remember thinking that I was influenced by that very much. I just recruited the people who seemed to be most desirable for the job. And of course to a very large extent you had to take the nominees of the various States, you couldn't help it.

QUESTION: But among the English recruits, apart from Brian and David Owen... I see names like Hugh Williams - he's in fact a New Zealander - your information staff, which is of course the one that interested me because I came to know them quite soon afterwards... Duckworth-Barker whom we spoke of, and other good people. And then many of the overseas ones became ASG's and Directors and what not under the...



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Lord GLADWYN: Yes, they did. A man called Cohen, I think.

QUESTION: Ben, yes. Chile. Marvelous.

Look, I've got to do this ...

We were talking about the Secretariat. The Secretariat has now grown into a force of many thousands. The influence of the original nucleus remained for a long time and eventually proved to be a cause of some irritation to the new incoming Powers who found all the top jobs occupied by Yanks and Limeys and Frenchmen and ...

Lord GLADWYN: I don't know anything about such goings on.

QUESTION: Don't you?

Lord GLADWYN: No. Nothing whatever.

QUESTION: But it's changing now because the first generation is well on its way out and all sorts of new people are in.

But you must - even though you were not at this stage on the scene - a year after you left New York the floodgates opened and the membership ...

Lord GLADWYN: That's in the Secretariat, when the membership (inaudible)

QUESTION: Yes, but in other words each member claimed and laid a claim to some share of the staff ...

Lord GLADWYN: I always thought they opened the gates too rapidly myself. I thought that increasing the membership so quickly and admitting almost anybody who applied was probably a mistake.

QUESTION: What would you have ...

Lord GLADWYN: Well I think that under the Charter you are able to become a Member State of the United Nations if you are willing and able to accept the obligations of the Charter.

QUESTION: And it further requires that you have to be peace-loving.

Lord GLADWYN: Well, peace-loving; whatever that means. Everybody says they are peace-loving, but they have to be able and willing to accept their obligations. Whereas some were willing, I don't think many were able, and I think that if the great Powers had been agreed, if the Americans and Russians were agreed not to admit people who were obviously incapable of fulfilling their obligations it might have been an advantage. But of course it was all destroyed by great-Power rivalry, because you couldn't veto somebody because they might go over to the other side.

QUESTION: Exactly. Well, as you know the place was kept locked up precisely because the Russians wanted so-and-so in and we wanted so-and-so in, and they divided countries ...

Lord GLADWYN: Yes.

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QUESTION: But as far as Africa and Asia were concerned, when you say Nigeria - Ghana is independent; obviously Ghana gets in and is acclaimed in the General Assembly - and Madagascar and whatever. But when it then comes to Rwanda and Urundi as separate - but you see it's very difficult to say "yes" to the one and "no" to the other because ...

Lord GLADWYN: Very difficult, but something should have been done in my view. It's so ludicrous to think the Maldives Islands has the same vote as China and to (inaudible).

QUESTION: Yes, it is. In the early days did you ever think of weighted voting? I know that it came up in the sense that at one point the Russians demanded a vote for each of their republics. That was at Yalta, wasn't it?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes. Well, before Yalta they started talking about that, but then the United States said they ought to have a vote for all their 48 States. (?)

QUESTION: Right. It started, didn't it, because the Russians said, "Look at the British; they're getting a vote from New Zealand" ...

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, they did.

QUESTION: ... and a vote from Canada.

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, yes.

QUESTION: And then the compromise provided for Byelorussia and the Ukraine.

Lord GLADWYN: Well that should never have been considered, really; unless, of course, the Americans were going to get California and New York. But it shouldn't have been considered, but Roosevelt was so keen on pleasing Stalin that he agreed. It doesn't make any difference.

QUESTION: No, it doesn't, and in fact the Maldives and China vote doesn't make all that amount of difference either because the votes in the General Assembly are ...

Lord GLADWYN: Well it was always thought that the Assembly should not have any great power. That was the idea. It was thought that the General Assembly should have less influence than the Security Council.

QUESTION: Well it doesn't today. It has -

Lord GLADWYN: Well it has more than it used to have, I suppose.

QUESTION: I suppose so, but moral suasion is still the principal tool there.

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, yes.

QUESTION: ... and there are some countries that are morally suaded and others that are not.

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, quite true.

QUESTION: As the drafts of the Charter emerged as you worked on them, were you - now you can claim all sorts of things with the virtue of hindsight - did you foresee any of today's problems coming up? Did you say no at the time? Did you warn and thump?

Lord GLADWYN: If I did it's on the record; I can't recollect it.

QUESTION: I see. Is there anything that you ...

Lord GLADWYN: I have forgotten a great deal, you know.

QUESTION: Well, we do. I thought I could at least provoke you into talking about some of the personalities that you worked with. Is there anyone with whom you remember a flaming row - in the Foreign Office? I don't mean on an issue of petty whatever, but on some principle, some UN principle.

Lord GLADWYN: I don't think so.

QUESTION: A peaceable man, are you?

Lord GLADWYN: We had discussions. I don't remember a row about anything. No, I honestly don't think we ever had a row. I don't think we did. We had discussions and differences of opinion quite often. What should the row have been about? I can't understand.

QUESTION: Well it might have been about, say, India.

Lord GLADWYN: No.

QUESTION: No?

Lord GLADWYN: No, no, no.

QUESTION: The role of India in the future UN?

Lord GLADWYN: Certainly not, no.

QUESTION: Not a divisive thing back at the Foreign Office?

Lord GLADWYN: No. I don't remember it, no.

QUESTION: Lots of laughs about Roosevelt pushing China as a big member.

Lord GLADWYN: Well we thought it was probably a mistake at that time, but we thought he had to go along with it.

QUESTION: Along with it because of his own domestic China lobby and -

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, of course. The great thing was to get America in firmly and not let it go isolationist.

QUESTION: And recalling of the League?

Lord GLADWYN: That was the idea.

QUESTION: Yes. Did you have any dealings with the American Senators who it was initially thought would be the ones to make trouble and who eventually became the great enthusiasts, Vandenberg and ...

Lord GLADWYN: I saw Vandenberg, but he was at the Paris peace conference after the war, and I saw him to some extent. But at Dumbarton Oaks I think I saw him only once or twice. But I met him once or twice at the peace conference, and Connolly too, but I didn't have any long conversations with him, no.

QUESTION: Chiefly, the people with whom you had long conversations were your colleagues at the Foreign Office, weren't they?

Lord GLADWYN: I suppose so. Yes, I remember having conversations with Pasvolsky of enormous lengths; and with Jimmy Dunn, of course.

QUESTION: What about the French? The idea of rescuing France and restoring her to great-Power status? I mean it must have ...

Lord GLADWYN: We were always in favour of that. The Americans under Roosevelt fought against it for a long time.

QUESTION: Based really on his own antipathy to DeGaulle, right?

Lord GLADWYN: Partly, yes, perhaps he was misguided.

QUESTION: Yes. He was also moved by people like Admiral Leahy and what-not.

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, very much so.

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QUESTION: Is there any great burning thought that you never had a chance to get off your chest? Is there any bit of satisfaction that you look back on the UN with, or any great ...

Lord GLADWYN: No, I think that perhaps I had a contribution to make, but I was partly responsible for the course of the Yalta voting formula, which I imagine was responsible for getting the Russians into it at all, and that emerged at a discussion at Dumbarton Oaks between myself and Cadogan. I can't remember who suggested it first, but anyhow it emerged from this conversation that I was authorized to make what turned out to be the Yalta voting formula to Pasvol'sky, who then thought it was quite a good idea and agreed to consider it. And then I had a word with Sobolev in London when I came back after Yalta and he had seemed very agreeable to it and I think he got around Molotov. In any case Stalin unexpectedly agreed to it at the Yalta conference. So I suppose I was at least partly responsible for that in the sense that I was partly responsible for something without which the (inaudible) wouldn't have come to be at all.

QUESTION: The history of the UN. The Yalta voting formula, meaning the unanimity of the five Powers.

Lord GLADWYN: No, it meant that on the enforcement section, that a permanent member would have a veto, but that they would not have a veto on the previous section, which dealt with the specific settlement of disputes.

QUESTION: And that there would be no veto on anything procedural.

Lord GLADWYN: Well, that was doubtful.

QUESTION: It was settled finally in that way, wasn't it?

Lord GLADWYN: There was agreement at San Francisco that procedural matters should also come essentially under the veto, but of course I disregarded that when I got the Chinese to come to New York.

QUESTION: You mean it was still an open question in 1950?

Lord GLADWYN: It was an open question, perhaps. Someone once said that I had violated the unofficial agreement at San Francisco, which no doubt I did.

QUESTION: As I have understood it, perhaps wrongly, the question of whether something is procedural or substantive is itself a procedural question.

Lord GLADWYN: There is doubt about that. Under the San Francisco Agreement, some might maintain that whether it is procedural or not was subject to the veto.

QUESTION: Under the Charter?

Lord GLADWYN: No, not under the Charter but there was said to have been agreement between the great Powers at San Francisco.

QUESTION: Now that the Security Council is an enlarged body, although the five remain the five, when you have such an agreement, the Yalta voting, we agree that here is what we write and sign in the Charter - and by the way we agree also on the Yalta voting formula - along comes -

Lord GLADWYN: (inaudible) that was incorporated in the Charter.

QUESTION: It was? It was made explicit there?

Lord GLADWYN: Oh yes, of course.

QUESTION: Except on this, as you say, procedural versus substantive ...

Lord GLADWYN: Well, that was slightly after that.

QUESTION: It was an argument for a long time then?

Lord GLADWYN: Oh yes.

QUESTION: Because there is always a thing about these informal agreements as to how they can possibly bind someone who was not a member at the time but who comes along afterwards and reads the rules of procedure and feels that he might ... Perhaps I have drilled at the rock base, if I may put it bluntly ...

Lord GLADWYN: No.

QUESTION: You are all right? You are not in pain?

Lord GLADWYN: Good gracious, no, no, no. But I'm not good at recalling my thoughts because they are mostly vanished. I have very little recollection.

QUESTION: I thought I could sort of trigger you and stimulate you and ask you rude questions and you would say "Good God, No".

Lord GLADWYN: No.

QUESTION: But you're not that kind of person.

Lord GLADWYN: I don't react very quickly. I am awfully sorry. I do my best but I'm not good at it.

* * *

Lord GLADWYN: (inaudible) what I thought happened in 1945.

QUESTION: Well, not quite that. I think they'll transcribe it and put it will all the caveats, you know. We know exactly how palsy a procedure ...

Lord GLADWYN: Well you needn't necessarily take as evidence what I say because it is quite likely to be all wrong.

QUESTION: No, it's leads, it's indications. I was aware of the fact that the procedure was causing you some distress.

Lord GLADWYN: No distress at all. I really apologize for the fact that I'm not good at it, that's all.

QUESTION: You really don't have to do that because we are grateful for what we have and that's it.

Lord GLADWYN: Well, I'm awfully sorry, but it isn't my fault exactly that I can't remember ...

QUESTION: No, of course not ...

Lord GLADWYN: (inaudible) I am only sorry that I am no good at it and not very interesting.

QUESTION: With your kind permission I shall press on to do what I've come to do.

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, I'll do my best to answer, but as I said, you won't find me very illuminating.

QUESTION: I am going to try to close some of the gaps we left last time and I'd like to ask you about some of the personalities and some of the atmospheres you worked in to the extent that you can recall them. I see for example that you were at the British Embassy in Rome in 1935.

