

UNITED NATIONS



# SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

# 2420<sup>th</sup>

MEETING: 23 MARCH 1983

NEW YORK

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#### NOTE

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## 2420th MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 23 March 1983, at 4.30 p.m.

*President:* Sir John THOMSON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

*Present:* The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

### Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2420)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Letter dated 22 March 1983 from the Deputy Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua addressed to the President of Security Council (S/15651)

*The meeting was called to order at 4.40 p.m.*

### Adoption of the agenda

*The agenda was adopted.*

#### **Letter dated 22 March 1983 from the Deputy Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15651)**

1. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Security Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Honduras, Mexico and Panama in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Ortez Colindres (Honduras) took a place at the Council table. Mr. Muñoz Ledo (Mexico) and Mr. Ozores Typaldos (Panama) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.*

2. The PRESIDENT: The Security Council is meeting today in response to the request made by the Deputy Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua to the Security Council in his letter dated 22 March 1983 to the President of the Security Council [S/15651].

3. Mr. TINOCO (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Approximately one year ago, on 25 March 1982 [2335th meeting], the Security Council heard an important and historic statement by the Co-ordinator of the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction, Commander Daniel Ortega Saavedra, regarding the aggressive activities carried out against the Sandinist People's Revolution and the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua by the United States Administration by means of counter-revolutionary bands.

4. Today, almost 12 months later, the people of Nicaragua is facing a new aggressive escalation of acts by the American Administration, in the form now of massive infiltration of military units and task forces of Somoza counter-revolutionaries from the territory of Honduras.

5. The international community is fully aware of, and the mass media have widely publicized, the acts of aggression that have been endured over the past two years by the Sandinist Revolution. The existence and use of counter-revolutionary encampments in Honduran territory all along the border with Nicaragua has been amply described and attested to in print as well as on film. Nor is any one here present unaware that the activities conducted by those counter-revolutionary elements had until very recently been characterized by a series of acts of military sabotage and terrorist actions taking the form mainly of attacks on civilians, towns and military posts all along the common border between Honduras and Nicaragua.

6. The beginning of 1982, when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States decided to set up the Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN) in order to group together counter-revolutionary elements, career military personnel, members of the Somozist National Guard, as well as other groups, and thus place them under the central leadership and direction of the CIA, marked the first stage of the systematic and accelerated development of counter-revolutionary activity against the Sandinist People's Revolution.

7. In the first phase of that development, the so-called Nicaraguan democratic force conducted a number of operations under United States direction, consisting mainly of sabotage and demolition of aircraft, incidents such as the detonation of a terrorist bomb in the Augusto César Sandino International Airport at Managua, which caused the deaths of three Nicaraguan immigration officers, and the demolition of two bridges along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border.

8. At the same time, military facilities have been set up on Honduran territory with the co-operation of Honduran Army units. This has led to the establishment of a real army, a sinister and reactionary one, which, with the necessary logistic support to sustain military operations and in general to maintain facilities for carrying out intermittent or sustained acts of war against Nicaragua, is now beginning to act in systematic fashion.

9. Between January and October 1982 an exceedingly important role has been played by counter-revolutionary training camps in United States territory, specifically, in the states of Florida, Texas and California. Ignoring and flouting its own laws and its own Neutrality Act, the United States Administration has been pushing ahead with the massive training of Somozist counter-revolutionaries in various private areas in Florida and the other afore-mentioned states, arguing that because those activities take place on private property they violate neither international nor United States law. In that connection there are films and various illustrated and written documents.

10. From July to October 1982 there began the process of massive transfers of the personnel recently retrained in Florida—for there were already career soldiers in the Somozist army—to the counter-revolutionary camps located in Honduran territory along the border with Nicaragua. In the last three months of 1982 settlements were installed in the region of Jinotega and Zelaya Norte, along with a co-ordinated and systematic series of attacks and harassment along the border in which increasingly sophisticated weapons were used.

11. In November 1982 there was an increase in infiltrations from Honduras aimed at sabotaging Nicaraguan agricultural production, on the one hand, and an attempt to take Jalapa—which is very near the Honduran border—on the other, a plan which met with complete failure because of the mobilization of the Nicaraguan people both economically and militarily.

12. I should like to point out clearly that Nicaraguan internal production for its main exports has, despite these plans, reached the highest levels in the history of the Revolution.

13. Following this complete failure of the counter-revolutionary forces, the CIA put into action the so-called Plan C, which provided for giving accelerated logistic support in ever-increasing quantity to the counter-revolutionary forces and for a significant increase in the efforts to recruit more elements for the counter-revolutionary forces. Then there was a restructuring of the so-called FDN under the guidance of the self-same CIA, in which the FDN constituted its political leadership, with a general staff and special forces.

14. Hence already on the eve of 1983 the first major or serious attempts were made at infiltration and settlement by the first Somozist counter-revolutionary units in Nicaraguan territory, and there were attempts by those forces

to take over the regions of Wuina, Wiwilí and Nueva Segovia, in the north of Nicaragua, very near the border with Honduras. Nevertheless, within a few days those efforts fell apart because of the activities of the Sandinist militias and the Sandinist People's Army.

