

Department for Disarmament Affairs  
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# The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK



Volume 25: 2000

## **NOTE**

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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## FOREWORD

The 2000 edition of *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* provides a descriptive narrative of events at the United Nations in the field of disarmament during the year of the historic Millennium Assembly. Though *The Yearbook* is now in its 25<sup>th</sup> edition, its more distant roots date back to the *Armaments Year-Books* issued by the League of Nations. Then, as now, nation-States and members of the concerned public have found it useful to have in one place a handy shelf reference documenting the triumphs and setbacks of the world community's efforts to reduce and eliminate the deadliest of weapons. This edition carries on this tradition.

The year 2000 marked a crucial juncture in the history of disarmament. In event after event associated with the new Millennium—including the publication of the Secretary-General's Millennium report, the Millennium Declaration of the General Assembly, the Millennium Summit Declaration of the Security Council, the Declaration and Agenda for Action agreed at the NGO Millennium Forum, and other documents such as the Commitment to Global Peace, issued by the Millennium World Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual Leaders, and the Declaration adopted by the Conference of Presiding Officers of National Parliaments, and more—the world community spoke as one on behalf of disarmament, particularly the goal of eliminating weapons of mass destruction.

During the Millennium Summit, 22 States responded to the Secretary-General's invitation to ratify six key legal instruments in the field of disarmament. Over the course of the year, 86 States chose to advance their security interests by ratifying or acceding to a wide range of disarmament treaties. (Appendix I of this volume contains further details concerning the specific status of these treaties.)

The solemn "ends" of disarmament also guided the deliberation of roughly 50 resolutions in the General Assembly as well as the work of many institutions throughout the United Nations disarmament machinery, including the Disarmament Commission, the Department for Disarmament Affairs and its three regional centres, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, and the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. Even the Conference on Disarma-

ment, which has been deadlocked for so many years, has persisted in its efforts to forge a new consensus on a multilateral agenda for this difficult field. The Security Council also devoted attention to aspects of disarmament pertaining to peace-keeping and peace-building.

With respect to the “means” of disarmament, the world community reaffirmed its determination to implement agreed disarmament commitments and to work out arrangements in new areas.

The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—after four weeks of deliberations during the Treaty’s 2000 Review Conference—broke new ground by identifying 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive pursuit of global nuclear disarmament. Among these steps, the nuclear-weapon States parties also made an “unequivocal undertaking” to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Collectively, the NPT parties also reaffirmed that global nuclear disarmament is “the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”—a succinct rejoinder to the arguments often heard on behalf of nuclear deterrence and missile defence. They also deplored the nuclear tests in South Asia in 1998 and reaffirmed the global need for full-scope IAEA safeguards as a “necessary precondition” for new nuclear supply arrangements. Future editions of *The Yearbook* will document whether such noble words are matched with commensurate deeds.

The world community also formally embarked on preparations for the 2001 UN Conference that will discuss, for the first time at the global level, one aspect of the small arms issue: illicit trade. As the Secretary-General has pointed out, control of the proliferation of illicit weapons is a necessary first step towards the non-proliferation of small arms, the weapons that are being used so indiscriminately at this very moment. At UN Headquarters in New York, the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference met, and across the world, in many different settings—regional and subregional, intergovernmental and non-governmental—people gathered to formulate positions and discuss ways and means.


The year, of course, was not without its setbacks. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) are not yet in force, while progress on START III has come to a halt, the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is in jeopardy, and the world still lacks a verification protocol to the

Biological Weapons Convention. Another year has passed without the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Central Asia and many African States have yet to become full parties to the Pelindaba Treaty. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons faced serious financial difficulties in 2000, while the International Atomic Energy Agency also worked under pressure to reconcile its ever-expanding ends with its limited means.

In the field of conventional arms, many UN Member States also failed last year to submit data to the Register of Conventional Arms or to use the standardized instrument for reporting their military expenditures. Military spending has continued to grow worldwide, by several estimates to a level around \$800 billion at the end of the year 2000. While preparations continued throughout the year for the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, enormous problems remain unsolved in enforcing arms embargoes mandated by the Security Council. Meanwhile, the "revolution in military affairs" fuels what amounts to an international arms race to improve qualitatively the accuracy and lethality of conventional arms.

The surest path to the fulfilment of global norms—whether or not related to disarmament—is their embodiment in concrete national and regional actions, particularly their integration into laws, policies and institutional structures. There is much in this volume to suggest that the norms of disarmament are indeed taking root across the globe, thanks in large part to some enlightened leadership from both national governments and civil society. An informed citizenry is indeed vital to the long-term success of disarmament.

I commend *The Yearbook* to all who desire a safer world with fewer arms.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Jayantha Dhanapala". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style. Below the signature is a single horizontal line.

Jayantha Dhanapala  
Under-Secretary-General  
for Disarmament Affairs



## NOTE

The *United Nations Disarmament Yearbook* is designed to be a concise reference work. As background information is greatly condensed, it may be helpful to consult previous editions. Factual information, presented where possible in tabular form, is provided in the appendices, and website addresses of other UN departments and services, intergovernmental organizations, research institutes and non-governmental organizations are footnoted.

*The Yearbook*, produced under the general direction of Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, and the Director of the Department, Evgeniy Gorkovskiy, was prepared by the following team: *coordinator/editor*: Carolyn Cooper, *chief writer*: Olga Sukovic; *other writers and contributors*: Vladimir Bogomolov, Tam Chung, Joao Honwana, Hannelore Hoppe, Nazir Kamal, Jenifer Mackby, Tamara Malinova, Agnès Marcaillou, Mika Murakami, Anita Ng, Sari Nurro and Jerzy Zaleski; *research assistance/language editing*: Joanna Panepinto; *typesetting*: Bertha Mae Ortiz.

The Department for Disarmament Affairs takes this opportunity to remind you that you can access up-to-date information on disarmament throughout the year by clicking on the Department's home page on the Internet: [www.un.org/Depts/dda/DDAHome.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/DDAHome.htm). Among the many electronic resources you will find is the departmental database on the status of multilateral treaties, which contains the texts of the treaties covered in appendix I of *The Yearbook*.



## CHAPTER I

# The 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

### Introduction

SINCE ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE THREE DECADES AGO, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The number of States parties has steadily risen to 187, which also renders the Treaty the most widely adhered to multilateral disarmament agreement.<sup>1</sup>

In accordance with article VIII of the Treaty, review conferences of its States parties have been held at five-year intervals since 1975. The fifth, in 1995, had two objectives: to review the Treaty's operation and to decide on its extension. Owing primarily to differences over nuclear disarmament, the Conference did not succeed in adopting a consensus review of the Treaty's implementation; however, it adopted without a vote a package of decisions. These decisions consisted of (a) elements for a strengthened review process, (b) principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and (c) the indefinite extension of the Treaty. The Conference also adopted a resolution on the Middle East.<sup>2</sup> In the context of its decision on a

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<sup>1</sup> Nine countries joined the NPT since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference: Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu.

<sup>2</sup> See the *Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, New York, 1995 (NPT/CONF.1995/32), part I for decision 1, "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty", decision 2, "Principles and Objectives".

strengthened review process, the Conference agreed to hold its Sixth Review Conference in 2000. The timing of the 2000 NPT Review Conference was of historic significance for several reasons: it was not only the first review conference since the Treaty's indefinite extension, but also the first in the new Millennium; it coincided with the 30th anniversary of the Treaty's entry into force; and it came when the nuclear non-proliferation regime was seen by many as having reached a critical juncture.

Despite some positive developments, many non-nuclear-weapon States experienced frustration prior to the Conference. The climate in the area of arms control and disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, had deteriorated considerably since 1995. The three sessions of the Preparatory Committee witnessed a persistent and significant divergence of views on substantive issues related to the Treaty, especially between the nuclear- and the non-nuclear-weapon States, and between those favouring an incremental approach and those seeking immediate and fundamental changes.

The Conference was also expected to test both the strength of the new review mechanism and the concept of accountability which had been agreed upon when States parties accepted the "permanence of the Treaty" and extended it indefinitely. Consequently, any perception by the States parties that the NPT regime was not yielding the expected or promised results would seriously undermine the Treaty.

It was under these circumstances that the Review Conference opened on 24 April for a period of four weeks.

## **Preparation for the 2000 Review Conference**

By adopting the 1995 decision on strengthening the NPT review process, the States parties agreed that the next review conference would be held in 2000 and that, from 1997, Preparatory Committee meetings would be held in each of the three years preceding the Review Conference, with the option of a fourth session, in the year of the Conference.

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for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, decision 3, "Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", and "Resolution on the Middle East". The texts of the decisions and resolution are reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 20: 1995, chap. I, annex, and in the booklet *Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, published by the United Nations, March 2000.



The Preparatory Committee held three sessions within the period April 1997 to May 1999<sup>3</sup> that were open to all States parties. At its first session, the Committee reached an understanding concerning the chairmanship of its sessions and the presidency of the Conference.<sup>4</sup> It devoted most of its meetings to substantive preparation of the Review Conference, which involved consideration of the principles, ways and means for the implementation of the Treaty and the decisions “package” of 1995. During its third session the Preparatory Committee devoted some time to discussions of the outcome and products of the Conference. Nevertheless, during its three sessions, the Committee was not able to reach agreement on any substantive recommendations to the Review Conference.

On matters related to the organizational and procedural preparations for the Review Conference, the Committee agreed on the date and venue, the provisional agenda, the draft rules of procedure and the allocation of aspects of its substantive items<sup>5</sup> to the three Main Committees of the Conference. Main Committee I would review the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty related to nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and international security, including the issue of security assurances; Main Committee II would address issues related to nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) and nuclear safeguards, and Main Committee III would review the implementation of provisions related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

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<sup>3</sup> New York, 7–18 April 1997; Geneva, 27 April–8 May 1998; and New York, 10–21 May 1999.

<sup>4</sup> A representative of the Western Group and the Group of Eastern European States would chair the first and second sessions respectively, and a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States Parties to the NPT would chair the third session and preside over the Conference. Accordingly, the Preparatory Committee elected Pasi Patokallio (Finland) to chair the first session, and Eugeniusz Wyzner (Poland) and Camilo Reyes (Colombia) to chair the second and third sessions, respectively.

<sup>5</sup> “Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (Item 16)” and “Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality (Item 17)”.

The Committee also requested the UN Secretariat, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and regional treaty organizations to prepare background documentation for the Conference. It concluded its work by adopting its final report to the Conference.<sup>6</sup>

### **The 2000 NPT Review Conference**

The 2000 Review Conference was convened from 24 April to 19 May in New York. A total of 158 out of 187 States parties participated<sup>7</sup> in this event, along with representatives of the United Nations and the IAEA. In accordance with the relevant rules of procedure, Cuba, a State not party to the Treaty, and Palestine attended the Conference as observers. A number of specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations were also granted observer

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<sup>6</sup> NPT/CONF.2000/1\*.

<sup>7</sup> Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

status.<sup>8</sup> A total of 141 research institutes and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) attended the Conference as well, in accordance with the rules of procedure.

At its opening plenary meeting on 24 April, Abdallah Baali of Algeria was elected President of the Conference by acclamation.<sup>9</sup> The President, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the IAEA addressed the Conference.

At the same meeting, the Conference adopted its agenda and rules of procedure as recommended by the Preparatory Committee,<sup>10</sup> as well as the allocation of items to the three Main Committees. The Conference also unanimously elected its officers.<sup>11</sup>

During the general debate from 24 April to 2 May, a total of 93 delegations made statements.<sup>12</sup> While an overwhelming majority

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<sup>8</sup> The Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, the European Community, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Arab States, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom), and the South Pacific Forum were granted observer agency status.

<sup>9</sup> At its third session, the Preparatory Committee unanimously endorsed the candidature of Jacob Selebi of South Africa for the presidency of the Review Conference. However, due to a new assignment within the Government of South Africa, Mr. Selebi had to withdraw his candidature. Consequently, on 8 December 1999, the Preparatory Committee held a brief resumed session, in New York, for the purpose of taking a decision on the presidency of the Conference. At that session, the Committee unanimously endorsed the candidacy of Abdallah Baali of Algeria, the representative of the States parties members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

<sup>10</sup> See document NPT/CONF.2000/1\*, annex VII (agenda) and annex VI (rules of procedure).

<sup>11</sup> The Conference elected the following Chairmen: Main Committee I, Camilo Reyes (Colombia); Main Committee II, Jean Lint (Belgium), Main Committee III, Markku Reimaa (Finland); Drafting Committee, André Erdős (Hungary); and Credentials Committee, Makmur Widodo (Indonesia). In addition, it elected 33 Vice-Presidents.

<sup>12</sup> See NPT/CONF.2000/SR.2-11.

expressed strong support for the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, statements showed that considerable differences remained in many areas, including nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; negative security assurances; negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; the transport of radioactive material; technical cooperation; and the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995.

A number of common themes ran through many of the statements. While there was universal support for the NPT, many States referred to the lack of universality with respect to membership in the Treaty. In this connection, the nuclear testing by two non-parties, India and Pakistan, was viewed as a serious setback. Regarding the implementation of article VI (nuclear disarmament), many non-nuclear-weapon States expressed disappointment over what they perceived to be insufficient progress in nuclear disarmament. Moreover, concerns were raised over the recent reaffirmation of nuclear doctrines by the major nuclear Powers. Many States welcomed the Russian Federation's ratification of both the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), and the unilateral reductions in nuclear weapons initiated by France and the United Kingdom. Yet there was clear concern on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon States over the slow progress in bilateral nuclear disarmament efforts. It was evident that the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States wanted to see a reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to obligations under article VI, with non-aligned States calling for the negotiation of the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe. Demands for security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States in a legally binding instrument were supported by many States. Several delegations also deplored the continuing impasse in the work of the CD and the consequent failure to commence negotiations on a fissile material treaty. There were also renewed calls by all States for the entry into force of the CTBT as soon as possible.

Many States parties also expressed strong concerns over US national missile defence (NMD) plans and their possible negative impact on existing multilateral disarmament treaties, especially the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In particular, China, Russia and

France expressed strong reservations about any actions that might undermine that Treaty.

As for articles III and IV (nuclear safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy), all States expressed strong support for IAEA safeguards under the NPT, which have become an integral part of the international non-proliferation regime. Nevertheless, concerns were voiced at the slow pace of signature and ratification of the 1997 IAEA Model Protocol Additional<sup>13</sup> to Existing Safeguards Agreements between States and the IAEA. Furthermore, several delegations also pointed to the continuing failure to resolve compliance challenges with regard to the safeguards agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the IAEA, as well as between Iraq and the IAEA. The NAM countries also emphasized the importance of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme and the need for its adequate funding.

Almost all States stressed the urgency of achieving the universality of the Treaty, with several referring to the situation in South Asia, where nuclear testing has taken place, and the Middle East, where only one State, Israel, has not joined the NPT. The four States not parties to the NPT—Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan—were urged to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without condition, particularly those States that operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

In one significant development, NGOs were invited to address the Conference. Time was therefore allotted for 15 representatives of the NGO community to present their views on various issues related to the Treaty and other nuclear matters.

### *Review of implementation*

Following the recommendations made by the Preparatory Committee, the Conference established three Main Committees, a Drafting Committee and a Credentials Committee, and allocated aspects of its substantive items to the three Main Committees as described above. Al-

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<sup>13</sup> The Protocol (INFCIRC/540) aims at strengthening safeguards through increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole.

though the Main Committees had not fully agreed upon their respective reports, they submitted them at the plenary meeting on 12 May.<sup>14</sup>

The Conference also established two subsidiary bodies under Main Committees I and II, respectively.<sup>15</sup> Subsidiary Body 1 discussed and considered the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament". Subsidiary Body 2 examined "regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution". The Subsidiary Bodies were open-ended, and the outcome of their work was reflected in the reports of the respective Main Committees.

A brief description of the discussions that took place in the Main Committees and Subsidiary Bodies is provided in the following sections, including references to a large number of documents that were submitted to the Conference by individual States and groups of States.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/1 (Main Committee I), NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/1 (Main Committee II), and NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/1 (Main Committee III).

<sup>15</sup> Subsidiary Body 1 was chaired by Clive Pearson (New Zealand) and Subsidiary Body 2 by Christopher Westdal (Canada). See document NPT/CONF.2000/DEC.1.

<sup>16</sup> The following States and groups of States submitted papers: *Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden*: NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.2 (introduction), 3, 5 & 6 (safeguards), 7 (plutonium), 8 (physical protection), MC.III/WP.1 (nuclear safety) & 2 (peaceful uses); *Australia, Austria, Netherlands, Lithuania, Luxembourg*: NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/WP.7 (general); *Belarus*: NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.16 (NWFZs); *Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway*: NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7 (complementary to EU common position); *Canada*: NPT/CONF.2000/WP.5 (review process), MC.I/WP.4 (programme of action); *China*: NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.2 (general), MC.II/WP.11 (general), MC.III/WP.3 (peaceful uses); *Egypt*: NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.1 (assurances), MC.II/WP.9/Rev.1 (Middle East), MC.III/WP.5 (peaceful uses) & 12 (technical cooperation); *EU*: (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.5 (general), MC.I/SB.1/WP.2 (general), MC.II/WP.10 (general), MC.III/WP.8 (general); *Finland*: NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/SB.1/WP.3 (nuclear disarmament); *France*: see P-5; *Indonesia*: see NAM; *Iran (Islamic Republic of)*: NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.14 (safeguards & ex

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*Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament*

Despite broad agreement by all the States parties that the NPT remained the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, closer consideration of the specific issues related to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament revealed continuing significant differences among the States parties. In the conduct of their work, the Main Committees experienced considerable difficulties in narrowing the gap between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States. The main areas of disagreement were related to nuclear disarmament, tackled by Main Committee I and its Subsidiary Body 1, and regional issues, particularly the Middle East and South Asia, dealt with by Subsidiary Body 2. Many non-nuclear-weapon States expressed disappointment and frustration over the insufficient progress they perceived in nuclear disarmament, especially in the implementation of article VI (nuclear disarmament). The nuclear-weapon States, however, were of the view that there had been noteworthy achievements since the previous Review Conference, despite some obvious setbacks, and provided literature on their nuclear-weapon programmes.

The status of implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, especially article VI, and the benchmarks set out in the decision on principles and objectives remained the most controversial issue. The majority of non-nuclear-weapon States parties wanted to see the Conference reaffirm the commitment to obligations under article VI. As a result, achieving a consensus outcome—the preferred method of work—was not considered an easy task for the Conference.

In implementation of decision 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Subsidiary Body 1 under Main Committee I was

port controls), MC.III/WP.10 (peaceful uses); *Ireland*: NPT/CONF.2000/WP.4/Rev.1 (review process); *Japan and Australia*: (NPT/CONF.2000/WP.1 (measures for implementation) & 2/Rev.1 (review process), MC.I/SB.1/WP.1 (general); *Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan*: NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.15 (NWFZ), MC.III/WP.11 (radioactive contaminants); *Mexico*: NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/WP.6 (financial support); *Mongolia*: NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.13 (NWFZs); *NAC*: NPT/CONF.2000/WP.3 (nuclear disarmament); *NAM*: NPT/CONF.2000/18 (general); *Netherlands, Norway*: NPT/CONF.2000/WP.7 (review process); *Nigeria*: NPT/CONF.2000/WP.9 (review process); *P-5*: NPT/CONF.2000/21; *Portugal*: see EU; *Russian Federation*: NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/WP.9 (peaceful uses); *South Africa*: NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/WP.4 (peaceful uses); *Switzerland*: NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.3 (action plan).

established to allow for focused discussion and consideration of practical steps, while the Committee reviewed the overall implementation of articles I, II and VI. The following main issues were debated:

*(a) Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament*

From the outset, the statements made in Main Committee I and Subsidiary Body 1 simply reconfirmed the existing wide divergence of views between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States on questions related to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, especially the implementation of article VI.

The unilateral steps that had been taken by some of the nuclear-weapon States (France and the United Kingdom) to reduce their respective nuclear arsenals and to increase transparency were praised by several delegations. So was the long awaited ratification of START II by the Russian State Duma. Nonetheless, the reaffirmation of nuclear doctrines by the major nuclear-weapon Powers, the nuclear tests conducted in South Asia, the prolonged stalemate in the work of the CD, the lack of full universality of the NPT, plans for an NMD system and related efforts to amend the 1972 ABM Treaty, and the CTBT's delay in entering into force were seen by many non-nuclear-weapon States as major setbacks.

France, on behalf of the five nuclear-weapon States, presented a joint statement in which they reiterated their strong and continuing support for the NPT as the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for nuclear disarmament. They also stated their unequivocal commitment to the fulfilment of all their obligations under the Treaty and to the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Moreover, for the first time, they jointly announced that their nuclear weapons were not targeted at any State. Despite some apparent differences among themselves over some of the issues, the joint statement ensured that sensitive topics such as missile defences would not become a stumbling block in the negotiations.

Although some of the elements in the P-5 statement were welcomed by a number of delegations, most non-nuclear-weapon States considered the statement to be insufficient. The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) countries (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South



Africa and Sweden) urged the nuclear-weapon States to make an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and, in the course of the review period 2000–2005, to engage in an accelerated process of negotiations and to take steps leading to nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, the NAC States proposed that the nuclear-weapon States take a set of interim steps such as the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, the reduction and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, and enhanced transparency measures with regard to their nuclear arsenals and fissile material inventories. The NAM States called on the nuclear States to unconditionally adhere to their commitments and obligations under article VI. Moreover, they reiterated their calls for the CD to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and to start negotiations on a “phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapon convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination”. Many non-nuclear-weapon States expressed dissatisfaction at the perceived “conditionalities” that the nuclear-weapon States had attached to their disarmament obligations.

Other nuclear-related issues such as missile defence and non-strategic nuclear weapons (tactical nuclear weapons) were referred to in statements and in papers prepared by some delegations but not fully debated during the Conference.

Subsidiary Body 1 discussed further practical steps, including the de-alerting and deactivation of nuclear weapons, the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, the placement of excess fissile materials for military purposes under safeguards, enhanced transparency measures, non-strategic nuclear weapons and more accountability on the part of the nuclear States. The above questions were then integrated into a single working paper, which was further debated in the Subsidiary Body. Nonetheless, the discussions in Subsidiary Body 1 also revealed the diverging positions between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States (see section on practical steps for nuclear disarmament).

**(b) *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty***

As anticipated, a large number of delegations stressed the importance of the CTBT and the urgent need to ensure its entry into force. States that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty were again strongly urged to do so without delay and without conditions. Many States also expressed regret at the nuclear tests conducted in South Asia in 1998, as well as at the US Senate's rejection of the CTBT. Russia's ratification of the Treaty was warmly welcomed, while France and the United Kingdom received praise for being the first two nuclear-weapon States to ratify it. Some countries expressed appreciation for the ongoing multilateral efforts to facilitate further ratification. Meanwhile, concerns were raised by some non-nuclear-weapon States over the issue of continued efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to qualitatively improve their nuclear arsenals through laboratory and sub-critical tests.

Several papers submitted by various delegations included specific proposals concerning the CTBT. In its paper, Switzerland proposed that while waiting for the Treaty to enter into force, all the parties with nuclear potentials listed in annex 2 of the Treaty observe moratoria on nuclear testing. The NAM States, in particular, pointed to the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States by calling upon them to refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the objectives of the CTBT and to provide transparency on-site and other measures to build confidence in its full implementation. Furthermore, they urged the nuclear-weapon States to comply with the "letter and spirit" of the CTBT.

In a joint document, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway proposed that all States parties make an effort to ensure the "earliest possible entry into force..., but not later than the 2005 Review Conference" through further ratification, especially by those 44 States whose ratification was required.

**(c) *Ban on the production of fissile material***

All delegations agreed on the need for the commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, but the wide gap between the States parties over future and existing stockpiles persisted. Virtually all delegations lamented the

continuing stalemate in the CD, which had thus far prevented the commencement of negotiations.

The NAM countries called for the immediate commencement of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the CD, taking into account the 1995 report of the Special Coordinator (Shannon report) on that item and the views relating to the scope of such a treaty.<sup>17</sup> Many other delegations agreed that negotiations should commence on that basis. A group of five States (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Norway), and Japan and Australia called for such negotiations to begin promptly and conclude not later than the 2005 Review Conference and they, as well as Switzerland, the EU, and the NAC States, proposed a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons pending conclusion of the negotiations. In a similar vein, Canada proposed that the five nuclear-weapon States utilize the NPT review process to issue a joint statement announcing a moratorium. For its part, China urged the CD to establish immediately an ad hoc committee on a fissile material cut-off treaty, as well as ad hoc committees on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and on nuclear disarmament.

#### *Practical steps for nuclear disarmament*

Taking into account the deliberations in Subsidiary Body 1, the Chair prepared a paper on the “practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI” as a basis for further discussions. In addition to the interim measures proposed in the paper submitted by the NAC States, other delegations tabled their proposals in Subsidiary Body 1. Most of the steps proposed were familiar to delegations as many of them had been discussed for a long time in various disarmament forums, including during the preparatory process. When Main Committee I concluded its work, there was general agreement that Subsidiary Body 1 should continue with its deliberations.

A subsequent revision of the Chair’s paper aroused specific concerns on the part of certain delegations. Belgium, Germany, Italy, the

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<sup>17</sup> In accordance with that report, the Ad Hoc Committee’s mandate would call for a treaty “banning the production of fissile material”, but would not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the Committee the issues relating to the scope of the future treaty. See the report of the Conference on Disarmament in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/50/27)*, paras. 27 and 28.

Netherlands and Norway believed that the language on the fissile material treaty, transparency measures and tactical nuclear weapons was inadequate, and thus presented their own proposal. As for the nuclear-weapon States, the Russian Federation objected to the reference to tactical nuclear weapons, and China opposed any reference to transparency. In addition, France stressed that it would be ready to provide an unequivocal undertaking for the "ultimate" elimination of nuclear weapons but not for any specific timeframe and Russia insisted that everything should be linked to the concept of strategic stability.

Strenuous efforts were made by all delegations to find consensus on the outstanding issues of Main Committee I. It was well understood that agreement on nuclear disarmament issues would have a positive impact on all the other outstanding issues. The President of the Conference convened informal consultations with a view to narrowing down the differences. During that process, the NAC States and the nuclear-weapon States undertook to hold a series of informal meetings in order to reach an acceptable solution.

The NAC delegations argued with considerable success for stronger language on nuclear disarmament issues, including the de-alerting of nuclear arsenals, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, an "unequivocal undertaking" from the nuclear-weapon States regarding nuclear disarmament, greater transparency of nuclear arsenals, reducing tactical nuclear weapons and the establishment of a subsidiary body in the CD to deal with nuclear disarmament.

In their discussions, the NAC and the P-5 made every effort to narrow the gap and reach a compromise text on the basis of new formulations contained in the working paper produced by the Chair of Subsidiary Body 1. On 18 May, following extensive debates, all of the nuclear-weapon States accepted the new formulations, which were incorporated into the Final Document under the heading "Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs", paragraph 15 (see page 281).

A total of 13 paragraphs on practical steps were agreed upon, including such measures as the following:

- The early entry into force of the CTBT;
- A moratorium on nuclear test explosions;
- The necessity of negotiations in the CD on a fissile material treaty;

- The establishment in the CD of an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament and agreement on a programme of work;
- The principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament;
- An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament;
- The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability;
- The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, the Russian Federation and the IAEA;
- Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective is general and complete disarmament;
- Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the ICJ;
- Further development of the verification capabilities required to assure compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Furthermore, one of the 13 steps set out further steps for all the nuclear-weapon States, leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that would promote international stability, based on the principle of undiminished security for all: (a) further efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally, (b) increased transparency with respect to their nuclear weapon capabilities; (c) further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons; (d) agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; (e) a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in their security policies; (f) arrangements to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material they designate as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification; and (g) engagement by all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

*Security assurances*

The issue of providing security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons remained a heavily debated item during the 2000 Review Conference. Many delegations expressed disappointment at the CD's failure to commence negotiations on a legally binding treaty on such security assurances, while others stressed the necessity of starting early negotiations on the issue.

China, Egypt, Portugal (on behalf of the EU), Indonesia (on behalf of NAM), Switzerland and a group of five countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Norway) made specific proposals on the subject in their respective working papers.<sup>18</sup> Egypt, supported by several NAM delegations, noted that the security assurances in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) were insufficient and stressed the importance of considering further steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. In its working paper, Egypt proposed a set of principles for the Security Council to pursue on the issue, including a trigger mechanism to ensure the Council's response to threats or attacks by nuclear weapons. It also called for the start of negotiations in the CD on a legally binding treaty.

Indonesia, on behalf of the NAM States, proposed that the States parties negotiate a legal instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to be adopted by the Review Conference as an annexed protocol to the NPT. The EU reaffirmed its readiness to pursue consideration of security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. Switzerland, for its part, stated that efforts in the area of legally binding and global security assurances should be intensified, while Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway jointly agreed that legally binding assurances would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Among the P-5, China urged the other nuclear-weapon States to renounce their nuclear deterrence policies characterized by "the first use of nuclear weapons", to commit themselves unconditionally not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and to conclude an international legal instrument to that effect. Moreover, it proposed that all the nuclear-weapon States unconditionally commit themselves not to

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<sup>18</sup> See footnote 16.

use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The United States commented on the lack of consensus regarding proposals for a legally binding treaty on security assurances. France was of the view that the assurances provided in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and its own ratification of the relevant protocols of the Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Tlatelolco treaties met the concerns expressed by the non-nuclear-weapon States. The United Kingdom, the Russian Federation and the United States offered to reaffirm the Security Council resolution. This offer, however, was strongly opposed by many of the NAM States.

Continuous efforts were made by the delegations to narrow the gap between the non-nuclear- and the nuclear-weapon States over the issue. Ultimately, the States parties agreed to reaffirm that, in accordance with the UN Charter, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. Moreover, the total elimination of nuclear weapons was “the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons”. The Conference called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue. (See art. VII, paras. 1–3, page 283.)

### *Nuclear-weapon-free zones*

As in 1995, the issue of NWFZs (article VII) was allocated to Main Committees I and II. Belarus, China, Egypt, Portugal on behalf of the EU, and the five Central Asian States (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) tabled working papers regarding the issue.<sup>19</sup>

There was widespread recognition of the contribution that the existing NWFZs made to non-proliferation and disarmament objectives, particularly in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, and, in that context, the Conference welcomed the efforts of the parties to those treaties to promote their common objectives (see para. 10, page 284). Several States, in plenary and Main Committee II meetings, stressed the need for increased ratification of the existing treaties, particularly ratification of their respective protocols by the nuclear-weapon-States. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed

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<sup>19</sup> See footnote 16.

their readiness to ratify the protocols of the Bangkok and Pelindaba treaties, and, with respect to the former, stated that consultations were being accelerated with the States parties to pave the way for their ratification. Many delegations strongly supported the guidelines on the establishment of NWFZs on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission in 1999,<sup>20</sup> with many viewing the creation of such zones as a means of enhancing regional and global peace and security.

Many countries also expressed support for the establishment of a NWFZ in Central Asia and encouraged the five Central Asian States to continue their efforts to that end. Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status was also welcomed by many delegations, and most of the language proposed in Mongolia's working paper was incorporated into the Final Document. (See art. VII, paras. 8 and 14, page 284.)

The proposals for NWFZs in the Middle East and in Central and Eastern Europe proved contentious.

In the case of the Middle East, the Arab States stressed their concerns regarding Israel, the only State in the region that was not a party to the NPT. In its working paper, Egypt proposed that there be: (a) a follow-up committee to initiate contacts with Israel, comprised of the Chair of each session of the NPT Preparatory Committees and the three depositary States; (b) a special envoy from the NPT States parties to pursue dialogue with Israel; and (c) discussions with Israel by the depositaries on behalf of the States parties. Progress in each instance would be reported on to the following review conference.

The Egyptian proposal was met with interest by a number of delegations, particularly the NAM countries, but merely received a lack-lustre response from many other delegations. It was strongly opposed by the United States, which raised the issue of Iraq's non-compliance and insisted that the resolution on the Middle East concerned all aspects of non-proliferation in the region; thus Israel's nuclear capabilities could not be addressed without looking into the matter of Iraq's non-compliance. Several other Western countries voiced similar con-

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<sup>20</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/54/42)*, annex I. The text is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 24: 1999, appendix III.



cerns. The latter issue was discussed in detail in Subsidiary Body 2, on regional issues. See below, page 22.

Following intensive discussions, agreement was reached to reaffirm support for the objective of establishing an effectively verifiable zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and countries of the Middle East and other interested States, were requested to report to the President of the 2005 Review Conference and to the Chairs of its Preparatory Committee through the Secretariat concerning the steps taken to promote such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution. The Conference also urged all States parties to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts to this effect. (See paras. 7 and 9 under "Regional issues", page 287.)

Belarus submitted a working paper outlining its "national position" on the proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free space in Central and Eastern Europe. Although insisting that it was not intent on reopening the debate, Belarus reiterated that such a measure would make an important contribution to strengthening nuclear non-proliferation and to achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons. However, owing to strong opposition from most of the States of the region, no specific reference was made in the Final Document.

### *Safeguards*

The issue of nuclear safeguards attracted the strong interest of the States parties, as delegations submitted many papers pertaining to the subject.<sup>21</sup> There was broad consensus on a number of safeguards-related questions during the review of article III. Overall, there was widespread agreement that IAEA safeguards were an indispensable part of the global non-proliferation regime and played a vital role in the implementation of the NPT.

The close attention given to safeguards was evident from the fact that almost all the papers submitted to Main Committee II contained proposals on this subject. A large number of those proposals were tabled by a group of ten States (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and

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<sup>21</sup> See footnote 16.

Sweden). Other countries (China, Egypt, South Africa, Iran (Islamic Republic of), NAM and the EU presented their own proposals.

Strong support was expressed for IAEA safeguards as "a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime" and for the reaffirmation of the Agency's central role as the competent authority for verification of compliance with the NPT. In that respect, many countries stressed that every effort should be made to ensure that the IAEA had the financial and human resources necessary to fulfil its tasks. Several delegations, however, expressed disappointment over the slow pace at which States had signed or ratified the 1997 Model Additional Protocol and therefore urged parties to sign it as soon as possible. Others called upon Iraq and the DPRK to comply fully with their obligations under the IAEA safeguards agreements. Once again, the Arab States asserted that Israel should place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

In contrast to the consensus that prevailed regarding safeguards in general, there were divergent views between the nuclear- and the non-nuclear-weapon States on specific aspects of the issue. The EU and NAM proposed that fissile material deemed as excess to defence needs be placed under IAEA verification arrangements. The nuclear-weapon States, however, were reluctant to make any firm commitment to that effect. Differences also surfaced regarding the funding of the IAEA's safeguards activities. While all countries agreed on the need for adequate funding, some emphasized that the nuclear-weapon States had a "special responsibility" in that area. Many Western countries, however, wanted the Conference to recognize the increase in the IAEA's verification activities and the financial constraints associated with the rise in its responsibilities. There was also considerable disagreement over the roles of the IAEA and Security Council in upholding compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements.

Although there was agreement that safeguards commitments were essential for peaceful nuclear cooperation and development, controversy arose over issues of transparency and export control. The Conference reaffirmed that source or special fissionable material provided to non-nuclear-weapon States should be subject to the safeguards

required by article III. It also reaffirmed paragraph 12<sup>22</sup> of decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, pertaining to new supply arrangements (see paras. 35 and 36, page 268). The NAM States stressed that transparency in the proceedings and decision-making of the nuclear-related export control regimes, which were established after the conclusion of the Treaty, should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States parties. In its working paper, the Islamic Republic of Iran expressed concern that "application of the unilaterally enforced export control regime has hampered access of the developing countries to nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes" and emphasized that all States parties, particularly the developing countries, should enjoy unrestricted access to such materials and equipment for peaceful purposes. Given the divergence of views over the activities of export control regimes, many NAM States opposed any reference in the Final Document to the Nuclear Suppliers Group or the Zangger Committee.

Following lengthy consultations, agreement was eventually reached on consensus language for many of the other outstanding issues related to safeguards, under article III, and the Conference reaffirmed the 1995 decision 2, paragraphs 9 to 13, regarding safeguards. It was agreed that nuclear material supplied to the nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes should not be diverted for the production of nuclear weapons, and should be, as appropriate, subject to IAEA safeguards agreements (para. 25, page 267). The nuclear-weapon States were also invited to keep the scope of the additional protocols they had concluded in connection with their voluntary-offer agreements under review (para. 26, page 267). The issue of the IAEA's access to the Security Council was resolved with a reference to the UN Charter (para. 9, page 264).

In addition to Main Committee II's discussions of safeguards-related issues, "regional issues, including with respect to the Middle

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<sup>22</sup> Para. 12 states: "New supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."

East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution” were examined in Subsidiary Body 2. In that connection, Subsidiary Body 2 also discussed safeguards-related issues as they pertained to questions of non-compliance by both Iraq and the DPRK. Language finally agreed upon was placed in the Final Document under article VII.

In the case of Iraq, disagreement between the United States and Iraq over language dealing with the question of compliance by the latter with its obligations under IAEA safeguards and under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) almost prevented agreement on the Final Document. A mutually acceptable solution was found following prolonged negotiations that continued right up to the closure of the Conference. Consequently, the agreed language, under article VII, referred to the IAEA Director General’s statement of 24 April 2000 to the effect that since the cessation of IAEA inspections in Iraq on 16 December 1998, the Agency had not been in a position to provide any assurance of Iraq’s compliance with its obligations under the Security Council resolution. It was also noted that, following the IAEA’s inspection in January 2000 pursuant to Iraq’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the inspectors were able to verify the presence of the nuclear material subject to safeguards. The Conference also reaffirmed the importance of Iraq’s full continuous cooperation with the IAEA and compliance with its obligations. (See subpara. 10, page 288.)

Regarding the DPRK, the Conference noted with concern that the IAEA’s inability to verify if the DPRK’s initial declaration of nuclear material was correct and complete, and was therefore unable to conclude if there had been any diversion. As a result, the DPRK was urged to preserve and make available to the IAEA all the information needed to verify its initial inventory. (See art. III, paras. 14 and 15, page 265.)

The nuclear situation in South Asia was addressed by a call upon both India and Pakistan to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, to sign and ratify the CTBT and to take all the measures set out in Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). The States parties also reaffirmed that India and Pakistan did not have the status of nuclear-weapon States.

*Peaceful uses of nuclear energy*

Discussions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Main Committee III revealed similar trends as in the prior review conferences. Although work proceeded more smoothly in Main Committee III than in the other Main Committees and their Subsidiary Bodies, that Committee also experienced its share of difficulties in a few areas. While there was broad consensus on a number of issues related to article IV, considerable divergence of views persisted over the transport of radioactive materials and funding for the IAEA's technical cooperation activities. The importance that States parties placed on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was evident given the large number of proposals that were submitted to Main Committee III.<sup>23</sup> The following sections provide an overview of the main issues discussed.

*(a) Cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy*

All countries strongly reaffirmed the inalienable right of the parties to the NPT to develop research, to produce and to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The developing countries, in particular, reiterated the need for unrestricted technology transfers and enhanced cooperation for the non-military applications of nuclear energy. Several NAM States expressed disappointment at the perceived reluctance by the developed countries, particularly the nuclear Powers, to fulfil their obligations under article IV. Many delegations also underlined the role of the IAEA in assisting developing countries in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Despite the broad support for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, some States urged caution regarding possible safety risks at older nuclear plants. Others, such as Ireland, warned against the potential hazards that nuclear energy posed. Nevertheless, language confirming respect for each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy was ultimately included in the Final Document under article IV. (See para. 2, page 272.)

In addition to concerns about safety, there was controversy over the part that nuclear energy could play in development. The Islamic

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<sup>23</sup> See footnote 16.

Republic of Iran proposed language that sought to identify nuclear power as having a role in achieving sustainable development in developing countries. Other delegations such as Austria, Denmark and Germany, however, were of the view that nuclear energy did not contribute to sustainable development and, thus, could not play a key role in future energy policies. Due to the strong opposition from several countries, namely the Pacific Island States and New Zealand, only recognition of the importance of the concept of sustainable development as a guiding principle for the peaceful use of nuclear energy was mentioned in the Final Document. (See para. 8, page 273.)

*(b) Nuclear and radiation safety, safe transport of radioactive materials, radioactive waste and liability*

Difficulties were experienced in narrowing the differences among States on issues related to the safe transport of radioactive materials and questions of liability in the event of accidents. New Zealand and Ireland spoke out for the stricter application of international codes and standards and for assurances by the major States transporting radioactive materials. There were also calls by several States, especially the South Pacific Island States, for the major shipping States to ensure the safe transport of radioactive materials and provide for compensation in the event of accidents. In the view of those delegations, such shipments should only be made if the cargo was of minimal risk and the vessels used of the highest safety standards. Other countries such as Australia, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) States and several Latin American countries strongly supported such concerns.

By contrast, some of the major shipping States emphasized their efforts to enhance transparency and to provide better information to the countries concerned. Moreover, they stressed the importance of rights and freedom of navigation on the high seas. Following strong arguments from concerned States, consensus language was agreed upon that stressed the importance of effective national and international regulations and standards for the protection of the States concerned from the risks of transportation of radioactive materials (see "Safe transport", para. 10, page 275). In addition, the States parties agreed that it was in the interests of all States that any transportation of such materials be conducted in compliance with the relevant international standards of nuclear safety and security and environmental protection, without prejudice to the freedoms, rights and obligations of navigation

provided for under international law. The concerns of small island developing States and other coastal States with regard to transportation of radioactive materials by sea were also noted.

Some delegations also expressed their support for the adoption of higher standards of nuclear safety and a "nuclear safety culture". The activities of the IAEA in this field were highly appreciated, in particular, the Nuclear Safety Convention and its review process and other related conventions. Nonetheless, there was agreement that individual States were primarily responsible for maintaining the safety of nuclear installations within their territories. (See "Nuclear and radiation safety", para. 1, page 274.)

The question of liability for nuclear-related damage was another intensely debated issue. Some countries argued for acknowledgment that economic damage could be done to tourist or fisheries-based economies in the event of a nuclear accident, even if serious contamination were avoided. Others opposed that position on the grounds that adequate arrangements to address such concerns were already in place. In the end, it was agreed to take note of the existence of various national and international liability mechanisms and the importance of having effective liability mechanisms in place. (See "Liability", page 277.)

### *(c) Technical cooperation*

All States expressed strong support for the IAEA's technical cooperation activities, and agreed that the IAEA should be provided with the financial and human resources to carry out its mandate in promotion, safety and verification. In particular, many NAM countries urged IAEA member States to ensure that adequate resources for technical cooperation were assured, predictable and sufficient. They also stressed that the special needs and priorities of the least developed countries parties to the NPT should be taken into account in bilateral and multi-lateral nuclear technical assistance and cooperation programmes. A few States, however, believed that existing resources were sufficient, if used effectively and efficiently.

Most States underlined the importance of the work of the IAEA as the principal agent for technology transfer among the international organizations referred to in article IV. There were, however, some differences over questions related to the IAEA's Technical Cooperation

Fund. While all delegations agreed that voluntary resources provided to and received from States parties under the Fund represented the most important contribution to the implementation of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme, many NAM countries expressed concern about the Fund's ability to meet the needs of the developing States. Some delegations were also of the view that the Technical Cooperation Fund should be seen in the context of a political commitment. The Islamic Republic of Iran expressed concern over the reference to "voluntary" contributions to the Fund, stating that the term "voluntary" might imply that some donor countries could impose conditions on their contributions. A compromise was eventually reached: to keep the word "voluntary" and to add a reference to the IAEA Statute. (See "Technical cooperation", page 277.)

*(d) Conversion of nuclear materials to peaceful uses*

The States parties welcomed the steps taken by nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear weapons arsenals. They also stressed the importance of international verification, as soon as practicable, of nuclear weapons material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military programmes. Most important, agreement was reached over the principle of "irreversibility" of such materials that had been transferred to peaceful purposes. The States parties also took note of the Declaration of the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit of April 1996,<sup>24</sup> including the measures in relation to the safe and effective management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes, and the related initiatives.

Despite some initial objections from Australia, Canada and France, it was also agreed to accommodate the demands of the five Central Asian States by noting that there had been exceptional instances in which serious environmental consequences had resulted from uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel-cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons. Moreover, all governments and international organizations with expertise in the field of cleanup and disposal of radioactive contaminants were urged to consider giving appropriate assistance. (See "Conversion", page 279.)

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<sup>24</sup> A/51/131.



### *Universality of the Treaty*

The issue of universality was debated in Main Committee I and also in Subsidiary Body 2, given its regional implications. As in the past, there was unanimous support for the broad concept of universality, but significant differences persisted as to how to address the problems associated with the four States not parties to the NPT, in particular Israel, India and Pakistan. (See section on safeguards.)

Nonetheless, in their consideration of article IX, States parties reaffirmed that non-parties might accede only as non-nuclear-weapon States, and agreed on the need to make further determined efforts towards universality of the Treaty, including through the enhancement of regional security (see page 289).

### *The strengthened review process*

Time was also allocated to consider ways to further strengthen the review process. To that end, many delegations made statements introduced several working papers.<sup>25</sup> There was general agreement on enhancing the 1995 decision on strengthening the process. Many delegations proposed that future Preparatory Committees should devote several meetings to substantive discussions and that the drafting recommendations to the Review Conference and decisions on procedural matters should take place in the final session(s). Some nuclear-weapon States, however, voiced strong reservations about turning the preparatory process into “mini-review” conferences.

Some delegations, principally the Netherlands and Norway, suggested that, in order to reinforce the strengthened review process, a programme of action should be adopted which would include specific elements that could be distributed among the sessions of the Preparatory Committee during the period up to the 2005 Review Conference. Several States, however, objected to restricting the scope of discussions in the Preparatory Committee so rigidly. Alternatively, Japan and Australia proposed that, in its early stages, the Committee should focus more on the review of the implementation and universality of the Treaty, while also addressing relevant international and regional issues and events, if any, at each session.

In its paper, Canada stated that “Preparatory Committees, as non-negotiating forums, should summarize their deliberations and forward

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<sup>25</sup> See footnote 16.

those summaries to successive sessions, culminating in recommendations to the Review Conference for action by that body to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality". Moreover, in order to increase transparency, Canada proposed greater participation by the NGOs, a suggestion so supported by several delegations.

Following the discussions and after taking into consideration the various proposals put forth, the President of the Conference prepared his draft proposal on the strengthened review process. During the subsequent discussions, a number of amendments were suggested.

Some NAM States called for four sessions of the Preparatory Committee to address both substantive and procedural matters, as well as including a reference to the establishment of subsidiary bodies not only at review conferences, but also during the preparatory process.

Nigeria submitted a working paper calling for the establishment of an "NPT Management Board" to receive and deliberate complaints about non-compliance; act as a clearing-house for information and reports; prevent proliferation; act as an executive council overseeing the operation of the NPT; and serve as a consultative mechanism through which States parties could engage in dialogue with non-parties. Ireland, for its part, proposed that consideration be given to the establishment of annual general conferences of States parties to consider and decide on any matters or questions covered by the Treaty, to be held in the years when review conferences were not held. Provision could also be made for convening extraordinary meetings of the general conference, if requested by a majority of States parties.

The President's paper was eventually adopted with some amendments, while retaining most of the original elements. (See page 290.)

## **General Assembly, 2000**

The General Assembly adopted one resolution on the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT.

**55/33 D - 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.** The draft resolution was introduced by Algeria on 16 October, adopted by the First Committee on 25 October (141-2-3) and by the General Assembly on 20 November (163-1-3). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 321 and 415, respectively.

**First Committee:** A number of States could not support the resolution because they could not welcome the Final Document. India, which cast a negative vote, stated that the Final Document made completely unacceptable and unwarranted references to it, a State that had chosen not to join the NPT because it believed it was a discriminatory and ineffective treaty and that the NPT nuclear-weapon States were active collaborators in, or silent spectators to, continuing proliferation. Though Cuba, which abstained, believed that the NPT was discriminatory, it had decided to participate as an observer at the Review Conference to demonstrate its serious-mindedness in following all disarmament and non-proliferation issues, and it hoped that the nuclear-weapon States would live up to the specific commitments they had assumed at the Conference. Pakistan, for its part, explained that as some of the provisions of the Final Document were inconsistent with its national security interests and policies, it would abstain on the vote.

Several States parties spoke concerning their affirmative votes. The United Kingdom stated that the Final Document set out, in a balanced way, a number of practical steps for the achievement of the global elimination of nuclear weapons, and that it stood by all these undertakings. Nepal believed the outcome of the Conference deserved to be welcomed and hoped that the unequivocal commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals would be promptly translated into action.

## Conclusion

The NPT Review Conference was undoubtedly one of the major events of disarmament in 2000. Despite low expectations of success, it concluded its deliberations with agreement on a number of key issues pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, nuclear safety and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This marked the first time in 15 years that the parties had been able to achieve an agreed Final Document. The consensus followed four weeks of difficult, prolonged and often contentious discussions. The tireless efforts of the President and the Chairmen of the Main Committees and Subsidiary Bodies were certainly instrumental in achieving consensus language, and the flexibility demonstrated by all States parties undoubtedly contributed significantly to the successful outcome. It is expected that the consensus will help to further strengthen the Treaty's review process.

In a statement issued on 20 May, the Secretary-General welcomed the achievement of the Conference, noting that it had reached a "historic consensus on several issues crucial to the security of all the peoples of the United Nations". He went on to express his conviction that the action of the parties marked a "significant step forward in humanity's pursuit of a more peaceful world—a world free of nuclear dangers, a world with strengthened global norms for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament".

The lengthy Final Document reaffirms the central role of the NPT in ongoing global efforts to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and reflects consensus language dealing with virtually all the major aspects of the Treaty. In addition, after noting that the Conference deplored the nuclear test explosions carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998, the Document reaffirms that any new State party to the Treaty will be accepted only as a non-nuclear-weapon State, regardless of its nuclear capabilities.

The most critical and delicate achievement is the incorporation in the Document of a set of practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI. These steps will provide benchmarks by which future progress by the States parties, especially by the nuclear-weapon States, can be measured. The most significant among the practical steps is the nuclear-weapon States' agreement, for the first time, to undertake unequivocally to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.

Although a landmark achievement, the Final Document does not resolve all differences. A wide divergence of views between the nuclear-weapon States on the one hand, and the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other, remains in a number of areas. Many of the elements in the Final Document are the result of compromises achieved by putting aside other sensitive issues for the sake of the Conference and the Treaty. Consequently, the States parties will have to revisit these issues during the next review process and will face tough challenges in the years ahead. That aside, the positive outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference will provide solid ground upon which future review conferences can build as they strive for further progress towards the ultimate common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

## CHAPTER II

### Other nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues

#### Introduction

UN MEMBER STATES HAVE FOLLOWED NUCLEAR ISSUES with great concern since the beginning of the nuclear age, and have signed a number of bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements by which they have reduced existing nuclear weapons, excluded their deployment from certain environments and regions and established international norms against their proliferation and testing. The United Nations has worked closely with all Member States and groups of States in the process of elaborating and supporting implementation of treaties. In 2000, the United Nations provided substantive and technical servicing to the Review Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), discussed in chapter I.

Over the years, the Russian Federation and the United States have signed a number of agreements concerning their nuclear weapons. The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) provides for a significant reduction of their arsenals over seven years.<sup>1</sup> The START II Treaty provides for the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs<sup>2</sup> and for the reduction of strategic nuclear warheads to no more than

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<sup>1</sup> The Treaty was signed on 31 July 1991 and entered into force on 5 December 1994. For the text of START I, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 16: 1991, appendix II.

<sup>2</sup> MIRV: multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle; ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile.

3,000 and 3,500 each by the year 2003.<sup>3</sup> The United States Senate ratified the START II Treaty on 26 January 1996, with conditions, while the Russian Federation ratified it in 2000.<sup>4</sup> In 1997, in Helsinki, presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed, *inter alia*, to negotiate, after START II enters into force, a START III agreement that will lower the number of deployed strategic warheads permitted each nation to 2,000 to 2,500 by the end of 2007. For a number of reasons, negotiations have not begun.

Through the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and its 1974 Protocol, signed between the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States, the two parties undertook not to build nationwide defence systems against strategic ballistic missile attack and limited the deployment of permitted missile defence systems to one site each. In 1997, the ABM Treaty was multilateralized to include Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, on whose territory key elements of the former Soviet ABM system—i.e., early-warning radars and test ranges—were deployed. For a number of years, there has been growing concern in the international community about the development and proliferation of missiles and missile defence systems, particularly in view of the US expressed desire to establish a national missile defence (NMD) system and to amend the ABM Treaty.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)<sup>5</sup> was opened for signature in 1996, after more than 40 years of efforts on the part of the international community to ban nuclear test explosions in all environments. Under its provisions, it will enter into force after the 44 States possessing a certain level of nuclear capability and listed in annex 2 to the Treaty have deposited their instruments of ratification. The Treaty received a serious setback in 1998, when India and Pakistan, both of which are among the 44 required States, conducted nuclear test explosions. In 1999, a conference to facilitate

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<sup>3</sup> The Treaty was signed on 3 January 1993. For the text of START II, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 18: 1993, appendix II.

<sup>4</sup> The Russian Federation ratified START II in April 2000.

<sup>5</sup> Prior to 1996, three treaties on nuclear testing, none of them comprehensive, had been concluded: the Partial Test-Ban-Treaty of 1963 and the two bilateral treaties, between the former USSR and the United States, on the limitation of yields of nuclear tests for military purposes and on peaceful nuclear explosions.

the CTBT's entry into force was convened, and as of the end of that year, 26 of the 44 States had ratified the Treaty, among them two nuclear-weapon States: France and the United Kingdom.

Differences in priorities in nuclear disarmament between non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States have prevented negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) since the beginning of 1997, affecting even generally non-controversial issues such as security assurances and a fissile material treaty. In 1999, during the presidency of Algeria, a proposal known as the "Dembri package" was made to deal with the two most sensitive issues—nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space—in two non-negotiating ad hoc working groups. Although the proposal was well received, it was not accepted by all, and therefore no subsidiary bodies were established.

This chapter deals with a wide range of issues relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including the situation in the CD, CTBT issues, the status of implementation of the START treaties, the ABM Treaty and other missile issues, strategic doctrines, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and the New Agenda Coalition, as well as nuclear safety and radioactive waste, nuclear terrorism and export controls. The subject of nuclear-weapon-free zones is dealt with in chapter V, page 142, and the subject of outer space is dealt with in chapter VI, page 165.

## **Developments and trends, 2000**

Because of their continuing terrifying potential for mass destruction, nuclear weapons—their development and proliferation, their delivery vehicles, and the status of efforts to reduce and eliminate arsenals—remained at the forefront of discussions in all disarmament forums. Early in the year, the Secretary-General<sup>6</sup> called for a reaffirmation of political commitment at the highest levels to reducing the dangers arising from existing nuclear weapons and from further proliferation, and he proposed that consideration be given to convening a major international conference that would help to identify ways of eliminating such dangers. At their Review Conference, the parties to the NPT took note of this proposal (see appendix II, page 280), while Member

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<sup>6</sup> Report of the Secretary-General to the Millennium Assembly (A/54/2000), paras. 248-253. See appendix III, page 294.

States of the United Nations, in their Millennium Declaration, pledged to keep all options open for achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons, including the possibility of convening an international conference (see appendix III, page 295). In general, support for the proposal came from non-aligned (NAM) States.

In the course of the year, various bodies examined possible steps and approaches to move forward on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The parties to the NPT agreed upon a set of practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to that end (see chapter I and appendix II), and the New Agenda Coalition<sup>7</sup> outlined its recommendations (see the section "New Agenda Coalition" below, on page 54). The Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters<sup>8</sup> proposed that emphasis be given to four measures: (a) de-alerting nuclear weapons; (b) reviewing nuclear doctrines; (c) eliminating tactical nuclear weapons; and (d) creating a climate for implementing nuclear disarmament measures by fostering an informed world public opinion through programmes of education and training.

### *Conference on Disarmament, 2000*

#### *Nuclear disarmament*

In 2000, despite some positive international developments such as the Russian Federation's ratification of the CTBT and the START II Treaty, and the 2000 NPT Review Conference's adoption of a substantive Final Document, the Conference on Disarmament was unable to agree on a programme of work and therefore did not conduct any substantive work on nuclear disarmament. The disagreements that emerged over the mandate of a potential subsidiary body to deal with

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<sup>7</sup> Comprises Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden. This edition of *The Yearbook* continues to refer to the group of countries as the "New Agenda Coalition", although towards the end of the year, during the First Committee of the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly, they began to refer to themselves as the "New Agenda".

<sup>8</sup> See the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Reducing nuclear danger" (A/55/324), submitted pursuant to resolution 54/54 K of 1 December 1999. The report contains an assortment of specific measures and broad approaches that received varying degrees of support from the Board and three discussion papers prepared by members.



this agenda item, combined with diverging views over the linkage of this issue with other items, such as the negotiation of a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for military purposes and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, were factors in this lack of progress.

Several conflicting views were expressed concerning the mandate of a potential subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament.

At one end of the spectrum, the NAM countries stressed the necessity of establishing an ad hoc committee with a mandate similar to that included in their 1999 proposals, which had called for "negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapon convention".<sup>9</sup> China adopted a similar position and therefore supported the non-aligned proposal, referring to General Assembly resolution 54/54 D, on nuclear disarmament.

At the other end of the spectrum, the United States believed that arms reduction, unlike a fissile material treaty, was not a topic ripe for negotiation in the CD—a view shared by Germany. The United States was ready to support a subordinate body with an appropriate mandate to discuss the issue, but held that proposals for negotiation did not constitute a basis for consensus. The Russian Federation also opposed the idea of negotiating a phased programme of disarmament with specific timeframes, and favoured instead a gradual approach, starting from the bilateral and plurilateral levels and progressing towards multilateral agreements. The Netherlands was also in favour of such an approach, and called for greater transparency and accountability concerning actions taken by nuclear-weapon States in this direction.

Japan alluded to the consensus achieved during the 2000 NPT Review Conference on the necessity of establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and held that the subject required a combination of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral efforts. Japan also insisted that multilateral efforts should not be underestimated and therefore supported the Belgian presidential proposal for an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament "through an exchange of information and views on practical steps for progressive and sys-

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<sup>9</sup> CD/1571.

tematic efforts to attain this objective".<sup>10</sup> Ireland expressed support for the establishment of a subsidiary body with a mandate to consider future multilateral efforts to deal with nuclear disarmament and inform bilateral efforts in that direction. Finland insisted on the importance of establishing a dialogue within the CD, as it could contribute to other efforts, citing, as an example, the Russian Duma's ratification of the START II Treaty. In the lead-up to the 2000 Review Conference, Mexico stressed the responsibility of nuclear-weapon States to implement their NPT obligations.

The other main source of disagreement on nuclear disarmament was the linkage made by NAM countries, China and the Russian Federation between this item and two other sensitive topics: negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of the production of fissile material for military purposes and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

On the one hand, some delegations insisted that the CD's programme of work should include a comprehensive and balanced package of all three issues. The Russian Federation insisted that arms reduction efforts and the ABM Treaty had been complementary ever since the latter was negotiated in 1972. Indeed, from the Russian perspective, any threat to the ABM Treaty, such as the proposed US national missile defence system, would be perceived as a threat to existing disarmament treaties, including the NPT. Under this view, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space could be dealt with only as a package. China argued that the stalemate the CD was facing came from the fact that different States had different national priorities and, therefore, in order to achieve consensus, the programme of work should include both nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

On the other hand, States such as Germany and Canada considered that the linkage of nuclear disarmament, the prohibition of the production of fissile material for military purposes and the prevention of an arms race in outer space was responsible for the impasse in the CD. Canada was ready to deal with nuclear disarmament as a separate issue and rejected the insistence of some delegations upon a comprehensive and balanced programme of work that would link it with other items, supporting the 1999 Dembri package.

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<sup>10</sup> CD/1620.

*Fissile material*

Although the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as recommended in 1995, was a non-controversial element of every proposal in 2000, the impasse with regard to the adoption of a comprehensive programme of work prevented the CD from doing so. As in 1999, calls from Eastern and Western European countries to immediately commence work on the issue were resisted by the NAM countries, which continued to insist that the programme of work should be adopted as a whole, and include other States' priorities as well. China did not oppose negotiations on a fissile material treaty, but, given the setbacks that had occurred during the year (the US Senate vote against ratification of the CTBT and the US plan for an NMD), it would find a programme of work leading to negotiations on fissile material without addressing the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space unacceptable.

The United States viewed attempts to link a fissile material treaty with the prevention of an arms race in outer space as a disguised effort to block fissile material negotiations altogether.<sup>11</sup> It referred to President Clinton's assurances that the national missile defence system would not trigger an arms race in outer space, as it consisted of a land-based system geared towards threats from "countries of concern".<sup>12</sup> The United States pointed out that the negotiation of a treaty on fissile material was both a national and international priority, as evidenced by the call of the 2000 NPT Review Conference for completion of the treaty within five years. In its view, the CD had the relevant experience to negotiate a treaty, adding that two ad hoc committees had already been created in 1995 and 1998 with such a mandate. Regarding unilateral efforts, the United States had voluntarily removed a large amount of fissile material from military stockpiles and pledged to make it available for IAEA safeguards as soon as practical. It would continue efforts with the Russian Federation and other States to ensure that nuclear materials were more secure

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<sup>11</sup> CD/PV.858, pp. 7-8.

<sup>12</sup> President Clinton's remarks were made in a speech delivered at Georgetown University on 1 September, the text of which was circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1625).

and transparent, and to transform excess weapons-grade plutonium irreversibly into non-military forms.

The Russian Federation held that negotiating a fissile material treaty was the next step in strengthening the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. It supported the re-establishment of an appropriate ad hoc committee to deal with the issue and favoured the immediate launching of work on an agreement to end the further production of weapons-grade fissile material. The Russian Federation also pointed out that it had not been producing any weapons-grade fissile material for years.

Eastern and Western European States emphasized the need for early commencement of such negotiations. Germany stressed that the successful negotiation of a treaty would be the most immediate and practical contribution the CD could make to nuclear disarmament. This view was also shared by Ireland, which added that the issue was particularly important to NPT members, who respected their obligations not to produce such material. Norway believed weapons-grade fissile material should no longer be produced and existing stockpiles should be brought under proper control with a view to net reduction. In this regard, it advocated a four-element strategy: a ban on the future production of weapons-grade fissile material; the creation of a norm to deal with excess military stockpiles; the adequate safeguarding of non-military fissile material; and transparency of military stocks.

Canada believed that the key question was how to resolve apparently irreconcilable differences without weakening proposals to such a level that they would be unacceptable to committed States. Japan insisted on the necessity of commencing negotiations as early as possible in order to respect the five-year target set by the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Pending the entry into force of a treaty, Japan called on States which produced fissile material for nuclear weapons to declare a moratorium on such production. It advocated a treaty that would be globally applicable, non-discriminatory, strengthened by cost-effective verification measures, and not affect the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It added that the issue of existing stockpiles should be dealt with either in parallel with the fissile material treaty negotiations or in subsequent negotiations.

*Security assurances*

As in 1999, the issue of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was addressed in the CD mainly in the context of the elaboration of its programme of work. In this regard, presidents Jean Lint of Belgium and Celso Amorim of Brazil made proposals that included the establishment of an ad hoc committee with a mandate to "negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".<sup>13</sup> However, due to the lack of consensus on a comprehensive programme of work, the ad hoc committee was not established.

Pakistan pointed out that there seemed to be no objection within the Conference to establishing an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances with a mandate similar to that of 1998. Pakistan asked why the Conference was focusing on issues that required further discussion before consensus could be achieved, instead of concentrating on items where agreement appeared to be easily reachable, such as negative security assurances. Pakistan insisted that the President, Jean Lint, include this issue in his proposal, and said it might review its position on other issues if negative security assurances were not covered by the proposed programme of work.

The Russian Federation supported the aspirations of non-nuclear-weapon States to be protected against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and said there was no multilateral negotiating forum other than the CD to address this problem. It favoured the re-establishment of a committee with the same mandate as in 1998, and did not object to the elaboration of a global agreement on negative security assurances, provided it took into account Russia's "fundamental reservations with regard to the cases where nuclear weapons could be used in order to repel aggression". The Russian Federation also expressed its readiness to enlarge the range of countries that benefit from the current system of security assurances by continuing the process of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones.

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<sup>13</sup> CD/1620, CD/1624.

*Issues related to the CTBT*

*Relationship Agreement between the UN and the CTBTO PrepCom*

The Agreement to Regulate the Relationship between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) was signed on 26 May in New York by the Secretary-General and the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO PrepCom.<sup>14</sup>

This was the first relationship agreement that the United Nations had concluded with a preparatory commission for the establishment of another international organization, and its first such agreement with an autonomous international organization responsible for verification activities since the conclusion of the Relationship Agreement with the IAEA, in 1957. Although the CTBTO PrepCom is not a part of the UN system, the conclusion of the Agreement provides a formal working relationship between the two organizations. In terms of the Agreement, both organizations agreed to cooperate closely and to maintain a close working relationship on matters of mutual interest and concern. The Agreement also provides for reciprocal representation of the executive heads of each organization or their representatives at meetings convened by the other organization.

The Agreement entered into force following its approval by the organizations: the CTBTO PrepCom during its eleventh session, held from 2 to 5 May, and the UN General Assembly on 15 June.<sup>15</sup>

*The CTBTO PrepCom*

Work on the establishment of the Treaty's verification regime continued at a steady pace throughout the year.<sup>16</sup> In his first statement to the plenary session of the General Assembly on 30 October, the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO PrepCom stressed that the success-

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<sup>14</sup> Press releasesssued by the CTBTO PrepCom (PI/RA/UN/01) and by UN Headquarters (DC/2712). See CTBTO website: <http://pws.ctbto.org/>.

<sup>15</sup> The text of the Agreement was annexed to UN General Assembly resolution 54/280.

<sup>16</sup> The report of the CTBTO PrepCom's work in 1999 was circulated as a document of the UN General Assembly at its fifty-fifth session (A/55/433).

ful implementation of the Treaty depended on the effectiveness of its worldwide verification system, "so that each party can be assured that all parties will adhere to the Treaty or at least that any violation of it will be detected".

He reported that after 42 months in existence, the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) had become a full-fledged international secretariat comprising 248 staff members from 70 countries. Its International Monitoring System (IMS) Division had continued to lay the groundwork for the network of technical stations. To date, about 60 per cent of the IMS site surveys were completed, while approximately 20 per cent of the stations had been installed and were sending data to the International Data Center (IDC) in Vienna.<sup>17</sup>

Since February, the IDC had been sending IMS data and IDC products on a test basis to States signatories that had submitted the information required to establish a secure signatory account. Currently more than 40 States are able to access the data and products. The core of the Global Communications Infrastructure (GCI) had been put in place in 1999, when global satellite coverage had been established with the installation of four GCI hubs and the infrastructure to link them to the IDC. GCI satellite terminals had been installed at 37 IMS stations, National Data Centres and development sites. In the area of OSI, the elaboration of a draft OSI operational manual was a priority task for the CTBTO PrepCom and the PTS.

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<sup>17</sup> IMS, a network of 170 seismological, 60 infrasound, 11 hydroacoustic and 80 radionuclide stations—supported by 16 radionuclide laboratories—will be capable of registering vibrations underground, in the sea and in the air, as well as detecting traces of radionuclides released into the atmosphere by a nuclear explosion. The stations will transmit a stream of data generated by these four complementary technologies, in near real time, via a global satellite communications system to the IDC in Vienna, where all the data will be processed. All data, raw or processed, from the monitoring facilities will be made available to the States signatories for their final analysis. Ambiguous events will be subject to consultation and clarification. As a final verification measure, an on-site inspection (OSI) may be requested.

A programme of work and budget for 2001 totaling US\$83,499,500<sup>18</sup> was adopted by the CTBTO PrepCom at its 13<sup>th</sup> session, held in Vienna from 20 to 21 November. The Commission elected Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands as Chairman for the first half of 2001 and renewed the appointment of Wolfgang Hoffmann as Executive Secretary for a period of 12 months.

### *Related issues*

The number of signatory and ratifying States of the CTBT continued to increase. During the Millennium Summit, five States signed and two deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General.<sup>19</sup> As of 31 December, a total of 160 States had signed the Treaty and 69 had ratified it. Of the 44 States whose ratification is essential for the Treaty to enter into force, 41 had signed and 30 had deposited their instruments of ratification. At the regional level, the Organization of American States (OAS)<sup>20</sup> urged its member States that had not yet done so, in particular those whose ratification was necessary for the Treaty's entry into force, to sign and/or ratify it so that it might enter into force as soon as possible.