Lord GLADWYN: That's right.

QUESTION: Was that not a very instructive time, with Mussolini in Ethiopia?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, it was quite interesting. I arrived there in 1931, which was the height of the depression here, you remember. I'd been secretary to the Under-Secretary of State Hugh Dalton (inaudible) I was doing parliamentary questions and all that. Anyway, the Government crashed and I was sent to Rome as a second secretary and arrived there, as it was the height of the depression. I didn't care for the sort of boy scout atmosphere of the fascist régime as such, but you have to recognize that by that time Mussolini, who had not gone mad by then, had succeeded more or less in coping with unemployment. We had seen our unemployment (inaudible) in England. He didn't seem to have much unemployment in the city and you had to think whether there wasn't something to the idea of some kind of régime that could at least reduce unemployment.

even if it was fascist. It wasn't actually nazi. The fascist régime was talking to the nazis, it wasn't simple at all; it was to some extent brutality, but none the less I wrote a thing on the corporate State, as it was called, an investigation into it which I dare say had some influence on events and that was sent home (inaudible). I didn't think that the corporate State would really work, but it was interesting (inaudible) those things that could be copied and that at least it bore investigation in our present awful economic distress. That was in 1932. I wrote it and sent it in by the Embassy. (inaudible) And then of course we interested Italy and we had a great many Italian friends and it was a very interesting time. I got out just before the outbreak of the Ethiopian war.

QUESTION: Were you aware of the League and of collective security ...

Lord GLADWYN: Of course I was, because during that time, when I was secretary to Sir Dalton, I went with him to Geneva on three occasions I think, as part of the British delegation; and indeed in those days, at the end of the 1920s, the League was functioning to some extent although in fact it was run, of course, only by Britain and France effectively. The United States was not in. The Germans came in and out. The Soviet Union was far (inaudible) in a constructive way, and in the course of events it broke up, starting with Japan and the Manchurian aggression and gradually crumbled; and it was quite evident that the Anglo-French hegemony - that's what it was - was no longer operative and could not work when the war broke out.

QUESTION: Did that memory at all move you to some thoughts as to how that could be corrected in a future peace organization?

Lord GLADWYN: Well, I thought that the League of Nations had very grave faults, notably the fact that the great Powers were not present in it. Substantially the real permanent members were only England and France. Therefore, if there was going to be a world organization again it would have to comprise all the great Powers, otherwise it would not work, nor would it work unless there was a certain amount of harmony between the greatest Powers. That was an undoubted fact which we all recognized and we tried to achieve.

QUESTION: And so as the war developed and as your work towards a future world organization took shape you were - am I putting words into your mouth? - very concerned to see that nothing was done that turned the great Powers away from it and made them go elsewhere.

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, that was it, but the principal objective of our foreign policy in 1943-1944 was in fact to achieve a settlement in which the United States fully participated and did not go neutral as indeed they did in 1919. Apart from that, the secondary objective was to have an organization which included all the great Powers, including essentially the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the alternative was to build up something like the Atlantic Alliance, which eventually formed, and at that moment was a second-best alternative, presumably.

QUESTION: Where were you when the war broke out?

Lord GLADWYN: When the war broke out I was in London. I was secretary to the head of the Foreign Office.

QUESTION: Vansittart then, was it?

Lord GLADWYN: I was appointed head of service to Vansittart before he was kicked upstairs in 1938 and taken on by the new head of the Foreign Office, Alexander Cadogan, and I was working in that capacity from 1939-1940 until the collapse of France, when Dalton was given the job by Churchill of organizing and co-ordinating the

services of sabotage, subversion and so on, and he chose me, because I knew him very well, as his first lieutenant in setting up that organization. While I was in the Foreign Office under Cadogan I was in fact the only Foreign Office liaison with the Secret Services. Now they have three departments coping with that, but I did it with one assistant, one lady.

QUESTION: And you doubtless came to know some of the people who have made some headlines since.

Lord GLADWYN: I suppose so.

QUESTION: I'm not going to ask you about Philby and things.

Lord GLADWYN: I don't mind in the least. I cannot recall. Who do you mean?

QUESTION: Burgess, Maclean, Philby etc., Blunt.

Lord GLADWYN: My only claim to fame was that Burgess, whom I met once or twice and thought was frightful, I persuaded Dalton not to take on in the SOE. He then gravitated to the Ministry of Information and was taken on by the Foreign Office and eventually by Hector McNeil, which was a disaster. I always thought he was absolutely frightful. Maclean, of course, I knew quite well.

QUESTION: He was an able man, I think.

Lord GLADWYN: Very able and extremely charming when he wanted to be, and everybody thought he was a pillar of the Establishment. It wasn't for me to suspect him. I wasn't in the Security Services and didn't know anything about it. But I thought he was in many ways an admirable chap, except that he did get frightfully drunk, and the reason was obvious.

QUESTION: When you came back from Dalton, from the economic, back into the maze of the Foreign Office -

Lord GLADWYN: I was then employed in the Treasury for about six weeks, but of course they had no job for me. Then they thought up this idea of forming this new department for coping with post-war problems.

QUESTION: And that was a very specific, specialized brief that you were given, to think ahead.

Lord GLADWYN: Fairly - principally economics, but things like UNRWA and all that. But it was quite evident that there was a political element in that which came out perhaps later. Perhaps they didn't mean to set it up as a particular planning department, but that is what it developed into, inevitably, because it could hardly be anything else.

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QUESTION: Give me an idea, if you wouldn't mind, as to how things worked. You said the other day, rather revealingly, that you were a man who preferred paper to spoken words.

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Lord GLADWYN: I don't like spoken words, no. I much prefer the written word.

QUESTION: But in the Foreign Office did you have departmental meetings?

Lord GLADWYN: Of course, all the time.

QUESTION: Did you clash? Did ideas float around? Did you argue?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, of course we had arguments, naturally. There were meetings and naturally I put forward a point of view and there were other points of view. No, we didn't have any rows, I don't think, particularly.

QUESTION: I don't mean bitter ones.

Lord GLADWYN: Certainly before Munich there was an appeasement section, so to speak, headed by Ted Carr, the great historian, Owen and, perhaps, and

Gwatkin, I dare say, who thought we must and should come to some kind of arrangement with the Nazis, chiefly economic, and others, under the leadership of Vansittart, who thought this was really hopeless, that there was no point in it, that Hitler was out for world domination and that was that, in which they were probably right.

QUESTION: Which civil servant was it that Chamberlain chose and moved into No. 10, who became quite a political figure later on? I am trying to remember who he was. He figures in "The Wilderness Years", the Churchill thing.

Lord GLADWYN: A Foreign Office chap?

QUESTION: I'm not sure.

Lord GLADWYN: Oh, you mean Horace Wilson?

QUESTION: Yes.

Lord GLADWYN: He wasn't Foreign Office. He was the chief industrial adviser.

QUESTION: Yes.

Lord GLADWYN: He had been advising Chamberlain and the Government on labour matters. Then he was put into No. 10. I think he was there just before Chamberlain took over from Baldwin.

QUESTION: Under Baldwin?

Lord GLADWYN: I think Baldwin and then he got an office there and Chamberlain really then took him on effectively as his chief Foreign Office adviser, which was irregular and probably unfortunate.

QUESTION: Did he play a part at all in the - well, it was early days, wasn't it, as far as -

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, he played a very considerable part. He did not quarrel so much with Alec Cadogan, I don't think, but he was always advising Chamberlain in what might be broadly called an appeasing direction. He was a chief element in that respect.

QUESTION: Much to the fury of Churchill.

Lord GLADWYN: Of course, Churchill didn't like it, nor did the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office respected him. When I say "the Foreign Office", many people at the Foreign Office respected him. They always thought he was perfectly honest in his views, but he was misguided, so it was thought.

QUESTION: What do you feel now to have been the quality of the thinking, the writing, the planning that went on towards the eventual world organization in the Foreign Office? Do you think it was realistic? Do you think people grasped it rather well?

Lord GLADWYN: I think so. I think they did. I think all departments were consulted. There were some very able people there. The chief expert from the point of view of organization was, of course, Prof Webster. He was very active. I had many great talks with him. I was more the spirit behind what is called the Four-Power plan, the idea that nothing would work unless the three Powers were in it. He eventually tried to modify that in the direction of giving something more like the Security Council as it now exists. We put up a paper as a result of it all and we exchanged views first of all with the Americans. We found that their views were not very dissimilar from ours and we had long discussions with them. I used to go over there before anything happened and so on, and they would come over here. We did get rather an Anglo-American front at Dumbarton Oaks.

QUESTION: Did you choose the delegation for Dumbarton Oaks?

Lord GLADWYN: No. Cadogan was the head of our delegation there. He chose me as his No. 2 effectively at Dumbarton Oaks. I did most of the work in the committee with Pasvolisky and Jimmy Dunn and Sobolev.

QUESTION: How would you sum up the main objectives of the delegation for that meeting?

Lord GLADWYN: To try to get something like the Anglo-American view accepted by the Russians, I suppose, and we succeeded in doing so.

QUESTION: With compromise -

Lord GLADWYN: Not much, no. In the long run the Russians tempered their strong views to a large extent and they accepted things like the Economic and Social Council and they accepted our views more or less as to how things should work. Eventually only one issue remained outstanding, apart from trusteeship.

QUESTION: The voting.

Lord GLADWYN: Yes.

QUESTION: That was the Council as an agency of last resort. Do you remember the regional idea - that there should be sort of regional security councils?

Lord GLADWYN: That was Churchill's idea, but I always thought that that was slightly dotty. He hadn't thought it out. The idea was that there was going to be a Council of Asia. Can you remember the Council of Asia? Where would the Council of Asia be - in Lhasa or somewhere? Would it be in China, Japan, India? It was cuckoo. You could not have had a Council of Asia. What would it have done anyway? You might as well have had a Council of Africa. He thought that because we wanted a Council of Europe there should be a Council of Asia, but he hadn't thought it out. It was nuts. Even his idea of a Council of Europe, nobody knew - and he was quite incapable of explaining - whether the Russians should be in or out, whether we should be in or out, if we were out, what our influence should be. It wasn't thought out. What the relationship would be to any central organization wasn't clear. He hadn't thought it out. He was a very great man. He was concentrating on winning the war and these were just the vague ideas of a chap with no particular meaning.

QUESTION: There was no one in his immediate circle who took them up and expanded them?

Lord GLADWYN: Oh, no, they were too frightened of him. Anyhow they did not want to interfere in that kind of thing. He just thought it out himself.

Stafford Cripps, who had slightly less lunatic views. Nevertheless, we got hold of Cripps through his Secretary, who was David Owen, and converted him and then it all went fairly well.

QUESTION: So I suppose that the UN regional economic commissions are the last vestiges of that idea -

Lord GLADWYN: Regional what? Oh, yes, the Commission for Europe.

QUESTION: And the Western Pacific and the Latin American one are the last vestiges of the Churchill regional -

Lord GLADWYN: I am sorry, I don't quite get the point.

QUESTION: I am saying that the UN now has a system of regional economic commissions.

Lord GLADWYN: Economic commissions?

QUESTION: Yes.

Lord GLADWYN: The Economic Commission for Europe was set up function.

QUESTION: (inaudible) It does a lot of things, even -

Lord GLADWYN: It didn't function really for a long time.