15. This new stage, this new escalation in the history of aggression by the American Administration against the people and Government of Nicaragua, began early this year, 1983, by means of a systematic process of concentrating counter-revolutionary forces which had hitherto been scattered in various camps along the border between Nicaragua and Honduras. This concentration occurred in two main areas. One of the points of concentration of the Somozist forces was in Honduran territory near the Jalapa area; the other was also in Honduran territory, in the area near Puerto Cabezas on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast, in the northern part of the country. And it is precisely from this strategic troop concentration that the CIA orders the Somozist murderers and ruffians to infiltrate our territory *en masse*.

16. Thus, in the first few days of February this year—that is to say, last month—the process of massive infiltration of our national territory began with small military units numbering approximately 2,000 men. Of these approximately 2,000 troops coming from the area of concentration near Jalapa, in Honduran territory, a large number remain in the mountainous region of Nicaragua, very close to the border with Honduras, and a very small number of these Somozist troops, organized in bands of approximately 100 men, have been infiltrating deeper into our national territory, reaching the area of Matagalpa, in the vicinity of Río Blanco.

17. At the same time, it is important to point out that on the other side, in the area of Honduras adjacent to Puerto Cabezas, counter-revolutionary forces camped there—and this is the second point of concentration to which I referred—about 2,500 men, faced serious difficulties in developing their massive infiltration plans at the same time as the forces that infiltrated the areas of Jinotega and Nueva Segovia. That is to say, there was no co-ordination in the introduction of the forces coming from those two main strategic concentrations.

18. The difficulty for these counter-revolutionary forces arose when, approximately three weeks ago, the task force of some 300 men that was detached in order to act as a vanguard for the entry for all those forces was found and surrounded by forces of the Sandinist militias and the Sandinist People's Army, which, in advance, inflicted a total rout on these troops. That military rout of the counter-revolutionary advance forces in the Nicaraguan Atlantic region played a determining role in thwarting so far the infiltration plans of the forces encamped in the area.

19. We should like to emphasize that the total number of men encamped on Honduran territory near the north-eastern region of Nicaragua, that is, the Atlantic region, is estimated at little more than 2,500, most of whom, as I

said earlier, are career soldiers of the genocidal Somozist Guard and members of the elite School for Basic Infantry Training, which was a corps especially set up for repression of the people.

20. With regard to the military activities of these Somozist forces infiltrated into our national territory, it is important to emphasize that their work has been aimed mainly at civilian targets. In their military activities they have been unable to take a single town, not even the smallest village, and their military tactical initiatives have been completely foiled.

21. The United States Government, which nurtured and nursed this dictatorship and which benefited from the way in which it sold its country down the river for the sake of its own economic enrichment, is today behind the new acts of aggression and behind the suffering that the Nicaraguan people is once more undergoing. These Somozist groups exist only to the extent that they are financed, trained and directed by institutions of the United States Government, which turns them into a tool for its own policy in the region.

22. At this stage we must define and state clearly how the Nicaraguan Governing Junta of National Reconstruction and the national leadership of the Sandinist National Liberation Front perceive the present situation: we should like to state quite clearly that we regard neither this counter-revolutionary force that has infiltrated the country nor the other 2,500 men who may infiltrate the Atlantic coast area as a threat in themselves to the stability of revolutionary power within our country. Not only will those forces be defeated militarily in the near future—today they have already been encircled and followed by the Sandinist militias and by the Sandinist People's Army—but from the political standpoint they have already been defeated, because they represent the scum that has caused our people's suffering. In the opinion of the Nicaraguan Government of National Reconstruction, the danger does not reside in these counter-revolutionary forces themselves, as by and large they have remained in the mountain areas of Nicaragua, very close to the Honduran border; on the contrary, the danger, which is very serious, resides in the fact that these actions of the Somozist forces in the centre and the north of the country may represent secondary or diversionary actions designed to facilitate the delivery of a more strategic blow to the Nicaraguan Revolution in other more sensitive areas—economically, politically and militarily speaking—such as the Pacific area of Nicaragua near the Honduran border.

23. Here we should like to draw attention to the fact that practically all, or most, of the forces of the Somozist Guard are already involved in the plans of aggression in the north of the country and the infiltration plans for the north-east Atlantic area and that therefore any more strategic type of military blow against our Revolution in the Pacific area would of necessity have to be dealt by forces other than the Somozists.

24. To be exact, we are thinking of the possibility that the Honduran army and other forces in the region may be pressured and encouraged to get more deeply and directly involved in the acts of aggression against the Sandinist Revolution. In this connection, we should like to draw the attention of members of the Security Council to four specific facts which strengthen these fears that are felt not only by the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction but by other distinguished Latin American leaders with regard to the potential dangers of such a situation.

25. First, the fact that approximately 1,500 or more of the members of the forces that have infiltrated the country are in the border area increases the likelihood that in the Sandinist forces' combat process against the reactionary elements, military units of the Honduran army may become involved in the conflict, whether they desire it or not. We believe that this would be a very appropriate pretext for the enemy forces of Nicaragua to use in order to start an accelerated escalation of the participation of the Honduran army in this counter-revolutionary activity.

26. Secondly, the Honduran army is massing troops in Honduran territory in the very area right behind the activities of the Somozist groups in the Jalapa area.