One significant development in 2000 was the ratification of the Treaty by the Russian Federation. On 21 April, the Duma approved ratification of the CTBT and on 28 May, President Putin signed into law a bill to ratify the Treaty. As a result, the Russian Federation became the third nuclear-weapon State along with France and the United Kingdom to ratify the CTBT. In a statement issued on 21

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<sup>18</sup> The breakdown was as follows: 51.5% to continue the establishment or upgrading of the global network of stations for the IMS; 15.5% to continue to build up the IDC in Vienna; 12% for the installation of the GCI to link the monitoring facilities by satellite to the IDC; 2.7% for the development of procedures, guidelines and the infrastructure to support on-site inspections after the Treaty's entry into force; 1.1% for the evaluation of verification activities; 3.6% for policy-making organs; and 13.6% for administration, coordination and support costs.

<sup>19</sup> See in this connection the report of the Secretary-General transmitting a decision of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO, by which it called upon States that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty to do so at the Millennium Summit (A/55/336).

<sup>20</sup> Resolution entitled "Inter-American Support for the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty" (AG/RES.1747-0/00).



April, the Secretary-General expressed his deep gratification at the ratification of the CTBT by the Russian State Duma.<sup>21</sup>

Early in the year, in view of the US Senate's rejection of ratification of the CTBT in October 1999, President Clinton appointed General Shalikashvili (former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff) as Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for the CTBT in an effort to obtain bipartisan support for ratification of the Treaty. Subsequently, General Shalikashvili conducted substantive discussions with senators from both parties as well as senior officials, scientists, diplomatic experts, academics and representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). He also made a thorough review of existing US national technical means of verification and of the IMS being set up in accordance with the Treaty, and he prepared a report for presentation to the President.<sup>22</sup>

As of the fall of the year, ratifying and signatory States were engaged in active consultations in Vienna over the possibility of holding a second conference to facilitate the CTBT's entry into force, pursuant to article XIV, paragraph 3, sometime in 2001. Subsequently, upon the request of a majority of ratifying States, the Secretary-General, as depositary, decided to convene the Conference from 25 to 27 September 2001 in New York. Consultations among ratifying and signatory States continued in preparation for the Conference.

### *The Independent Commission on the Verifiability of the CTBT*

Civil society maintained strong support for international efforts to promote the early entry into force of the CTBT. In August 2000, the Verification Research, Training & Information Centre (VERTIC), a London-based NGO, established the Independent Commission on the Verifiability of the CTBT to assess its ability to detect attempted violations. The Commission, composed of 14 individuals from scientific, academic, governmental and inter-governmental circles, assessed

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<sup>21</sup> SG/SM/7366.

<sup>22</sup> General Shalikashvili's report was presented to the President on 4 January 2001. The report concluded that the Treaty was a very important part of global non-proliferation efforts and thus compatible with keeping a safe, reliable US nuclear deterrent; it would be in the national interest of the United States to seek its entry into force. The text of the report is posted at: [www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ctbtpage/ctbt\\_report.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ctbtpage/ctbt_report.html).

the Treaty's verifiability in terms of both existing capabilities available to the international community, such as national technical means (NTM), civilian satellite imagery and scientific networks, and future capabilities, once the CTBTO's monitoring and verification systems would be fully functioning.<sup>23</sup>

The Commission concluded that the overall resources for verifying compliance with the CTBT comprised the IMS, NTM and other scientific networks, and that when these resources were fully in place, they would be capable of detecting and identifying relevant events with high probability. Resources would further improve as more monitoring stations were set up and global communication systems expanded. These global capabilities would serve as a powerful deterrent to any potential violator. Consequently, the Commission recommended that States should provide the political, financial and technical support necessary to speed up the establishment of the CTBT verification regime; that they should encourage the exchange of data between the IMS and the international scientific community; and that they should support research to improve the scientific and technical underpinnings of global verification capabilities.

### ***Issues related to START and other bilateral agreements***

In a major development, the Russian State Duma approved the ratification of the START II Treaty on 14 April, paving the way for the commencement of START III negotiations.<sup>24</sup> Acting President Putin enacted legislation to implement the START II Treaty on 4 May.

A number of noteworthy proposals were also made during the course of the year in connection with the reduction of nuclear weapons. On 24 May, then US presidential candidate George W. Bush called for a significant cut in the US nuclear arsenal, stating that such weapons were "the expensive relics of dead conflicts". At the

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<sup>23</sup> The Commission's report is posted on VERTIC's website: [www.vertic.org](http://www.vertic.org).

<sup>24</sup> See the statement issued by Acting President Putin contained in document A/55/64 and Corr.1. The United States ratified START II in 1996, however, the 1997 Protocol must be ratified before it can enter into force.

same time, however, he called for a broader missile defence system that would ultimately protect both the US and its allies.<sup>25</sup>

On 13 November, President Putin proposed that the Russian Federation and the United States could reduce the number of their respective nuclear warheads to 1,500 each by 2008, with the possibility of even further cutbacks.<sup>26</sup> At the same time, he reiterated that it was necessary to retain and strengthen the ABM Treaty. He also suggested that there was room for wide-ranging cooperation in the area of theatre missile defences (TMD) and that the future Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC), see below, could become a component of such cooperation.

The issue of NMD had a considerable impact on efforts to pursue further reductions in Russian and US nuclear arsenals. During the first half of the year, both States conducted additional rounds of discussions on START III and ABM Treaty issues.<sup>27</sup> No progress, however, was reportedly made. On 3 and 4 June, a summit was held in Moscow between the two presidents,<sup>28</sup> but no major breakthroughs were achieved on the contentious issues of NMD and US efforts to amend the ABM Treaty.

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<sup>25</sup> On 26 January 2001, President Bush reiterated his campaign pledge to reduce US nuclear weapons while moving ahead with the construction of an NMD system.

<sup>26</sup> ITAR-TASS news agency, 13 November.

<sup>27</sup> The discussions were undertaken in accordance with the Joint Statement concerning Strategic Offensive and Defensive Arms and further Strengthening of Stability, issued on 20 June 1999 following a meeting between presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Cologne, Germany.

<sup>28</sup> Among the documents issued at the Summit were the: (a) Joint Statement on Principles of Strategic Stability, (b) Agreement on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches, and (c) Joint Statement concerning Management and Disposition of Weapon-Grade Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, in which the two leaders announced completion of a corresponding bilateral agreement on the subject. The three documents are reproduced in document CD/1617. See also *Disarmament Diplomacy*, issue Number 47, June 2000, pp. 21–23 for the texts of the Joint Statement and of two White House Fact Sheets on the agreements. Consult also the weekly compilation of presidential documents on the US General Printing Office website: [www.gpo.gov/](http://www.gpo.gov/).

Nonetheless, in their Joint Statement on Principles of Strategic Stability, the two leaders reaffirmed the need to maintain strategic nuclear stability, including the need for further progress in reductions within the framework of a future START III. They reaffirmed their commitment to the ABM Treaty as "a cornerstone of strategic stability" and to continuing efforts to enhance its viability and effectiveness. The two leaders agreed that the growing threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including missiles, represented a "potentially significant change in the strategic situation and international security environment" and that the process should be reversed, including through existing and possible new international legal mechanisms.

The Summit produced two disarmament-related agreements: one on the management and disposition of weapons-grade plutonium and the other on the establishment of a joint center for the exchange of data from early warning systems and notification of missile launches. By the former, both countries will irreversibly dispose of a total of 68 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium no longer required for defence purposes by irradiating it as fuel in reactors or by immobilizing it with high-level radioactive waste, and they will be required to construct new plutonium conversion plants and have them operational by 2007. By the latter, they will establish the JDEC in Moscow in order to exchange information gathered from each party's missile launch warning systems about the launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. The JDEC is expected to promote increased mutual confidence in the capabilities of both States' warning systems, as well as contribute considerably to reducing the danger of accidental missile launches. As a follow-up to the above agreement, both parties signed a memorandum of understanding on notifications of missile launches on 16 December in Brussels.<sup>29</sup>

### *ABM and other missile-related issues*

The issue of long-range ballistic missiles and missile defences remained a major area of concern for the international community in 2000. Indeed, missile programmes in various countries and US plans for NMD cast a shadow over multilateral disarmament efforts.

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<sup>29</sup> See document A/55/807, annex.

The testing and development of ballistic missiles continued in many regions.

On 16 March, the Russian Government organized in Moscow the International Expert Meeting on the Problem of Creation of a Global System of Control over the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technologies. The purpose of the meeting was to initiate an exchange of views on the Russian proposal to create a global control system for missiles, which President Yeltsin had originally made at the G-8 Cologne Summit in June 1999. Representatives from 46 countries attended the event, including several States members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

In the ensuing months, the Russian Federation actively pursued various diplomatic initiatives in response to US plans for an NMD system. President Putin proposed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Europe and Russia set up a joint anti-missile shield against missile threats from certain States. He believed that the shield, which would be based on the boost-phase intercept concept, could replace the proposed NMD system. The United States, however, viewed the Russian proposal only as a possible complement to its own NMD plans.

Moreover, during President Putin's official visits to China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in mid-July, missile-related issues were again discussed. On 18 July, the presidents of China and the Russian Federation issued a joint statement on anti-missile defence,<sup>30</sup> stressing the importance of preserving the integrity and effectiveness of the ABM Treaty. They also underlined the need for international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles through political, legal and diplomatic means, to explore the possibility of gradually working out a global system for monitoring the non-proliferation of missiles and related technology and to conduct extensive non-discriminatory dialogue and cooperation in this field.

The United States continued several rounds of bilateral discussions with the DPRK concerning the latter's ballistic missile programme and other related issues. Although significant developments occurred in the bilateral context, culminating in late October in the

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<sup>30</sup> See documents A/55/276, annex, and CD/1622.

first visit ever paid to the DPRK by the US Secretary of State, no major breakthrough was achieved in their talks on missile issues.

As further steps in its efforts to develop an NMD system, the United States conducted a second and third missile interceptor test on 18 January and 7 July. In both tests, however, the missiles failed to hit their targets. On 1 September, following a deployment readiness review that considered the threat, costs and technical feasibility of such a system, President Clinton announced that he would leave the decision on deployment to the next Administration, as there was not sufficient information about the technical and operational effectiveness of the system to move forward with deployment. Nevertheless, he reaffirmed the US commitment to continue development and testing of the NMD system.<sup>31</sup>

The above developments in the area of ballistic missile proliferation and missile defences were followed closely in the First Committee<sup>32</sup> and once again led to the tabling of missile-related resolutions. The Russian Federation, together with Belarus, China and Kyrgyzstan, introduced a draft resolution on the preservation of and compliance with the ABM Treaty, which, when adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 55/33 B, recorded a slight increase in the number of positive votes compared to the results of the previous year. Many States expressed strong support for the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and voiced concerns over the possible impact that any renewed NMD deployment efforts might have on existing and future disarmament agreements.

The Islamic Republic of Iran also introduced, for the second consecutive year, a draft resolution entitled "Missiles", which was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 55/33 A. By the resolution, Member States requested the Secretary-General to prepare an expert report on the subject for submission in 2002 (see chapter VIII).

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<sup>31</sup> Fact Sheet: National Missile Defense, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 1 September.

<sup>32</sup> In response to resolution 54/54 F, the Secretary-General submitted a report transmitting the views received from Member States on these issues. The report contained replies from: Bangladesh, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Japan, Jordan, Qatar and United Kingdom (A/55/116 and Add.1).

### *Strategic doctrines*

Both the United States and the Russian Federation released new reports concerning their respective national security strategies. On 5 January, the White House made public a 52-page report entitled *National Security Strategy for a New Century*.<sup>33</sup> For its part, the Russian Federation released a new 21-page *National Security Concept* on 14 January.<sup>34</sup>

The US *National Security Strategy* defined three "core objectives": to enhance US security; to bolster its economic prosperity; and to promote democracy and human rights abroad. While acknowledging that the conditions of rapid globalization would require it to cooperate with the international community (including the United Nations) in pursuing the above goals, the report clearly stressed US willingness to act alone when necessary. It also addressed US concerns and positions on a wide range of disarmament-related issues such as weapons of mass destruction and the need to prevent their proliferation, current disarmament treaties, export controls and NMD.

While emphasizing that arms control and non-proliferation initiatives remained essential elements of US strategy, the report stated that nuclear weapons served as a guarantee of US security commitments to its allies and that the United States would continue to maintain a robust triad of strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any potential adversaries. The report reaffirmed the NPT as the cornerstone of international non-proliferation efforts. With regard to the ABM Treaty, it stated that the United States was committed to continued efforts to enhance its viability and effectiveness, but would seek to negotiate modifications if it was decided to deploy a limited NMD system; it would not give any State a veto over such a decision.

NATO's Nuclear Planning Group,<sup>35</sup> meeting twice in the year, reviewed the status of NATO nuclear forces and a number of related activities. The Group reaffirmed the continuing validity of the fundamentally political purpose and principles underpinning NATO's nu-

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<sup>33</sup> *National Security Strategy for a New Century*, the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 5 January.

<sup>34</sup> *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*, No. 1 (174), 14 January.

<sup>35</sup> Ministerial meetings were held on 8 June and 5 December in Brussels. See NATO press communiqués M-DPC/NPG-1(2000)59 of 8 June and M-DPC/NPG-2(2000)115 of 5 December.

clear forces, as set out in its 1999 *Strategic Concept*, and determined that its reduced nuclear force posture fully complied with that document.<sup>36</sup> It also reiterated that NATO's nuclear forces were a credible and effective element of NATO strategy for preventing war, and were maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.

The Russian Federation's *National Security Concept*,<sup>37</sup> approved by then Acting President Putin and by the Russian Security Council on 10 January and 4 February, respectively, was divided into four parts: Russia in the world community; Russia's national interests; threats to its national security; and ways to counter such threats. Among external factors that constituted threats, the document cited the desire on the part of some States to diminish the role of the United Nations, NATO enlargement, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles and a weakening of processes of integration within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). As a means of countering these challenges, the document stressed the need to increase Russia's military potential, to strengthen the regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to assist in settling conflicts, including through UN peace-keeping activities, and to strengthen relations with the other CIS countries.

In April, Acting President Putin approved Russia's new *Military Doctrine*,<sup>38</sup> which was intended to replace the *Basic Guidelines for the Russian Federation's Military Doctrine* of 1993 and to elaborate on the military policies outlined in the new *National Security Concept*. The new doctrine addressed a broad range of issues, including the internal and external threats facing the Russian Federation. In line with the *National Security Concept*, the new doctrine upheld the policy of nuclear deterrence and allowed for the use of nuclear weapons in response to any attack with weapons of mass destruction or large-

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<sup>36</sup> See *The Yearbook*, vol. 24:1999, p. 28, and the Washington Summit communiqué, "An Alliance for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century", issued on 24 April 1999 and reproduced in *NATO Review*, No. 2, Summer 1999, pp. D2-7.

<sup>37</sup> Excerpts from the *National Security Concept* are reproduced in *The Arms Control Reporter*, sect. 615D.1.

<sup>38</sup> The Russian Defense Ministry had previously released a draft version of the document in October 1999.



scale conventional aggression and in the event that Russia's military allies and national interest were threatened.

On 3 February, Pakistan announced that it had set up a National Command Authority to take charge of formulating and implementing its nuclear policies. As of the end of the year, India had not established a nuclear command and control structure, although its National Security Advisory Board had issued a draft nuclear doctrine in August 1999.

Among the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT that the parties at the 2000 NPT Review Conference<sup>39</sup> agreed upon was "a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies" and "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament". For further details, see chapter I, page 14 and appendix II, page 282.

At the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries,<sup>40</sup> the ministers expressed concern at the updating of strategic defence doctrines that set out new rationales for the use of nuclear weapons and the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems. They also stressed the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all nuclear-weapon States.

### *IAEA safeguards<sup>41</sup>*

Since the approval of the Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements by IAEA's Board of Governors in May 1997, progress in signing and bringing it into force has been slow. As of the end of the year, 53 States had signed the Model Protocol, including the five nuclear-weapon States and one State with a non-comprehensive safeguards agreement, Cuba. The Model Protocol was in force in 18 States.

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<sup>39</sup> See the *Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (NPT/CONF.2000/28), vol. I, part I. The Final Document, part I, is reproduced in appendix II of this volume.

<sup>40</sup> Held 8-9 April in Cartagena, Colombia.

<sup>41</sup> See the IAEA website: [www.iaea.org](http://www.iaea.org).

The 44th regular session of the General Conference of the IAEA welcomed the fact that all nuclear-weapon States had concluded protocols additional to their voluntary-offer safeguards agreements, and once more requested all concerned States and other parties to safeguards agreements that had not yet done so to sign additional protocols promptly.<sup>42</sup>

In his statement to the General Conference, the Director-General pointed out that an important measure to strengthen and maximize the effectiveness of the safeguards system was the development of new "integrated safeguards". This referred to the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency—integrating traditional safeguards measures with the measures of the Additional Protocol to ensure a system that was cost effective while achieving the maximum degree of assurance both of non-diversion of declared nuclear material and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The technical framework for the implementation of integrated safeguards was expected to be completed by the end of 2001.<sup>43</sup>

The 2000 NPT Review Conference noted that implementation of the measures specified in the Model Additional Protocol would provide, in an effective and efficient manner, increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole and that those measures were being introduced as an integral part of the IAEA's safeguards system (see chapter I, page 19 and appendix II, page 266).

Regarding implementation of the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and the DPRK in connection with the NPT, the Director-General reported to the NPT Review Conference<sup>44</sup> that the DPRK was still in non-compliance, although the agreement remained valid and in force. The DPRK continued to accept IAEA activities solely in the context of the "Agreed Framework" concluded in October 1994 with the United States. As requested by the Security Council, the Agency was monitoring a "freeze" of the DPRK's graphite moderated

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<sup>42</sup> GC(44)RES/19.

<sup>43</sup> See statement of the IAEA Director-General to the 44<sup>th</sup> regular session of the IAEA General Conference 2000, Vienna, 18 September.

<sup>44</sup> See the statement of the Director-General to the 2000 NPT Review Conference, New York, 24 April.

reactors and related facilities under that agreement, but the degree of cooperation from the DPRK remained limited. In the Final Document of their Review Conference, the NPT States parties emphasized the importance of full compliance by the DPRK with its safeguards agreement and action by it to preserve and make available to the IAEA all information needed to verify its initial inventory (see chapter I and appendix II, pages 22 and 265), and the IAEA General Conference, in its resolution GC(44)/RES/26, made a similar request.

With regard to Iraq, the Director-General of the IAEA reported to the NPT Review Conference<sup>45</sup> that, since December 1998, the Agency had not been in a position to implement its mandate under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and related resolutions. As a consequence, it could not provide any assurance that Iraq was in compliance with its obligations under those resolutions. In the light of the fact that Security-Council mandated activities had ceased in December 1998, and given the requirements of the IAEA safeguards system, the Agency carried out an inspection in Iraq in January 2000 pursuant to Iraq's NPT safeguards agreement. The inspectors were able to verify the presence of the nuclear material subject to safeguards that was still in Iraq.

The importance of safeguards was also highlighted in the UN General Assembly and the IAEA General Conference in connection with discussion on the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. As in previous years, both bodies adopted resolutions on the subject. By resolution 55/36, the General Assembly reaffirmed the importance that Israel's accession to the NPT and placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards would have for the goal of universal adherence to the NPT. While considering the resolution, the Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", to which were annexed the IAEA resolution and a presidential statement of the General Conference.<sup>46</sup> By resolution GC(44)/RES/28, the IAEA General Conference affirmed the need for all States in

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<sup>45</sup> In addition to the statement of the Director-General on 24 April, see his two progress reports, documents S/2000/300 (April) and S/2000/983 (October), which he submitted to the Security Council pursuant to paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions.

<sup>46</sup> A/55/448.

the region to apply full-scope Agency safeguards and invited the countries concerned to adhere to international non-proliferation regimes, including the NPT. In addition, the General Conference, by its decision GC(44)DEC/12, requested the Director-General to make arrangements to convene a forum in which participants from the Middle East and other interested parties could learn from the experience of other regions, including in the area of confidence-building relevant to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

### *New Agenda Coalition<sup>47</sup>*

On 13 September, the foreign ministers of the New Agenda Coalition Countries—Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden—issued a communiqué<sup>48</sup> in which they stressed that while their initiative of 1998 had advanced the agenda for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it remained a matter of real urgency and must be delivered through an accelerated process of negotiations on all fronts. They welcomed the positive and substantial outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, particularly the unequivocal undertaking by the five nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, as a new determination to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, and stressed that the programme of action agreed at the Conference must be implemented fully and regularly reviewed.

The ministers called for universal adherence to the NPT and for the three States that are not parties to it and that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States and to place their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. They also stressed the importance of full compliance with the provisions of the NPT; called for early commencement of negotiations on nuclear arms reductions between the United States and the Russian Federation; looked forward to early action by the five nuclear-weapon States on the series of undertakings made by them at the Conference; and called upon the parties to the ABM Treaty to preserve its integrity and validity. They also called upon all States to refrain from decisions that could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament,

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<sup>47</sup> See footnote 7.

<sup>48</sup> A/C.1/55/3.

### *Other nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues*

lead to a new arms race or be inconsistent with the commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, the ministers underlined the importance of the practical steps towards implementation of article VI agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which included references to entry into force of the CTBT and the negotiation of a ban on the production of fissile material. They affirmed that international peace and stability could be best maintained and enhanced with the involvement of the international community as a whole, where multilateral engagement and further progress on disarmament were crucial, and that they would continue to pursue the New Agenda initiative with determination. Subsequently, the representatives of the New Agenda Coalition initiated General Assembly resolution 55/33 C, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda" (see page 60). At the time that the General Assembly was considering the resolution, it had before it a report of the Secretary-General conveying his observations and the observations of a number of international organizations and one government on the subject.<sup>49</sup>

### *Nuclear safety and radioactive waste*

Within the framework of the IAEA's safety programme for the year 2000, the International Conference on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management was held in Córdoba, Spain, from 13 to 17 March<sup>50</sup> to provide an international forum for senior officials and scientists in order to foster information exchange and consensus on the safety of radioactive waste management. In its conclusion, the Conference emphasized that effective national strategies for waste disposal would require the clear definition of a detailed, transparent approach that would enable all parties, including the general public, to participate in the decision-making process.

During the 44th regular session of the IAEA General Conference, the Scientific Forum on Radioactive Waste Management was

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<sup>49</sup> A/55/217. The report contained the views of: IAEA, South Pacific Forum, Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO and Thailand.

<sup>50</sup> The Conference was organized by the IAEA, in cooperation with the European Commission, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the World Health Organization. See document GOV/INF/2000/8-GC(44)/INF/5.

convened to build on the conclusions of the Córdoba Conference.<sup>51</sup> Experts and senior governmental officials from IAEA member States and partner organizations discussed related scientific, technical and public policy issues. In its report to the General Conference, the Forum urged the IAEA to facilitate the international exchange of experience on technical and social issues, collaboration on creating opportunities for research and development, and continuing peer reviews of programmes and activities in member States.<sup>52</sup>

In the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the States parties welcomed and underlined the intensification of national measures and international cooperation in order to strengthen nuclear safety, radiation protection, the safe transport of radioactive materials and radioactive waste management, including activities conducted in this area by the IAEA. For details, see chapter I and appendix II, pages 24 and 274.

The 44th regular session of the General Conference again adopted a resolution on measures to strengthen international cooperation in nuclear, radiation and waste safety.<sup>53</sup> The resolution noted, *inter alia*, the indispensable nature of international cooperation in nuclear safety and appealed to all member States, particularly those operating, constructing or planning nuclear power reactors, which had not yet taken the necessary steps to become party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, to do so. In addition, the General Conference adopted a number of resolutions aimed at strengthening the global

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<sup>51</sup> See IAEA Press Release PR 2000/20 (18 September) and IAEA News Briefs, July/August 2000, Volume 15, Number 3 (88).

<sup>52</sup> Report to the 44<sup>th</sup> General Conference of the IAEA on the Third Scientific Forum, Radioactive Waste Management: Turning Options into Solutions, para. 10.

<sup>53</sup> GC(44)/RES/11.

framework for nuclear safety<sup>54</sup> and a resolution on measures against illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive sources.<sup>55</sup>

### ***Nuclear terrorism***

In February, the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996 continued its work to elaborate a draft international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, one aspect of its efforts to develop a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism. Australia, the coordinator of informal bilateral consultations on the convention, reported that different views persisted concerning its scope and that, while the bilateral consultations were useful, the time was not yet ripe to convene open-ended informal consultations. It was agreed that the coordinator would continue consultations during the intersessional period on outstanding issues. Later in the year, during the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly, further work was conducted within the framework of the Sixth Committee. However, owing to the persistence of different views, no progress was made. By resolution 55/158, the General Assembly decided that the Ad Hoc Committee should continue its efforts to resolve the outstanding issues relating to the draft convention.

### ***Export controls***

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) held its plenary meeting in Paris from 22 to 23 June. With the admission of Belarus, Cyprus and Turkey, the membership of the NSG rose to 38. At the meeting, the Group agreed that its activities continued to fulfil the aim of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons through export controls on nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, software and technology. It would continue its efforts to promote greater transparency and openness in its activities, particularly towards non-members, in

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<sup>54</sup> GC(44)/RES/12 (safety of radioactive waste management), GC(44)/RES/13 (education and training in radiation protection and nuclear safety and waste management), GC(44)/RES/14 (safety of nuclear research reactors), GC(44)/RES/16 (Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident and Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency), GC(44)/RES/17 (safety of transport of radioactive materials).

<sup>55</sup> GC(44)/RES/20.

order to strengthen the nuclear safeguards regime and to facilitate the exchange of nuclear and nuclear-related material for peaceful nuclear cooperation. The Group encouraged all States that had not yet done so to conclude the IAEA Model Additional Protocol as soon as possible and to bring such protocols into force.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held its 15<sup>th</sup> plenary meeting in Helsinki from 10 to 13 October.<sup>56</sup> The members agreed that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery was a threat to global and regional stability, and they discussed responses to the challenges posed by indigenous missile programmes and missile exports. Noting that export controls continued to play an important role in facing these challenges, they agreed that the MTCR must continue to adapt itself to technological developments, and they renewed their commitment to implement strictly their export controls and to strengthen them as necessary. They also continued their deliberations, begun in 1999, on a set of principles, commitments, confidence-building measures and incentives that could constitute a code of conduct against missile proliferation. In this connection, they decided to engage non-members in a broader common effort in order to reach agreement on a multilateral instrument open to all States.

On 21 November, China issued an official statement on its export controls of missile-related items and technology,<sup>57</sup> in which it stressed that it had no intention to assist any country in the development of ballistic missiles that could deliver nuclear weapons, and stated that it would improve and reinforce its export control system, including by publishing a comprehensive export control list of missile-related items, such as equipment, material and technology, which could be directly used in missiles, as well as missile-related dual-use items. According to the statement, the Government would require all Chinese

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<sup>56</sup> Thirty-two countries participate in the MTCR: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. The European Commission participated as a permanent observer and Slovenia attended as an observer. See MTCR Press Release of 13 October.

<sup>57</sup> Spokesman's statement, Foreign Ministry of China, 21 November.



entities and individuals to obtain a licence for the export of items on the list, and China would cooperate with other countries on the issue of non-proliferation with a view to strengthening their respective export control systems for missile-related equipment and technology.

### **Disarmament Commission, 2000**

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 54/56 A of 1 December 1999, the Disarmament Commission began, at its 2000 session, to consider the agenda item entitled "Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament", entrusting the task to its Working Group I. The Group, chaired by the representative of Ghana, held a general exchange of views on the subject, the Chairman conducted a number of informal consultations, and five working papers were submitted. Among the papers was one by the Chairman, which was ultimately annexed to the Group's report to the Commission, without prejudice to the position of any delegation.<sup>58</sup> The Commission will resume its work on the item at its 2001 session.

### **General Assembly, 2000**

The Assembly took action on 12 draft resolutions dealing with the subjects discussed in this chapter. In explaining their votes, many delegations referred to the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the substantive parts of which are reproduced in appendix II. In addition to the reports of the Secretary-General that have already been mentioned in this chapter, two others were before the First Committee: one on the subject of nuclear disarmament<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.1 (Chairman), A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.2 (China), A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.3 (France on behalf of the EU), A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.4 (United States), A/CN.10/2000/WG.I/WP.5 (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine). See the report of the Working Group contained in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/55/42)*.

<sup>59</sup> A/55/444.

and the other conveying information provided by three Member States with respect to the advisory opinion of the ICJ.<sup>60</sup>

### ***Nuclear disarmament***

**55/33 C - Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda.** The draft resolution was introduced by Sweden, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 392 for the sponsors), on 23 October, and on 30 October it presented a revised text with minor changes to some of the paragraphs. The revised draft was adopted by the First Committee on 1 November (as a whole: 146-3-8; pr. para. 15: 151-3-1; and op. para. 16: 151-0-4) and by the General Assembly on 20 November (as a whole: 154-3-8; pr. para. 15: 160-3-1; and op. para. 16: 161-0-4). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 317 and 414, respectively.

**First Committee:** Pakistan and India explained their negative votes on the draft. Both States objected to the reference to status in preambular paragraph 5, with Pakistan pointing out that it had never asked for special status, but should continue to maintain its ability to deter nuclear or other aggression. India held that no status had to be conferred, since it was already a nuclear-weapon State—a reality that had to be factored into any realistic agenda. On other matters, Pakistan believed that the provisions of operative paragraph 13 (adherence to the NPT without delay or conditions and to IAEA safeguards agreements) were not an integral part of the nuclear disarmament process. Overall, India asserted that the main thrust of the draft was cast in the NPT framework, so as to be more palatable to the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. It criticized the resolution for its surprising omission of the reaffirmation of the doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons by the remaining transcontinental multilateral alliance; its ignorance of efforts in certain countries to refine and modernize nuclear weapons for retention; and its omission of specific references to interim measures such as de-alerting and the removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles.

Two States explained their abstentions. France, stated that there were two concrete measures in the Final Document that were indivisible: the unequivocal commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to

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<sup>60</sup> A/55/131 and Add.1. The report contained information from: Cuba, Iraq, New Zealand and Qatar.

achieve nuclear disarmament; and the reaffirmation that general and complete disarmament was the objective of the efforts of all parties. In its view, placing the former measure in the preambular part of the resolution as a principle of general scope did not reflect the balance of the two measures in the Final Document. Russia noted that the NPT Review Conference had clearly defined the agenda for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and expressed satisfaction with the references in the draft resolution to its ratification of START II and the link between implementation of that Treaty and the ABM Treaty. It noticed, however, differences of view among some countries of the Coalition regarding strategic stability—the basis of which was the ABM Treaty, and took that to mean that there were also differences regarding the conditions necessary for further disarmament; thus it could not support the draft.

Cuba, while voting in favour of the draft as a whole, abstained on the two paragraphs because of its well-known position as a non-party to the NPT.

Five States parties to the NPT, which had either abstained or voted against the corresponding resolution, 54/54 G, in 1999, explained that they were voting affirmatively largely because of the similarity in language between the draft resolution and the Final Document. In addition, China expressed a number of reservations: the text should have been more explicit in its reference to the importance of the ABM Treaty; adoption of measures for nuclear transparency should be conditional upon an international environment of stability and trust, linked to nuclear disarmament and premised upon the undiminished security of the countries concerned; and the draft should have clearly called upon nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. The United States noted that the draft resolution recognized that nuclear disarmament was a process requiring pragmatic proposals, step by step. This incremental approach was the one most likely to bring about a nuclear-weapon-free world. It stressed that its support for the draft, however, did not mean acceptance of preambular paragraph 4, which did not reflect the language of the Final Document, but rather its overall support for the results of the Conference. The United Kingdom was unequivocally committed to the global elimination of nuclear weapons and believed that the Review Conference's package of measures was reflected in

the draft resolution. It cautioned that conditions favourable to the elimination of nuclear weapons would require action from all States across the global security agenda, emphasizing in this context the importance of the development of credible international verification arrangements. Both Turkey and the Republic of Korea felt that the draft reflected the consensus of the Final Document.

**55/33 N - Reducing nuclear danger.** The draft resolution was introduced by India, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 396 for the sponsors), on 19 October, and a slightly revised text was submitted on 30 October. The same day, the revised draft was adopted by the First Committee (102-42-14), and on 20 November by the General Assembly (110-45-14). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 334 and 420, respectively.

**First Committee:** The United States cast a negative vote because the draft failed to acknowledge the real progress made on unilateral, bilateral and multilateral fronts to reduce nuclear dangers, and particularly the successful outcome of the NPT Review Conference. It felt that an international conference on nuclear issues was inopportune; however, if it was necessary to consider such a conference, it would support a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament with balanced agenda objectives.

**55/33 R - A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.** The draft resolution was introduced by Japan on 18 October, and on 30 October it was re-introduced, also on behalf of Australia, with considerable revisions to operative paragraph 9. The revised draft was adopted by the First Committee on 1 November (as a whole: 144-1-12; and op. para. 8: 137-2-11) and by the General Assembly on 20 November (as a whole: 155-1-12; and op. para. 8: 150-2-10). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 342 and 423, respectively.

**First Committee:** Five States explained their abstentions. China, France and the Russian Federation noted discrepancies between the language in the draft resolution and that of the NPT Final Document. China felt the draft implied a deadline of 2005 for conclusion of fissile material negotiations in the CD. In addition, China noted that certain indispensable principles and measures were missing from the text as in previous years: special responsibilities of the States with the largest nuclear arsenals, the need to abandon the doctrine of nuclear deterrence characterized by the first use, and the policy and

practice of nuclear sharing. France asserted that any resolutions on the topic of nuclear disarmament must faithfully reflect the balances achieved in the NPT Review Conference. In its view, the draft departed markedly from that consensus. (See in this connection, comments by France on page 60 regarding resolution 55/33 C). Russia could not consider that one part of the NPT Final Document was more important than another and observed that the sponsors had selectively cited its provisions in a way that violated the balance of interests achieved at the 2000 Conference. It stressed the need for all countries to focus their efforts on implementing the decisions of the Conference. Both Egypt and Pakistan cast a negative vote on operative paragraph 8 (on means of delivery), believing that it was discriminatory; Pakistan also stated that the paragraph gave more emphasis to non-proliferation than to nuclear disarmament. Egypt agreed with the main thrust of the resolution, while Pakistan could not endorse most of operative paragraph 3. Nevertheless, as a non-party to the Treaty, Pakistan abstained rather than voting against the draft.

Those voting in favour of the draft as a whole included the United Kingdom, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Algeria and Indonesia. The United Kingdom reiterated the same approach it took in discussing resolution 55/33 C (see page 61). The Islamic Republic of Iran and Algeria saw the draft as a reflection of the nuclear disarmament elements outlined in the Final Document. However, both abstained in the vote on operative paragraph 8, which, for Iran, did not reflect the balanced outcome of the NPT discussions on regulating nuclear transfers, and which, for Algeria, was ambiguous. Indonesia also abstaining in the vote on operative paragraph 8, believed that security challenges relating to non-proliferation could not be met with selective approaches that consisted mainly of technology denial regimes, and felt that some of the draft's wording tended to justify such regimes.

**55/33 T - Nuclear disarmament.** The draft resolution was introduced by Myanmar, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 397 for the sponsors), on 23 October, adopted by the First Committee on 30 October (as a whole: 99-39-17; and op. para. 9: 139-2-16) and by the General Assembly on 20 November (as a whole: 109-39-20; and op. para. 9: 150-2-15). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 347 and 424, respectively.

**First Committee:** India, Pakistan and Japan abstained in their vote. India, abstaining on the draft as a whole and also casting a

negative vote on operative paragraph 9, noted that the draft diluted a number of traditional positions of the Non-Aligned Movement and Group of 21 on nuclear disarmament, which it fully supported. Pakistan held that the draft omitted reference to two important proposals made by members of the Group of 21: a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive mandate for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. Japan objected to the reference to a comprehensive and phased programme with agreed timeframes for nuclear disarmament (preambular paragraph 5) and did not agree to holding an international conference on nuclear disarmament so close to the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

China, Chile and New Zealand, which voted in favour of the draft as a whole and operative paragraph 9, explained their support. New Zealand noted two reservations: it did not consider itself bound by preambular references to meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement and the draft's references to the CD were rather too prescriptive in view of the ongoing negotiations in the CD on a programme of work.

**55/33 Y - The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1574) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.** The revised draft resolution, in which the phrase "with a view to their conclusion within five years" at the end of operative paragraph 2 was deleted, was introduced by Canada, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 401 for the sponsors), on 30 October. It was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 1 November and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 358.

**First Committee:** Three States explained their positions. Israel stated that the matter could not be considered in isolation from the peace process and the overall arms control efforts in the Middle East. Japan emphasized that the deletion of the reference to the timeline in the original version of the draft resolution should not be construed as diminishing the urgency of these important negotiations. Pakistan

upheld the draft resolution because it had agreed to open talks on a fissile material treaty in the CD that addressed both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation aspects.

**55/34 G - Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.** The draft resolution was introduced by India, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 403 for the sponsors) on 17 October, adopted by the First Committee on 30 October (101-42-14) and by the General Assembly on 20 November (109-43-16). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 370 and 429, respectively.

**First Committee:** The United States, which voted against the draft and Japan, which abstained, expressed similar views, namely that the only way to achieve nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation was through a step-by-step process, which the draft did not reflect. Moreover, the United States was convinced that this practical approach would be achieved through bilateral, unilateral and multilateral measures and, in light of the NPT Final Document, believed that the relevance of the current version of the Indian initiative had further decreased in 2000.

Pakistan explained its vote in favour of the draft, reaffirming its consistent efforts to promote full respect for the principles and purposes of Article 2.4 of the UN Charter on the non-use or threat of use of force in international relations, and its adherence to the ICJ advisory opinion.

### *Non-proliferation and related issues*

**55/31 - Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.** The draft resolution was introduced by Pakistan, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 391 for the sponsors), on 20 October, adopted by the First Committee on 25 October (97-0-50) and by the General Assembly on 20 November (111-0-54). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 309 and 410, respectively.

**First Committee:** Among those States abstaining on the vote, Australia and the Republic of Korea held that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT fully compliant with its provisions had a legitimate right to negative security assurances and that nuclear-weapon States had a mutual obligation to provide those assurances.

In their view, the draft did not give due primacy to the claims and interests of States parties to the NPT in this regard. In addition, the Republic of Korea noted that it had no fixed position on whether security assurances should take the form of a single international instrument or bilateral or regional instruments.

India, voting in favour, held that, pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, States possessing them had an obligation to provide internationally binding, credible, universal and non-discriminatory negative security assurances and reiterated its willingness to enter into arrangements on "no first use".

**55/36 - The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.** On 23 October, Egypt introduced the draft resolution on behalf of States Members of the United Nations that are members of the League of Arab States. On 27 October two revisions were introduced, in which a new operative paragraph 1 was inserted welcoming the NPT Review Conference's conclusions on the Middle East and in which the reference to Israel by name in operative paragraph 3 was dropped. On 1 November, Egypt, on behalf of some States Members of the United Nations that are members of the League of Arab States<sup>61</sup> and Afghanistan, introduced another revision and in addition orally amended the text by adding the words, "and underlined the necessity of universal adherence to the Treaty and of strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty", at the end of preambular paragraph 6. The revised draft was adopted as orally amended by the First Committee at the same meeting (as a whole: 139-3-7, and pr. para. 6: 138-2-5) and by the General Assembly on 20 November (as a whole: 157-3-8, and pr. para. 6: 158-2-5). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 376 and 431, respectively.

**First Committee:** The United States and Israel, voting against the resolution as a whole, and Israel, casting a negative vote on preambular paragraph 6, shared the view that the draft failed to promote non-proliferation in the Middle East because it was biased, created an inaccurate picture of nuclear proliferation in the region, and cited the NPT Final Document selectively. Furthermore, in their view, the real risk of proliferation in the Middle East emanated from States

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<sup>61</sup> The delegation of Iraq indicated that it was not a sponsor of the revised draft resolution.



parties to international treaties that did not comply with their international obligations.

India abstained on the draft as a whole and voted against preambular paragraph 6, stating that the draft resolution should be limited to the region it purported to address.

France, speaking on behalf of a large number of States,<sup>62</sup> stated that they had voted in favour, taking into account the new elements represented by the adoption of the NPT Final Document and stressed that the Document should be implemented in all its aspects. Norway was able to support the draft resolution in 2000 because it included the essential element of recognizing the necessity of strict compliance by all parties to the NPT. In its view, this was an important step in addressing the situation and taking into account the situation in the region in its totality. Pakistan supported the draft because its provisions were applicable to the Middle East region only.

Iraq stated that if it had the right to do so, it would have voted against the sixth preambular paragraph.

### *Nuclear tests*

**55/41 - Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.** The draft resolution was introduced by Australia, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 407 for the sponsors), on 23 October, adopted by the First Committee on 30 October (149-0-7) and by the General Assembly on 20 November (161-0-6). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, refer to pages 387 and 432, respectively.

**First Committee:** The Syrian Arab Republic abstained on the vote because of loopholes in the CTBT itself. In its view, the Treaty disregarded the legitimate concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States: guarantees of negative security assurances and the right to acquire advanced technology. Moreover, the CTBT set no timeframe for the nuclear-weapon States to phase out their nuclear arsenals; made no explicit statement on the illegal use or threat to use nuclear weapons; recognized no need to achieve the universality of the NPT; and allowed the qualitative development or production of nuclear weapons,

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<sup>62</sup> Speaking on behalf of the EU, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe associated with it, the associated countries of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as Iceland—country of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and member of the European Economic Area (EEA).

possible abuse of the Treaty's on-site verification mechanism, and possible action by States signatories against non-signatories. It also rejected the inclusion of Israel in the region of the Middle East and South Asia.

Israel reiterated its willingness to continue its active role in non-proliferation efforts, including the CTBT. It voted in favour of the draft, but expressed a reservation concerning operative paragraph 1, citing in this connection article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty: "At entry into force of this Treaty the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of this Treaty." Pakistan, voting in favour of the draft, reaffirmed its unilateral moratorium on further testing until the Treaty's entry into force and stated it would sign it once the sanctions against it were removed.

### ***ABM Treaty and missiles***

**55/33 A - Missiles.** The draft resolution was introduced by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 20 October, and on 31 October a revised draft was submitted with slight changes to two operative paragraphs and the addition of a new operative paragraph 2, requesting the Secretary-General to seek further the views of Member States on the issue and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session. At the same meeting the revised draft was adopted by the First Committee (90-0-60) and on 20 November by the General Assembly (97-0-65). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 315 and 412, respectively.

**First Committee:** The five States that explained their abstentions—Australia, France<sup>63</sup> on behalf of a number of Western and Eastern European States, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States—pointed out that the draft resolution failed to highlight the problem of proliferation of missiles and relevant technology and did not acknowledge their ongoing efforts to address these problems within the MTCR. Australia pointed out that preambular paragraph 4 could be interpreted as ignoring the contributions of the MTCR, while

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<sup>63</sup> Speaking on behalf of the EU, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe associated with the EU—Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia—and the associated countries Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as Iceland and Norway, as countries of EFTA and members of the EEA which associate themselves with the EU.

France stated that the recently adopted MTCR draft code of conduct had a role to play in this field. With regard to the expert panel, the United States, citing the responses contained in the Secretary-General's report on missiles, stated that there was insufficient agreement within the international community to merit the establishment of a group of experts. Australia believed that the group, if established, should focus on the analysis and reduction of ballistic missile proliferation, especially long-range ballistic missiles.

Of those States voting in favour, China, Egypt, and Pakistan expressed the view that resolving the question of missiles in all its aspects required non-discriminatory measures. China felt that the proposal for a panel of governmental experts was a constructive effort towards establishing a universal and non-discriminatory global multi-lateral mechanism through dialogue and cooperation. Egypt shared this view, emphasizing that the entire missile question had to be considered comprehensively within the framework of weapons of mass destruction. Pakistan was disappointed that the draft did not acknowledge that the central security danger posed by missiles arose from the existing deployment of nuclear equipped missiles by some of the major Powers. Moreover, it had hoped that the draft would express concern at the discriminatory measures that certain States maintained through the MTCR, thus denying developing countries the legitimate means of self-defence and peaceful exploration of missile technology.

Regardless of their votes, however, Australia, China, France, and Pakistan expressed interest in participating in the expert panel, with China and Pakistan emphasizing the need for equitable geographic representation.

**55/33 B - Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.** The draft was introduced by the Russian Federation, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 391 for the sponsors), on 18 October. On 30 October, it was re-introduced with a new operative paragraph 7 welcoming the decision by the United States not to authorize deployment of a national missile defence at this time. The revised draft was adopted by the First Committee on 1 November (78-3-65) and by the General Assembly on 20 November (88-5-66). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 315 and 413, respectively.

**First Committee:** The United States did not support the revised draft because it objected to the General Assembly's taking sides and

making judgments on substantive issues in ongoing discussions between itself and Russia, and to the premise that amendments to the Treaty were incompatible with preserving and strengthening it.

Explaining their reasons for abstaining on the vote, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Germany<sup>64</sup> on behalf of a number of Western and Eastern European countries, Ghana, Nigeria, the Philippines and Sweden underlined the need for consensus on this resolution. They believed that dialogue and cooperation between the two parties was critical for achieving disarmament agreements, and that the First Committee's treatment of the draft did not set the tone for this constructive dialogue. Sweden added that strategic stability closely linked to cold war doctrines should no longer be the sole basis for disarmament and non-proliferation and that other sources for achieving disarmament could be found in the NPT Final Document. New Zealand held that the front-line defence against missiles and their delivery systems was to strengthen and implement disarmament measures like the NPT and its regime, the Chemical Weapons Convention, an effective verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention, and strict control of missile technology and its components. Peru called for a thorough revision of the current concept underlying strategic equilibrium along the lines of resolutions that demanded total nuclear disarmament.

A large number of States voting in favour of the draft reaffirmed the integrity and continued importance of the Treaty as the foundation of global strategic stability, while expressing some reservations. In explaining its vote, Pakistan referred to a number of the draft's paragraphs. With respect to operative paragraph 3, it wished that the call on the parties to the Treaty to refrain from deployment of ABM systems for national defence had been universal and had envisaged the total non-deployment of all such systems, including non-strategic systems. It was concerned that theatre missile defence systems deployed in certain sensitive regions of the world would have a destabilizing effect and serious implications for global security. It was also disappointed at the inclusion of preambular paragraph 7, which referred

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<sup>64</sup> On behalf of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey and United Kingdom.

to widespread concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, saying that such concern was being raised to justify the development and deployment of ballistic missile defence systems. The Syrian Arab Republic also expressed strong reservations about the language in preambular paragraph 7 and operative paragraph 5 saying that it was far removed from the main objective of the draft text and would encourage the Treaty's violation.

Azerbaijan, Cuba, India and Nepal supported the draft because of the importance of the ABM Treaty to strategic stability. In addition, Nepal pointed out that the international community should encourage dialogue between the parties.

### *International Court of Justice*

**55/33 X – Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*.** The draft resolution was introduced by Malaysia, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 400 for the sponsors), on 19 October, adopted by the First Committee on 30 October (as a whole: 109-27-21; and op. para. 1: 150-4-1) and by the General Assembly on 20 November (as a whole: 119-28-22; and op. para. 1: 162-4-1). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 356 and 427, respectively.

**First Committee:** The United States and Luxembourg,<sup>65</sup> speaking on behalf of ten States, voted against the draft as a whole because they felt that an incremental process such as that outlined in the NPT Final Document would be a more effective approach than the call in the draft resolution for multilateral negotiations in 2001 on a nuclear weapons convention. The United States also voted against operative paragraph 1. However, Luxembourg and the countries on whose behalf it spoke voted in favour of that paragraph because they supported the unanimous conclusion of the ICJ regarding the obligation to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament.

Japan abstained on the draft resolution as a whole, while voting in favour of operative paragraph 1, because the resolution did not favour an incremental approach.

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<sup>65</sup> Luxembourg spoke on behalf of the three Benelux countries, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Italy, Norway and Portugal.

Chile and the DPRK, voting in favour of the draft and operative paragraph 1, shared the view that the advisory opinion upheld the international community's commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

## **Conclusion**

Following the NPT parties' adoption of a consensus Final Document, it had been hoped that some progress, on nuclear items in particular, could be made in the CD and the First Committee in the latter part of the year. Two resolutions in the First Committee did indeed benefit from the success of the NPT Review Conference: the resolution on the need for a new agenda and that on negotiations in the CD on a fissile material treaty. The former resolution received three positive votes and no negative votes from the five nuclear-weapon States—which had given the 1999 resolution no support whatsoever—mainly because its language drew heavily on that of the NPT Final Document. The latter resolution was adopted without a vote, while the corresponding 1999 draft had never been put to the vote.

Controversy over missile-related issues intensified, with some States believing that problems must be addressed in a comprehensive manner within a global, multilateral framework, while others preferred to focus on ways to control the proliferation of missiles and relevant technology, working within existing structures such as the MTCR. In an attempt to open up multilateral dialogue on the subject, the General Assembly mandated an expert study on the issue of missiles in all its aspects, to be completed in 2002.

Although the US decision on an NMD was postponed until the next Administration, uncertainty regarding the future of the ABM Treaty loomed over bilateral and multilateral discussions. Both Russia and China held that amendment of the Treaty would constitute its violation, and warned that any threat to the ABM Treaty, such as a US NMD system, would be perceived as a threat to existing disarmament treaties. This view was also shared by the NAM countries. These conflicting positions exacerbated the efforts of the CD to agree on a programme of work. Members could find no bridge to span the gap in positions over an appropriate mechanism for dealing with the nuclear item—a challenge further complicated by diverging views over the linkage of this issue with the negotiation of a treaty on fissile

material for military purposes and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

By the end of the year, the requisite number of ratifications for the CTBT's entry into force had not been reached. Nevertheless, important progress was made during the year.; in particular, the Russian Federation ratified it, becoming the third nuclear-weapon State to do so. In May, the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO signed a Relationship Agreement, thereby establishing the legal basis for close cooperation on matters of mutual interest. Work on the verification system of the CTBT continued at a steady pace, with a view to having it in place by the time of entry into force, as called for in the Treaty. In addition, the Independent Commission on the Verifiability of the Treaty determined that once the overall resources for verifying compliance with the CTBT were fully in place, they would be capable of detecting and identifying relevant events with high probability.





## CHAPTER III

### **Biological and chemical weapons**

#### **Introduction**

CURBING THE PROLIFERATION OF TWO DISTINCT CATEGORIES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, namely chemical and biological weapons, and prohibiting their use have been preoccupations of the international community since the founding of the United Nations. Thus far, international efforts have resulted in the conclusion of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the first such treaty to be negotiated completely within a multilateral forum, the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Ever since these two multilateral agreements were opened for signature in 1972 and 1993, respectively, the United Nations has sought to promote universal participation in them and compliance with their provisions as well as to prevent the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons to non-party States. In addition, Member States have continuously reaffirmed the necessity of upholding the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

The scope of the CWC, the obligations assumed by States parties and the system of verification it established are unprecedented. Opened for signature in Paris in January 1993, it entered into force on 29 April 1997. Since then the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), with its headquarters in The Hague, has been actively involved in its implementation.<sup>1</sup>

While the CWC incorporates intrusive verification procedures, the BWC does not include a specific verification mechanism. Accord-

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<sup>1</sup> For further information, see the OPCW website: [www.opcw.org](http://www.opcw.org).

ingly, between 1986 and 1991, parties to the BWC agreed upon and elaborated confidence-building measures involving data exchanges in an effort to prevent and reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions and to improve international cooperation in peaceful biotechnological activities. At the Third Review Conference, in 1991,<sup>2</sup> the parties decided to establish an open-ended ad hoc group of governmental experts (subsequently known as the VEREX Group) to identify and examine potential verification measures, and a special conference in September 1994 considered the VEREX report.<sup>3</sup>

At the Special Conference, the parties agreed to establish an ad hoc group, open to all States parties, "to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument". The Ad Hoc Group has met since 1995 and, since 1997, the rolling text of a protocol on verification, submitted by the Chairman of the Group, has served as the basis for negotiations.

This chapter deals with developments related to the implementation of the BWC and the CWC and to the work of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in Iraq (UNMOVIC), the successor of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). UNMOVIC was established by Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) to ensure the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of Iraq's biological and chemical weapons programmes.

## **Developments and trends, 2000**

The year 2000 marked two important anniversaries—the 75th anniversary of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the BWC. In commemorating the former, Member States of the United Nations reaffirmed the validity of the Protocol and called for its provisions to be upheld. In particular, they called upon those States that continue to maintain reservations to

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<sup>2</sup> Four review conferences of the BWC have been held: 1980, 1986, 1991 and 1996. See *The Yearbook*, vol. 5: 1980, vol. 11: 1986, vol. 16: 1991 and vol. 21: 1996. The Fifth Review Conference will be held in 2001.

<sup>3</sup> For the report of the Special Conference, see document BWC/SPCONF/1, parts I, II and III. The Final Declaration of the Conference is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 19: 1994, pp. 126–128. The VEREX report is contained in document BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/9.

the Protocol to withdraw them.<sup>4</sup> As the States parties were observing the 25th anniversary of the BWC, they were also intensively engaged in the sixth year of their negotiations on a verification protocol.

### *Biological weapons*

Marking the 25th anniversary of the BWC, many participants in the Ad Hoc Group reaffirmed the determination of the States parties to bring the negotiations to an end before the Fifth Review Conference, in 2001. The three depositary States—the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States—in their joint statement in the Ad Hoc Group pledged their efforts to achieve this goal and called upon all other States parties to do likewise, and to accede to the protocol once it is agreed.

The leaders of eight major industrialized democracies and the President of the European Commission, meeting in Okinawa for the 26th Summit, committed themselves to work with others to conclude the negotiations on the verification protocol as early as possible in 2001.<sup>5</sup> At the Millennium Summit of the United Nations, heads of State and Government reaffirmed that commitment (see appendix, III, page 292).

The Ad Hoc Group held four sessions in 2000 in Geneva, under the chairmanship of Tibor Tóth of Hungary: the eighteenth session from 17 January to 4 February, the nineteenth from 13 to 31 March, the twentieth from 10 July to 8 August and the twenty-first from 20 November to 8 December.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See the report of the Secretary-General (A/55/115 and Add.1) indicating that, since 1998, two further States, Canada and Estonia, had withdrawn their reservations.

<sup>5</sup> A/55/257-S/2000/766, para. 78.

<sup>6</sup> The following States parties participated in all four sessions: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. The fol-

*Work of the Ad Hoc Group*

The Group continued its consideration of the following sections of the rolling text of the draft protocol under the guidance of the Chairman and a number of Friends of the Chair: (a) preamble, (b) general provisions, (c) definitions of terms and objective criteria, (d) measures to promote compliance, (e) confidentiality issues, (f) national implementation and assistance, (g) measures related to article X of the Convention (scientific and technological exchange and technical cooperation), (h) investigations, (i) legal issues and (j) seat of the organization. The Chairman steered discussions on issues relating to organization and arrangements for implementation. The results of discussions during the sessions were incorporated into the rolling text, with brackets reflecting sections on which agreement was not yet possible. Textual proposals pertaining to various areas were prepared by the Chairman and his Friends for future consideration, with a view to moving the negotiations forward. While these proposals were annexed to the rolling text, it was reaffirmed that the rolling text was the only basis for negotiations in the Ad Hoc Group.

At the end of the twenty-first session, in December, the rolling text comprised a preamble, 23 articles, 6 annexes, which provide detailed procedures on the implementation of the provisions of the protocol, and 8 appendices.<sup>7</sup>

At a press conference held in August, during the twentieth session, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group reported that the negotiations were moving ahead and that good progress had been made in certain areas, such as investigations, cooperation and promotional aspects of cooperation. However, there had been less progress with regard to compliance measures, which were core elements of the future protocol.

Following States parties participated in two sessions: Cyprus (20th and 21st), Ireland (20th and 21st), Jordan (18th and 19th), Panama (18th and 19th) and Slovenia (18th and 19th). The following States parties participated in one session: Albania (18th), Iraq (18th), Jamaica (21st), Mongolia (19th), Singapore (19th), Thailand (21st) and Viet Nam (21st). In addition, the following States signatories of the Convention participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Group in 2000: Egypt (21st), Morocco (18th, 19th, 20th and 21st), and Myanmar (21st).

<sup>7</sup> See the report of the Ad Hoc Group dated 18 December (BWC/AD HOC GROUP/54).

In the course of the twenty-first session, the Ad Hoc Group addressed its programme of work for 2001 and decided that it would hold three sessions that year, as follows: the twenty-second session from 12 to 23 February, the twenty-third from 23 April to 11 May and the twenty-fourth from 23 July to 17 August.

Furthermore, the Group recognized that completion of its mandate would require additional assistance. Therefore the Chairman requested Facilitators to assist the Group in the following areas: harmonization of timelines for activities and measures in the protocol, structural harmonization of issues, editorial issues, decision on the establishment of a preparatory commission, headquarters agreement with the host country, and harmonization of legal aspects of the protocol.

In accordance with the Group's decision of the previous session, the two candidates for the seat of the future organization, the Netherlands and Switzerland, submitted their responses to a questionnaire and made presentations outlining the basis of their respective bids.

In his closing statement at the twenty-first session, the Chairman stated that though there were many unsolved issues, the Group was in the final phase of work, and he reaffirmed the Group's commitment to deliver a protocol to the States parties that would fulfil the mandate within the allocated timeframe.

Parallel to their efforts to elaborate a verification mechanism, States parties continued their information exchange in the framework of politically binding confidence-building measures. The issues on which information was exchanged include: relevant research centres and laboratories; national biological defence research and development programmes; outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins; relevant legislation, regulations and other measures; past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes; and vaccine production facilities. In 2000, 36 States parties submitted reports.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Uzbekistan. See document DDA/BWC/2000/CBM and Add.1.

***Chemical weapons: the Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW***

The year 2000 marked the third year of operation of the OPCW. A large number of States continued to stress the importance of the Convention and the OPCW in their statements in the First Committee, the CD and the Disarmament Commission, and called upon States outside the regime to join it. Activities aimed at increasing the universality of membership continued at all levels. By the end of 2000, 12 more States<sup>9</sup> had deposited their instruments of ratification or accession, bringing the total number of States parties to 141.

In addition, a large number of workshops, seminars, conferences, symposia and other gatherings of governmental representatives, experts, representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and industry were held, organized by States, sometimes in cooperation with the OPCW.

The Fifth Session of the Conference of States Parties was held in The Hague from 15 to 19 May.<sup>10</sup> It was attended by 109 States parties,<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Azerbaijan, Colombia, Eritrea, Gabon, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Malaysia, Mozambique, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Yugoslavia.

<sup>10</sup> Report of the Fifth Session of the Conference of the States Parties, C-V/6.

<sup>11</sup> Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

2 contracting States,<sup>12</sup> 7 signatory States,<sup>13</sup> a non-signatory State,<sup>14</sup> representatives of four international organizations<sup>15</sup> and 16 NGO and industry representatives. The Conference had before it a number of reports concerning the work and activities of the OPCW. It approved the report on the implementation of the Convention (1 January–31 December 1999), and noted the report of the Executive Council on the performance of its activities (30 April 1999–2 April 2000). The Conference also adopted its programme and budget for 2001 and renewed the appointment of the Director-General. In addition, the Conference adopted a decision regarding the model agreement for chemical-weapons destruction facilities and a recommendation on ensuring the universality of the Convention. Furthermore, six requests to use chemical weapons production facilities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention and three privileges and immunities agreements were decided upon. The Conference also adopted a decision on the request of the Russian Federation for an extension of its obligation to meet the first intermediate deadline for the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpiles and on international financial assistance to it. Furthermore, the Conference elected 21 States parties as new members of the Executive Council for a two-year term of office, to commence on 12 May 2001.<sup>16</sup>

In his opening statement,<sup>17</sup> the Director-General of the OPCW underlined the significant progress made in the implementation of the Convention. He called upon all States—in particular those in the region of the Middle East—that had not joined the Convention to

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<sup>12</sup> Malaysia and Yugoslavia.

<sup>13</sup> Cape Verde, Gabon, Israel, Rwanda, Thailand, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

<sup>14</sup> The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was granted observer status.

<sup>15</sup> Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Permanent Court of Arbitration, United Nations, and International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

<sup>16</sup> (Africa) Botswana, Cameroon, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia; (Asia) China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia; (Eastern Europe) Bulgaria, Croatia; (Latin America and the Caribbean) Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay; (Western Europe and Other States) France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, United States.

<sup>17</sup> See OPCW Press Release 018/00.

do so, and urged Israel to ratify it. The Director-General also welcomed the forthcoming dialogue between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and expressed the hope that the latter would join the CWC. He noted the OPCW's successful start of inspections of chemical industry plants in the United States. Referring to the delay in destroying chemical weapons in the Russian Federation, the Director-General expressed the belief that Russia had demonstrated its commitment to the CWC by actions it had recently taken.

In the course of the year, the Executive Council of the OPCW held five sessions,<sup>18</sup> during which it dealt with a wide range of issues, some of which are discussed below.

The CWC made advances towards achieving universality in 2000, adding 12 new States parties: 3 from Africa, 5 from Asia, 2 from Eastern Europe and 2 from Latin America and the Caribbean; see appendix I, page 220. In view of the tensions in the Middle East, it is noteworthy that two of the new Asian States—United Arab Emirates and Yemen—were from that region, joining Jordan and Sudan as States parties.

Regarding the practical elimination of chemical weapons, by the end of the year, one half of the 61 chemical-weapons production plants declared to the OPCW by 11 States parties had been destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes. In addition, 7 per cent of the world's declared stockpile of 70 thousand tonnes of chemical agents and 15 per cent of the 8.4 million chemical munitions covered by the Convention had been destroyed. The United States continued its destruction programme, destroying 17.5 per cent of its schedule 1 chemical weapons and 99 per cent of its schedule 3 weapons.<sup>19</sup> However, the Russian Federation's lack of progress in launching an effective programme, due to administrative and financial difficulties, had

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<sup>18</sup> The eighteenth session was held 15–18 February; the nineteenth, 3–7 April; the twentieth, 27–28 June; the twenty-first, 3–6 October; and the twenty-second, 5–8 December.

<sup>19</sup> The Convention provides for 3 schedules of toxic chemicals and their precursors. The schedules identify chemicals for the application of the relevant verification measures, as set out in the Verification Annex to the Convention. The level of control over any chemical relates to the level of risk it poses to the object and purpose of the Convention and to the peaceful use of the chemical. See *The Yearbook*, vol. 17: 1992, p. 34.



a negative impact on its ability to meet its treaty obligations, and in spite of proposals put forward by Russian officials, it was evident late in the year that its destruction operations would likely be further delayed.

By the end of the year, all declared chemical weapons were inventoried, and all declared chemical-weapons production facilities were inactivated and made subject to the Convention's verification regime. Throughout the year, the OPCW conducted more than 300 inspections in 45 States parties and extended the scope of its inspection activities to 14 new States parties.

States parties continued their efforts to develop national legislation to regulate scheduled chemicals under the Convention. A number of States parties amended their implementing national legislation to enforce the ban on transfers of schedule 2 chemicals. Others that were in the process of drafting legislation requested assistance from the OPCW Technical Secretariat in determining the most effective method of regulating scheduled chemicals and precursors so as to facilitate the reporting required under the Convention and to improve control over transfers. To respond to such requests and to gain an overall view of the matter, the Technical Secretariat initiated in June a questionnaire survey of national legislative measures that had been or would be introduced by States parties. As of early December, 48 States had submitted their responses to the survey.<sup>20</sup>

In June, an exercise to investigate alleged use of chemical weapons took place in Słobovo, Poland. The exercise made it possible for the OPCW to test and evaluate procedures for this type of investigation in a realistic environment with the assistance of local citizens, military personnel and facilities offered by Poland. The planning of the exercise took nine months, and its execution involved more than 50 staff members from the OPCW.

In the context of its mandate for international cooperation, the OPCW initiated its Associate Programme. The programme was designed to give participants first-hand experience of the requirements of modern chemical manufacturing, as well as of plant safety and

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<sup>20</sup> See the legislation questionnaire "Survey of national measures to regulate scheduled chemicals under the Chemical Weapons Convention" (S/194/2000), issued by the OPCW Technical Secretariat, Office of the Legal Adviser, and the opening statement by the Director-General to the Executive Council at its twenty-second session.

other aspects of the operations of chemical companies, and to familiarize them with the manner in which the OPCW implements the CWC. Representatives from 12 countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America participated. The three-month long programme took place at the OPCW Secretariat, the University of Surrey, and in modern industrial chemical plants in the Netherlands.<sup>21</sup>

The Secretariat provided support to the national authorities of various States parties with the goal of achieving designation for more laboratories through their participation in official OPCW proficiency tests. (The evaluation of laboratories by means of the tests allows the OPCW to maintain a list of facilities qualified to undertake sample analyses.) During the year 2000, two official proficiency tests were concluded. As a result of the tests, 12 laboratories retained their designated status and one laboratory was newly designated.<sup>22</sup>

The Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the OPCW was signed on 17 October. By that Agreement, both organizations recognize the need to work jointly to achieve mutual objectives, and they agree to cooperate closely within their respective mandates and to consult on matters of mutual interest and concern, particularly in relation to promoting peace, disarmament and international cooperation in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter and the CWC. The Relationship Agreement will be implemented provisionally until it is officially adopted by the Conference of the States Parties of the OPCW and by the UN General Assembly in 2001.

Following the signing of the Relationship Agreement, the item "Cooperation between the United Nations and the OPCW" was included in the agenda of the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly. In his statement to the General Assembly on 20 October, the Director-General of the OPCW stressed the positive examples that the work of the OPCW provides for other legal instruments and verification regimes. He went on to highlight the successes of the OPCW over its three and a half years of existence, noting that they were impressive for an organization with a staff of around 500 persons from 66

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<sup>21</sup> OPCW Press Release 032/00.

<sup>22</sup> See the two notes of the OPCW Director-General: "Evaluation of the results of the sixth official proficiency test" (S/201/2000) and "Status of laboratories designated for the analysis of authentic samples" (S/204/2000), issued by the OPCW Technical Secretariat, Verification Division.

countries, including 200 inspectors, and operating with an annual budget of 55 million US dollars.

In his statement, the Director-General referred to the areas of implementation discussed above. In addition, in the context of remarks concerning universality, he pointed out that the Convention's mandates provide for assistance and protection to States parties in the event of an attack with chemical weapons and for promotion of technological development. In connection with the latter point, he called upon those States parties that retain export controls outside the CWC's framework to re-evaluate the need for them. He stressed the urgency of ensuring adequate funding for the OPCW, and warned that any significant widening of the gap between the financial resources available and its mandated responsibilities could damage its credibility and slow down the momentum towards universality. He also highlighted the need for the Convention to remain flexible to respond to new challenges such as chemical terrorism. Looking to the future, he expressed the hope that the OPCW would evolve from an organization with the purpose of ridding the world of chemical weapons to one with the purpose of promoting the use of chemistry for the benefit of all nations.

Delegations generally expressed their satisfaction with the signature of the Relationship Agreement, welcomed the work of the OPCW in implementing the CWC and emphasized the need for continuing efforts to achieve its universality.

Specifically, France, speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU) and associated States, expressed their belief that the Convention constituted an outstanding step in the sphere of disarmament and non-proliferation, and called upon all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify it. Referring to the importance of ensuring that chemical-weapon States destroy their stockpiles within the timeframes set out in the Convention, it recalled the EU's Joint Action of 17 December 1999 to allocate 5.9 million euros to help in the construction of a chemical-weapons destruction plant in Russia. Furthermore, France expressed the hope that the progress made in implementing the CWC would give impetus to the negotiations currently under way on a protocol to strengthen the BWC.

The Islamic Republic of Iran commended the work of the OPCW in verifying the compliance of States parties with their obligations, and, as an international forum, in facilitating consultations and cooper-

ation among them. Addressing the issue of universality, it stressed that much still needed to be done in the region of the Middle East. It believed that both the United Nations and the OPCW should utilize their available means of cooperation to guarantee the achievement of that end.