QUESTION: There is also one for Asia and there is ECLA for Latin America. I am saying that historically, I suspect, these economic commissions are the last -

Lord GLADWYN: I don't know, I suppose they emerged from that eventually - maybe.

QUESTION: But they have very little political role.

Lord GLADWYN: No.

QUESTION: There is a Pan American organization, of course, which does have some -

Lord GLADWYN: Still some. Though less than they did.

QUESTION: But none of the other regions seem to have -

Lord GLADWYN: You are talking about political regions.

QUESTION: I then diverted for a moment into the economic.

Lord GLADWYN: But the original was (sought out) in the way of political reasons?

QUESTION: Right.

Lord GLADWYN: I suppose there were political reasons under the (inaudible), but that didn't work well.

QUESTION: Was there a big argument about setting up an Economic and Social Council separate from the Assembly? I think they are still talking about Dumbarton Oaks.

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, at Dumbarton Oaks there was a lot of talk. The Russians eventually agreed. They didn't really attach great importance to it. They really considered only the political side and the role of the Security Council.

QUESTION: And their ability really to stop action inimical to them?

Lord GLADWYN: (inaudible). Oh that's the thing they all insisted on, yes.

QUESTION: The Office of the Secretary-General. Do you remember anything about what rights he should have? He does have one -

Lord GLADWYN: There was an Article - 99 - that was agreed. Yes, even the Russians agreed to that.

QUESTION: That's the Article which gives him the right to bring matters to the attention -

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, bring matters on his own initiative -

QUESTION: Which is rather different from the League's Secretary-General in that respect?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, of course. I think they agreed with that. It has been used on one or two occasions.

QUESTION: Yes, Korea was a case.

Lord GLADWYN: Korea -

QUESTION: Yes, the UN Commission in Korea cabled him on 25 June 1950 - it is a matter that I happen to know about because I was involved - saying that there had been an aggression, and it was he who called the Council together and presented -

Lord GLADWYN: The Russians walked out. (Inaudible) after consulting the Americans (inaudible), of course.

QUESTION: Yes, I think that's the point.

There was a British suggestion at Dumbarton Oaks for regular meetings of the Council, or in some other forum, of the Foreign Ministers and Foreign Secretaries of the Powers. Do you remember that?

Lord GLADWYN: No.

QUESTION: It was a proposal that there should be such meetings.

Lord GLADWYN: I have forgotten. It may well be. I do not know.

QUESTION: Then the next question falls away. It says here: "How great a loss has it been that such meetings have not been held?"

Lord GLADWYN: The idea was that the Foreign Secretaries might come to the Security Council. They do now.

QUESTION: Only when their interests -

Lord GLADWYN: They do occasionally.

QUESTION: The idea was, and it has been revived a few times since, that there should be a meeting in which every seat is occupied by the Foreign Secretary or Foreign Minister - and some people have even suggested the Head of State.

Lord GLADWYN: We can't always arrange them (for the first of the month). But there were occasions and have been occasions when one's Foreign Minister has been there of course. When I was there, certainly.

QUESTION: What about some other Dumbarton issues - defining aggression? Do you remember the argument about the definition of aggression?

Lord GLADWYN: That's a slippery aggressor. Nobody has ever been able to find an aggressor. It is a legal conception which nearly everybody has abandoned because we will never get agreement on what an aggressor is.

QUESTION: But the Charter says that the greatest sin that a State -

Lord GLADWYN: Armed attack or act of aggression. But then there is, - nobody quite knew - armed attack, of course, you can define as an armed attack. That is a perfectly good legal conception. But aggression, it was never really clear what an aggression was, nor can it be.

QUESTION: But if you separate an armed attack from a provocation and the context in which it comes - Well, I suppose it is the one line that you dare not cross.

Lord GLADWYN: An act of aggression - everybody knows what they think of the aggression (inaudible) against it as such. If you want to define it legally, it is very difficult.

QUESTION: Chapter VII is all about response to that.

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, to an armed attack.

QUESTION: What did you think of the American impulse at Dumbarton Oaks and later of having the UN certify human rights, individual human rights?

Lord GLADWYN: I was never a good specialist in human rights. I had other things to do and to think about and never got down to human rights in the legal sense. I am afraid it was outside my sphere in a way. Human rights was left very much to the lawyers. It is a lawyer's paradise.

QUESTION: It is, but it was a political thing right from the start, wasn't it?

Lord GLADWYN: Also, yes.

QUESTION: If the UN could take up human rights issues, be it in Honduras or South Africa, then there is something very funny about the domestic jurisdiction clause, isn't there?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, indeed; but they had to put that in for political reasons.

QUESTION: Have you any views as to what the significance was of putting the human rights field into economic and social rather than political -

Lord GLADWYN: I can't remember. Perhaps I did at the time. Maybe I wrote enormous memoranda on it. That is quite conceivable.

QUESTION: The idea of amending the Charter after 10 years, or reviewing the Charter. Did you have any views on that? Did you think that -

Lord GLADWYN: No, we thought there should be a right to amend the Charter. We didn't think the chances were very high, because the agreement by unanimity that it started off with made it seem extremely unlikely. We never thought there was much future for that. (Inaudible) had to put it in, of course, yes.

QUESTION: I read somewhere - I think it is the view of Cadogan; I am trying to recall the essence of it - that rather than have a beautifully tailored Charter, strictly drafted, that wouldn't work, let's sort of ease along the three or four good chaps to begin with and then come to the Charter after an evolutionary process. I think that was the -

Lord GLADWYN: (Inaudible) said that before Dumbarton Oaks, or after?

QUESTION: I think after, but I could be wrong on that.

Lord GLADWYN: Well, you may well have. But it is quite true that if you can get some kind of agreement behind the scenes it is a good thing - nobody would dispute that - and that you can't always rely on the letter of the Charter.

QUESTION: Did you have a giggle about Woodrow Wilson and open covenants openly arrived at in the old days?

Lord GLADWYN: When I was very young that was.

QUESTION: But you believed it then, when you were very young, or not?

Lord GLADWYN: I can't remember whether I had - I wasn't thinking about that sort of thing, I think, probably, but I dare say that it was not considered very practical. Yes, the open - yes, it was - I think no diplomats would think that that was really a very good thing, to openly arrive at (inaudible) confidence in discussions at all, it seems to be counter-productive.

QUESTION: So you would have been inclined to have open covenants privately arrived at?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, yes, anyhow yes, a covenant should be (inaudible) to declare what (inaudible) explain and arrived at - yes.

QUESTION: Yalta - can we turn to Yalta?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes (inaudible) I refer you to this enormous controversy I have been having with (inaudible).

QUESTION: I know, I've got them here.

Lord GLADWYN: All right, you might as well have that, because that's all - I mean, (inaudible) to repeat all that, that's what you've got on the record.

QUESTION: Well, these are suggestions from a very bright couple of researchers, things work that way ...

Lord GLADWYN: I'm sure of that, but I have said anything I had - as clearly as I can say in Encounter.

QUESTION: I have it, I have the book. And I have read it.

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, good, yes. By the way, you might, what you might like to get is the record from Charlton of the discussions that I had with him on the BBC.

QUESTION: Oh? About when? When the book came out?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes and no. That's about a year ago now.

QUESTION: Charlton.

Lord GLADWYN: You know, Michael Charlton, he's a great BBC interviewer, who did Solzhenitsyn.

QUESTION: Oh, we'll get that.

Lord GLADWYN: Well, you should, that's quite, quite, quite ...

QUESTION: Was that television or radio? Do you remember?

Lord GLADWYN: Radio, radio.

QUESTION: And, oh, oh, well, I'll find out ...

Lord GLADWYN: As the BBC, they'll - Michael Charlton - he'll send you a copy.

QUESTION: Michael Charlton, I will certainly do that, because ...

Lord GLADWYN: Because that is quite interesting, about all the origins of the cold war.

QUESTION: Good.

Lord GLADWYN: He's of Australian origin, but he is a very distinguished chap, Michael Charlton, brilliant and ...

QUESTION: How would you define the Australians?

Lord GLADWYN: What?

QUESTION: O.K., I'm joking, sorry.

Lord GLADWYN: What?

QUESTION: No, no, it's a bad joke - on the South Africans that I know about ...

Lord GLADWYN: Well, he's a very good man and he works for this (?record). I think he's one of the (two words indistinct).

QUESTION: Good. We'll certainly get that. The voting - of course, Yalta settled the voting, didn't it - the Security Council voting? Was that - it was your compromise, wasn't it, it was your, it was your ...?

Lord GLADWYN: Well, I suppose I was partly responsible for it, but it originated in a talk which I had with Cadogan at Dumbarton Oaks - not that I remember anything else.

QUESTION: How accurate is the assessment - it says here - that no significant negotiation of this voting point happened, that the proposed compromise was brought up one day and accepted by Stalin the next?

Lord GLADWYN: Well, that's not quite true. And so we had - I tried to sell it to Pasvolisky, who was interested and consulted (words indistinct) didn't hear much more from the American point of view, except that we knew - Jimmy Dunn (words indistinct) considering it and I got back to London - that's all we heard. And then I also had a talk with Sobolev, recommending it, in London.

QUESTION: A lunch?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, we lunched in a restaurant at the Soviet Embassy. And then, the next thing we heard was that Molotov had advised Stalin to accept it, which he did. He just accepted it.

QUESTION: Your relations with Soviet diplomats - you found Sobolev amenable to talk ...?

Lord GLADWYN: He was the best, I meant, but I didn't have very much intimate deliberations with anyone except with Sobolev, I don't think - and then (name indistinct) of course, the Soviet (word indistinct).

QUESTION: That is an amazing life, isn't it, I mean, when you think of ...?

Lord GLADWYN: I always respect Gromyko. I think he is a very remarkable man, but I believe that Troyanovsky is just as good.

QUESTION: Well, I am hardly able to judge their quality, but Troyanovsky has a great deal of charm and

Lord GLADWYN: Well, I am told he is very intelligent too.

QUESTION: Oh, yes. But that Gromyko should have been in office, you know in 1941 and still be the Soviet Foreign Minister in 1983 is astonishing, isn't it?

Lord GLADWYN: Quite astonishing. Oh, it really is staggering.

QUESTION: We are hoping very much that he's going to respond to - he has in fact agreed to be interviewed much as you are today, but ...

Lord GLADWYN: You won't agree with him.

QUESTION: I mean, I, you know, if I ask him - tell me about your encounter with Stalin - I don't think I'm going to get ...

Lord GLADWYN: Oh, no, you wouldn't get anything out of him like that.

QUESTION: I'm sure not.

Lord GLADWYN: I very much doubt whether he'd give you an interview.

QUESTION: Well, he has said he would, but ...

Lord GLADWYN: Really?

QUESTION: He did, yes, but they want questions in advance and you know what that means. It means that someone in the Ministry will ...

Lord GLADWYN: Well then he reads out, he consults his Politburo, it is types out and he reads it out to you.

QUESTION: Right. Well, that's, you know, of very small interest. It says - can you recall - and I suspect that any question that begins Can you recall is going to give you trouble right away - can you recall the British expectations before San Francisco and how would they ...

Lord GLADWYN: Before San Francisco?

QUESTION: For San Francisco.

Lord GLADWYN: No before Dumbarton Oaks?

QUESTION: No, no. Your expectations for the (inaudible) San Francisco Conference and were you happy with what you got?