27. Thirdly, the Honduran army is also concentrating and massing troops in the Choluteca area of Honduras, which adjoins the most strategic and sensitive areas of the Pacific area of Nicaragua.

28. Fourthly, in the last few hours specific events have taken place that confirm our fears concerning the possible role of the Honduran army. I am referring to the fact that late on 20 March, at 4.06 p.m., to be precise, Honduran troops located in Las Lomas de los Pastores, in Honduran territory 1.5 kilometres south-west of Santo Tomás del Nance, opened fire with rifles, 81-mm mortars and 50-mm machine-guns on the Vado Ancho observation post, located two kilometres south-west of Santo Tomás del Nance. At 5.35 p.m. of the same day Honduran troops once again attacked the aforementioned observation post.

29. Similarly, yesterday, at 9.00 a.m., in the Palo Verde area, in Honduran territory west of Santo Tomás del Nance, the Honduran army carried out a massive deployment of military forces in an offensive pattern only 800 metres from the border with Nicaragua. In this connection, we have already sent the corresponding note of protest to the Government of Honduras [*S/15656, annex II*].

30. The responsibility of the United States Administration for this potential danger threatening peace in Central America cannot be hidden. The political will and determination of the main leaders of the present American Administration in trying to defeat the Nicaraguan revolutionary Junta and to destroy the Sandinista People's Revolution, using all the means available to them, cannot be denied. Suffice it to recall but a few elements

that illustrate this and refer to the basis and history of this strange systematic and vehement persecution of the Sandinista People's Revolution. On 15 July 1980, in the text adopted at its National Convention in Detroit, the Republican Party, in its political platform for the elections, shamefully and unprecedentedly stated:

"We deplore the taking of Nicaragua by the Marxist Sandinistas. We do not support any United States aid for any Marxist Government in this hemisphere, and we oppose the Carter Administration's programme of assistance to the Government of Nicaragua. Nevertheless we will support the efforts of the people of Nicaragua to establish a free and independent Government."

31. That was the prelude, an expression of the desire and determination of the extreme right to put an end to the very existence of the Sandinist People's Revolution. From that time on, and when the Reagan Administration took office, we saw the beginning of hostile attitudes in all fields towards the Government of Nicaragua. One of the first acts of foreign policy of the present American Administration was to cut off the remainder of the aid for Nicaragua that had been approved by the Carter Administration.

32. Subsequently a series of policies succeeded one another in the economic, diplomatic and military fields, designed to undermine the existence of the Nicaraguan Revolution. With regard to financial and economic matters many manoeuvres were undertaken to block loans by various international organizations, such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. Several actions designed to destabilize Nicaragua were begun by the CIA. From the initial bands of paramilitary counter-revolutionaries who began to operate inside the country and subsequently went to the training camps in Florida, we have come to the present serious situation that threatens the Central American region with the new policy of supporting infiltration by Somozist bands into our country.

33. Some very recent statements by various American officials give us an idea of the manner in which the present United States Administration deals with Central American problems and how they shape their policy regarding Nicaragua. In essence we can say that what was stated in the Republican platform in July 1980 has changed not a whit. On the contrary, the gravity of their measures has increased.

34. In his message to the President of Panama in February of this year, President Ronald Reagan said:

"We offer regional comprehensive *rapprochement* in the search for peace, democracy and development in Central America. Unfortunately these principles are not shared by all, nor can we commit ourselves to trusting peaceful means alone to settle international domestic disputes."

On 22 February, in his statement to the War Veterans Association, he stated:

"Central America is too close to us, and our strategic interest in the maritime routes of the Caribbean and the Panama Canal is too great, for us not to pay attention to reality. The spectre of Governments controlled by Marxist-Leninists in Central America having political and ideological loyalty to Cuba and the Soviet Union is a direct challenge that we must deal with."

35. According to the Latin American service of Reuters, on 21 February 1982, Mr. Thomas O. Enders, Under-Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, said:

"We must make it clear that if the Soviet Union and Cuba, together or separately, intend to turn Nicaragua into the same kind of threat as was the case of Cuba after the revolution, then the United States will certainly take action to make sure that that does not happen."

36. On 17 February 1983 the United States newspaper, *The Miami Herald*, referring to an appearance by Mr. William Casey, head of the CIA, before Congress, reported as follows:

"Casey asked the Congress for funds to continue to be provided until 1984 to finance the controversial covert operation against Nicaragua. The role of the United States continues to be limited to giving financial assistance and advice to anti-Sandinist forces in Honduras for the carrying out of attacks against Nicaragua."

37. In the official news bulletin of the United States Embassy in Managua of 4 March 1983—we do not know if it is the same news bulletin issued in other Latin American countries—there is a quotation from the speech made by President Reagan to the members of the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, as follows:

"The threat is more to the entire Western Hemisphere and towards the area than it is to one country. If they get a foothold, and with Nicaragua already there, and El Salvador should fall as a result of this armed violence on the part of the guerrillas, I think Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, all of these would follow."

