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Letter dated 18 April 1983 from the Permanent Representative of
Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 18 April 1983 addressed to you by Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Federated State of Kibris.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. Coşkun KIRCA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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ANNEX

Letter dated 18 April 1983 from Mr. Nail Atalay
to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to attach herewith a letter dated 18 April 1983 addressed to Your Excellency by H.E. Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Federated State of Kibris.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nail ATALAY
Representative of the
Turkish Federated State of Kibris

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APPENDIX

Letter dated 18 April 1983 from Mr. Rauf R. Denktas
to the Secretary-General

I regret I have to bring to Your Excellency's notice some developments which, no doubt, along with the unilateral resort to U.N. General Assembly by the Greek Cypriot side, will adversely affect the process of the intercommunal negotiations. I refer to Mr. Kyprianou's recent visit to Athens which has underlined the involvement of Greece in the Cyprus conflict and her continuing grave responsibility for the developments in the island for decades.

The joint decision by Greece and the Greek Cypriot leadership to resort to U.N. is, once again, not a decision of the legitimate Cyprus government but of the Greek Cypriot wing of Cyprus and in furtherance of the pan-Hellenistic ideal for the ultimate union of the island with Greece. This has been made abundantly clear in statements made by President Karamanlis of Greece and by Premier Papandreou. I must, therefore, put on record once again certain undeniable facts.

The bi-communal partnership in the independence of Cyprus which was established in 1960 after the unsuccessful attempt by Greece and its agents in Cyprus to unite the island with Greece through terrorism had a chance of permanence if and only if this bi-communal independence was accepted as a cherished end by the two co-founder partners of the Republic of Cyprus, i.e. the Turkish and Greek peoples of the island. The guarantees against Enosis and partition were worked out in order to satisfy both peoples that permanence of the Republic was assured, thus giving them the chance, through an evolutionary process, to work out a common destiny.

Mr. Averoff, the then Foreign Minister of Greece had, however, shocked the Turkish side when in 1959, he declared in the Greek Parliament that:

"The direction towards independence is not a Greek manoeuvre... But I ask you, if in order to reach Enosis, one were obliged to make the manoeuvre of a temporary independence, would he who had done this deserve criticism."

(Cyprus Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958,
Stephen C. Xydis, Ohio University Press, 1967,
p.53)

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Archbishop Makarios joined the race for keeping the Enosis (Union of Cyprus with Greece) campaign open. His statements from 1960 to 1977 to this end are unequivocal. Mr. Kyprianou's understanding of the value of independence for Cyprus was equally clear-cut and to the point when he spoke on 1 April 1967, on the occasion of the 12th anniversary of the commencement of the EOKA terrorist campaign for Enosis:

"Another essential prerequisite is the maintenance by the Greek Cypriots of their national issue as such. They should never think that the Cyprus question can be considered, even for a moment, a political matter. It is neither a political nor a party nor a personal matter.

"It is a national issue both for Cyprus and Greece and, the solution cannot be anything else than Enosis... At this critical stage the Cyprus struggle is passing through, there is a great advantage which did not exist in 1955 and that is the fact that Cyprus has now a voice of her own in the international field. In spite of a large number of disadvantages, Cyprus is now an independent and sovereign state and, therefore, her struggle for union with Greece is easier and shorter than before."

(Official Press Release, No.4 of 1 April 1967,
Greek Cypriot P.I.O.)

Mr. Kyprianou's rejection of the embedded partnership rights to the Turkish Cypriots in the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus and his rejection of every bilateral agreement between the two peoples of Cyprus since 1974 with his unabashed pretence to be able to speak for both peoples, and his constant rejection of all formulae for the re-establishment of the bi-communal partnership republic on agreed terms, spring from this belief that independence can be used for achieving union of the island with Greece or for ultimate take-over of the bi-communal island by Greek Cypriots. The archaic idea that Hellenism must be revived everywhere Alexander the Great once trod, continues to be the main impediment to accepting the basic fact that Cyprus can survive as one country only by subscribing to the equal partnership rights of the Turkish Cypriots in the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. Keeping alive the hope that Cyprus will eventually be united with Greece is damaging all efforts for re-establishing a bi-communal republic on the basis of my accord with Archbishop Makarios back in 1977 which ostensibly continues to provide the guidelines for the final settlement of this Greek-instigated problem of Cyprus.