Lord GLADWYN: What do you mean (inaudible) the Charter as it is cogitated in San Francisco (inaudible) document?

QUESTION: As compared with ...
(here there appears to be a break in the recording)

QUESTION: It says here - what criteria did you use? Did you just reach out and say - oh, if so-and-so will do it well ...

Lord GLADWYN: No, we just thought somebody was fine for the job perhaps and we chose them (inaudible) we thought they'd do it.

QUESTION: Did you run advertisements and did people say ...

Lord GLADWYN: I think we did probably, because we at the civil service - I think, in London - asked (inaudible) people.

QUESTION: This is the sort of question really which is something that came up much later, but did you feel pressure to take certain people, were there Governments squeezing ...?

Lord GLADWYN: Well, I think that the Chinese wanted us to take a man called Hoo.

QUESTION: Victor.

Lord GLADWYN: We did. He's a very nice man.

QUESTION: He's the only man - I think - who has ever served the U.N. - apart from linguists - who was fully competent in all five official languages.

Lord GLADWYN: Really? Victor Hoo?

QUESTION: Yes.

Lord GLADWYN: Was he? I didn't know.

QUESTION: Oh, yes, he was a remarkable man. And he stayed in office for as long as the Peking Government ...

Lord GLADWYN: Well, he was the representative - the Chinese Government wanted to (?stick) him on so we took him on, yes.

QUESTION: Right.

Lord GLADWYN: The Chilean Government, I think, asked us to take on ...

QUESTION: Ben Cohen.

Lord GLADWYN: Ben Cohen.

QUESTION: Who became the head of the ...

Lord GLADWYN: But (word indistinct) nothing against him, he had (word indistinct) before we took him on, yes.

QUESTION: Trying to remember that first - (?Evan Kirno), who was a lawyer from Czechoslovakia.

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, he was taken on.

QUESTION: Henri (?Logier) was the French sociologist.

Lord GLADWYN: Yes.

QUESTION: And - it was economic and social then, wasn't it, you had both?

Lord GLADWYN: (?Logier) - was he a very early recruit, I can't remember?

QUESTION: Well, certainly by the New York phase of the first Assembly.

Lord GLADWYN: I think he was not chosen here.

QUESTION: (?Chelt), the Dutchman. Do you remember Adrian (?Chelt)?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, vaguely, yes, yes I do.

QUESTION: (?Byron) - Andrew Cordier.

Lord GLADWYN: Oh, yes, Andy - he was a great stand-by. Well he was, of course, the representative of the State Department.

QUESTION: He was, yes, and really a very, very central figure for some years.

Lord GLADWYN: Oh yes, but he from the start was the - well, he was practically the number two.

QUESTION: Sorry, number two to the Secretary-General?

Lord GLADWYN: Well, when I was acting Secretary-General or (words indistinct) he was - (acting person) - directly associated with me, yes.

QUESTION: Which he went on to be for Trygve Lie and for a time for ...

Lord GLADWYN: For Ducworth-Barker.

QUESTION: Yes.

Lord GLADWYN: And there's Colonel Hope, but he didn't want to go on - one

arm for an old veteran - very good. He did, I think, organization generally, I think.

QUESTION: Right. Any of the other foreigners - Sobolev came aboard, didn't he?

Lord GLADWYN: No.

QUESTION: Who was the first Russian?

Lord GLADWYN: There was a Russian, but I can't remember his name. Not Zonn?

QUESTION: No, I'll remember his name in a moment. Not Zorin?



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Lord GLADWYN: No.

QUESTION: Anyway, we'll get there. (?Everyone) played their little part. And did you - did that group sort of get together - did you hold staff meetings ...?

Lord GLADWYN: No, not really much, no.

QUESTION: Each one did his own sort of ...

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, I think so, yes. I was really trying to get the Executive Committee to agree on rules of procedure - it was a very busy time actually - and we had to get all the arrangements, you see, it was difficult in wartime to get all the arrangements ...

QUESTION: Rationing and shortage of everything?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes.

QUESTION: The papers, I must say, as one who just drowns in verbiage these days - the economy and grace of the summary record of the Preparatory Commission and of the first session is a great tribute to you; whether you wrote every word yourself or not, you are the creator of the document and ...

Lord GLADWYN: Probably I wrote most of it, but I (words indistinct). I think I brought it in.

QUESTION: Marvellous. Decision to locate the Headquarters in the United States.

Lord GLADWYN: Well, Phil Baker was all in favour of Geneva and there was a chance that there would be but there (were shades?) in that of the failure of the League of Nations - I think prevented that - (words indistinct).

QUESTION: A taste in the mouth.

Lord GLADWYN: And then to everybody's immense surprise, the Russians plumped for New York and nobody could understand why. They always told me afterwards they bitterly regretted it - the Russians did - but (I believe) they had a free choice - there was no reason why they shouldn't have voted for it.

QUESTION: Can you guess why they regretted it particularly? Would ...

Lord GLADWYN: I don't have any idea. There they are.

QUESTION: Gromyko or someone said this was a big mistake on our part.

Lord GLADWYN: I think it was Sobolev who subsequently - I think, yes - yes, it was Sobolev who told me afterwards that they(? from their point of view had done it), but I don't know - where else could it have been, apart from Geneva? Yes, it could have been The Hague or somewhere.

QUESTION: Well, it also could have been on some inviolate island or Tangier or ...

Lord GLADWYN: (It would be) a lot more difficult to set it up, yes.

QUESTION: I suppose.

Lord GLADWYN: We wanted somewhere with hotels and all that, you see.

QUESTION: Yes. (name indistinct) resort would have been fine - however ...

Lord GLADWYN: The Americans were very much in favour of having it in America.

QUESTION: Because they wanted ...

Lord GLADWYN: They wanted to get the American public behind it, I think.

QUESTION: Exactly.

Lord GLADWYN: That was the main reason; that was the over-riding reason.

QUESTION: Were you on the - I can't remember - you weren't involved in the Headquarters Committee, were you, that went to Philadelphia and San Francisco and Westchester ...

Lord GLADWYN: Afterwards?

QUESTION: Afterwards, you ...

Lord GLADWYN: Afterwards?

QUESTION: When it was decided - after the first London session of the Assembly ...

Lord GLADWYN: Oh, no. I wasn't in there, no.

QUESTION: At that point ...

Lord GLADWYN: We had decided on New York then.

QUESTION: Had they? But there was a chase around - I can't remember the exact dates - there was a chase around as to whether it was going to be New York or San Francisco or ...

Lord GLADWYN: Oh, all that.

QUESTION: Yes.

Lord GLADWYN: No, I saw all the papers and so on. I think I was partly associated with it, but not directly, no.

QUESTION: To choose a Secretary-General. Do you remember that funny bit where three Russians proposed Trygve Lie as President of the Assembly and then ...

Lord GLADWYN: They did indeed, yes, yes, they wanted him; they didn't like Spaak you see.

QUESTION: And then someone said ooh, quick, it's not going to be like that, it's going to have - and then they elected him Secretary-General.

Lord GLADWYN: Spaak? Oh no, Trygve Lie.

QUESTION: There is a Professor (?Barros) - I haven't read his work - who is today saying that Trygve Lie was from the start the preferred Soviet candidate. Do you - was this because of his Norwegian socialism? Usually socialists were not very popular with the Russians.

Lord GLADWYN: Well they preferred Lie to Spaak, I can't think why.

QUESTION: That's the only ...

Lord GLADWYN: They did do that. Certainly the Russians preferred Lie to Spaak. I really don't know why they did. I suppose he was a Norwegian socialist (several words indistinct) and so on, but I don't know, they were probably wrong in thinking that he was pro-Russian in any way.

QUESTION: He certainly wasn't. He proved that ...

Lord GLADWYN: He was the - he objected very much to Yalta (?speech) of Churchill (word indistinct).

QUESTION: He did?

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, very much so and then he thought that the Russians would take it very ill and that it was very wrong for the Russians. So to that extent he sympathized with the Russians, yes.

QUESTION: Aha. Well, that, of course, goes a long way to explaining ... Why did you not accept his offer to be an Assistant Secretary-General?

Lord GLADWYN: He offered to me ...?

QUESTION: It says here that he offered you an assistant secretary-generalship.

Lord GLADWYN: In the United Nations?

QUESTION: Yes.

Lord GLADWYN: I am completely oblivious of the fact. He may have, I never received a call.

QUESTION: Not only did you decline it, you don't remember it.

Lord GLADWYN: I don't remember it. No, I wouldn't have accepted it anyway. I was more keen on staying in my own service really and ...

QUESTION: I can understand.

Lord GLADWYN: No, I have no recollection of being (word or words indistinct) by Lie. Maybe.

QUESTION: But you wouldn't have taken it?

Lord GLADWYN: I wouldn't have taken it, no.

QUESTION: Not even something as near your interests as, say the political and Security Council ...

Lord GLADWYN: No, I wouldn't have wanted to go outside the country. I am much happier here, for various reasons.

QUESTION: Right. And then there is a chapter about figures with whom you worked. We have already touched ...

Lord GLADWYN: Who?

QUESTION: People - personalities - Gromyko ...

Lord GLADWYN: Oh, yes, yes. (word indistinct) figures.

QUESTION: Figures, exactly. Yes, there is. Michael (words indistinct).

Lord GLADWYN: He died, I (?think).

QUESTION: Andrei Gromyko we have touched on and you saw him all over the place, didn't you - Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, San Francisco - and there is a funny sense of humour there, you know, underneath it all. It comes out every now and again. It is a little sardonic, but I've seen it at work every now and again.

Lord GLADWYN: Oh, Grom?

QUESTION: Grom.

Lord GLADWYN: Oh, yes, he can be quite amusing.

QUESTION: What is he like at dinner - you know - in a small group?

Lord GLADWYN: Well, he's all right, well I wouldn't call him very gay (words indistinct) you can talk to him about all kinds things, he is very sensible you know.

QUESTION: Right. we have touched on Alger Hiss and last week on Leo Pasvolsky. Pasvolsky - here it says Pavlovsky, which is ...

Lord GLADWYN: I know, Pavlovsky, as if he was a dog, yes.

QUESTION: Or the husband of a dancer.

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, yes.

QUESTION: And I think that you - we agreed that Pasvolsky was something like your opposite number in the US.

Lord GLADWYN: Well, Pasvolsky was quite a different character. He was a very high-powered intellectual - a don character really - and highly intelligent and very vigorous and not exactly the same type as me, but he'd occupied the same position as I did perhaps.

QUESTION: Yes, that's what I meant. Why would he ...?

Lord GLADWYN: And I got on quite well with him, but of course, he didn't get on with everybody. He hated lawyers, you know, couldn't bear lawyers. Of course, I think partly he felt that they would interfere with his own theories on how things should be organized, you see, they talk too much and that was that and from his point of view he was probably quite right. The Charter wasn't written by lawyers, it's quite true. He got on very well with Professor Webster. He rather faded out afterwards. What happened to him?

QUESTION: He died only a few years ago. I'm not sure ...

Lord GLADWYN: But what happened to him?

QUESTION: I think, you know, he went to Georgetown University or something like that.

Lord GLADWYN: But he faded out, didn't he? Nobody heard of him. He didn't write much, did he?

QUESTION: No, but when this project started up, someone said - is he still alive? - and the news came back that he wasn't.

Wellington Koo - it says here - what do you remember of Wellington Koo?