The same United States Embassy bulletin, dated 11 March, quotes a speech made by President Reagan on 10 March to the National Association of Manufacturers as follows:

"The nations of Central America are among our nearest neighbours. El Salvador, for example, is nearer to Texas than Texas is to Massachusetts. Central America is simply too close, and the strategic stakes are too high, for us to ignore the danger of Governments seizing power there with ideological and military ties to the Soviet Union."

“Half of all the foreign trade of the United States passes through either the Canal or the other Caribbean sea lanes on its way to or from our ports.

“We’ve been slow to understand that the defence of the Caribbean and Central America against Marxist-Leninist takeover is vital to our national security in ways we’re not accustomed to thinking about.”

38. The new situation facing the Nicaraguan Revolution as a result of the escalation of the aggression aimed against our Government is one that the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction is facing calmly, while taking the necessary measures on the domestic, material, military and political levels to ensure that such plans of aggression shall not succeed. The support of the people of Nicaragua for such measures is enthusiastic, and the participation of the Nicaraguan masses in militias and reserve units is even greater than it has been in the past. In this connection the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction has clearly and repeatedly stated that every measure taken against the Somozist aggression fostered by the United States is a measure to protect the highest interests of the Nicaraguan people and to preserve the civil and public liberties that are the hallmarks of our pluralistic process and our mixed economy. The Governing Junta has specifically announced that this political pluralism will be maintained despite all foreign aggression. It has reiterated its right to strengthen our lines of defence whenever the situation so demands and has, finally, stated quite clearly that the defence of the Nicaraguan Revolution and the defence of Nicaragua’s territorial integrity will be carried out energetically, with determination within and to the limits of our own territory. This clearly means that any internationalization of the conflict in the border area between Honduras and Nicaragua will be the result of provocation and premeditated action on the part of reactionary forces at the international level acting against Nicaragua.

39. We would like to draw to the attention of members of the Security Council the fact that already the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries has, at various levels—at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau held from 10 to 14 January 1983 at Managua, as well as at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983—drawn attention to the continuing acts of aggression and offensive acts intended to destabilize the Sandinist Revolution and has appealed for the cessation of such acts. The heads of State or Government called upon the United States Administration to adopt a constructive attitude and asked the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to follow closely and with keen attention the development of acts of aggression against Nicaragua.

40. The fears expressed by the Nicaraguan Revolution regarding a possible internationalization of the conflict

in the region continue to be valid. We should like to point out that we have recent military information, gathered from the counter-revolutionary forces assembled on Honduran territory, that in the next few days those forces plan to move in three directions towards the interior of the country. One route would be towards the area of Jalapa, Nueva Segovia and Teotecacinte, in the centre of the country; in other words, it would be reinforcement for the counter-revolutionary forces already in that area. The second would be in the direction of the Nicaraguan gold mines in the northeastern part of our country, and the third would be towards the Puerto Cabezas area near the Mosquitia region of Nicaragua.

41. We should also like to inform you that intelligence sources have informed us of something of great concern to us, namely, that in the counter-revolutionary camps in Mocorón, in Honduran territory in the Atlantic region; in Trojes, in the central region of Jalapa; and in El Paraíso, in the region nearer the Pacific, feverish activity has been begun by the Somozist forces and their advisers aimed at attempting to infiltrate over the next few days—according to latest intelligence estimates—some 4,000 more men into Nicaraguan territory.

42. Our statement in the Council is designed to appeal to the American Administration to cease its aggressive stance against our country, its attempts to defeat the Revolutionary Government and destroy the Sandinist People’s Revolution, its threatening military manoeuvres, the “secret” but widely recognized war the Reagan Administration is waging against our country and to cease to create pain and suffering for our people. We appeal to the United States to cease turning a deaf ear to the peace initiatives that the countries of Latin America and countries outside the region have been making. We urge the United States to revise its policy and abandon its course of military and bellicose solutions to the Central American crisis; we appeal to the United States to reconsider, calmly and with the historic responsibility incumbent upon it because of its very power and strength, all peace initiatives presented, such as those, for example, of the Governments of Mexico and Venezuela, in an attempt to reach a solution to the border problem between Honduras and Nicaragua and proposals such as the one issued from Contadora Island in January this year<sup>1</sup> by the Governments of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, which draws attention to the most important main elements of the Central American crisis with a view to finding peaceful and practical negotiated solutions to it. We appeal to the members of the Council and to the international community to exert their efforts to develop in a co-ordinated manner a policy conducive to peaceful, negotiated solutions in the Central American region.

43. For its part Nicaragua reiterates its willingness to enter into a dialogue on Central American problems, its readiness to tackle immediately the problems and differences that have arisen as a result of military actions in the northern border area with Honduras and its open,

constructive attitude with regard to any type of peaceful solution to the crisis in the Central American region.

44. Finally, because it is extremely important for the future, peace and lives of more than 20 million Central Americans, we urge the international community to remain ready and alert in the face of the sinister intentions of international reactionary forces that are trying to turn the border conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras into a large-scale aggression of a strategic nature aimed at the Sandinist People's Revolution.

45. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Honduras, on whom I call.