China, while welcoming the signing of the Relationship Agreement and congratulating the OPCW upon its important accomplishments, noted that there were still issues related to the implementation of the Convention which could not be ignored, such as the fact that important countries in certain regions had not ratified it and others had expressed reservations pertaining to important and substantive articles when adopting their own national legislation. It also stressed that more attention should be paid to the destruction and verification of abandoned chemical weapons.

Brazil pointed out that the OPCW, with no diminution of its autonomous, distinct character, was beginning to operate as a branch of the UN system. Thus the United Nations now had impartial and efficient means to act with increasing legitimacy to promote disarmament and non-proliferation in the area of chemical weapons. Moreover, with regard to development, cooperation between the OPCW and the United Nations offered promising prospects for the chemical industry and for the use of scientific and technical knowledge for peaceful purposes.

In addition to the concern about universality, which it shared with all parties to the CWC, India noted another concern, namely, the slow implementation of article XI. Referring to the ongoing negotiations on a protocol to the BWC, it stressed that it was essential that both the CWC and BWC be implemented fully and completely in order to ensure that they could serve as models for dealing effectively with all categories of weapons of mass destruction.

## UNMOVIC

On 17 December 1999, the Security Council adopted resolution 1284 (1999),<sup>23</sup> by which it established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), to undertake the responsibilities mandated to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) by the Council with regard to the verification of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under paragraphs 8, 9 and 10

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<sup>23</sup> See *The Yearbook*, vol. 24: 1999, chap. II, pp. 68-71.

of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions. The new Commission, a subsidiary body of the Security Council, would take over UNSCOM's assets, liabilities and archives and was mandated to establish and operate a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification which would implement the plan approved by resolution 715 (1991) and address unresolved disarmament issues. It would also identify, as necessary in accordance with its mandate, additional sites in Iraq to be covered by the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification.

By the same resolution, the Secretary-General was requested to appoint an Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, after consultation with and subject to the approval of the Council, and in consultation with him/her and the Council members, to appoint suitably qualified experts as a College of Commissioners for UNMOVIC. The resolution requested the Executive Chairman to submit to the Council an organizational plan for UNMOVIC, including its structure, staffing requirements, management guidelines, recruitment and training procedures. The Security Council also reaffirmed the provisions of the relevant resolutions with regard to the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in addressing Iraq's compliance with the Council's resolutions. The Council furthermore expressed its intention to suspend sanctions for a period of 120 days once UNMOVIC and the IAEA reported that Iraq had cooperated in all respects with them, in particular in fulfilling the work programme referred to in paragraph 7 of resolution 1284 (1999), and both UNMOVIC and the IAEA had reported to the Council that the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification was fully operational.

In accordance with paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution, the Secretary-General, by a letter dated 26 January,<sup>24</sup> recommended to the Council that Dr. Hans Blix of Sweden be appointed as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC. The recommendation was subsequently approved by the Council.<sup>25</sup>

On 6 April, in consultation with and through the Secretary-General, the Executive Chairman submitted to the Council, for its

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<sup>24</sup> S/2000/60.

<sup>25</sup> S/2000/61.

approval, the organizational plan requested.<sup>26</sup> It described the cooperative management structure of UNMOVIC, explained its staffing principles, defined the responsibilities of the Commission and obligations of Iraq and outlined its organizational structure, including its various divisions and services. The Security Council discussed the plan and approved it on 13 April.<sup>27</sup>

On 6 March, the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, acting on behalf of the Secretary-General, wrote to members of the Security Council to consult on the list of qualified experts to serve as Commissioners of the College proposed by the Secretary-General.<sup>28</sup> Following these consultations, in a letter dated 10 March addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General announced that he had appointed 16 experts as Commissioners.<sup>29</sup> He also stated that Dr. Blix, in his capacity as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, would chair the meetings of the College.

The College of Commissioners held three meetings during 2000<sup>30</sup> to review the implementation of resolution 1284 (1999) and other relevant resolutions and provide political advice and guidance to the Executive Chairman, including guidance on significant policy decisions and on the Commission's quarterly written reports submitted to the Council through the Secretary-General. In addition to the members of the College, representatives of the IAEA and the OPCW attended the meetings as observers.

In the course of its meetings, the College of Commissioners discussed and commented on practical preparations for the commencement of the Commission's work in Iraq. One of the main points discussed was the timeframe for UNMOVIC activities in Iraq, within the meaning of Council resolution 1284 (1999), in particular para-

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<sup>26</sup> S/2000/292 and Corr.1. The structure provides for: a College of Commissioners, Executive Chairman, Office of the Executive Chairman, Division of Planning and Operations, Division of Analysis and Assessment, Division of Information, Division of Technical Support and Training and Administrative Service.

<sup>27</sup> S/2000/311.

<sup>28</sup> S/2000/516.

<sup>29</sup> S/2000/207.

<sup>30</sup> The meetings took place 23–24 May, 23–24 August and 27–29 November.

graphs 7, 12 and 33. The College also discussed and commented on a draft action plan for the resumption of activities in Iraq. Furthermore, it held an exchange of views on procedures applied and to be applied by UNMOVIC for operations in the field, including, in particular, for inspections of "sensitive sites". With regard to the latter, the College stressed the need for guidelines and standard operating procedures that would especially assist chief inspectors in the conduct of their responsibilities. The College was also consulted on and supported principles for sampling and analysis, which would form the basis of detailed guidelines for such activities with respect to Iraq. It also discussed and had briefings on the use of satellite imagery.

In accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), the Commissioners were consulted on the contents of the reports of the Executive Chairman to the Security Council and they provided guidance to the Executive Chairman for those reports. In 2000, three quarterly reports, submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of resolution 1284 (1999), were transmitted to the Security Council.<sup>31</sup> In addition, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC provided monthly briefings to the Presidents of the Security Council.

At all meetings, the College received extensive briefings by the Executive Chairman and staff of UNMOVIC on various aspects of the status of its work, including the results of its training courses, the process for recruiting personnel and the Joint UNMOVIC/IAEA Unit for Export/Import Monitoring, including the revision of the lists of mainly dual-use items and materials to which the mechanism applies.

Furthermore, the Commissioners were briefed on IAEA's activities in Iraq under Security Council resolution 1284 (1999)<sup>32</sup> and on activities related to the implementation of the "oil-for-food" programme.

As evident from the quarterly reports, one of the core activities of UNMOVIC was the recruitment of staff. As of the end of the year, recruitment for most of the positions needed for the core staff

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<sup>31</sup> The first covered the period 1 March–31 May (S/2000/516); the second, 1 June–31 August (S/2000/835); and the third, 1 September–30 November (S/2000/1134).

<sup>32</sup> For further details, see the above-cited quarterly reports.

based in New York had taken place: 43 persons (of whom 10 are women) from 20 Member States.<sup>33</sup>

In addition, pursuant to resolution 1284 (1999), high-quality technical and cultural training for UNMOVIC personnel and potential future inspectors was organized, as described in the quarterly reports. The first training course was held from 11 July to 10 August in New York, at which 44 persons drawn from 19 nationalities took part. The second training course took place in France from 7 November to 8 December, in which 58 persons encompassing 23 nationalities participated. The governments of France and the United States provided facilities for the practical elements of the respective courses. At the end of the year, the preparations for a third training course were under way. The training programme comprised historical, legal, administrative and political issues related to weapons inspections and monitoring activities in Iraq, historical and cultural background on Iraq and discipline-specific training (ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, biological weapons and export/import).<sup>34</sup>

In accordance with the provisions of resolution 1284 (1999), UNMOVIC and the IAEA reconstituted the Export/Import Joint Unit in New York to deal with exports of dual-use goods subject to the provisions of resolution 1051 (1996). The Unit continued the revision and updating of the lists of items to which the export/import mechanism applies. The Joint Unit received notifications from States and international organizations of exports to Iraq of dual-use goods.<sup>35</sup>

The Commission also began a systematic and thorough review of existing databases, reassessed and evaluated the archives taken over from UNSCOM, and examined inspection procedures with a view to defining appropriate operational procedures to be applied under the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification.<sup>36</sup> A number of other activities aimed at facilitating the resumption of inspections in Iraq were also carried out. They included studies to determine the priority of sites to be inspected and formats of reporting from the field as well as studies to identify sites at which dual-use items might have been installed or used since December 1998, when

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<sup>33</sup> S/2000/1134.

<sup>34</sup> S/2000/516.

<sup>35</sup> S/2000/1134.

<sup>36</sup> S/2000/835.



inspection activities were suspended. Communications equipment and a variety of sensors for use in the field were also being evaluated by the Commission's experts and lists of other logistical requirements were drawn up.<sup>37</sup>

The Executive Chairman also undertook numerous consultations with representatives of many governments, the Director-General of the IAEA and the Director-General of the OPCW.

### **Australia Group**

The Australia Group,<sup>38</sup> meeting from 2 to 5 October in Paris for informal consultations, welcomed Cyprus and Turkey as new participants. The Group reaffirmed the common purpose of all participants of upholding the aims of the BWC and CWC and confirmed their commitment to the successful conclusion of the negotiations on a protocol to the BWC. The Group also reaffirmed the belief of all participants that effective export licensing at the national level, on a non-discriminatory basis, was crucial to achieving the aims of the BWC and CWC to facilitate the use of chemical and biological technology for peaceful purposes. In order to reflect the changing technical environment, a number of adjustments were made to the common control lists which form the basis for the national measures taken by its participants. The participants ensured that their national positions on transfers of chemical mixtures were in line with the decisions taken by the OPCW.

### **General Assembly, 2000**

The General, pursuant to recommendations of the First Committee, took action on three draft resolutions dealing with subjects discussed in this chapter.

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<sup>37</sup> S/2000/1134.

<sup>38</sup> The Australia Group, an informal forum of States chaired by Australia, has the goal of discouraging and impeding the proliferation of chemical weapons by harmonizing national export controls on precursor chemicals for chemical weapons and by facilitating information exchange. The Group was established in 1984 as a result of the use of chemical weapons in the war between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq. The Group has established common export controls for the non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

**55/33 J - Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.** The draft resolution was introduced by South Africa on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on 19 October. On 25 October, at the time of the vote in the First Committee, South Africa orally revised operative paragraph 2 by replacing the words "one State party" with the words "two States parties". The draft resolution, as orally revised, was thereupon adopted by the First Committee (144-0-4) and on 20 November by the General Assembly (163-0-5). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 330 and 418, respectively.

**55/33 H - Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.** The draft resolution was introduced by Poland on behalf of itself and Canada on 16 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 25 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see pages 327.

*First Committee:* Although Egypt sympathized with the general thrust of the draft resolution, which addressed a legal instrument aimed at having an impact on disarmament, as opposed to non-proliferation, it did not consider itself part of the consensus decision. Egypt explained its reservation in terms of Foreign Minister Moussa's proposal for a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and the fact that all States of the region were parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with the exception of Israel. Israel's explanation of its support of the draft resolution also reflected regional concerns regarding weapons of mass destruction. Although it had signed the Convention, it would not ratify it until other countries in the region followed suit, among which, it stated, were some known to have used chemical weapons in the past and believed to be currently striving to improve their capabilities.

**55/40 - Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.** The draft resolution was introduced by Hungary on behalf of the sponsors on 19 October (see page 407 for the sponsors), adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 31 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 385.

## **Conclusion**

The year 2000 marked both the 75th anniversary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the BWC.

The States parties to the BWC, working through four intensive sessions of the Ad Hoc Group, pursued their objective of concluding a protocol on verification. The rolling text advanced in a number of areas, but serious differences of view persisted with respect to compliance measures, a key component of the future protocol. As a large amount of unagreed text remained at the end of the year, the Ad Hoc Group will have to exert considerable effort and demonstrate flexibility in order to conclude its negotiations before the Fifth Review Conference, to be held late in 2001.

Significant progress was made by the OPCW in implementing the provisions of the Convention, as evident from the continuing destruction or conversion of chemical-weapons production plants and the destruction of chemical agents and chemical munitions. By the end of the year, inventories for all declared chemical weapons had been established and all declared chemical-weapons production facilities were inactivated and subject to the CWC verification regime. The task of ensuring the destruction of all stockpiles in the chemical-weapon States as soon as possible and within the timeframes set out in the Convention poses a considerable challenge. The achievement of universality of the Convention remains key to its effective implementation. While the number of countries adhering to the Convention increased during the year, many chose to remain outside.

The signing of the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the OPCW marked an important step in coordinating and harmonizing the activities and efforts of both organizations and in facilitating the implementation of the CWC.

UNMOVIC, the successor of UNSCOM, commenced its work as requested by Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) in order to prepare itself for full operation. In doing so, it focused on the recruitment and training of staff and potential future inspectors, began a systematic and thorough review of existing databases, reassessed and evaluated the archives taken over from UNSCOM, and examined inspection procedures with a view to defining appropriate operational procedures to be applied under the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification. The Commission will only be able, however,

to assess Iraq's compliance with respect to its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions when the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification is in operation and there is cooperation by Iraq.

## CHAPTER IV

### Conventional weapons issues

#### Introduction

QUESTIONS RELATED TO CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND ARMED FORCES have been discussed in different bodies of the United Nations since its creation.<sup>1</sup> Except for efforts in the 1950s and early 1960s to discuss them in the framework of general and complete disarmament, the emphasis has been on weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. While recognizing the need to address conventional weapons, most non-nuclear-weapon States, especially non-aligned countries, have felt the urgency to make progress in nuclear disarmament. As a result, very limited measures have been undertaken, and most of them have been at the regional level. The first global agreement to prohibit or restrict the use of certain conventional weapons was reached in 1981, when the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) and its three Protocols were signed.

In the early 1990s, in response to an increase in the number of conflicts, especially intra-State ones, the United Nations and other fora began to address questions related to small arms and light weapons. The Security Council considered these questions in the context of ongoing conflicts. The growing awareness of the need to curb the excessive accumulation and transfer of these arms led the General

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<sup>1</sup> See *The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1), chap. 2. See, in particular, resolution 41(I) of 14 December 1946.

Assembly to mandate three expert studies,<sup>2</sup> and, in 1998, to take the major decision to convene an international conference on the illicit trade in small arms in all its aspects in 2001 and, in 1999, to establish a preparatory committee open to participation of all States. In addition, in 1998, the Secretary-General designated the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) as the focal point for all action on small arms within the UN system, and the Department subsequently established the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) mechanism.

In 1999, the Disarmament Commission adopted guidelines on conventional arms control, with an emphasis on practical disarmament measures.<sup>3</sup> In addition, negotiations began on a draft protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition (referred to hereafter as the firearms protocol), supplementing the UN convention against transnational organized crime, also under negotiation.<sup>4</sup> The protocol was not expected to apply to State-to-State transactions or transfers for purposes of national security.

Parallel to efforts to curb and prohibit the use of certain conventional arms, the General Assembly established two mechanisms to increase transparency in military matters and thus to generate confidence among States: the standardized instrument for international reporting of military expenditures (1980)<sup>5</sup> and the UN Register of Conventional Arms (1992).<sup>6</sup>

To address the dramatic increase in the number of civilian mine casualties during the 1990s, the international community undertook,

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<sup>2</sup> Three expert studies on the subject were prepared: A/52/298 (1997), A/54/258 (1999) and A/54/155 (1999).

<sup>3</sup> A/54/42, annex III.

<sup>4</sup> The Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was concluded in 2000 and opened for signature in December 2000. The Firearms Protocol, annexed to document A/55/383/Add.2, was adopted by the General Assembly on 31 May 2001.

<sup>5</sup> The instrument covers three categories of expenditure (operating costs, procurement and construction, and research and development) relating to strategic, land, naval, air and other combat forces, central support administration and command, paramilitary forces, and military assistance.

<sup>6</sup> The Register covers transfers in 7 categories of weapons: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers.

in 1996, to amend Protocol II<sup>7</sup> of the CCW to prohibit the use and transfer of non-detectable mines and to extend its scope of application to cover both international and internal armed conflicts. Efforts to go beyond Amended Protocol II towards a total ban led to the adoption of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines (APMs) and on Their Destruction at a diplomatic conference in Oslo in September 1997.<sup>8</sup>

Efforts to regulate and reduce conventional weapons and armed forces and to establish confidence-building measures in military matters have also been made at subregional and regional levels.

This chapter deals with questions concerning conventional weapons at the global level: efforts to curb the destabilizing and excessive accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons; practical disarmament measures; transparency measures; and issues related to anti-personnel mines. Regional aspects of these subjects are discussed in chapter V.<sup>9</sup>

## **Developments and trends, 2000**

In 2000, issues pertaining to small arms and light weapons were discussed in the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Secretariat, at a number of meetings celebrating the Millennium and at the Preparatory Committee for the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.<sup>10</sup>

During the year, the Security Council continued to consider questions related to small arms and the protection of civilians, especially children, in armed conflicts. Through resolutions and presidential

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<sup>7</sup> Amended Protocol II entered into force on 3 December 1998, and the First Annual Conference of its States parties took place in December 1999 in Geneva.

<sup>8</sup> The Convention entered into force on 1 March 1999 and the First Meeting of its States parties took place in May 1999, in Maputo, Mozambique; for the text of the Maputo Declaration, see *The Yearbook*, vol. 24: 1999, pp. 111–114.

<sup>9</sup> For additional information on issues discussed in this chapter, see the DDA website: [www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB](http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB).

<sup>10</sup> Hereafter referred to in this chapter as the 2001 UN Conference.

statements,<sup>11</sup> it addressed the impact of small arms during conflicts, links between arms trafficking and other criminal activities, and the importance of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants (DDR).

The Council reaffirmed, *inter alia*, its strong condemnation of the deliberate targeting of civilians or other protected persons in situations of armed conflict; reaffirmed its grave concern at the harmful and widespread impact of such conflict on civilians, particularly women, children and other vulnerable groups; urged all parties to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of children in armed conflict;<sup>12</sup> and invited the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution. It also expressed its grave concern at the linkages between illicit trade in natural resources and armed conflict and between illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons and armed conflict, which could prolong the conflict and intensify its impact on children. The Council also considered the matter of DDR in a peace-keeping environment as a part of its overall and continuing effort to contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of UN peace-keeping and peace-building activities in conflict situations around the world; affirmed its intention to include in the mandates of the UN peace-keeping operations, on a case-by-case basis, clear terms for activities related to DDR; encouraged all those involved in the planning for DDR to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependents; and recognized that adequate and timely funding for DDR was critical to the successful implementation of a peace process.

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<sup>11</sup> See the following Security Council resolutions: 1296 (2000), on the protection of civilians in armed conflict; 1314 (2000), on the impact of armed conflict on children; and 1325 (2000), on women and peace and security. See also presidential statements S/PRST/2000/10 and S/PRST/2000/25.

<sup>12</sup> By its resolution 1314 (2000), the Security Council welcomed the adoption by the General Assembly on 25 May of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.



The Panel on UN Peace Operations submitted its report<sup>13</sup> to the Secretary-General in which, after a thorough and very critical analysis of the past experiences of UN peace-keeping operations, it made a number of recommendations for reform. While referring to a pressing need to establish more effective strategies for conflict prevention, the Panel considered that “disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants—key to immediate post-conflict stability and reduced likelihood of conflict recurrence—was an area in which peace-building made a direct contribution to public security and law and order”. However, the basic objective of DDR would not be met unless all three elements of the programme were implemented. After stressing the need for better information-gathering, analysis, and strategic planning capacities, the Panel proposed the creation of the Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) within the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) and that the Monitoring, Database and Information Branch (MDI) of DDA should be one of its close affiliates.

In response to a request of the Security Council<sup>14</sup> to develop a reference manual for use in the field in support of weapons destruction programmes, the Secretary-General prepared a report<sup>15</sup> with the assistance of governmental, technical experts that highlighted the advantages and disadvantages of various practical destruction methods currently available and their environmental impact. The experts developed a possible partial layout for an eventual manual and made a number of recommendations, among which was regular maintenance and review of the manual on the Internet.

The Register continued to be the most important instrument of transparency in the field of conventional weapons at the global level. Although it is far from a universal instrument, there was a substantial

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<sup>13</sup> In March 2000, the Secretary-General convened a high-level Panel under the chairmanship of Lakhdar Brahimi of Algeria to undertake a thorough review of the UN peace and security activities and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations. For the text, see document A/55/305-S/2000/809.

<sup>14</sup> S/PRST/1999/28.

<sup>15</sup> For the text of the report entitled “Methods of destruction of small arms, light weapons, ammunition and explosives”, see document S/2000/1092. Annex II sets out the definition of small arms and light weapons, and annex III sets out the format of the reference manual.

increase in the number of replies for 1999. Differences among Member States regarding its future development persisted. The 2000 Expert Group on the Register could not agree on expanding the scope of the Register to include data on military holdings and procurement through national production on the same basis as data on transfers. It was also not able to agree on the inclusion of weapons of mass destruction. In spite of these differences, however, for the first time in several years, the General Assembly adopted only one resolution on the issue.

The trend towards an increase in military expenditures, noted by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) during the previous year, seemed to persist. SIPRI's provisional figures for 2000 indicate that the world spent \$798 billion in current US dollars; an increase of 3 per cent over 1999 and of 5 per cent over 1998, when post-cold war reductions in world military expenditure ended. The estimate corresponds to a world average of \$130 per capita.<sup>16</sup> According to the *World Development Report 2000*, global military expenditure represented more than 10 per cent of central government expenditures, ranging from an average of 16.4 per cent for low-income economies to 10.1 per cent for high-income economies.<sup>17</sup> The United Nations continued to gather official data from Member States through its standardized reporting instrument for military expenditures. The level of participation remained low, although there was some perceptible improvement.

Preparations for the Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the CCW were undertaken during the Preparatory Committee meetings and a number of decisions were taken. Two important developments took place in Geneva with regard to the two legal instruments on anti-personnel mines: the Second Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine-Ban Convention, from 11 to 15 September, and the Second Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II, from 11 to 13 December. The General Assembly adopted resolutions directly pertaining to these two instruments, as described

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<sup>16</sup> The figure \$798 billion in current US dollars corresponds roughly to \$756 billion at constant 1998 prices and exchange rates. See *SIPRI Yearbook 2001*, Oxford University Press, 2001.

<sup>17</sup> *World Development Report 2000*, published by the World Bank, p. 286. The figures refer to data for 1999.

on pages 127–128, and a resolution on the more general topic of assistance in mine action.<sup>18</sup>

The foreign ministers of the G-8, meeting in Miyazaki, Japan, on 13 July, launched the so-called “G-8 Miyazaki Initiative for Conflict Prevention”<sup>19</sup> through which they would undertake a number of initiatives to address small arms and light weapons, conflict and development, illicit trade in diamonds, and children in armed conflicts. After expressing their strong support for national, regional and international efforts to ensure that transfers of small arms were carried out in a responsible and legal fashion, they underlined the need for a successful outcome of the 2001 UN Conference.

### *Small arms*

During the year, a number of meetings at governmental and non-governmental levels were held and reports were prepared on issues related to small arms and light weapons. There was a great deal of activity in this area within the United Nations system, particularly connected with Millennium events, and the General Assembly had before it a large body of material related to small arms.

### *Millennium summit meetings*

In his report<sup>20</sup> submitted to the Millennium Summit of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General focused on two categories of weapons: small arms and light weapons, because they currently kill most people in most wars; and nuclear weapons, because of their terrifying potential for mass destruction. After stressing that there was still no global non-proliferation regime to limit the spread of

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<sup>18</sup> Resolution 55/120, adopted without a vote. See also the corresponding report of the Secretary-General (A/55/542). In addition, the General Assembly of OAS, meeting in San José, Costa Rica, 3–5 June, adopted two resolutions related to mines: “Support for Action against Mines in Peru and Ecuador” (AG/RES.1745 (XXX-0/00)), and “Support for the Program of Integral Action against Anti-personnel Mines in Central America” (AG/RES.1751 (XXX-0/00)).

<sup>19</sup> For the text, see document A/55/161-S/2000/714, annex.

<sup>20</sup> For the report, entitled “We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century”, see document A/54/2000\*, paras. 234–253, excerpted in appendix III of this volume, page 292.

small arms, as was the case with chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, the Secretary-General underlined that controlling the proliferation of illicit weapons was a necessary first step towards the non-proliferation of small arms and that these weapons must be brought under the control of States. He urged Member States to take advantage of the forthcoming Conference by taking serious actions that would curtail the illicit traffic in these weapons.

Issues related to small arms and light weapons were addressed by a large number of Heads of State and Government at the Millennium Summit, held from 6 to 8 September at UN Headquarters in New York, and during the general debate of the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly. At the Millennium Summit, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations Millennium Declaration,<sup>21</sup> in which Member States undertook, *inter alia*, "to take concerted action to end illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, especially by making arms transfers more transparent and supporting regional disarmament measures, taking account of all the recommendations of the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons".

On 7 September, in the course of the Millennium Summit, the Security Council held a meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government to discuss the need to ensure an effective role for the Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, particularly in Africa, and adopted a resolution entitled "Millennium Summit Declaration".<sup>22</sup> In it, the Security Council pledged: to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in addressing conflict at all stages from prevention to settlement to post-conflict peace-building; stressed the critical importance of DDR and emphasized that DDR programmes should normally be integrated into the mandates of peace-keeping operations; and called for effective international action to prevent the illegal flow of small arms into areas of conflict.

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<sup>21</sup> General Assembly resolution 55/2 of 8 September; see appendix III, page 295.

<sup>22</sup> Security Council resolution 1318 (2000); see appendix III, page 297.

The participants in the Millennium Forum<sup>23</sup> adopted a final document, in which they urged the United Nations to take a number of measures, *inter alia*, to develop a draft proposal for global disarmament to be discussed in a fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, and to expand the Arms Register in order to show the production and sale of small arms and light weapons. In addition, they urged governments to initiate a worldwide freeze on armed forces and a 25 per cent cut in production and export of major weapons and small arms and, to that end, to adopt an international code of conduct on arms exports, as the beginning of a worldwide build-down of conventional forces.

*Preparatory process for the 2001 UN Conference*

The Preparatory Committee, established on the basis of General Assembly resolution 54/54 V of 15 December 1999, held its first session from 28 February to 3 March in New York with the participation of 150 States.<sup>24</sup> In addition, 9 intergovernmental organizations and

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<sup>23</sup> The Millennium Forum took place from 22 to 26 May at UN Headquarters in New York, a gathering of 1,350 representatives of over 1,000 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society organizations from more than 100 countries. It adopted a document which deals with peace, security and disarmament. See appendix III, page 298.

<sup>24</sup> Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of the Congo, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania,

entities participated as observers.<sup>25</sup> During the session, the Committee held a total of 10 meetings, of which 4 were closed meetings and 4 were devoted to the general debate, in which 57 participating States made statements. The Committee elected Carlos dos Santos of Mozambique as Chairman and 24 Vice-Chairmen representing different groups of States. At its first meeting the Committee also adopted its agenda.

Although the General Assembly had requested<sup>26</sup> the Committee to decide on the date and the venue of the Conference in 2001 as well as the dates and venue of the Committee's subsequent sessions, the Preparatory Committee deferred its decision on the date and venue of the Conference and on the modalities of attendance of non-governmental organizations at its sessions. It decided to hold its second session in New York from 8 to 19 January 2001 and its third session from 19 to 30 March, and to consider the recommendations to the Conference on all relevant matters, including the objective, a draft agenda, draft rules of procedure and draft final documents, which would include a programme of action. From 17 to 19 July and in October–November during the First Committee, informal consultations open to all members of the Preparatory Committee were convened by its Chairman. This gave delegations an opportunity to express preliminary views on both the draft objective and a draft programme of action.

In order to contribute regional and subregional perspectives to the work of the Conference, States of Latin America and the Caribbean and of Africa held meetings to develop their respective common ap-

Russian Federation, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Yemen.

<sup>25</sup> Caribbean Community, European Commission, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Organization of the Islamic Conference, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

<sup>26</sup> General Assembly resolution 54/54 V of 15 December 1999.

proaches and communicated those approaches to the Preparatory Committee. In Latin America, the Regional Preparatory Meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean States for the Conference took place in Brasilia from 22 to 24 November and adopted the Brasilia Declaration.<sup>27</sup> After recalling relevant regional efforts, the representatives reiterated their determination to participate actively in the Conference, expressed their support for the work of the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, highlighted the importance of an adequate participation of civil society in the preparatory process, and agreed to a number of goals for the Conference. The Ministers of the member States of the OAU, meeting in Bamako, Mali, from 30 November to 1 December, adopted the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons.<sup>28</sup> They appealed to the wider international community and, in particular, to arms supplier countries to accept that trade in small arms should be limited to governments and authorized registered licensed traders, and to support and fund the efforts of the OAU member States in addressing these problems. Finally, they called for a realistic and implementable programme of action to be adopted at the Conference.

In addition, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) adopted at its Forum for Security Cooperation, on 24 November, a Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons,<sup>29</sup> which contained norms, principles and measures covering all aspects of the problem of the spread of such weapons. It focused on: (a) combating illicit trafficking in all its aspects; (b) management of stockpiles, reduction of surpluses and destruction; and (c) small arms and light weapons as an integral part of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The OSCE believed that the Document could make a valuable contribution to the activities of the United Nations in this field.

During the consideration of issues related to small arms, the General Assembly had before it the Secretary-General's report con-

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<sup>27</sup> For the text of the Declaration, see document A/55/679, appendix.

<sup>28</sup> For the text of the Bamako Declaration, see A/CONF.192/PC/23, annex.

<sup>29</sup> The Document was circulated as a document of the 2001 UN Conference (A/CONF.192/PC/20), annex.

veying the views of six Member States on his 1999 report on small arms.<sup>30</sup>

### *Feasibility study*

The Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, established by the Secretary-General at the request of the General Assembly,<sup>31</sup> was mandated to carry out a study on the feasibility of restricting the manufacture and trade of small arms and light weapons to the manufacturers and dealers authorized by States, which would cover the brokering activities, particularly illicit activities, related to such weapons, including transportation agents and financial transactions. In the course of its work, the Group identified and evaluated a range of existing laws, regulations, administrative procedures and related approaches at the national and international levels. The Group also explored and evaluated possible new approaches or options in this regard in the light of ongoing developments. Furthermore, during the meeting, presentations were made by experts on the status of the negotiations in Vienna on a protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition and related materials, as well as by representatives of civil society, including manufacturers and NGOs. The study is to be submitted as one of the background documents for the 2001 UN Conference.<sup>32</sup>

### *Consultations on illicit trafficking in small arms*

The Secretary-General held broad-based consultations on illicit trafficking in small arms and submitted a report<sup>33</sup> providing an overview of meetings convened under the auspices of the United Nations by

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<sup>30</sup> A/55/189 and Add. 1. Views regarding the 1999 report (A/54/258) were received from: Brazil, China, Colombia, Jordan, Ukraine and Qatar.

<sup>31</sup> General Assembly resolution 54/54 V of 15 December 1999. The Group held two sessions in New York (14–19 May and 10–14 July), and also met in Sofia (17–19 October) for an informal workshop at the invitation of the Government of Bulgaria.

<sup>32</sup> A/CONF.192/2. The study was originally submitted as a document of the Third Preparatory Committee (A/CONF.192/PC/33).

<sup>33</sup> The report was submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 54/54 R of 1 December 1999 (A/55/323 and Add.1).



regional and subregional organizations, and by States or groups of States. The report also contained general observations on the magnitude and scope of illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; measures to combat illicit trafficking in such weapons; and the role of the United Nations in collecting, collating, sharing and disseminating information on illicit trafficking.

The Secretary-General stated that the consultations highlighted the awareness of the issue of illicit small arms trafficking and that an increasing number of States, regional organizations and representatives of civil society were proposing and, in some cases, implementing prevention and reduction measures to combat this phenomenon. In addition, interest in these matters had been provoked by the Vienna-based negotiations on the protocol on firearms. Replies of 11 governments and information on activities of various representatives of civil society were annexed to the report.<sup>34</sup>

### *Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism*

CASA held six meetings<sup>35</sup> over the course of the year, at which participants discussed what activities would be appropriate for it to carry out, what measures could strengthen it, and the role CASA should play vis-à-vis the Conference. In addition, DDA carried out a series of interviews with individual focal points early in the year to ascertain the range of views on these matters. CASA meetings provided opportunities for extensive briefings on various aspects of the work of the United Nations and other international organizations in small arms. At its July meeting, CASA members were briefed on: the informal meeting, from 17 to 19 July, of the Preparatory Committee for the 2001 UN Conference; the activities of the Geneva-based

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<sup>34</sup> Brazil, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Jordan, Portugal (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the European Union (EU)), Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden and Tunisia. Later, additional replies by France (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the EU, supplementing the reply submitted by Portugal) and by Qatar were submitted.

<sup>35</sup> 18 January, 25 April, 5 June, 21 July, 15 September and 22 November.

Reference Group on Small Arms (RGSA);<sup>36</sup> the activities of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA);<sup>37</sup> and the OAU consultations (Addis Ababa, 22–23 June) on illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking in small arms and light weapons. During its September meeting, the Group was briefed, *inter alia*, on the firearms protocol negotiations in Vienna. In addition, an informal exchange of views was held on the draft resolution entitled “Illicit traffic in small arms”, which South Africa later introduced in the First Committee. At its last meeting, in November, the participants were briefed on the new developments in the implementation of UN arms embargoes imposed by the Security Council, on the Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council on methods of destruction of small arms, light weapons, ammunition and explosives, and on the discussions during the First Committee on issues related to small arms and the preparatory process for the 2001 UN Conference and regional events. In addition, the Director of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) briefed the participants on the draft paper entitled “Removing military weapons from civilian hands”.

***Practical disarmament measures and assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms***

The open-ended Group of Interested States on Practical Disarmament Measures, established in 1998, met four times during the year<sup>38</sup> to discuss different project proposals.

With the successful conclusion of the “Weapons in exchange for development” project in Gramsch, the Government of Albania decided to replicate the project in other areas of the country with the continuing assistance of DDA and UNDP and the Group of Interested States. In April, DDA dispatched an evaluation mission to

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<sup>36</sup> Established in 1998 with a membership comprising the Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UNDP, UNICEF, the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the ICRC (observer) and the Steering Committee on Humanitarian Response. The RGSA is tasked with developing an advocacy strategy on the humanitarian impact of small arms.

<sup>37</sup> A network of some 200 NGOs from the areas of human rights, development, conflict prevention, peace-building, public health, gun control and arms control.

<sup>38</sup> The Group met 10 February, 6 June, 11 September and 12 December.

Albania to assess the result of the pilot project. It reported that progress was being made, particularly in terms of a significant change of attitude among the citizens towards weapons, and that the Government remained committed to the collection and destruction of weapons in the possession of civilians.

An information-gathering mission<sup>39</sup> visiting Niger from 30 July to 12 August recommended that UNDP, in close consultation with DDA and the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED), together with the Government and target populations, should develop and expand a programme of action aimed at effectively addressing the proliferation of illicit weapons and retrieving and collecting them in the region of N'Guigmi. It also made a number of recommendations to enhance the functioning of the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Arms (CNCCAI).

The joint DDA/DPA mission to Congo, from 26 to 28 July, financially supported by the Group of Interested States, gathered information about the current political climate and assessed Congo's needs in respect of DDR. It recommended that the UN should persist in implementing the peace process, and that the Secretariat's involvement in any visible weapons collection programme should be linked to progress in implementing the political aspects of the peace process.

During consideration of the issues related to assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms, the General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General<sup>40</sup> covering related activities within the United Nations, such as discussions at the Preparatory Committee for the 2001 UN Conference, and sessions of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. Referring to the UN Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament Measures, established in 1998, the Secretary-General noted that DDA had been working closely with UNDP and with members of the Group of Interested States, seeking to use the Trust Fund to provide support for projects and programmes on practical disarmament and related

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<sup>39</sup> The DDA-led fact-finding mission included representatives of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), UNDP and the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa.

<sup>40</sup> A/55/216. The report was submitted pursuant to resolution 54/54 J of 1 December 1999.

development issues, including support for programmes for weapons collection and destruction.

The report also referred to regional and subregional initiatives in Africa. For details see chapter V, page 139.

### ***Register of Conventional Arms and transparency***

Three reports were issued during the year, highlighting Member States' efforts to promote transparency: the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, the annual report on the Register for the calendar year 1999, and the standardized reporting instrument for military expenditures for 1999.

### ***Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Register***

The report of the Group of Governmental Experts<sup>41</sup> on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development covered, in addition to the review of its operation and a section on development, regional aspects, implementation, and conclusion and recommendations.

After reviewing the operation of the Register, the Group concluded that the goal of universality had not yet been reached and that there were significant differences in the level of participation among regions. Despite extensive discussion of various proposals for further development of the Register—technical adjustments that had already been considered in 1994 and 1997 and a number of new adjustments to the existing seven categories of weapons—the Group could not reach agreement and decided that further consideration should be given to these proposals in the next periodic review. The Group also concluded that the review process, initiated at the time of the Register's establishment, should be continued.

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<sup>41</sup> By its resolution 54/54 I of 1 December 1999, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts, to report to it on: (a) the early expansion of the scope of the Register; and (b) the elaboration of practical means for the development of the Register in order to increase transparency related to weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to transfers of equipment and technology directly related to the development and manufacture of such weapons. The report was issued as document A/55/281.

Considering the implementation of the Register, the Group analysed existing reporting methods, contacts among Member States, access to data and information, and the role of the UN Secretariat, and then made a number of conclusions and recommendations. The Group welcomed the voluntary reporting by a number of States on their military holdings and procurement through national production. The Group recognized the importance of the principle of transparency and its relevance to weapons of mass destruction. In considering a proposal to add such a category, the Group reviewed the nature of the Register, regional security concerns and existing international legal instruments. In view of these factors, and taking into account that the Register covered conventional arms only, the experts agreed that the question of transparency in weapons of mass destruction was an issue that should be addressed by the General Assembly. The Group reaffirmed the importance of encouraging the submission of "nil" reports to provide as complete a picture as possible of transactions in equipment and to help to achieve the goal of universal participation. It also expressed satisfaction with the increased use of the "remarks" column, which added qualitatively to the data contained in the Register. For the conclusions and recommendations of the 2000 Group, see annex II, page 133.

During the First Committee, on 11 October, DDA, in cooperation with the Government of the Netherlands, organized an informal meeting on the report of the Group of Experts to allow for an exchange of views among Member States on the continuing operation and further development of the Register.

*Annual report on the Register for the calendar year 1999*

The report of the Secretary-General<sup>42</sup> and the six addenda for the calendar year 1999 contained data and information provided by 98 governments on imports and exports in the seven categories of conventional arms. A composite table for 1999, listing all the replies received by the Secretary-General and indicating whether each reply contained data on imports and exports or both, and whether relevant explanations

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<sup>42</sup> See A/55/299 and Add. 1-6 and Corr. 1. Electronic copy of the report is available on the UN website: [www.un.org](http://www.un.org). Information for the calendar year 1999 may be submitted until the close of the fifty-fifth session and will be issued as further addenda to document A/55/299.

and background information were included, is annexed to this chapter (see page 129).

The report for 1999 indicated a substantial increase in the number of submissions. Regional participation is reflected in the following table:

**Member States participating in the  
United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: 1994-99\*  
(by region)  
(excluding Cook Islands, Niue and Switzerland submissions)**

<u>1994</u>	<u>1995</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1997</u>	<u>1998</u>	<u>1999</u>
<i>African States</i>					
10 of 53	9 of 53	8 of 53	11 of 53	3 of 53	6 of 53
<i>Asian States</i>					
26 of 53	27 of 53	22 of 53	26 of 53	21 of 53	21 of 53
<i>Eastern European States</i>					
18 of 22	17 of 22	18 of 22	16 of 22	15 of 22	18 of 22
<i>Latin American and Caribbean States</i>					
18 of 33	14 of 33	16 of 33	14 of 33	12 of 33	20 of 33
<i>Western European and Other States</i>					
26 of 28	27 of 28	27 of 28	28 of 28	28 of 28	27 of 28

\* Updated to include submissions to the Register as of 23 April 2001.

*Objective information on military matters,  
including transparency of military expenditures*

The Secretary-General sent a note verbale, on 24 March, to Member States requesting them to submit their annual reports, not later than 30 April, on their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year for which data were available, preferably using to the extent possible the reporting instrument recommended in resolution 35/42 of 12 December 1980. Replies received from 32 Governments, all of which used the reporting instrument, have been reproduced in a report of

the Secretary-General.<sup>43</sup> Despite the fact that all resolutions on this subject were adopted by consensus in the General Assembly, the number of reporting States has remained rather small, in the range between 27 and 35.

During the First Committee, on 10 October, DDA organized an informal meeting on the UN standardized instrument for reporting military expenditures. The main purpose of the meeting was to enhance familiarity with the UN instrument, discuss significant developments relevant to the issue of transparency and other matters related to that instrument.

***Preparatory Committee for the Second Review  
Conference of the States Parties to the CCW***

The First Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, held in 1995–1996, decided, consistent with article 8, paragraph 3(c), to convene a further Conference five years following the entry into force of the amendments adopted at that Conference, but in any case not later than 2001, with preparatory expert meetings starting as early as 2000, if necessary.

Recalling that decision, the General Assembly recommended, at its fifty-fifth session,<sup>44</sup> that the Review Conference be held in Geneva in December 2001; welcomed the convening of the first session of the Preparatory Committee on 14 December 2000; and decided to convene the second from 2 to 6 April 2001 and the third from 24 to 28 September 2001. Furthermore, the General Assembly noted that, in conformity with article 8 of the Convention, the next review conference might consider any proposal for amendments to the Convention or the Protocol thereto as well as any proposals relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by existing Protocols to the Convention.

The first session of the Preparatory Committee was held at Geneva on 14 December under the chairmanship of Henrik Salander of

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<sup>43</sup> A/55/272. Replies were received from: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mexico, Monaco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United States and Uzbekistan.

<sup>44</sup> See resolution 55/37 of 20 November.

Sweden, with 53 States parties participating.<sup>45</sup> The Committee approved its provisional agenda and the costs estimates of its own meeting and of the Conference. It also addressed the nomination of the President, the organization of work of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies, and the officers of the Conference and its committees. It agreed that more consultations were needed on these matters and deferred decisions to its second session, in April 2001. The Committee agreed to recommend that the Conference adopt the same rules of procedure as those of the First Review Conference; however, at the request of China and Pakistan, the rule on decision-making would be amended. The Preparatory Committee recommended that the President of the Second Review Conference make the following statement: "With regard to Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, it is affirmed that, in the deliberations and negotiations relating to the Convention and its annexed Protocols, High Contracting Parties have proceeded on the basis of consensus and no decisions have been taken by vote." The Committee adopted the provisional agenda for its second session and, noting the recommendation of the General Assembly, decided that the Second Review Conference would be held in Geneva from 11 to 21 December 2001.

The Committee held a general exchange of views on the review of the operation and status of the Convention and its annexed Protocols, including the consideration of new proposals. The ICRC felt that a priority for the 2001 Review Conference should be the extension of the scope of application of all current and future Protocols of the CCW to non-international conflicts. It also suggested the adoption of a new protocol to address the widespread problems caused by

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<sup>45</sup> Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. The following 6 States not parties to the Convention participated as observers: Egypt, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Republic of Korea and Turkey. Representatives of the ICRC also participated in the work of the Conference. The representatives of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), including some of its member organizations, attended this meeting.



explosive remnants of war. Switzerland introduced two proposals: (a) the regulation of submunitions and (b) a protocol on wound ballistic regulation for small-calibre ammunition. The United States introduced treaty language to amend article I of the Convention so that the prohibitions and restrictions of the CCW and its annexed Protocols would apply to armed conflicts not of an international character in the territory of one of the parties. It also introduced proposals on detectability of anti-vehicle mines and a compliance regime. The Netherlands, together with 24 other States parties, presented a non-paper on explosive remnants of war. While some States welcomed these proposals, others advised a more cautious approach as, in their view, the expansion of the scope of the Convention and its Protocols to cover internal conflicts might entail serious legal obligations and problems for countries that are not parties to all Protocols. The Preparatory Committee concluded its work by adopting its Final Document.<sup>46</sup>

### *Anti-personnel mines<sup>47</sup>*

Two events took place related to anti-personnel mines: the Second Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II, and the Second Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine-Ban Convention.

### *Amended Protocol II*

In accordance with the decisions and recommendations of the First Annual Conference,<sup>48</sup> which had been held in December 1999 in Geneva, the Second Annual Conference was convened from 11 to 13 December 2000 in Geneva, and elected Kálmán Petöcz of Slovakia as its President.

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<sup>46</sup> CCW/CONF.II/PC.1/1.

<sup>47</sup> Readers may consult the following UN websites: UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS): [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/) and the DDA website: [www.un.org/Depts/dda](http://www.un.org/Depts/dda). In addition they may consult the websites of the ICBL: [www.icbl.org](http://www.icbl.org), the ICRC: [www.org/eng/mines](http://www.org/eng/mines) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD): [www.gichd.ch](http://www.gichd.ch).

<sup>48</sup> See document CCW/AP.II/CONF.1/2, annexes VI and VII.

Forty-seven States that had notified the depositary of their consent to be bound by Amended Protocol II participated in the work of the Conference,<sup>49</sup> and 27 States not parties participated as observers.<sup>50</sup> At its first plenary meeting, a message from the United Nations Secretary-General was delivered, and the Conference adopted its agenda, rules of procedure, and cost estimates.

The Conference conducted its work in plenary meetings and re-established the Group of Experts under the chairmanship of Col. Erwin Dahinden of Switzerland to consider agenda item 9, entitled "Consideration of matters arising from reports by High Contracting Parties according to paragraph 4 of Article 13 of the Amended Protocol II", and agenda item 10, entitled "Consideration of the development of technologies to protect civilians against indiscriminate effects of mines". On 13 December, the Chairman of the Group of Experts presented his report, which was adopted by the Conference.

During the exchange of views, in which 21 States, including France on behalf of the EU and associated States, participated, delegations reviewed the operation and status of Amended Protocol II. The issues of wider adherence to the Protocol and its universality figured in nearly all statements.

While the Committee was considering its agenda item on preparations for the Second Review Conference, the US delegation introduced proposals to improve the detectability of mines other than anti-personnel landmines and to tighten the requirements for self-destruction and self-deactivation of all remotely-delivered mines;

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<sup>49</sup> Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>50</sup> Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Tunisia and Turkey. The representatives of the ICRC and GICHD also participated in the work of the Conference. The representatives of the ICBL, including some of its member organizations, attended public meetings of the Conference.

it also submitted a compliance annex with the outline of a verification mechanism. While some countries expressed readiness to examine those proposals, others questioned the concept of constant revision of the Protocol. South Africa made a strong statement on behalf of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), stating that "in the interest of achieving the widest possible adherence to Amended Protocol II and cognizant of obligations of these States parties who are also party to other instruments dealing with APLs [anti-personnel landmines], Amended Protocol II should not be further revised".

The Conference had before it 29 national annual reports<sup>51</sup> containing six categories of information.<sup>52</sup>

The Conference concluded its work by adopting its report,<sup>53</sup> which included a declaration (see annex III to this chapter, page 136) urging all States that had not yet done so to take all measures to accede to Amended Protocol II as soon as possible. In its report, the Conference recommended that the Secretary-General, as depositary, and the President of the Second Annual Conference exercise their authority to achieve the goal of its universality, and called upon the States parties to promote wider adherence in their respective regions. In accordance with resolution 55/37, the Conference decided to convene the Third Annual Conference on 10 December 2001 in Geneva.

### *Mine-Ban Convention*

On the basis of the decision of the First Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine-Ban Convention, the Second Meeting took place from 11 to 15 September in Geneva. Between the First and Second Meet-

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<sup>51</sup> Australia, Austria, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>52</sup> (a) dissemination of information on the Protocol to armed forces and civilian populations; (b) mine clearance and rehabilitation programmes; (c) steps taken to meet technical requirements of the Protocol and any other relevant information pertaining thereto; (d) legislation related to the Protocol; (e) measures taken on international technical information exchange, on international cooperation on mine clearance, and on technical cooperation and assistance; and (f) other relevant matters.

<sup>53</sup> CCW/AP.II/CONF.2/1.

ings, intersessional work was conducted through Standing Committees of Experts (SCEs), which were supported by the GICHD and benefited greatly from the active participation of relevant non-governmental, regional and international organizations.<sup>54</sup>

The official opening of the First Meeting, on 11 September, was preceded by a ceremony at which statements were delivered by the President of Switzerland and other public officials, Her Royal Highness Princess Astrid of Belgium, the President of the Swiss Campaign against Landmines, Sir Paul McCartney and Heather Mills. On a highly emotional note, 18 landmine survivors—representatives of three generations from 14 countries—gave their personal testimonies and appealed to delegations for concrete action to end the landmines crisis.

The President of the First Meeting, Leonardo Santos Simão, Foreign Minister of Mozambique, then declared open the Second Meeting of the States Parties.<sup>55</sup> Sixty-two States parties participated; in addition, 7 States that had ratified the Convention but for which it had not yet entered into force and an additional 41 States not parties participated as observers.<sup>56</sup> In addition, in accordance with the rules

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<sup>54</sup> The intersessional work programme for 1999 and 2000 was organized in five periods of meetings: September and December 1999, and January, March and May 2000.

<sup>55</sup> The proceedings of the Meeting are contained in its Final Report (APLC/MSP.2/2000/1).

<sup>56</sup> *States parties*: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Germany, Guatemala, Guinea, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Monaco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Yemen and Zimbabwe. *States that had ratified but for which the Convention was not yet in force*: Bangladesh, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Gabon, Ghana and Mauritania. *States not parties*: Afghanistan, Algeria, yet in force: Bangladesh, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic,

of procedure, a number of international organizations and institutions, regional organizations, entities and non-governmental organizations attended the Meeting as observers.<sup>57</sup> The Meeting elected Steffen Kongstad of Norway as President and unanimously confirmed the nomination of Christian Faessler of Switzerland as Secretary-General. A message by the Secretary-General of the United Nations was delivered, and Jakob Kellenberger, President of the ICRC, and Jody Williams, Ambassador for the ICBL, addressed the Meeting; the latter presented *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, a comprehensive survey of the landmine situation in every country of the world.

In the course of the general exchange of views, 34 States parties, 15 observer States and 7 observer organizations made statements. The Meeting then reviewed the general status and operation of the Convention, noted that there were now 107 States parties and expressed satisfaction that efforts to implement the Convention were making a difference, with considerable areas of mined land having been cleared over the past year, with casualty rates having been reduced in several of the world's most mine-affected States, and with more and better efforts being undertaken to assist landmine victims.

The President informed the Meeting that he had not been notified that any State wished to make a request for an extension of the deadline for completing destruction of anti-personnel mines, as provided

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Gabon, Ghana and Mauritania. *States not parties:* Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Bhutan, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Malta, Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Viet Nam and Zambia.

<sup>57</sup> In accordance with rules 1.2 and 3: EU; IAEA; ICBL; ICRC; OAS; Sovereign Military Order of Malta; United Nations Organization: UN Secretariat (DPKO/UNMAS, UNOCHA), UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, UNIDIR, UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), World Health Organization (WHO), World Bank. In accordance with rule 1.4, the following organizations attended the Meeting as observers on the invitation of the Meeting: Geneva Foundation, GICHD, Green Earth Organization, International Development Research Centre (IDRC), League of Arab States, Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, Organization of the Islamic Conference, PRIO (International Peace Research Institute, Oslo) and SOLIDEST.

for in article 5, nor a request for clarification of compliance, as provided for in article 8.<sup>58</sup>

Considering matters pertaining to reporting on transparency, under article 7, an amendment to the reporting format was adopted, whereby a form for *voluntary reporting* on activities undertaken with respect to article 6, in particular on assistance provided for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims, was added. Although no changes were made regarding the technical ways and means of circulating reports, States parties were encouraged to submit reports electronically and, when submitting an annual update, to highlight changes in relation to earlier reports.<sup>59</sup>

On 15 September, the Meeting agreed that the Third Meeting would be held from 18 to 21 September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. It also adopted a declaration, which was annexed to its Final Report and is reproduced in annex III to this chapter (see page 136).

The Meeting reviewed the work of the SCE on the general status and operation of the Convention. With a view to streamlining the intersessional work programme and encouraging participation, it was decided that there would be four Standing Committees (SCs) instead of five,<sup>60</sup> and that only three periods of meetings would be held annually, including the Meeting of the States parties.<sup>61</sup> Within the framework of three plenary meetings, the Meeting held informal consultations on international cooperation and assistance in accordance with article 6 and on the substantive aspects of mine action covered by the SCEs in their reports. It urged States parties and all other relevant parties, where appropriate, to act with urgency on the recommendations made by the SCEs.

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<sup>58</sup> The names, nationalities and other relevant data of experts provided by States parties under article 8, paragraph 9, had been communicated to all States parties before the Meeting (APLC/Article 8/2000).

<sup>59</sup> For the decision and document pertaining to consideration of article 7, see the Final Report (APLC/MSP.2/2000/1), para. 27 and annex III.

<sup>60</sup> The Committees, to be renamed "Standing Committees" (SCs), would deal with the following areas: mine clearance and related technologies; victim assistance, socio-economic reintegration and mine awareness; stockpile destruction; and general status and operation of the Convention.

<sup>61</sup> For the decision and document pertaining to intersessional work, see the Final Report (APLC/MSP.2/2000/1), paras. 28 and 29 and annex II.

The Meeting adopted the President's Action Programme,<sup>62</sup> which provided a summary of concrete initiatives and activities that flowed from the work of the SCEs as well as other specific initiatives that had been announced since the conclusion of the work of the SCEs or during the Second Meeting.

In accordance with the relevant decisions of the Second Meeting, the first session of the Standing Committees of the intersessional work programme 2000–2001 took place from 4 to 8 December in Geneva.<sup>63</sup>

The SC on the general status and operation of the Convention noted with satisfaction that since the Second Meeting of the States parties, there had been two new ratifications, and that by the end of the year 2000, 139 States had signed, ratified or acceded to the Convention.

It further noted that 57 States parties had submitted their annual reports under article 7 in a timely manner, while 38 had been late, and that 21 had submitted annual updates of their initial report.<sup>64</sup>

It also noted that there was no evidence of either production or transfer of anti-personnel mines from States parties and that the number of countries producing mines worldwide (including non-States parties) had decreased from 55 to 16. Regarding the destruction of stockpiles, it noted that 25 States parties had completed the destruction process, in another 24 the process was well under way, but in 17 it had not yet commenced. It was informed that there had been new mine victims in more than 70 countries since the Convention entered into force, and that 88 countries were considered to be mine-affected.

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid., annex V.

<sup>63</sup> The SCs met 4–5 December (victim assistance), 5–6 December (mine clearance and related technologies), 7 December (stockpile destruction) and 8 December (general status and operation of the Convention).

<sup>64</sup> In accordance with the decision taken in Maputo regarding article 7 reports, information submitted by the States parties can be retrieved directly from the website at the United Nations in New York <http://domino.un.org/MineBan.nsf>. (See also DDA website: [www.un.org/Depts/dda/DDA-Home.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/DDA-Home.htm), link to “Article 7 Mine-Ban Convention Reports”.)

### ***Wassenaar Arrangement***

Members of the Wassenaar Arrangement,<sup>65</sup> meeting in Bratislava from 30 November to 1 December, reaffirmed their commitment to maintain responsible national policies in the licensing of exports of arms and sensitive dual-use items. They noted with concern illicit arms flows to zones of conflict and areas covered by Security Council embargoes, as well as licit transfers to zones of conflict from States not participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement.

The participants further agreed to continue consideration of practical arms control measures, including appropriate collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) member States to respect the provisions of the ECOWAS moratorium, and providing advisory and/or technical assistance in the implementation of the moratorium. They reaffirmed their concerns about the threat posed by illicit possession and use of Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) and agreed to adopt stringent export controls on such systems. The plenary also reaffirmed the importance of responsible export policies towards, and effective export control over, small arms and light weapons to prevent destabilizing accumulations. They took positive note of other international efforts, including the forthcoming 2001 UN Conference, and the work of the OSCE, including its adoption of the document on small arms and light weapons (see page 105).

The participants further agreed on non-binding best practices regarding: the effective enforcement of national export controls; the disposal of surplus military equipment; and the control of exports of items designated as very sensitive. They also agreed to a number of control list amendments which would be published shortly and affirmed the importance they attached to timely updates of the lists to keep pace with technology advances while maintaining security interests. Participating States again confirmed that the Arrangement

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<sup>65</sup> The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was established in 1996. Its current membership comprises 33 States: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.



was open, on a global and non-discriminatory basis, to prospective adherents that comply with agreed criteria for participation, and they agreed to study the possibility of further contacts with other non-proliferation regimes to avoid duplication of work and to facilitate complementarity.

## **Conference on Disarmament**

### ***Transparency in armaments***

In 2000, the issue of transparency in armaments was addressed during plenary meetings in connection with efforts to find a comprehensive agreement on the establishment of subsidiary bodies on agenda items. Both proposals for a programme of work presented by presidents Jean Lint and Celso Amorim included the appointment of a special co-ordinator with a mandate to seek the views of Conference members on the most appropriate way to deal with transparency,<sup>66</sup> but, due to the lack of consensus on a comprehensive programme of work, a special co-ordinator was not appointed.

The Netherlands expressed support for the Register of Conventional Arms. It hoped that both participation in and the scope of the Register, which currently covers 90 per cent of the transfers of conventional armaments, could be further enhanced. The Netherlands added that the Register should continue to be a tool for conventional arms control, but believed that transparency in armaments should be extended to weapons of mass destruction. It praised the effectiveness and efficiency of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in achieving transparency with respect to chemical weapons, and expressed the hope that the same degree of transparency would be achieved with respect to biological weapons. It also welcomed recent efforts towards greater transparency regarding nuclear armaments made by the United Kingdom and the United States.

## **Disarmament Commission, 2000**

The Disarmament Commission, on 26 June, adopted its agenda for the 2000 substantive session and decided to allocate to Working Group

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<sup>66</sup> CD/1620, CD/1624.

II the item entitled "Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms". The Working Group on the item, chaired by the representative of Argentina, held a general exchange of views on the subject, the Chair conducted informal consultations with various delegations, and a total of 6 working papers were submitted.<sup>67</sup> The Working Group held 6 meetings, from 28 June to 6 July, and on 6 July considered and adopted by consensus its report on the item. The Disarmament Commission will continue the consideration of the item at its 2001 session.

### **General Assembly, 2000**

The General Assembly, pursuant to recommendations of the First Committee, took action on six draft resolutions and one draft decision dealing with subjects discussed in this chapter. While considering the item on the CCW,<sup>68</sup> the First Committee had before it the report of the Secretary-General providing data on the status of the Convention.

#### ***Small arms, illicit trade and the 2001 UN Conference***

**55/33 F – Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them.** The draft resolution was introduced by Mali on 18 October on behalf of the sponsors, and two revised texts were subsequently introduced on 27 October and 1 November, respectively (see page 393 for the sponsors), which clarified some provisions of the last preambular paragraph and some of the operative paragraphs. The revised draft resolution was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 1 November and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 323.

*First Committee:* Before the vote, Egypt expressed its reservations about the eighth preambular paragraph, in particular, the reference to the need to take into account the report of the Secretary-

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<sup>67</sup> Papers were submitted by China (A/CN.10/2000/WG.II/WP.2); South Africa (A/CN.10/2000/WG.II/WP.3); Switzerland (A/CN.10/2000/WG.II/WP.4); Japan (A/CN.10/2000/WG.II/WP.5); and by Portugal and France on behalf of the EU and associated countries (A/CN.10/2000/WG.II/WP.6 and A/CN.10/2000/WG.II/WP.7).

<sup>68</sup> A/55/97.

General of the OAU on the proliferation, illicit circulation of and traffic in small arms. Since that report reflected the attitude of the Secretary-General of the OAU, a number of African States, including Egypt, had expressed reservations about it at the recent Togo Summit. Although Egypt joined the consensus on the draft resolution, it was not part of the consensus on the eighth preambular paragraph.

**55/33 Q - Illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons.** The draft resolution was introduced by South Africa on behalf of the sponsors on 17 October (see page 396 for the sponsors), and a revised text was introduced on 25 October in which the word "therein" at the end of operative paragraph 1 was replaced by the words "in collecting, collating, sharing and disseminating information on illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons". The revised draft resolution was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 25 October, and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 338.

**55/415 - Small arms.** The draft decision was introduced by Japan on behalf of the sponsors on 30 October (see page 408 for the sponsors), adopted by the First Committee without a vote on 31 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the decision, see page 388.

*First Committee:* France, speaking on behalf of a large number of countries,<sup>69</sup> regretted that Switzerland had to withdraw its offer to host the 2001 UN Conference, but held that Geneva must remain a UN focal point for disarmament. It then expressed the need to prepare an international plan of action to address the substantive issues of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

### *Practical disarmament measures*

**55/33 G - Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures.** The draft resolution was introduced by Germany on behalf of the sponsors on 17 October (see page 403 for the sponsors), adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 26 October, and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 325.

<sup>69</sup> The countries of the EU, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe associated with it, the associated countries of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as Norway and Iceland as European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries members of the European Economic Area (EEA).

*Transparency in armaments*

**55/33 U - Transparency in armaments.** The draft resolution was introduced by the Netherlands on behalf of the sponsors on 18 October (see page 398 for the sponsors). It was adopted by the First Committee on 1 November (as a whole: 133-0-17); pr. para. 5: 134-2-12; op. para. 2: 136-3-11; op. para. 5(b): 135-3-12; and op. para. 7: 132-0-16 and by the General Assembly on 20 November (as a whole: 149-0-16; pr. para. 5: 149-2-10; op. para. 2: 147-3-11; op. para. 5 (b): 147-3-13; op. para. 7: 144-0-17). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 351 and 425, respectively.

*First Committee:* Several States explained their abstentions on the draft text as a whole, many of them calling for expansion of the Register. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, speaking on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the League of Arab States, reiterated that any mechanism on transparency must be balanced, comprehensive and non-discriminatory and stressed that the Register had to include data on advanced conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and up-to-date technology with military applications. It regretted that the 2000 Group of Governmental Experts had failed to expand the scope of the Register in this way and also to include military holdings and procurement through national production. This, in its view, had rendered the Register inadequate to function as an effective confidence-building or early warning mechanism and to meet the security concerns of all States, in particular those of the Middle East. The above views were also shared by Algeria, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic.

Myanmar, also believing that the scope of the Register should be expanded to include weapons of mass destruction, expressed reservations on two additional points: the request (operative paragraph 5(b)) for another expert report in 2003 was too ambitious and premature, and the rationale for inviting the CD to continue its work in this area (operative paragraph 7) was not clear. Pakistan had similar difficulties with regard to operative paragraph 5(b) and Mexico shared Myanmar's view with regard to operative paragraph 7, adding that the draft did not specify what type of new mandate the CD would undertake.

China could not support the draft resolution, stating that the United States registration of its arms sales to Taiwan, a province of China, had politicized the Register. The sales were not only a violation of its sovereignty, but also a serious intervention in its internal affairs.

Cuba voted in favour of the draft as a whole, but abstained on paragraph 7 regarding further work by the CD because it considered that that body had already concluded its work on transparency.

***Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)  
and anti-personnel mines***

**55/37 - Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.** The draft resolution was introduced by Sweden on behalf of the sponsors on 20 October (see page 405 for the sponsors), adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 25 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 378.

**55/33 V - Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.** The draft resolution was introduced by Norway on 20 October on behalf of the sponsors (see page 399 for the sponsors), adopted on 26 October by the First Committee (127-0-22) and on 20 November by the General Assembly (143-0-22). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 353 and 426, respectively.

**First Committee:** Nine States explained their abstentions in terms of their security concerns, but supported the humanitarian goal of the Convention and had taken and were taking steps such as implementation of moratoriums on exports of APMs to alleviate the suffering caused by these weapons. Cuba, Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, the Republic of Korea and Pakistan explained their individual security situations that necessitated the use of mines in self-defence. In addition to expressing security concerns, Egypt, Iran and Pakistan stressed the urgency of mine clearance. Myanmar advocated that the CD undertake discussion on curbing illicit trafficking and indiscriminate use. Cuba and Pakistan advocated a ban on exports. India called for negotiations on a comprehensive ban in phases, and both India and Pakistan supported negotiations on transparency in the CD. Iran called for efforts to explore alternatives to landmines

which, while effective, would not pose any threat to civilians. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya abstained because the draft resolution did not require the elimination of APMs.

Three States that are not parties explained their affirmative votes. Singapore, Sri Lanka and Turkey, while supporting the Convention for its humanitarian objectives, stated that they were unable to accede due to security concerns. Singapore held that a blanket ban on all types of APMs might be counterproductive since some countries need them for their defence and security.

## **Conclusion**

The preparatory process for the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects got under way during the year, reflecting the growing awareness and understanding of the need to address the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons. The growing participation of NGOs and civil society, in general, in addressing negative consequences of illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons made a valuable contribution to these efforts.

The United Nations, in collaboration with other international organizations, global or regional, and at the request of the States concerned, continued to provide assistance to States in curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them, and in matters concerning disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. Moved by the ongoing devastating conflicts, especially intra-State conflicts, the Security Council took a number of measures with a view to promoting durable peace and sustainable development in every region of the world, especially in Africa.

The two UN instruments—the Register of Conventional Arms and the standardized instrument for international reporting of military expenditures—contributed to building transparency in military matters. However, in spite of the fact that for the first time in a number of years the General Assembly adopted only one resolution on transparency in armaments and there was a substantial increase in the number of reporting States, it was clear from the deliberations in the First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament that differences among Member States regarding the further development of the Register persisted. Consequently, the Group of Governmental

Experts on the Register could not agree on an expansion of its scope, although it made a number of recommendations concerning its implementation.

There were further positive developments concerning the two legal instruments dealing with anti-personnel mines. The Second Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine-Ban Convention were held, at which the States parties reaffirmed their commitments to the objectives of, and reviewed the implementation of their respective instruments. Furthermore, States parties initiated the preparatory process for the Second Review Conference of the CCW.

The Millennium events and documents adopted by Member States reaffirmed the urgent need for effective international action to prevent the illegal flow of small arms and light weapons into areas of conflict, for an international regime to curtail their proliferation, and for the eradication of anti-personnel mines.

# ANNEX I

## **Composite table of replies of Governments for the Register of Conventional Arms: 1999\*** (including a "nil" report submitted by Cook Islands and Niue)

<i>Government</i>	<i>Data on exports</i>	<i>Data on imports</i>	<i>Explanation submitted in note verbale</i>	<i>Background information</i>
Andorra	nil	nil		no
Argentina	nil	yes		no
Armenia	nil	yes		yes
Australia	yes	yes		yes
Austria	nil	yes		yes
Bangladesh	nil	yes		no
Belarus	yes	yes		no
Belgium	yes	yes		yes
Belize	nil	nil		no
Bhutan	nil	nil		no

\* See A/55/299 and Add. 1-6 and Corr. 1.