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Lord GLADWYN: Nothing very much. He was a professional diplomat and all that. He had a very pretty wife -

QUESTION: He made very long speeches.

Lord GLADWYN: I didn't have much talk with him, really.

QUESTION: Then it leaps forward from that period - we're nearly there; have no great fear - to the Korean war and your time in America. What led to your great popularity with American television viewers? Do you think we could revive it?

Lord GLADWYN: I don't know what led to the great popularity except that I suppose I made a good impression on television and was quite clear and decisive in my views. I have no nerves. In television, if you have nerves it's a very bad thing. But if you have no nerves and couldn't care less what the audience think, then you will probably get away with it. And anyhow I knew what I was going to say and I did more or less call off the Russians, and that produced the great popularity, I suppose. But I think that my only contribution, really, to the United Nations was the decision whereby I managed to get my way by rulings as the President of the Security Council. This was my view, and as President it stood, and this was adopted by majority vote - which, of course, was twisting the regulations, really. But I think it was useful.

QUESTION: Just so one has it fixed in the mind, you ruled that a particular question, it says here, was procedural and therefore not subject to the veto.

Lord GLADWYN: Yes.

QUESTION: Was this the invitation to General Woo?

Lord GLADWYN: It was on that occasion.

QUESTION: The question of -

Lord GLADWYN: - whether the Chinese should be invited, yes.

QUESTION: I see. And you ruled that the question -

Lord GLADWYN: Oh no, no. I beg your pardon. No, on the question of inviting the Chinese you had to get a majority vote and no veto. With great difficulty, through the China lobby, I got the Americans to abstain, which was a great concession on their part because the China lobby was breathing down their necks, you know. But they did abstain. And then we just managed to get the seven necessary votes - on the second round, because the first time, I think, the Yugoslavs hadn't understood and voted the wrong way, and therefore we had to get it done the next day. But we got it through. It was simply a question of getting the majority. But the question of a ruling was on quite a different matter, on whether the Korean - I can't remember exactly the issue - what was it? Well, as I say, my memory has gone, but I got my way by insisting - I ruled that this was a matter that was not subject to the veto, and my ruling stood unless it was upset.

QUESTION: And that would have required somebody to say, "I challenge". And no one did that.

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, and then I think I should have said there would have to be a majority of seven in order to overrule my ruling.

QUESTION: Well, that sort of looks after the questions -

Lord GLADWYN: That was the double veto, yes.

QUESTION: Yes, exactly. I am looking at a summary of a speech you made in January 1954 saying that Korea might not have happened if China had been a Member of the United Nations.

Lord GLADWYN: Well, if China had been a Member of the United Nations I think the Russians would have - why would I say that? I can't think - the Russians would have had to - China would have been on the Committee of Four

wouldn't it?

QUESTION: Certainly.

Lord GLADWYN: And - I don't know what. I suppose - wouldn't they have sided with the (inaudible)- in which case they would have vetoed any United Nations action. I can't see why - what was the conclusion I drew? Probably the wrong conclusion, in that case. The Americans might have gone ahead, but you wouldn't have had the United Nations behind them.

QUESTION: That's right. In other words, there'd have been no absence -

Lord GLADWYN: No, no.



QUESTION: Cadogan diaries, page 786: "Even the atomic bomb hasn't shaken people out of their old ways of thinking."

Lord GLADWYN: That's what Cadogan said.

QUESTION: Yes, Cadogan, page 787: "Gromyko: What other things besides the veto bring the Security Council into disrepute?" Cadogan answers: "Principally the use of the Council for propaganda." Are you stirred to anything by that, or not?

Lord GLADWYN: I don't quite understand the point.

QUESTION: Yes, post-hostilities planning: we've been through that. Freedom from fear and want ... Yes, it was Churchill - February 1943 - we're just going back to that business about the three regional councils. February 1943, in a letter from Churchill to FDR: "Three regional councils with forces, etc., to settle disputes - Europe, Far East, Western Hemisphere - US to be represented on all three."

Lord GLADWYN: Well, can you imagine it?

QUESTION: Yes, I can. I mean I can't. But I know what you mean.

Lord GLADWYN: It doesn't make any sense.

QUESTION: Well, I've tested you in the fire -

Lord GLADWYN: Not a bit, no. As I say, I can't recall really what happened very much at this distance in time. There are the public records, after all.

QUESTION: Oh, yes.

Lord GLADWYN: And I'd very much like it if you could hire someone from the United Nations to go through all the project records and then tell me what I said. I would like it. I haven't got the time or the energy to do it.

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QUESTION: I know. Anyway, you have other fish to fry now, don't you?

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Lord GLADWYN: I do have other things to do, yes.

QUESTION: You march in a different direction. Very early on in your book you talk about bound volumes of memos. Someone in your absence had bound them all very neatly.

Lord GLADWYN: I don't know if you could see them or not. They were made available to me.

QUESTION: Were they taken to the Public Record Office?

Lord GLADWYN: No. They were in the Foreign Office. When I left, I always left my opinion in the press, and they had taken these duplicates of some minutes and papers, and they bound them all together. And though I wasn't allowed to because of the 30-year rule, nevertheless I was

able to allude to some of these things, and I think they were made available simply to me because they were my own personal records. Whether they are now all published, I haven't any idea. Some of them might be.

QUESTION: Because the 30-year rule of course has since -

Lord GLADWYN: Has it been modified?

QUESTION: Oh yes.

Lord GLADWYN: Yes, but 30 years ago it was still in existence.

QUESTION: When you wrote there was still two years to go. But now it is free and clear.

Lord GLADWYN: Well, I don't know. It might be. But to find out you've only got to ring up the Foreign Office and find out if these things are available.

QUESTION: Until you said Tuesday for our first session, I was going to spend Tuesday at Kew.

Lord GLADWYN: Oh yes. A lot there.

QUESTION: I've got a marvellous woman. How much trouble she took. She sent me the fullest directions as to how to get there.

Lord GLADWYN: I believe it is very good.

QUESTION: Look at this. And then she lists - as you can imagine, they have quite a lot of paper.

Lord GLADWYN: Well, I'd love to see all this myself. Yes, the old files - 1945, 1946, 1947.

QUESTION: She was very kind. I wrote her appreciatively. But someone younger and sharper can go and do that.

Lord GLADWYN: If you do get anyone to do it -

QUESTION: Yes, I'll let you know whatever you want.

Lord GLADWYN: Let me know if there's anything very interesting which I was alleged to have said then. I'd like to know what it was.

QUESTION: Absolutely.

Lord GLADWYN: Would you like to do that if they do get anyone?

QUESTION: Oh yes, I'll make sure that you are kept in the picture. I'm going to spend this weekend with my old buddy Colonel Alfred Katan.

Lord GLADWYN: A South African?

QUESTION: A South African.

Lord GLADWYN: You're not South African?

QUESTION: Yes. I'm an American resident.

Lord GLADWYN: Are you an American citizen?

QUESTION: If I choose to be, in three years' time I can be. But, you know, my son was born in - I've been 35 years with the UN, so -

Lord GLADWYN: Oh, I see. You're a resident in the United States but not an American citizen.

QUESTION: Not an American citizen. I've been on the Secretariat as a South African.

Lord GLADWYN: But can't you become an American citizen at once if you want to?

QUESTION: Not at once. My son was born there, and I can stay.
They give me what is called a green card, and in due time my wife, a limey -

Lord GLADWYN: You were born in South Africa?

QUESTION: Yes.



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Lord GLADWYN: And you came to the United Nations when?

QUESTION: When I was a mere youth - in 1946 ...

Lord GLADWYN: Oh yes, so, I see - from the beginning? I see. Oh.

QUESTION: ... and joined the Secretariat a few months later, and have -

Lord GLADWYN: I see. Yes.

QUESTION: - I've done things for them in various parts of the world ...

Lord GLADWYN: I see ...

: QUESTION: ... chiefly in the area of broadcasting and television. So, I will stay in America. I'm not rushing to go back to the land of apartheid - and so - I was against apartheid before people knew how to spell it, so it's not a novelty to me. On the other hand it has not exactly been easy, particularly as one rose in seniority - I ended up as the Deputy Director of the Division - not exactly been easy to be a South African ...

...

United Nations Oral History Project

**Gladwyn Jebb
24 October 1985**

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Lord Gladwyn Jebb

Interviewed by William Powell,

24 October 1985

POWELL: Now, Lord Gladwyn, I want to express, to begin with, our appreciation that you have agreed to do some supplementary questions because we want to have this oral history record as complete as possible. Now, you were in the foreign office during the war, I believe, in 1942 and '43 in the Economic and Reconstruction Department. When did you first begin to discuss or begin to think about the nature and shape of a postwar organization which would assist in maintaining international peace and security?

GLADWYN: Well I joined that department which in fact I formed about the middle of nineteen hundred and forty-three, I suppose. I came back to the Foreign Office then. I had been in Economic Warfare before then. I managed to recruit one or two people and we began working on, first of all, on the economic side--the economic problems that would arise at the end of the war like refugees, and food, and so on and so forth. But after a bit, after about a few months it became evident that you couldn't separate those kinds of problems from political problems, and so more and more, the department concentrated on what was going to happen politically after the war--whether you could--whether there was any chance to form some kind of international organization which should organize all the other things which had to be done. And so, we got out various schemes and discussed them in the Foreign Office, and with other people too.

I think the first broad scheme we got out was in '44, a thing called the

"Four Power Plan" because our general directive was, from above, was that whatever scheme for postwar political cooperation you conceived of then, you had to contemplate cooperation with the Russians because they were our allies, they were--in fact, if it hadn't been for the Russian victory we should all ourselves now be in saltbines, I mean we have to recognize the fact that the Russians they largely won the war, with our help of course too, from our economic help. Even so, the directive from on high, from Churchill downward, was that any scheme which had to be worked out for international organization had to contemplate cooperation with the Soviet Union. And of course with the United States and indeed with ourselves, principally, and other powers. So, that was the general impression we had to have. We couldn't get out any scheme which was based on the idea that there was going to be a Cold War and that the one thing after the war was to break with the Russians; that would have been quite inconceivable. Nobody would have agreed to that. It was the last thing that the Americans wanted, and in fact, it was Roosevelt above all and indeed all the Americans, who shared this view that the great thing after the war was to have cooperation with the Russians, without which, they thought, quite rightly, that no international organization would work. And so, we had, broadly speaking, to get out some kind of scheme which was based on cooperation between the United States, the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth and Empire, which was in existence still, after all, and even then it represented, goodness knows how much--a third of humanity, India was still being run by the English then, and so on. And indeed, after reflection, the French, because the French, after all, they still had their empire and it was an enormous concern. And then of course, the Americans insisted that China, which was in a state of anarchy really, should be brought in because, in principle, and according to the Americans anyhow, China would eventually be a great Power, which was perfectly true. And therefore, you had to

contemplate some kind of association between the--of a sort with(?) the great Powers, and that had to have been a basis for any scheme you considered. That was the sort of general directive we had.

So we got out a thing called the "Four Power Plan", originally, which I think probably didn't consider France at that moment, I think, but, it was all rather a great Power conception, I think, and duly so. And that was then . . . that was the basis of our thought. But after that, we got in touch with the Americans, and the Americans, of course, having come into the war in '44, were thinking very hard about what kind of organization there should be after the war. They had their own ideas, and we went and cooperated with them (?) and exchanged views and so on. And then, our own Four Power Plan was modified. We got out a thing called the United Nations Plan, which was something not very dissimilar from what eventually the United Nations was, I think. And then finally there was the conference at Dumbarton Oaks in '45 . . . was it '45?