46. Mr. ORTEZ COLINDRES (Honduras) (*interpretation from Spanish*): We have listened with due attention to the statement of the representative of Nicaragua, Mr. Victor Hugo Tinoco, in which an effort was made to involve Honduras in events relating to internal uprisings against the Sandinist régime which is governing his country. My Government would like to set forth clearly its position in that respect so as to contribute, as a Member respectful of its international obligations, to the maintenance of peace in Central America and thereby in the international community. I should then like to comment on certain other matters that have been raised and deal briefly with the charges made against us.

47. First, Honduras, as is well known to all, is part of a regional context comprising mainly five countries which formed—from 1823 to 1838—the Federal Republic of Central America. Those countries are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and, of course, our country. The economic and political interests of those five States have always been intimately interrelated. As will be recalled, until just a few years ago, there flourished in the subregion of the American continent one of the most important politico-economic movements—the Common Market of Central America—and the fundamental regional agreements that were part of that arrangement are more or less still in existence.

48. I wish to draw attention to the fact that the headquarters of a principal international body, of which I had the honour to be President for thirteen and a half years—the Central American Bank for Economic Integration—is located at Tegucigalpa, where every 21 days representatives of the five Governments, including Nicaragua, meet to negotiate credits in that international institution. Incidentally, in all fairness it should be said that 65 per cent of its operating budget comes from soft loans by the people of the United States.

49. Honduras, we wish to make clear, is not involved in a bilateral dispute with Nicaragua, a sister-country; on the contrary, in the regional context, Honduras is subject to all the important political repercussions relating to the situation in neighbouring States.

50. Secondly, in actuality what we have before us is an exclusively internal Nicaraguan problem. While it is not Honduran troops who are fighting 10 kilometres inside

Nicaragua's border, but rather Nicaraguans, that is something which also affects us. However, in the view of our Government, the present situation in Nicaragua is related to increasing political and social tensions between the Sandinist Government and opposition groups of all political tendencies in Nicaragua, with which the Government has not been able to agree on establishing a pluralistic and democratic society in Nicaragua, as was declared in the Manifesto of the Sandinist Movement when General Somoza's régime was overthrown. The situation which has just arisen, as well as the preceding events, must therefore be resolved exclusively by the Nicaraguans themselves.

51. Today, coincidentally, a full year has elapsed since the Minister for External Relations, Mr. Edgardo Paz Barnica, presented to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) a peace proposal [S/14919, annex] which, among other things, would immediately lay the groundwork for general disarmament in the region and result in an objective and reasonable reduction in the number of foreign advisers, military and others—who are of course extracontinental advisers in the case of Nicaragua. As we have stated publicly, we favour the creation of appropriate international supervisory machinery, to which Honduras is willing to submit, to exercise control over the sensitive areas in the two countries and deal with the destabilizing factors to which I have referred. Let us develop procedures and set up appropriate machinery to put an end to the arms traffic in the region.

52. I have seen a large number of enormous trucks using our territory for the transport of armaments from across the Nicaraguan border. Evidence of this has been submitted to the diplomatic corps and the international press on many occasions. That is why we wish the fundamental aspect to be maintained: that is, absolute respect for established boundaries. With Nicaragua we have a legally established boundary about which much has been said—a river boundary, formed by the big Segovia River, which runs from the Teotecacinte mountain pass all the way to the Atlantic, and there is no dispute over that legally delineated border. In that connection, Honduras wishes to respect not only those boundaries but also the traditional jurisdictional borders of all the States of the region with a view to avoiding any possible threat to peace and to establishing the parameters for a permanent dialogue.

53. We have here the Secretary-General, who knows that a year ago we showed a very strong desire at the highest official levels that the Organization should spark a permanent and serious dialogue so that we, the five countries of Central America, where violence is now rampant, could make a step forward in the search for peace and not just go on concealing Central America's difficult situation behind the smoke-screen of events.

54. This is why we are interested in developing such parameters through a multilateral permanent dialogue that would make it possible, at both the internal and international levels, to encourage political agreements



aimed at strengthening a democratic and pluralistic system.

55. The Government of my country is one produced by popular election. We would like to see our Nicaraguan brothers enjoy a similar atmosphere and to speak not of weapons but of votes cast in the coming days or years to give legitimacy to an authority that was taken by force.

56. We have to be consistent with this proposal, and for this reason Honduras is prepared to contribute to a regional dialogue that would enable the achievement of the objectives I have just outlined. This is why we regard this problem most seriously and have sent invitations to other countries of the region, with Costa Rica, which is a democratic country, suggesting that a meeting take place as soon as possible to seek solutions that would enable us to consolidate peace. Four countries responded positively; only the Government of Nicaragua did not specifically respond to that invitation to start a permanent dialogue. Let us hope that it may now be possible to produce a recommendation here that will enable us to crystallize this desire for peace involving five countries of Central America. We should certainly be very happy to see some neighbouring democratic countries participating also in such a dialogue. We very much welcome the initiative of the Governments of Venezuela and Mexico, as well as the efforts of another democracy, the Dominican Republic, which has very generously offered its own territory as a site for such a meeting.

57. We adhere to the principle of non-intervention, and we wish to reiterate here that the Government of Honduras is fully prepared to contribute with all the means at its disposal towards discussing and attaining the longed-for peace in Central America. However, we are greatly concerned at the statements by Nicaragua's Minister for Defence, Commander Humberto Ortega Saavedra, who states that we are now at the brink of an international war between Nicaragua and Honduras.