<i>Government</i>	<i>Data on exports</i>	<i>Data on imports</i>	<i>Explanation submitted in note verbale</i>	<i>Background information</i>
Bolivia	nil	nil		no
Bosnia and Herzegovina	nil	yes		no
Brazil	nil	yes		yes
Bulgaria	yes	nil		no
Burkina Faso	nil	nil		no
Cambodia				yes
Canada	yes	nil		yes
Chile	yes	yes		no
Cook Islands	nil	nil		no
Costa Rica	nil	nil		no
Croatia	nil	nil		yes
Cuba	nil	nil		no
Cyprus	nil	nil		no
Czech Republic	yes	yes		yes
Denmark	nil	yes		yes
Dominica	nil	nil		no
Dominican Republic	nil	nil		no
Ecuador	nil	nil		no
Estonia	nil	nil		yes
Finland	yes	yes		yes
France	yes	yes		yes
Georgia	nil	nil		yes
Germany	yes	yes		yes
Greece	yes	yes		yes
Grenada	nil	nil		no



<i>Government</i>	<i>Data on exports</i>	<i>Data on imports</i>	<i>Explanation submitted in note verbale</i>	<i>Background information</i>
Guatemala	nil	nil		no
Guyana	nil	nil		no
Honduras	nil	nil		no
Hungary	yes	yes		no
Iceland	nil	nil	yes	
India		yes		no
Indonesia		yes		no
Ireland	nil	nil		yes
Israel	yes	yes		yes
Italy	yes	nil		yes
Jamaica	nil	nil		no
Japan	nil	yes		yes
Jordan	nil	yes		no
Kazakhstan	yes	yes		no
Latvia	nil	nil		no
Liechtenstein	nil	nil		no
Lithuania	nil	yes		no
Luxembourg	nil	yes		yes
Madagascar	nil	nil		no
Malaysia	nil	yes		no
Maldives	nil	nil		no
Malta	nil	nil		no
Marshall Islands	nil	nil		no
Mexico	nil	nil		no
Monaco	nil	nil		no
Mongolia	nil	nil		no

<i>Government</i>	<i>Data on exports</i>	<i>Data on imports</i>	<i>Explanation submitted in note verbale</i>	<i>Background information</i>
Nepal	nil	nil		no
Netherlands	yes	yes		yes
New Zealand	nil	yes		yes
Niue	nil	nil		no
Norway	yes	yes		no
Pakistan	nil	yes		no
Paraguay	nil	nil		no
Peru	nil	nil		no
Poland	yes	nil		yes
Portugal		yes		no
Qatar		nil		no
Republic of Korea	nil	yes		no
Romania	nil	yes		no
Russian Federation	yes	nil		no
San Marino	nil			no
Sao Tome and Principe		nil		no
Seychelles	nil	nil		no
Singapore	nil	yes		no
Slovakia	yes	yes		yes
Slovenia	nil	nil		yes
Solomon Islands		nil		no
South Africa	yes	nil		no
Spain	nil	yes		yes
Sweden	yes	yes		yes
Switzerland	yes	yes		yes

<i>Government</i>	<i>Data on exports</i>	<i>Data on imports</i>	<i>Explanation submitted in note verbale</i>	<i>Background information</i>
Thailand		yes		no
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	nil	yes		no
Trinidad and Tobago	nil	nil		no
Turkey	nil	yes		yes
Turkmenistan	yes	nil		yes
Ukraine	yes	nil		no
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	yes	yes		yes
United States of America	yes	yes		yes
Uruguay		yes		no
Uzbekistan	nil	nil		no
Viet Nam	nil	nil		no
Zambia	nil			no

## ANNEX II

### **Recommendations of the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Arms Register\*\***

(a) Member States should participate in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms with a view to achieving the shared goal of universal participation in that instrument;

(b) Member States should be reminded of the importance of participating in the Register, both in reporting data and information and in making "nil" reports on imports and exports of conventional weapons covered by the Register;

(c) Member States in a position to do so should make use of the "Remarks" column in the standardized reporting form to provide additional data, such as types or models;

\*\* A/55/281, para. 94.

(d) Member States should be encouraged to report promptly in order to help ensure the early dissemination to Governments of the data and the information in the reports;

(e) Member States should nominate a national point of contact for matters connected with the Register and details on the contact point should be sent with the annual submission on the understanding that this information will be held by the Secretariat and provided on request to Governments only; furthermore, the Secretariat should maintain an updated list of national points of contact and circulate it to all Member States;

(f) The note verbale which the Secretariat sends annually to the Member States along with the standard reporting forms should also include an attachment for the filing of "nil" returns by States that do not have transfers to report. This attachment should read as follows: "The Government of ..., in reference to General Assembly resolution ..., confirms that it has neither exported nor imported any equipment in the seven categories of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms for the calendar year ... and therefore submits a 'nil' return." The text of the note verbale should accordingly contain a reference to the attached form for reporting "nil" returns;

(g) The Secretariat should assist Member States, as appropriate, in the implementation of agreed regional and subregional confidence-building measures;

(h) The General Assembly should decide on the appropriate time to conduct a full review of the continuing operation and further development of the Register at an early date;

(i) The General Assembly should consider a provision for additional resources to the Secretariat to operate and maintain the Register and to:

- (i) Update the United Nations information booklet on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms on the basis of the present recommendations and distribute it among the Member States;
- (ii) Send a note verbale, with the reporting forms, to Member States by the end of January and reminders, where appropriate, at the beginning of June;
- (iii) Ensure that all information relating to the Register is electronically available as soon as possible. The updated United Nations information booklet on the Register should also be made available in the Register website both as a hypertext linked series of pages and as a downloadable document. The Secretariat should continue to provide the General Assembly with the annual consolidated report of data and information registered, including that provided on a voluntary basis on military holdings and procurement through national production, together with an index of other

additional background information. States providing data on military holdings and procurement through national production may request that these data not be published;

- (iv) Ensure that all basic data and information relevant to the Register is available electronically in all official languages of the United Nations;
- (v) Undertake a study with the assistance of a technical expert to determine the feasibility of electronic filing of national submissions to the Register;
- (vi) Develop a separate home page for the Register, using a graphic design for efficient use of the Register data, and establish links between this home page and other comparable registers and data banks established by other international and regional organizations;
- (vii) Send complete submissions to capitals and to all permanent missions to the United Nations in electronic form or hard copy, as appropriate;
- (viii) Facilitate informal meetings relevant to the Register, such as briefings by the Secretariat on its operation and procedures, in parallel to the meetings of the First Committee;
- (ix) Facilitate the holding of regional or subregional workshops and seminars, as appropriate, particularly to encourage greater participation.

### **ANNEX III**

#### **Declaration on the Occasion of the Second Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II to the CCW\*\*\***

We, the States which have notified the Depositary of our consent to be bound by Amended Protocol II to the CCW, meeting in Geneva on 11–13 December 2000 for our Second Annual Conference:

*Bearing in mind* the important contribution of Protocol II to international efforts to alleviate the suffering caused by the indiscriminate use of landmines;

*Noting* that Protocol II is the only international legal instrument which covers all types of landmines, as well as booby-traps and other devices;

*Having reviewed* the operation and status of the Protocol, in accordance with paragraph 3 (a) of Article 13;

*Having considered* the national annual reports presented by States which have notified the Depositary of their consent to be bound by the Protocol;

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\*\*\* CCW/AP.II/CONF.2/1, annex VI.

*Welcomed* the fact that, since the First Annual Conference held in December 1999, 13 more States have notified the Depositary of their consent to be bound by the Protocol, thus bringing the total number of States which have adhered to the Protocol to 58;

*Emphasized* the importance of achieving the widest possible adherence to the Protocol;

*Urged* all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to accede to it as soon as possible.

#### **ANNEX IV**

##### **Declaration of the Second Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine-Ban Convention\*\*\*\***

1. We, the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, along with other States, international organizations and institutions and non-governmental organizations, are gathered in Geneva, Switzerland to reaffirm our unwavering commitment both to the total eradication of anti-personnel mines and to addressing the insidious and inhumane effects of these weapons.

2. We celebrate the ongoing growth in support for the Convention and our satisfaction with the general status and operation of it: over 100 States have formally accepted the obligations of the Convention; over 20 States Parties have completed destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines and a further 23 States Parties are in the process of destroying stockpiles; the new international norm established by the Convention is taking hold as demonstrated by the behaviour of many States not parties to the Convention; and approximately US\$250 million has been allocated by donors over the past year to address the global landmine problem.

3. We recognize that much work remains. However, we are pleased that our efforts are making a difference: considerable areas of mined land have been cleared over the past year; casualty rates have been reduced in several of the world's most mine-affected States; and more and better efforts are being undertaken to assist landmine victims.

4. While we celebrate the success of the Convention, we remain deeply concerned that anti-personnel mines continue to kill, maim and threaten the lives of countless innocent people each day; that the terror of mines prevents individuals from reclaiming their lives; and that the lasting impact of these weapons denies communities the opportunity to rebuild long after conflicts have ended.

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\*\*\*\* APLC/MSP.2/2000/1, part II.

5. We deplore the continued use of anti-personnel mines. Such acts are contrary to the aims of the Convention and exacerbate the humanitarian problems already caused by the use of these weapons. We call upon all those who continue to use anti-personnel mines, as well as those who develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain and transfer these weapons, to cease now and to join us in the task of eradicating these weapons.

6. We implore those States that have declared their commitment to the object and purpose of the Convention and that continue to use anti-personnel mines to recognize that this is a clear violation of their solemn commitment. We call upon all States concerned to respect their commitments.

7. We celebrate this Second Meeting of the States Parties. But we recognize that achieving the promise of this unique and important humanitarian instrument rests in continuing to be tireless in our efforts to end the use of anti-personnel mines, to eradicate stockpiles, to cease development, production and transfers of these weapons, to clear mined areas in order to free land from its deadly bondage, to assist victims to reclaim their lives and to prevent new victims.

8. We also recognize that these are common tasks for humanity and therefore call upon all governments and people everywhere to join us in this effort. We call upon those in a position to do so to provide technical and financial assistance to meet the enormous challenges of mine action, and, whenever relevant, to integrate these efforts into development planning and programming. We call upon those States that have not formally accepted the obligations of the Convention to ratify or accede to it promptly. We call upon all States that are in the process of formally accepting the obligations of the Convention to apply provisionally the terms of the Convention. And we call upon one another as States Parties to effectively implement the Convention and to comply fully with its provisions.

9. We reiterate that, as a community dedicated to seeing an end to the use of anti-personnel mines, our assistance and cooperation will flow primarily to those who have foresworn the use of these weapons forever through adherence to and implementation of the Convention.

10. While we realize that our task is huge, we warmly welcome the substantial progress that has been made during the intersessional work programme and the accomplishments of this programme's Standing Committees of Experts.

11. We recall that the intersessional work programme was established at the First Meeting of the States Parties to focus and advance the international community's mine action efforts and to measure progress made in achieving its objectives. We express our satisfaction that the intersessional work programme has lived up to this promise, has assisted in developing a global

picture of priorities consistent with the obligations and time-frames contained within the Convention, and has been undertaken in a manner consistent with the Convention's tradition of inclusivity, partnership, dialogue, openness and practical cooperation.

12. We acknowledge that the progress made during the intersessional work programme was significantly enhanced by the substantive participation of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and other relevant non-governmental organizations, and by regional and international organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross. We express our gratitude to these organizations for their important contributions and we thank the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining for its support of the first intersessional work programme and its commitment to continuing to support future intersessional work.

13. Building upon the accomplishments of the intersessional work programme, including increased participation in the work of the Convention by mine-affected States, we call upon all interested parties to continue to participate in the work of the Standing Committees between now and the next Meeting of the States Parties, which will take place on 18 to 21 September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua.

14. In reflecting upon our progress and accomplishments, and in considering the work that lies ahead, we reconfirm our conviction to make anti-personnel mines objects of the past, our obligation to assist those who have fallen victim to this terror, and our shared responsibility to the memories of those whose lives have been lost as a result of the use of these weapons, including those killed as a result of their dedication to helping others by clearing mined areas or providing humanitarian assistance.



## CHAPTER V

### Regional disarmament

#### Introduction

THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER RECOGNIZED THE BENEFIT that came from viewing global and regional measures as complementary. This approach has been followed in the field of disarmament for decades. The UN Secretary-General has carried out expert studies and prepared reports on various aspects of this approach,<sup>1</sup> and has facilitated regional negotiations, at the request of the States concerned. The Disarmament Commission developed recommendations and guidelines on regional disarmament in 1993, and nuclear-weapon-free zones in 1999.<sup>2</sup> Recently, cooperation with regional and subregional organizations has intensified as the advantages of such interaction have become more apparent (see below). The three regional centres of the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), established in the 1980s, provide practical support for these approaches in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America

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<sup>1</sup> See: *Study on All Aspects of Regional Disarmament* (UN publication, Sales No. E.81.IX.2); *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era* (A/C.1/47/7) and *A New Agenda for Peace* (A/47/2777-S/24111).

<sup>2</sup> "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security", document A/48/42, annex II; "Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned", document A/54/42, annex I.

and the Caribbean.<sup>3</sup>

The regional concept was applied first to the nuclear field in the late 1950s with the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Antarctica and was subsequently expanded with the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) in other parts of the world, thus promoting nuclear non-proliferation. NWFZs have been established in the following regions: Latin America and the Caribbean, through the Treaty of Tlatelolco (concluded in 1967); the South Pacific, through the Treaty of Rarotonga (concluded in 1985); Southeast Asia, through the Bangkok Treaty (concluded in 1995); and Africa, through the Pelindaba Treaty (concluded in 1995). For the status of these treaties, see appendix I. Proposals to establish zones in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East, South Asia and Central Europe have been put forward for many years by the interested States, but none has been realized so far. Proposals for a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe made since the 1950s, were recently renewed by Belarus and the Russian Federation;<sup>4</sup> no resolution on the subject was tabled in the General Assembly in 2000. In 1997, after the General Assembly endorsed the initiative of the countries of Central Asia to establish a NWFZ in their region, negotiations on a draft treaty for a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) got under way. In addition, the General Assembly for the first time welcomed, in 1998, Mongolia's declaration of its nuclear-weapon-free status.<sup>5</sup>

Important conventional arms and armed forces reductions, as well as confidence-building and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs/CSBMs) were undertaken in Europe in 1990 through the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

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<sup>3</sup> The Secretary-General issued a report on each of the regional centres: Africa (A/55/171), Asia and the Pacific (A/55/181) and Latin America and the Caribbean (A/55/169). In addition, pursuant to resolution 54/55 E, he issued a note (A/55/151) referring to these reports.

<sup>4</sup> In a speech to German politicians and businessmen on 15 June, President Putin renewed the initiative for the establishment of a Central and Eastern European NWFZ, linking the proposal to concerns in the region about the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons. See *The Arms Control Reporter*, 2000, Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies, Cambridge, 2001, sect. 459.B.5.

<sup>5</sup> See resolution 53/77 D.

and related documents on CSBMs.<sup>6</sup> Later, other regions began to adopt and apply CBMs. The Organization of American States (OAS) adopted two instruments: the 1997 Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials,<sup>7</sup> and the 1999 Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions.<sup>8</sup> A number of CBMs have been undertaken in Southeast Asia through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, and in other subregions through bilateral and multilateral agreements among States. Most recently, the number of conflicts in Africa led the United Nations and a number of regional and subregional organizations, both inter-governmental and non-governmental, to focus their attention on the question of proliferation of conventional arms, especially small arms and light weapons, at the regional level.<sup>9</sup>

This chapter deals with issues concerning developments in specific regions related to NWFZs, confidence-building, and efforts to curb the flow of arms and reduce armed forces in the context of post-conflict peace-building.

### **Developments and trends, 2000**

During the year, efforts to consolidate the existing NWFZs and create a new one continued. Security and disarmament issues, especially the excessive accumulation of arms, and the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons, were discussed in many disarmament and security fora at regional and subregional levels. The United Nations made efforts to address an ever increasing number of conflicts, especially intra-State ones in Africa, to alleviate their devastating consequences for civilians. In this context, various regional

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<sup>6</sup> For the texts of the CFE Treaty and Vienna Document on CSBMs which were updated at the Istanbul Summit meeting in 1999, see documents CFE.DOC/2/99 and FSC.DOC/1/99.

<sup>7</sup> For the text, see document A/53/78, annex. The text is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 22: 1997, appendix III.

<sup>8</sup> AG/RES. 1607 (XXIX-O/99). The text is reproduced in *The Yearbook*, vol. 24: 1999, appendix II.

<sup>9</sup> In 1998, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) declared a moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in the subregion.

and subregional organizations and individual States assisted others in collecting and destroying arms, and in conflict prevention, management and resolution. Nearly all regions carried out some of these activities, although with different degrees of urgency depending on the security situation in a given region.

### *Nuclear-weapon-free zones*

The 2000 NPT Review Conference recognized the continuing contribution that NWFZ treaties were making to the achievement of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives, and stressed the importance of their signature and ratification by all regional States, as well as the signature and ratification of relevant protocols by the nuclear-weapon States. (See chapter I, page 17.) It also supported proposals for the establishment of NWFZs where they did not exist, such as in the Middle East and South Asia, and it welcomed Mongolia's declaration of its nuclear-weapon-free status. In connection with the Middle East, the Conference invited "all States, especially States of the Middle East, to reaffirm or declare their support for the objective of establishing an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction... and to take practical steps towards that objective." (See appendix II, page 287.)

The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, whether pertaining to those in existence or to proposals,<sup>10</sup> was addressed by a large number of States, especially those belonging to such arrangements, during the debate in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee. With respect to the treaties of Pelindaba and Rarotonga, no major developments took place. However, the Pacific Islands Forum noted in October that there had been no further signatures or ratifications of the latter treaty since 1997 and it reiterated its call upon the United States to promptly ratify

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<sup>10</sup> Pursuant to resolution 54/51, the Secretary-General submitted a report containing observations on the the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and transmitting the views of Egypt, Qatar and the Russian Federation on the subject. See document A/55/388.

the relevant Protocols.<sup>11</sup> With respect to the Treaty of Tlatelolco,<sup>12</sup> the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) adopted a resolution entitled "The Lima Appeal",<sup>13</sup> calling upon the world community to follow the examples of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Pelindaba, Bangkok and Rarotonga, to join their decisions and political efforts towards the creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones in other inhabited regions of the planet.

The States parties to the Bangkok Treaty, formally known as the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), continued to focus their efforts on negotiations with the nuclear-weapon States related to the Protocol to the Treaty in order to secure their early accession to it. In addition, executing organs of the Treaty, the Commission and the Executive Committee, were established and began their work, and consultations with IAEA were undertaken.

Negotiations on drafting the text of a treaty for CANWFZ continued during the year. The UN-sponsored Expert Group on CANWFZ, consisting of experts from each of the five States,<sup>14</sup> held a meeting at Sapporo from 2 to 5 April, at which they made substantial progress, resulting in their acceptance of nearly all the draft provisions on an *ad credendum* basis.

On 3 February, the parliament of Mongolia adopted a domestic law and resolution on its nuclear-weapon-free status,<sup>15</sup> a step welcomed not only by the 2000 NPT Review Conference, as mentioned above, but also by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM). The

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<sup>11</sup> The Forum, meeting in Kiribati, 27–30 October, issued a communiqué. See document A/55/536, annex.

<sup>12</sup> At its XIV special session, the General Conference of OPANAL adopted resolution CG/E/Res. 400, on strengthening the Agency; and at its XXX session, the General Assembly of OAS adopted resolution AG/RES.1748 (XXX-0/00), on consolidating the regime of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

<sup>13</sup> For the text of resolution CG/Res. 387, adopted at the sixteenth regular session of OPANAL, held in Lima 30 November–1 December 1999, see document A/55/62, annex.

<sup>14</sup> Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

<sup>15</sup> A/55/56-S/2000/160.

13th Ministerial Conference of NAM, held in Cartagena, Colombia, from 8 to 9 April, expressed support for Mongolia's legislation, considering it a concrete contribution to international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.<sup>16</sup> In addition, on 5 October, the five nuclear-weapon States made a joint statement on security assurances in connection with Mongolia, in which they reaffirmed their commitment to seek immediate Security Council action to assist it if it became a victim of an act of aggression, and also reaffirmed their respective unilateral negative security assurances.<sup>17</sup> In addition, the General Assembly had before it a report of the Secretary-General<sup>18</sup> on activities related to Mongolia's status, in particular the twelfth regional disarmament meeting in Asia and the Pacific, in Kathmandu in February, and the Kanazawa Symposium on Northeast Asia, in June.

States belonging to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba continued to call for promotion of the nuclear-weapon-free status of the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. Resolution 55/33 I, which these States sponsored, contained a new element: the possibility of convening an international conference to support the common goals of those treaties. The resolution proved unacceptable to the Western nuclear-weapon States, while five States (among them the Russian Federation) abstained.

### *Conventional disarmament at regional levels*

Issues related to conventional arms were addressed by regional and sub-regional organizations, sometimes in cooperation with other international bodies within or outside the UN system, in the broad context of peace and security within a given region or subregion. Throughout the year, in the light of preparations for the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects,<sup>19</sup> a great deal of attention was paid to questions related to small arms. The following sections give an overview of the most significant developments in various regions during 2000, while issues related

<sup>16</sup> See the Final Document of the Ministerial Conference (A/54/917-S/2000/580), para. 74.

<sup>17</sup> A/55/530-S/2000/1052.

<sup>18</sup> A/55/166.

<sup>19</sup> Hereafter referred to as the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms or the 2001 UN Conference.

to global aspects of conventional arms and the forthcoming 2001 UN Conference are dealt with in chapter IV.

### *Africa*

The Security Council considered questions related to conflicts, the promotion of durable peace, security and sustainable development on the African continent and adopted a number of resolutions and issued a number of presidential statements.<sup>20</sup> The Council was especially involved in the situations in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and in the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict. In its Millennium Summit Declaration,<sup>21</sup> the Council reaffirmed its determination, in view of the particular needs of Africa, to give special attention to the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development on the continent and to the specific characteristics of African conflicts, and called for cooperation and effective coordination between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and subregional organizations.

The OAU, as in previous years, played the primary role in addressing the various political disputes and armed conflicts that were threatening peace and security throughout the continent. At the 36th Summit of the OAU, held in Lomé from 10 to 12 July, member States adopted the Lomé Declaration,<sup>22</sup> in which they committed themselves to resolutely combat illicit proliferation and circulation of small arms and light weapons, and trafficking in such weapons, and emphasized the need for the African States to take an active part in the 2001 UN Conference.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> See Security Council resolutions: 1297 (2000) and 1298 (2000) on Ethiopia and Eritrea, and 1304 (2000) on Democratic Republic of Congo; and presidential statements: S/PRST/2000/2, S/PRST/2000/15 and S/PRST/2000/28 on Democratic Republic of Congo; and S/PRST/2000/10 on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

<sup>21</sup> Relevant excerpts of the Summit Declaration are reproduced in appendix III, page 292. For the entire text, see Security Council resolution 1318 (2000), sects. II-VII.

<sup>22</sup> AHG/Decl.2 (XXXVI).

<sup>23</sup> Preceding the Summit, the OAU Council of Ministers, meeting in Lomé, 6-8 July, adopted a decision on the preparation for the Ministerial Conference in Bamako. See decision CM/Dec. 527 (LXXII).

At the subregional level, ECOWAS<sup>24</sup> continued its efforts at conflict prevention and management in West Africa. At the Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the Mediation and Security Council, held in Bamako on 12 and 13 December, the participants considered the situations in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Guinea/Liberia. In addition, ECOWAS was involved in activities related to the implementation of its 1998 moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and light weapons, especially the establishment of national commissions; followed the destruction of arms through incineration in Niger; and upheld respect for children's rights and protection of war-affected children.

The first ministerial meeting between the European Union (EU) and ECOWAS, held in Abuja, Nigeria, on 16 October, discussed their cooperation in conflict prevention, the situation in the region, and the ECOWAS moratorium.

*Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions  
in Central Africa*<sup>25</sup>

The Advisory Committee held two ministerial meetings during 2000 and organized with the secretariat of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) a meeting of experts to examine draft texts on integrating the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX)<sup>26</sup> into the structure of ECCAS. The heads of State and Government of ECCAS subsequently adopted the texts at their Summit, held in Malabo on 24 February, and the Standing Advisory Committee welcomed these steps at its Thirteenth Ministerial Meeting.<sup>27</sup> The Fourteenth Ministerial Meeting evaluated, *inter alia*, the implementation of its previous decisions and recommendations, reviewed the geopolitical and security situation in Central Africa and examined the implementation of the recommendations of the 1999

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<sup>24</sup> The reader may consult the ECOWAS website: [www.ecowas.int](http://www.ecowas.int).

<sup>25</sup> Composed of: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe.

<sup>26</sup> The decision to establish COPAX was taken by the Heads of State and Government of ECCAS in June 1999.

<sup>27</sup> See document A/54/889-S/2000/506. The Thirteenth Ministerial Meeting was held 2-6 May in N'Djamena, Chad.



Sub-regional Conference on the Proliferation of and Illicit Traffic in Small Arms in Central Africa.<sup>28</sup> While considering the work of the Standing Advisory Committee, the First Committee had before it a report of the Secretary-General.<sup>29</sup>

The OAU secretariat, with the support of and in collaboration with a number of institutions and governments, organized the first continental meeting of African experts on small arms and light weapons,<sup>30</sup> at which the experts approved recommendations related to: (a) prevention and reduction of illicit proliferation of and trade in small arms and light weapons, and (b) policy, institutional arrangements and operational measures for addressing these issues. The OAU also organized an international consultation on illicit proliferation<sup>31</sup> in order to ascertain the views of UN agencies, African regional organizations and NGOs on the priorities for tackling these problems.

At the Conference on the proliferation of small arms in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, held in Nairobi, Kenya, from 12 to 15 March, the participants<sup>32</sup> adopted the Nairobi Declaration and initiated a study on illicit arms within the region; later, in Nairobi, from 5 to 10 November, experts adopted a Coordination Action Programme and a document on the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration.<sup>33</sup>

The Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa<sup>34</sup> strengthened its cooperation with the OAU and provided substantive support to governments in weapons collection programmes carried out in Guinea Bissau and arms control efforts in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, Niger and Togo. The Centre continued to serve as the operational and policy framework for the Programme

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<sup>28</sup> See document A/55/505-S/2000/1005. The Fourteenth Ministerial Meeting was held 17–18 August in Bujumbura, Burundi.

<sup>29</sup> A/55/170.

<sup>30</sup> Addis Ababa, 17–19 May; see document A/55/323, paras. 28–32.

<sup>31</sup> Addis Ababa, 22–23 June; see document A/55/323, paras. 33–36.

<sup>32</sup> Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania.

<sup>33</sup> For the text of the Declaration see document A/54/860-S/2000/385.

<sup>34</sup> See the report of the Secretary-General on the Regional Centre (A/55/171).

for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) and supported the ECOWAS moratorium, and the peace and security activities of the Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.

The Centre also provided support to the West African Conference on Child Soldiers, held in Accra, Ghana, from 27 to 28 April. The Centre further initiated, in early July, a series of assessment missions to the Central African subregion to develop a "disarmament for development" programme, the initial phase of which would concentrate on Cameroon, Chad and the Central African Republic.

The Centre assisted in preparing for the OAU Ministerial Conference on Small Arms and in drafting the Bamako Declaration (see chapter IV, page 105). Subsequently it organized,<sup>35</sup> from 7 to 9 December, the All-Africa Civil Society Consultation on Small Arms, the key objective of which was to formulate an action plan for the Bamako Declaration. At the end of the year, representatives of PCASED, ECOWAS, the UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and the Centre finalized the guidelines for national commissions on proliferation of small arms, to be established in all ECOWAS countries in support of its moratorium. For further details on the work of the Centre, see chapter VII.

### *Americas*

An important development related to conventional arms in the region was the adoption of the Brasilia Declaration at the Regional Preparatory Meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean States, which reflected their common approach to the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms. For details see chapter IV, page 105.

The OAS<sup>36</sup> continued to be involved in disarmament and security matters in the hemisphere, especially in promoting and implementing mine clearance and transparency in conventional weapons and in curbing illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms. The General Assembly of the OAS, meeting in San José, Costa Rica, from 3 to

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<sup>35</sup> In collaboration with the Norwegian Initiative for Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) and the Norwegian Red Cross and Oxfam, UK.

<sup>36</sup> See the OAS website: [www.oas.org](http://www.oas.org).

5 June, adopted a number of resolutions related to these issues.<sup>37</sup> In its Declaration on Small Arms and Light Weapons,<sup>38</sup> the Assembly requested the Permanent Council, through its Committee on Hemispheric Security, to study the feasibility of developing a declaration on all aspects of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, in the context of the 2001 UN Conference, and by its resolution "Children and armed conflicts",<sup>39</sup> it urged member States to sign and ratify the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on the participation of children in armed conflicts; called upon all parties in armed conflicts to respect the provisions of international humanitarian law that protect children, and supported efforts of the countries concerned to demobilize child soldiers, and to rehabilitate and reintegrate into society children affected by armed conflicts.

With regard to mine action, the OAS, Argentina and Canada, in cooperation with the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, organized a regional seminar on the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines in November in Buenos Aires. The seminar was conceived as a practical exercise to assist Latin American parties to the Mine-Ban Convention in fulfilling their legal obligations to destroy all stocks within four years of the treaty's entry into force.

The Regional Centre<sup>40</sup> carried out several activities under its project "Regional clearing-house on firearms, ammunition and explosives", intended to serve as a tool for nurturing national and regional expertise in the field of practical disarmament. The Centre organized an awareness-building workshop in cooperation with the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) to highlight the im-

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<sup>37</sup> See, for example, the following resolutions: "Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions" (AG/RES.1749 (XXX-0/00)), and "Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA)" (AG/RES.1750 (XXX-0/00)).

<sup>38</sup> AG/RES.1743 (XXX-0/00).

<sup>39</sup> AG/RES.1709 (XXX-0/00).

<sup>40</sup> See the report of the Secretary-General on the Regional Centre (A/55/169).

portance of the CICAD model regulations in the context of the implementation of the Inter-American Firearms Convention.<sup>41</sup> In the same subject area, it designed, at the request of the UN International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), a joint project to train and equip Peruvian customs officers in order to strengthen border controls for curbing illicit trafficking in drugs, firearms and ammunition and, at the request of Chile, facilitated discussions on the possible development of a similar project in the border area between Chile and Peru.

The Centre also organized, on 19 May, a workshop on "Military perspectives of regional security: consultations with Lima military attaches" to address potential military contributions to CSBMs in the region. In addition, it participated in consultations on regional capacity-building for stockpile destruction of anti-personnel mines and took part in the planning mission to Managua in connection with preparations for the Third Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine-Ban Convention. For further details on the work of the Regional Centre, see chapter VII.

### *Asia and the Pacific*

While there is no regional organization in which all States of Asia and the Pacific participate, a number of activities related to conventional arms and confidence-building took place through subregional organizations and forums.

Questions related to security, regional stability and confidence-building were addressed primarily by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), its Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). At the global level, the Security Council remained actively seized of the situation in East Timor,<sup>42</sup> and the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific endeavoured to contribute to security and stability in the region through its activities.

The 33rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting met in Bangkok from 24 to 25 July, and the 7th meeting of ARF also took place there,

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<sup>41</sup> The workshop took place in Fort-de-France, Martinique, 23–24 May.

<sup>42</sup> See, for example, the report of the Security Council Mission to East Timor and Indonesia (S/2000/1005) of 21 November and a subsequent presidential statement (S/PRST/2000/39).

on 27 July.<sup>43</sup> The foreign ministers taking part in both meetings considered a wide range of regional and international issues and welcomed the participation, for the first time, of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in ARF's proceedings. They noted with satisfaction the significant progress made in enhancing political and security dialogue and cooperation within the Asia-Pacific region, emphasized the importance of confidence-building measures and agreed that such efforts should be intensified. While CBMs remained ARF's primary focus, they believed that advances could be made in the development of the ARF process from CBMs to preventive diplomacy. In that context, they commended the work of the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group on CBMs,<sup>44</sup> which had updated its list of measures and had held substantive discussions on a draft paper on concepts and principles of preventive diplomacy.

With respect to global concerns, the ministers expressed support for the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms. In the field of weapons of mass destruction, they emphasized the need for systematic and progressive efforts on the part of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, reiterated the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and noted the progress achieved thus far in negotiating a verification protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

The Pacific Islands Forum considered a number of regional security issues. It also urged its members to sign and ratify the CTBT and called upon the nuclear-weapon States to pursue the steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Under its auspices, the South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference, held from 9 to 11 March in Nadi, Fiji, agreed that work be undertaken to produce a model law on weapons control and that member States adapt the model to their domestic legislation.

In addition, a number of meetings related to small arms issues were held at the governmental and non-governmental levels in South

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<sup>43</sup> See the ASEAN website: [www.aseansec.org](http://www.aseansec.org).

<sup>44</sup> The Inter-Sessional Support Group met in Singapore 5–6 April.

Asia. The Kandalama Conference<sup>45</sup> considered that measures to combat small arms proliferation in the region might include: bilateral or multilateral collection and exchange of data, cooperative monitoring of manufacturing centres, exchange of data and information on domestic collection of weapons, destruction of collected weapons, and cooperative border management. The Kandy Conference,<sup>46</sup> a follow-up to the Kandalama Conference, addressed two issues: developing a cooperative approach to address small arms proliferation in the region, and strengthening participation from the region in the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

The main theme of the Asia Regional Workshop, sponsored by Japan and held in Tokyo from 8 to 9 June, was an Asian perspective on the problems of small arms in preparation for the 2001 UN Conference. The workshop was organized with a view to promoting discussion, but not to developing agreed positions.<sup>47</sup>

Through its activities, the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific<sup>48</sup> continued to contribute to enhancing openness, transparency and CBMs in the region; it also organized three major meetings. The first, held in Kathmandu from 15 to 17 February, focused on nuclear disarmament and the elaboration of measures and strategies for moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons. It also dealt with the following issues: missile proliferation, prevention of an arms race in outer space, Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, and preparations for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The second, a regional seminar on illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, organized by the Centre together with the governments of Japan and Indonesia, was held on 3 and 4 May in Jakarta. As the first meeting ever held by the Centre in Southeast Asia, it provided an opportunity to discuss small arms as a separate issue within the framework of ASEAN and to identify common concerns related

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<sup>45</sup> Organized by the Colombo-based Regional Centre for Strategic Studies in collaboration with Canada and the Department for Disarmament Affairs, the Conference was held 20–23 June in Kandalama, Sri Lanka.

<sup>46</sup> Organized by the same institutions as the Kandalama Conference and in collaboration with the United Kingdom and the University of Bradford, the Conference was held in Kandy, Sri Lanka, 23–25 June.

<sup>47</sup> See document A/55/323, para. 63.

<sup>48</sup> See the report of the Secretary-General (A/55/181).

to the problems arising from their illicit trafficking. The Centre's third major meeting, in Akita, from 22 to 25 August, discussed strategies for peace and security, new approaches to peace and security in North-east Asia, eliminating nuclear danger, and conventional weapons.

In addition, the Centre continued to assist the five Central Asian States in drafting a treaty to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region, as discussed on page 143, and also organized several informal meetings in order to assist the States concerned in resolving differences, particularly on the provisions concerning the relationship between the draft treaty and other existing agreements. In order to assist Mongolia in promoting non-military aspects of its international security, the Centre hosted informal meetings involving relevant bodies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), DESA, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Public Information (DPI).

The Centre again provided the United Nations Association of Japan with technical and substantive services for its organization of another symposium in the Kanazawa series. The Sixth Kanazawa Symposium, held from 7 to 10 June, dealt with stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia, the Korean peninsula, technological and social challenges and regional cooperation. For further details on the work of the Regional Centre, see chapter VII.

### *Europe*

Security issues were addressed within the existing regional institutional framework, that is, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU and other regional and subregional organizations. Major security concerns related to developments in the Balkans, especially in Kosovo, led to establishing means to react promptly to such crises and to the excessive accumulation and proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

The Security Council continued to follow the implementation of its resolution 1244 (1999) under which a civil presence, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and a security presence (KFOR) were established in Kosovo, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Council expressed satisfaction with the progress made regarding the security situation in the province, condemned acts

of violence within Kosovo against ethnic minorities and expressed its grave concerns at the situation in southern Serbia due to violent action by ethnic Albanian extremist groups.<sup>49</sup>

NATO continued its activities through different bodies and through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The meetings of the North Atlantic Council in Foreign and in Defence Ministers' sessions<sup>50</sup> reviewed the implementation of the Defence Capabilities Initiative, launched at the 1999 NATO Summit in Washington, and noted with satisfaction the contribution made by NATO's Southeast Europe Initiative to regional dialogue and cooperation with a view to enhancing long-term security and stability in the Balkans.

Work proceeded, under the auspices of the OSCE,<sup>51</sup> on the various components of the Dayton Agreement. The States parties to the Agreement on Subregional Arms Control, also known as the Florence Agreement,<sup>52</sup> continued to destroy surplus weapons and equipment, and a number of inspections took place in spite of the fact that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had temporarily suspended participation in 1999 because of the Kosovo crisis and NATO intervention, and did not resume its participation until July 2000. At their meeting in Vienna, from 2 to 3 November, the parties reviewed the implementation of the Agreement, expressed satisfaction with the process and agreed to consider measures that would enhance implementation in the future and contribute to transparency and openness. In the framework of the negotiations on regional stability in Southeast Europe, the participating States continued discussions on CSBMs and initiated discussions on an information exchange on military forces.

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<sup>49</sup> See presidential statements S/PRST/2000/35 of 22 November and S/PRST/2000/40 of 19 December.

<sup>50</sup> The North Atlantic Council Meetings in Foreign Ministers' Sessions took place in Florence, 24–25 May, and in Brussels, 14–15 December; Council Meetings in Defence Ministers' Sessions took place in Brussels, 8–9 June and 5–6 December. See final communiqués posted on the NATO website: [www.nato.int/docu](http://www.nato.int/docu).

<sup>51</sup> OSCE, Annual Report 2000 on OSCE Activities (1 November 1999 to 31 November 2000), pp. 66–69.

<sup>52</sup> The Agreement was signed in Florence on 14 June 1996 between Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska.



At their Summit, held in Queluz, Portugal, on 31 May, the EU and United States issued a statement on Southeast Europe in which they expressed their support for full implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) on Kosovo, and stated that they remained fully committed to the goals and vision of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.<sup>53</sup>

On the tenth anniversary of the signing of the CFE Treaty,<sup>54</sup> States parties continued to implement its provisions and the Vienna Documents on CSBMs. The Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty, signed at the Istanbul Summit on 19 November 1999, had not entered into force as of the end of the year.

On 20 November, in Brussels, the member States of the EU adopted a Military Capability Commitment Declaration elaborating in detail their capabilities required to enable the EU to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This action was taken in follow-up to their decision in December 1999 to create a rapid reaction force to be deployed by 2003.<sup>55</sup>

The OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation adopted, on 24 November, a Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons,<sup>56</sup> which contained norms, principles and measures covering all aspects of the problem of the spread of small arms and light weapons. For details, see chapter IV, page 105.

The region's great interest in issues related to small arms and light weapons found expression in a series of conferences and workshops held in various countries throughout the year. States belonging to the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe held a number of workshops and seminars related to the security in the region, and specifically

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<sup>53</sup> The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe was initiated by the EU and adopted in Cologne on 10 June 1999 and endorsed at the Sarajevo Summit on 30 July 1999.

<sup>54</sup> See the statement of President Putin, circulated as a document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1630).

<sup>55</sup> The EU decided in June 1999 to abolish the Western European Union (WEU) and to create its own capability for independent military action by the end of 2000.

<sup>56</sup> Circulated as a document of the 2001 UN Conference (A/CONF.192/PC/20), annex. See also document A/55/323, paras. 37–42, regarding the preparatory process for the Document.

to issues of small arms.<sup>57</sup> At the seminar on small arms and light weapons collection and destruction, held in Sofia from 17 to 19 October, possible measures for control over proliferation were considered as a major aspect of the efforts for post-conflict rehabilitation in areas of recent armed conflict. The seminar studied the synergies between current efforts and processes led by the United Nations, the EU, NATO and the OSCE, as well as input by the Wassenaar Arrangement.

The ministers of foreign affairs of the countries participating in the South-East European Cooperation process, meeting in Ohrid, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 14 July, issued a joint statement<sup>58</sup> in which they underlined, *inter alia*, the importance of preventing the illegal transfer and possession of small arms and light weapons and expressed their determination for further practical cooperation in these fields. The Workshop on Stockpile Management and Security of Small Arms and Light Weapons, held in Thun, Switzerland, from 16 to 17 March, provided a platform for the exchange of information and experience between the EAPC and Partnership for Peace countries. The main topic of the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network held, in Lucerne from 11 to 12 May, was small arms and the 2001 Conference.<sup>59</sup>

The EU continued to contribute to combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons and to cooperate with the United Nations, NATO and other regional organizations through its Programme for Preventing and Combating the Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms, its Code of Conduct on Arms Exports,

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<sup>57</sup> The Workshop on Small Arms and Light Weapons, held in Ljubljana, on 27 January, considered the uncontrolled or illegal transfer of large numbers of small arms and light weapons and the need to increase the transparency of arms transfers by expanding the Register of Conventional Arms to include small arms; at the Working Table on Security Issues, Sarajevo, 15–16 February, proposals were made on establishment of a regional fund for the destruction of small arms; on collecting and destroying small arms in Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; on a destruction facility in Albania for stockpiles of ammunition. See document A/55/323, paras. 53–55.

<sup>58</sup> A/55/165, annex.

<sup>59</sup> For further details concerning the three meetings, see document A/55/323, paras. 60–62.

and the EU Joint Action.<sup>60</sup> It also participated in and assisted the United Nations in collecting, destroying and preventing the spread of small arms in a number of countries. For details, see chapter IV.

### **General Assembly, 2000**

The General Assembly took action on 14 draft resolutions dealing with the subjects discussed in this chapter. Another draft resolution, entitled "Regional disarmament and non-proliferation", was introduced in the First Committee by Belarus, but later withdrawn as it could not command consensus. While considering the item on strengthening security and cooperation in the Mediterranean, the First Committee had before it a report of the Secretary-General conveying the views of Member States on the subject.<sup>61</sup>

### ***Nuclear-weapon-free zones***

**55/39 - Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).** The draft resolution was introduced by Mexico, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 406 for the sponsors) on 18 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 25 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 383.

**55/33 W - Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.** The revised draft resolution was introduced by Uzbekistan, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 400 for the sponsors), on 20 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 25 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 355.

***First Committee:*** India stated that it was prepared to extend all possible support and commitment in response to an expressed need for the early realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. Nepal held that the establishment of such zones was an effective confidence-building measure.

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<sup>60</sup> A/54/374.

<sup>61</sup> A/55/254. The report conveyed the views of: Algeria, Jordan, Portugal, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the EU, Qatar and Russian Federation.

**55/30 – Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.** The draft resolution was introduced by Egypt on 20 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 26 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 307.

*First Committee:* Israel joined the consensus because it supported the eventual establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which should also be free of chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. It believed that such a zone should be based on arrangements freely arrived at by all States of the region concerned and that such a zone could only be established through direct negotiation between the States of the region after they had established full, peaceful and diplomatic relations between them. Israel noted that the continuing threat against its very existence had a critical impact on the region's ability to establish such a zone.

**55/33 S – Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status.** The draft resolution was introduced by Mongolia on 19 October, and on 25 October it introduced a revised text in which minor changes were made to the seventh preambular paragraph, a new tenth preambular paragraph was added, which took note of the fact that the joint statement of the five nuclear-weapon States on security assurances for Mongolia had been transmitted to the Security Council, and operative paragraph 4, requesting the Security Council to take note of the joint statement, was consequently deleted. The revised draft resolution was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 25 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 345.

*First Committee:* The United States noted that it would continue to cooperate in the implementation of the draft resolution and expressed the hope that other Member States and the appropriate UN bodies would continue to lend their cooperation and support in this endeavour. India similarly extended its cooperation, support and commitment to Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and called upon all Member States, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons, to respond positively for the full realization and strengthening of Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status.

**55/33 I – Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.** The draft resolution was introduced by Brazil, on behalf of

the sponsors (see page 394 for the sponsors), on 23 October, and on 30 October a revised draft was introduced in which, at the end of operative paragraph 6, referring to a possible international conference, the words "can help in promoting these objectives" were replaced by "might be held to support the common goals envisaged in those treaties". It was adopted by the First Committee on 31 October (as a whole: 146-4-6; op. para. 3, last 3 words: 134-1-10; and op. para. 3 as a whole: 138-1-9) and by the General Assembly on 20 November (as a whole: 159-4-5; op. para. 3, last 3 words: 152-1-10; and op. para. 3 as a whole: 155-1-9). For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 328 and 417, respectively.

**First Committee:** The United Kingdom, speaking also on behalf of France and the United States, explained their negative votes. Noting that the sponsors had refused to include the applicable passages of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as reassurance that the fundamental freedom of the seas would not be affected, they were increasingly concerned that the draft intended to restrict that fundamental freedom in ways that undermined the norms set by the Convention. They also expressed their concern at the introduction of a new element, an international conference of States parties and signatories to nuclear-weapon-free zones, as its objectives were not clear and the UNDC had already agreed on general guidelines for nuclear-weapon-free zones in 1999.

India, explaining its negative vote on the last three words in operative paragraph 3 and the paragraph as a whole, and its abstention on the draft resolution as a whole, held that there was no consensus on the establishment of such a zone in South Asia, and that the text did not reflect the new realities in South Asia.

Spain, explaining its abstention on the draft resolution as a whole, found difficulties with the concept of an international conference, as such a conference would be a departure from the consensus already reached in prior negotiations on nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Four States which voted in favour explained their positions. China noted that the draft resolution referred to the applicable principles and rules of international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the right of passage through maritime space, and on the understanding that it did not seek to add any new legal obligation to those already contained in the relevant nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, China had voted in favour. The Philippines took exception

to the inclusion of mention of the right of passage through maritime space, as such language could only refer to the passage of ships carrying nuclear weapons, and it felt that this language did not and would not contribute to the realization of the draft resolution's objectives. However, the Philippines believed that the draft resolution contained elements worthy of its support. Both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Nepal expressed general support for the achievements of the existing treaties and the hope that such zones would be expanded to other regions.

*Conventional disarmament at regional levels*

**55/33 O - Regional disarmament.** The draft resolution was introduced by Pakistan, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 396 for the sponsors), on 19 October. On 26 October, Cameroon submitted amendments consisting of new operative paragraphs 6 to 8, which requested information from all States on disarmament initiatives and confidence-building measures, and invited the Secretary-General to assist sub-regional and regional organizations in implementing such initiatives. These amendments were subsequently withdrawn by Cameroon, as they would not command consensus, and the draft resolution was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 1 November and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 336.

**55/33 P - Conventional arms control at the regional and sub-regional levels.** The draft resolution was introduced by Pakistan, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 396 for the sponsors), on 18 October, adopted by the First Committee (145-1-1) on 26 October and by the General Assembly (163-1-1) on 20 November. For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 337 and 421, respectively.

**First Committee:** Before the vote, India indicated that it would vote against the draft text for the following reasons: it remained convinced that the draft proposal, in particular the call upon the Conference on Disarmament to formulate principles (operative paragraph 2), had no productive value since in 1993 the Disarmament Commission had adopted consensus guidelines on regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security; and it also felt that the reference to conventional arms control in South Asia (6th preambular paragraph) was too restrictive, as India's security concerns were not confined to that area.

**55/34 B - Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.** The draft resolution was introduced by Burundi, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 402 for the sponsors) on 23 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 26 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 361.

**55/27 - Maintenance of international security - good-neighbourliness, stability and development of South-Eastern Europe.** The draft resolution was introduced by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 389 for the sponsors), on 17 October, and on 31 October, a revision was introduced, incorporating a few minor changes. It was adopted by the First Committee at the same meeting (150-0-0) and by the General Assembly without a vote on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 301.

*First Committee:* Belarus explained that it could not join the consensus, because, among other things, the draft resolution's main thrust was not disarmament, but issues more appropriate for consideration in the plenary of the General Assembly. A similar view was shared by Cuba, which supported the draft resolution, but felt that it raised issues, such as the work of the United Nations and NATO in Kosovo, requiring broader and more comprehensive consideration than that which the First Committee could give.

**55/38 - Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region.** The draft resolution was introduced by Algeria, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 406 for the sponsors), on 17 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 27 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 381.

### *Regional centres*

**55/34 D - United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa.** The draft resolution was introduced by Lesotho, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States, on 20 October. In introducing it, Lesotho made an oral revision to operative paragraph 3 to clarify the purpose of the appeal for voluntary contributions. The draft was adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 26 October and

by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 365.

**55/34 E – The United Nations Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean.** The draft resolution was introduced by Belize, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, on 20 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 26 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 367.

**55/34 F – United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament.** The draft resolution was introduced by South Africa, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, on 19 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 26 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 369.

**55/34 H – United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific.** The draft resolution was introduced by Nepal, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 404 for the sponsors), on 19 October, and on 26 October some minor editorial amendments were made to operative paragraph 4. It was adopted, as amended, without a vote by the First Committee on 26 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 371.

*First Committee:* Oman, which supported the draft resolution, approved the efforts taken to keep the Centre in operation, and hoped that the Centre would soon begin to serve the needs of the entire region.

## **Conclusion**

Regional approaches to achieving peace, security and disarmament were applied in regions and subregions with varying intensity in both the nuclear and conventional fields.

The existing NWFZ regimes continued to make a valuable contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and security at the regional level, and substantial progress was made in the negotiations on drafting the Treaty on CANWFZ. In addition, the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia was strengthened through its own legislation and through the guarantees provided by the five nuclear-weapon States.



In the conventional field, two major subjects were addressed in the regional context within and outside the United Nations: small arms and light weapons, and CBMs.

The ongoing conflicts in Africa, particularly intra-State conflicts, were addressed by the UN Security Council. The OAU and subregional organizations such as ECOWAS and ECCAS discussed matters of policy and institutional arrangements, and engaged in drafting legal and political documents. In several instances, States undertook practical disarmament measures, such as collecting and destroying small arms and light weapons.

The OAS continued its efforts to promote transparency in conventional weapons, to undertake mine clearance and to encourage the building of regional capacity for stockpile destruction of mines. Individual countries, in cooperation with the Regional Centre, took steps to further implement the Inter-American Firearms Convention.

Preparations for the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects got under way at the regional level. African, Latin American and Caribbean, and European States succeeded in adopting their respective common positions as their contributions to the Conference itself.

The process of integration in Europe was further strengthened; however, problems related to events in the Balkans, especially in Kosovo, persisted in threatening the stability and security of the region.

The three UN regional centres actively assisted States in their endeavours to maintain peace and security and to address questions related to small arms and light weapons.



## CHAPTER VI

### Other issues

#### Introduction

A NUMBER OF ISSUES that have been considered with different degrees of intensity by the international community for years, but that led to no major developments in 2000, were nevertheless the subject of resolutions in the General Assembly. They are dealt with in this chapter under the title "Other issues", because they do not lend themselves to placement in any of the topical chapters of this volume, nor do they share a common theme among themselves. This chapter covers: outer space; information technology and security; the relationship between disarmament and development; and observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of treaties. In addition, it introduces the subject of depleted uranium, although the subject was not a specific item on the agenda of the General Assembly.

#### Outer space

During 2000, as has been the case for the past several years, the main activities of the United Nations concerning questions of outer space took place in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.<sup>1</sup> No substantive work with respect to disarmament took place as, once again, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) did not establish

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<sup>1</sup> See the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (A/55/20). In the Final Document of the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cartagena, Colombia, from 8 to 9 April, the participants urged member states to implement the decisions taken at UNISPACE III (1999) and welcomed UN General Assembly resolution 54/68, which took note of the outcome of UNISPACE III.

an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Nevertheless, delegations raised the issues of the militarization of outer space in plenary meetings of the CD and in the general debate in the First Committee, especially in the context of the emerging policy of the United States to introduce a national missile defence (NMD) system. Such a move, in the opinion of many, would endanger the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. At the Millennium Summit, President Putin stated that plans for the militarization of outer space were alarming, and suggested that an international conference on the prevention of such a trend should be organized, under the aegis of the United Nations, in the spring of 2001 in celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the first manned flight in outer space.

### *Conference on Disarmament, 2000*

Efforts to find a compromise programme of work to allow the CD to deal with the issues of outer space, nuclear disarmament and fissile material were made throughout the session, but substantive differences, among nuclear-weapon States in particular, prevented the establishment of subsidiary bodies on these items. Nevertheless, the subject was discussed during plenary meetings. Several countries, notably China and the Russian Federation, expressed their concerns over the US intention to amend or possibly withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty in order to deploy an NMD system. Some countries stressed the urgent need for negotiations on legal instruments that would prevent an arms race in outer space, as the current regime appeared unable to do so. Others questioned the existence of an arms race in outer space or the risk of one developing.

In an effort to find agreement, several delegations submitted new or updated proposals for the establishment of subsidiary bodies, with mandates ranging from discussion to the negotiation of a legally binding instrument.

China held that the prevention of an arms race in outer space was its top priority in the CD, as adopting a treaty today would prevent the CD from having to negotiate the demilitarization of outer space in the future. It believed the CD had the necessary experience to negotiate such an instrument, as it had already discussed the topic within ad hoc committees from 1985 to 1994. China stressed that the existing legal regime had too many loopholes, did not prevent new weapons of mass destruction (such as lasers, particle beams,

X-rays and kinetic weapons) or weapons systems from being placed in outer space, and was not fully complied with. It expressed concern that amendment of the ABM Treaty would create a new arms race, thereby putting an end to the positive trend in non-proliferation that had emerged after the cold war. China regarded the US plans as part of a wider programme to dominate outer space, with a view to achieving unilateral military and strategic dominance. In a working paper,<sup>2</sup> China proposed the establishment of an ad hoc committee with a mandate for the "negotiation and conclusion of one or several international legal instruments to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space."

The Russian Federation supported China's proposal and shared its concerns. It believed that the existing outer space regime was already weak, as it did not prohibit the deployment, use or testing in space of conventional weapons. The Russian Federation stated that the ABM Treaty was a crucial element of the existing outer space and non-proliferation regimes and should be preserved, as it would prevent the emergence of new anti-ballistic weapons.<sup>3</sup> It viewed the United States plan for an NMD system as an attempt to enhance American security at the expense of others' and a threat to global strategic stability, as the deployment of such a system would undermine the Russian Federation's strategic deterrent.

The United States maintained that the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space was not ripe for negotiation, and deplored the linkage that was being made between negotiations on it and negotiations on fissile material. It stated that it did not oppose discussing the issue in a suitable context, in line with the Dembri,

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<sup>2</sup> CD/1606.

<sup>3</sup> CD/PV.843, p. 4. In this connection, the Russian Federation noted the proposal made during the G8 meeting in Cologne, June 1999, in which the Russian president had called for the creation of a global missile and missile technology non-proliferation control system.

Lint and Amorim proposals for a programme of work,<sup>4</sup> but reiterated that the United States did not see any prospects for an arms race in outer space, as the existing outer space regime already provided a comprehensive framework for peaceful use. The United States did not see any justification for limitations on the right of sovereign States to collect data from outer space, referring to the use of military satellites to provide early warning against missile attacks and to monitor arms control agreements. Regarding the possible amendment to the ABM Treaty, the United States said it had been negotiated in 1972 under military and political circumstances that were no longer valid, as new threats now needed to be addressed. It held that the Treaty would be amended only to permit the deployment of a limited NMD system, which would be directed against "countries of concern", but which would not affect the Russian Federation's strategic deterrent nor provide defence against the ballistic missiles of Russia and China. It added that this system would be predominantly land-based, and would not involve placing weapons in outer space.

Japan did not recognize the existence of an arms race in outer space or the risk that such a situation would emerge in the near future. It also stressed that the issue was not ripe for negotiation, noting that although the CD had established ad hoc committees to discuss the item in the past, no convergence of views had ever emerged. It admitted, however, that the existing regime might need to be updated to accommodate new technologies. Germany supported the establishment of a subsidiary body to discuss all aspects of this broad issue and to address the security concerns of certain States. Canada expressed support for a programme of work in line with the Dembri package.

The Group of 21 deplored what they considered the inflexibility of some nuclear-weapon States, stressing the urgent need for commencement of substantive work, as called for in General Assembly

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<sup>4</sup> CD/PV.828, pp. 21–23 (Dembri); CD/1620 (Lint) and CD/1624 (Amorim). The Dembri "package", proposed by Algeria during its presidency of the CD in 1999, envisaged a programme of work that would accommodate consideration of the two most sensitive issues—nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space—in two non-negotiating ad hoc working groups. Although the proposal was well received, it was not accepted by all and therefore no subsidiary bodies were established. For a description of the Amorim proposal, see chap. VII, page 182.

resolution 54/53. Mexico considered the 1967 Outer Space Treaty still valid, but perhaps insufficient to prevent the deployment or testing of weapons other than weapons of mass destruction in outer space. It stated the time had come to ban the establishment of military bases, facilities or fortification for military uses, and the testing and deployment of any category of weapon in outer space. It was therefore in favour of the establishment of an ad hoc committee with a mandate to "negotiate and conclude an international legal instrument on the prohibition of the testing, deployment and use of weapons and weapons systems and/or their components in outer space that would help prevent an arms race in outer space."<sup>5</sup> Ireland noted that there had been wide support for the launching of negotiations and for the proposals that were made in 1999, and therefore agreed that the CD should embark on negotiations on the non-weaponization of outer space.

### *General Assembly, 2000*

**55/32 – Prevention of an arms race in outer space.** The draft resolution was introduced by Egypt, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 391 for the sponsors), on 19 October, adopted by the First Committee on 30 October (154-0-2) and by the General Assembly (163-0-3) on 20 November. For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see 312 pages and 411, respectively.

**First Committee:** France, speaking on behalf of a large number of countries that voted in favour,<sup>6</sup> stated that they were prepared to support the establishment of a subsidiary body on the issue within the CD provided that the nature and mandate of that body had the assent of every member State. Nevertheless, they recalled that the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, universal treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear devices was a priority of the EU.

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<sup>5</sup> CD/PV.847, p. 11.

<sup>6</sup> Speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU) and the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, as well as the associated countries of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey.

## **Information technology and security**

It is widely acknowledged that military applications of scientific and technological developments, especially in information and communication, can contribute significantly to the improvement and upgrading of advanced weapons systems, in particular, weapons of mass destruction, and lead to a renewed, qualitative arms race. In addition, it is recognized that information technology has become a key feature of warfare, and the distinction between civilian and military use of technology has become less and less relevant. Nevertheless, there are some positive aspects to technological advances. For example, some technological developments can be used to distinguish more accurately between military and non-military targets and to monitor peace operations, compliance with ceasefires and verification of treaties. In view of this complexity, the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held a preliminary discussion on the impact of a possible revolution in military affairs and on the question whether it would change in a significant way the political context in which arms control and disarmament negotiations take place.

During the consideration of the draft resolution on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security, the First Committee had before it a report of the Secretary-General,<sup>7</sup> submitted pursuant to resolution 54/49, containing the views of Member States and their assessments of the following questions: (a) general appreciation of the issues of information security; (b) definition of basic notions related to information security, including unauthorized interference with or misuse of information and telecommunications systems and information resources; and (c) advisability of developing international principles that would enhance the security of global information and telecommunication systems and help to combat information terrorism and criminality.

### ***General Assembly, 2000***

**55/29 – Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament.** The draft resolution was introduced by India, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 390 for the spon-

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<sup>7</sup> A/55/140 and Corr.1, and Add.1. Replies were received from Japan, Qatar, the Russian Federation and Poland.



sors), on 18 October, adopted by the First Committee on 27 October (91-44-17) and by the General Assembly (97-46-21) on 20 November. For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 305 and 409, respectively.

**55/28 – Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.** The draft resolution was introduced by the Russian Federation, on 19 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 27 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 304.

## Depleted uranium

Questions related to the use of depleted uranium (DU) weapons have been raised at governmental and non-governmental levels in connection with the Gulf War and military intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Yugoslavia. Consequently, a number of studies have been undertaken to evaluate whether DU weapons might affect the health of the populations living in the conflict areas around the Gulf and in the Balkans.<sup>8</sup>

In October 1999, The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), through its “Depleted Uranium Desk Assessment Group”, carried out a desk assessment study of the potential effects of the possible use of DU weapons during the Kosovo conflict, but could not complete its mission due to lack of information on their use.<sup>9</sup> In February 2000, NATO confirmed to the UN Secretary-General that DU had been used during the Kosovo conflict and, in July, provided UNEP with a detailed map indicating sites where such munitions had been used. Subsequently, from 5 to 19 November, UNEP experts conducted a field mission in Kosovo, visiting 11 sites, to assess the

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<sup>8</sup> For further information, see *Depleted Uranium in Kosovo, Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment*, appendix XI, UNEP, 2001.

<sup>9</sup> See UNEP/UNCHS Balkans Task Force report, 1999, “The potential effects on human health and the environment arising from possible use of depleted uranium during the 1999 Kosovo conflict. A preliminary assessment”.

environmental situation and any possible connected health risks and prepared their report on the situation, which was published in 2001.<sup>10</sup>

During the General Assembly, Yugoslavia submitted a document<sup>11</sup> providing information on the use of DU in Yugoslavia in 1999 and its consequences.

### **Relationship between disarmament and development**

The question of the relationship between disarmament and development remained controversial. While the vast majority of Member States, mostly non-aligned, continued to call for implementation of the action programme of the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development,<sup>12</sup> a number of States, especially member States of the EU and the United States, considered that there was no automatic link between the two concepts.

The Secretary-General submitted a report entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development"<sup>13</sup> pursuant to General Assembly resolution 54/54 T, in which he informed the Assembly of the implementation of the programme of activities adopted by the Steering Group on Disarmament and Development,<sup>14</sup> established in 1999, and conveyed information received from the Government of Colombia.

During the year, the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) cooperated with UNDP on the disarmament and development approach, as reflected in "weapons for development programmes" pursued in the context of combating the proliferation of small arms

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<sup>10</sup> *Depleted Uranium in Kosovo, Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment*, UNEP, 2001. The report lists, in appendix VIII, the DU-targeted sites provided by NATO. It recommends procedures for treating affected sites and precautionary measures; it does not reach any definitive overall conclusions, but recommends further work to reduce scientific uncertainties.

<sup>11</sup> A/55/398-S/2000/883, annex.

<sup>12</sup> United Nations publication, sales No. E.87.IX.8.

<sup>13</sup> A/55/258.

<sup>14</sup> The Group comprises the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, the Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs, the Administrator of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations.

and light weapons. DDA also launched a process of consultations with independent experts on the changing paradigm of disarmament and development; it undertook the first in the series in July, by electronic means, with the Bonn International Centre for Conversion.

One of the salient features of the Steering Group's programme of activities is the periodic organization of seminars or symposia to focus on specific aspects of disarmament-development issues, thus providing a forum where relevant UN bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other international agencies can share their experience in areas of common concern.<sup>15</sup>

On 21 June, DDA and the Department for Economic and Social Affairs, in collaboration with two NGOs prominent in the field, Economists Allied for Arms Reduction (ECAAR) and the World Policy Institute, organized a panel discussion at UN headquarters on the implications of the restructuring of the global arms industry. The panel included speakers from the arms industry and NGO experts with long-standing involvement in arms trade and related issues.<sup>16</sup>

### ***General Assembly, 2000***

#### **55/33 L - Relationship between disarmament and development.**

The draft resolution was introduced by South Africa, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, on 19 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 27 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 332.

**First Committee:** The United States did not participate in the consensus on the draft resolution because it maintained that disarmament and development were two distinct issues that did not lend themselves to being linked. Moreover, as it had not participated in the

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<sup>15</sup> See the booklet *ECAAR Papers: United Nations 1999 Symposium on Disarmament and Development*, published by ECAAR, 2000. The booklet is available on the ECAAR website: [www.ecaar.org](http://www.ecaar.org).

<sup>16</sup> The panelists included: Joel Johnson (Vice President International, Aerospace Industries Association), Janne Nolan (The Century Foundation), Natalie Goldring (University of Maryland, College park), William Hartung (World Policy Institute) and David Gold (former Senior Economic Affairs Officer of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs).

1987 International Conference on the subject, it was not bound by its Final Document. France, speaking on behalf of a large number of countries that had joined the consensus,<sup>17</sup> stated that member States of the EU did not believe there was a simple automatic link between their commitment to cooperation for economic and social development and the savings that could be derived from disarmament.

### **Arms limitation and disarmament agreements**

By resolution 54/54 S of 1 December 1999, entitled "Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control", the General Assembly had invited all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General information on the measures they had adopted to promote the objectives envisaged in the resolution and requested him to submit a report containing this information. The Secretary-General's report<sup>18</sup> comprised the replies received from two Member States, Cuba and the Russian Federation, on practical measures that they had undertaken.

### **General Assembly, 2000**

**55/33 K - Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control.** The draft resolution was introduced by South Africa, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, on 19 October, adopted by the First Committee on 27 October (149-0-4) and by the General Assembly (165-0-4) on 20 November. For the text of the resolution and the voting pattern, see pages 331 and 419, respectively.

**First Committee:** The United States, abstaining in the vote, doubted the draft's relevance to the work of the First Committee. It maintained that States parties to bilateral, regional and/or multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements should take relevant environmental concerns into account when carrying them out.

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<sup>17</sup> Speaking on behalf of the EU and the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, and the associated countries Cyprus and Malta.

<sup>18</sup> A/55/129.

## **Conclusion**

Although all the questions dealt with in this chapter, with the exception of the issue of use of DU, have been considered within the UN framework for years, little progress regarding any of them was made in 2000. There was a lively discussion regarding outer space in the Conference on Disarmament and a number of Member States expressed concern about the possible militarization of outer space, frequently referring in this context to US plans to develop and deploy NMD. However, the CD remained unable to establish an ad hoc body to consider the subject. Some progress was made in the field of disarmament and development, as the relevant UN bodies coordinated their efforts in implementing the programme of activities adopted by the Steering Group on Disarmament and Development. For the first time, the chapter deals with issues related to the possible hazardous effects of the use of DU weapons. However, no specific discussion took place in the First Committee on the subject, and no draft resolution was tabled.



## CHAPTER VII

### **Institutional aspects**

#### **Introduction**

UN ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT AND THE REGULATION OF ARMAMENTS continued to be carried out through the Organization's main organs: the General Assembly and the Security Council. The existing disarmament machinery<sup>1</sup> consists of the General Assembly and its two subsidiary bodies, namely, the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission (UNDC), and the Conference on Disarmament (CD)—the "single multilateral negotiating forum" on disarmament of the international community. In addition, questions of disarmament are dealt with in other international frameworks established on the basis of multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements.

Following discussions concerning the rationalization of the work of the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission, it was decided that the Committee should make every effort to conduct and conclude its substantive work in not fewer than 30 meetings, within a timeframe not exceeding five weeks, and that the Disarmament Commission, as of 2000, would have an annual substantive session lasting three weeks and its agenda should normally comprise two substantive

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<sup>1</sup> See part IV of the Final Document adopted by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament, in 1978, resolution S-10/2. The General Assembly has held three sessions devoted to disarmament: the first special session on disarmament (SSOD I) was the tenth special session of the General Assembly (1978), SSOD II was its twelfth special session (1982) and SSOD III was its fifteenth special session (1988).

items per year, including one on nuclear disarmament.<sup>2</sup> For a number of years<sup>3</sup> the Disarmament Commission endeavoured to reach consensus on the objectives and agenda of a future, fourth special session devoted to disarmament (SSOD IV), but without success, owing to differences of view concerning the adoption of an agenda according priority to nuclear disarmament. Consequently, the General Assembly has been unable to establish a date for convening the special session.

Believing that the year 2000 would constitute a unique and symbolically compelling moment for Member States to articulate and affirm an animated vision for the United Nations in the new era, the Secretary-General proposed to the General Assembly<sup>4</sup> that a "Millennium Assembly", including a summit segment, be convened in that year, and that a non-governmental Millennium Forum be held in conjunction with the Assembly. Subsequently, the General Assembly decided to designate its fifty-fifth session the "Millennium Assembly".

After its re-establishment in 1998,<sup>5</sup> the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) was structured in five branches: Conference on Disarmament Secretariat and Conference Support Branch (Geneva); Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch; Conventional Arms (including Practical Disarmament Measures) Branch; Monitoring, Database and Information Branch; and Regional Disarmament Branch.

## **Developments and trends, 2000**

### ***Millennium summit meetings***

The Secretary-General submitted, as a part of the preparations for the Millennium Assembly, a report entitled "We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century",<sup>6</sup> which served as a basic document for consideration at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations. The report dealt with seven major themes. In the

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<sup>2</sup> See General Assembly decisions 52/416 B (First Committee) and 52/492 (Disarmament Commission), both adopted on 8 September 1998.

<sup>3</sup> From 1996 to 1999.

<sup>4</sup> See documents A/51/950 and A/52/850.

<sup>5</sup> See the Secretary-General's Bulletin (ST/SGB/1998/10).

<sup>6</sup> A/54/2000\*.



framework of the theme “freedom from fear”, the report dealt with issues related to arms reductions, particularly with regard to small arms and nuclear weapons. For the corresponding text, see appendix III, page 292. See also chapter IV, page 95, regarding small arms, and chapter II, page 31, regarding the Secretary-General’s proposal in the nuclear field.

On the basis of the General Assembly’s resolutions 53/202 and 53/239, the Millennium Summit of the United Nations took place at UN Headquarters in New York from 6 to 8 September under the overall theme “The role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century”, with 146 Heads of State or Government and representatives of 187 Member States participating in this largest-ever gathering of world leaders.<sup>7</sup> On 8 September, the Summit adopted the United Nations Millennium Declaration.<sup>8</sup> In the section on peace, security and disarmament, the Heads of State and Government called on Member States to make the United Nations more effective in maintaining peace and security; to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons; to take concerted action to end illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, taking account of all recommendations of the 2001 UN Conference on the subject; to consider acceding to the two legal instruments on anti-personnel mines; and to ensure the implementation of relevant treaties by the States parties.