POWELL: '44.

GLADWYN: '44, of course, yes, '44, when we got in touch with the Russians and the Russians agreed to come to this conference, and they put forward their plan, which was even more "great Power" of course, than ours, or the American plan.

POWELL: Was that really the first contact, at Dumbarton Oaks, with the Russians?

GLADWYN: Yes, I know, I think we'd had some indication of their view before, but we got their plan, their own project, a little bit before Dumbarton Oaks.

And we studied that, and the Americans studied it, and then the conference started. And of course, one has to recognize that Dumbarton Oaks was the one conference, I think, the only conference, in which the Russians really went all out to please, and were extremely cooperative. Gromyko talked English all the time, Arkady Sobolev, who was of Leningrad, his number two, was a great friend of mine, and he was extremely obliging. They had a legal advisor whose name I forget, who was first class. And they really put forward constructive ideas and really had extremely good ideas. They seemed to concentrate on politics, they weren't so keen on economic cooperation, but they agreed to have an Economic and Social Council, that was agreed with them and so on. And generally speaking, the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were reasonable, except of course, for the one outstanding issue of voting in the Security Council, on which they insisted, up to that point, in having a veto on almost everything, you see. And we and the Americans simply couldn't accept that. But, it was a matter of fact, it was the famous Yalta voting formula which eventually got agreement with the Russians at Yalta. . . . That particular formula essentially was that the decisions under the relevant part of the Charter which dealt with peaceful cooperation and so on should not be subject to a veto, but that the vetos only apply when it was a question of taking actual(?) decisions. That was of course, the formula which I remember I helped to put through when I saw Sobolev off in London afterwards, in the American Embassy, in the Soviet Embassy, (?) and then Jimmy Dunn I think had a talk with the Russian ambassador in Moscow, and Harry Hopkins, I hear there handled it. (?) But anyhow, when we got to Yalta, rather to our surprise, suddenly it came up and Stalin said quite quietly, "Oh, yes, of course, yes, Molotov's talked to me about this, we agree." And so then, of course, having got agreed on that formula, it was all set for the Four Power Agreement and the Conference of San Francisco, which was then decided on at Yalta, and it happened on the

twentieth of April, which is my birthday, incidentally.

We went ahead on those lines and then of course, it was further elaborated in the Conference of San Francisco. There was less of a great Power conception and more of a . . . rights restrictive of the smaller powers and so on, and eventually the right that originated in the Charter. That was the history, broadly speaking, in two words, of the Charter. It was nearly held up altogether, as you know, by the Russians making an effort in the last resort, in the Conference of San Francisco, to go back effectively on the veto, to have a veto even on procedure and--

POWELL: --discussion.

GLADWYN: Discussion, yes. And that week, Harry Hopkins was sent over to see Stalin, and Stalin overruled Molotov and said the way was clear for the Soviet signature of the Charter.

POWELL: I want to correct you on one thing--the date of your birthday. It was April twenty-fifth.

GLADWYN: Twenty-fifth, yes. Why, what did I say?

POWELL: Twentieth.

GLADWYN: No, no I didn't.

POWELL: Well anyway, I have a legend, which I want you to confirm or deny. And this concerns Yalta, and I have heard this story, that when, after the decision was taken to hold this conference at San Francisco, it was a question

of the date. And a voice from the back of the British delegation said, "How about April twenty-fifth?"

GLADWYN: That's perfectly right, yes.

POWELL: And, it was somebody, maybe it was Churchill, who turned around and growled, "Why April twenty-fifth?", and you replied, "Because that's my birthday." And no one could find a better reason or a better date, and that's why the San Francisco Conference opened on your birthday. Is that true?

GLADWYN: Yes, perfectly true, absolutely.

POWELL: Why didn't you put it in your memoirs? (Ms. Akao laughs in the background.)

GLADWYN: It happened in the . . . British delegation actually; the meeting was there in the British delegation in the--what was the name of the palace--I can't remember . . . which we were ensconced in . . .

POWELL: Tell me, about Yalta, one thing that always intrigued me and indeed, at Dumbarton Oaks too; did you get the impressions that the Russians were really enthusiastic about the idea of the UN, or were they going along with a Western idea so that they would have some leverage for what they wanted to do in Eastern Europe?

GLADWYN: Well, I think they were less enthusiastic, so to speak, I suppose, than they were at Dumbarton Oaks. And they were more suspicious of the West in Yalta than they had been at Dumbarton Oaks, there was a very simple

reason." At Yalta, they had advanced into the . . . and almost got into the territory of the Old Reich (?), and it was pretty certain they were going to win the war. In Dumbarton Oaks of course, it was not so, and indeed, no doubt, they suspected we were going to do a deal with the Germans and all that, you know, they're very suspicious people. But (laughs) at Yalta, presumably, they thought they were in a stronger position, and they could probably take a tougher line, I think. But they didn't abandon Dumbarton Oaks, no, nor did they early at San Francisco, except on one occasion. There was a row about whether the Poles should be represented--the Lublin Poles--

POWELL: Or the London Poles, yes.

GLADWYN: Well that was a great, that was a side issue really, but very important. But it had nothing to do with the Charter.

POWELL: Now . . . to turn to the San Francisco Conference, you had a very high level delegation there.

GLADWYN: Yes, we had. Well, of course, Eden had to go back.

POWELL: Because of the general election.

GLADWYN: Was it the general election?

POWELL: Well there was one in the summer of '45.

GLADWYN: Yes, that's true, well then of course, yes, and then it was early at Potsdam--

POWELL: Potsdam, too, yes--

GLADWYN: they knew the result. Yes, he had to go back. Lord Halifax wasn't allowed to go far (?). Yes, at that time there was a sort of interim Government, you know, the Labor Party had gone and--the Labor Party had resigned from the Government and there was interim Government going on, and there was Churchill in command, and Halifax was there, no, Halifax was ambassador in Washington. . . .

POWELL: What I was going to ask you, basically, was the--I mean, with this leadership you had Lord Cranborne as well and so on. Were they--sort of window dressing and was the work really done by you and Sir Alexander Cadogan?

GLADWYN: Well, yes, more or less, I think, yes, I think I've--so they were--they made the sort of speeches--

POWELL: I mean, you were the two professionals.

GLADWYN: Yes, and the politicians made the speeches. Alec Cadogan, of course, was a very great--he was there most of the time. There was a great intelligent lawyer called Sir William Malkin. But Leo Pasvolsky, of course, was the great figure on the American side.

POWELL: He was the equivalent of Professor Charles Webster.

GLADWYN: Yes, he was really, yes. And he was more important because he was--Leo Pasvolsky was very--he had more political influence than Professor

Webster. But nevertheless, he was there, and, of course, a lot of work was in the so-called "Coordination Committee", in which Pasvolsky and I sat, you see, at the end of it.

POWELL: Was that your principal function there--I was going to ask you were you--

GLADWYN: No, I was Secretary to the main Ministers' (?) Meeting, you see, too, I was Secretary of that. And there was a sort of sub-committee of that, which I sat on too, with Jimmy Dunn, and people like that, there were a couple of executives, there were now, and Pasvolsky of course. I think most of the work was done there, yes. Some of the work was done in the committees, you know, under the people like Evatt, and so I think we had rows about various things and altered the Charter in some respect, yes.

POWELL: Did you get to know Stettinius?

GLADWYN: Ah . . . what was his name? . . . Ed.

POWELL: Edward, yes.

GLADWYN: Ed. Ed Stettinius. Yes he was a splendid man, but he wasn't very effective.

POWELL: I was wondering about that.

GLADWYN: Oh, no. He was a very nice man, and--

POWELL: Sort of a lightweight, wasn't he?

GLADWYN: --an able businessman, but politically, a lightweight. Whenever Molotov used to say something awful at the meeting, (Powell laughs) he used to turn around to his people and say (imitates an American accent), "Hell, what do I do?", he would say, "Hell, what do I do?", and he had no idea really, what to do, actually. (laughter)

POWELL: Now, what were the working methods of the British delegation there at San Francisco? Did you have to refer many questions back to London for the consideration of the Prime Minister?

GLADWYN: No, no, no, not much, no, hardly at all, no.

POWELL: I mean, after all, you did have Eden there and you did have Attlee there.

GLADWYN: Attlee came, but he wasn't in any position of authority. I saw a lot of him there, but he wasn't in any position of authority. He was just there . . . he was just a Labor leader in opposition, at that time . . . a very nice man, and frightfully able. (In response to Powell handing him something) Thank you. (?)

POWELL: What about some of the other personalities at the Conference? I'm thinking about Herbert Evatt, Romulo and so on. Did you get to know them?

GLADWYN: Oh, yes Bert Evatt, of course, but he was principally concerned in pushing his own canoe, and (Powell laughs) becoming an international

personality in order to--

POWELL: He did that rather well--

GLADWYN: --in order to impose himself in Australia, back home, you see. And he wasn't a very nice man really, no; I quite liked him myself, but he was a . . . well . . . a terrific sort of a politician and . . . a bully in some ways, too. He was effective, of course, a very effective lawyer.

POWELL: And he sort of led the revolt of the smaller-medium Powers.

GLADWYN: Yes, he did that. With some success, with some success. He did get certain amendments of the Charter which were of certain importance, yes he did.

POWELL: Well, now, did you see, say, for example, Field Marshall Smutts? Was he around very much?

GLADWYN: No, I don't think he was there--no, not very much, no--he came up a bit. He did the . . .

POWELL: I think the Preamble of the Charter.

GLADWYN: The Preamble, yes. He cooked up that with Professor Webster.

POWELL: Oh, he did?

GLADWYN: That was his main con--Webster was very largely responsible for it,

but Smuts had the idea, writing these fine Labor sentiments into the Preamble.(?) Yes, that's what he did, yes. I think also he was quite keen on the bit in about the Internal Affairs of States. (laughter)

POWELL: He was forward-looking, in other words.

GLADWYN: Oh, yes.

POWELL: Tell me this: You were there on June 26 when the Charter was signed. I guess the atmosphere on that day--there was pretty well optimism unrestrained. Did you have your reservations then?

GLADWYN: Well, I never thought it was going to be--sort of--anything so terrific as all that, within a short peace and all that(?), no I didn't. And so, I thought that everything would depend on whether there was a row between the Americans and Russians, and by that time it looked as if there well might be. I thought we had to do it, and no choice, it was the only thing to do. But no, I was never as optimistic as all that. Never so optimistic as many Americans were. The Americans were actually convinced it was going to be a new world, you see. However, we in England, after all, we had seen the collapse of the League of Nations, and so we were less optimistic perhaps.

POWELL: Now, before the delegates left San Francisco, the UK Government had invited the Preparatory Committee to meet in London and then hold the first session of the General Assembly there.

GLADWYN: Yes.

POWELL: I always felt that that was an extraordinary gesture. Your country had hardly had time to catch its breath from the war, there were shortages everywhere, rationing was in effect, accommodations for overseas visitors were going to be very difficult.

GLADWYN: It was very difficult, yes.

POWELL: This must have been a Cabinet decision, and presumably--when was it made, do you know?

GLADWYN: I can't remember when it was exactly made, I don't know, but it was made. I didn't have a hand in making it.

POWELL: Did you, in effect, come to San Francisco with that invitation in your pocket?