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It is, therefore, with great disappointment that I report to you the destructive statement of Mr. Karamanlis' toast to Mr. Kyprianou as reported in ANA bulletin from Athens dated 11 April 1983:

"The Cyprus struggle as known, was conducted, up to 1960, in common and in agreement with Makarios and we arrived after many painful adventures at the independence of the island - an independence which would allow Cyprus to develop as an exemplary state in the Eastern Mediterranean without dismissing the hope of union with Greece under certain conditions and basically under the condition of defining by Athens and Nicosia of a parallel foreign policy."

It is ironical that Mr. Karamanlis was the leader who had signed the Zurich and London Agreements which ostensibly had closed the road to Enosis and partition. It is extremely disappointing to have it confirmed that, that signature by Greece was only a ruse for getting power in Cyprus for use against the Turkish Cypriot partners with a view to uniting Cyprus with Greece. In this context it is worth while to remember this excerpt from the joint communique issued on 2 February 1966, at the end of Archbishop Makarios' visit to Athens:

"... The two governments object to any solution ruling out the island's union with Greece..."

That is why the intercommunal talks during 1968-1974 period did not result in a compromise settlement because the Turkish side had insisted then as it insists now, that Enosis in any form with any country shall continue to be outlawed. Unfortunately the latest Athens visit by Mr. Kyprianou had underlined once again, the fact that the expansionist aims of Greece continue to guide the Greek Cypriot leadership. For a better appreciation of the eulogy to Enosis (union with Greece) and the treatment of the Cyprus problem as a problem of pan-Hellenism which must continue until the final consummation, Mr. Karamanlis' statement is attached to this letter as it appeared in ANA bulletin.

I would be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the U.N. General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Rauf R. Denktas
President of the
Turkish Federated State of Kibris

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Enclosure

Greeks became established in Cyprus, as is known three and a half thousand years ago and made her a second Greece. Later, they followed a parallel - a totally parallel - course to that of the Greeks of continental Greece. They maintained through the ages unchanging brotherly bonds with them and preserved the features of their common descent: language, religion and culture - that is, the basic characteristics of the unity of the nation.

Given this, it was natural for the Greek people of Cyprus to always have their eyes everted to Greece and to want to unite with her. And this reasonable desire became more intense and bit by bit took on the form of a liberation struggle from the time Greece became an independent state.

That struggle passed through many stages. The most critical of them, however, and the most dramatic, was the one that began after the (Second World) War and continues still.

It has been a struggle full of heroism, of international treachery and of mistakes of our own. A difficult struggle, just like all of our national struggles, which took on a pan-Hellenic nature and became manifest on all fronts, with Archbishop Makarios and General Grivas in the forefront, a struggle, finally difficult, as I said, but also courageous, because we knew from the outset that we would have to face more powerful opponents.

Despite that, we undertook the struggle because we believed that the superiority of our opponents would be neutralised by the spirit of freedom and democracy which appeared to prevail in the post war world.

That struggle, as you know, I myself experienced personally and intensely. Just as you too experienced it, Mr. President. And although by nature, I avoid emotional and rhetorical flights, I am able to assure you that I have felt pain over the case of Cyprus as few others have. Because I laboured for the Cyprus issue and bound it to my political history.

Mr. President,

The Cyprus struggle, as known, was conducted up to 1960 in common and in agreement with Makarios. And we arrived, after many painful adventures at the independence of the island. An independence which would allow Cyprus to develop as an exemplary state in the Eastern Mediterranean, without dismissing the hope of union with Greece, under certain conditions and basically under the condition of the defining by Athens and Nicosia of a parallel foreign policy.