On 18 December, after considering the Millennium Declaration, the General Assembly adopted resolution 55/162, entitled “Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit”, by which it called upon governments and all relevant organs, organizations and bodies of the UN system to implement the Declaration.

The Security Council, meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government in the course of the Millennium Summit, adopted the Millennium Summit Declaration,<sup>9</sup> in which it pledged to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in addressing conflict at all stages; reaffirmed its determination to give equal priority to the maintenance of international peace and security in every region of the world; stressed the critical importance of the disarmament, demobilization

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<sup>7</sup> See Press Release GA/9758.

<sup>8</sup> For the text of the Millennium Declaration, see General Assembly resolution 55/2. The relevant excerpts are reproduced in appendix III, page 292.

<sup>9</sup> See Security Council resolution S/1318 (2000).

and reintegration of ex-combatants; called for effective international action to prevent the illegal flow of small arms into areas of conflict; and called for the strengthening of cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations or arrangements, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. For the corresponding text, see appendix III, page 292. In addition, the Heads of State or Government of the five permanent members of the Security Council issued on 7 September a statement in which they pledged to focus their efforts on a number of priority areas, among them, peace and security, and peacekeeping.<sup>10</sup>

In the framework of marking the New Millennium, questions related to disarmament were also addressed in a number of meetings, workshops and round tables at the non-governmental level.<sup>11</sup> The most important event was the Millennium Forum, which took place at UN Headquarters from 22 to 26 May.<sup>12</sup> The Forum adopted a final document entitled "We the Peoples Millennium Forum Declaration and Agenda for Action: Strengthening the United Nations for the twenty-first century",<sup>13</sup> in which the United Nations, governments and civil society were urged to take concrete measures in a number of areas, including peace, security, and disarmament. As far as disarmament was concerned, the Forum recommended development of a draft proposal for global disarmament, to be discussed in a fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament; a call for governments to convene a conference to eliminate nuclear dangers, as proposed by the Secretary-General; extension of the network of nuclear-free zones to cover all areas other than the territory of the nuclear-weapon States; initiation of a worldwide freeze on armed forces and a 25 per cent cut in production and export of major weapons and small arms; and

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<sup>10</sup> For the text, see document A/55/367-S/2000/856, annex.

<sup>11</sup> Two such events were: the Millennium World Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual Leaders, which issued a statement "Commitment to Global Peace" (see website: [www.millenniumpeacesummit.org/declaration](http://www.millenniumpeacesummit.org/declaration)) and the Inter-Parliamentary Union's Conference of Presiding Officers, which issued a declaration (see website: [www.ipu.org/splz-e/sp-dclr](http://www.ipu.org/splz-e/sp-dclr)).

<sup>12</sup> In the deliberations of the Forum, 1,350 representatives of over 1,000 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society organizations from more than 100 countries participated.

<sup>13</sup> For the text see document A/54/959.

establishment of peace education. For the text of the corresponding part of the Declaration, see appendix III, page 292.

### ***Conference on Disarmament, 2000***

The CD was in session from 17 January to 24 March, 22 May to 7 July and 7 August to 22 September, and concluded by adopting its report<sup>14</sup> to the General Assembly. The presidency of the Conference was successively assumed by: Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil and Bulgaria. Sixty-five members<sup>15</sup> participated in the session. In addition, 41 other States,<sup>16</sup> at their request, were invited to take part. The Conference adopted the same agenda as at its 1999 session.<sup>17</sup>

Throughout the annual session, successive presidents conducted intensive consultations with a view to reaching consensus on the programme of work. In general, they focused on seeking an agreement

<sup>14</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/55/27)*.

<sup>15</sup> Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

<sup>16</sup> Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Brunei Darussalam, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Iceland, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Mauritius, Nepal, Oman, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Sudan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Uruguay and Zambia.

<sup>17</sup> The 2000 substantive agenda items were: (a) cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; (b) prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; (c) prevention of an arms race in outer space; (d) effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons; (f) comprehensive programme of disarmament; and (g) transparency in armaments.

on mandates for subsidiary bodies on nuclear disarmament and prevention of an arms race in outer space, on the assumption that all other elements of the programme of work, including the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons with its current mandate, would not be contested. Two presidents, Jean Lint of Belgium and Celso Amorim of Brazil, submitted, at the end of their respective terms of office, proposals for the programme of work.<sup>18</sup>

The Amorim proposal, containing a draft decision on the programme of work and a draft presidential declaration to be made in connection with the eventual adoption of that decision, was widely recognized as a solid basis for further intensified consultations. It envisaged, *inter alia*, the establishment of ad hoc committees, with non-negotiating mandates, on both issues. In accordance with the proposal, the Ad Hoc Committee that was to "deal with nuclear disarmament" should "exchange information and views on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to attain this objective", while the Ad Hoc Committee that was to "deal with the prevention of an arms race in outer space" should "examine and identify specific topics or proposals, which could include confidence-building or transparency measures, general principles, treaty commitments and the elaboration of a regime capable of preventing an arms race in outer space". Both Ad Hoc Committees would be requested to take into consideration all relevant views and proposals, present and future, and also to address questions related to their respective mandates. Furthermore, in order to secure the agreement of States that had advocated negotiating mandates for either one or both of these Ad Hoc Committees, the decision was to be accompanied by a presidential declaration which, stressing the negotiating character of the CD and the necessity of understanding the mandates and the work of these subsidiary bodies in that light, left open the possibility of reconsidering the mandates of the Committees if developments in the international strategic scene which would have affected the security interests of the individual CD member States warranted it. However, it was not possible to translate the Amorim proposal into concrete action. A number of delegations and groups of delegations reiterated their priorities in this regard.

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<sup>18</sup> CD/1620 and CD/1624, respectively.

Malaysia, on behalf of the Group of 21, reaffirmed the Group's proposals for the programme of work<sup>19</sup> and for a draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament.<sup>20</sup> China was of the view that the Conference should adopt a comprehensive and balanced programme of work setting up ad hoc committees with negotiating mandates on the priority issues of all States; it advocated an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a legal instrument to prevent the weaponization of outer space and an arms race in outer space and it supported the non-aligned countries' proposal for an Ad Hoc Committee to conduct negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The Russian Federation advocated the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on outer space with a mandate to elaborate specific arrangements preventing near-Earth space from becoming an arena for confrontation between the great Powers, as well as the re-establishment, in parallel, of the Ad Hoc Committee on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, Germany<sup>21</sup> proposed that the Conference start substantive work on issues that were common to the different proposals for the programme of work, particularly the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, while consultations on the two outstanding issues, namely, nuclear disarmament and prevention of an arms race in outer space, would continue.

Since none of the proposals enjoyed consensus, the Conference did not establish any mechanism to deal with specific agenda items during the session. In view of the stalemate, the Conference requested the last president of the session and the incoming president to conduct appropriate consultations during the intersessional period and to make recommendations, if possible, that could help work to commence early in 2001 on various agenda items. The Conference recognized its support for the Amorim proposal as a basis for further intensified consultations, which should take into account proposals and views presented during 2000.

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<sup>19</sup> CD/1570.

<sup>20</sup> CD/1571.

<sup>21</sup> On behalf of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

*Disarmament Commission, 2000*

The UNDC held three meetings during its organizational session for 2000, on 2 December 1999, and 15 February and 26 June 2000, considering questions related to the organization of work and substantive items in accordance with the document "Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission"<sup>22</sup> and in the light of General Assembly resolution 54/56 A. The UNDC decided to include in its agenda two substantive items: (a) ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament and (b) practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms. It established a committee of the whole and two working groups to deal with the two substantive items.

At the beginning of the substantive session, convened from 26 June to 7 July<sup>23</sup> under the chairmanship of Javad Zarif, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Commission held a general exchange of views on all agenda items. It entrusted Working Group I with the item on the ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament, and Working Group II with the item on practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms. The work of Working Groups I and II is discussed in chapters II (see page 59) and chapter IV (see page 123), respectively. The UNDC concluded its work on 7 July by adopting its report to the General Assembly,<sup>24</sup> which incorporated the reports of the two Working Groups. Questions related to its future agenda items and the dates and duration of its next session were subject, as was the case in 1999, to long informal and inconclusive consultations and discussions throughout the session.

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<sup>22</sup> A/CN.10/137.

<sup>23</sup> At its organizational meeting on 15 February, the Commission decided that it would meet for two weeks in 2000, from 26 June to 7 July. It was agreed that convening the 2000 substantive session for only two weeks would be on an exceptional basis and would not establish a precedent for coming years.

<sup>24</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/55/42).*

### ***The question of a fourth special session on disarmament***

In 2000, a number of Member States, especially non-aligned, continued to call for a fourth special session devoted to disarmament and the Secretary-General submitted a report on the subject.<sup>25</sup>

In the Final Document of the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM),<sup>26</sup> held at Cartagena, Colombia, from 8 to 9 April, the Ministers reiterated their support for the convening of SSOD IV, expressed deep concern over the lack of consensus in the UNDC on the subject, and entrusted the non-aligned Working Group on Disarmament to press for further steps leading to the convening of such a session with the participation of all Member States.

The Millennium Forum Declaration also called, *inter alia*, upon the United Nations and interested governments to develop a draft proposal for global disarmament, to be discussed in a fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

As the process of reaching agreement did not advance in 2000, the General Assembly, by resolution 55/33 M, simply reaffirmed its previous decision to convene SSOD IV subject to the emergence of consensus on its objectives and agenda.

### ***Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters***

The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters held two sessions in 2000, from 31 January to 2 February in New York and from 5 to 7 July in Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico. (See annex I for the membership of the Board, page 195). The Secretary-General submitted a report to the General Assembly on the work of the Board in 2000,<sup>27</sup> covering both its sessions.

At its two sessions, the Board formulated recommendations to the Secretary-General on the following issues: (a) nuclear issues; (b) small arms in the light of the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms; and (c) education for disarmament. In addition,

<sup>25</sup> See document A/55/130 and Add.1 in which the replies of India, the Russian Federation and Pakistan, submitted on the basis of General Assembly resolution 54/54 U, were reproduced.

<sup>26</sup> See document A/54/917-S/2000/580, annex, para. 86.

<sup>27</sup> A/55/349.

the Board had on its agenda issues related to a revolution in military affairs and its effect on disarmament and arms limitation, but due to lack of time postponed its consideration to future sessions.

The Board held discussions on nuclear issues, with special emphasis on questions related to ballistic missile defence systems, the proliferation of which would unbalance the strategic stability of the last 50 years based on nuclear deterrence. The US preparations for a national missile defence (NMD) system and its possible effect on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty were seen as one of the catalysts of the growing threat of missile proliferation. At the January session of the Board, members expressed great concern over developments that they viewed as setbacks for the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and the Board urged the Secretary-General to use the moral authority vested in his high office to appeal to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to overcome their differences and to pursue their fundamental obligation under article VI. At its July session, the members of the Board expressed different opinions concerning the results of the Review Conference. Some maintained that it had strengthened the Treaty, while others considered that it had not taken into account the heightened debate over the strategic consequences of possible deployment of NMD. However, the Board recommended that the Secretary-General continue to focus on the issue of complete elimination of nuclear weapons and on promoting education about the danger of nuclear war.

Pursuant to resolution 54/54 K, the Board held a preliminary exchange of views on specific measures that might reduce the risk of nuclear war, using papers prepared by three members as a basis for discussion.<sup>28</sup> Members agreed that it would be useful to continue their examination of the subject at a later date. For further details, see chapter II, page 31.

The discussions on the complex issue of the proliferation of small arms pointed to the need for a multi-track approach to the 2001 UN Conference: raising of consciousness about highly public and humanitarian aspects of the issue; creation of international norms, such as criteria governing the transfer and receipt of small arms; and initiatives and activities of regions and subregions. Board members believed that

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<sup>28</sup> For a summary of the discussion and the three papers, see the note of the Secretary-General on reducing nuclear danger (A/55/324).



the third approach was by far the most important and that regional efforts should be taken not only after conflict had broken out, but also in a preventive mode; in addition, they should be sustained, and they should be supported both politically and financially by the international community.

Board members believed that, with the end of the cold war, there was a pervasive, dangerous complacency about disarmament in both public and governmental spheres and that this was reflected in a lack of interest in the subject throughout the educational system. After an extensive discussion of education for disarmament and presentations made by representatives of the academic community and NGOs, the Board recommended that the Secretary-General highlight the need for disarmament and non-proliferation education at all levels of education at the Millennium Summit, and proposed that the United Nations undertake an expert study of the issue. Later, the Board developed a draft mandate for a study that was incorporated into resolution 55/33 E. See chapter VIII, page 201, for details, and see page 322 for the resolution.

As Board of Trustees for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the Board reviewed the activities of the Institute for the previous year and its proposed programme of work and budget for 2001.<sup>29</sup> The Director informed the Board of plans to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of the Institute during the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly. (For UNIDIR's activities, see chapter VIII, page 95).

### *Disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services*

The Department for Disarmament Affairs continued to provide training for young diplomats, especially those from developing countries, through the UN fellowship, training and advisory services programme established by the General Assembly at its tenth special session.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> A/55/267.

<sup>30</sup> Resolution S-10/2, para. 108, of 1978.

In 2000, fellowships were awarded to young diplomats from 28 Member States.<sup>31</sup> As in previous years, the programme comprised three segments: a study session in Geneva; study trips to intergovernmental organizations working in the field of disarmament and to Member States, at their invitation; and a study session at UN Headquarters in New York.

The programme commenced on 4 September in Geneva and concluded on 3 November in New York. It included lectures by representatives of delegations to the Conference on Disarmament and the First Committee of the General Assembly and by UN officials; attendance at meetings of the CD, the Second Meeting of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Convention and the First Committee of the General Assembly; and research projects conducted by the fellows on disarmament-related topics of their own choice.

Study visits were undertaken to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), in Vienna, and to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany hosted the fellows in Berlin, where they were briefed by, and held discussions with, senior officials and experts of the Federal Foreign Office. In addition, they participated in a round table organized by the Bonn International Center for Conversion and visited the Nammo Buck GmbH conversion plant. At the invitation of the Government of Japan, the fellows visited Tokyo, Nagasaki and Hiroshima. In Tokyo, the fellows met with senior officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and were acquainted with the arms control and disarmament policies of the Government of Japan. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the fellows heard an account of the legacy of atomic bombing. A two-day seminar on non-proliferation and disarmament issues was organized at UN Headquarters by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.

The official closing of the programme took place on 1 November at a certificate-awarding ceremony presided over by the Chairman

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<sup>31</sup> Algeria, Armenia, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Latvia, Lebanon, Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United States and Zambia. See the report of the Secretary-General (A/55/152).

of the First Committee and the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs.

### ***Department for Disarmament Affairs***

Within the Secretariat, DDA continued to advise and assist the Secretary-General in the discharge of his responsibilities under the Charter and mandates given by the General Assembly and Security Council and the legislative organs of the UN system in the sphere of disarmament. Its activities fell within five broad areas. See appendix VII, page 434, for the list of reports and notes of the Secretary-General that were prepared by DDA and issued throughout the year.

First, DDA provided technical and substantive assistance to various disarmament bodies: the CD, the UNDC, the First Committee, the UN Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa and the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. It also served meetings of States parties to multilateral conventions: the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference; the Preparatory Committee for the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms; the Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; the Second Annual Conference of Amended Protocol II; the Second Meeting of the Mine-Ban Convention; and the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention drafting a verification protocol. In addition, the Department followed developments with respect to the four existing treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones and continued to provide substantive assistance in the drafting of a treaty for a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Second, DDA provided assistance to experts' groups carrying out two studies on the continuing operation of the Register of Conventional Arms and its further development and on the feasibility of restricting the manufacture and trade of small arms and light weapons to the manufacturers and dealers authorized by States. For details, see chapter IV.

In the third area, on the basis of General Assembly mandates and decisions of treaty bodies, the Department issued reports containing official information received from governments on arms transfers in seven major categories of conventional weapons (Register of Conventional Arms) and arms expenditures (standardized instrument for

international reporting of military expenditures). These reports were posted on the website. In addition, the Department maintained a database on transparency under the Mine-Ban Convention and a database on signatories, ratification and accession of States to multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements on its website.

The fourth area was related to coordination of or participation in activities among a number of UN or UN-related bodies. The Department served as focal point for the Coordinating Action on Small Arms mechanism (CASA) and the open-ended Group of Interested States on Practical Disarmament Measures. Within the framework of activity of these two bodies, DDA headed fact-finding missions in connection with weapons collection (see chapters IV and V). The Department also chaired the Steering Group on Disarmament and Development. The Department worked closely on some landmine-related matters with the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which serves as the focal point for mine action within the United Nations, and was cited by the Brahimi panel<sup>32</sup> as a possible close affiliate in the projected "Information and Strategic Analyses Secretariat" of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security.

The fifth area of activities was related to information and maintaining close liaison with UNIDIR, other research and educational institutes outside the UN, and with NGOs. The Department implemented the UN disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme. It organized symposia, seminars and round-table discussions in New York and in a number of Member States on a wide range of issues. To heighten public awareness of disarmament issues, and as a part of its information activities, the Department disseminated to Member States and the international community objective information on disarmament and security matters through its website, publications and other activities. For further details concerning information activities, see chapter VIII.

In the course of the year, DDA provided training for interns in various aspects of its work, such as following the debate in the General Assembly and the First Committee and reporting thereon, assisting in preparations of other meetings and in research tasks, drafting portions of publications and contributing to various databases.

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<sup>32</sup> A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 71.

*Regional centres*

The Department continued to oversee and coordinate the activities of its three regional centres, established by the General Assembly with their respective mandates, and organized, together with them, regional conferences, symposiums and round-table discussions on disarmament and security issues.<sup>33</sup> The activities of the centres are funded from voluntary contributions. Thus, in each of the resolutions it adopted on the centres, the General Assembly appealed to all States, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen their programmes and activities and to facilitate their implementation. For details on the substantive activities of the three regional centres, see chapter V, and for lists of their publications, see chapter VIII, annex II.

The Regional Centre for Africa, in Lomé, continued to experience financial, staffing and operational difficulties due mainly to the lack of voluntary contributions. Nevertheless, it contributed to efforts to promote wider understanding and cooperation among African States in the areas of peace, disarmament and security, expanding its contacts and cooperation with governmental and non-governmental organizations, research and academic institutions and other relevant UN bodies. The Director of the Centre visited a number of countries to discuss the revitalization process of the Centre and to seek support. He participated in the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the OAU Ministerial Conference on Small Arms, the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa Conference on Small Arms and the summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In addition, the Centre provided organizational and/or substantive support for a conference to sensitize civil society on weapons proliferation in Niger, a West African conference on child soldiers and a meeting of African experts on small arms in Addis Ababa. The Centre also provided substantive support for implementation of the West African Action Plan, besides launching an Africa-wide child soldier project. It participated in the African preparatory meeting

<sup>33</sup> See the reports of the Secretary-General on the regional centres: A/55/171 (Africa), A/55/191 (Asia and the Pacific) and A/55/169 (Latin America and the Caribbean). A fourth report (A/55/151), submitted pursuant to resolution 54/55 E, consists of a simple reference to the three reports.

for the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms (Bamako) as well as in All-Africa Civil Society Consultations on Small Arms (Lomé). The Centre continued to distribute information materials published by the Secretariat and other UN organizations.

The Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean, in Lima, continued to face financial difficulties in spite of its relative success in fund-raising and in developing contacts with potential partners in the region, Europe, North America and Africa, with regional organizations, research institutes, academic institutions and individual experts, and with UN national and regional offices. It carried out several activities and organized workshops under its project "Regional clearing-house on firearms, ammunition and explosives". In addition, it organized a workshop on military perspectives of regional security: consultations with Lima military attachés; and another on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Lima); it supported the regional preparatory meeting for the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms (Brasilia); and it participated in the organization of a seminar on the destruction of stockpiles of anti-personnel mines (Buenos Aires).

The Regional Centre for Asia and the Pacific continued to promote disarmament and security dialogue through its activities, within limited financial and staff resources. It carried out its activities through: (a) organizing regional meetings on disarmament and security issues; (b) providing assistance to the five Central Asian States in drafting a treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia; and (c) providing assistance to Mongolia in consolidating its nuclear-weapon-free status.

The Centre organized three major meetings: on strategic stability, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the 2000 NPT Review Conference (Kathmandu); on illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons (Jakarta), and on disarmament and the United Nations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century: strategy and action (Akita).

Consultations on the relocation of the Centre held with the host country, Nepal, Member States and interested international organizations were inconclusive and, owing to the lack of sufficient extra-budgetary resources to finance the physical establishment and operation of the Centre in Kathmandu, the Director continued to operate from UN Headquarters in New York. However, in November the General Assembly adopted resolution 55/34 H on the Centre, by which

it requested the Secretary-General to expedite his ongoing consultations with other concerned Member States and interested organizations, and urged him to conclude them by 31 July 2001 to assess the possibility of enabling the Centre to operate effectively from Kathmandu as soon as possible.

### **General Assembly, 2000**

As an integral part of the Millennium Assembly, the Millennium Summit took place at UN Headquarters from 6 to 8 September, as noted above.<sup>34</sup> Its work was organized through plenary meetings and four interactive round-table sessions,<sup>35</sup> each of which was held concurrently with a plenary meeting. The Summit discussed a range of issues impinging upon disarmament, such as globalization; peace and security; and the urgent need to adapt peace-keeping operations to the new circumstances and to pay increased attention to conflict prevention, peacemaking and peace-building. The Millennium Summit adopted, as mentioned above, the UN Millennium Declaration<sup>36</sup> (see page 295).

The Millennium Assembly held a general debate at its plenary meetings, between 12 and 22 September,<sup>37</sup> in the course of which a number of Member States addressed a range of disarmament and security questions.

The First Committee, meeting under the chairmanship of U Mya Than of Myanmar, held a general debate on all its agenda items, listed in annex II to this chapter, between 2 and 13 October, and structured

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<sup>34</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 3<sup>rd</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> meetings.

<sup>35</sup> The four round tables were chaired by the Prime Minister of Singapore; the President of Poland; the President of Venezuela; and the President of Algeria. For the work of the round tables, see the presentations made by the Chairmen at the 8th plenary meeting of the General Assembly in *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 8<sup>th</sup> meeting.

<sup>36</sup> The General Assembly adopted, without a vote, two resolutions related to the Millennium Summit: resolution 55/2, the Millennium Declaration, on 8 September, and resolution 55/162, entitled "Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit", on 18 December.

<sup>37</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 10<sup>th</sup> to 28<sup>th</sup> meetings.

discussions (thematic discussions and introduction of draft resolutions) from 13 to 23 October, and took action on draft resolutions from 25 October to 1 November.<sup>38</sup>

The General Assembly took action on 4 draft resolutions dealing with the subjects discussed in this chapter.

**55/35 B – Report of the Conference on Disarmament.** The draft resolution was introduced by Bulgaria on 12 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 26 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 374.

**55/35 C – Report of the Disarmament Commission.** The draft resolution was introduced by the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of the sponsors on 18 October (see page 405 for the sponsors), adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 26 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 375.

**55/33 M – Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.** The draft resolution was introduced on 19 October by South Africa on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 26 October, and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 333.

**55/34 C – United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services.** The draft resolution was introduced by Nigeria on behalf of the sponsors on 20 October (see page 402 for the sponsors), adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 26 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 364.

**First Committee:** Before the vote, while joining the consensus and supporting the programme as a useful tool for training fellows, especially those from different countries, Cuba and the Syrian Arab Republic expressed the view that the refusal of the United States to allow fellows from their respective countries to visit Washington and New Mexico, as provided for in the programme, was discriminatory and unacceptable.

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., *First Committee*, 3<sup>rd</sup> to 28<sup>th</sup> meetings.



## **Conclusion**

Millennium summit meetings and corresponding documents reaffirmed, once again, the importance of the United Nations as a forum for dealing with questions related to disarmament and the regulation of armaments and the fact that these questions are an essential part of the overall activities of the world Organization in the field of international peace and security. The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, adopted 48 resolutions and one decision, out of which 29 were adopted by consensus. However, there was no agreement again on the objectives and agenda of a SSOD IV and thus the Assembly only reaffirmed its previous decision to convene a special session once agreement had emerged.

The Disarmament Commission began consideration of two new items in 2000, after prolonged negotiations. The CD, due to differences among its members regarding priority in disarmament negotiations, was once again unable to undertake substantive work, and did not establish or re-establish any mechanism for any of its agenda items.

The Department for Disarmament Affairs continued its activities of providing technical and substantive assistance to various disarmament bodies and expert study groups, coordinating some interdepartmental activities, issuing reports containing official information received from governments, and carrying out an active information programme.

## **ANNEX I**

### **Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, 2000**

Munir Akram, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations Office at Geneva

Hanan Bar-On, Ambassador, Senior Adviser to the President, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot

Rolf Ekéus, Ambassador of Sweden to the United States, Washington, D.C.

Nabil Fahmy, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Egypt to the United States, Washington, D.C.

Arundhati Ghose, Ambassador, Member of the Union Public Service Commission, New Delhi

Guillermo Enrique González, Ambassador of Argentina to the United States, Washington D.C.

Raimundo González, Ambassador of Chile to Austria

- Peter Goosen, Chief Director for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Africa, Pretoria
- Kostyantyn I. Gryshchenko, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States, Washington, D.C.
- Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Chairman of the Board, Institut des hautes études de défense nationale, Paris
- Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador of China for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva
- Rokiatou NDiaye Keita, Director, International Institute for Peace and Security, Bamako
- Graça Machel, President, Foundation for Community Development, Maputo
- Miguel Marín Bosch, Consul General of Mexico, Barcelona
- Harald Müller, Director of Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt
- William C. Potter, Professor and Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey
- Boris Pyadyshev, Editor-in-Chief, International Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow
- Jane Sharp, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Defence Studies, London
- Yoshitomo Tanaka, Ambassador, President, Radio Press, Inc., Tokyo
- Nugroho Wisnumurti, Ambassador, Director-General for Political Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Jakarta Pusat
- Guennadi Yevstafiev, Independent Consultant to the National Security Council of the Russian Federation, Moscow
- Patricia Lewis, Director, UNIDIR, Geneva (*ex-officio*)

## ANNEX II

### **Agenda items of the General Assembly as allocated to the First Committee\***

1. Reduction of military budgets (item 65).
2. Development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States (item 66).
3. Maintenance of international security (item 67):
  - (a) Prevention of the violent disintegration of States;
  - (b) Stability and development of South-Eastern Europe.
4. Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (item 68).
5. Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament (item 69).

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\* A/C.1/55/1.

6. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (item 70).
7. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (item 71).
8. Prevention of an arms race in outer space (item 72).
9. General and complete disarmament (item 73):
  - (a) Notification of nuclear tests;
  - (b) Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia;
  - (c) Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status;
  - (d) Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol;
  - (e) Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems;
  - (f) Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction;
  - (g) Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction;
  - (h) Missiles;
  - (i) Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda;
  - (j) Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures;
  - (k) Transparency in armaments;
  - (l) Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them;
  - (m) Reducing nuclear danger;
  - (n) Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas;
  - (o) Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels;
  - (p) Regional disarmament;
  - (q) Nuclear disarmament;
  - (r) Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*;
  - (s) Illicit traffic in small arms;
  - (t) Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control;
  - (u) Relationship between disarmament and development;
  - (v) Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

- (w) Small arms.
- 10. Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly (item 74):
  - (a) Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa;
  - (b) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa;
  - (c) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific;
  - (d) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons;
  - (e) United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament;
  - (f) United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean;
  - (g) United Nations Disarmament Information Programme;
  - (h) United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services.
- 11. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session (item 75):
  - (a) Report of the Disarmament Commission;
  - (b) Report of the Conference on Disarmament;
  - (c) Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters;
  - (d) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research;
  - (e) Disarmament Week.
- 12. The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (item 76).
- 13. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (item 77).
- 14. Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region (item 78).
- 15. Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (item 79).
- 16. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (item 80).
- 17. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (item 81).

## CHAPTER VIII

### Studies and information

#### Introduction

EXPERT STUDIES, OUTREACH AND PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES AND RESEARCH in the field of disarmament have been carried out by the United Nations for years. From time to time, in an effort to deepen and further its work on a particular aspect of disarmament, the General Assembly requests the Secretary-General to carry out a study with the assistance of governmental experts. On a continuing basis, the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) undertakes a wide variety of activities within the general mandate of its disarmament information programme,<sup>1</sup> and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) conducts its research programme.

#### Disarmament studies programme

##### *Studies completed in 2000*

Only one expert study was completed during the year. The Group of Governmental Experts on the continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development

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<sup>1</sup> The disarmament information programme was launched as the World Disarmament Campaign in 1982 by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Plenary Meetings*, 1<sup>st</sup> meeting, paras. 110 and 111.

submitted its report<sup>2</sup> to the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth session. The experts, who had been appointed by the Secretary-General (see annex I to this chapter), reported upon: (a) the early expansion of the scope of the Register; and (b) the elaboration of practical means for its development in order to increase transparency related to weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to transfers of equipment and technology directly related to their development and manufacture. The report and the resulting resolution, 55/33 U, entitled "Transparency in armaments" are discussed in chapter IV, see page 126.

### *Studies in progress*

The work of the Group of Governmental Experts on small arms, established by the Secretary-General at the request of the General Assembly,<sup>3</sup> proceeded with the preparation of a report on the feasibility of restricting the manufacture and trade of small arms and light weapons to the manufacturers and dealers authorized by States. The mandate covered brokering activities, particularly illicit activities relating to such weapons, transportation agents and financial transactions. The Group consisted of experts from 20 countries (see annex II to this chapter, page 207). Chaired by Canada, it held two sessions in New York, from 14 to 19 May and from 10 to 14 July, and also met in Sofia from 17 to 19 October for an informal workshop. Subsequently, in early 2001, the Group submitted its study as one of the background documents for the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.<sup>4</sup> For details, see chapter IV, page 95.

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<sup>2</sup> A/55/281. The report was prepared pursuant to resolutions 52/38 R of 9 December 1997, 53/77 V of 4 December 1998 and 54/54 O of 1 December 1999.

<sup>3</sup> General Assembly resolution 54/54 V of 15 December 1999.

<sup>4</sup> The study was finalized at its third session (29 January to 2 February 2001) and was submitted to the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2001 UN Conference as document A/CONF.192/PC/33. It was subsequently issued as a document of the Conference (A/CONF.192/2).

### ***Studies mandated in 2000***

Two new studies were mandated in 2000. Pursuant to resolution 55/33 A, entitled "Missiles", the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts to be established in 2001 on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, to prepare a report on the issue of missiles in all its aspects for consideration by the Assembly at its fifty-seventh session.<sup>5</sup> The decision on the scope of the study will be made by the panel. Resolution 55/33 A is discussed in chapter II (see page 68).

By resolution 55/33 E, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, a study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. The study would have the following aims: (a) to define contemporary disarmament and non-proliferation education and training; (b) to assess the current situation at the primary, secondary, university and postgraduate levels, in all regions of the world; (c) to recommend ways to promote education and training in disarmament and non-proliferation at all levels of formal and informal education; (d) to examine ways to utilize more fully evolving pedagogic methods, particularly the revolution in information and communications technology, including distance learning; (e) to recommend ways in which organizations of the United Nations system with special competence in disarmament or non-proliferation education or both can harmonize and coordinate their efforts; and (f) to devise ways to introduce disarmament and non-proliferation education into post-conflict situations as a contribution to peace-building. The report is to be submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session, in 2002. Resolution 55/33 E is discussed below (see page 205).

### **United Nations Disarmament Information Programme**

Activities of DDA reflected a reinvigorated outreach programme in two substantive priority areas: weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons (particularly small arms and light weapons). Pursuant to resolution 53/78 E of 4 December 1998, the Secretary-General

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<sup>5</sup> The first session of the panel will take place from 30 July to 3 August 2001 in New York and the other two sessions will be held in 2002.

submitted a report<sup>6</sup> covering both the implementation of the activities of the UN disarmament information programme during the previous two years and the activities contemplated for the next two years.

In the current year, through publications, its website, symposia and exhibits, DDA focused on two major conferences: the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), held in April-May, and preparations for the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, to be held in July 2001. Implementation of many of the activities of the programme depended upon the generous contributions of Member States to the Voluntary Trust Fund for the UN Disarmament Information Programme and to partnerships with research institutes and specialized non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

DDA continued to develop its own home-page under the section "peace and security" within the UN website,<sup>7</sup> providing up-to-date material in the form of press releases and statements of the Secretary-General and senior officials, information on current and upcoming events in the field of disarmament and background documentation, including the Register of Conventional Arms. In addition, through the website the public was given access to databases on the First Committee, on the status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements, and on the annual reports submitted under article 7 by parties to the Mine-Ban Convention. Small publications were also posted on the website.

The Department maintained a strong publications programme, in most instances carrying out the writing, editing, typesetting and design components on its own. In some instances it collaborated with the Department of Public Information (DPI) or with organizations outside the United Nations. (See annex III for a list of publications.) Lack of resources within the Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services delayed the translation and reproduction of some publications, while lack of resources within DDA hampered their timely distribution. In the case of small publications, these deficiencies were to some extent offset by issuing them electronically in advance.

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<sup>6</sup> A/55/128 and Add.1.

<sup>7</sup> Internet: <http://www.un.org/Dept/dda/DDAHome.htm>.



The disarmament information programme continued cooperation between the United Nations and research institutes and educational institutions at various levels. The Department hosted, from 9 to 10 February, workshops for Secretariat and Missions staff on Cooperative Monitoring for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Other Security Measures, which were conducted by the Cooperative Monitoring Centre (CMC) of the US Sandia National Laboratories. The Department, together with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), organized on 1 May a panel discussion on "Arms Control and Disarmament: A New Conceptual Approach".<sup>8</sup> A symposium on "Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC): International Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Biotechnology", jointly organized by DDA and the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB), was held at UN Headquarters to mark the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention. On 21 June, DDA, Economists Allied for Arms Reduction (ECAAR), and the World Policy Institute jointly hosted a symposium on "Global Restructuring of the Arms Trade and Its Implications". The Department, together with UNIDIR, commemorated the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the Institute (see below).

The Department collaborated with the NGO Committee on Disarmament<sup>9</sup> and/or DPI in organizing a number of events during the year, including a series of panel discussions during Disarmament Week and events during the 2000 NPT Review Conference and the preparatory process for the UN 2001 Conference.

In collaboration with the States parties and building upon a practice initiated during the three Preparatory Committee sessions, DDA facilitated the participation of NGOs in the 2000 NPT Review Conference. As a result, NGO representatives had an unprecedented opportunity to express their views to the Review Conference in a meeting devoted to that purpose.

To launch a UN information campaign on small arms and light weapons, DDA and DPI organized the premiere of the United Nations

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<sup>8</sup> The presentations were published as *DDA Occasional Papers*, "Arms Control and Disarmament: A New Conceptual Approach", No. 4, September 2000.

<sup>9</sup> See website: [www.igc.org/disarm/](http://www.igc.org/disarm/).

video documentary on small arms: *Armed to the Teeth*, on 16 October at UN Headquarters. The Deputy-Secretary-General opened the event, which more than 300 diplomats, media, non-governmental and Secretariat members attended.

On 23 October, the under-secretaries-general for disarmament affairs and public information and the actor and producer Michael Douglas, a UN Messenger of Peace, opened the redesigned and relocated disarmament exhibit, which forms a part of the UN guided tour at Headquarters. The exhibit, comprising floor-to-ceiling photographs, a treaty timeline, a world map showing nuclear-weapon-free zones, a graphic representation of military expenditures and actual artifacts and weapons, provides the visitor, within a very short space of time, with an overall impression of the United Nations work in disarmament.

### **United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research<sup>10</sup>**

By a note to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General transmitted the report<sup>11</sup> of the Director of UNIDIR on the activities of the Institute for the period from July 1999 to June 2000, as well as the report of the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR on the proposed programme of work and estimated budget for 2000–2001. To mark the 20th anniversary of the establishment of UNIDIR, the Institute, together with DDA, sponsored a discussion<sup>12</sup> on 17 October at UN Headquarters on “Disarmament as Humanitarian Action” to explore the strong links between security, disarmament, human rights and humanitarian action for more effective assistance to those people most in need.

During the year, the research programme of the Institute focused on: global security, regional security, and human security and disarmament. In the broad framework of global security, the Institute carried

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<sup>10</sup> See website: [www.unidir.org](http://www.unidir.org).

<sup>11</sup> A/55/267.

<sup>12</sup> After the introductory remarks made by the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs and the Director of UNIDIR, presentations were made by: Soren Jessen-Petersen, Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva; Martin Griffiths, Director, Henri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva; and Randall Forsberg, Director, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, Cambridge, Massachusetts. UNIDIR will incorporate material from the discussion in a forthcoming publication.

out research on the implementation of treaties already concluded (NPT, Biological Weapons Convention and the costs of treaties) and issues relevant to current and future negotiations. As far as regional security was concerned, the Institute focused on peace-keeping and specific issues related to Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia. The Institute's work in the field of human security dealt with issues related to small arms and light weapons in West Africa, the flow of illicit small arms throughout Central Asia and militarization of refugee camps in Guinea, near the border with Sierra Leone. UNIDIR also initiated a research project on participatory evaluation of the implementation of the Mine-Ban Convention. The project involves a broad spectrum of international governmental organizations and NGOs, and will result in a major report, briefing papers and other articles.

The Institute engaged in extensive networking with specialized agencies and institutions of the UN system and other organizations through electronic means, its publications and conferences, seminars and discussions. A list of publications issued by the Institute during the period under review is contained in annex IV to this chapter.

### **General Assembly, 2000**

The General Assembly took action on 3 draft resolutions dealing with the subjects discussed in this chapter.

**55/33 E – United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education.** The draft resolution was introduced by Mexico, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 392 for sponsors) on 18 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 27 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 322.

**55/34 A – United Nations Disarmament Information Programme.** The draft resolution was introduced by Mexico, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 402 for the sponsors) on 18 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 26 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 359.

**55/35 A – Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.** The draft resolution was introduced by France, on behalf of the sponsors (see page 404 for the sponsors) on 23 October, adopted without a vote by the First Committee on 26 October and by the General Assembly on 20 November. For the text of the resolution, see page 373.

## **ANNEX I**

### **Composition of the Group of Governmental Experts on the UN Register of Conventional Arms**

- Col. Falah Al-Jam'an, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Jordan to the United Nations, New York
- Angélica Arce, Minister, Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations, New York
- Alamgir Babar (third session), Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations, New York
- Giora Becher, Director of Regional Security and Arms Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel
- Paulo Cordiero de Andrade Pinto (first and third sessions), Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations, New York
- Mitsuro Donawaki, Ambassador and Special Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
- Leonardo Fernandes (second session), Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations, New York
- Rafael M. Grossi (Chair of the Group) Minister, Embassy of Argentina, Brussels
- Lt. Col. (Ret.) José Rufino Menéndez Hernández, Director of the Centre for Disarmament and International Security Studies, Havana
- Jyrki K. Iivonen, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of Finland, Washington, D.C.
- Onno D. Kervers, Head of the Nuclear Affairs and Non-Proliferation Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague
- Mária Krasnohorská, Director of the Disarmament Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava
- Pyotr G. Litavrin, Head of Division, Department for Security and Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow
- William Malzahn (second session), Bureau of Arms Control, United States Department of State, Washington, D.C.
- Satish C. Mehta, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, New York

**Com. (Navy) Anthony Okanlawon Oni, Lagos**

**Debra G. Price, Conventional Weapons and European Security Issues, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Ottawa**

**Mansour Salsabili (second and third sessions), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Teheran**

**Col. Gerhard Schepe (second and third sessions), Permanent Mission of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva**

**Christine Seve, Sous Direction du Contrôle, Direction des relations internationales, Délégation Générale pour l'Armement, Paris**

**Shahbaz (first and second sessions), Director-General (Disarmament), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad**

**Giovanni Snidle (first and third session), Bureau of Political Affairs, United States Department of State, Washington, D.C.**

**Tumagole Patrick Tsholetsane, Assistant Director for Regional Arms Matters, Department for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria**

**Andrew Wood, Ministry of Defence, London**

**Wu Haitao, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations, New York**

## **ANNEX II**

### **Composition of the Group of Experts established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 54/54 V as of December 2000**

**Egberto José de Azevedo (second session), Expert, Federal Police, Ministry of Justice, Brasilia**

**Geraldine Baker, Senior Special Agent, United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Affairs, Washington, D.C.**

**Jostein Bernhardsen, Deputy Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Oslo**

**Spencer Chilvers (second session), Deputy Head of the Policy Unit, Department of Trade and Industry, Export Control Organisation, London**

**Michel Coninx (second session), Magistrat National, Office des magistrats nationaux, Brussels**

**Amandeep Singh Gill, First Secretary, Embassy of India, Tehran**

**Col. Miguel Angel Lizarraga Granados, Industrial Engineer, Office of Manufacturers of the Secretary of National Defence, Dirección de Fábricas de la Defensa Nacional, Mexico City**

**Brig. Ali Salem Ibrahim, Police Academy, Cairo**

**Tariq Javed, Section Officer (Disarmament), Disarmament Cell, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad**

## *The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2000*

- Etienne Bosquillon de Jenlis, Contrôleur général des Armées, chargé de la coordination de la réglementation et du contrôle des matériels de guerre et des biens sensibles, Contrôle général des Armées, Ministère de la défense, Paris
- Pyotr G. Litavrin (second session) Head of Division, Department for Security and Disarmament Affairs, Moscow
- Margaret (Peggy) Mason (Chair of the Group) Adviser on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa
- J. B. Miyumo, Senior Deputy Commissioner, Head, Tax Programmes, Kenya Revenue Authority, Customs and Excise Department, Nairobi
- Manoel Gomes Pereira (first session), International Adviser, Ministry of Justice, Brasilia
- Col. Marc Pirlot (first session), Ecole Royale Militaire, Brussels
- Navy Captain (Ret.) Aharon Shahr, Senior Coordinator, Arms Control and Regional Security, Arms Control Division, Ministry of Defence, Tel Aviv
- Shamim Shaikh, Chief of Acquisition, Department of Defence, Pretoria
- Anastasio Siderakis, in charge of the Technical Division, Inspection and Verification Department of the National Register of Arms (RENAR), Buenos Aires
- Yuri Sterk, Director General for International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia
- Errol Strong, Chief Security Attaché, Embassy of Jamaica, Washington, D.C.
- Geoffrey Trett (first session), Senior Research Officer, Ministry of Defence, London
- Wu Haitao, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations, New York
- Przemyslaw Wyganowski, Chief of the Conventional Arms Unit, Export Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw

### **ANNEX III**

#### **Publications and other materials of the Department for Disarmament Affairs or produced in collaboration with the Department**

*The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, vol. 24: 1999 (Sales No. E.00.IX.1)

*DDA Update*, March 2000

*DDA Update*, June 2000

*DDA Update*, September 2000

*DDA Update*, December 2000

*Occasional Papers*, No. 4, *Arms Control and Disarmament: A New Conceptual Approach*, September 2000 (Sales No. E.00.IX.5)

*Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* – 24 April–19 May 2000, New York, booklet (00-27462)/Conférence d'examen des parties au Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires – 24 avril–19 mai 2000, New York (00-36276)/Conferencia de las Partes encargada del examen del Tratado sobre la no proliferación de las armas nucleares – 24 de abril a 19 de mayo de 2000, Nueva York (00-36277)

*Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* – 24 April–19 May 2000, New York, press kit (DPI/2085)/Conférence d'examen des parties au Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires – 24 avril–19 mai 2000, New York (DPI/2085)

*Disarmament Resolutions and Decision of the Fifty-fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly*, December 2000

*ECAAR Papers: United Nations 1999 Symposium on Disarmament and Development*, published by ECAAR, 2000

*Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC)*

*African Peace Bulletin/Bulletin Africain de la Paix*, April 2000–June 2000, Issue No. 25

*African Peace Bulletin/Bulletin Africain de la Paix*, July 2000–September 2000, Issue No 26

*West Africa Small Arms Moratorium: High-Level Consultations on the Modalities for the Implementation of PCASED*, by Jacqueline Seck, 2000, 81p., UNIDIR and UNREC, United Nations publication, UNIDIR/2000/2

*Moratoire ouest-africain sur les armes légères : Consultations de haut niveau sur les modalités de la mise en œuvre du PCASED*, par Jacqueline Seck, 2000, 83p., UNIDIR et Le Centre régional des Nations Unies pour la paix et le désarmement en Afrique, publication des Nations Unies, UNIDIR/2000/2

*The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons*, published in cooperation with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, UNREC, 2000, 117 p.

UNREC Flier

***Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development  
in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-LIREC)***

*Forging Security and Development Initiatives, 1999–2000*, Report of Activities, published by UN-LIREC, 2000, 36 p.

**ANNEX IV**

**Publications of UNIDIR**

***Research reports***

*Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control*, by William C. Potter, Nikolai Sokov, Harald Müller and Annette Schaper, 2000, 87p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.00.0.21.

*Bound to Cooperate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone*, Anatole Ayissi and Robin-Edward Poulton (eds), 2000, 213p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.00.0.20.

*The Small Arms Problem in Central Asia: Features and Implications*, by Bobi Pirseyedi, 2000, 120p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.00.0.6.

*Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, by Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, 2000, 540p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.00.0.4.

*West Africa Small Arms Moratorium: High-Level Consultations on the Modalities for the Implementation of PCASED*, by Jacqueline Seck, 2000, 81p., UNIDIR and UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations publication, UNIDIR/2000/2

*Moratoire ouest-africain sur les armes légères : Consultations de haut niveau sur les modalités de la mise en œuvre du PCASED*, par Jacqueline Seck, 2000, 83p., UNIDIR et Le Centre régional des Nations Unies pour la paix et le désarmement en Afrique, publication des Nations Unies, UNIDIR/2000/2

*Coming to Terms with Security: A Lexicon for Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence-Building*, by Steve Tullu and Thomas Schamlberger, 2000, United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.00.0.12

***Disarmament Forum***

One, 2000: *What next for the NPT?*

Two, 2000: *Small Arms Control: the need for coordination*

Three, 2000: *Peacekeeping: evolution or extinction?*

Four, 2000: *Biological Weapons: from the BWC to biotech*



## **A P P E N D I C E S**



## APPENDIX I

### **Status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements**

The data contained in this appendix have been furnished by the depositaries of the treaties or agreements concerned, as follows:

#### *Secretary-General of the United Nations*

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.

#### *Canada and Hungary*

Treaty on Open Skies.

#### *France*

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

#### *Mexico*

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

#### *Netherlands*

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty).

## *The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2000*

### *Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity*

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty).

### *Organization of American States*

Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials.

Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions.

### *Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America*

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

### *Thailand*

Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty).

### *United States of America*

Antarctic Treaty.

### *Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat*

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga).

Inclusion of information concerning the treaties and agreements of which the Secretary-General is not the depositary is as reported by the respective depositaries and implies no position on the part of the United Nations with respect to the data reported.

The total number of parties has been calculated on the basis of information received from the depositaries.

**Actions reported in the period 1 January to 31 December 2000**

The following list shows actions reported, if any, during the period 1 January to 31 December 2000 with regard to multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements.<sup>a</sup>

Accession is indicated by (a), acceptance by (A), approval by (AA) and succession by (s). In the case of multi-depositary clauses, depositary action may be completed with one or more of the several depositaries. The letters "O", "B", "M", "L", and "W" indicate where the reported action was completed: "O" for Ottawa, "B" for Budapest, "M" for Moscow, "L" for London, and "W" for Washington.

**Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare**

SIGNED AT GENEVA: 17 June 1925

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each signatory as from the date of deposit of its ratification; accessions take effect on the date of the notification by the depositary Government

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: France

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 132

**The Antarctic Treaty**

SIGNED AT WASHINGTON: 1 December 1959

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 23 June 1961

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: United States of America

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 44

**Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water**

SIGNED BY THE ORIGINAL PARTIES<sup>b</sup> IN MOSCOW: 5 August 1963

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 8 August 1963

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1963

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

*The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2000*

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 124

**Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 27 January 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 10 October 1967

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: United Arab Emirates — 4 October (W) (a)

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 97

**Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT MEXICO CITY: 14 February 1967

ENTERED INTO FORCE: for each Government individually

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Mexico

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 38<sup>c</sup>

*Amendment to article 7<sup>d</sup>*

NEW RATIFICATIONS: Panama — 8 August (A)

*Amendment to article 25<sup>e</sup>*

NEW RATIFICATIONS: Ecuador — 30 August

Panama — 8 August (A)

*Amendment to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20<sup>f</sup>*

NEW RATIFICATIONS: Ecuador — 30 August

Panama — 8 August (A)

**Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 1 July 1968

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 March 1970

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 187

**Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 11 February 1971

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 18 May 1972

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 92

**Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON: 10 April 1972

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 26 March 1975

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Russian Federation (M), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (L), and United States of America (W)

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 143

**Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GENEVA: 18 May 1977

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 5 October 1978

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 66

**Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 18 December 1979

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 July 1984

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

*The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2000*

NEW PARTIES:<sup>g</sup> none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 9

**Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK: 10 April 1981

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 2 December 1983

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: <sup>h</sup>	El Salvador	—26 January (a)
	Colombia	— 6 March (a)
	Estonia	—20 April (a)
	Seychelles	— 8 June (a)
	Bangladesh	— 6 September (a)
	Lesotho	— 6 September (a)
	Maldives	— 7 September (a)
	Republic of Moldova	— 8 September (a)
	Nicaragua	— 5 December

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 84

*Amended Protocol II (entered into force on 3 December 1998)*

El Salvador	—26 January
Colombia	— 6 March
Estonia	—20 April
Seychelles	— 8 June
Ecuador	—14 August
Bangladesh	— 6 September
Jordan	— 6 September
Bosnia and Herzegovina	— 7 September
Maldives	— 7 September
Israeli <sup>i</sup>	—30 October
Nicaragua	— 5 December

TOTAL NUMBER OF ACCEPTANCES: 57

*Protocol IV (entered into force on 30 July 1998)*

El Salvador	—26 January
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### *Status of agreements*

<b>Colombia</b>	— 6 March
<b>Estonia</b>	—20 April
<b>Seychelles</b>	— 8 June
<b>Bangladesh</b>	— 6 September
<b>Maldives</b>	— 7 September
<b>Republic of Moldova</b>	— 8 September
<b>Belarus</b>	—13 September
<b>Israel<sup>i</sup></b>	—30 October
<b>Nicaragua</b>	— 5 December
<b>Pakistan</b>	— 5 December

**TOTAL NUMBER OF ACCEPTANCES: 56**

### South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT RAROTONGA: 6 August 1985

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 11 December 1986

**DEPOSITARY:** The Secretary-General of the Forum Secretariat

NEW PARTIES: Tonga —18 December

**TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 17<sup>k</sup>**

### **Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)**

**SIGNED AT PARIS: 19 November 1990**

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 9 November 1992

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: The Netherlands

**NEW PARTIES:** none

**TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 30**

### Agreement on Adaptation

ADOPTED AND SIGNED AT ISTANBUL: 19 November 1999

NOT YET IN FORCE<sup>1</sup>

**NEW SIGNATORIES:** none

NEW RATIFICATIONS: Belarus — 4 October

## Treaty on Open Skies

SIGNED AT HELSINKI: 24 March 1992

*The UN Disarmament Yearbook: 2000*

NOT YET IN FORCE<sup>m</sup>

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS: Canada and Hungary

NEW RATIFICATIONS: Ukraine —20 April

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 24

**Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction**

SIGNED AT PARIS: 13 January 1993

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 29 April 1997

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES:	Eritrea	—14 February (a)
	Azerbaijan	—29 February
	Kazakhstan	—23 March
	Colombia	— 5 April
	Malaysia	—20 April
	Yugoslavia <sup>n</sup>	—20 April (a)
	Mozambique	—15 August (a)
	Kiribati	— 7 September (a)
	Gabon	— 8 September
	Jamaica	— 8 September
	Yemen	— 2 October
	United Arab Emirates	—28 November

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 141

**Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty)**

SIGNED AT BANGKOK: 15 December 1995

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 27 March 1997

DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENT: Thailand

NEW PARTIES: none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 9

**African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)**

SIGNED AT CAIRO: 11 April 1996

NOT YET IN FORCE<sup>o</sup>

**DEPOSITARY:** The Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity

**NEW SIGNATORIES:** none

**TOTAL NUMBER OF SIGNATORIES:** 55

**NEW RATIFICATIONS:** Guinea —21 January

Swaziland —17 July

Togo —18 July

**NEW RATIFICATIONS:** 3

**TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS:** 16<sup>p</sup>

### **Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

**OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT NEW YORK:** 24 September 1996

**NOT YET IN FORCE<sup>q</sup>**

**DEPOSITARY:** The Secretary-General of the United Nations

**NEW SIGNATORIES:** Guyana — 7 September

Kiribati — 7 September

Nauru — 8 September

Nigeria — 8 September

Sierra Leone — 8 September

**TOTAL NUMBER OF SIGNATURES:** 160

**NEW RATIFICATIONS:** Lithuania — 7 February

Turkey —16 February

Bangladesh — 8 March

The Former Yugoslav Republic  
of Macedonia —14 March

Morocco —17 April

Iceland —26 June

Portugal —26 June

Russian Federation —30 June

Chile —12 July

Kiribati — 7 September

Maldives — 7 September

Belarus —13 September

United Arab Emirates —18 September

Gabon —20 September

Lao People's Democratic Republic	— 5 October
Cambodia	—10 November
Kenya	—30 November
Nicaragua	— 5 December

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 69

**Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT WASHINGTON, D.C.: 14 November 1997

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 1 July 1998

DEPOSITARY: Organization of American States

NEW PARTIES:<sup>7</sup> none

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 10

**Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine-Ban Convention)**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT OTTAWA: 3 December 1997

ENTERED INTO FORCE: 1 March 1999

DEPOSITARY: The Secretary-General of the United Nations

NEW PARTIES: <sup>8</sup>	Philippines	—15 February
	Albania	—29 February
	Botswana	— 1 March
	Togo	— 9 March
	Seychelles	— 2 June
	Rwanda	— 8 June
	Côte d'Ivoire	—30 June
	Dominican Republic	—30 June
	Ghana	—30 June
	Mauritania	—21 July
	Nauru	— 7 August (a)
	Bangladesh	— 6 September
	Colombia	— 6 September

*Status of agreements*

Kiribati	— 7 September (a)
Maldives	— 7 September
Gabon	— 8 September
Republic of Moldova	— 8 September
United Republic of Tanzania	—13 November
Romania	—30 November

TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTIES: 109

**Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions**

OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT GUATEMALA CITY: 7 June 1999

NOT YET IN FORCE<sup>t</sup>

DEPOSITARY: ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

NEW SIGNATORIES: None

NEW RATIFICATIONS: None

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATIFICATIONS: 1

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties-weapons of mass destruction as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries

(s) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions)

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	CTBT	CWC	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	PTBT	Sea-Bed
Afghanistan		s r			s	r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Albania		r		s	s r	r	r			
Algeria				s	s r	r	r	r	s	r
Andorra				s			r			
Angola				s		r	r			
Antigua and Barbuda				s		r	r	r	r	r
Argentina	s r	s r		s r	s r	r	r	s r	s r	s r
Armenia		r		s	s r		r		r	
Australia	s r	s r	r	s r	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Austria	r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Azerbaijan				s r	s r		r			
Bahamas		r			s		r	r	r	r
Bahrain		r		s	s r	r	r			
Bangladesh		r		s r	s r	r	r	r	r	
Barbados		s r				r	s r	r		
Belarus		s r		s r	s r		r	s r	s r	s r
Belgium	s r	s r		s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r	s r
Belize		r					r			

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties—weapons of mass destruction as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	CTBT	CWC	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	PTBT	Sea-Bed
Benin		S r		S	S r	r	S r	r	S r	S r
Bhutan		r			S	r	r		r	
Bolivia		S r		S r	S r	r	S r	S	S r	S
Bosnia and Herzegovina		r		S	S r		r		r	r
Botswana		S r			r		S r	S	r	S r
Brazil	r	S r		S r	S r	S r	r	S r	S r	S r
Brunei Darussalam		r		S	S r		r			
Bulgaria	r	S r		S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r
Burkina Faso		r		S	S r	r	S r	S r	S	
Burundi		S		S	S r		r	S	S	S
Cambodia		S r		S r	S	r	r			S
Cameroon					S r	r	S r	S	S	S
Canada	r	S r		S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r
Cape Verde		r		S	S	r	r		r	r
Central African Republic		S			S	r	r	S	r	S r
Chad				S	S		S r		S r	
Chile	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	r	S r	S r	
China	r	r		S	S r	r	r	r		r
Colombia	r	S r		S	S r		S r	S	S r	S

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties—weapons of mass destruction as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	CTBT	CWC	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	PTBT	Sea-Bed
Comoros				S	S		I			
Congo		I		S	S		I			I
Cook Islands				S	S I					
Costa Rica		S I		S	S I		S I		S I	S
Côte d'Ivoire		S		S	S I	I	S I		S I	I
Croatia		I		S	S I		I		I	
Cuba	I	S I			S I	I		I		I
Cyprus		S I		S	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Czech Republic	I	I		S I	S I	I	I	I	I	I
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	I	I				I	I			
Democratic Republic of the Congo		S I		S	S		S I	S	S I	
Denmark	I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Djibouti				S	S		I			
Dominica		I			S		I			
Dominican Republic		S I		S	S	I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Ecuador	I	S I		S	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	
Egypt		S		S		S I	S I	S I	S I	



Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties-weapons of mass destruction as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	CTBT	CWC	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	PTBT	Sea-Bed
El Salvador		S I		S I	S I	S	S I	S I	S I	
Equatorial Guinea		I		S	S I	I	I	I	I	S
Eritrea					I		I			
Estonia		I		S I	S I	S I	I			
Ethiopia		S I		S	S I	S I	S I	S	S	S I
Fiji		S I		S I	S I	I	I	I	I	
Finland	I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I
France	S I	I	S	S I	S I	S I	I	S I		
Gabon		S		S I	S I		I		S I	
Gambia		S I			S I	I	S I	S	I	S
Georgia		I		S	S I		I			
Germany	I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Ghana		S I		S	S I	I	S I	S	S I	S I
Greece	I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Grenada		I		S I	S	I	I			
Guatemala	I	S I	S	S	S	I	S I		S I	S I
Guinea				S	S I		I			S
Guinea-Bissau		I		S	S	I	I	I	I	I
Guyana		S		S	S I		I	S		

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties-weapons of mass destruction  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	CTBT	CWC	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	PTBT	Sea-Bed
Haiti		S		S	S		S r	S	S	
Holy See				S	S r	r	r	S		
Honduras		S r		S	S		S r	S	S r	S
Hungary	r	S r		S r	S r	r	S r	S r	S r	S r
Iceland		S r		S r	S r	r	S r	S r	S r	S r
India	r	S r	S		S r	S r		S r	S r	r
Indonesia		S r		S	S r	r	S r	S	S r	
Iran (Islamic Republic of)		S r		S	S r	r	S r	S	S r	S r
Iraq		S r				r	S r	S r	S r	S r
Ireland		S r		S r	S r	r	S r	S r	S r	S r
Israel				S	S	r		S r	S r	
Italy	r	S r		S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r
Jamaica		r		S	S r	r	S r	S r	S r	S r
Japan	S r	S r		S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r
Jordan		S r		S r	r	r	S r	S	S r	S r
Kazakhstan				S	S r		r	r		
Kenya		r		S r	S r	r	S r	r	r	
Kiribati				S r	r		r			
Kuwait		S r		S	S r	r	S r	r	S r	

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties-weapons of mass destruction as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	CTBT	CWC	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	PTBT	Sea-Bed
Kyrgyzstan				S	S		I			
Lao People's Democratic Republic		S I		S I	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Latvia		I		S	S I	I	I			I
Lebanon		S I				I	S I	S I	S I	S
Lesotho		S I		S I	S I	I	S I	S		S I
Liberia		S		S	S	I	S I		S I	S
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya		I				I	S I	I	S I	I
Liechtenstein		I		S	S I	I	I			I
Lithuania		I		S I	S I	S I	I			
Luxembourg		S I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S	S I	S I
Madagascar		S		S	S	I	S I	I	S I	S
Malawi		S		S	S I	I	I		I	
Malaysia		S I		S	S I	I	S I	S	S I	S I
Maldives		I		S I	S I	I	S I			
Mali		S		S I	S I		S I	I	S	S
Malta		S I		S	S I	I	S I			S I
Marshall Islands				S	S		I			
Mauritania				S	S I		I		S I	

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties—weapons of mass destruction  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	CTBT	CWC	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	PTBT	Sea-Bed
Mauritius		S r			S r	r	S r	r	r	S r
Mexico		S r	r	S r	S r	r	S r	S r	S r	r
Micronesia (Federated States of)				S r	S r		r			
Monaco		r		S r	S r	r	r			
Mongolia		S r		S r	S r	r	S r	S r	S r	S r
Morocco		S	S r	S r	S r	r	S r	r	S r	S r
Mozambique				S	r		r			
Myanmar		S		S	S		r	S r	S r	S
Namibia				S	S r		r			
Nauru				S	S		r			
Nepal		S		S	S r	r	S r	S r	S r	S r
Netherlands	r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r
New Zealand	S r	S r		S r	S r	r	S r	S r	S r	S r
Nicaragua		S r		S r	S r	S r	S r	S	S r	S r
Niger		S r		S	S r	r	r	S r	S r	S r
Nigeria		S r		S	S r	r	S r	r	S r	
Niue										
Norway	S r	S r		S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r	S r

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties--weapons of mass destruction  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	CTBT	CWC	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	PTBT	Sea-Bed
Oman		I		S	S I		I			
Pakistan		S I	I		S I	I		S I	S I	
Palau							I			
Panama		S I		S I	S I	I	S I	S	S I	S I
Papua New Guinea	I	I		S	S I	I	I	I	I	
Paraguay		I		S	S I	I	S I		S	S
Peru	I	S I	S	S I	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	
Philippines		S I	S I	S	S I	I	S I	S	S I	I
Poland	I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Portugal		S I		S I	S I	S I	I	I	S	I
Qatar		S I		S I	S I	I	I			I
Republic of Korea	I	S I		S I	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Republic of Moldova				S	S I		I			
Romania	I	S I	S	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Russian Federation	S I	S I		S I	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Rwanda		S I			S	I	I	S	S I	S I
Saint Kitts and Nevis		I			S	I	I			
Saint Lucia		I		S	S I	I	I			

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties-weapons of mass destruction  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	CTBT	CWC	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	PTBT	Sea-Bed
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines		r			s	r	r	r		r
Samoa				s	s		r		s r	
San Marino		s r		s	s r		s r	s r	s r	
Sao Tome and Principe		r		s			r			r
Saudi Arabia		s r			s r	r	r	r		s r
Senegal		s r		s r	s r	r	s r		s r	s
Seychelles		r		s	s r		r	r	r	r
Sierra Leone		s r		s	s	r	r	s r	s r	s
Singapore		s r		s	s r		s r	r	r	s r
Slovakia	r	r		s r	s r	r	r	r	r	r
Slovenia		r		s r	s r		r		r	r
Solomon Islands		r		s		r	r			r
Somalia		s					s r	s	s	
South Africa	s r	s r		s r	s r	r	r	s r	r	s r
Spain	r	s r		s r	s r	s r	r	r	s r	r
Sri Lanka		s r		s	s r	r	s r	s r	s r	
Sudan					r	r	s r		s r	s
Suriname		r		s	s r		r		r	

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties-weapons of mass destruction  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	CTBT	CWC	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	PTBT	Sea-Bed
Swaziland		I		S	S I	I	S I		I	S I
Sweden	I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Switzerland	I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Syrian Arab Republic		S				I	S I	I	S I	
Tajikistan				S I	S I		I			
Thailand		S I		S	S	S I	I	S I	S I	
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia		I		S I	I		I			
Togo		S I		S	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Tonga		I				I	I	I	I	
Trinidad and Tobago					I	I	S I	S	S I	
Tunisia		S I		S	S I	I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Turkey	I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Turkmenistan		I		S I	S I		I			
Tuvalu							I			
Uganda		I		S	S	I	I	I	S I	
Ukraine	I	S I		S	S I		I	S I	S I	S I
United Arab Emirates		S		S I	S I		I	I		

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties-weapons of mass destruction  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party reported	Antarctic Treaty	BW	Celestial Bodies	CTBT	CWC	Geneva Protocol	NPT	Outer Space	PTBT	Sea-Bed
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	S I	S I		S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I
United Republic of Tanzania		S			S I	I	I		S I	S
United States of America	S I	S I		S	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I
Uruguay	I	I	S I	S	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	S
Uzbekistan		I		S I	S I		I			
Vanuatu		I		S			I			
Venezuela	I	S I		S	S I	S I	S I	S I	S I	
Viet Nam		I		S	S I	I	I	I		I
Yemen		S I		S	S I	I	S I	I	S I	S I
Yugoslavia <sup>m</sup>		S I			I	S I	S I	S	S I	S I
Zambia				S	S		I	I	I	I
Zimbabwe		I		S	S I		I			



Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries  
(s) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions); (x) consent to be bound

Signatory or party reported	CCW	Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons					ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
		P. I	P. II	P. III	Amended P. II	P. IV		
Afghanistan	S	—	—	—	—	—	I	
Albania		—	—	—	—	—		S I
Algeria		—	—	—	—	—	I	S
Andorra		—	—	—	—	—		S I
Angola		—	—	—	—	—		S
Antigua and Barbuda		—	—	—	—	—	I	S I
Argentina	S I	X	X	X	X	X	I	S I
Armenia		—	—	—	—	—		
Australia	S I	X	X	X	X	X	S I	S I
Austria	S I	X	X	X	X	X	I	S I
Azerbaijan		—	—	—	—	—		
Bahamas		—	—	—	—	—		S I
Bahrain		—	—	—	—	—		
Bangladesh	I	X	X	X	X	X	I	S I
Barbados		—	—	—	—	—		S I
Belarus	S I	X	X	X	—	X	S I	
Belgium	S I	X	X	X	X	X	S I	S I

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties – conventional weapons  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party reported	CCW	Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons					ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
		P. I	P. II	P. III	Amended P. II	P. IV		
Belize		—	—	—	—	—		S r
Benin	r	x	—	x	—	—	S r	S r
Bhutan		—	—	—	—	—		
Bolivia		—	—	—	—	—	S	S r
Bosnia and Herzegovina	r	x	x	x	x	—		S r
Botswana		—	—	—	—	—		S r
Brazil	r	x	x	x	x	x	S r	S r
Brunei Darussalam		—	—	—	—	—		S
Bulgaria	S r	x	x	x	x	x	S r	S r
Burkina Faso		—	—	—	—	—		S r
Burundi		—	—	—	—	—		S
Cambodia	r	x	x	x	x	x	S r	S r
Cameroon		—	—	—	—	—		S
Canada	S r	x	x	x	x	x	S r	S r
Cape Verde	r	x	x	x	x	x	r	S
Central African Republic		—	—	—	—	—		
Chad		—	—	—	—	—		S r
Chile		—	—	—	—	—	r	S

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties – conventional weapons  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party reported	CCW	Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons					ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
		P. I	P. II	P. III	Amended P. II	P. IV		
China	S I	X	X	X	X	X		
Colombia	I	X	X	X	X	X		S I
Comoros		—	—	—	—	—		
Congo		—	—	—	—	—		
Cook Islands		—	—	—	—	—		S
Costa Rica	I	X	X	X	X	X	I	S I
Côte d'Ivoire		—	—	—	—	—		S I
Croatia	I	X	X	X	—	—		S I
Cuba	S I	X	X	X	—	—	S I	
Cyprus	I	X	X	X	—	—	S I	S
Czech Republic	I	X	X	X	X	X	S I	S I
Democratic People's Republic of Korea		—	—	—	—	—	I	
Democratic Republic of the Congo		—	—	—	—	—	S	
Denmark	S I	X	X	X	X	X	S I	S I
Djibouti	I	X	X	X	—	—		S I
Dominica		—	—	—	—	—	I	S I

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties – conventional weapons as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party as reported	CCW	Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons					ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
		P. I	P. II	P. III	Amended P. II	P. IV		
Dominican Republic		—	—	—	—	—	—	S r
Ecuador	S r	X	X	X	X	—	—	S r
Egypt	S	—	—	—	—	—	r	—
El Salvador	r	X	X	X	X	X	—	S r
Equatorial Guinea		—	—	—	—	—	—	r
Eritrea		—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Estonia	r	X	—	X	X	X	—	—
Ethiopia		—	—	—	—	—	S	S
Fiji		—	—	—	—	—	—	S r
Finland	S r	X	X	X	X	X	S r	—
France	S r	X	X	—	X	X	—	S r
Gabon		—	—	—	—	—	—	S r
Gambia		—	—	—	—	—	—	S
Georgia	r	X	X	X	—	—	—	—
Germany	S r	X	X	X	X	X	S r	S r
Ghana		—	—	—	—	—	S r	S r
Greece	S r	X	X	X	X	X	r	S
Grenada		—	—	—	—	—	—	S r