GLADWYN: No, no, no. Only afterwards. Well, yes, at the end.

POWELL: Yes.

GLADWYN: It was decided at the end that I should effectively take over from Alger Hiss, who had been running the San Francisco Conference--

POWELL: That's right, he was the--

GLADWYN: Dean Acheson was going to be transferred, effectively, to London on the first of February. Therefore, I'd have to dispatch a commission on the Executive Committee before that. Then, rather at the last minute, it

was decided that I should do it as I was going to be the equivalent of Alger Hiss. But, it was only decided rather at the last minute, I think. It wasn't easy in London, certainly it wasn't conducive (?) to get Church House all ready and to get the restaurant going, and the whole . . .

POWELL: Central Hall.

GLADWYN: . . . Central Hall all ready in time, that kind of thing. Then apart from that, we had to get all kinds of very difficult questions settled about procedure and the rules of procedure, and all that, which had great political consequences.

POWELL: Well, I was going to ask you, you started out, you had David Owen--

GLADWYN: He was the first man, the first chap, yes.

POWELL: Yes, and then Brian Urquhart--

GLADWYN: And then after that, and then Brian Urquhart came into my office, and I just got into the Church House(?). He was the first man to come into my office. He applied for the job--

POWELL: But you had no budget, you had no staff . . .

GLADWYN: No staff, no. Well, I eventually got some money from the Foreign Office, yes.

POWELL: It must have been an appalling job.

GLADWYN: Well, we had to recruit very quickly: a financial man, an administration man . . .

POWELL: I remember Colonel Holt very well.

GLADWYN: Yes, he was a very nice man, yes. We got quite a good collection and got people who came on to the U.N. --there was old Ben Cohen, you know.

POWELL: Picture right up there. (Motions to Cohen's picture)(?) He was our first Assistant Secretary General for Public Information.

GLADWYN: And then there was Hoo.



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POWELL: Yes, Victor Hoo. And Adrian Pelt.

GLADWYN: Oh, yes, yes, yes.

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POWELL: Yes, you had quite a team there.

GLADWYN: And at the end, there was a great business because Mr. Lie would take on all these people. I recommended that he would do so because they all seemed pretty able, you see. But for about a week he didn't know whether they were going to be taken on. And so the rhyme went on I think to say, "They didn't know whether they were coming or going: Koo, Hoo, Cohen and Owen."
(laughter)

POWELL: Well, they're so many things I want to ask you and I've gotten my eye

on the clock. Now for one thing, that first day in the General Assembly in Central Hall, I was there, and it didn't go according to the script.

GLADWYN: Didn't it, I've forgotten.

POWELL: There was . . . Paul Henri Spaak of Belgium that everybody expected was going to be elected President of the General Assembly. And then Vishinsky suddenly gets up and nominates Trygve Lie and Dimitri Manvilsky gets up and seconds the nomination, and calls for it by acclamation. And you--

GLADWYN: --No, Spaak was the President, you mean the Secretary-General.

POWELL: No, I mean that Spaak's name had not been mentioned, and you and Andy Cordier were up there on the podium sorting . . . no, Zuleta Angel was up there.

GLADWYN: Who?

POWELL: Angel. Zuleta, the President of the Preparatory Commission--

GLADWYN: Oh, yes, Zuleta, Zuleta, that's right--

POWELL: And they were trying to sort this out and finally, they--

GLADWYN: Zuleta the was President--

POWELL: of the Preparatory Commission.

GLADWYN: And then he sat in the chair when the Assembly first met.

POWELL: That's right. And it took him several minutes sort it out and finally they found in the Rules of Procedure that there were going to be no nominations, and no seconding, and the balloting was going to be secret. And so, suddenly, they went into secret ballot and the man whose name had never been mentioned that afternoon, Paul Henri Spaak, (laughs while speaking) had been elected President of the General Assembly.

GLADWYN: Yes I remember that, now it's coming back to me, yes.

POWELL: And, of course, I've always wondered why the Russians did this maneuver. Did they hate Spaak that much, or did they have their own candidate as the post of Secretary-General? I've heard they had a Pole or a Yugoslav in mind.

GLADWYN: Oh yes, they did put forward a Pole, I remember, but I can't remember who it was.

POWELL: And that they wanted to sidetrack Lie by putting him in as President of the General Assembly. I don't know what the story was.

GLADWYN: Very likely, but we didn't know exactly what the Russians were up to, we didn't know.

POWELL: Now, when were you first aware that Lie was going to be the candidate for Secretary-General, do you remember that?

GLADWYN: Well, some time went by before his name came forward. Our candidate was Mike Pearson, of course. And, failing that, of course, we did like Spaak. But both were ruled out by the Russians, particularly Mike Pearson.

POWELL: Thought he was too close to the Americans?

GLADWYN: North Americans, yes, and that kind of thing. Indeed, at one stage, even my name was put forward, but that was quite impossible because I was a member of Britain, and they've never been accepted by the Russians anyhow. But, it was evident that there would have to be a Scandinavian or something like that. And then eventually, Lie was rather thought of as a second best, in a way, I think. And his name came forward, and nobody particularly objected to him, and the Americans and Russians accepted him.

POWELL: And when he actually took over, he was elected I think--he gave his acceptance speech in the General Assembly on the second of February--was there a kind of a "hand-over"? Did you sit down with him for a series of conferences?

GLADWYN: Yes, yes, we did he came over and we had long talks about whether he should take on the staff, and that kind of thing. And generally speaking, I'd sort of run(?) and yes, I can't remember exactly, but we'd have talks with him, of course. . . . He was a quite sensible old boy, you know.

POWELL: He had a rough time for a good share of his--

GLADWYN: Over here.

POWELL: Yes, over here, yes.

GLADWYN: Yes, I know, yes. And instantly, of course, he called to the Russians over the Korean War.

POWELL: Yes. Tell me this: when you sort of vacated your office in Church House, you remained a member of the British delegation to that Assembly?

GLADWYN: Yes, I came, I sat behind them, yes I did. Yes, I switched over and became a member of the delegation. And then I went back--when I was over—I went back to the Foreign Office, and took up a job as Undersecretary. By that time, Mr. Bevin chose me as the chap who would be responsible for negotiating the peace treaties, you see, so I switched over to that, and really, came away from the United Nations for a long period.

POWELL: But then you went back to the UN in 1950.

GLADWYN: What do you mean--oh, in 1950--at that time, after the peace treaties were over, I had more time as Undersecretary, and as Deputy Undersecretary of State. I had come to the United Nations' side then too, yes.

POWELL: But I mean, when you actually came here to New York, it was just at the time of the Korean War.

GLADWYN: Oh no, I came before, when the first Assembly, when the second Assembly were, I came over then, with the delegation then. In spite of the fact I was dealing with treaties, too. I came over to the delegation here.

POWELL: And you sensed at that time the increasing hostility between the Americans and the Russians.

GLADWYN: Oh, yes, very much so. After one of Molotov's speeches, he talked about the two camps, and that kind of thing. I remember approaching Sobolev very much about that. Didn't get any change out of him.

POWELL: Now, you were here--when did you arrive--in July of 1950, I think--

GLADWYN: Two days after the Korean War had broken out, yes.

POWELL: . . . And almost immediately became known in almost every American home, I think.



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GLADWYN: Well, it wasn't my fault, I know--

(laughter from Mr. Powell and Ms. Akao)

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POWELL: (laughing) Nobody's accusing you of anything, Lord Gladwyn.

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GLADWYN: Well, I don't know, it's not a sort of normal thing for a diplomat to do, and not a thing you like doing, anyhow. As I didn't like . . . publicity at all.

POWELL: Well, I mean, after all, you and Mr. Malik had some--

GLADWYN: Well yes, I scored off Malik of course, (?) and so on. Malik I quite liked, personally--

POWELL: I was going to ask you, how did you get along with him personally, outside the conference room?

GLADWYN: Quite alright, quite alright, yes, he's quite a good man. . . . But, actually, I really took him on intellectually, really, and made some speeches attacking Marxism, and generally speaking, their absurd idea of history and (?) running everything and so on and so forth. And that's really what I suppose I made my name on, yes.

POWELL: Well now tell me, . . . when Trygve Lie's first term was up as Secretary-General, the US managed to get that Assembly extension without taking it back to the Security Council, which many students, I think have since said, or scholars, have said that this was a very dubious legality.

GLADWYN: Might be, but there was nothing else to be done, really, because the Russians wouldn't agree to any successor, and we couldn't really just sack Lie, and what could you--they wanted to run it with a sort of nameless troika, or something like that.

POWELL: The British didn't object too much to that extension . . .

GLADWYN: No, no, of course they didn't want Lie in tears. They were happy a successor to Lie, but until they got agreement we weren't going to give them any--quite happy, in fact, we wanted Lie to carry on.

POWELL: Well when Lie finally decided to resign and the Security Council was faced the question of finding a second Secretary-General, I believe I read that it was you who came up with the name of Hammarskjöld.

GLADWYN: That's perfectly true. For a long time we couldn't get agreement on anybody, everybody was vetoed by the Russians you see, and so on, we were all despairing.(?) And it was in the final meeting somewhere over here, I think I said, "Well, what about a Swede, I know—I have met a Swede I think could do, his name is Dag Hammarskjöld, I don't know him very well, but I think he's extremely competent and he's an economist, and I think a very admirable man. I really don't know very much about him, but I suggest that he ought to be considered." And I said, "I can't put him forward because I haven't got any authority to do so." But then, by the next meeting, the Frenchman, Hapneau, (?) put him forward officially. But that was how it came about and then the Russians, to our amazement, agreed.



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POWELL: And that was it.

GLADWYN: And that was it, yes.

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POWELL: Now, in view of what (chuckling) . . . happened in the next few years, including Suez and the Congo, did you ever regret putting Hammarskjöld forward?

GLADWYN: No, not exactly. I think he did what he could, but he wanted to be a sort of lay Pope, and circumstances were against that, really.

POWELL: (chuckling) I must remember that phrase, I like it very much.

GLADWYN: (chuckling) That's what he wanted to be. One time, in the Congo, he almost succeeded in being, but it was quite evident he couldn't be it really,

it was impossible. But he was a very able man and I think he did some good, too in bringing the whole thing together. But he was an odd character, of course.

POWELL: But do you think he may have stretched the limits of the office of the Secretary-General a little too far that time?

GLADWYN: Well probably, I think he did. But of course, there was always Article Hundred, of course, he could appeal to that and bring forward things under that. But I think he did probably a bit too much, yes. Obviously, he realized that he couldn't do that kind of thing when he was killed. I don't know what happened to him when he was killed, whether that was--have you got any information about that? Was it a plot to kill him, do you think, or was it just an accident?

POWELL:

I don't think so. I've talked to Brian Urquhart about this many times and I think, at best, it's an open verdict, but I think it was probably just bad flying.

GLADWYN: Bad flying, yes. In the middle of a desert somewhere, yes.

POWELL: Yes, yes, I don't think so.

GLADWYN: The plot theory seldom works, you know, when it comes to the factors, it's awfully difficult.

POWELL: Now, you had left the UN by the time that U Thant arrived.

GLADWYN: I wasn't here when he arrived, no.

POWELL: No, I mean but you have, from the vantage point of the Foreign Office, you observed his performance.

GLADWYN: Well, I was in Paris by that time. I wasn't observing the United Nations much in Paris, I had too much to do.