58. A half hour ago my Government informed me it had sent an official note to the OAS Permanent Council. I can tell the Security Council that the note describes the threatening declarations which made it necessary for our country to mobilize its forces. The mobilization of forces within our territory is, of course, our sovereign right. Our Political Constitution makes it incumbent upon us to defend the country.

59. Power in Nicaragua derives not from votes but from weapons. We must defend democratic power in Honduras by peaceful or any other means. Our country at this moment is prepared to submit to international supervision to verify how many weapons each country has, whether various countries have a defensive or offensive capability. We judge the armaments which now exist in Nicaragua according to reports in the American press, such as in *The New York Times* last week, according to which the German Democratic Republic sent 100 heavy trucks and 100 anti-aircraft batteries. We have also learned, and we will be able to prove this, of armoured

divisions of Russian origin—more than two divisions, in fact. This has, of course, produced a considerable imbalance in armaments in this region.

60. I will state once more that Honduras will not allow its territory to be used for the invasion of a sister country, nor will it permit military camps on the border. To prove our sincerity, quite recently the Honduran Minister for External Relations, Mr. Edgardo Paz Barnica, officially invited the Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua, Mr. Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann, to come to the region and inspect it personally. Helicopters and communications equipment were placed at his disposal to enable him to inspect the frontier so that he could see for himself that all these reports were completely groundless. But that invitation, which was intended to put an end to the tension and to all speculations with regard to it, was not accepted by the Government of Nicaragua.

61. My Government has today sent an official communication to the OAS Permanent Council denouncing the affirmations made a few hours ago by the Ministry of Defence of Nicaragua, which in their turn echoed the forceful declarations of members of the Junta last year in Madrid, which are definitely a threat to peace in our region. In that regard I shall submit further evidence to the Security Council. All these events are a threat to peace in the region and a prelude not to an internal war but to an international war against Honduras with all the forces at the disposal of the other country, which far surpass the defensive resources of any State in that region. The Government of Honduras will invoke its right of self-defence, should this happen, as is provided in the Charter of the United Nations.

62. I say that we should not forget the fact that Honduras is prepared to participate in all meetings aimed at establishing a durable peace, but I must point out that both Nicaragua and Honduras are members of the OAS, and in accordance with Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations it is necessary first to exhaust the regional remedies before bringing problems affecting peace before this world body.

63. There are no anti-Sandinist camps in our territory, nor are we prepared to support the Nicaraguan insurgents. The good faith of Honduras can be seen in the official invitations, which still stand, extended to the Government of Nicaragua to inspect the common frontier together whatever day and time may be designated by the Government of Nicaragua. It will have to determine the date and time to begin this inspection. This invitation, which we are now repeating, was not deemed prudent or acceptable by the sister Government of Nicaragua.

64. Honduras has 35,000 refugees, most of whom are Nicaraguans. It is paradoxical to note that those who today govern Nicaragua were at one time themselves refugees in our Honduran territory, where they found a warm reception, kindness, understanding and a desire that they establish a government and crystallize democ-

racy in Nicaragua. It is impossible for our armed forces to control a border of thousands of kilometres. When those who are at present members of the Sandinist Government were insurgents, we could not control them either in order thus to protect the Government they subsequently toppled, that of General Somoza. Yesterday's insurgents are those who govern today. All we want is for Nicaragua to resolve its own internal problems and not create a smoke-screen which could at this time conceal the serious internal contradictions being experienced by this sister country.

65. The Government of Honduras does not believe in violent solutions, and any troop mobilization—I repeat—is prompted solely and exclusively by the firm will to defend our national sovereignty, which is a categorical imperative laid down in the Political Constitution.

66. Finally, I wish officially to challenge—and I have here the telegrams—the information concerning the alleged attack by Honduran troops against the Nicaraguan observation post of Vado Ancho, two kilometres southwest of the village of Santo Tomás del Nance. The Government of Honduras wishes briefly to state, in answer to the Government of Nicaragua, that at no time has the Honduran army attacked the post of Vado Ancho, nor any other place in Nicaraguan territory. On the contrary, it is the border populations of Honduras who have frequently been the victims of acts of aggression by Sandinist armed forces, as the Honduran Foreign Ministry has just denounced, sending copies of this denunciation both to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council. I repeat that the main concern of the Honduran Government, its sole and exclusive concern in the present circumstances, has to do with the recent statements made by Commander Humberto Ortega Saavedra to the effect that he believed that a war against Honduras was imminent. The armed forces of the Honduran nation would be doing nothing more than complying with the basic duty of its Constitution should they have to repel foreign aggression and see to it that the sovereignty of the Republic was respected.

67. We believe that this kind of threat, coming from the highest authorities of this sister country at a time of tension, should be replaced by prudence and moderation, if the Government of Nicaragua really wants a return to tranquillity in Central America and a normalization of the fraternal relations that have always existed between our peoples and Governments.

68. Lastly, we want to make clear that the Honduran Government reiterates to the Nicaraguan Government that, with the support of the majority of American countries and those of Western Europe, peace plans have been introduced which, unfortunately, have not been heeded by Nicaragua. Nevertheless, the Honduran Government continues with the same determination in the search for peace for our suffering and bleeding Central America, based on justice, the strengthening of the democratic system and respect for the dignity of the human person.