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party reported	CCW	Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons					ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
		P. I	P. II	P. III	Amended P. II	P. IV		
Guatemala	r	x	x	x	—	—	r	s r
Guinea		—	—	—	—	—		s r
Guinea-Bissau		—	—	—	—	—		s
Guyana		—	—	—	—	—		s
Haiti		—	—	—	—	—		s
Holy See	r	x	x	x	x	x	s	s r
Honduras		—	—	—	—	—		s r
Hungary	s r	x	x	x	x	x	s r	s r
Iceland	s	—	—	—	—	—	s	s r
India	s r	x	x	x	x	x	s r	
Indonesia		—	—	—	—	—		s
Iran (Islamic Republic of)		—	—	—	—	—	s	
Iraq		—	—	—	—	—	s	
Ireland	s r	x	x	x	x	x	s r	s r
Israel	r	x	x	—	x	x		
Italy	s r	x	x	x	x	x	s r	s r
Jamaica		—	—	—	—	—		s r
Japan	s r	x	x	x	x	x	r	s r

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons - as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	CCW	Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons					ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
		P. I	P. II	P. III	Amended P. II	P. IV		
Jordan	I	X	—	X	X	—		S r
Kazakhstan		—	—	—	—	—		
Kenya		—	—	—	—	—		S
Kiribati		—	—	—	—	—		r
Kuwait		—	—	—	—	—	r	
Kyrgyzstan		—	—	—	—	—		
Lao People's Democratic Republic	I	X	X	X	—	—	S r	
Latvia	I	X	X	X	—	X		
Lebanon		—	—	—	—	—	S	
Lesotho	I	X	X	X	—	—		S r
Liberia		—	—	—	—	—	S	r
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya		—	—	—	—	—		
Liechtenstein	S r	X	X	X	X	X		S r
Lithuania	I	X	—	X	X	X		S
Luxembourg	S r	X	X	X	X	X	S	S r
Madagascar		—	—	—	—	—		S r
Malawi		—	—	—	—	—	r	S r

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party reported	CCW	Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons					ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
		P. I	P. II	P. III	Amended P. II	P. IV		
Malaysia		—	—	—	—	—		S I
Maldives	I	X	—	X	X	X		S I
Mali		—	—	—	—	—		S I
Malta	I	X	X	X	—	—		S
Marshall Islands		—	—	—	—	—		S
Mauritania		—	—	—	—	—		S
Mauritius	I	X	X	X	—	—	I	S I
Mexico	S I	X	X	X	—	X		S I
Micronesia (Federated States of)		—	—	—	—	—		
Monaco	I	X	—	—	X	—		S I
Mongolia	S I	X	X	X	—	X	S I	
Morocco	S	—	—	—	—	—	S	
Mozambique		—	—	—	—	—		S I
Myanmar		—	—	—	—	—		
Namibia		—	—	—	—	—		S I
Nauru		—	—	—	—	—		I
Nepal		—	—	—	—	—		

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties – conventional weapons  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party reported	CCW	Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons					ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
		P. I	P. II	P. III	Amended P. II	P. IV		
Netherlands	S r	X	X	X	X	X	S r	S r
New Zealand	S r	X	X	X	X	X	r	S r
Nicaragua	S r	—	—	—	X	X	S	S r
Niger	r	X	X	X	—	—	r	S r
Nigeria	S	—	—	—	—	—		
Niue		—	—	—	—	—		S r
Norway	S r	X	X	X	X	X	S r	S r
Oman		—	—	—	—	—		
Pakistan	S r	X	X	X	X	X	r	
Palau		—	—	—	—	—		
Panama	r	X	X	X	X	X		S r
Papua New Guinea		—	—	—	—	—	r	
Paraguay		—	—	—	—	—		S r
Peru	r	X	—	X	X	X		S r
Philippines	S r	X	X	X	X	X		S r
Poland	S r	X	X	X	—	—	S r	S
Portugal	S r	X	X	X	X	—	S	S r
Qatar		—	—	—	—	—		S r



Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	CCW	Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons				ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
		P. I	P. II	P. III	Amended P. II	P. IV	
Republic of Korea		—	—	—	—	—	r
Republic of Moldova	r	x	x	x	—	x	s r
Romania	s r	x	x	x	—	—	s r
Russian Federation	s r	x	x	x	—	x	s r
Rwanda		—	—	—	—	—	s r
Saint Kitts and Nevis		—	—	—	—	—	s r
Saint Lucia		—	—	—	—	—	s r
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines		—	—	—	—	—	s
Samoa		—	—	—	—	—	s r
San Marino		—	—	—	—	—	s r
Sao Tome and Principe		—	—	—	—	—	s
Saudi Arabia		—	—	—	—	—	
Senegal	r	—	—	x	x	—	s r
Seychelles	r	—	—	—	x	x	s r
Sierra Leone	s	—	—	—	—	—	s
Singapore		—	—	—	—	—	
Slovakia	r	x	x	x	x	x	s r

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	CCW	Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons					ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
		P. I	P. II	P. III	Amended P. II	P. IV		
Slovenia	I	X	X	X	—	—		S I
Solomon Islands		—	—	—	—	—	I	S I
Somalia		—	—	—	—	—		
South Africa	I	X	X	X	X	X		S I
Spain	S I	X	X	X	X	X	S I	S I
Sri Lanka		—	—	—	—	—	S I	
Sudan	S	—	—	—	—	—		S
Suriname		—	—	—	—	—		S
Swaziland		—	—	—	—	—		S I
Sweden	S I	X	X	X	X	X	I	S I
Switzerland	S I	X	X	X	X	X	I	S I
Syrian Arab Republic		—	—	—	—	—	S	
Tajikistan	I	—	—	—	X	X	I	I
Thailand		—	—	—	—	—		S I
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	I	X	X	X	—	—		I
Togo	S I	X	X	X	—	—		S I
Tonga		—	—	—	—	—		

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties – conventional weapons  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party reported	CCW	Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons					ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
		P. I	P. II	P. III	Amended P. II	P. IV		
Trinidad and Tobago		—	—	—	—	—		S I
Tunisia	I	X	X	X	—	—	S I	S I
Turkey	S	X	X	X	—	—	S	
Turkmenistan		—	—	—	—	—		S I
Tuvalu		—	—	—	—	—		
Uganda	I	X	X	X	—	—	S	S I
Ukraine	S I	X	X	X	X	—	S I	S
United Arab Emirates		—	—	—	—	—		
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	S I	X	X	X	X	X	S I	S I
United Republic of Tanzania		—	—	—	—	—		S I
United States of America	S I	X	X	—	X	—	S I	
Uruguay	I	X	X	X	X	X	I	S
Uzbekistan	I	X	X	X	—	X	I	
Vanuatu		—	—	—	—	—		S
Venezuela		—	—	—	—	—		S I
Viet Nam	S	X	X	X	—	—	I	

Composite table of signatories and parties to multilateral treaties - conventional weapons  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party reported	CCW	Protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons					ENMOD	Mine-Ban Convention
		P. I	P. II	P. III	Amended P. II	P. IV		
Yemen		—	—	—	—	—	s r	s r
Yugoslavia	s r	x	x	x	—	—		
Zambia		—	—	—	—	—		s
Zimbabwe		—	—	—	—	—		s r

Composite table of signatories and parties to regional treaties  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries  
(s) signed; (r) ratified (including accessions and successions)

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE 1992	CFE 1999 <sup>u</sup>	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l Acquisitions
Algeria							S r		
Angola							S		
Antigua and Barbuda	S r							S	
Argentina	S r							S	S
Armenia			r						
Australia		S r							
Azerbaijan			r						
Bahamas	S r							S r	
Barbados	S r								
Belarus			r	r	S				
Belgium			S r		S r				
Belize	S r							S r	
Benin							S		
Bolivia	S r							S r	S
Botswana							S r		
Brazil	S r							S r	S
Brunei Darussalam						S r			
Bulgaria			S r		S r				

Composite table of signatories and parties to regional treaties  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE 1992	CFE 2000 <sup>u</sup>	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
Burkina Faso							S r		
Burundi							S		
Cambodia						S r			
Cameroon							S		
Canada			S r		S r			S	S r
Cape Verde							S		
Central African Republic							S		
Chad							S		
Chile	S r							S	S
China	S r (A.P.II) <sup>v</sup>	S r (P.2 & 3) <sup>w</sup>					S r (P.I & II) <sup>x</sup>		
Colombia	S r							S	S
Comoros							S		
Congo							S		
Cook Islands		S r							
Costa Rica	S r							S	S
Côte d'Ivoire							S r		
Cuba	S								

Composite table of signatories and parties to regional treaties  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE		Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
			1992	2000 <sup>u</sup>					
Czech Republic			S r		S r				
Democratic Republic of the Congo							S		
Denmark			S r		S r				
Djibouti							S		
Dominica	S r								S
Dominican Republic	S r							S	
Ecuador	S r							S r	S
Egypt							S		
El Salvador	S r							S r	S
Eritrea							S		
Ethiopia							S		
Fiji		S r							
France	S r (A.P.I & II) <sup>v</sup>	S r (P.I-3) <sup>w</sup>	S r		S r		S r (P.I-III) <sup>x</sup>		
Gabon							S		
Gambia							S r		
Georgia			r		S r				
Germany			S r		S r				

Composite table of signatories and parties to regional treaties  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE 1992	CFE 2000 <sup>a</sup>	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
Ghana							S		
Greece			S I		S I				
Grenada	S I							S	
Guatemala	S I							S	S
Guinea							S I		
Guinea-Bissau							S		
Guyana	S I							S	
Haiti	S I							S	S
Honduras	S I							S	
Hungary			S I		S I				
Iceland			S I		S I				
Indonesia			S I			S I			
Italy			S I		S I				
Jamaica	S I							S	
Kazakhstan			I						
Kenya							S		
Kiribati		S I							
Kyrgyzstan					S				



Composite table of signatories and parties to regional treaties  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (continued)

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE 1992	CFE 2000 <sup>a</sup>	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
Lao People's Democratic Republic						S I			
Lesotho							S		
Liberia							S		
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya							S		
Luxembourg			S I		S I				
Malawi							S		
Malaysia						S I			
Mali							S I		
Mauritania							S I		
Mauritius							S I		
Mexico	S I						S I	S I	S
Morocco							S		
Mozambique							S		
Myanmar						S I			
Namibia							S		
Nauru		S I							
Netherlands	S I (A.P.I) <sup>y</sup>		S I		S I				

Composite table of signatories and parties to regional treaties  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE 1992	CFE 2000 <sup>u</sup>	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Polindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
New Zealand		S I							
Nicaragua	S I							S I	S
Niger							S		
Nigeria							S		
Niue		S I							
Norway			S I		S I				
Panama	S I							S I	
Papua New Guinea		S I							
Paraguay	S I							S	S
Peru	S I							S I	S
Philippines						S			
Poland			S I		S I				
Portugal			S I		S I				
Republic of Moldova			I						
Romania			S I		S I				
Russian Federation	S I (A.P.II) <sup>v</sup>	S I (P.2 & 3) <sup>w</sup>	S I		S		S (P.I & II) <sup>x</sup>		
Rwanda							S		

Composite table of signatories and parties to regional treaties  
as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE 1992	CFE 2000 <sup>a</sup>	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Polindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
Saint Kitts and Nevis	s r							s	
Saint Lucia	s r							s	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	s r							s	
Samoa		s r							
Sao Tome and Principe							s		
Senegal							s		
Seychelles							s		
Sierra Leone							s		
Singapore						s r			
Slovakia			s r		s r				
Solomon Islands		s r							
South Africa							s r		
Spain			s r		s r				
Sudan							s		
Suriname	s r							s	
Swaziland							s r		
Thailand						s r			
Togo							s r		

Composite table of signatories and parties to regional treaties as of 31 December 2000, as reported by depositaries (*continued*)

Signatory or party reported	Treaty of Tlatelolco	Treaty of Rarotonga	CFE 1992	CFE 2000 <sup>u</sup>	Open Skies	Bangkok Treaty	Pelindaba Treaty	Firearms Convention	Convent'l. Acquisitions
Tonga		S I							
Trinidad and Tobago	S I							S	
Tunisia							S		
Turkey			S I		S I				
Tuvalu		S I							
Uganda							S		
Ukraine				I	S I				
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	S I (A.P.I & II) <sup>v</sup>	S I (P.1-3) <sup>w</sup>	S I	S I	S I		S (P.1 & II) <sup>x</sup>		
United Republic of Tanzania							S I		
United States of America	S I (A.P.I & II) <sup>y</sup>	S (P.1-3) <sup>w</sup>	S I	S I	S I		S (P.1 & II) <sup>x</sup>	S	S
Uruguay	S I							S	S
Vanuatu		S I							
Venezuela	S I							S	S
Viet Nam						S I			
Zambia							S		
Zimbabwe							S I		

Notes:

<sup>a</sup> The texts of treaties concluded up to 1992 are contained in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements*, 4th edition; 1992, vols. 1 and 2 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.93.IX.11), in *Status*, 5th edition: 1996 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.97.IX.3), and thereafter in the relevant volumes of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook. The texts and status data are also posted on the website of the Department for Disarmament Affairs: [www.un.org/Depts/dda](http://www.un.org/Depts/dda).

<sup>b</sup> The original parties are the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States.

<sup>c</sup> Total includes the five nuclear-weapon States and the Netherlands, which have ratified one or both of the Additional Protocols. The Treaty is fully in force for all the regional States that ratify it and waive the requirements under article 28.

<sup>d</sup> Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990

<sup>e</sup> Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991.

<sup>f</sup> Amendment adopted by the General Conference of OPANAL, pursuant to resolution 290 (VII) of 26 August 1992.

<sup>g</sup> Article 19, paragraph 4, states:

"For each State depositing its instrument of ratification or accession after the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of any such instrument."

<sup>h</sup> Article 5, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Convention state:

"2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

3. Each of the Protocols annexed to this Convention shall enter into force six months after the date by which twenty States have notified their consent to be bound by it in accordance with paragraph 3 or 4 of Article 4 of this Convention."

<sup>i</sup> With the following declaration:

"Article 1:

The declaration made by Israel upon accession to the [Convention], shall be equally applicable regarding the Amended Protocol II.

Article 2 (3):

Israel understands that the word 'primarily' is included in article 2, paragraph 3 of the Amended Protocol II, to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of vehicles as opposed to persons, that are equipped with anti-handling devices are not considered Anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.

Article 3(9):

Israel understands, regarding article 3, paragraph 9, that an area of land can itself be a legitimate military objective for the purpose of the use of land-mines, if its neutralization or denial of its use, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

Article 4:

It is the understanding of the State of Israel, regarding article 4 of the Amended Protocol II and the Technical Annex, that article 4 of the Amended Protocol II shall not apply to mines already emplaced. However, provisions of the Amended Protocol II, such as those regarding marking, monitoring and protection of areas containing mines under the control of a high contracting party, shall apply to all areas containing mines, regardless of when the mines were emplaced.

Article 5(2)(b):

Israel understands that article 5 paragraph 2(b) does not apply to the transfer of areas pursuant to peace treaties, agreements on the cessation of hostilities, or as part of a peace process or steps leading thereto.

Article 7(f)(1):

Israel reserves the right to use other devices (as defined in Article 2(5) of the Amended Protocol II) to destroy any stock of food or drink that is judged likely to be used by an enemy military force, if due precautions are taken for the safety of the civilian population.

Article 11(7):

(a) Israel understands that the provision on technical assistance mentioned on article 11 paragraph 7, will be without prejudice to a High contracting Party's constitutional and other legal provisions.

(b) No provision of the Amended Protocol II may be construed as affecting the discretion of the State of Israel to refuse assistance or to restrict or deny permission for the export of equipment, material or scientific or technological information for any reason.

Article 14:

a) It is the understanding of the Government of the State of Israel that the compliance of commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon, or executing military actions to which the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Protocols apply, cannot be judged on the basis of information which subsequently comes to light, but must be assessed on the basis of the information available to them at the time that such actions were taken.

b) Article 14 of the Amended Protocol II (insofar as it relates to penal sanctions) shall apply only in a situation in which an individual-

1) knew, or should have known, that his action was prohibited under the Amended Protocol II,

2) intended to kill or cause serious injury to a civilian; and

3) knew or should have known, that the person he intended to kill or cause serious injury to was a civilian.

c) Israel understands that the provisions of article 14 of the Amended Protocol II relating to penal sanctions refer to measures by authorities of States Parties to the Protocol and do not authorize the trial of any person before an international criminal tribunal. Israel shall not recognize the jurisdiction of any international tribunal to prosecute an Israeli citizen for violation of the Protocol or the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

General:

Israel understands that nothing in the Amended Protocol II may be construed as restriction or affecting in any way non-lethal weapon technology that is designed to temporarily disable, stun, signal the presence of a person, or operate in any other fashion, but not to cause permanent incapacity."

j) With the following declaration:

"With reference to the scope of application defined in Article 1 of the Convention, the Government of the State of Israel will apply the provisions of the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons as well as the Convention and those annexed Protocols to which Israel has agreed to become bound, to all armed conflicts involving regular armed forces of States referred to in article 2 common to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, as well as to all armed conflicts referred to in Article 3 common to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949."

<sup>k</sup> Total includes nuclear-weapon States—China and the Russian Federation, which have ratified Protocols 2 and 3, and France and the United Kingdom, which have ratified Protocols 1–3.

<sup>l</sup> Article 31, paragraph 3, states:

"This Agreement on Adaptation shall enter into force 10 days after instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States Parties listed in the Preamble, after which time the Treaty shall exist only in its amended form."

<sup>m</sup> Article XVII, paragraph 2, states:

"This Treaty shall enter into force 60 days after the deposit of 20 instruments of ratification, including those of the Depositaries, and of States Parties whose individual allocation of passive quotas as set forth in Annex A is eight or more."

<sup>n</sup> The former Yugoslavia was an original Member of the United Nations, the Charter having been signed and ratified on its behalf on 26 June 1945, and 19 October 1945, respectively. The following republics constituting the former Yugoslavia declared their independence on the dates indicated: Slovenia (25 June 1991), The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (17 September 1991), Croatia (8 October 1991), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (6 March 1992). Yugoslavia came into being on 27 April 1992 following the promulgation of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on that day. Yugoslavia nevertheless advised the Secretary-General on 27 April 1992 that it claimed to continue the international legal personality of the former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia accordingly claimed to be a member of

those international organizations of which the former Yugoslavia had been a member. It also claimed that all those treaty acts that had been performed by the former Yugoslavia were directly attributable to it, as being the same State (See documents S/23877 and A/46/915). Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, all of which had applied for and were admitted to membership in the United Nations, in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter (by resolutions 46/237 adopted on 22 May 1992, 46/238 adopted on 22 May 1992, 46/236 adopted on 22 May 1992, and 47/225 adopted on 8 April 1993 respectively), objected to this claim.

In its resolution 47/1 of 22 September 1992, the General Assembly, acting upon the recommendation of the Security Council in its resolution 777 (1992) of 19 September 1992, considered that Yugoslavia could not continue automatically the membership of the former Yugoslavia in the United Nations, and decided that it should accordingly apply for membership in the Organization. It also decided that Yugoslavia could not participate in the work of the General Assembly. The Legal Counsel took the view, however, that this resolution of the General Assembly neither terminated nor suspended the membership of the former Yugoslavia in the United Nations. At the same time, the Legal Counsel expressed the view that the admission of a new Yugoslavia to membership in the United Nations, in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, would terminate the situation that had been created by General Assembly resolution 47/1 (See document A/47/485).

General Assembly resolution 47/1 did not specifically address the question of the status of either the former Yugoslavia or of Yugoslavia with regard to multilateral treaties that were deposited with the Secretary-General. The Legal Counsel took the view in this regard that the Secretary-General was not in a position, as depositary, either to reject or to disregard the claim of Yugoslavia that it continued the legal personality of the former Yugoslavia, absent any decision to the contrary either by a competent organ of the United Nations directing him in the exercise of his depositary functions, or by a competent treaty organ created by a treaty, or by the contracting States to a treaty directing him in the exercise of his depositary functions with regard to that particular treaty, or by a competent organ representative of the international community of States as a whole on the general issue of continuity and discontinuity of statehood to which the claim of Yugoslavia gave rise.

Consistent with the claim of Yugoslavia to continue the international legal personality of the former Yugoslavia, the Secretary-General, as depositary, continued to list treaty actions that had been performed by the former Yugoslavia in status lists in the present publication, using for that purpose the short-form name "Yugoslavia", which was used at that time to refer to the former Yugoslavia. Between 27 April 1992 and 1 November 2000, Yugoslavia undertook numerous treaty actions with respect to treaties deposited with the Secretary-General. Consistent with the claim of Yugoslavia to continue the international legal personality of the former Yugoslavia, these treaty actions were also listed in status lists against the name "Yugoslavia". Accordingly, the Secretary-General, as depositary, did not make any differentiation in the present publication between treaty actions that were performed by the former Yugoslavia and those that were performed by Yugoslavia, both categories of treaty actions being listed against the name "Yugoslavia".



The General Assembly admitted Yugoslavia to membership by its resolution A/55/12 on 1 November 2000. At the same time, Yugoslavia renounced its claim to have continued the international legal personality of the former Yugoslavia.

By a notification dated 8 March 2001, received by the Secretary-General on 12 March 2001, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia lodged an instrument, *inter alia*, advising its intent to succeed to various multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, and confirming certain actions relating to such treaties. The notification stated the following:

"[T]he Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, having considered the treaties listed in the attached annex 1, succeeds to the same and undertakes faithfully to perform and carry out the stipulations therein contained as from April 27, 1992, the date upon which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia assumed responsibility for its international relations [Ed. note: Annex 1 attached to the notification contains a list of treaties to which the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a signatory or party],

...[T]he Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia maintains the signatures, reservations, declarations and objections made by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the treaties listed in the attached annex 1, prior to the date on which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia assumed responsibility for its international relations.

...[T]he Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia confirms those treaty actions and declarations made by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which are listed in the attached annex 2. [Ed. note: Annex 2 attached to the notification contains a list of certain treaty actions undertaken by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between 27 April 1992 and 1 November 2000.]"

Treaty actions undertaken by Yugoslavia are listed in this publication against the designation "Yugoslavia".

<sup>o</sup> Article 18, paragraph 2, states:

"It [this Treaty] shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the twenty-eighth instrument of ratification."

<sup>p</sup> Total includes France, which has ratified Protocols I, II and III, and China, which has ratified Protocols I and II. Does not include Kenya, which ratified the Treaty on 15 November 2000, but did not deposit its instrument of ratification until 9 January 2001.

<sup>q</sup> Article XIV, paragraph 1, states:

"This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature."

<sup>r</sup> Article XXV, states:

"This Convention shall enter into force on the 30<sup>th</sup> day following the date of deposit of the second instrument of ratification. For each State ratifying the Convention after the deposit of the second instrument of ratification, the Convention shall enter into force on the 30<sup>th</sup> day following deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification."

<sup>s</sup> Article 17, paragraph 2, states:

“For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40<sup>th</sup> instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”

<sup>t</sup> Article X states:

“This Convention shall enter into force on the 30<sup>th</sup> day following the date of deposit with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States of the sixth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession by a member state of the Organization of American States. Thereafter, the Convention shall enter into force for any other Member State of the Organization of American States on the 30<sup>th</sup> day following the date of deposit by such State of an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession.”

<sup>u</sup> Agreement on Adaptation.

<sup>v</sup> A.P. means Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

<sup>w</sup> P. means Protocol to the Treaty of Rarotonga.

<sup>x</sup> P. means Protocol to the Pelindaba Treaty.

## APPENDIX II

### **2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document**

#### **Part I**

#### **Review of the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference**

##### **Articles I and II and first to third preambular paragraphs**

1. The Conference reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and the regime of non-proliferation in all its aspects has a vital role in promoting international peace and security. The Conference reaffirms that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty. The Conference remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance of all parties with its provisions are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

2. The Conference recalls that the overwhelming majority of States entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the context, inter alia, of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Treaty.

3. The Conference notes that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

4. The Conference notes that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

5. The Conference reaffirms that the strict observance of the provisions of the Treaty remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing, under any circumstances, the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security.

6. The Conference expresses its concern with cases of non-compliance of the Treaty by States parties, and calls on those States non-compliant to move promptly to full compliance with their obligations.

7. The Conference welcomes the accessions of Andorra, Angola, Brazil, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu to the Treaty since 1995, bringing the number of States parties to 187, and reaffirms the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty.

8. The Conference urges all States not yet party to the Treaty, namely Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without condition, particularly those States that operate unsafe-guarded nuclear facilities.

9. The Conference deplores the nuclear test explosions carried out by India and then by Pakistan in 1998. The Conference declares that such actions do not in any way confer a nuclear-weapon-State status or any special status whatsoever. The Conference calls upon both States to undertake the measures set out in United Nations Security Council resolution 1172 (1998).

10. The Conference also calls upon all State parties to refrain from any action that may contravene or undermine the objectives of the Treaty as well as of United Nations Security Council resolution 1172 (1998).

11. The Conference notes that the two States concerned have declared moratoriums on further testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear tests by signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Conference regrets that the signing and ratifying has not yet taken place despite their pledges to do so.

12. The Conference reiterates the call on those States that operate unsafe-guarded nuclear facilities and that have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear-weapon development or deployment and to refrain

from any action which could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.

**Article III and fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs,  
especially in their relationship to article IV  
and the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs**

1. The Conference recalls and reaffirms the decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", noting paragraph 1 of the principles and objectives and the elements relevant to article III of the Treaty, in particular paragraphs 9 to 13 and 17 to 19, and to article VII of the Treaty, in particular paragraphs 5 to 7. It also recalls and reaffirms the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by that Conference.
2. The Conference notes that recommendations made at previous Conferences for the future implementation of article III provide a helpful basis for States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and provide assurance of compliance with non-proliferation undertakings.
3. The States parties urge the international community to enhance cooperation in the field of non-proliferation issues and to seek solutions to all concerns or issues related to non-proliferation in accordance with the obligations, procedures and mechanisms established by the relevant international legal instruments.
4. The Conference reaffirms that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is vital in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in providing significant security benefits. The Conference remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty can achieve this goal, and it urges all four States not parties to the Treaty, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan, to accede to it without delay and without conditions, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional Protocols consistent with the Model contained in INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).
5. The Conference reaffirms the fundamental importance of full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and the relevant safeguards agreements.
6. The Conference recognizes that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, play an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament and to nuclear cooperation.
7. The Conference reaffirms that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of IAEA and

the IAEA safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is the conviction of the Conference that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

8. The Conference emphasizes that measures should be taken to ensure that the rights of all States parties under the provisions of the preamble and the articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no State party is limited in the exercise of these rights in accordance with the Treaty.

9. The Conference emphasizes the importance of access to the Security Council and the General Assembly by IAEA, including its Director General, in accordance with article XII.C. of the statute of IAEA and paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), and the role of the Security Council and the General Assembly, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in upholding compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and ensuring compliance with safeguards obligations by taking appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to it by IAEA.

10. The Conference considers that IAEA safeguards provide assurance that States are complying with their undertakings under relevant safeguards agreements and assist States in demonstrating this compliance.

11. The Conference stresses that the non-proliferation and safeguards commitments in the Treaty are also essential for peaceful nuclear commerce and cooperation and that IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to the environment for peaceful nuclear development and international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

12. The Conference stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved. In the meantime, the Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States under the relevant voluntary-offer safeguards agreements in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources.

13. The Conference reiterates the call by previous Conferences of the States parties for the application of IAEA safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty. The Conference notes with satis-

faction that, since 1995, 28 States have concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA in compliance with article III, paragraph 4, of the Treaty, 25 of which have brought the agreements into force.<sup>1</sup>

14. The Conference notes with concern that IAEA continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and is therefore unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in that country.

15. The Conference looks forward to the fulfilment by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its stated intention to come into full compliance with its Treaty safeguards agreement with IAEA, which remains binding and in force. The Conference emphasizes the importance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea preserving and making available to IAEA all information needed to verify its initial declaration.

16. The Conference reaffirms that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.

17. The Conference reaffirms that the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty should be designed to provide for verification by IAEA of the correctness and completeness of a State's declaration so that there is a credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

18. The Conference notes the measures endorsed by the IAEA Board of Governors in June 1995 for strengthening and making more efficient the safeguards system, and notes also that these measures are being implemented pursuant to the existing legal authority conferred upon IAEA by comprehensive safeguards agreements.

19. The Conference also fully endorses the measures contained in the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540(Corrected)), which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997. The safeguards-strengthening measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol will provide IAEA with, inter alia, enhanced information about a State's nuclear activities and complementary access to locations within a State.

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<sup>1</sup> Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, Czech Republic, Dominica, Estonia, Ethiopia, Grenada, Guyana, Kazakhstan, Monaco, Namibia, St. Kitts and Nevis, San Marino, Slovenia, Ukraine and Zimbabwe.

20. The Conference recognizes that comprehensive safeguards agreements based on document INFCIRC/153 have been successful in their main focus of providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material and have also provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Conference notes that implementation of the measures specified in the Model Additional Protocol will provide, in an effective and efficient manner, increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole and that those measures are now being introduced as an integral part of IAEA's safeguards system. The Conference notes, in particular, the relationship between the additional protocol and the safeguards agreement between IAEA and a State party as set out in article 1 of the Model Additional Protocol. In this regard, it recalls the interpretation provided by the IAEA secretariat on 31 January 1997 and set out in document GOV/2914 of 10 April 1997 that, once concluded, the two agreements had to be read and interpreted as one agreement.

21. The Conference notes the high priority that IAEA attaches, in the context of furthering the development of the strengthened safeguards system, to integrating traditional nuclear-material verification activities with the new strengthening measures and looks forward to an expeditious conclusion of this work. It recognizes that the aim of these efforts is to optimize the combination of all safeguards measures available to IAEA in order to meet the Agency's safeguards objectives with maximum effectiveness and efficiency within available resources. Furthermore, the Conference notes that credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, notably those related to enrichment and reprocessing, in a State as a whole could permit a corresponding reduction in the level of traditional verification efforts with respect to declared nuclear material in that State, which is less sensitive from the point of view of non-proliferation. The Conference notes the important work being undertaken by IAEA in the conceptualization and development of integrated safeguards approaches, and encourages continuing work by IAEA in further developing and implementing these approaches on a high-priority basis.

22. The Conference recognizes that measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system with a view to providing credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities must be implemented by all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the nuclear-weapon States. The Conference also recognizes that the interests of nuclear non-proliferation will be effectively served by the acceptance of IAEA safeguards strengthening measures by States with item-specific safeguards agreements. The Conference welcomes the additional protocol concluded by Cuba and urges it also to bring the protocol into force as soon as possible.



23. The Conference notes that bilateral and regional safeguards play a key role in the promotion of transparency and mutual confidence between neighbouring States, and that they also provide assurances concerning nuclear non-proliferation. The Conference considers that bilateral or regional safeguards could be useful in regions interested in building confidence among their member States and in contributing effectively to the non-proliferation regime.

24. The Conference stresses the need to respect the letter and the spirit of the Treaty with respect to technical cooperation with States not party to the Treaty.

25. The Conference recognizes that nuclear material supplied to the nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes should not be diverted for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and should be, as appropriate, subject to IAEA safeguards agreements.

26. The Conference notes that all nuclear-weapon States have now concluded additional protocols to their voluntary-offer safeguards agreements incorporating those measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol that each nuclear-weapon State has identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Protocol, when implemented with regard to that State, and as consistent with that State's obligations under article I of the Treaty. The Conference invites such States to keep the scope of those additional protocols under review.

27. The Conference commends IAEA for making its experience in the verification of nuclear non-proliferation available to the Conference on Disarmament in connection with the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

28. The Conference takes note of the Declaration of the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit of April 1996, including in relation to the safe and effective management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes, and the initiatives stemming from it.

29. The Conference underlines the importance of international verification of nuclear material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes that has been irreversibly transferred to peaceful purposes. The Conference supports recent unilateral offers and mutual initiatives to place excess material under appropriate IAEA verification arrangements. Nuclear materials designated by each of the nuclear-weapon States as no longer required for military purposes should as soon as practicable be placed under IAEA or other relevant verification.

30. The Conference notes the considerable increase in the Agency's safeguards responsibilities since 1995. It further notes the financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards system is functioning and calls upon all

States parties, noting their common but differentiated responsibilities, to continue their political, technical and financial support of IAEA in order to ensure that the Agency is able to meet its safeguards responsibilities.

31. The Conference welcomes the significant contributions by States parties through their support programmes to the development of technology and techniques that facilitate and assist the application of safeguards.

32. The Conference considers that the strengthening of IAEA safeguards should not adversely affect the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation. The allocation of resources should take into account all of the Agency's statutory functions, including that of encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses with adequate technology transfer.

33. The Conference recognizes that the transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices should be consistent with States' obligations under the Treaty.

34. The Conference, recalling the obligations of all States parties under articles I, II and III of the Treaty, calls upon all States parties not to cooperate or give assistance in the nuclear or nuclear-related field to States not party to the Treaty in a manner which assists them in manufacturing nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

35. The Conference reaffirms that each State party to the Treaty has undertaken not to provide source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by article III of the Treaty.

36. The Conference reaffirms paragraph 12 of decision 2 (Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament), adopted on 11 May 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

37. The Conference recognizes that there are nuclear-related dual-use items of equipment, technology and materials not identified in article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty that are relevant to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and therefore to the Treaty as a whole. The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that their exports of nuclear-related dual-use items to States not party to the Treaty do not assist any nuclear-weapons programme. The Conference reiterates that each State party should also ensure that any transfer of such items is in full conformity with the Treaty.

38. The Conference recognizes the particular requirement for safeguards on unirradiated direct-use nuclear material, and notes the projections by IAEA that the use of separated plutonium for peaceful purposes is expected to increase

over the next several years. The Conference recognizes the non-proliferation benefits of the conversion of civilian research reactors to low-enriched uranium fuel. The Conference notes with appreciation that many research reactors are discontinuing the use of highly enriched uranium fuel in favour of low-enriched uranium fuel as a result of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Programme. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the considerable work undertaken to ensure the continuing effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in relation to reprocessing, to the storage of separated plutonium and to uranium enrichment.

39. The Conference welcomes the additional transparency on matters pertaining to the management of plutonium resulting from the establishment, in 1997, of Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (see INFCIRC/549), setting out the policies that several States, including the nuclear-weapon States, have decided to adopt.

40. The Conference welcomes the announcement made by some nuclear-weapon States that they have ceased the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

41. The Conference notes the conclusion drawn by the Board of Governors of IAEA that the proliferation risk with regard to neptunium is considerably lower than that with regard to uranium or plutonium and that at present there is practically no proliferation risk with regard to americium. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the recent decisions of the IAEA Board of Governors, which enabled IAEA to enter into exchanges of letters with States, on a voluntary basis, to ensure the regular and timely receipt of information as well as the application of measures required for efficient implementation of certain monitoring tasks regarding the production and transfer of separated neptunium, and which requested the Director General of IAEA to report to the Board when appropriate with respect to the availability of separated americium, using relevant information available through the conduct of regular IAEA activities and any additional information provided by States on a voluntary basis.

42. The Conference notes the paramount importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material, and calls upon all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials. The Conference notes the need for strengthened international cooperation in physical protection. In this regard, the Conference notes that 63 States have become party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

43. Expressing concern about the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials, the Conference urges all States to introduce and enforce appropriate measures and legislation to protect and ensure the security of such material. The Conference welcomes the activities in the fields of prevention, detection and response being undertaken by IAEA in support of efforts against

illicit trafficking. The Conference acknowledges the Agency's efforts to assist member States in strengthening their regulatory control on the applications of radioactive materials, including its ongoing work on a registry of sealed sources. It also welcomes the Agency's activities undertaken to provide for the enhanced exchange of information among its member States, including the continued maintenance of the illicit trafficking database. The Conference recognizes the importance of enhancing cooperation and coordination among States and among international organizations in preventing, detecting and responding to the illegal use of nuclear and other radioactive material.

44. The Conference notes that 51 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements,<sup>2</sup> and urges them to do so as soon as possible. This includes States parties without substantial nuclear activities. The Conference notes that in the case of States without substantial nuclear activities, the conclusion of safeguards agreements involves simplified procedures. The Conference recommends that the Director General of IAEA continue his efforts to further facilitate and assist these States parties in the conclusion and the entry into force of such agreements.

45. The Conference welcomes the fact that since May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors has approved additional protocols to comprehensive safeguards agreements with 43 States and that 12 of those additional protocols are currently being implemented. The Conference encourages all States parties, in particular those States parties with substantial nuclear programmes, to conclude additional protocols as soon as possible and to bring them into force or provisionally apply them as soon as possible.

46. The Conference urges IAEA to continue implementing strengthened safeguards measures as broadly as possible, and further urges all States with safeguards agreements to cooperate fully with IAEA in the implementation of these measures.

47. The Conference recommends that the Director General of IAEA and the IAEA member States consider ways and means, which could include a possible plan of action, to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of such safeguards agreements and additional protocols, including, for example,

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<sup>2</sup> Andorra, Angola, Bahrain, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mozambique, Niger, Oman, Palau, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu and Yemen.

specific measures to assist States with less experience in nuclear activities to implement legal requirements.

48. The Conference calls upon all States parties to give their full and continuing support to the IAEA safeguards system.

49. The Conference notes the agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America to convert in the Russian Federation 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the Russian Federation's nuclear weapons to low enriched uranium for use in commercial reactors. It welcomes the conversion to date of over 80 tonnes of HEU in the framework of this agreement. The Conference also recognizes the affirmation by the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States of America of the intention of each country to remove by stages approximately 50 tonnes of plutonium from their nuclear weapons programmes and to convert it so that it can never be used in nuclear weapons.

50. The Conference requests that IAEA continue to identify the financial and human resources needed to meet effectively and efficiently all of its responsibilities, including its safeguards verification responsibilities. It strongly urges all States to ensure that IAEA is provided with these resources.

51. The Conference recognizes that national rules and regulations of States parties are necessary to ensure that the States parties are able to give effect to their commitments with respect to the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items to all States taking into account articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and, for States parties, also fully respecting article IV. In this context, the Conference urges States parties that have not yet done so to establish and implement appropriate national rules and regulations.

52. The Conference recommends that the list of items triggering IAEA safeguards and the procedures for implementation, in accordance with article III, paragraph 2, be reviewed from time to time to take into account advances in technology, the proliferation sensitivity and changes in procurement practices.

53. The Conference requests that any supplier arrangement should be transparent and should continue to take appropriate measures to ensure that the export guidelines formulated by them do not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty.

54. The Conference recommends that transparency in export controls should continue to be promoted within a framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States parties to the Treaty.

55. The Conference encourages all other States that separate, hold, process or use separated plutonium in their civil nuclear activities to adopt policies similar to those which have been adopted by the participants in the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (see INFCIRC/549). Furthermore, the Con-

ference encourages the States concerned to consider similar policies for the management of highly enriched uranium used for peaceful purposes.

56. The Conference urges all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material on the earliest possible date and to apply, as appropriate, the recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities contained in IAEA document INF-CIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) and in other relevant guidelines. It welcomes the ongoing informal discussions among legal and technical experts, under the aegis of IAEA, to discuss whether there is a need to revise the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

#### **Article IV and sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs**

##### **Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy**

1. The Conference affirms that the Treaty fosters the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place.

2. The Conference reaffirms that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. The Conference recognizes that this right constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. In this connection, the Conference confirms that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

3. The Conference also reaffirms the undertaking by all parties to the Treaty to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy among States parties to the Treaty. The Conference notes the contribution that such uses can make to progress in general and to helping to overcome the technological and economic disparities between developed and developing countries.

4. The Conference urges that in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.

5. Referring to paragraphs 14 to 20 of the decision on Principles and Objectives of 1995, the Conference reasserts the need to continue to enhance the

peaceful uses of nuclear energy by all States parties and cooperation among them.

6. The Conference underlines the role of IAEA in assisting developing countries in the peaceful use of nuclear energy through the development of effective programmes aimed at improving their scientific, technological, and regulatory capabilities. In this context, the Conference takes note of the medium-term strategy of IAEA.

7. The Conference affirms that every effort should be made to ensure that IAEA has the financial and human resources necessary to effectively meet its responsibilities as foreseen in article III.A of the statute of IAEA.

8. The Conference recognizes the importance of the concept of sustainable development as a guiding principle for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Conference endorses the role of IAEA in assisting member States, upon request, in formulating projects that meet the objective of protecting the global environment by applying sustainable development approaches. The Conference recommends that IAEA continue taking this objective into account when planning its future activities. It further notes that IAEA regularly reports to the General Assembly on progress made in these fields.

9. The Conference recognizes the importance of safety and non-proliferation features, as well as aspects related to radioactive waste management being addressed in nuclear power development as well as other nuclear activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle at the technological level. The Conference recalls the role of IAEA in the assessment of prospective nuclear power technologies in this respect.

10. The Conference commends IAEA for its efforts to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme and to ensure the continuing relevance of the programme to the changing circumstances and needs of recipient member States. In this context, the Conference welcomes the new strategy for technical cooperation, which seeks to promote socio-economic impact within its core competencies, by integrating its assistance into the national development programme of each country with a view to ensuring sustainability through expanding partnerships in development, model project standards and the use of country programme frameworks and thematic plans. The Conference recommends that IAEA continue taking this objective and the needs of developing countries, notably least developed countries, into account when planning its future activities.

11. The Conference acknowledges the need for the parties to the Treaty to discuss regularly and take specific steps towards the implementation of article IV of the Treaty.

Nuclear and radiation safety,  
safe transport of radioactive materials,  
radioactive waste and liability

*Nuclear and radiation safety*

1. The Conference affirms that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can help to ensure that international cooperation in nuclear and radiation safety will take place within an appropriate non-proliferation framework. The Conference acknowledges the primary responsibility of individual States for maintaining the safety of nuclear installations within their territories, or under their jurisdiction, and the crucial importance of an adequate national technical, human and regulatory infrastructure in nuclear safety, radiological protection and radioactive waste management.
2. The Conference notes that a demonstrated global record of safety is a key element for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that continuous efforts are required to ensure that the technical and human requirements of safety are maintained at the optimal level. Although safety is a national responsibility, international cooperation on all safety-related matters is indispensable. The Conference encourages the efforts of IAEA in the promotion of safety in all its aspects, and encourages all States parties to take the appropriate national, regional and international steps to enhance and foster a safety culture. The Conference welcomes and underlines the intensification of national measures and international cooperation in order to strengthen nuclear safety, radiation protection, the safe transport of radioactive materials and radioactive waste management, including activities conducted in this area by IAEA. In this regard, the Conference recalls that special efforts should be made and sustained to increase the awareness in these fields, through appropriate training.
3. The Conference welcomes the activities of IAEA directed towards the strengthening of nuclear safety in operating power and research reactors. The Conference further endorses the work of IAEA in the organization of international peer review services, the support to the regulatory bodies and other relevant areas of the infrastructure of member States through the Technical Cooperation Programme, the safety standards advisory commission and committees in the preparation of internationally recognized safety standards, the emergency response unit and the continuing work on transport safety matters.
4. The Conference welcomes the entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and encourages all States, in particular those operating, constructing or planning nuclear power reactors that have not yet taken the necessary steps to become party to the Convention, to do so. It would also welcome a voluntary application of the related provisions of the Convention to other relevant nuclear installations dedicated to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference also expresses its satisfaction with the outcome of the first



review meeting under the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and looks forward to the report from the next review meeting, in particular with respect to those areas where the first review meeting found that there was room for safety improvements.

5. The Conference encourages all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

6. The Conference notes the bilateral and multilateral activities that have enhanced the capabilities of the international community to study, minimize and mitigate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in support of the actions taken by the Governments concerned.

7. The Conference considers that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety, have dangerous political, economic and environmental implications and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

8. The Conference notes the importance of openness, transparency and public information concerning the safety of nuclear facilities.

#### *Safe transport of radioactive materials*

9. The Conference endorses the IAEA regulations for the safe transport of radioactive materials and urges States to ensure that these standards are maintained. The Conference notes the decision in 1997 by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to incorporate the Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships (INF Code) into the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.

10. The Conference underlines the importance of effective national and international regulations and standards for the protection of the States concerned from the risks of transportation of radioactive materials. The Conference affirms that it is in the interests of all States that any transportation of radioactive materials be conducted in compliance with the relevant international standards of nuclear safety and security and environmental protection, without prejudice to the freedoms, rights and obligations of navigation provided for in international law. The Conference takes note of the concerns of small island developing States and other coastal States with regard to the transportation of radioactive materials by sea.

11. Recalling resolution GC(43)/RES/11 of the General Conference of IAEA, adopted by consensus in 1999, the Conference invites States shipping radioac-

tive materials to provide, as appropriate, assurances to concerned States, upon their request, that the national regulations of the shipping State take IAEA transport regulations into account and to provide them with relevant information relating to shipments of such materials. The information provided should in no case be contradictory to the measures of physical security and safety.

12. The Conference notes that States parties have been working bilaterally and through international organizations to improve cooperation and exchange of information among the States concerned. In this context, the Conference calls upon States parties to continue working bilaterally and through the relevant international organizations to examine and further improve measures and international regulations relevant to international maritime transportation of radioactive material and spent fuel.

*Spent fuel and radioactive waste*

13. The Conference notes that a major issue in the debate over the use of nuclear technologies is the safety of the management of spent fuel and of radioactive waste. The Conference notes the conclusion of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and encourages States that have not yet taken the necessary steps to become party to the Convention, to do so. The Conference expresses the hope that this Convention will enter into force at the earliest possible date. The Conference underlines the importance of managing fuel and radioactive waste that were excluded from this Convention because they are within military or defence programmes in accordance with the objectives stated in this Convention.

14. The Conference commends the efforts of IAEA in radioactive waste management, and calls upon the Agency, in view of the increasing importance of all aspects of radioactive waste management, to strengthen its efforts in this field as resources permit. The Conference recognizes the activities of IAEA in the search for new approaches on radioactive waste management solutions that are both safe and publicly acceptable. It endorses IAEA programmes to assist member States in spent fuel and radioactive waste management through, inter alia, safety standards, peer reviews and Technical Cooperation activities.

15. The Conference also notes that the contracting parties to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention) have urged all States that have not done so to accept the 1993 amendment of annex I to the London Convention, which prohibits contracting parties from dumping radioactive wastes or other radioactive matter at sea.

### *Liability*

16. The Conference notes the adoption of the 1997 Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. The Conference also notes the existence of various national and international liability mechanisms. Furthermore, the Conference stresses the importance of having effective liability mechanisms in place.

### *Technical cooperation*

1. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of those parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to cooperate in contributing alone, or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

2. The Conference recognizes the benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and nuclear techniques in the fields referred to in articles II and III of the statute of IAEA, and their contribution to achieving sustainable development in developing countries and for generally improving the well-being and the quality of life of the peoples of the world.

3. The Conference acknowledges the importance of the work of IAEA as the principal agent for technology transfer among the international organizations referred to in article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, and affirms the importance of the Technical Cooperation activities of IAEA, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, in fulfilling the obligations set forth in article IV of the Treaty.

4. The Conference recognizes that voluntary resources provided to and received from States parties to the Treaty under the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund represent the most important contribution to the implementation of the Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme, the major instrument for its cooperation with developing countries. The Conference expresses its appreciation to all IAEA member States party to the Treaty which respect their commitments to the Technical Cooperation Fund by pledging and paying in full their contributions.

5. The Conference notes, however, that there has been a growing gap between the approved target figures for the Technical Cooperation Fund and the actual payments.

6. The Conference stresses that every effort should be made to ensure that IAEA's financial and human resources necessary for Technical Cooperation activities are assured, predictable and sufficient to meet the objectives mandated

in article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and article II of the IAEA statute. The Conference notes IAEA General Conference resolutions GC(43)/RES/6 and GC(43)/RES/14, and urges States members of IAEA to make every effort to pay in full and on time their voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund and reminds them of their obligation to pay their Assessed Programme Costs. It also encourages IAEA to continue to manage its Technical Cooperation activities in an effective and cost-efficient manner, and in accordance with article III.C of the IAEA statute.

7. The Conference notes the consultation among States members of IAEA on the target for the Technical Cooperation Fund for the coming years and encourages member States to reach agreement on the indicative planning figures (IPF).

8. The Conference notes that the special needs and priorities of the least developed countries parties to the Treaty should be taken into account in bilateral and multilateral nuclear technical assistance and cooperation programmes. The Conference recommends that IAEA continue, through its Technical Cooperation Programme, to give special attention to the needs and priorities of least developed countries.

9. The Conference recognizes that regional cooperative arrangements for the promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy can be an effective means of providing assistance and facilitating technology transfer, complementing the Technical Cooperation activities of IAEA in individual countries. It notes the contributions of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA), the Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Advancement of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean (ARCAL), the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific (RCA), as well as the regional Technical Cooperation Programme in Central and Eastern Europe.

10. The Conference notes the significant level of bilateral cooperation between States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy worldwide and welcomes the reports thereon. The Conference recognizes that it is the responsibility of States parties to create the conditions to enable this cooperation, in which commercial entities play an important role in a manner that conforms with the States parties' obligations under articles I and II of the Treaty. The Conference urges States in a position to do so to continue and where possible increase their cooperation in this field, particularly to developing countries and parties to the Treaty with economies in transition.

11. The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment

and technological information for peaceful purposes. Transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty are to be encouraged. They would be facilitated by eliminating undue constraints that might impede such cooperation.

#### **Conversion of nuclear materials to peaceful uses**

1. The Conference notes steps taken by nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear weapons arsenals and underlines the importance of international verification, as soon as practicable, of nuclear weapons material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military programmes and that has been irreversibly transferred to peaceful purposes. This process requires strict procedures for the safe handling, storage and disposal of sensitive nuclear materials, as well as the safe management of radioactive contaminants in strict compliance with the highest possible standards of environmental protection and nuclear and radiation safety.
2. The Conference takes note of the Declaration of the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit of April 1996, including the measures in relation to the safe and effective management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes, and the initiatives stemming therefrom.
3. The Conference also notes that there have been exceptional instances in which serious environmental consequences have resulted from uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel-cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons.
4. The Conference calls upon all Governments and international organizations that have expertise in the field of cleanup and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance, as may be requested, for radiological assessment and remedial purposes in these affected areas, while noting the efforts that have been made to date in this regard.

#### **Article V**

The Conference affirms that the provisions of article V of the Treaty as regards the peaceful applications of any nuclear explosions are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

#### **Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs**

1. The Conference notes the reaffirmation by the States parties of their commitment to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty.

2. The Conference notes that, despite the achievements in bilateral and unilateral arms reduction, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpile still amounts to many thousands. The Conference expresses its deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these nuclear weapons could be used.
3. The Conference takes note of the proposal made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the convening of a major international conference that would help to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers be considered at the Millennium Summit.
4. The Conference reaffirms that the cessation of all nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions will contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and, therefore, to the further enhancement of international peace and security.
5. The Conference welcomes the adoption by the General Assembly and subsequent opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in New York on 24 September 1996, and notes that 155 States have signed it and that 56 of them, including 28 whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force, have deposited their instruments of ratification. The Conference welcomes the ratifications by France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the recent decision by the State Duma of the Russian Federation to ratify the Treaty. The Conference calls upon all States, in particular on those 16 States whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty.
6. The Conference welcomes the final declaration adopted at the Conference on facilitating the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, convened in Vienna in October 1999, in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty.
7. The Conference notes the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the *Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons* issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996.
8. The Conference notes the establishment, in August 1998, by the Conference on Disarmament, of the Ad Hoc Committee under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference regrets that negotiations have not been pursued on this issue as recommended

in paragraph 4 (b) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".

9. The Conference welcomes the significant progress achieved in nuclear weapons reductions made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament. Ratification of START II by the Russian Federation is an important step in the efforts to reduce strategic offensive weapons and is welcomed. Completion of ratification of START II by the United States remains a priority.

10. The Conference also welcomes the significant unilateral reduction measures taken by other nuclear-weapon States, including the close-down and dismantling of nuclear weapon-related facilities.

11. The Conference welcomes the efforts of several States to cooperate in making nuclear disarmament measures irreversible, in particular, through initiatives on the verification, management and disposition of fissile material declared excess to military purposes.

12. The Conference reiterates the important contribution made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty through their voluntary withdrawal of all tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from their territories.

13. The Conference welcomes the signing, in September 1997, by Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America of significant agreements relating to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, including a Memorandum of Understanding. The Conference welcomes the ratification of these documents by the Russian Federation. Ratification of these documents by the other countries remains a priority.

14. The Conference notes the nuclear-weapon States' declaration that none of their nuclear weapons are targeted at any State.

15. The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament":

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or

other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

- Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;
- Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;
- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;



- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

## **Article VII and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States**

1. The Conference reaffirms that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

2. The Conference reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Conference agrees that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference calls upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue.

3. The Conference notes the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to the United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

4. The Conference notes the establishment in March 1998 by the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Committee on effective international ar-

rangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons.

5. The Conference recognizes the important role which the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones and the signature to the protocols of new and previously existing zones by the nuclear-weapon States has played in extending negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the zones concerned. The Conference underlines the importance of concerned States taking steps to bring into effect the assurances provided by nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and their protocols.

6. The Conference welcomes and supports the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties since 1995, and reaffirms the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.

7. The Conference supports proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not yet exist, such as in the Middle East and South Asia.

8. The Conference welcomes and supports the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status, and takes note of the recent adoption by the Mongolian parliament of legislation defining that status as a unilateral measure to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons on its territory, bearing in mind its unique conditions, as a concrete contribution to promoting the aims of nuclear non-proliferation and a practical contribution to promoting political stability and predictability in the region.

9. The Conference further welcomes the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and urges its rapid implementation.

10. The Conference recognizes the continuing contributions that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are making towards the achievement of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives, particularly in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, and towards keeping the areas covered by those treaties free of nuclear weapons, in accordance with international law. In this context, the Conference welcomes the vigorous efforts being made among States parties and signatories to those treaties in order to promote their common objectives.

11. The Conference stresses the importance of the signature and ratification of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba by all regional States, as well as the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States

that have not yet done so of the relevant protocols to those treaties, recognizing that security assurances are available to States parties to those Treaties. In this context, the Conference takes note of the statement of the five nuclear-weapon States that the internal processes are under way to secure the few lacking ratifications to the treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba, and that consultations with the States parties to the Treaty of Bangkok have been accelerated, paving the way for adherence by the five nuclear-weapon States to the protocol to that Treaty.

12. The Conference welcomes the consensus reached in the General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. The Conference urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.

13. The Conference further welcomes the report on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission on 30 April 1999.

14. The Conference regards the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones as a matter of priority, and in this respect supports the intention and commitment of the five Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region, welcomes the practical steps they have taken towards implementation of their initiative and notes with satisfaction the substantial progress they have made in drawing up and agreeing on a draft treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

15. The Conference, taking note of all initiatives by States parties, believes that the international community should continue to promote the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with the relevant guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and in that spirit welcomes the efforts and proposals that have been advanced by the States parties since 1995 in various regions of the world.

16. Regional issues

*The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East:*

1. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Confer-

ence and recognizes that the resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved. The Resolution, which was co-sponsored by the depositary States (Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995.

2. The Conference reaffirms its endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.
3. The Conference recalls that in paragraph 4 of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East the Conference "calls upon all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards". The Conference notes, in this connection, that the report of the United Nations Secretariat on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East (NPT/CONF.2000/7) states that several States have acceded to the Treaty and that, with these accessions, all States of the region of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, are States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference welcomes the accession of these States and reaffirms the importance of Israel's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.
4. The Conference notes the requirement under article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to conclude agreements with IAEA to meet the requirements of the statute of IAEA. In this regard, the Conference notes from paragraph 44 of the review of article III that nine States parties in the region have yet to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA and invites those States to negotiate such agreements and bring them into force as soon as possible. The Conference welcomes the conclusion of an Additional Protocol by Jordan and invites all other States in the Middle East, whether or not party to the Treaty, to participate in IAEA's strengthened safeguards system.
5. The Conference notes the unanimous adoption by the United Nations Disarmament Commission, at its 1999 session, of guide-

lines on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned.<sup>3</sup> The Conference notes that, at that session, the Disarmament Commission encouraged the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as well as the development of zones free from all weapons of mass destruction. The Conference notes the adoption without a vote by the General Assembly, for the twentieth consecutive year, of a resolution proposing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

6. The Conference invites all States, especially States of the Middle East, to reaffirm or declare their support for the objective of establishing an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction, to transmit their declarations of support to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to take practical steps towards that objective.
7. The Conference requests all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such a zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. It requests that the Secretariat prepare a compilation of those reports in preparation for consideration of these matters at the Preparatory Committee meetings and the 2005 Review Conference.
8. The Conference requests the President of the 2000 Review Conference to convey the Final Document of the Conference, including its conclusions and recommendations, to the Governments of all States, including those States parties unable to attend the Conference and to States that are not party to the Treaty.
9. Recalling paragraph 6 of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Conference reiterates the appeal to all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their

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<sup>3</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/54/42), annex I, sect. C.*

delivery systems. The Conference notes the statement by the five nuclear-weapon States reaffirming their commitment to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

10. Bearing in mind the importance of full compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Conference notes the statement of 24 April 2000 by the IAEA Director General that, since the cessation of IAEA inspections in Iraq on 16 December 1998, the Agency has not been in a position to provide any assurance of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). The Conference further notes that IAEA carried out an inspection in January 2000 pursuant to Iraq's safeguards agreement with IAEA during which the inspectors were able to verify the presence of the nuclear material subject to safeguards (low enriched, natural and depleted uranium). The Conference reaffirms the importance of Iraq's full continuous cooperation with IAEA and compliance with its obligations.

*South Asia and other regional issues:*

11. The Conference emphasizes that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing.
12. With respect to the nuclear explosions carried out by India and then by Pakistan in May 1998, the Conference recalls Security Council resolution 1172 (1998), adopted unanimously on 6 June 1998, and calls upon both States to take all of the measures set out therein. Notwithstanding their nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear-weapon States.
13. The Conference urges India and Pakistan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive Agency safeguards. The Conference further urges both States to strengthen their non-proliferation export control measures over technologies, material and equipment that can be used for the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
14. The Conference notes that India and Pakistan have declared moratoriums on further testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear testing by signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Conference urges both States to sign the Treaty, in accordance with their pledges to do so.
15. The Conference notes the willingness expressed by India and Pakistan to participate in the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nu-

clear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Pending the conclusion of a legal instrument, the Conference urges both countries to observe a moratorium on the production of such material. The Conference also urges both States to join other countries in actively seeking an early commencement of negotiations on this issue, in a positive spirit and on the basis of the agreed mandate, with a view to reaching early agreement.

16. The Conference notes with concern that, while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, IAEA continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and is therefore unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Conference looks forward to the fulfilment by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its stated intention to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with IAEA, which remains binding and in force. The Conference emphasizes the importance of action by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to preserve and make available to IAEA all information needed to verify its initial inventory.

### **Article IX**

1. The Conference reaffirms its conviction that the preservation of the integrity of the Treaty and its strict implementation are essential to international peace and security.
2. The Conference recognizes the crucial role of the Treaty in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
3. The Conference reaffirms that in accordance with article IX, States not currently States parties may accede to the Treaty only as non-nuclear-weapon States.
4. The Conference undertakes to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty. These efforts should include the enhancement of regional security, particularly in areas of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia.
5. The Conference reaffirms the long-held commitment of parties to the Treaty to universal membership and notes that this goal has been advanced by the accession to the Treaty of several new States since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, thereby bringing its membership to 187 States parties. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the Treaty in establishing a norm of international behaviour in the nuclear field.

6. The Conference therefore calls upon those remaining States not party to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities. These States are Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan. In this context, the Conference welcomes the signature by Cuba of the protocol additional to its safeguards agreements with IAEA.

7. The Conference particularly urges those non-parties to the Treaty that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities—India, Israel and Pakistan—to take similar action, and affirms the important contribution this would make to regional and global security.

8. The Conference also takes note that the widening of the entry into force of protocols additional to safeguards agreements with IAEA will strengthen the nuclear safeguards regime and facilitate the exchange of nuclear and nuclear-related material in peaceful nuclear cooperation.

9. In this connection, the Conference underlines the necessity of universal adherence to the Treaty and of strict compliance by all existing parties with their obligations under the Treaty.

10. The Conference requests the President of the Conference to convey formally the views of States parties on this issue to all non-parties and to report their responses to the parties. Such efforts should contribute to enhancing the universality of the Treaty and the adherence of non-parties to it.

### **Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty**

1. The States parties reaffirmed the provisions in the Decision on “Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty” adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

2. The States parties stressed that three sessions of the Preparatory Committee, normally for a duration of 10 working days each, should be held in the years prior to the Review Conference. A fourth session, would, if necessary, be held in the year of the Review Conference.

3. The States parties recommended that specific time be allocated at sessions of the Preparatory Committee to address specific relevant issues.

4. Recalling the Decision on subsidiary bodies of the 2000 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/DEC.1), subsidiary bodies can be established at the Review Conference to address specific relevant issues.

5. The States parties, recalling paragraph 4 of Decision 1 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, agreed that the purpose of the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee would be to “consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as



well as its universality". To this end, each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty.

6. The States parties also agreed that the Chairpersons of the sessions of the Preparatory Committee should carry out consultations with the States parties to prepare the ground for the outcome of the sessions as well as their agenda.

7. The consideration of the issues at each session of the Preparatory Committee should be factually summarized and its results transmitted in a report to the next session for further discussion. At its third and, as appropriate, fourth sessions, the Preparatory Committee, taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference.

8. The States parties agreed that the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference should be finalized at the last session of the Preparatory Committee.

9. The States parties also agreed that a meeting should be allocated to non-governmental organizations to address each session of the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference.

## APPENDIX III

### Millennium documents

#### Excerpts pertaining to arms control and disarmament

##### **We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century: report of the Secretary-General\***

#### **IV. Freedom from fear**

##### **F. Pursuing arms reductions**

234. The post-cold-war era has seen both gains and setbacks in the realm of disarmament. On the positive side, the Ottawa Convention banning landmines and the Chemical Weapons Convention have both entered into force. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been concluded, nuclear safeguards have been strengthened and nuclear-weapon-free zones now embrace all of the southern hemisphere. Nuclear weapons numbers have almost halved since 1982, and world military expenditures declined by some 30 per cent between 1990 and 1998.

235. The rest of the picture is much less encouraging. Little meaningful progress has been achieved in limiting the proliferation of small arms. The nuclear non-proliferation regime has suffered major blows as a result of clandestine nuclear weapon programmes, the nuclear tests in South Asia and the unwillingness of key states to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

236. Advances in biotechnology are increasing the potential threat posed by biological weapons, while negotiations on a verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention are being unnecessarily prolonged. For three years in a row now, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has not engaged in any negotiations because its members have been unable to agree on disarmament priorities.

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\* A/54/2000, part IV, sect. F. (Figures not included.)

237. I cannot here review the entire arms control spectrum. Instead, I focus on two categories of weapon that are of special concern: small arms and light weapons, because they currently kill most people in most wars; and nuclear weapons, because of their continuing terrifying potential for mass destruction.

*Small arms*

238. The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other weapons systems — and in most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed, could well be described as “weapons of mass destruction”. Yet there is still no global non-proliferation regime to limit their spread, as there is for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

239. Small arms proliferation is not merely a security issue; it is also an issue of human rights and of development. The proliferation of small arms sustains and exacerbates armed conflicts. It endangers peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. It undermines respect for international humanitarian law. It threatens legitimate but weak governments and it benefits terrorists as well as the perpetrators of organized crime.

240. Much of the cold war’s small arms surplus finished up in the world’s most dangerous conflict zones and, as the number of weapons in circulation increased, their price declined, making access to them ever easier even in the poorest countries. In parts of Africa in the mid-1990s, for example, deadly assault rifles could be bought for the price of a chicken or a bag of maize. Reducing the toll caused by these weapons will be difficult, not least because of the extraordinary number in circulation, which some estimates put as high as 500 million.

241. An estimated 50 to 60 per cent of the world’s trade in small arms is legal — but legally exported weapons often find their way into the illicit market. The task of effective proliferation control is made far harder than it needs to be because of irresponsible behaviour on the part of some states and lack of capacity by others, together with the shroud of secrecy that veils much of the arms trade. Member States must act to increase transparency in arms transfers if we are to make any progress. I would also urge that they support regional disarmament measures, like the moratorium on the importing, exporting or manufacturing of light weapons in West Africa.

242. Even if all arms transfers could be eliminated, however, the problem posed by the many millions of illicitly held small arms already in circulation in the world’s war zones would remain.

243. Because most conflict-prone poor countries lack the capacity to detect and seize illicit weapons, a more promising path may be the use of market incentives. Outright buy-back programmes may simply stimulate arms imports from neighbouring countries, but non-monetary reimbursement schemes have worked

in Albania, El Salvador, Mozambique and Panama. In return for weapons, individuals may receive tools, such as sewing machines, bicycles, hoes and construction materials, and entire communities have been provided with new schools, health-care services and road repairs.

244. Not only governments but also the private sector can and should help fund such programmes. This would be a particularly appropriate contribution by major international corporations that have a presence in conflict-prone regions.

245. Controlling the proliferation of illicit weapons is a necessary first step towards the non-proliferation of small arms. These weapons must be brought under the control of states, and states must be held accountable for their transfer. The United Nations is convening a conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in 2001, in which I hope civil society organizations will be invited to participate fully.

246. *I urge Member States to take advantage of this conference to start taking serious actions that will curtail the illicit traffic in small arms.*

247. The many recent expressions of concern about small arms proliferation are a welcome sign that the importance of the issue is being recognized, but words alone do nothing to prevent the ongoing slaughter of innocent people. Dialogue is critical, but we must match the rhetoric of concern with the substance of practical action.

### *Nuclear weapons*

248. Let me now turn to nuclear weapons. When the bipolar balance of nuclear terror passed into history, the concern with nuclear weapons also seemed to drift from public consciousness. But some 35,000 nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the nuclear powers, with thousands still deployed on hair-trigger alert. Whatever rationale these weapons may once have had has long since dwindled. Political, moral and legal constraints on actually using them further undermine their strategic utility without, however, reducing the risks of inadvertent war or proliferation.

249. The objective of nuclear non-proliferation is not helped by the fact that the nuclear weapon states continue to insist that those weapons in their hands enhance security, while in the hands of others they are a threat to world peace.

250. If we were making steady progress towards disarmament, this situation would be less alarming. Unfortunately the reverse is true. Not only are the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks stalled, but there are no negotiations at all covering the many thousands of so-called tactical nuclear weapons in existence, or the weapons of any nuclear power other than those of the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

251. Moreover, unless plans to deploy missile defences are devised with the agreement of all concerned parties, the progress achieved thus far in reducing the number of nuclear weapons may be jeopardized. Confidence-building is required to reassure states that their nuclear deterrent capabilities will not be negated.

252. Above all else, we need a reaffirmation of political commitment at the highest levels to reducing the dangers that arise both from existing nuclear weapons and from further proliferation.

253. *To help focus attention on the risks we confront and on the opportunities we have to reduce them, I propose that consideration be given to convening a major international conference that would help to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.*

## **United Nations Millennium Declaration\*\***

### **II. Peace, security and disarmament**

8. We will spare no effort to free our peoples from the scourge of war, whether within or between States, which has claimed more than 5 million lives in the past decade. We will also seek to eliminate the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction.

9. We resolve therefore:

- To strengthen respect for the rule of law in international as in national affairs and, in particular, to ensure compliance by Member States with the decisions of the International Court of Justice, in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, in cases to which they are parties.
- To make the United Nations more effective in maintaining peace and security by giving it the resources and tools it needs for conflict prevention, peaceful resolution of disputes, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. In this context, we take note of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations<sup>a</sup> and request the General Assembly to consider its recommendations expeditiously.
- To strengthen cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter.
- To ensure the implementation, by States Parties, of treaties in areas such as arms control and disarmament and of international humanitarian law and human rights law, and call upon all States to consider signing and ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.<sup>b</sup>

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\*\* General Assembly resolution 55/2, sect. II.