POWELL: No, but did you get any impression of him?

GLADWYN: Not much. Of course, I had very little to do with the United Nations then. All I did was meet him once or twice at parties and he seemed a very good chap. The (?), good Buddhist, and so on, and no doubt, very suitable. I really don't know much about him.

POWELL: Now, since this is the fortieth anniversary year of the UN, and we've just finished this tremendous Commemorative Session, there are a few general questions I think I'd like to ask you.

(Ms. Akao asks to turn the tape over)

END OF SIDE ONE

POWELL: You were at Dumbarton Oaks, you were at Yalta, and at San Francisco. How has the Charter, which you helped to draft, stood the test of time? Is it in need of revision?

GLADWYN: Well, I don't think you can revise it, because under the Charter itself, it can only be revised with the consent, effectively, of the

Russians. You have to have American and Soviet agreement on any of this. And if you got that, you probably would be able to. They'd still be subject, in principle, to veto; China and--

POWELL: But my question is, is it in need of revision, whether it possible or not.

GLADWYN: Well, no, I think really, if could get any kind of American-Soviet cooperation, you could make the present Charter work perfectly well, in my view. I don't see why it would be necessary to revise it, I don't think. It might possibly get the question of the voting in the Assembly rather regulated. It seems rather absurd now when you get States that are minute, of a hundred thousand, twenty thousand people having one vote, and China, a hundred million people, a billion people with one vote too. In principle, it seems to me to be rather wrong. But I daresay, it's the only way to make it work at all.

POWELL: I was going to say, it's an extremely sensitive issue . . . on the part of the mini-States, yes.

GLADWYN: I suppose, but even so, it seems rather ridiculous, really.

POWELL: What do you think about the attitude--

GLADWYN: I once thought of a good thing to have a resolution--we were going to give a resolution to the Assembly with rather more power . . . and make them more effective. You might have a system whereby it would have to be a two-thirds resolution embodying two-thirds of the population of the world . .

. in which case there'd have to be a--you know--out of four billion people, or more, there'd have to be three billion people and I would think their representatives here would have to vote for it. (?)

POWELL: Well, we got China and India and (laughing) Pakistan and Indonesia .

. . .

GLADWYN: India and China, they would only be two. You wouldn't have two-thirds of them. (laughter) You would have to have America, and Europe and Russia, or one of them, to come in, too.

POWELL: Yes, that's true. Well, what about the attitude of Member States, Lord Gladwyn, toward the UN? They seemed to have lost a lot of the enthusiasm--

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GLADWYN: Who?

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POWELL: --the Member States--that they had forty years ago.

GLADWYN: Oh, I don't think that the average person cares much about the United Nations nowadays, there's very little enthusiasm for it. But, I really don't think it matters very much, it's a Government's matter. If you can get the Governments to be reasonable, then it doesn't very much what people . . . the populace thinks. It just may come about, (?) and then they automatically think it's a good thing. If you can get agreements between the Great Powers, notably the Soviet Union and the Americans, everybody would be a little happy. And then of course, the stock of this organization will just go . . . it'll go straight up. You can't increase the stock of this organization by

organizing propaganda, and saying, "It was a very good show, you must all come and help me (?)", you see. It doesn't do much good.

POWELL: Now, do you think this . . . Commemorative Session of the last ten days or so, with all these Heads of State and Government, was this a ritual, or do you think that they really felt that this place is still important?

GLADWYN: Yes, I think so, yes it still is important simply as a meeting ground, it is important, I think really. And if there's ever going to be any kind of a lackening of tension between the super-Powers, it's quite likely to happen here, in the corridors, people meet each other, in minor ways, and . . . certainly, the situation would be worse off if it didn't exist, there's no doubt about that. And, I think there was an article in the New York Times just the other day that said such as that, and I agreed with it. But, I think everything depends certainly, on the Governments being reasonable. Of course sometimes, it's arguable that the whole human race has gone mad, of course, it's quite possible to think that. But, on the assumption that it hasn't gone mad, you must go on the assumption of course, that the human race has not gone mad, what the Germans call the "Uber Alles" theory. And that's the only thing you can do. Of course, if they had all gone mad, there's nothing to be done, we should all be blown up. But seeing that it's absolute--if reason has anything to do with it at all, it must mean that nuclear war is out, of course, people don't really want--even Governments don't really want to be blown up, and therefore, it probably won't happen.

POWELL: No, they wouldn't have anybody to govern.

GLADWYN: Well, it would all be in smoke; there would be a nuclear winter, and

that would be the end.

POWELL: Do you find that the fact that the UN has increased from say . . . 51, at the time of the signing of the Charter, to 159 today, has that--

GLADWYN: 51?

POWELL: 51 at San Francisco. There were 51 Member States.

GLADWYN: Oh, then, yes, I see. Well, of course, it's made it much more difficult to govern. I myself think it was rather a mistake to do it with everybody. There ought to have been a numerical limit--limitation, really . . . (?) that's what I view myself. Otherwise, it would have San Marino, or Monaco, or Andorra, or anywhere(?) on an as equal level with China. It does seem a little odd, really. I think there ought to have been a numerical limit, perhaps, a million people, or something like that, myself.

POWELL: Or a class of Associate Membership, or something like that.

GLADWYN: Well, they they could have all got together and had an Associate Membership or something like that, yes.

POWELL: Yes. Well, I think it's too late. What about the Security Council? You--

GLADWYN: Indeed, the Europeans, of course, ought to one member really, if it comes to that. The EEC ought to have one member. . . . That would have reformed the Security Council itself, wouldn't it?

POWELL: It certainly would. (laughter) I can see Britain and France competing for the same seat.

GLADWYN: Well, we could toss up, or something.

POWELL: Yes. Now, you sat on the Security Council for a long time. How do you think it is effective?

GLADWYN: Well, in my day, it was quite effective, really, yes. We did do--we took some sensible decisions. Of course, in my day, it was quite different. Even after the time I left, at the end of '54--beginning of '54--we had Commonwealth Meetings, and we had Commonwealth Policy. Even the Indian came along and we informed the Commonwealth Policy, which was then adopted by me in the Security Council, and all of that. But things have changed very substantially since then.

POWELL: But you do now have Common Market consultation, don't you?

GLADWYN: Yes, we have Common Market consultation, that's quite true. That didn't happen in my day. It wasn't formed.

POWELL: Now, your . . . first employee and your protégé, Brian Urquhart, I guess maybe . . . your second employee . . . is now in charge of the UN Peace-Keeping Operation. And, peace-keeping is not a device provided for in the Charter.

GLADWYN: No, it came on at will(?) . . . in form it came out of the sort of

Military Staff Committee idea, in a way.

POWELL: Yes. But, some people considered it one of the most important UN contributions. What do you think about it?

GLADWYN: I think one can exaggerate that, but I think it has played a role, and indeed, a beneficent role. There are about five in operation now, and they can't do very much, but they do hold the ring.

POWELL: In Cypress.

GLADWYN: Yes, certainly in Cypress, and even in Lebanon, to some extent, and therefore, it's obviously a good thing as such, yes. I think what exaggerates the importance, if things got really tough, of course, I daresay they'd all be killed or something, but, they can't shoot anyhow. But it does do--yes, I quite agree it is a new dimension, new necessity (?) which has had a certain effect.

POWELL: And then one final question, if I have the time, Lord Gladwyn. How do you consider the future of the United Nations? Do you think about it?

GLADWYN: Well I think unless, as I said, the human race goes mad, it means that they'll get agreement on arms, eventually. Then the thing will sober up, I would think, and it'll be more useless, more power will degenerate in this particular machine.(?) It all depends, really on whether you can get--in my view I think it definitely depends on the two super-Powers coming and getting an agreement on arms, agreement on some part, and that would lead to some kind of active cooperation, if you like. Indeed, it's absurd not to think of it

because their interests, in many ways, are identical.

POWELL: In talking simply in the terms of the Soviet Union and the United States, where does China fit into this . . . equation?

GLADWYN: Well, China hasn't really organized itself yet, but it will. I was there about three--I'm a hero in China, you know, because when I was . . . President of the Security Council--I think it was just when they were coming into the war--anyhow, I managed, as President, to overrule the veto of Chiang Kai-shek, you see, the representative of Chiang Kai-Shek, overrule the double veto, so to speak, and got the Americans to abstain, with great reluctance, and therefore addressed an invitation to the Red Chinese, "come and represent it here." And General Woo came over with the delegation, and he had lunch with us and all that. It didn't do much good, they stayed with the Russians and went back. But still (?), it was the first time that Mandarin was talked in the Security Council, and they were very grateful of that. So then I went to China about two or three--three years ago--I found that General Woo was the Vice Chief of General Staff at Peking. I was received with great acclaim as a sort of hero and a sort of friend of Red China. And indeed, after that, I lost my popularity here because the China lobby then attacked me like anything. And I was a villain, more than a hero, then.

POWELL: I must add one story there for the record. I believe that Sir Binnacle Shiva Rao.

GLADWYN: Who?

POWELL: Sir Binnacle Rao was on the Security Council as the Indian

representative.

GLADWYN: Yes he was, yes.

POWELL: And I remember the remark of The Economist at the time: that General Woo did all the "Raoing" and Sir Binnacle Rao did all the "Wooing". (laughter)

GLADWYN: They liked it. I had forgotten that. But they liked it. Sir Binnacle Rao was a blameless character, very nice. General Woo was rather tough, but a good chap.

POWELL: Well, do you have any final thoughts you want to give us before we terminate this interview?



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GLADWYN: No. I think it must go on, and peg away, and I think it's just not necessary to be completely gloomy. Unless, as I say, you have the impression of the human race as gone mad. I remember that--slightly at the end of the interview--when we were in San Francisco, the Russians had a Legal Advisor called Golunsky. And he was very gloomy, he died of consumption shortly after this, but he was very gloomy, very nice, and we fraternized. He used to come dine with us, you see. And found out he was about the gloomiest man in the world. He thought that the human race was devouring the fair face of nature, and it was like a sort of proliferation of bacilli, which had gone out of hand, you see, and the population were going mad and it was a staggering proliferation of bacilli, which unless checked, would absolutely devour nature and reduce the world to an impossible desert. The great thing therefore, was to check this proliferation, you see. He had hopes that there might be a plague; this was before the explosion of the atom bomb; he had hopes that

there would be a plague, you see, and something would happen. Otherwise, he thought we were completely doomed. And that was that. He was a very gloomy man indeed. There was something in it, though--

POWELL: That's a sideline on San Francisco I had never heard before.

GLADWYN: This was Golunsky, a very nice man, but he was very gloomy.

POWELL: But you enjoyed San Francisco.

GLADWYN: Oh yes, it was great fun, yes. Oh, they had Jimmy Dunn, I used to cooperate with him very much.(?) I remember particularly Alger Hiss, very much.



POWELL: I was going to ask you, you took over from Hiss, but--

GLADWYN: No, I never liked him very much. He was a very arrogant man, I thought.

POWELL: Yes. Well, thank you very much, Lord Gladwyn, I'm delighted that you were able to give this time to us, (Gladwyn interjects: not a bit, I hope it was useful?) and if we have a supplementary question or two, we may Eric Jensen of the London Information Centre to locate you in London and put you in front of a microphone again.

GLADWYN: Certainly. I was going to get ready for this monster party. They're going to be two hundred people at dinner . . .

END OF SIDE TWO.

END OF INTERVIEW



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