69. Should there be any need to clarify at higher levels any problem that may remain in an eclectic and not very clear situation, I am sure that the Government of Honduras would be prepared to have its Minister for External Relations confer at the highest levels so that, with the help of the Council, which is entrusted with the maintenance of peace, there may be a positive spark of dialogue in the region. We cannot ignore that Central America is involved in this context.

70. The Government of my country has asked me to explain clearly and categorically that our problem is not a bilateral one. Costa Rica has invited Nicaragua; so have El Salvador and Honduras. There have been discussions; everyone has answered and reacted favourably. May I allow myself to put a question publicly to the Deputy Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua: are you prepared for an immediate dialogue under the auspices of any organization in order to put an end to tensions in the region? I am putting this question publicly because the Government of Honduras will accept here and now any peace initiative and, at the same time, any multilateral disarmament, provided it is agreed upon at the regional level with proper supervision, such as that of the United Nations.

71. Mrs. KIRKPATRICK (United States of America): Sir, may I begin, as is our custom, by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month and expressing what I think you appreciate—the very great esteem of my Government for the democratic traditions, in theory and in practice, for which your country stands as an example to us all. I desire also to express my Government's gratitude to the President of the Security Council for the past month, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Oleg Troyanovsky, for his responsible and expeditious conduct of the office of President of the Security Council.

72. We are living through an extraordinary period. One of the characteristics of this extraordinary period in which we now find ourselves is a kind of proliferation of rights. New rights unprecedented in human history are invented and claimed, and as with all rights, outrage is expressed when these new rights are violated. Twice this month we have heard a new right invoked. We have heard one country invoke the "right to aggression", and we have heard outrage expressed when its "right to overthrow a neighbouring Government" was violated. We have heard the same Government outraged again when its "right to occupy a neighbouring territory" was violated.

73. Now comes the Government of Nicaragua claiming yet a new right—the "right of repression of its own people", with impunity and with immunity from any consequences flowing therefrom. The Government of Nicaragua has suggested today that someone is violating its "right to repress its people" and perhaps even its "right actively to attempt to overthrow neighbouring Governments and to direct revolutions from its own territory against its neighbours", and it has come to

the international community in this international forum appealing that we protect it against the frustration and bitterness of its own people while it builds a harsh new military dictatorship to rule those people, to repress those people, to whom it so clearly promised democracy. That is precisely the appeal of the Nicaraguan Government to the Council today: protect Nicaragua in the free exercise of its "right to repression", repression at home, aggression abroad.

74. This is a new right, which we have not heard invoked before, but the myths by which it is accompanied are, unfortunately, already familiar. Those myths are as follows: that Nicaragua is a democratic revolution, armed for the sole purpose of liberating the Nicaraguan people from the yoke of dictatorship; that Nicaragua wants to live at peace with its neighbours; and that Nicaragua is about to be invaded by the United States, or Honduras or someone.

75. I think these three myths, because of their crucial role in the extraordinary arguments which are now recurrent, made by the Government of Nicaragua, deserve a bit of examination by the Council as we consider the proposals before us today and an appropriate response to those.

76. First, the myth that the Sandinist military dictatorship is a democratic revolution. God knows the people of Nicaragua have longed for a democratic revolution. They joined, almost unanimously, in a fight against the heavy-handed dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza. They joined in that struggle because they were promised democracy. The promises that the so-called Sandinista Junta made to the people of Nicaragua and to the OAS are very clear. I think those promises are interesting today, so interesting that we should examine them. They are expressed with special clarity in a letter addressed by the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) to the OAS dated 17 July 1979. That is the same month that the FSLN became the Government of Nicaragua. It was on the basis of those solemn promises, voluntarily offered to the OAS, that the OAS and a good many others offered their support to the FSLN in its efforts to become the Government of Nicaragua. I should like to read that letter. It says:

"Mr. Secretary-General"

—that is, the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States—

"We are pleased to make available to you and to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member States of the Organization a document containing our plan to secure peace in our heroic, long-suffering country, at the moment when the people of Nicaragua is consolidating its political and military victory over the dictatorship.

"First, we have developed this plan on the basis of the resolution of the Seventeenth Meeting of Consul-