- To take concerted action against international terrorism, and to accede as soon as possible to all the relevant international conventions.
- To redouble our efforts to implement our commitment to counter the world drug problem.
- To intensify our efforts to fight transnational crime in all its dimensions, including trafficking as well as smuggling in human beings and money laundering.
- To minimize the adverse effects of United Nations economic sanctions on innocent populations, to subject such sanctions regimes to regular reviews and to eliminate the adverse effects of sanctions on third parties.
- To strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.
- To take concerted action to end illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, especially by making arms transfers more transparent and supporting regional disarmament measures, taking account of all the recommendations of the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.
- To call on all States to consider acceding to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,<sup>c</sup> as well as the amended mines protocol to the Convention on conventional weapons.<sup>d</sup>

Notes:

<sup>a</sup> A/55/305-S/2000/809; see *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifty-fifth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 2000*, document S/2000/809.

<sup>b</sup> A/CONF.183/9.

<sup>c</sup> See CD/1478.

<sup>d</sup> Amended protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices (CCW/CONF.I/16 (part I), annex B).

## Millennium Summit Declaration\*\*\*

### II

*Pledges* to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in addressing conflict at all stages from prevention to settlement to post-conflict peace-building;

*Reaffirms* its determination to give equal priority to the maintenance of international peace and security in every region of the world and, in view of the particular needs of Africa, to give special attention to the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, and to the specific characteristics of African conflicts;

### V

*Stresses* the critical importance of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, and *emphasizes* that such programmes should normally be integrated into the mandates of peacekeeping operations;

### VI

*Calls for* effective international action to prevent the illegal flow of small arms into areas of conflict;

*Decides* to continue to take resolute action in areas where the illegal exploitation and trafficking of high-value commodities contributes to the escalation or continuation of conflict;

...

...

### VII

*Calls for* the strengthening of cooperation and communication between the United Nations and regional or subregional organizations or arrangements, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, and in particular in respect of peacekeeping operations;

*Emphasizes* the importance of continued cooperation and effective coordination between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and African subregional organizations in addressing conflict in Africa, and of enhanced support for the Organization of African Unity Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution;

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\*\*\* Security Council resolution 1318(2000) sects. II, V, VI and VII.

**Millennium Forum\*\*\*\***

**B. Peace, security, and disarmament**

...

...

Despite over 50 years of effort, no decisive progress has yet been made in eliminating nuclear weapons, which are still capable of destroying all life on this planet, and the circle of their possessors is expanding. For mainly commercial reasons, there is no adequate verification for treaties prohibiting biological weapons, while knowledge of how to produce them spreads. Rape continues to be used as a weapon of war. Space has been militarized and space weapons are being actively developed. For the moment, the problem is centred in a small group of eight States that are claiming for themselves the right to possess weapons that could destroy all of humankind.

Disarmament alone is not the way to peace; it must be accompanied by genuine human security. It is imperative that NGOs be included in the dialogue for peace. The world community—civil society, including younger and older people, and Governments—has the resources and knowledge to move from a culture of violence to a culture of peace.

...

**The Forum urges:**

***The United Nations:***

1. To carry out the objective of moving towards the abolition of war by practical means, the United Nations Secretariat and interested Governments, or a separate group of Governments, should develop a draft proposal for global disarmament to be discussed in a fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. This proposal would be aimed specifically at reducing the level of armed violence throughout the world through continuing improved conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conventional disarmament and nuclear weapons abolition, in a programme designed to be promoted by a broad coalition of civil society organizations, particularly youth organizations, as well as by interested Governments.

...

...

...

5. To ensure that no “non-discriminatory” weapons, such as landmines and sub-munitions, are used by any military force, in particular by any force or coalition acting under a United Nations mandate.

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\*\*\*\* A/54/959, sect. B.



...  
...

8. To expand the United Nations arms register in order to show the production and sale of small arms and light weapons. It should include specific names of their producers and traders.

9. To reopen the Peace Education Unit in the Department of Political Affairs, with provisions for continuous liaison with NGOs.

...  
...  
...

***Governments:***

1. To promptly carry out their obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and to ban them. For this purpose, Governments should, by the beginning of the year 2001, convene the conference to eliminate nuclear dangers, as proposed by Secretary-General Annan. Governments should immediately undertake to close laboratories that research and develop new nuclear weapons, to de-alert nuclear weapons and to withdraw nuclear weapons from foreign States.

2. Together with nearly all Governments that participated in the recent Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference, Forum participants consider that unilateral deployment of nationwide missile defence by any country could have dangerously destabilizing effects and create pressures to permanently retain high levels of nuclear weapons or even to increase existing levels. The deployment of theatre missile defences in Asia or other regions could have serious regional destabilizing effects. Such plans should be relinquished in favour of a worldwide missile launch warning system and a conference to review methods of ending production of long-range surface-to-surface missiles and long-range bombers.

3. To expand the network of nuclear free zones until they cover all areas other than territory of weapons States and to complement that network by maritime measures that close ports to naval vessels unless they certify that they are not carrying nuclear weapons. Civil society should energetically promote all these measures to control nuclear weapons.

4. To initiate a worldwide freeze on armed forces and a 25 per cent cut in production and export of major weapons and small arms, and to that end to adopt an international code of conduct on arms exports, as the beginning of worldwide build-down of conventional forces.

5. To implement the International Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention of 1997, also known as the Ottawa Treaty, to ban anti-personnel landmines.

6. To establish a commission at the United Nations to devise ways of stopping the technological development of new and more advanced weapons that create new imbalances in global power relationships. The Conference on Disarmament should also establish a working group on this subject.

7. To establish peace education, including coping with domestic conflict, covering all ages from young children to older adults, at all levels from pre-school through university and non-formal community education. Education for peace and conflict avoidance is essential for moving towards sustainable peace. Implementation of this obligation of each national Government should be assured by an appropriate treaty.

8. To increase their efforts to promote and to comply with international humanitarian laws, limiting the methods and means of war and protecting non-combatants, civilian populations and humanitarian personnel.

...

10. To immediately adopt measures to implement the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, so that children up to the age of 18 will be prohibited from participation in armed conflict.

#### ***Civil society:***

1. To give special attention and support to those disabled and injured by violent conflict, to children and the elderly, and to the reintegration into society of former combatants. Protection of war-affected children in conflict zones must become a worldwide campaign.

2. To maintain the impartiality and independence of all NGOs working for peace, security, disarmament and humanitarian issues from political, military and economic powers and institutions. At the same time, NGOs should organically link with popular movements promoting equity, justice and diversity (such as the labour movement, women's movements and civil rights movements).

3. To protect the humanitarian principles that are linked with human rights and reject all attempts to transform the field of humanitarian assistance into a new market open to private companies.

## APPENDIX IV

### Text of disarmament resolutions and decision

#### Resolution 55/27

##### **Maintenance of international security— good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on 1 August 1975,

*Recalling also* the United Nations Millennium Declaration,

*Welcoming* the democratic changes in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and their positive effects on the peace, stability and development of South-Eastern Europe,

*Recalling* its resolutions 48/84 B of 16 December 1993, 50/80 B of 12 December 1995, 51/55 of 10 December 1996, 52/48 of 9 December 1997, 53/71 of 4 December 1998 and 54/62 of 1 December 1999,

*Recalling also* the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe initiated by the European Union, adopted at Cologne, Germany, on 10 June 1999 and endorsed at the Sarajevo Summit of 30 July 1999, and stressing the crucial importance of its implementation,

*Recalling further* the Sarajevo Summit Declaration, in which the participants affirm their collective and individual readiness to give concrete meaning to the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe by promoting political and economic reforms, development and enhanced security in the region and also their commitment to make every effort to assist countries in the region in making speedy and measurable progress along this road,

*Emphasizing* the crucial importance of the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999 on Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

*Noting* the importance of the activities of the international organizations, such as the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and the contribution of the Central European Initiative and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation for the implementation of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe,

*Noting also* the importance of the Charter on Good-Neighbourly Relations, Stability, Security and Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe, signed by the States participating in the South-East European Cooperation Process at Bucharest on 12 February 2000, and the joint statement of the heads of State and Government adopted at Skopje on 25 October 2000,

*Noting further* the convening of the International Conference on War-Affected Children at Winnipeg, Canada, from 10 to 17 September 2000,

*Emphasizing* the importance of regional efforts in South-Eastern Europe on arms control, demining, disarmament and confidence-building measures, and concerned that, in spite of ongoing efforts, the illicit traffic in and circulation of small arms continue to persist,

*Mindful* of the importance of national and international activities by all relevant organizations aimed at the creation of peace, security, stability, democracy, cooperation, economic development, the observance of human rights and good-neighbourliness in South-Eastern Europe,

*Affirming* its determination that all nations should live together in peace with one another as good neighbours,

1. *Affirms* the urgency of consolidating South-Eastern Europe as a region of peace, security, stability, democracy, cooperation and economic development and for the promotion of good-neighbourliness and the observance of human rights, thus contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security and enhancing the prospects for sustained development and prosperity for all peoples in the region as an integral part of Europe;

2. *Calls upon* all participants in the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, and all concerned international organizations, to support the efforts of South-Eastern European States to overcome the negative effects of the Kosovo crisis and other recent crises so as to enable them to pursue sustainable development and their integration into the European structures, and welcomes the results of the third meeting of the Working Table on Security Issues of the Stability Pact, held at Sofia on 4 and 5 October 2000;

3. *Encourages* all States to contribute to the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) on Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and welcomes the efforts and supports the role of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and the Kosovo Force in the implementation of their mandates under that resolution;

4. *Calls upon* all States, the relevant international organizations and competent organs of the United Nations to respect the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States and the inviolability of international borders, to continue to take measures in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as appropriate, to eliminate threats to international peace and security and to help to prevent conflicts which can lead to the violent disintegration of States;

5. *Stresses* the importance of good-neighbourliness and the development of friendly relations among States, and calls upon all States to resolve their disputes with other States by peaceful means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

6. *Urges* strengthening of the relations among the States of South-Eastern Europe on the basis of respect for international law and agreements, in accordance with the principles of good-neighbourliness and mutual respect;

7. *Stresses* the importance of regional efforts aimed at preventing conflicts that endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and, in this regard, notes with satisfaction the role of the Multinational Peace Force for South-Eastern Europe;

8. *Emphasizes* the importance of regional efforts in South-Eastern Europe for arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures;

9. *Recognizes* the seriousness of the problem of anti-personnel mines in South-Eastern Europe and, in this context, welcomes the efforts of the international community in support of mine action and encourages States to join and support these efforts;

10. *Urges* all States to take effective measures against illicit traffic in and circulation of small arms and to help programmes and projects aimed at the safe destruction of surplus stocks of small arms and light weapons, and stresses the importance of closer cooperation among States, inter alia, in crime prevention, combating illicit trade of people, drug trafficking and money-laundering;

11. *Stresses* that closer engagement of the South-Eastern European States in furthering cooperation on the European continent will favourably influence the security, political and economic situation in the region, as well as good-neighbourly relations among the States;

12. *Calls upon* all States and the relevant international organizations to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on the subject of the present resolution;

13. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session an item entitled "Maintenance of international security—good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe".

**Resolution 55/28**

**Developments in the field of information and telecommunications  
in the context of international security**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 53/70 of 4 December 1998 and 54/49 of 1 December 1999,

*Recalling also* its resolutions on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, in which, inter alia, it recognized that scientific and technological developments could have both civilian and military applications and that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needed to be maintained and encouraged,

*Noting* that considerable progress has been achieved in developing and applying the latest information technologies and means of telecommunication,

*Affirming* that it sees in this process the broadest positive opportunities for the further development of civilization, the expansion of opportunities for cooperation for the common good of all States, the enhancement of the creative potential of mankind and additional improvements in the circulation of information in the global community,

*Recalling* in this connection the approaches and principles outlined at the Information Society and Development Conference, held at Midrand, South Africa, from 13 to 15 May 1996,

*Bearing in mind* the results of the Ministerial Conference on Terrorism, held in Paris on 30 July 1996, and the recommendations it made,

*Noting* that the dissemination and use of information technologies and means affect the interests of the entire international community and that optimum effectiveness is enhanced by broad international cooperation,

*Expressing concern* that these technologies and means can potentially be used for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security and may adversely affect the security of States in both civil and military fields,

*Noting* the contribution of those Member States that have submitted their assessments on issues of information security to the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of resolutions 53/70 and 54/49,

*Taking note* of the reports of the Secretary-General containing those assessments,

*Welcoming* the initiative taken by the Secretariat and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in convening an international meeting of experts at Geneva in August 1999 on developments in the field of

information and telecommunications in the context of international security, as well as its results,

*Considering* that the assessments of the Member States contained in the reports of the Secretary-General and the international meeting of experts have contributed to a better understanding of the substance of issues of international information security and related notions,

1. *Calls upon* Member States to promote further at multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of information security, as well as possible measures to limit the threats emerging in this field;

2. *Considers* that the purpose of such measures could be served through the examination of relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunications systems;

3. *Invites* all Member States to continue to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on the following questions:

(a) General appreciation of the issues of information security;

(b) Definition of basic notions related to information security, including unauthorized interference with or misuse of information and telecommunications systems and information resources;

(c) The content of the concepts mentioned in paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report based on replies received from Member States to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security".

### **Resolution 55/29**

#### **Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recognizing* that scientific and technological developments can have both civilian and military applications and that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needs to be maintained and encouraged,

*Concerned* that military applications of scientific and technological developments can contribute significantly to the improvement and upgrading of advanced weapon systems and, in particular, weapons of mass destruction,

*Aware* of the need to follow closely the scientific and technological developments that may have a negative impact on international security and disarmament, and to channel scientific and technological developments for beneficial purposes,

*Cognizant* that the international transfers of dual-use as well as high-technology products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes are important for the economic and social development of States,

*Also cognizant* of the need to regulate such transfers of dual-use goods and technologies and high technology with military applications through multilaterally negotiated, universally applicable, non-discriminatory guidelines,

*Expressing concern* about the growing proliferation of ad hoc and exclusive export control regimes and arrangements for dual-use goods and technologies, which tend to impede the economic and social development of developing countries,

*Recalling* that in the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, it was noted with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes persist,

*Emphasizing* that internationally negotiated guidelines for the transfer of high technology with military applications should take into account the legitimate defence requirements of all States and the requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, while ensuring that access to high-technology products and services and know-how for peaceful purposes is not denied,

1. *Affirms* that scientific and technological progress should be used for the benefit of all mankind to promote the sustainable economic and social development of all States and to safeguard international security and that international cooperation in the use of science and technology through the transfer and exchange of technological know-how for peaceful purposes should be promoted;

2. *Invites* Member States to undertake additional efforts to apply science and technology for disarmament-related purposes and to make disarmament-related technologies available to interested States;

3. *Urges* Member States to undertake multilateral negotiations with the participation of all interested States in order to establish universally acceptable, non-discriminatory guidelines for international transfers of dual-use goods and technologies and high technology with military applications;



4. *Encourages* United Nations bodies to contribute, within existing mandates, to promoting the application of science and technology for peaceful purposes;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament".

### **Resolution 55/30**

#### **Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 A and B of 9 December 1981, 37/75 of 9 December 1982, 38/64 of 15 December 1983, 39/54 of 12 December 1984, 40/82 of 12 December 1985, 41/48 of 3 December 1986, 42/28 of 30 November 1987, 43/65 of 7 December 1988, 44/108 of 15 December 1989, 45/52 of 4 December 1990, 46/30 of 6 December 1991, 47/48 of 9 December 1992, 48/71 of 16 December 1993, 49/71 of 15 December 1994, 50/66 of 12 December 1995, 51/41 of 10 December 1996, 52/34 of 9 December 1997, 53/74 of 4 December 1998 and 54/51 of 1 December 1999 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

*Recalling also* the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, and in particular paragraph 63 (d), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

*Emphasizing* the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and to deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate,

*Reaffirming* the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

*Emphasizing* the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

*Bearing in mind* the consensus reached by the General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

*Desirous* of building on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

*Welcoming* all initiatives leading to general and complete disarmament, including in the region of the Middle East, and in particular on the establishment therein of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons,

*Noting* the peace negotiations in the Middle East, which should be of a comprehensive nature and represent an appropriate framework for the peaceful settlement of contentious issues in the region,

*Recognizing* the importance of credible regional security, including the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone,

*Emphasizing* the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone,

*Having examined* the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 54/51,

1. *Urges* all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Calls upon* all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. *Takes note* of resolution GC(44)/RES/28, adopted on 22 September 2000 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its forty-fourth regular session, concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East;

4. *Notes* the importance of the ongoing bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the activities of the multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

5. *Invites* all countries of the region, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;

6. *Also invites* those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

7. *Invites* the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the present resolution;

8. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General;

9. *Invites* all parties to consider the appropriate means that may contribute towards the goal of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region of the Middle East;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to pursue consultations with the States of the region and other concerned States, in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 46/30 and taking into account the evolving situation in the region, and to seek from those States their views on the measures outlined in chapters III and IV of the study annexed to his report or other relevant measures, in order to move towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;

11. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

12. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

### **Resolution 55/31**

#### **Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons**

*The General Assembly,*

*Bearing in mind* the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

*Convinced* that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

*Welcoming* the progress achieved in recent years in both nuclear and conventional disarmament,

*Noting* that, despite recent progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, further efforts are necessary towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

*Convinced* that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

*Determined* to abide strictly by the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations on the non-use of force or threat of force,

*Recognizing* that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

*Considering* that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures and arrangements to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

*Recognizing* that effective measures and arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can contribute positively to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

*Bearing in mind* paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document,

*Recalling* the relevant parts of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, and of the special report of the Conference on Disarmament submitted to the Assembly at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament, as well as the report of the Conference on its 1992 session,

*Recalling also* paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, inter alia, that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

*Noting* the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International

Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, with a view to reaching agreement on this question,

*Taking note* of the proposals submitted under the item in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

*Taking note also* of the relevant decision of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, as well as the relevant recommendations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference,

*Taking note further* of the unilateral declarations made by all the nuclear-weapon States on their policies of non-use or non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States,

*Noting* the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

*Taking note* of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 and the views expressed on it,

*Recalling* its relevant resolutions adopted in previous years, in particular resolutions 45/54 of 4 December 1990, 46/32 of 6 December 1991, 47/50 of 9 December 1992, 48/73 of 16 December 1993, 49/73 of 15 December 1994, 50/68 of 12 December 1995, 51/43 of 10 December 1996, 52/36 of 9 December 1997, 53/75 of 4 December 1998 and 54/52 of 1 December 1999,

1. *Reaffirms* the urgent need to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that in the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties with regard to evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;

3. *Appeals* to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work actively towards an early agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;

4. *Recommends* that further intensive efforts be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including, in particular, those considered in the

Conference on Disarmament, be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;

5. *Recommends also* that the Conference on Disarmament actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

### **Resolution 55/32**

#### **Prevention of an arms race in outer space**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recognizing* the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

*Reaffirming* the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development,

*Reaffirming also* the provisions of articles III and IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,

*Recalling* the obligation of all States to observe the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the use or threat of use of force in their international relations, including in their space activities,

*Reaffirming* paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, in which it is stated that in order to prevent an arms race in outer space further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

*Recalling* its previous resolutions on this issue, and taking note of the proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its regular sessions, and of the recommendations made to the competent organs of the United Nations and to the Conference on Disarmament,

*Recognizing* that prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger for international peace and security,

## *Text of resolutions and decision*

*Emphasizing* the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space,

*Considering* that wide participation in the legal regime applicable to outer space could contribute to enhancing its effectiveness,

*Noting* that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, taking into account its previous efforts since its establishment in 1985 and seeking to enhance its functioning in qualitative terms, continued the examination and identification of various issues, existing agreements and existing proposals, as well as future initiatives relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and that this contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions,

*Noting also* that there were no objections in principle in the Conference on Disarmament to the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, subject to re-examination of the mandate contained in the decision of the Conference on Disarmament of 13 February 1992,

*Emphasizing* the mutually complementary nature of bilateral and multilateral efforts in the field of preventing an arms race in outer space, and hoping that concrete results will emerge from those efforts as soon as possible,

*Convinced* that further measures should be examined in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, including the weaponization of outer space,

*Stressing* that the growing use of outer space increases the need for greater transparency and better information on the part of the international community,

*Recalling* in this context its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 45/55 B of 4 December 1990, 47/51 of 9 December 1992 and 48/74 A of 16 December 1993, in which, inter alia, it reaffirmed the importance of confidence-building measures as means conducive to ensuring the attainment of the objective of the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

*Conscious* of the benefits of confidence- and security-building measures in the military field,

*Recognizing* that negotiations for the conclusion of an international agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space remain a priority task of the Ad Hoc Committee and that the concrete proposals on confidence-building measures could form an integral part of such agreements,

1. *Reaffirms* the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and the readiness of all States to contribute to that common objective, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies;

2. *Reaffirms its recognition*, as stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, that the legal regime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, that this legal regime plays a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in that environment, that there is a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and enhance its effectiveness, and that it is important to comply strictly with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral;

3. *Emphasizes* the necessity of further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space;

4. *Calls upon* all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and to refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to the relevant existing treaties in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation;

5. *Reiterates* that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

6. *Invites* the Conference on Disarmament to complete the examination and updating of the mandate contained in its decision of 13 February 1992, and to establish an ad hoc committee as early as possible during the 2001 session of the Conference;

7. *Recognizes*, in this respect, the growing convergence of views on the elaboration of measures designed to strengthen transparency, confidence and security in the peaceful uses of outer space;

8. *Urges* States conducting activities in outer space, as well as States interested in conducting such activities, to keep the Conference on Disarmament informed of the progress of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the matter, if any, so as to facilitate its work;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".



**Resolution 55/33 A**

**Missiles**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 54/54 F of 1 December 1999,

*Reaffirming* the role of the United Nations in the field of arms regulation and disarmament and the commitment of Member States to take concrete steps to strengthen that role,

*Realizing* the need to promote regional and international peace and security in a world free from the scourge of war and the burden of armaments,

*Convinced* of the need for a comprehensive approach towards missiles, in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner, as a contribution to international peace and security,

*Bearing in mind* that the security concerns of Member States at the international and regional levels should be taken into consideration in addressing the issue of missiles,

*Underlining* the complexities involved in considering the issue of missiles in the conventional context,

*Expressing* its support for the international efforts against the development and proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction,

1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Secretary-General, submitted pursuant to resolution 54/54 F,

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General further to seek the views of Member States on the issue of missiles in all its aspects and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session;

3. *Also requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts to be established in 2001 on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, to prepare a report for the consideration of the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session on the issue of missiles in all its aspects;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Missiles".

**Resolution 55/33 B**

**Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty  
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 50/60 of 12 December 1995 and 52/30 of 9 December 1997 on compliance with arms limitation and disarmament and

non-proliferation agreements and its resolution 54/54 A of 1 December 1999 on preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,

*Recognizing* the historical role of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 26 May 1972 between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a cornerstone for maintaining global peace and security and strategic stability, and reaffirming its continued validity and relevance, especially in the current international situation,

*Stressing* the paramount importance of full and strict compliance with the Treaty by the parties,

*Recalling* that the provisions of the Treaty are intended as a contribution to the creation of more favourable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

*Mindful* of the obligations of the parties to the Treaty under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Concerned* that the implementation of any measures undermining the purposes and provisions of the Treaty affects not only the security interests of the parties, but also those of the whole international community,

*Recalling* the widespread concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,

1. *Calls* for continued efforts to strengthen the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and to preserve its integrity and validity so that it remains a cornerstone in maintaining global strategic stability and world peace and in promoting further strategic nuclear arms reductions;

2. *Calls also* for renewed efforts by each of the States parties to preserve and strengthen the Treaty through full and strict compliance;

3. *Calls upon* the parties to the Treaty, in accordance with their obligations under the Treaty, to limit the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, to refrain from the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems for the defence of the territory of their country, not to provide a base for such a defence and not to transfer to other States or deploy outside their national territory anti-ballistic missile systems or their components limited by the Treaty;

4. *Considers* that the implementation of any measure undermining the purposes and the provisions of the Treaty also undermines global strategic stability and world peace and the promotion of further strategic nuclear arms reductions;

5. *Urges* all Member States to support efforts aimed at stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;

6. *Supports* further efforts by the international community, in the light of emerging developments, towards safeguarding the inviolability and integrity of the Treaty, which is in the strongest interest of the international community;

7. *Welcomes* the decision taken by the United States of America on 1 September 2000 not to authorize deployment of a national missile defence at this time, and considers that it constitutes a positive step for the preservation of strategic stability and security;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems".

### **Resolution 55/33 C**

#### **Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda**

*The General Assembly,*

*Noting* its resolutions 53/77 Y of 4 December 1998 and 54/54 G of 1 December 1999,

*Expressing* its deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used,

*Noting* the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996,

*Noting also* that three States continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and concerned at the continued retention of the nuclear-weapons option by those three States,

*Declaring* that nuclear test explosions carried out in 1998 by two of the States that have not renounced the nuclear-weapons option do not in any way confer a nuclear-weapon State status or any special status whatsoever,

*Noting* that, despite achievements in bilateral and unilateral arms reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still amount to many thousands,

*Welcoming* the significant progress achieved in nuclear weapon reductions made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, as a step towards nuclear disarmament,

*Welcoming also* the ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) by the Russian Federation as an important step in the efforts to reduce strategic offensive weapons, and noting that completion of ratification of START II by the United States of America remains a priority,

*Concerned* that negotiations on nuclear arms reductions are not actively under way,

*Welcoming* the significant unilateral reduction measures taken by other nuclear-weapon States, including the closing down and dismantling of nuclear-weapon-related facilities,

*Welcoming also* the efforts of several States to cooperate in making nuclear disarmament measures irreversible, in particular through the adoption of initiatives on the verification, management and disposition of fissile material declared excess to military purposes,

*Noting* the declaration by the nuclear-weapon States that none of their nuclear weapons are targeted at any State,

*Underlining* the necessity of strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Noting* the United Nations Millennium Declaration, in which the heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,

*Welcoming* the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Taking into consideration* the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Treaty are committed under article VI of the Treaty,

*Underlining* the need for action to achieve a world free from nuclear weapons,

*Determined* to pursue practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty,

1. *Agrees* on the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

2. *Calls* for the upholding of a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of the above-mentioned Treaty;

3. *Agrees* on the necessity for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, and urges the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty, with a view to their conclusion within five years;

4. *Agrees also* on the necessity of establishing within the context of the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament, and urges the Conference to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body;

5. *Calls* for the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures;

6. *Calls also* for the early entry into force and full implementation of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible, while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with the provisions of that Treaty;

7. *Calls further* for the completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency;

8. *Calls* for steps to be taken by all nuclear-weapon States that would lead to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability and, based upon the principle of undiminished security for all, for:

(a) Further efforts to be made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

(b) Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities, and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress in nuclear disarmament;

(c) The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

(d) Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

(e) A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies so as to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

(f) The engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons;

9. *Calls also* for arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, the fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under International Atomic Energy Agency or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes;

10. *Reaffirms* that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

11. *Calls* for regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraph 4 (c) of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, and, in this regard, recalls the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996;

12. *Agrees* to pursue the further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world;

13. *Calls upon* all States not yet party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without condition, in particular those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and also calls upon those States to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols, consistent with the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 15 May 1997, for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, and to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the

international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation;

14. *Calls upon* those States that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol;

15. *Notes* the paramount importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material, and calls upon all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials;

16. *Notes also* that the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and that it called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations on this issue to the 2005 Review Conference;

17. *Reaffirms* the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament, and supports proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not yet exist, such as in the Middle East and South Asia;

18. *Affirms* that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments;

19. *Acknowledges* the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General Assembly resolution 54/54 G, and requests him, within existing resources, to prepare a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

20. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda", and to review the implementation of the present resolution at that session.

#### **Resolution 55/33 D**

#### **2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of the 1995 Review

and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, in which it was agreed that Review Conferences should continue to be held every five years and that, accordingly, the next Review Conference should be held in the year 2000,

*Recalling also* its resolutions 50/70 Q of 12 December 1995 and 51/45 A of 10 December 1996,

*Recalling further* that the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons met in New York from 24 April to 19 May 2000 to review the operation of the Treaty, as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference,

*Welcomes* the adoption by consensus on 19 May 2000 of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including in particular the documents entitled "Review of the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference" and "Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty".

### **Resolution 55/33 E**

#### **United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education**

*The General Assembly,*

*Desirous* of stressing the urgency of promoting concerted international efforts at disarmament and non-proliferation, especially in the field of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, with a view to strengthening international security and enhancing sustainable economic and social development,

*Conscious* of the need, more than a decade after the end of the cold war and at the start of the twenty-first century, to combat the negative effects of cultures of violence and complacency in the face of current dangers in this field through long-term programmes of education and training,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, a study on disarmament and non-proliferation, that would have the following aims:

(a) To define contemporary disarmament and non-proliferation education and training, taking into account the need to promote a culture of non-violence and peace;

(b) To assess the current situation of disarmament and non-proliferation education and training at the primary, secondary, university and postgraduate levels of education, in all regions of the world;



(c) To recommend ways to promote education and training in disarmament and non-proliferation at all levels of formal and informal education, in particular the training of educators, parliamentarians, municipal leaders, military officers and government officials;

(d) To examine ways to utilize more fully evolving pedagogic methods, particularly the revolution in information and communications technology, including distance learning, to enhance efforts in disarmament education and training at all levels, in the developed and the developing world;

(e) To recommend ways in which organizations of the United Nations system with special competence in disarmament or education or both can harmonize and coordinate their efforts in disarmament and non-proliferation education;

(f) To devise ways to introduce disarmament and non-proliferation education into post-conflict situations as a contribution to peace-building; and considers that the group of experts should invite representatives of organizations of the United Nations system with special competence in disarmament or education or both to participate in its work, and should also invite university educators, disarmament and peace-related institutes and non-governmental organizations that have special qualifications in education and training or in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation to make written and oral presentations to it;

2. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session on this question.

### **Resolution 55/33 F**

#### **Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them**

*The General Assembly,*

*Considering* that the proliferation, illicit circulation of and traffic in small arms constitute an impediment to development, and a threat to populations and to national and regional security and are a factor contributing to the destabilization of States,

*Gravely concerned* at the extent of the proliferation, illicit circulation of and traffic in small arms in the States of the Saharo-Sahelian subregion,

*Welcoming* the conclusions of the United Nations advisory missions sent to the affected countries of the subregion by the Secretary-General to study the best way of curbing the illicit circulation of small arms and collecting them,

*Welcoming also* the designation of the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat as the coordination centre for all United Nations activities concerning small arms,

*Thanking* the Secretary-General for his report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, and bearing in mind the statement on small arms made by the President of the Security Council on 24 September 1999,

*Welcoming* the recommendations made at the meetings of the States of the subregion held at Banjul, Algiers, Bamako, Yamoussoukro and Niamey to establish close regional cooperation with a view to strengthening security,

*Welcoming also* the initiative taken by the Economic Community of West African States concerning the declaration of a moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in West Africa,

*Recalling* the Algiers Declaration adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its thirty-fifth ordinary session, held at Algiers from 12 to 14 July 1999, and bearing in mind the report of the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity on the proliferation, illicit circulation of and traffic in small arms,

*Emphasizing* the need to advance efforts towards wider cooperation and better coordination in the struggle against the stockpiling, proliferation and widespread use of small arms, inter alia, through the common understanding reached at the meeting on small arms held at Oslo on 13 and 14 July 1998 and the Brussels Call for Action adopted by the International Conference on Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable Development, held at Brussels on 12 and 13 October 1998, as adopted in document A/53/681, paragraph 4,

1. *Welcomes with satisfaction* the Declaration of the Ministerial Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, held at Abuja on 8 and 9 May 2000, encourages the Secretary-General to continue his efforts, in the context of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 49/75 G of 15 December 1994 and of the recommendations of the United Nations advisory missions, to curb the illicit circulation of small arms and to collect such arms in the affected States that so request, with the support of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity;

2. *Encourages* the setting up in the countries in the Saharo-Saharan subregion of national commissions against the proliferation of small arms, and invites the international community to support as far as possible the smooth functioning of the national commissions where they have been set up;

3. *Welcomes* the Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa, adopted by the heads of State and Government of the Economic

Community of West African States at Abuja on 31 October 1998, and urges the international community to give its support to the implementation of the moratorium;

4. *Recommends* the involvement of organizations and associations of civil society in efforts to combat the illicit circulation of small arms in the context of the national commissions and their participation in the implementation of the moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of small arms;

5. *Takes note* of the conclusions of the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Economic Community of West African States, held at Bamako on 24 and 25 March 1999, on the modalities for the implementation of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development, and welcomes the adoption by the meeting of a plan of action;

6. *Expresses its full support* for the appeal launched by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its thirty-fifth ordinary session for a coordinated African approach, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity, to the problems posed by the proliferation, illicit circulation of and traffic in small arms, bearing in mind the experiences and activities of the various regions in this regard;

7. *Encourages* cooperation among State bodies, international organizations and civil society in combating the illicit circulation of small arms and supporting operations at the subregional level;

8. *Expresses its full support* for the convening of a United Nations conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects in June/July 2001, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 54/54 V of 15 December 1999;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to examine the question and to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

10. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them".

### **Resolution 55/33 G**

#### **Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 51/45 N of 10 December 1996, 52/38 G of 9 December 1997, 53/77 M of 4 December 1998 and 54/54 H of 1 December 1999,

*Convinced* that a comprehensive and integrated approach towards certain practical disarmament measures, such as arms control, particularly with regard to small arms and light weapons, confidence-building measures, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, demining and conversion, often is a prerequisite to maintaining and consolidating peace and security and thus provides a basis for effective rehabilitation and social and economic development in areas that have suffered from conflict,

*Noting with satisfaction* that the international community is more than ever aware of the importance of such practical disarmament measures, especially with regard to the growing problems arising from the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and proliferation of small arms and light weapons, which pose a threat to peace and security and reduce the prospects for economic development in many regions, particularly in post-conflict situations,

*Stressing* that further efforts are needed in order to develop and effectively implement programmes of practical disarmament in affected areas,

*Taking note* of the report of the Secretary-General prepared with the assistance of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, and in particular the recommendations contained therein, as an important contribution to the consolidation of the peace process through practical disarmament measures,

*Taking into account* the deliberations at the 2000 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission in Working Group II on agenda item 5, entitled "Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms", and encouraging the Disarmament Commission to continue its efforts aimed at the identification of such measures,

1. *Stresses*, in the context of the present resolution, the particular relevance of the "Guidelines on conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament, with particular emphasis on consolidation of peace in the context of General Assembly resolution 51/45 N", adopted by the Disarmament Commission by consensus at its 1999 substantive session;

2. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures, submitted pursuant to resolution 51/45 N, and once again encourages Member States, as well as regional arrangements and agencies, to lend their support to the implementation of the recommendations contained therein;

3. *Welcomes* the activities undertaken by the group of interested States that was formed in New York in March 1998, and invites the group to continue to analyse lessons learned from previous disarmament and peace-building projects, as well as to promote new practical disarmament measures to

consolidate peace, especially as undertaken or designed by affected States themselves;

4. *Encourages* Member States, including the group of interested States, to lend their support to the Secretary-General in responding to requests by Member States to collect and destroy small arms and light weapons in post-conflict situations;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures".

### **Resolution 55/33 H**

#### **Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its previous resolutions on the subject of chemical weapons, in particular resolution 54/54 E of 1 December 1999, adopted without a vote, in which it noted with appreciation the ongoing work to achieve the objective and purpose of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,

*Determined* to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction,

*Noting with satisfaction* that since the adoption of resolution 54/54 E, fourteen additional States have ratified or acceded to the Convention, bringing the total number of States parties to the Convention to one hundred and forty,

1. *Emphasizes* the necessity of universal adherence to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the Convention without delay;

2. *Notes with appreciation* the ongoing work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to achieve the objective and purpose of the Convention, to ensure the full implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States parties;

3. *Stresses* the importance of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in verifying compliance with the provisions of the Convention as well as in promoting the timely and efficient accomplishment of all its objectives;

4. *Also stresses* the vital importance of full and effective implementation of and compliance with all provisions of the Convention;

5. *Urges* all States parties to the Convention to meet in full and on time their obligations under the Convention and to support the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in its implementation activities;

6. *Stresses* the importance to the Convention that all possessors of chemical weapons, chemical weapons production facilities or chemical weapons development facilities, including previously declared possessor States, should be among the States parties to the Convention, and welcomes progress to that end;

7. *Welcomes* the cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the signature of the Relationship Agreement between the United Nations and the Organization, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction".

### **Resolution 55/33 I**

#### **Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 51/45 B of 10 December 1996, 52/38 N of 9 December 1997, 53/77 Q of 4 December 1998 and 54/54 L of 1 December 1999,

*Welcoming* the adoption by the Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session of a text entitled "Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned",

*Determined* to pursue the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

*Determined also* to continue to contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and to the process of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, in particular in the field of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, with a view to strengthening international peace and security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

*Recalling* the provisions on nuclear-weapon-free zones of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

*Stressing* the importance of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as the Antarctic Treaty, to, inter alia, achieve a world entirely free of nuclear weapons,

*Underlining* the value of enhancing cooperation among the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty members by means of mechanisms such as joint meetings of States parties, signatories and observers to those treaties,

*Recalling* the applicable principles and rules of international law relating to the freedom of the high seas and the rights of passage through maritime space, including those of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,

1. *Welcomes* the continued contribution that the Antarctic and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are making towards freeing the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons;

2. *Calls* for the ratification of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba by all States of the region concerned, and calls upon all concerned States to continue to work together in order to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties by all relevant States that have not yet done so;

3. *Welcomes* the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and calls upon all States to consider all relevant proposals, including those reflected in its resolutions on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia;

4. *Convinced* of the important role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and in extending the areas of the world that are nuclear-weapon-free, and, with particular reference to the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States, calls upon all States to support the process of nuclear disarmament and to work for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons;

5. *Calls upon* the States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, in order to pursue the common goals envisaged in those treaties and to promote the nuclear-weapon-free status of the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, to explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation among themselves and their treaty agencies;

6. *Welcomes* the vigorous efforts being made among States parties and signatories to those treaties to promote their common objectives, and considers that an international conference of States parties and signatories

to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties might be held to support the common goals envisaged in those treaties;

7. *Encourages* the competent authorities of the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties to provide assistance to the States parties and signatories to such treaties so as to facilitate the accomplishment of these goals;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas".

### **Resolution 55/33 J**

#### **Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its previous resolutions on the subject, in particular resolution 53/77 L of 4 December 1998,

*Determined* to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

*Recalling* the long-standing determination of the international community to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons as well as the continuing support for measures to uphold the authority of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, as expressed by consensus in many previous resolutions,

*Welcoming* the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

*Welcoming also* the initiatives by some States parties to withdraw their reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol,

1. *Renews its previous call* to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and reaffirms the vital necessity of upholding its provisions;

2. *Notes with appreciation* the recent withdrawal of reservations by two State parties to the Geneva Protocol;

3. *Calls upon* those States that continue to maintain reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to withdraw those reservations;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session a report on the implementation of the present resolution.



**Resolution 55/33 K**

**Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 50/70 M of 12 December 1995, 51/45 E of 10 December 1996, 52/38 E of 9 December 1997, 53/77 J of 4 December 1998 and 54/54 S of 1 December 1999,

*Emphasizing* the importance of the observance of environmental norms in the preparation and implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements,

*Recognizing* that it is necessary to take duly into account the agreements adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, as well as prior relevant agreements, in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms limitation,

*Mindful* of the detrimental environmental effects of the use of nuclear weapons,

1. *Reaffirms* that international disarmament forums should take fully into account the relevant environmental norms in negotiating treaties and agreements on disarmament and arms limitation and that all States, through their actions, should fully contribute to ensuring compliance with the aforementioned norms in the implementation of treaties and conventions to which they are parties;

2. *Calls upon* States to adopt unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures so as to contribute to ensuring the application of scientific and technological progress in the framework of international security, disarmament and other related spheres, without detriment to the environment or to its effective contribution to attaining sustainable development;

3. *Welcomes* the information provided by Member States on the implementation of the measures they have adopted to promote the objectives envisaged in the present resolution;

4. *Invites* all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General information on the measures they have adopted to promote the objectives envisaged in the present resolution, and requests the Secretary-General to submit a report containing this information to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control".

**Resolution 55/33 L**

**Relationship between disarmament and development**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly concerning the relationship between disarmament and development,

*Recalling also* the adoption on 11 September 1987 of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development,

*Recalling further* its resolutions 49/75 J of 15 December 1994, 50/70 G of 12 December 1995, 51/45 D of 10 December 1996, 52/38 D of 9 December 1997, 53/77 K of 4 December 1998 and 54/54 T of 1 December 1999,

*Bearing in mind* the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, and the final document of the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cartagena, Colombia, on 8 and 9 April 2000,

*Welcoming* the different activities organized by the high-level Steering Group on Disarmament and Development, as contained in the report of the Secretary-General,

*Stressing* the growing importance of the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development in current international relations,

1. *Calls upon* the high-level Steering Group on Disarmament and Development to strengthen and enhance its programme of activities, in accordance with the mandate set out in the action programme adopted at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development;

2. *Urges* the international community to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development, with a view to reducing the ever-widening gap between developed and developing countries;

3. *Invites* all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General, by 15 April 2001, their views and proposals for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, as well as any other views and proposals with a view to achieving the goals of the action programme, within the framework of current international relations;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take action, through appropriate organs and within available resources, for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the International Conference;

5. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development".

### **Resolution 55/33 M**

#### **Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 49/75 I of 15 December 1994, 50/70 F of 12 December 1995, 51/45 C of 10 December 1996, 52/38 F of 9 December 1997, 53/77 AA of 4 December 1998 and 54/54 U of 1 December 1999,

*Recalling also* that, there being a consensus to do so in each case, three special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were held in 1978, 1982 and 1988, respectively,

*Bearing in mind* the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, adopted by consensus at the first special session devoted to disarmament, which included the Declaration, the Programme of Action and the Machinery for disarmament,

*Bearing in mind also* the objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

*Taking note* of paragraph 145 of the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, which supported the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which would offer an opportunity to review, from a perspective more in tune with the current international situation, the most critical aspects of the process of disarmament and to mobilize the international community and public opinion in favour of the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and of the control and reduction of conventional weapons,

*Taking note also* of the report of the 1999 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission and of the fact that no consensus was reached on the item entitled "Fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament",

*Desiring* to build upon the substantive exchange of views on the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament during the 1999 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission,

*Reiterating its conviction* that a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament can set the future course of action in the field of disarmament, arms control and related international security matters,

*Emphasizing* the importance of multilateralism in the process of disarmament, arms control and related international security matters,

*Noting* that, with the recent accomplishments made by the international community in the field of weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional arms, the following years would be opportune for the international community to start the process of reviewing the state of affairs in the entire field of disarmament and arms control in the post-cold-war era,

*Taking note* of the report of the Secretary-General regarding the views of States Members of the United Nations on the objectives, agenda and timing of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament,

1. *Decides*, subject to the emergence of a consensus on its objectives and agenda, to convene the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to seek the views of States Members of the United Nations on the objectives, agenda and timing of the special session and to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament".

### **Resolution 55/33 N**

#### **Reducing nuclear danger**

*The General Assembly,*

*Bearing in mind* that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

*Reaffirming* that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would constitute a violation of the Charter of the United Nations,

*Convinced* that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

*Convinced also* that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

*Considering* that, until nuclear weapons cease to exist, it is imperative on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to adopt measures that assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

*Considering also* that the hair-trigger alert of nuclear weapons carries unacceptable risks of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons, which would have catastrophic consequences for all mankind,

*Emphasizing* the imperative need to adopt measures to avoid accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incidents arising from computer anomaly or other technical malfunctions,

*Conscious* that limited steps relating to detargeting have been taken by the nuclear-weapon States and that further practical, realistic and mutually reinforcing steps are necessary to contribute to the improvement in the international climate for negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons,

*Mindful* that reduction of tensions brought about by a change in nuclear doctrines would positively impact on international peace and security and improve the conditions for the further reduction and the elimination of nuclear weapons,

*Reiterating* the highest priority accorded to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and by the international community,

*Recalling* that in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons it is stated that there exists an obligation for all States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

*Welcoming* the call in the United Nations Millennium Declaration to seek to eliminate the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction and the resolve to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers,

1. *Calls* for a review of nuclear doctrines and, in this context, immediate and urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Requests* the five nuclear-weapon States to take measures towards the implementation of paragraph 1 of the present resolution;

3. *Calls upon* Member States to take the necessary measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and to promote nuclear disarmament, with the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons;

4. *Takes note* of the report prepared by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and submitted by the Secretary-General in pursuance of paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 54/54 K of 1 December 1999, including the need for the Board to continue its discussions on the subject;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, within existing resources, to continue to seek inputs from the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters on information with regard to specific measures that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war, including the proposal contained in the United Nations Millennium Declaration for convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of the fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Reducing nuclear danger".

### **Resolution 55/33 O**

#### **Regional disarmament**

##### *The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 45/58 P of 4 December 1990, 46/36 I of 6 December 1991, 47/52 J of 9 December 1992, 48/75 I of 16 December 1993, 49/75 N of 15 December 1994, 50/70 K of 12 December 1995, 51/45 K of 10 December 1996, 52/38 P of 9 December 1997, 53/77 O of 4 December 1998 and 54/54 N of 1 December 1999 on regional disarmament,

*Believing* that the efforts of the international community to move towards the ideal of general and complete disarmament are guided by the inherent human desire for genuine peace and security, the elimination of the danger of war and the release of economic, intellectual and other resources for peaceful pursuits,

*Affirming* the abiding commitment of all States to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations in the conduct of their international relations,

*Noting* that essential guidelines for progress towards general and complete disarmament were adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly,

*Taking note* of the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1993 substantive session,

*Welcoming* the prospects of genuine progress in the field of disarmament engendered in recent years as a result of negotiations between the two super-Powers,

*Taking note* of the recent proposals for disarmament at the regional and subregional levels,

*Recognizing* the importance of confidence-building measures for regional and international peace and security,

*Convinced* that endeavours by countries to promote regional disarmament, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region and in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments, would enhance the security of all States and would thus contribute to international peace and security by reducing the risk of regional conflicts,

1. *Stresses* that sustained efforts are needed, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and under the umbrella of the United Nations, to make progress on the entire range of disarmament issues;

2. *Affirms* that global and regional approaches to disarmament complement each other and should therefore be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security;

3. *Calls upon* States to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels;

4. *Welcomes* the initiatives towards disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and security undertaken by some countries at the regional and subregional levels;

5. *Supports and encourages* efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at the regional and subregional levels in order to ease regional tensions and to further disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation measures at the regional and subregional levels;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Regional disarmament".

### **Resolution 55/33 P**

#### **Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 48/75 J of 16 December 1993, 49/75 O of 15 December 1994, 50/70 L of 12 December 1995, 51/45 Q of 10 December 1996, 52/38 Q of 9 December 1997, 53/77 P of 4 December 1998 and 54/54 M of 1 December 1999,

*Recognizing* the crucial role of conventional arms control in promoting regional and international peace and security,

*Convinced* that conventional arms control needs to be pursued primarily in the regional and subregional contexts since most threats to peace and

security in the post-cold-war era arise mainly among States located in the same region or subregion,

*Aware* that the preservation of a balance in the defence capabilities of States at the lowest level of armaments would contribute to peace and stability and should be a prime objective of conventional arms control,

*Desirous* of promoting agreements to strengthen regional peace and security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces,

*Noting with particular interest* the initiatives taken in this regard in different regions of the world, in particular the commencement of consultations among a number of Latin American countries and the proposals for conventional arms control made in the context of South Asia, and recognizing, in the context of this subject, the relevance and value of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which is a cornerstone of European security,

*Believing* that militarily significant States and States with larger military capabilities have a special responsibility in promoting such agreements for regional security,

*Believing also* that an important objective of conventional arms control in regions of tension should be to prevent the possibility of military attack launched by surprise and to avoid aggression,

1. *Decides* to give urgent consideration to the issues involved in conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament, as a first step, to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control, and looks forward to a report of the Conference on this subject;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels".

### **Resolution 55/33 Q**

#### **Illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 54/54 R of 1 December 1999,

*Expressing its appreciation* to the Secretary-General for his report,

*Recognizing* the human suffering caused by illicit trafficking in small arms and that Governments bear the responsibility of intensifying their efforts by developing an understanding of the issues and practical ways of addressing the problem,



*Bearing in mind* the interface among violence, criminality, drug trafficking, the illicit trade in diamonds, terrorism and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons,

*Stressing* the importance of the efforts to elaborate an international convention against transnational organized crime, including a protocol to combat the illicit manufacturing of and illicit trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, within the framework of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,

*Convinced* of the importance of national, regional and international measures to combat illicit trafficking in and illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons, including those suited to indigenous regional approaches,

*Welcoming*, in this regard, the decision by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, to convene an African ministerial conference on the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons at Bamako in November 2000, the establishment of the Consultative Committee by the States parties to the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials, the decision by the Council of Ministers of the Southern African Development Community to conclude its negotiations on a protocol on the control of firearms, ammunition and other related materials in the region of the Southern African Development Community, the decision by the States members of the Economic Community of West African States to implement their Declaration of a Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa, and the adoption by the European Union of the Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms and the other initiatives it has taken, such as the Joint Action on Small Arms that has been endorsed by several Member States not members of the European Union,

*Noting*, in this regard, the commitments made by the Foreign Ministers of the Group of Eight industrialized countries, contained in the Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention, the Foreign Ministers of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the members of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe in the Joint Declaration on Responsible Arms Transfers, the members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe at the Istanbul Summit, the members of the South Pacific Forum in the Nadi Framework of principles, and by participants in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa Conference on the Proliferation of Small Arms in the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa,

*Noting also* that several regional and subregional workshops, seminars and conferences were held and that individual States have undertaken

initiatives to promote measures to combat illicit trafficking in and illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons,

*Welcoming* the assistance provided by States in support of bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives aimed at addressing illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons and, in this regard, welcoming also the establishment of the United Nations Development Programme Trust Fund for Support to Prevention and Reduction of the Proliferation of Small Arms, the United Nations Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament Measures and the United Nations Global and Regional Disarmament Trust Fund,

*Welcoming also* the preparatory process for the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, bearing in mind the recommendations made by the Secretary-General in his report on small arms, prepared with the assistance of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, as well as the views of Member States on the objectives, scope, agenda, dates and venue of the Conference,

*Recalling* the presidential statement issued by the Security Council on 24 September 1999 and the request of the Council therein to the Secretary-General to develop, with the assistance of technical experts and the support of Member States, a reference manual for use in the field on ecologically safe methods of weapons, ammunition and explosives destruction in order better to enable Member States to ensure the disposal of weapons, ammunition and explosives voluntarily surrendered by civilians or retrieved from former combatants,

*Considering* that the United Nations could, through a coordinated approach, collect, share and disseminate information to Member States on useful and successful practices to prevent the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, and mindful of the role of the mechanism for coordinating action on small arms in this regard,

*Recalling* that the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, respectively, held workshops on illicit trafficking in small arms at Lomé and Lima in 1999, and noting with appreciation the regional seminar held at Jakarta on 3 and 4 May 2000 under the auspices of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific,

*Mindful* of the impact of surplus small arms and light weapons on the illicit trade in these weapons, and welcoming the practical measures taken by States to destroy surplus weapons and confiscated or collected weapons,

in accordance with the recommendations of the Secretary-General in his report on small arms,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his broad-based consultations, within available financial resources and with any other assistance provided by States in a position to do so, and to provide the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects with information on the magnitude and scope of illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, measures to combat illicit trafficking in and circulation of small arms and light weapons, and the role of the United Nations in collecting, collating, sharing and disseminating information on illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons;

2. *Encourages* States to promote regional and subregional initiatives and requests the Secretary-General, within available financial resources, and those States in a position to do so, to assist States in undertaking such initiatives to address the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons in affected regions, and invites the Secretary-General to utilize these initiatives as part of his consultations;

3. *Encourages also* States in a position to do so to take appropriate national measures to destroy surplus, confiscated or collected small arms and light weapons, and to provide, on a voluntary basis, information to the Secretary-General on the types and quantities of arms destroyed as well as the methods of their destruction, and requests the Secretary-General to circulate this information annually to all States;

4. *Invites* States in a position to do so to continue to provide assistance, bilaterally, regionally and through multilateral channels, such as the United Nations, in support of measures associated with combating illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, including assistance, in response to requests by States, in collecting and destroying surplus, confiscated or collected small arms and light weapons;

5. *Invites* the Secretary-General to provide advisory and financial assistance, within available financial resources and with any other assistance provided by States in a position to do so, in response to requests by States, in support of measures associated with combating illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, including assistance in collecting and destroying surplus, confiscated or collected small arms and light weapons;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session an item entitled "Illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons".

**Resolution 55/33 R**

**A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 49/75 H of 15 December 1994, 50/70 C of 12 December 1995, 51/45 G of 10 December 1996, 52/38 K of 9 December 1997, 53/77 U of 4 December 1998 and 54/54 D of 1 December 1999,

*Recognizing* that the enhancement of international peace and security and the promotion of nuclear disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other,

*Reaffirming* the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation and as an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament,

*Recalling* the progress made by the nuclear-weapon States in the reduction of their nuclear weapons unilaterally or through negotiation, and the efforts made towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by the international community,

*Reaffirming* the conviction that further advancement in nuclear disarmament will contribute to consolidating the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation, ensuring international peace and security,

*Bearing in mind* the recent nuclear tests, as well as the regional situations, which pose a challenge to international efforts to strengthen the global regime for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

*Taking note* of the report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, bearing in mind the various views of Member States on the report,

*Welcoming* the successful adoption of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which contains, inter alia, an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

1. *Reaffirms* the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls upon States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions;

2. *Also reaffirms* the importance for all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty;

3. *Stresses* the central importance of taking the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty:

(a) The early signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by all States, especially by those States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, with a view to its early entry into force before 2003, as well as a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending its entry into force;

(b) The immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and the conclusion as early as possible before 2005 of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives and, pending its entry into force, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;

(c) The establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament in the context of establishing a programme of work, with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament;

(d) The inclusion of the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures;

(e) The early entry into force and full implementation of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible, while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 26 May 1972 between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions;

(f) Steps by all nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

(i) Further efforts by all nuclear-weapon States to continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals, unilaterally or through negotiation;

(ii) Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

of Nuclear Weapons and as voluntary confidence-building measures to support further progress in nuclear disarmament;

- (iii) The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
- (iv) Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;
- (v) A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies so as to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
- (vi) The engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons;

4. *Recognizes* that the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons will require further steps by the nuclear-weapon States, including:

(a) The continuation of the nuclear disarmament process beyond START III;

(b) Deeper reductions by all nuclear-weapon States, unilaterally or through negotiation, in nuclear weapons in the process of working towards their elimination;

5. *Invites* the nuclear-weapon States to keep the States Members of the United Nations duly informed of the progress or efforts made towards nuclear disarmament;

6. *Welcomes* the ongoing efforts in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, notes the importance of the safe and effective management of the resultant fissile materials and calls for arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, the fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under the International Atomic Energy Agency or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes;

7. *Stresses* the importance of further development of the verification capabilities, including International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world;

8. *Calls upon* all States to redouble their efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery, confirming and strengthening, if necessary, their

policies not to transfer equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to the proliferation of those weapons;

9. *Also calls upon* all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security, safe custody, effective control and physical protection of all materials that could contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

10. *Stresses* the importance of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards with a view to enhancing nuclear non-proliferation, and encourages all States which have not done so to conclude an additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency as soon as possible;

11. *Welcomes* the adoption by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 22 September 2000 of resolution GC(44)/RES/19, which contains elements of a plan of action to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and calls for the early and full implementation of that resolution;

12. *Encourages* the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

### **Resolution 55/33 S**

#### **Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 53/77 D of 4 December 1998,

*Recalling also* the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

*Bearing in mind* its resolution 49/31 of 9 December 1994 on the protection and security of small States,

*Proceeding* from the fact that nuclear-weapon-free status is one of the means of ensuring the national security of States,

*Convinced* that the internationally recognized status of Mongolia will contribute to enhancing stability and confidence-building in the region as well as promote Mongolia's security by strengthening its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders and the preservation of its ecological balance,

*Welcoming* the measures taken to implement resolution 53/77 D at the national and international levels,

*Recalling* that in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held at Headquarters from 24 April to 19 May 2000, the Conference welcomed the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status and took note of the adoption by the Mongolian parliament of legislation defining and regulating that status,

*Taking note* of the efforts undertaken by the five nuclear-weapon States and Mongolia to implement the provision of the resolution concerning Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status,

*Taking note also* of the joint statement of the five nuclear-weapon States made on 5 October 2000 on security assurances in connection with Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, including their commitment to Mongolia to cooperate in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 53/77 D with respect to Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, in accordance with the principles of the Charter,

*Noting* that the joint statement has been transmitted to the Security Council by the five nuclear-weapon States,

*Welcoming* Mongolia's active and positive role in developing peaceful, friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the States of the region and other States,

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 53/77 D,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 53/77 D entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status";

2. *Takes note also* of the adoption by the Mongolian parliament of legislation defining and regulating its nuclear-weapon-free status as a concrete step towards promoting the aims of nuclear non-proliferation;

3. *Welcomes* the joint statement of the five nuclear-weapon States providing security assurances to Mongolia in connection with its nuclear-weapon-free status as a contribution to implementing resolution 53/77 D;

4. *Endorses and supports* Mongolia's good-neighbourly and balanced relationship with its neighbours as an important element of strengthening regional peace, security and stability;

5. *Invites* Member States to continue to cooperate with Mongolia in taking the necessary measures to consolidate and strengthen Mongolia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders, its economic security, its ecological balance and its nuclear-weapon-free status, as well as its independent foreign policy;



6. *Appeals* to the Member States of the Asia and Pacific region to support Mongolia's efforts to join the relevant regional security and economic arrangements;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations bodies to continue to provide assistance to Mongolia in taking the necessary measures mentioned in paragraph 5 above;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session on the implementation of the present resolution;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-seventh session the item entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status".

### **Resolution 55/33 T**

#### **Nuclear disarmament**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 49/75 E of 15 December 1994 on a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat, and its resolutions 50/70 P of 12 December 1995, 51/45 O of 10 December 1996, 52/38 L of 9 December 1997, 53/77 X of 4 December 1998 and 54/54 P of 1 December 1999 on nuclear disarmament,

*Reaffirming* the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world,

*Bearing in mind* that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1972 and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 1993 have already established legal regimes on the complete prohibition of biological and chemical weapons, respectively, and determined to achieve a nuclear weapons convention on the prohibition of the development, testing, production, stockpiling, loan, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, and to conclude such an international convention at an early date,

*Recognizing* that there now exist conditions for the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons,

*Bearing in mind* paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, calling for the urgent negotiation of agreements for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon

systems, and for a comprehensive and phased programme with agreed time-frames, wherever feasible, for the progressive and balanced reduction of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time,

*Noting* the reiteration by the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of their conviction that the Treaty is a cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and the reaffirmation by the States parties of the importance of the decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the decision on the extension of the Treaty and the resolution on the Middle East, adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Reiterating* the highest priority accorded to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and by the international community,

*Recognizing* that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and any proposed treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices must constitute disarmament measures, and not only non-proliferation measures,

*Welcoming* the entry into force of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), to which Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States of America are States parties,

*Welcoming also* the ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) by the Russian Federation, and looking forward to its early entry into force and its full implementation and to an early commencement of START III negotiations,

*Noting with appreciation* the unilateral measures by the nuclear-weapon States for nuclear arms limitation, and encouraging them to take further such measures,

*Recognizing* the complementarity of bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and that bilateral negotiations can never replace multilateral negotiations in this respect,

*Noting* the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the multilateral efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on such an international convention at an early date,

*Recalling* the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, issued on 8 July 1996,

and welcoming the unanimous reaffirmation by all Judges of the Court that there exists an obligation for all States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

*Mindful* of paragraph 114 and other relevant recommendations in the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to commence negotiations in 1998 on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time,

*Recalling* paragraph 72 of the final document of the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cartagena, Colombia, on 8 and 9 April 2000,

1. *Recognizes* that, in view of recent political developments, the time is now opportune for all the nuclear-weapon States to take effective disarmament measures with a view to the elimination of these weapons;

2. *Also recognizes* that there is a genuine need to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

3. *Urges* the nuclear-weapon States to stop immediately the qualitative improvement, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems;

4. *Also urges* the nuclear-weapon States, as an interim measure, to de-alert and deactivate immediately their nuclear weapons and to take other concrete measures to reduce further the operational status of their nuclear weapon systems;

5. *Reiterates its call upon* the nuclear-weapon States to undertake the step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons;

6. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to agree on an internationally and legally binding instrument on the joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and calls upon all States to conclude an internationally and legally binding instrument on security assurances of non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;

7. *Urges* the nuclear-weapon States to commence plurilateral negotiations among themselves at an appropriate stage on further deep

reductions of nuclear weapons as an effective measure of nuclear disarmament;

8. *Underlines* the importance of applying the principle of irreversibility to the process of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures;

9. *Welcomes* the positive outcome of the 2000 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, in the Final Document of the Review Conference, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI of the Treaty, and the reaffirmation by the States parties that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and calls for the full and effective implementation of the steps set out in the Final Document;

10. *Calls* for the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein;

11. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years;

12. *Calls* for the conclusion of an international legal instrument or instruments on adequate security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States;

13. *Calls also* for the early entry into force and strict observance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

14. *Expresses its regret* that the Conference on Disarmament was unable to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament at its 2000 session, as called for in General Assembly resolution 54/54 P;

15. *Reiterates its call upon* the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament early in 2001 and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons;

16. *Calls* for the convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects at an early date to identify and deal with concrete measures of nuclear disarmament;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

18. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Nuclear disarmament".

### **Resolution 55/33 U**

#### **Transparency in armaments**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 46/36 L of 9 December 1991, 47/52 L of 15 December 1992, 48/75 E of 16 December 1993, 49/75 C of 15 December 1994, 50/70 D of 12 December 1995, 51/45 H of 10 December 1996, 52/38 R of 9 December 1997, 53/77 V of 4 December 1998 and 54/54 O of 1 December 1999 entitled "Transparency in armaments",

*Continuing to take the view* that an enhanced level of transparency in armaments contributes greatly to confidence-building and security among States and that the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms constitutes an important step forward in the promotion of transparency in military matters,

*Welcoming* the consolidated report of the Secretary-General on the Register, which includes the returns of Member States for 1999,

*Welcoming also* the response of Member States to the request contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 46/36 L to provide data on their imports and exports of arms, as well as available background information regarding their military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies,

*Welcoming further* the report of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development,

*Stressing* that the continuing operation of the Register and its further development should be reviewed in order to secure a Register that is capable of attracting the widest possible participation,

1. *Reaffirms* its determination to ensure the effective operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, as provided for in paragraphs 7 to 10 of resolution 46/36 L;

2. *Endorses* the report of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development and the recommendations contained therein;

3. *Calls upon* Member States, with a view to achieving universal participation, to provide the Secretary-General by 31 May annually with the

requested data and information for the Register, including nil reports if appropriate, on the basis of resolutions 46/36 L and 47/52 L, the recommendations contained in paragraph 64 of the 1997 report of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development and the recommendations contained in paragraph 94 of the 2000 report of the Secretary-General and the appendices and annexes thereto; 70

4. *Invites* Member States in a position to do so, pending further development of the Register, to provide additional information on procurement from national production and military holdings and to make use of the "Remarks" column in the standardized reporting form to provide additional information such as types or models;

5. *Reaffirms* its decision, with a view to further development of the Register, to keep the scope of and participation in the Register under review and, to that end:

(a) Recalls its request to Member States to provide the Secretary-General with their views on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development and on transparency measures related to weapons of mass destruction;

(b) Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of governmental experts to be convened in 2003, on the basis of equitable geographical representation, to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, taking into account the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the views expressed by Member States and the reports of the Secretary-General on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development, with a view to a decision at its fifty-eighth session;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to implement the recommendations in his 2000 report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development and to ensure that sufficient resources are made available for the Secretariat to operate and maintain the Register;

7. *Invites* the Conference on Disarmament to consider continuing its work undertaken in the field of transparency in armaments;

8. *Reiterates its call upon* all Member States to cooperate at the regional and subregional levels, taking fully into account the specific conditions prevailing in the region or subregion, with a view to enhancing and coordinating international efforts aimed at increased openness and transparency in armaments;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session on progress made in implementing the present resolution;

10. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Transparency in armaments".

**Resolution 55/33 V**

**Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition  
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer  
of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 54/54 B of 1 December 1999,

*Reaffirming* its determination to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, which kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

*Believing it necessary* to do the utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to facing the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

*Wishing* to do the utmost in ensuring assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration, of mine victims,

*Welcoming* the entry into force on 1 March 1999 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, and noting with satisfaction the work undertaken to implement the Convention and the substantial progress made towards addressing the global landmine problem,

*Recalling* the First Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention, held at Maputo from 3 to 7 May 1999, and the reaffirmation made in the Maputo Declaration of a commitment to the total eradication of anti-personnel mines,

*Recalling also* the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Convention, held at Geneva from 11 to 15 September 2000, and the Declaration of the Second Meeting of States Parties reaffirming the commitment to implement completely and fully all provisions of the Convention,

*Noting with satisfaction* that additional States have ratified or acceded to the Convention, bringing the total number of States that have formally accepted the obligations of the Convention to one hundred and eight,

*Emphasizing* the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to the Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization,

*Noting with regret* that anti-personnel mines continue to be used in conflicts around the world, causing human suffering and impeding post-conflict development,

1. *Invites* all States that have not signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction to accede to it without delay;

2. *Urges* all States that have signed but not ratified the Convention to ratify it without delay;

3. *Stresses* the importance of the full and effective implementation of, and compliance with, the Convention;

4. *Urges* all States parties to provide the Secretary-General with complete and timely information, as required in article 7 of the Convention, in order to promote transparency and compliance with the Convention;

5. *Invites* all States that have not ratified the Convention or acceded to it to provide, on a voluntary basis, information to make global mine action efforts more effective;

6. *Renews its call upon* all States and other relevant parties to work together to promote, support and advance the care, rehabilitation and social and economic reintegration of mine victims, mine awareness programmes, and the removal of anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world and the assurance of their destruction;

7. *Invites and encourages* all interested States, the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations to participate in the programme of inter-sessional work established at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention and further developed at the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Convention;

8. *Welcomes* the generous offer of the Government of Nicaragua to host the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Convention;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in accordance with article 11, paragraph 2, of the Convention, to undertake the preparations necessary to convene the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Convention at Managua, from 18 to 21 September 2001, and, on behalf of States parties and in accordance with article 11, paragraph 4, of the Convention, to invite States not parties to the Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations to attend the Meeting as observers;

10. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the



Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”.

**Resolution 55/33 W**

**Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 52/38 S of 9 December 1997 and 53/77 A of 4 December 1998 and its decision 54/417 of 1 December 1999,

*Recalling also* paragraphs 60, 61, 62 and 64 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly and the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recalling further the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of the report of its Main Committee II related to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia,

*Convinced* that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is conducive to the achievement of general and complete disarmament,

*Emphasizing* the importance of internationally recognized agreements on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world and on the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime,

*Welcoming* the adoption by the Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session of principles and guidelines for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned,

*Believing* that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region and bearing in mind the specific characteristics of the region, can enhance the security of the States involved and strengthen global and regional peace and security,

*Recalling* the Almaty Declaration of the heads of State of the Central Asian States of 28 February 1997 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, the statement issued at Tashkent on 15 September 1997 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and the Communiqué of the Consultative Meeting of Experts of the Central Asian Countries, the Nuclear-Weapon States and the United Nations, held at Bishkek on 9 and 10 July 1998, on the elaboration of acceptable ways and means of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia,

*Reaffirming* the universally recognized role of the United Nations in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones,

1. *Notes with appreciation* the support of all States for the initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia;

2. *Welcomes* the desire of all five States of the Central Asian region to finalize work on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and the concrete steps that they have taken to that end to prepare the legal groundwork for the initiative and the progress that they have achieved in this regard;

3. *Calls upon* all five Central Asian States to continue their dialogue with the five nuclear-weapon States on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, within existing resources, to continue to provide assistance to the Central Asian States in the elaboration of an agreement on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia;

5. *Decides* to continue its consideration of the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia at its fifty-sixth session under the agenda item entitled "General and complete disarmament".

### **Resolution 55/33 X**

#### **Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons***

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 49/75 K of 15 December 1994, 51/45 M of 10 December 1996, 52/38 O of 9 December 1997, 53/77 W of 4 December 1998 and 54/54 Q of 1 December 1999,

*Convinced* that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth, and recognizing that the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the certainty that they will never be produced again,

*Reaffirming* the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world,

*Mindful* of the solemn obligations of States parties, undertaken in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,

*Recalling* the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Welcoming* the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament,

*Recalling* the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in its resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996, and expressing its satisfaction at the increasing number of States that have signed and ratified the Treaty,

*Recognizing with satisfaction* that the Antarctic Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba are gradually freeing the entire southern hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear weapons,

*Noting* the efforts by the States possessing the largest inventories of nuclear weapons to reduce their stockpiles of such weapons through bilateral agreements or arrangements and unilateral decisions, and calling for the intensification of such efforts to accelerate the significant reduction of nuclear-weapon arsenals,

*Recognizing* the need for a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons,

*Reaffirming* the central role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, and regretting the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations, particularly nuclear disarmament, in the Conference on Disarmament during its 2000 session,

*Emphasizing* the need for the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time,

*Desiring* to achieve the objective of a legally binding prohibition of the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat or use of nuclear weapons and their destruction under effective international control,

*Recalling* the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996,

*Taking note* of the relevant portions of the note by the Secretary-General relating to the implementation of resolution 54/54 Q,

1. *Underlines once again* the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control;

2. *Calls once again upon* all States immediately to fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations in 2001 leading to an early conclusion of a convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination;

3. *Requests* all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the present resolution and nuclear disarmament, and requests the Secretary-General to apprise the General Assembly of that information at its fifty-sixth session;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*".

### **Resolution 55/33 Y**

**The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 48/75 L of 16 December 1993 and 53/77 I of 4 December 1998,

*Convinced* that a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation,

*Recalling* the 1998 report of the Conference on Disarmament, in which, inter alia, the Conference records that, in proceeding to take a decision on this matter, that decision is without prejudice to any further decisions on the establishment of further subsidiary bodies under agenda item 1 and that intensive consultations will be pursued to seek the views of the members of the Conference on Disarmament on appropriate methods and approaches for dealing with agenda item 1, taking into consideration all proposals and views in that respect,

1. *Recalls* the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee which shall negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator<sup>11</sup> and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

2. *Urges* the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty.

**Resolution 55/34 A**

**United Nations Disarmament Information Programme**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its decision taken in 1982 at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament, by which the World Disarmament Campaign was launched,

*Bearing in mind* its resolution 47/53 D of 9 December 1992, in which it decided, inter alia, that the World Disarmament Campaign should be known thereafter as the "United Nations Disarmament Information Programme" and the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund as the "Voluntary Trust Fund for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme",

*Recalling* its resolutions 49/76 A of 15 December 1994, 51/46 A of 10 December 1996 and 53/78 E of 4 December 1998,

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme,

1. *Takes note with appreciation* of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme;

2. *Commends* the Secretary-General for his efforts to make effective use of the limited resources available to him in disseminating as widely as possible, including by electronic means, information on arms limitation and disarmament to Governments, the media, non-governmental organizations, educational communities and research institutes, and in carrying out a seminar and conference programme;

3. *Stresses* the importance of the Programme, as a significant instrument in enabling all Member States to participate fully in the deliberations and negotiations on disarmament in the various United Nations bodies, and in assisting them in complying with treaties, as required, and in contributing to agreed mechanisms for transparency;

4. *Notes with appreciation* the cooperation of the Department of Public Information of the Secretariat and its information centres in pursuit of the objectives of the Programme;

5. *Recommends* that the Programme focus its efforts:

(a) To inform, to educate and to generate public understanding of the importance of multilateral action and support for it, including action by the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament, in the field of arms

limitation and disarmament, in a factual, balanced and objective manner, and, inter alia, to continue to publish in all official languages *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*, periodic hard copy and regular electronic updates of the *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements* and ad hoc publications in hard copy and electronic form;

(b) To continue to coordinate, produce and manage the disarmament Internet web site as a part of the United Nations web site with a view to maintaining an updated source of accessible information, and, within available resources, to produce versions of the site in as many official languages as feasible;

(c) To continue to intensify United Nations interaction with the public, principally non-governmental organizations and research institutes, to help further an informed debate on topical issues of arms limitation, disarmament and security;

(d) To continue to organize discussions on topics of interest in the field of arms limitation and disarmament with a view to broadening understanding and facilitating an exchange of views and information among Member States and civil society;

6. *Emphasizes* the importance of contributions to the Voluntary Trust Fund for the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme to sustain a strong outreach programme, and invites all Member States to make contributions to the Fund;

7. *Commends* the Secretary-General for supporting the efforts of universities, other academic institutions and non-governmental organizations active in the education field in widening the worldwide availability of disarmament education, invites him to continue to support and cooperate with educational institutions and non-governmental organizations engaged in such efforts, without cost to the regular budget to the United Nations, and takes note of the proposal made by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters in July 2000 for a study on disarmament and non-proliferation education;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session a report covering both the implementation of the activities of the Programme by the United Nations system during the two previous years and the activities of the Programme contemplated by the system for the following two years;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-seventh session the item entitled "United Nations Disarmament Information Programme".

**Resolution 55/34 B**

**Regional confidence-building measures:  
activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee  
on Security Questions in Central Africa**

*The General Assembly,*

*Bearing in mind* the purposes and principles of the United Nations and its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

*Recalling* its resolutions 43/78 H and 43/85 of 7 December 1988, 44/21 of 15 November 1989, 45/58 M of 4 December 1990, 46/37 B of 6 December 1991, 47/53 F of 15 December 1992, 48/76 A of 16 December 1993, 49/76 C of 15 December 1994, 50/71 B of 12 December 1995, 51/46 C of 10 December 1996, 52/39 B of 9 December 1997, 53/78 A of 4 December 1998 and 54/55 A of 1 December 1999,

*Considering* the importance and effectiveness of confidence-building measures taken at the initiative and with the participation of all States concerned and taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, since such measures can contribute to regional stability and to international security,

*Convinced* that the resources released by disarmament, including regional disarmament, can be devoted to economic and social development and to the protection of the environment for the benefit of all peoples, in particular those of the developing countries,

*Recalling* the guidelines for general and complete disarmament adopted at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament,

*Convinced* that development can be achieved only in a climate of peace, security and mutual confidence both within and among States,

*Bearing in mind* the establishment by the Secretary-General on 28 May 1992 of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, the purpose of which is to encourage arms limitation, disarmament, non-proliferation and development in the subregion,

*Recalling* the Brazzaville Declaration on Cooperation for Peace and Security in Central Africa, the Bata Declaration for the Promotion of Lasting Democracy, Peace and Development in Central Africa, and the Yaoundé Declaration on Peace, Security and Stability in Central Africa,

*Bearing in mind* resolutions 1196 (1998) and 1197 (1998), adopted by the Security Council on 16 and 18 September 1998 respectively, following its consideration of the report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa,

*Emphasizing* the need to strengthen the capacity for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa,

*Recalling* the decision of the fourth ministerial meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee in favour of establishing, under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, a subregional centre for human rights and democracy in Central Africa,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General on regional confidence-building measures, which deals with the activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa in the period since the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 54/55 A;

2. *Reaffirms its support* for efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at regional and subregional levels in order to ease tensions and conflicts in Central Africa and to further peace, stability and sustainable development in the subregion;

3. *Also reaffirms its support* for the programme of work of the Standing Advisory Committee adopted at the organizational meeting of the Committee, held at Yaoundé from 27 to 31 July 1992;

4. *Notes with satisfaction* the progress made by the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee in implementing the programme of activities for the period 1999-2000, in particular by:

(a) Holding the Subregional Conference on the Proliferation of and Illicit Traffic in Small Arms in Central Africa at N'Djamena from 25 to 27 October 1999;

(b) Holding the twelfth ministerial meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee at N'Djamena from 27 to 30 October 1999;

(c) Holding a meeting of experts of the countries of the subregion to draft the Protocol on the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa and the Mutual Assistance Pact between countries of Central Africa at Malabo from 14 to 17 February 2000;

(d) Holding the thirteenth ministerial meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee at N'Djamena from 2 to 6 May 2000;

(e) Holding the Subregional Conference on the Question of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Central Africa at Bujumbura from 14 to 16 August 2000;

(f) Holding the fourteenth ministerial meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee at Bujumbura from 17 to 19 August 2000;

5. *Emphasizes* the importance of providing the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with the essential support they need to carry



out the full programme of activities which they adopted at their ministerial meetings;

6. *Welcomes* the creation of a mechanism for the promotion, maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in Central Africa, to be known as the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa, by the summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Central African countries, held at Yaoundé on 25 February 1999, and requests the Secretary-General to give his full support to the effective realization of that important mechanism;

7. *Emphasizes* the need to make the early-warning mechanism in Central Africa operational so that it will serve, on the one hand, as an instrument for analysing and monitoring political situations in the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with a view to preventing the outbreak of future armed conflicts and, on the other hand, as a technical body through which the member States will carry out the programme of work of the Committee, adopted at its organizational meeting held at Yaoundé in 1992, and requests the Secretary-General to provide it with the assistance necessary for it to function properly;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to continue to lend all their support to the effective establishment and smooth functioning of the Subregional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1197 (1998), to provide the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with the necessary support for the implementation and smooth functioning of the early-warning mechanism and the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa;

10. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to support the establishment of a network of parliamentarians with a view to the creation of a subregional parliament in Central Africa;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to continue to provide increased assistance to the countries of Central Africa for coping with the problems of refugees in their territories;

12. *Welcomes with satisfaction* the decision taken by the Standing Advisory Committee at its fourteenth ministerial meeting to organize a subregional conference on the protection of women and children in armed conflicts, and requests the Secretary-General to lend all the necessary support for the holding of the conference;

13. *Thanks* the Secretary-General for having established the Trust Fund for the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa;

14. *Appeals* to Member States and to governmental and non-governmental organizations to make additional voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund for the implementation of the programme of work of the Standing Advisory Committee;

15. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide the States members of the Standing Advisory Committee with assistance to ensure that they are able to carry on their efforts;

16. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session a report on the implementation of the present resolution;

17. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa".

#### **Resolution 55/34 C**

##### **United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services**

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme,

*Recalling* its decision, contained in paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, as well as its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in which it decided, *inter alia*, to continue the programme,

*Noting with satisfaction* that the programme has already trained an appreciable number of public officials selected from geographical regions represented in the United Nations system, most of whom are now in positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament affairs in their respective countries or Governments,

*Recalling* all the annual resolutions on the matter since the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, in 1982, including resolution 50/71 A of 12 December 1995,

*Noting with satisfaction* that the programme as designed continues to enable an increasing number of public officials, in particular from the developing countries, to acquire more expertise in the sphere of disarmament,

*Believing* that the forms of assistance available to Member States, in particular to developing countries, under the programme will enhance the capabilities of their officials to follow ongoing deliberations and negotiations on disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral,

1. *Reaffirms* its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly and the report of the Secretary-General approved by the Assembly in its resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978;

2. *Expresses its appreciation* to the Governments of Germany and Japan for inviting the 1999 and 2000 fellows to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, and to the Government of the United States of America for having organized in 1999 a specific study programme in the field of disarmament thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall objectives of the programme;

3. *Expresses its appreciation also* to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the Monterey Institute of International Studies for having organized specific study programmes in the field of disarmament in their respective areas of competence, thereby contributing to the objectives of the programme;

4. *Commends* the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has continued to be carried out;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to implement annually the Geneva-based programme within existing resources and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-seventh session the item entitled "United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services".

### **Resolution 55/34 D**

#### **United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa**

*The General Assembly,*

*Mindful* of the provisions of Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations stipulating that a function of the General Assembly is to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of

international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and arms limitation,

*Recalling* its resolutions 40/151 G of 16 December 1985, 41/60 D of 3 December 1986, 42/39 J of 30 November 1987 and 43/76 D of 7 December 1988 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, and its resolutions 46/36 F of 6 December 1991 and 47/52 G of 9 December 1992 on regional disarmament, including confidence-building measures,

*Recalling also* its resolutions 48/76 E of 16 December 1993, 49/76 D of 15 December 1994, 50/71 C of 12 December 1995, 51/46 E of 10 December 1996, 52/220 of 22 December 1997, 53/78 C of 4 December 1998 and 54/55 B of 1 December 1999,

*Aware* of the widespread support for the revitalization of the Regional Centre and the important role that the Centre can play in the present context in promoting confidence-building and arms-limitation measures at the regional level, thereby promoting progress in the area of sustainable development,

*Taking into account* the report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa,

*Bearing in mind* the efforts undertaken in the framework of the revitalization of the activities of the Regional Centre for the mobilization of the resources necessary for its operational costs,

*Taking into account* the need to establish close cooperation between the Regional Centre and the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of the Organization of African Unity, in conformity with the relevant decision adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its thirty-fifth ordinary session, held at Algiers from 12 to 14 July 1999,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Secretary-General, and commends the activities carried out by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, in particular in support of the efforts made by the African States in the areas of peace and security;

2. *Reaffirms* its strong support for the revitalization of the Regional Centre, and emphasizes the need to provide it with resources to enable it to strengthen its activities and carry out its programmes;

3. *Appeals once again* to all States, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and the foundations, to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen the programmes and activities of the Regional Centre and facilitate their implementation;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide all necessary support, within existing resources, to the Regional Centre for better achievements and results;

5. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to facilitate the establishment of close cooperation between the Regional Centre and the Organization of African Unity, in particular in the area of peace, security and development, and to continue to assist the Director of the Regional Centre in his efforts to stabilize the financial situation of the Centre and revitalize its activities;

6. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa".

#### **Resolution 55/34 E**

##### **United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 41/60 J of 3 December 1986, 42/39 K of 30 November 1987 and 43/76 H of 7 December 1988 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, with headquarters in Lima,

*Recalling also* its resolutions 46/37 F of 9 December 1991, 48/76 E of 16 December 1993, 49/76 D of 15 December 1994, 50/71 C of 12 December 1995, 52/220 of 22 December 1997 and 53/78 F of 4 December 1998,

*Recalling especially* its resolution 54/55 F of 1 December 1999, in which it welcomed the revitalization of the Regional Centre, the efforts made by the Government of Peru to that end and the appointment of the Director of the Centre by the Secretary-General,

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General, which concludes that the Regional Centre has launched projects aimed at furthering the understanding of the relationship between security and development, enhanced the role of the United Nations as a regional catalyst for activities on peace and disarmament and acted as a politically neutral platform for discussions on security and development issues,

*Noting* that security and disarmament issues have always been recognized as significant topics in Latin America and the Caribbean, the first inhabited region in the world to be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

*Bearing in mind* the important role that the Regional Centre can play in promoting confidence-building measures, arms control and limitation, disarmament and development at the regional level,

*Also bearing in mind* the importance of information, research, education and training for peace, disarmament and development in order to achieve understanding and cooperation among States,

*Recognizing* the need to provide the three United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament with sufficient financial resources for the planning and implementation of their programmes of activities,

1. *Reiterates* its strong support for the role of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean in the promotion of United Nations activities at the regional level to strengthen peace, stability, security and development among its member States;

2. *Expresses its satisfaction* with the vast range of activities carried out by the Regional Centre in the last year;

3. *Expresses its appreciation* for the political support and financial contributions to the Regional Centre, which are essential for its continued operation;

4. *Invites* all States of the region to take part in the activities of the Regional Centre, proposing items for inclusion in its agenda, making greater and better use of the Centre's potential to meet the current challenges facing the international community and with a view to fulfilling the aims of the Charter of the United Nations in the fields of peace, disarmament and development;

5. *Appeals* to Member States, in particular the States of the Latin American and Caribbean region, and to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and to foundations, to make voluntary contributions to strengthen the Regional Centre, its programme of activities and the implementation thereof;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Regional Centre with all necessary support within existing resources, so that it may carry out its programme of activities and achieve better results;

7. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean".

**Resolution 55/34 F**

**United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 54/55 E of 1 December 1999 regarding the maintenance and revitalization of the three United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament,

*Recalling also* the reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean,

*Reaffirming* its decision, taken in 1982 at its twelfth special session, to establish the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme, the purpose of which is to inform, educate and generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms control and disarmament,

*Bearing in mind* its resolutions 40/151 G of 16 December 1985, 41/60 J of 3 December 1986, 42/39 D of 30 November 1987 and 44/117 F of 15 December 1989 on the regional centres for peace and disarmament in Nepal, Peru and Togo,

*Recognizing* that the changes that have taken place in the world have created new opportunities as well as posed new challenges for the pursuit of disarmament and, in this regard, bearing in mind that the regional centres for peace and disarmament can contribute substantially to understanding and cooperation among the States in each particular region in the areas of peace, disarmament and development,

*Noting* that in paragraph 146 of the Final Document of the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Durban, South Africa, from 29 August to 3 September 1998, the heads of State or Government welcomed the decision adopted by the General Assembly on maintaining and revitalizing the three regional centres for peace and disarmament in Nepal, Peru and Togo,

1. *Reiterates* the importance of the United Nations activities at the regional level to increase the stability and security of its Member States, which could be promoted in a substantive manner by the maintenance and revitalization of the three regional centres for peace and disarmament;

2. *Reaffirms* that, in order to achieve positive results, it is useful for the three regional centres to carry out dissemination and educational programmes that promote regional peace and security aimed at changing basic

attitudes with respect to peace and security and disarmament so as to support the achievement of the purposes and principles of the United Nations;

3. *Appeals* to Member States in each region and those that are able to do so, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions to the regional centres in their respective regions to strengthen their programmes of activities and implementation;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide all necessary support, within existing resources, to the regional centres in carrying out their programmes of activities;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament".

### **Resolution 55/34 G**

#### **Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons**

*The General Assembly,*

*Convinced* that the use of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to the survival of mankind,

*Bearing in mind* the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*,

*Convinced* that a multilateral, universal and binding agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would contribute to the elimination of the nuclear threat and to the climate for negotiations leading to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, thereby strengthening international peace and security,

*Conscious* that some steps taken by the Russian Federation and the United States of America towards a reduction of their nuclear weapons and the improvement in the international climate can contribute towards the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

*Recalling* that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, it is stated that all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

*Reaffirming* that any use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared



in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December 1981,

*Determined* to achieve an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons, leading to their ultimate destruction,

*Stressing* that an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step in a phased programme towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, with a specified framework of time,

*Noting with regret* that the Conference on Disarmament, during its 2000 session, was unable to undertake negotiations on this subject as called for in General Assembly resolution 54/55 D of 1 December 1999,

1. *Reiterates its request* to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances;

2. *Requests* the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly on the results of those negotiations.

### **Resolution 55/34 H**

#### **United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific**

##### *The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 42/39 D of 30 November 1987 and 44/117 F of 15 December 1989, by which it established the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and renamed it the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, with headquarters in Kathmandu and with the mandate of providing, on request, substantive support for the initiatives and other activities mutually agreed upon by the Member States of the Asia-Pacific region for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament, through appropriate utilization of available resources,

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General, in which he expresses his belief that the mandate of the Regional Centre remains valid and that the Centre could be a useful instrument for fostering a climate of cooperation in the post-cold-war era,

*Noting* that trends in the post-cold-war era have emphasized the function of the Regional Centre in assisting Member States as they deal with new security concerns and disarmament issues emerging in the region,

*Commending* the useful activities carried out by the Regional Centre in encouraging regional and subregional dialogue for the enhancement of openness, transparency and confidence-building, as well as the promotion of disarmament and security through the organization of regional meetings, which has come to be widely known within the Asia-Pacific region as the "Kathmandu process",

*Expressing its appreciation* to the Regional Centre for its organization of the twelfth regional disarmament meeting in Asia and the Pacific, held at Kathmandu from 15 to 17 February 2000, the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues, held at Akita, Japan, from 22 to 25 August 2000, and the regional seminar on illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, held at Jakarta on 3 and 4 May 2000,

*Welcoming* the idea of the possible creation of an educational and training programme for peace and disarmament in Asia and the Pacific for young people with different backgrounds, to be financed from voluntary contributions,

*Noting* the important role of the Regional Centre in assisting region-specific initiatives of Member States, including its assistance in the work related to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia,

*Appreciating highly* the important role that Nepal has played as the host nation of the headquarters of the Regional Centre,

1. *Reaffirms* its strong support for the forthcoming operation and further strengthening of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific;

2. *Underlines* the importance of the Kathmandu process as a powerful vehicle for the development of the practice of region-wide security and disarmament dialogue;

3. *Expresses its appreciation* for the continuing political support and financial contributions to the Regional Centre, which are essential for its continued operation;

4. *Appeals* to Member States, in particular those within the Asia-Pacific region, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations and foundations, to make voluntary contributions, the only resources of the Regional Centre, to strengthen the programme of activities of the Centre and the implementation thereof;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, taking note of paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 49/76 D of 15 December 1994, to provide the Regional Centre with the necessary support, within existing resources, in carrying out its programme of activities;

6. *Expresses its appreciation* for the generous offer of His Majesty's Government of Nepal to bear the operational cost of the Centre for it to function from Kathmandu;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to expedite his ongoing consultations with other concerned Member States and interested organizations, and urges him to conclude them by 31 July 2001 to assess the possibility of enabling the Centre to operate effectively from Kathmandu as soon as possible;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific".

### **Resolution 55/35 A**

#### **Twentieth anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 34/83 M of 11 December 1979, in which it requested the Secretary-General to establish the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on the basis of the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General,

*Reaffirming* its resolution 39/148 H of 17 December 1984, in which it approved the statute of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, renewed the invitation to Governments to consider making voluntary contributions to the Institute and requested the Secretary-General to continue to give the Institute administrative and other support,

*Recalling* its resolution 45/62 G of 4 December 1990 on the tenth anniversary of the Institute,

*Considering* the continuing need for the international community to have access to independent and in-depth research on security issues and prospects for disarmament, taking note of the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the in-depth evaluation of the disarmament programme, in which the Office indicated the erosion of the value of the United Nations subvention to the Institute in real terms and recommended the development of proposals for alleviating difficulties regarding the current financial and organizational arrangements adopted in implementation of the statute of the Institute and that those proposals should be submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at its fifty-fifth session, and having considered the annual report of the Director of the Institute and report of the Advisory

Board on Disarmament Matters in its capacity as the Board of Trustees of the Institute, in which hope was expressed that the United Nations subvention to the Institute would be restored to its pre-1996 level and adjusted for inflation,

1. *Welcomes* the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research;
2. *Recognizes* the importance and high quality of the work of the Institute;
3. *Reiterates its conviction* that the Institute should continue to conduct independent research on problems relating to disarmament and security and to undertake specialized research requiring a high degree of expertise;
4. *Requests* all Member States to consider making financial contributions to the Institute in order to ensure its viability and the quality of its work over the long term;
5. *Recommends* that the Secretary-General seek ways to increase the funding of the Institute, within existing resources.

#### **Resolution 55/35 B**

##### **Report of the Conference on Disarmament**

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the report of the Conference on Disarmament,

*Convinced* that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, has the primary role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament,

*Recognizing* the need to conduct multilateral negotiations with the aim of reaching concrete agreements,

*Recalling*, in this respect, that the Conference has a number of urgent and important issues for negotiation,

1. *Reaffirms* the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community;
2. *Urges* the Conference to fulfil that role in the light of the evolving international situation, with a view to making early substantive progress on priority items on its agenda;
3. *Welcomes* the strong collective interest of the Conference in commencing substantive work as soon as possible during its 2001 session;
4. *Also welcomes* the decision of the Conference to request its President to conduct jointly with the incoming President intensive

## *Text of resolutions and decision*

consultations during the inter-sessional period in order to try to achieve this goal, as expressed in paragraph 35 of the report of the Conference;

5. *Encourages* the Conference to continue the ongoing review of its membership, agenda and methods of work;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to ensure the provision to the Conference of adequate administrative, substantive and conference support services;

7. *Requests* the Conference to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament".

### **Resolution 55/35 C**

#### **Report of the Disarmament Commission**

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the report of the Disarmament Commission,

*Recalling* its resolutions 47/54 A of 9 December 1992, 47/54 G of 8 April 1993, 48/77 A of 16 December 1993, 49/77 A of 15 December 1994, 50/72 D of 12 December 1995, 51/47 B of 10 December 1996, 52/40 B of 9 December 1997, 53/79 A of 4 December 1998 and 54/56 A of 1 December 1999,

*Considering* the role that the Disarmament Commission has been called upon to play and the contribution that it should make in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session,

*Bearing in mind* its decision 52/492 of 8 September 1998,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Disarmament Commission;

2. *Reaffirms* the importance of further enhancing dialogue and cooperation among the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament;

3. *Also reaffirms* the role of the Disarmament Commission as the specialized, deliberative body within the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery that allows for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues, leading to the submission of concrete recommendations on those issues;

4. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final

Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and with paragraph 3 of Assembly resolution 37/78 H of 9 December 1982, and to that end to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations on the items of its agenda, taking into account the adopted "Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission";

5. *Recommends* that the Disarmament Commission, at its 2000 organizational session, adopt the following items for consideration at its 2001 substantive session:

(a) Ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament;

(b) Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms;

6. *Requests* the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding three weeks during 2001 and to submit a substantive report to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament, together with all the official records of the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;

8. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to ensure the full provision to the Disarmament Commission and its subsidiary bodies of interpretation and translation facilities in the official languages and to assign, as a matter of priority, all the necessary resources and services, including verbatim records, to that end;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission".

### **Resolution 55/36**

#### **The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East**

*The General Assembly,*

*Bearing in mind* its relevant resolutions,

*Taking note* of the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the latest of which is resolution GC(44)/RES/28, adopted on 22 September 2000,

*Cognizant* that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region of the Middle East would pose a serious threat to international peace and security,

*Mindful* of the immediate need for placing all nuclear facilities in the region of the Middle East under full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

*Recalling* the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 11 May 1995, in which the Conference urged universal adherence to the Treaty as an urgent priority and called upon all States not yet parties to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities,

*Recognizing with satisfaction* that, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference undertook to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and called upon those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities, and underlined the necessity of universal adherence to the Treaty and of strict compliance by all parties with their obligations under the Treaty,

*Recalling* the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 11 May 1995, in which the Conference noted with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, reaffirmed the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty and called upon all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

*Noting* that Israel remains the only State in the Middle East that has not yet become party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

*Concerned* about the threats posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the security and stability of the Middle East region,

*Stressing* the importance of taking confidence-building measures, in particular the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in order to enhance peace and security in the region and to consolidate the global non-proliferation regime,

*Emphasizing* the need for all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, inviting the countries

concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

*Noting* that one hundred and sixty States have signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including a number of States in the region,

1. *Welcomes* the conclusions on the Middle East of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

2. *Reaffirms* the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East;

3. *Calls upon* that State to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without further delay and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East".

### **Resolution 55/37**

#### **Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 54/58 of 1 December 1999 and previous resolutions referring to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

*Recalling with satisfaction* the adoption, on 10 October 1980, of the Convention, together with the Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), which entered into force on 2 December 1983,



*Also recalling with satisfaction* the adoption by the Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, on 13 October 1995 of the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV), and on 3 May 1996 of the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II),

*Recalling* that the States parties at the Review Conference declared their commitment to keeping the provisions of Protocol II under review in order to ensure that the concerns regarding the weapons it covers are addressed, and that they would encourage the efforts of the United Nations and other organizations to address all problems of landmines,

*Recalling also* the role played by the International Committee of the Red Cross in the elaboration of the Convention and the Protocols thereto,

*Welcoming* the additional ratifications and acceptances of or accessions to the Convention, as well as the ratifications and acceptances of or accessions to amended Protocol II and Protocol IV,

*Noting* that, in conformity with article 8 of the Convention, conferences may be convened to examine amendments to the Convention or to any of the Protocols thereto, to examine additional protocols concerning other categories of conventional weapons not covered by existing Protocols or to review the scope and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto and to examine any proposed amendments or additional protocols,

*Noting also* that, in accordance with article 13 of amended Protocol II, a conference of States parties to that Protocol shall be held annually for the purpose of consultations and cooperation on all issues in relation to the Protocol,

*Noting further* that the provisional rules of procedure of the First Annual Conference of the States Parties to Amended Protocol II provide for the invitation of States not parties to the Protocol, the International Committee of the Red Cross and interested non-governmental organizations to take part in the Conference,

*Welcoming* the results of the First Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, held at Geneva from 15 to 17 December 1999,

*Commending* the efforts of the Secretary-General and the President of the Conference towards the promotion of the goal of universality of amended Protocol II,

*Welcoming* the holding of an informal meeting of experts of the States parties to amended Protocol II and other interested States at Geneva on 31 May and 2 June 2000, which provided for structured discussion on several items under amended Protocol II,

1. *Calls upon* all States that have not yet done so to take all measures to become parties, as soon as possible, to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and the Protocols thereto, in particular the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II), with a view to achieving the widest possible adherence to this instrument at an early date, and calls upon successor States to take appropriate measures so that ultimately adherence to these instruments will be universal;

2. *Calls upon* States parties to the Convention that have not yet done so to express their consent to be bound by the Protocols to the Convention;

3. *Welcomes* the convening, from 11 to 13 December 2000, of the Second Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, in accordance with article 13 thereof, and calls upon all States parties to amended Protocol II to address at that meeting, inter alia, the issue of holding the third annual conference in 2001;

4. *Recalls* the decision of the States parties to the Convention to convene the next review conference no later than 2001, preceded by a preparatory committee, and recommends that the review conference be held at Geneva in December 2001;

5. *Welcomes* the convening of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference at Geneva on 14 December 2000, and decides to convene the second session from 2 to 6 April 2001 and the third session from 24 to 28 September 2001;

6. *Notes* that, in conformity with article 8 of the Convention, the next review conference may consider any proposal for amendments to the Convention or the Protocols thereto as well as any proposal for additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional weapons not covered by existing Protocols to the Convention;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention and the Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference;

8. *Also requests* the Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary of the Convention and the Protocols thereto, to continue to inform the General Assembly periodically of ratifications and acceptances of and accessions to the Convention and the Protocols thereto;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

**Resolution 55/38**

**Strengthening of security and cooperation  
in the Mediterranean region**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its previous resolutions on the subject, including resolution 54/59 of 1 December 1999,

*Reaffirming* the primary role of the Mediterranean countries in strengthening and promoting peace, security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region,

*Bearing in mind* all the previous declarations and commitments, as well as all the initiatives taken by the riparian countries at the recent summits, ministerial meetings and various forums concerning the question of the Mediterranean region,

*Recognizing* the indivisible character of security in the Mediterranean and that the enhancement of cooperation among Mediterranean countries with a view to promoting the economic and social development of all peoples of the region will contribute significantly to stability, peace and security in the region,

*Recognizing also* the efforts made so far and the determination of the Mediterranean countries to intensify the process of dialogue and consultations with a view to resolving the problems existing in the Mediterranean region and to eliminating the causes of tension and the consequent threat to peace and security, and their growing awareness of the need for further joint efforts to strengthen economic, social, cultural and environmental cooperation in the region,

*Recognizing further* that prospects for closer Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in all spheres can be enhanced by positive developments worldwide, in particular in Europe, in the Maghreb and in the Middle East,

*Reaffirming* the responsibility of all States to contribute to the stability and prosperity of the Mediterranean region and their commitment to respecting the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

*Noting* the peace negotiations in the Middle East, which should be of a comprehensive nature and represent an appropriate framework for the peaceful settlement of contentious issues in the region,

*Expressing its concern* at the persistent tension and continuing military activities in parts of the Mediterranean that hinder efforts to strengthen security and cooperation in the region,

*Taking note* of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. *Reaffirms* that security in the Mediterranean is closely linked to European security as well as to international peace and security;

2. *Expresses its satisfaction* at the continuing efforts by Mediterranean countries to contribute actively to the elimination of all causes of tension in the region and to the promotion of just and lasting solutions to the persistent problems of the region through peaceful means, thus ensuring the withdrawal of foreign forces of occupation and respecting the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all countries of the Mediterranean and the right of peoples to self-determination, and therefore calls for full adherence to the principles of non-interference, non-intervention, non-use of force or threat of use of force and the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, in accordance with the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations;

3. *Commends* the Mediterranean countries for their efforts in meeting common challenges through coordinated overall responses, based on a spirit of multilateral partnership, towards the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchanges and cooperation, guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity, and encourages them to strengthen such efforts through, inter alia, a lasting multilateral and action-oriented cooperative dialogue among States of the region;

4. *Recognizes* that the elimination of the economic and social disparities in levels of development and other obstacles, as well as respect and greater understanding among cultures, in the Mediterranean area will contribute to enhancing peace, security and cooperation among Mediterranean countries through the existing forums;

5. *Calls upon* all States of the Mediterranean region that have not yet done so to adhere to all the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, thus creating the necessary conditions for strengthening peace and cooperation in the region;

6. *Encourages* all States of the region to favour the necessary conditions for strengthening the confidence-building measures among them by promoting genuine openness and transparency on all military matters, by participating, inter alia, in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures and by providing accurate data and information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms;

7. *Encourages* the Mediterranean countries to strengthen further their cooperation in combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, international crime and illicit arms transfers, and illicit drug production, consumption and trafficking, which pose a serious threat to peace, security and stability in the region and therefore to the improvement of the current

political, economic and social situation and which jeopardize friendly relations among States, hinder the development of international cooperation and result in the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic basis of pluralistic society;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report on means to strengthen security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region".

### **Resolution 55/39**

#### **Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* that, in its resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, it expressed the hope that the States of Latin America would take appropriate measures to conclude a treaty that would prohibit nuclear weapons in Latin America,

*Recalling also* that, in the same resolution, it voiced its confidence that, once such a treaty was concluded, all States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would lend it their full cooperation for the effective realization of its peaceful aims,

*Considering* that, in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, it established the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear-weapon States and those that do not possess such weapons,

*Recalling* that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was opened for signature at Mexico City on 14 February 1967,

*Noting with satisfaction* the holding on 14 February 1997 of the eleventh special session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,

*Recalling* that, in its preamble, the Treaty of Tlatelolco states that military denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage,

*Recalling also* that, in its resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, it welcomed with special satisfaction the Treaty of Tlatelolco as an event

of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security,

*Recalling further* that in 1990, 1991 and 1992 the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean approved and opened for signature a set of amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, with the aim of enabling the full entry into force of that instrument,

*Recalling* resolution C/E/RES.27 of the Council of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, in which the Council called for the promotion of cooperation and consultations with other nuclear-weapon-free zones,

*Noting with satisfaction* that the Treaty of Tlatelolco is now in force for thirty-two sovereign States of the region,

*Also noting with satisfaction* that on 8 November 1999 Nicaragua deposited its instrument of ratification of the amendment to the Treaty of Tlatelolco approved by the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in its resolution 290 (E-VII) of 26 August 1992; that on 8 August 2000 Panama deposited its instrument of accession to the amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco approved by the General Conference in its resolutions 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990, 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991 and 290 (E-VII); and that on 30 August 2000 Ecuador deposited its instrument of ratification of the amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco approved by the General Conference in its resolutions 268 (XII) and 290 (E-VII),

*Further noting with satisfaction* that the amended Treaty of Tlatelolco is fully in force for Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela,

1. *Welcomes* the concrete steps taken by some countries of the region during the past year for the consolidation of the regime of military denuclearization established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco);

2. *Urges* the countries of the region that have not yet done so to deposit their instruments of ratification of the amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco approved by the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in its resolutions 267 (E-V), 268 (XII) and 290 (E-VII);

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

**Resolution 55/40**

**Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and to their destruction,

*Noting with satisfaction* that there are one hundred and forty-three States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, including all of the permanent members of the Security Council,

*Bearing in mind* its call upon all States parties to the Convention to participate in the implementation of the recommendations of the Review Conferences, including the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and to provide such information and data in conformity with standardized procedure to the Secretary-General on an annual basis and no later than 15 April,

*Recalling* the provisions of the Convention related to scientific and technological cooperation and the related provisions of the final report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint, the final report of the Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention held from 19 to 30 September 1994, and the final documents of the Review Conferences,

*Welcoming* the reaffirmation made in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their development, production and stockpiling are effectively prohibited under article I of the Convention,

*Recalling* its resolution 49/86, adopted without a vote on 15 December 1994, in which it welcomed the final report of the Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, adopted by consensus on 30 September 1994, in which the States parties agreed to establish an ad hoc group, open to all States parties, whose objective should be to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument to be submitted for the consideration of the States parties,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* the increase in the number of States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, reaffirms the call upon all signatory States that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and calls upon those States that have not signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention;

2. *Welcomes* the information and data provided to date, and reiterates its call upon all States parties to the Convention to participate in the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention;

3. *Welcomes also* the progress achieved so far in the negotiation of a protocol to strengthen the Convention, and reaffirms the decision of the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention urging the conclusion of the negotiations by the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint as soon as possible before the commencement of the Fifth Review Conference and urging it to submit its report, which shall be adopted by consensus, to the States parties for consideration at a Special Conference;

4. *Calls upon* all States parties, in this context, to accelerate the negotiations, and to redouble their efforts within the Ad Hoc Group to formulate an efficient, cost-effective and practical regime and to seek early resolution of the outstanding issues through renewed flexibility in order to complete the protocol in accordance with the decision of the Fourth Review Conference;

5. *Notes* that, at the request of the States parties, the Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention will be held at Geneva from 19 November to 7 December 2001, and that, after appropriate consultation, a Preparatory Committee for that Conference, open to all States parties to the Convention, was established and will meet at Geneva from 25 to 27 April 2001;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to render the necessary assistance to the depositary Governments of the Convention, to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Review Conferences, as well as the decisions contained in the final report of the 1994 Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, including all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Group and the Special Conference, which is to consider the report of the Ad Hoc Group, in accordance with its mandate, as confirmed by the Fourth Review Conference, and to render the necessary assistance and to provide



such services as may be required for the Fifth Review Conference and the preparations for it;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction".

### **Resolution 55/41**

#### **Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was adopted by its resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996 and opened for signature on 24 September 1996,

*Noting* that, in its resolution 54/63 of 1 December 1999, it decided to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fifth session the item entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty",

*Encouraged* by the signing of the Treaty by one hundred and sixty States, including forty-one of the forty-four needed for its entry into force, and welcoming the ratification of sixty-five States, including thirty of the forty-four needed for its entry into force,

*Recalling* its endorsement, in resolution 54/63, of the Final Declaration of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held at Vienna from 6 to 8 October 1999 to promote the entry into force of the Treaty at the earliest possible date,

1. *Stresses* the importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

2. *Welcomes* the contributions by the States signatories to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, in particular to its efforts to ensure that the Treaty's verification regime will be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty upon its entry into force, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty;

3. *Urges* States to maintain their moratoria on nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, pending the entry into force of the Treaty;

4. *Calls upon* all States that have not yet signed the Treaty to sign and ratify it as soon as possible and to refrain from acts that would defeat its object and purpose in the meanwhile;

5. *Calls upon* all States that have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty, in particular those whose ratification is needed for its entry into force, to accelerate their ratification processes with a view to their early successful conclusion;

6. *Urges* all States to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty".

### **Decision 55/415**

#### **Small arms**

The General Assembly, recalling its resolutions 50/70 B of 12 December 1995, 52/38 J of 9 December 1997, 53/77 E of 4 December 1998 and 54/54 V of 15 December 1999:

(a) Decided to convene the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in New York, from 9 to 20 July 2001;

(b) Decided to convene the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference in New York, from 19 to 30 March 2001;

(c) Decided to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-sixth session the item entitled "Small arms".

## TABLE OF RESOLUTIONS AND DECISION ON DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS

## RESOLUTIONS

<i>Resolution No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Reference in Text</i>	<i>Sponsors</i>
55/27	Maintenance of international security—good-neighbourliness, stability and development in South-Eastern Europe (66, 67)	161 301	Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia/Herzeg, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Rep, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg,

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\*\* The State that introduced the draft resolution or decision is shown in bold type.

<i>Resolution No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Reference in Text</i>	<i>Sponsors</i>
55/27 ( <i>cont.</i> )			Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, <b>the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</b> , Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States (without a vote, <i>p. 409</i> )
55/28	Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (68)	171 304	<b>Russian Fed</b> (without a vote, <i>p. 409</i> )
55/29	Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament (69)	170 305	Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Rep, El Salvador, Fiji, Guyana, <b>India</b> , Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Kenya, Libyan AJ, Malaysia, Mauritius, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe (97-46-21, <i>p. 409</i> )
55/30	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East (70)	158 307	<b>Egypt</b> (without a vote, <i>p. 410</i> )

55/31	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (71)	65 309	Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, Cuba, DPR of Korea, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Malaysia, Myanmar, <b>Pakistan</b> , Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Viet Nam (111-0-54, p. 410)
55/32	Prevention of an arms race in outer space (72)	169 312	Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei Dar-Salam, Chile, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, DPR of Korea, <b>Egypt</b> , El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russian Fed, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Togo (163-0-3, p. 411)
55/33	General and complete disarmament		
	A. Missiles (73 (h))	68 315	<b>Iran (Isl R)</b> (97-0-65, p. 412)
	B. Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (73 (e))	69 315	Belarus, China, Kyrgyzstan and <b>Russian Fed</b> (88-5-66, p. 413)

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\*\* The State that introduced the draft resolution or decision is shown in bold type.

Resolution No.	Title	Reference in Text	Sponsors
55/33 (cont.)	C. Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda (73 (i))	60 317	Algeria, Angola, Austria, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Fiji, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mexico, Mozambique, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe (154-3-8, p. 414)
	D. 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (73)	28 321	Algeria (163-1-3, p. 415)
	E. United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education (73)	205 322	Algeria, Argentina, Chile, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Mozambique, New Zealand, Pakistan, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand and Ukraine (without a vote, p. 416)

55/33 (cont.)	F. Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them (73 (h))	124 323	Austria, Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, <b>Mali</b> , Mauritania, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Portugal, Rep of Moldova, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom (without a vote, <i>p. 417</i> )
	G. Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures (73 (j))	125 325	Albania, Argentina, Austria, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, <b>Germany</b> , Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,

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\*\* The State that introduced the draft resolution or decision is shown in bold type.

Resolution No.	Title	Reference in Text	Sponsors
55/33 (cont.)			Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, TFYR Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe (without a vote, p. 417)
	H. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (73 (g))	92 327	Canada and <b>Poland</b> (without a vote, p. 417)
	I. Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (73 (n))	158 328	Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, <b>Brazil</b> , Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Jamaica, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Madagascar, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, New Zealand,



Nicaragua, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Samoa, St Kitts-Nevis, S Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, UR of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe (159-4-5, p. 417)

**South Africa**, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (163-0-5, p. 418)

**South Africa**, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of the Non-aligned Countries (163-0-4, p. 419)

**South Africa**, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (without a vote, p. 420)

92  
330

J. Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol (73 (d))

174  
331

K. Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control (73 (t))

173  
332

L. Relationship between disarmament and development (73 (u))

\* The first reference indicates the page where discussion of the resolution begins in the relevant chapter; the second reference (in italics) indicates the page where the text of the resolution is reproduced.

\*\* The State that introduced the draft resolution or decision is shown in bold type.

Resolution No.	Title	Reference in Text	Sponsors
55/33 (cont.)	M. Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (73 (v))	194 333	<b>South Africa</b> , on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (without a vote, <i>p. 420</i> )
	N. Reducing nuclear danger (73 (m))	62 334	Bhutan, Costa Rica, Cuba, Fiji, <b>India</b> , Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe (110-45-14, <i>p. 420</i> )
	O. Regional disarmament (73 (p))	160 336	Bangladesh, Egypt, Fiji, Indonesia, Nepal, <b>Pakistan</b> , Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tunisia and Turkey (without a vote, <i>p. 421</i> )
	P. Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels (73 (o))	160 337	Bangladesh, Belarus, Fiji, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Nepal, <b>Pakistan</b> , Spain, TFYR Macedonia and Ukraine (163-1-1, <i>p. 421</i> )
	Q. Illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons (73 (s))	125 338	Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,

Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, **South Africa**, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago, United Kingdom, UR of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe (without a vote, p. 422)

Australia and **Japan** (155-1-12, p. 423)

Mongolia (without a vote, p. 424)

Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Brunei Dar-Salam, Cambodia, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Ecuador, El Salvador,

R. A path to the total elimination  
of nuclear weapons (73) 62  
342

S. Mongolia's international  
security and nuclear-weapon-  
free status (73 (c)) 158  
345

T. Nuclear disarmament (73 (q)) 63  
347

\* The first reference indicates the page where discussion of the resolution begins in the relevant chapter; the second reference (in italics) indicates the page where the text of the resolution is reproduced.

\*\* The State that introduced the draft resolution or decision is shown in bold type.

Resolution No.	Title	Reference in Text	Sponsors
55/33 (cont.)			Ethiopia, Fiji, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Panama, Philippines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Thailand, UR of Tanzania, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe (109-39-20, p. 424)
	U. Transparency in armaments (73 (k))	126 351	Afghanistan, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (FS),

Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, **Netherlands**, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Tonga, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, UR of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe (149-0-16, p. 425)

V. Implementation of the  
Convention on the Prohibition  
of the Use, Stockpiling,  
Production and Transfer of  
Anti-personnel Mines and on  
Their Destruction (73 (f))

127

353

Angola, Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,

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Resolution No.	Title	Reference in Text	Sponsors
55/33 (cont.)			Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Moldova, St Kitts-Nevis, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe (143-0-22, p. 426)
	W. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia (73 (b))	157 355	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and <b>Uzbekistan</b> (without a vote, p. 427)
	X. Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the <i>Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons</i> (73 (r))	71 356	Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brunei Dar-Salam, Cambodia, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Iraq, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lesotho, <b>Malaysia</b> , Marshall Islands, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria,

Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe (119-28-22, p. 427)

Y. The Conference on  
Disarmament decision  
(CD/1547) of 11 August 1998

to establish, under item 1 of its  
agenda entitled "Cessation of  
the nuclear arms race and  
nuclear disarmament", an ad  
hoc committee to negotiate, on  
the basis of the report of the  
Special Coordinator (CD/1299)  
and the mandate contained  
therein, a non-discriminatory,  
multilateral and internationally  
and effectively verifiable treaty  
banning the production of  
fissile material for nuclear  
weapons or other nuclear  
explosive devices (73)

64  
358

Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria,  
Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia,  
Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland,  
France, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Hungary,  
Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Kenya, Lithuania,  
Malaysia, Mali, Monaco, Myanmar, Netherlands,  
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rep of  
Korea, Romania, Russian Fed, Senegal, Slovakia,  
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, TFYR Macedonia,  
Turkey and United Kingdom (without a vote,  
p. 428)

# Table of resolutions and decision

\* The first reference indicates the page where discussion of the resolution begins in the relevant chapter; the second reference (in italics) indicates the page where the text of the resolution is reproduced.

\*\* The State that introduced the draft resolution or decision is shown in bold type.

Resolution No.	Title	Reference in Text	Sponsors
55/34	Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly		
	A. United Nations Disarmament Information Programme (74 (g))	205 359	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, <b>Mexico</b> , Myanmar, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa and Togo (without a vote, <i>p.</i> 428)
	B. Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa (74 (a))	161 361	Angola, <b>Burundi</b> , Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Dem Rep of Congo, Equat Guinea and Gabon (without a vote, <i>p.</i> 429)
	C. United Nations disarmament, fellowship, training and advisory services (74 (h))	194 364	Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Japan, Liberia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, <b>Nigeria</b> , Pakistan, Romania, Russian Fed, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia, United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe (without a vote, <i>p.</i> 429)



55/34 ( <i>cont.</i> )	D. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (74 (b))	161 365	<b>Lesotho</b> , on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of African States (without a vote, <i>p. 429</i> )
	E. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (74 (f))	162 367	<b>Belize</b> , on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (without a vote, <i>p. 429</i> )
	F. United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament (74 (e))	162 369	<b>South Africa</b> , on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the movement of Non-Aligned Countries (without a vote, <i>p. 429</i> )
	G. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons (74 (d))	65 370	Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, DPR of Korea, Dominican Rep, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Guyana, <b>India</b> , Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Kenya, Lao PDR, Libyan AJ, Malaysia, Mauritius, Namibia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe (109-43-16, <i>p. 429</i> )

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\*\* The State that introduced the draft resolution or decision is shown in bold type.

<i>Resolution No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Reference in Text</i>	<i>Sponsors</i>
55/34 (cont.)	H. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (74 (c))	162 371	Australia, Brunei Dar-Salam, Cambodia, China, DPR of Korea, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, <b>Nepal</b> , New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Rep of Korea, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam (without a vote, <i>p.</i> 430)
55/35	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session		
	A. Twentieth anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (75 (d))	206 373	Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, <b>France</b> , Gabon, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Romania, Russian

Fed, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States (without a vote, *p. 430*)

**Bulgaria** (without a vote, *p. 430*)

Argentina, Armenia, Benin, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, **Iran (Isl R)**, Luxembourg, Monaco, Sierra Leone and Venezuela (without a vote, *p. 430*)

**Egypt**, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the League of Arab States (157-3-8, *p. 431*)

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,

194  
374

B. Report of the Conference on Disarmament (75 (b))

194  
375

C. Report of the Disarmament Commission (75 (a))

66  
376

The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (76)

127  
378

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (77)

55/35  
(cont.)

55/36

55/37

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<i>Resolution No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Reference in Text</i>	<i>Sponsors</i>
55/37 (cont.)			Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay (without a vote, p. 432)
55/38	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region (78)	161 381	Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia/Herzeg, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritania, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, TFYR Macedonia, Tunisia, Turkey and United Kingdom (without a vote, p. 432)
55/39	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (79)	157 383	Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Suriname, Trinidad-Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela (without a vote, p. 432)

55/40	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (80)	92 385	Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia/Herzeg, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, <b>Hungary</b> , Iceland, India, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States (without a vote, p. 432)
55/41	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (81)	67 387	Argentina, <b>Australia</b> , Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland,

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<i>Resolution/ Decision No.</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Reference in Text</i>	<i>Sponsors</i>
55/41 ( <i>cont.</i> )			Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lao PDR, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Romania, Russian Fed, Samoa, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Zambia (161-0-6, <i>p. 432</i> )
<b>DECISION</b>			
55/415	Small arms (73 (w))	125 388	Austria, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, El Salvador, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Israel, <b>Japan</b> , Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Netherlands, Niger, Philippines, Poland, Rep of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Tonga, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan and Zambia (without a vote, <i>p. 433</i> )

## APPENDIX VI

### Voting patterns of resolutions and decision on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly in 2000

		<i>Reference in text</i>
<b>Resolutions on disarmament questions</b>		
55/27	Maintenance of international security—good-neighbourliness, stability and development of South-Eastern Europe	161
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
55/28	Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security	171
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
55/29	Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament	170
	<i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 97 to 46 with 21 abstentions, as follows:</i>	
	<i>In favour:</i> Algeria, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, DPR of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,	

- 55/29  
(cont.) Panama, Papua N Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian AR, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, UA Emirates, UR Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

*Against:* Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia/Herzeg, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, TFYR Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States

*Abstaining:* Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Paraguay, Rep of Korea, Russian Federation, Samoa, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Tajikistan, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu

- 55/30 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East 158

*Adopted without a vote*

- 55/31 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 65

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 111 to none, with 54 abstentions, as follows:*

*In favour:* Algeria, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, DPR of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon,



55/31  
(cont.) Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

*Against:* None

*Abstaining:* Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rep of , Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, TFYR Macedonia, Tonga, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Vanuatu

55/32 Prevention of an arms race in outer space 169

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 163 to none, with 3 abstentions, as follows:*

*In favour:* Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/ Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia,

55/32 Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, DPR of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, United Kingdom, UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:* None

*Abstaining:* Israel, Micronesia (FS), United States

55/33 A Missiles

68

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 97 to none, with 65 abstentions, as follows:<sup>a</sup>*

*In favour:* Algeria, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte

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<sup>a</sup> Subsequent to the voting, the delegation of Djibouti informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

55/33 A d'Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El  
(cont.) Salvador, Equat Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana,  
Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India,  
Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan,  
Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Libyan  
AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,  
Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique,  
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman,  
Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Peru, Philippines,  
Qatar, Russian Fed, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,  
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,  
Swaziland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga,  
Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, UA  
Emirates, UR Tanzania, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen,  
Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:* None

*Abstaining:* Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia,  
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bolivia,  
Bosnia/Herzeg, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,  
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Eritrea,  
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece,  
Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,  
Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,  
Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (FS), Monaco,  
Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay,  
Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova,  
Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia,  
Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, TFYR  
Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United  
States, Uruguay, Vanuatu

B Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the 69  
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 88 to 5, with 66 abstentions, as follows:*<sup>b</sup>

*In favour:* Algeria, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda,  
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus,

<sup>b</sup> Subsequent to the voting, the delegation of Honduras informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

55/33 B (cont.) Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, China, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, DPR of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Equat Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Rep of Moldova, Russian Fed, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UR Tanzania, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:* Albania, Honduras, Israel, Micronesia (FS), United States

*Abstaining:* Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Morocco, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Korea, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, TFYR Macedonia, Trinidad-Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela

C Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda 60

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 154 to 3, with 8 abstentions, as follows:<sup>c</sup>*

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<sup>c</sup> Subsequent to the voting, the delegation of Honduras informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

55/33 C *In favour:* Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian AR, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, United Kingdom, UR Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:* India, Israel, Pakistan

*Abstaining:* Bhutan, France, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius, Monaco, Russian Fed, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

- D 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 28

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 163 to 1, with 3 abstentions, as follows:*

55/33 D *In favour:* Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, United Kingdom, UR Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:* India

*Abstaining:* Cuba, Israel, Pakistan

E United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education

205

*Adopted without a vote*

## Voting patterns of resolutions and decision

		<i>Reference in text</i>
55/33 F	Assistance to States for curbing illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them	124
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
G	Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures	125
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
H	Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	92
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
I	Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	158
	<i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 159 to 4, with 5 abstentions, as follows:</i>	
	<i>In favour:</i> Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, DPR of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,	

55/33 I (cont.) Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:* France, Monaco, United Kingdom, United States

*Abstaining:* Andorra, India, Israel, Russian Fed, Spain

J Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol

92

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 163 to none, with 5 abstentions as follows:*

*In favour:* Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, DPR of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico,



55/33 J Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, (cont.) Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, United Kingdom, UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:* None

*Abstaining:* Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Rep of Korea, United States

- K Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control 174

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 165 to none, with 4 abstentions, as follows:*

*In favour:* Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, DPR of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Latvia,

- 55/33 K Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:* None

*Abstaining:* France, Israel, United Kingdom, United States

- L Relationship between disarmament and development 173

*Adopted without a vote*

- M Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament 194

*Adopted without a vote*

- N Reducing nuclear danger 62

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 110 to 45, with 14 abstentions, as follows:*

*In favour:* Algeria, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, DPR of Korea, Djibouti,

55/33 N Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat  
(cont.) Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,  
Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,  
India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya,  
Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ,  
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,  
Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia,  
Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru,  
Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,  
Papua N Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, St  
Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa,  
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore,  
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan,  
Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian AR, Thailand, Togo,  
Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan,  
Uganda, UA Emirates, UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu,  
Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:* Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria,  
Belgium, Bosnia/Herzeg, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,  
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,  
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,  
Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,  
Malta, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Netherlands, New  
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Moldova,  
Romania, Russian Fed, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia,  
Spain, Sweden, TFYR Macedonia, Turkey, United  
Kingdom, United States

*Abstaining:* Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, China,  
Georgia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,  
Paraguay, Rep of Korea, Tajikistan, Ukraine,  
Uzbekistan

O Regional disarmament 160

*Adopted without a vote*

55/33 P Conventional arms control at the regional and subre- 160  
gional levels

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 163 to 1, with 1 absten-  
tion, as follows:*

55/33 P *In favour:* Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, United Kingdom, UR Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:* India

*Abstaining:* Bhutan

55/33 Q Illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons

125

*Adopted without a vote*

55/33 R A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons

62

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 155 to 1, with 12 abstentions, as follows:*

*In favour:* Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, United Kingdom, UR Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:* India

*Abstaining:* Bhutan, China, Cuba, DPR of Korea, Egypt, France, Israel, Mauritius, Monaco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russian Fed

		Reference in text
55/33 S	Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status	158
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
T	Nuclear disarmament	63
	<i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 109 to 39, with 20 abstentions, as follows:</i>	
	<i>In favour:</i> Algeria, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, DPR of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian AR, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe	
	<i>Against:</i> Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia/Herzeg, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, TFYR Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States	

55/33 T Abstaining: Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus,  
(cont.) Georgia, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan,  
Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Rep of Korea, Russian Fed, San  
Marino, Sweden, Tajikistan, Ukraine, UA Emirates,  
Uzbekistan

55/33 U Transparency in armaments

126

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 149 to none, with 16  
abstentions, as follows:*<sup>d</sup>

*In favour:* Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand,

<sup>d</sup> Subsequent to the voting, the delegation of Qatar informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.

55/33 U TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago,  
(cont.) Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United  
Kingdom, UR Tanzania, United States, Uruguay,  
Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:* None

*Abstaining:* Algeria, Bahrain, China, DPR of Korea,  
Egypt, Iran (Isl R), Jordan, Libyan AJ, Mexico,  
Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syrian AR,  
Tunisia, UA Emirates

- V Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition 127  
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of  
Anti-personnel mines and on Their Destruction

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 143 to none, with 22  
abstentions, as follows:*

*In favour:* Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola,  
Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,  
Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados,  
Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,  
Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam,  
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon,  
Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa  
Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,  
Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, El  
Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji,  
Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany,  
Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana,  
Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland,  
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho,  
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar,  
Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius,  
Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia,  
Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,  
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua N Guinea,  
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar,  
Rep of Moldova, Romania, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia,  
St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra  
Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands,



## Voting patterns of resolutions and decision

*Reference  
in text*

55/33 V South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,  
(cont.) Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo,  
Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenis-  
tan, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, United Kingdom,  
UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen,  
Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:* None

*Abstaining:* Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, Egypt, India,  
Iran (Isl R), Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon,  
Libyan AJ, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (FS),  
Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, DPR of Korea, Russian  
Fed, Syrian AR, United States, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

W	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia	157
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*Adopted without a vote*

X	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the <i>Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons</i>	71
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*Adopted by a recorded vote of 119 to 28, with 22 abstentions, as follows:*

*In favour:* Algeria, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, DPR of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N

55/33 X Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, St  
(cont.) Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San  
Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,  
Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka,  
Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian AR,  
Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia,  
Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, UR Tanzania, Uruguay,  
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia,  
Zimbabwe

*Against:* Andorra, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech  
Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,  
Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,  
Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,  
Portugal, Romania, Russian Fed, Slovakia, Slovenia,  
Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States

*Abstaining:* Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria,  
Azerbaijan, Bosnia/Herzeg, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus,  
Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan,  
Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein, Rep of Korea, Rep of  
Moldova, Tajikistan, TFYR Macedonia, Turkmenistan,  
Uzbekistan

- Y The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1547) 64  
of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its  
agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race  
and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to  
negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special  
Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained  
therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and interna-  
tionally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the  
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or  
other nuclear explosive devices

*Adopted without a vote*

- 55/34 A United Nations Disarmament Information Programme 205  
*Adopted without a vote*

## Voting patterns of resolutions and decision

		<i>Reference in text</i>
55/34 B	Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa	161
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
C	United Nations disarmament, fellowship, training and advisory services	194
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
D	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa	161
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
E	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean	162
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
F	United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament	162
	<i>Adopted without a vote</i>	
G	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	65
	<i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 109 to 43, with 16 abstentions, as follows:</i>	
	<i>In favour:</i> Algeria, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-salam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Dem PR of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic R), Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia,	

55/34 G (cont.) Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, St Kitts- Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian AR, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:* Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia/Herzeg, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, TFYR Macedonia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States

*Abstaining:* Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Cyprus, Georgia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Rep of Korea, Russian Fed, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

H United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific 162

*Adopted without a vote*

55/35 A Twentieth anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

*Adopted without a vote*

B Report of the Conference on Disarmament 194

*Adopted without a vote*

55/35 C Report of the Disarmament Commission 194

*Adopted without a vote*

55/36

The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

66

*Adopted by a recorded vote of 157 to 3, with 8 abstentions, as follows:*

*In favour:* Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, DPR of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libyan AJ, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian AR, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, United Kingdom, UR Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:* Israel, Micronesia (FS), United States

*Abstaining:* Australia, Canada, Ethiopia, India, Marshall Islands, Singapore, Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago

		Reference in text
55/37	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects  <i>Adopted without a vote</i>	127
55/38	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region  <i>Adopted without a vote</i>	161
55/39	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)  <i>Adopted without a vote</i>	157
55/40	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction  <i>Adopted without a vote</i>	92
55/41	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty  <i>Adopted by a recorded vote of 161 to none, with 6 abstentions, as follows:</i>  <i>In favour:</i> Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia/Herzeg, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Dar-Salam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Rep, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equat Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Isl R), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,	67

## Voting patterns of resolutions and decision

*Reference  
in text*

55/41  
(cont.)      Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia (FS), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua N Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rep of Korea, Rep of Moldova, Romania, Russian Fed, St Kitts-Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent-Gren, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, TFYR Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UA Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

*Against:* None

*Abstaining:* Bhutan, India, Libyan AJ, Mauritius, Syrian AR, UR Tanzania

55/415      Small arms 125

*Adopted without a vote*

## APPENDIX VII

### List of reports and notes of the Secretary-General\*

#### *General Assembly*

<b>Agenda item 49</b>	<b>The Millennium Assembly of the United Nations</b>
A/54/959	Millennium Forum: note by the Secretariat, <i>p. 180</i>
A/54/2000	We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century: report of the Secretary-General, <i>p. 178</i>
<b>Agenda item 65</b>	<b>Reduction of military budgets</b>
A/55/272	Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures: report of the Secretary-General, <i>p. 113</i>
<b>Agenda item 68</b>	<b>Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security</b>
A/55/140, Add.1 and Corr. 1	Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security: report of the Secretary-General, <i>p. 170</i>
<b>Agenda item 70</b>	<b>Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East</b>
A/55/388	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General, <i>p. 142</i>
<b>Agenda item 73</b>	<b>General and complete disarmament</b>
A/55/115 and Add.1	Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol: note by the Secretary-General, <i>p. 77</i>
A/55/116 and Add.1	Missiles: report of the Secretary-General, <i>p. 48</i>

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\* Page numbers indicate references in the text.



## *Reports and notes of the Secretary-General*

A/55/129	Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control: report of the Secretary-General, <i>p. 174</i>
A/55/130 and Add.1	Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: report of the Secretary-General, <i>p. 185</i>
A/55/131 and Add.1	Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: note by the Secretary-General, <i>p. 59</i>
A/55/166	Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status: report of the Secretary-General, <i>p. 144</i>
A/55/189 and Add.1	Small arms: report of the Secretary-General, <i>p. 106</i>
A/55/216	Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them: report of the Secretary-General, <i>p. 109</i>
A/55/217	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda: report of the Secretary-General, <i>p. 55</i>
A/55/258	Relationship between disarmament and development: report of the Secretary-General, <i>p. 172</i>
A/55/299, Add.1-6 and Corr.1	United Nations register of conventional arms: report of the Secretary-General, <i>p. 111</i>
A/55/323 and Add.1	Illicit traffic in small arms: report of the Secretary-General, <i>p. 106</i>
A/55/324	Reducing nuclear danger: note by the Secretary-General, <i>p. 34</i>
A/55/444	Nuclear disarmament: note by the Secretary-General, <i>p. 59</i>
<b>Agenda item 74</b>	<b>Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly</b>
A/55/128 and Add.1	United Nations Disarmament Information Programme: report of the Secretary-General, <i>p. 202</i>
A/55/151	United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament: note by the Secretary-General, <i>p. 140</i>

- A/55/152 and  
Corr.1 United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services: report of the Secretary-General, *p. 188*
- A/55/169 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean: report of the Secretary-General, *p. 149*
- A/55/170 Activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa: report of the Secretary-General, *p. 147*
- A/55/171 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa: report of the Secretary-General, *p. 147*
- A/55/181 United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific: report of the Secretary-General, *p. 152*
- A/55/281 Continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and its further development: note by the Secretary-General, *p. 110*
- Agenda item 75 Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session**
- A/55/349 Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters: report of the Secretary-General, *p. 185*
- Agenda item 76 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East**
- A/55/267 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research: note by the Secretary-General, *p. 204*
- A/55/448 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General, *p. 53*
- Agenda item 77 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects**
- A/55/97 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects: report of the Secretary-General, *p. 124*
- Agenda item 78 Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region**

*Reports and notes of the Secretary-General*

A/55/254      Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region, *p. 157*

**Agenda item 81      Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty**

A/55/336      Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: note by the Secretary-General, *p. 42*

***Security Council***

S/2000/1092      Methods of destruction of small arms, light weapons, ammunition and explosives: report of the Secretary-General, *p. 99*

## APPENDIX VIII

### Disarmament resolutions and decision listed by chapter

*Reference  
in text*

<b>Chapter I</b>	<b>2000 NPT Review Conference</b>	
55/33 D	2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	28
<b>Chapter II</b>	<b>Other nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues</b>	
	<i>Nuclear disarmament</i>	
55/33 C	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda	60
55/33 N	Reducing nuclear danger	62
55/33 R	A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons	62
55/33 T	Nuclear disarmament	63
55/33 Y	The Conference on Disarmament decision (CD/1574) of 11 August 1998 to establish, under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", an ad hoc committee to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	64
55/34 G	Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons	65

## *Disarmament resolutions and decision*

	<i>Reference in text</i>
<b><i>Non-proliferation and related issues</i></b>	
55/31 Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	65
55/36 The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	66
<b><i>Nuclear tests</i></b>	
55/41 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	
<b><i>ABM Treaty and missiles</i></b>	
55/33 A Missiles	68
55/33 B Preservation of and compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems	69
<b><i>International Court of Justice</i></b>	
55/33 X Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the <i>Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons</i>	71
<b>Chapter III Biological and chemical weapons</b>	
55/33 J Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol	92
55/33 H Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	92
55/40 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction	92
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## APPENDIX IX

### Abbreviations and acronyms

ABM Treaty	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
APLs	anti-personnel landmines
APMs	anti-personnel mines
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BMD	ballistic missile defence
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CANWFZ	Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CASA	Coordinating Action on Small Arms
CBMs	confidence-building measures
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CFE Treaty	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CICAD	Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CMC	Cooperative Monitoring Center (US Sandia National Laboratories)
CNCCAI	National Commission for the Monitoring and Collection of Illicit Arms
COPAX	Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa
CSBMs	confidence- and security-building measures
CSCAP	Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DDA	Department for Disarmament Affairs
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPKO	Department of Peace-keeping Operations
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea

EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ECAAR	Economists Allied for Arms Reduction
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Observer Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECPS	Executive Committee on Peace and Security
EEA	European Economic Area
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EISAS	Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security
EU	European Union
FSC	Forum for Security Cooperation
GCI	Global Communications Infrastructure
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IANSA	International Action Network on Small Arms
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
ICGEB	International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDC	International Data Centre
IMS	International Monitoring System
JDEC	Joint Data Exchange Center
MANPADS	Man Portable Air Defence Systems
MDI	Monitoring, Database and Information Branch, DDA
MIRV	multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	non-governmental organizations
NMD	national missile defence
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWFZ	nuclear-weapon-free zone
NWS	nuclear-weapon State
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity

## *Abbreviations and acronyms*

OPANAL	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSI	on-site inspections
PCASED	Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum
PTBT	Partial Test-Ban Treaty
PTS	Provisional Technical Secretariat (of the CTBTO)
RGSA	Reference Group on Small Arms
SACSQCA	Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SC	Standing Committee
SCE	Standing Committee of Experts
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
SEEI	Southeast Europe Initiative (NATO)
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SSOD	special session on disarmament
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (I, II and III)
TMD	theatre missile defence
UNDC	United Nations Disarmament Commission
UNDCP	United Nations International Drug Control Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNISPACE	United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
VEREX	Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint
VERTIC	Verification Research, Training and Information Centre
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

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