tation, on June 23 1979 [S/13451]—a resolution that was historic in every sense of the word: it demands the immediate replacement of the genocidal Somoza dictatorship, which is now nearing its end, and backs the installation of a broadly representative, democratic government in our country, such as the one we have formed. While saying that the solution to this problem is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the people of Nicaragua, it appeals to hemispheric solidarity to preserve our people's right to self-determination. We are presenting to the community of nations of the hemisphere, in connection with our plan to secure peace, the goals that have inspired our Government ever since it was formed. They have been set forth in our documents and political declarations and we wish to ratify some of them here. 1) Our firm intention to establish full observance of human rights in our country, in accordance with the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights<sup>2</sup> and the charter of human rights of the OAS.<sup>3</sup> Our observance of human rights has already been made plain by the way in which the Sandinist National Liberation Front has treated hundreds of prisoners of war; our Government thus invites the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to visit our country as soon as we are installed in our national territory. 2) Our wish that our installation in Nicaragua come about through peaceful and orderly transition. The Government of National Reconstruction would take it as a gesture of solidarity if the foreign ministers of the hemisphere were to visit our country, and we hereby extend to them a fraternal invitation to do so. 3) Our decision to embrace civil justice in our country and to try those incriminated of crime against the people according to the regular law. By their heroic struggle the people have won themselves the right to let justice prevail for the first time in half a century and will do so within the framework of the law, without a spirit of vengeance and without indiscriminate reprisals. 4) Those collaborators with the régime that may wish to leave the country and are not responsible for the genocide we have suffered or for other serious crimes that demand trial by the civil courts may do so with all necessary guarantees which the Government of National Reconstruction authorizes as of now; the departure of these persons may be supervised by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and by the International Red Cross. 5) The plan to call the first free elections our country has known in this century so that Nicaraguans can elect their representatives to the city councils and to a constituent assembly, and later elect the country's highest authorities.

"Mr. Secretary, it is now up to the Governments of the hemisphere to speak so that the solidarity with the struggle of our people that was carried forward in the name of democracy and justice can be possible in Nicaragua and become fully effective.

"We ask that you transmit the text of this letter to the Foreign Ministers of the OAS.

"Yours most respectfully, Governing Junta of National Reconstruction, Violeta de Chamorro, Sergio Ramírez Mercado, Alfonso Robelo, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, Moisés Hassan."

77. It is an interesting letter. Those were presumably serious commitments, seriously entered into: commitments to respect for human rights; commitments to respect for the freedom of all Nicaraguans, including minorities; commitments to free election; commitments to a government of civil law—a rule of law, regular civil law. What happened to those commitments? We cannot be indifferent to that.

78. First, let us look at the commitment to respect human rights, including, of course, that most basic human, democratic right, the right to opposition, the right to autonomous activity, which is the very basis of a pluralist society. It is particularly sad to see what happened to those persons who joined the FSLN in establishing this Government and in making those commitments. Take, for example, the private sector. In October 1981, the leaders of the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), the umbrella private-sector organization established to co-operate with the Sandinist revolution, were arrested and gaoled for four months because they issued a statement criticizing official policy. Sandinist expropriation of private enterprise raised the Government's share of the economy progressively, but the offence of the leaders of COSEP was not to resist that progressive incorporation of the economy into the Government, but to express, presumably, criticisms of it in exercise of their right of free speech. In November 1980, Sandinist security forces murdered the private sector leader, Jorge Salazar, who was unarmed, in what everyone in the world understood to be a transparent set-up. The private-sector organization, COSEP, and the independent political parties at that stage withdrew from the Council of State in protest.

79. But it was not only the private sector that suffered—very quickly—the repressive policies of the Sandinista Government: labour unions were harassed when they tried to resist being harnessed and incorporated into the State; their leaders were beaten and arrested; tightly controlled government, labour and peasant organizations were established and promptly lost a good many of their members.

80. The independent press, whose rights were promised solemnly by the FSLN on assuming office, was quickly repressed, with the electronic media incorporated into a tight vise of Government control, and all organs of the newspapers, except for a single independent voice, *La Prensa*, which for years was the opposition to the Somoza Government, were co-ordinated, as it were, by the Government. Since then *La Prensa* has repeatedly been shut down and is heavily censored. Government-controlled newspapers and media published news stipulated by the Ministry of the Interior. *La Prensa* is subject to prior censorship; frequently it is forbidden to publish interviews and news, and it is always virtually forbid-

den to publish criticism. It is also forbidden to publish information concerning what it is forbidden to publish.

81. Churches in Nicaragua have been progressively repressed. Archbishop Obando y Bravo, who had, like the COSEP leaders, been a supporter of the revolution and a strong opponent of the Somoza régime, was banned from performing mass on television. The Catholic Church radio was closed down several times and eventually incorporated into a system of Government control. Repeatedly clergy were subjected to really quite humiliating attacks, and the Sandinist attempt to organize a parallel people's church has followed unsuccessful efforts to intimidate the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church of Nicaragua. A variety of Protestant sects, including Evangelicals, Mormons, Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses and Moravians have been attacked; their centres have been taken over by Sandinist defence committees and their pastors have been harassed. At least 55 Moravian churches on the Atlantic coast have been burned.

82. It is very important to know that of the thousands of Nicaraguans today living in exile in Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, the United States, Venezuela and all sorts of other countries, a very large number supported, assisted and joined the Sandinists in their opposition to the Somoza Government. Among these dissidents is one signatory of the letter I have read out, Alfonso Robelo, and another, Violeta Chamorro, has long since very quickly resigned from the Government and continues to be engaged in the struggle to maintain some sort of voice of freedom inside Nicaragua.

83. In addition to this systematic persecution of opposition forces the Government of Nicaragua has progressively violated its commitments to elections and, of course, to freedom of opposition. It has grown progressively intolerant, disillusioning a very large number of its original leadership.

84. On 8 April 1982, for example, after nine months underground, former FSLN Commander Edén Pastora, the famous Commander Zero, denounced the Sandinist régime's ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union and announced that his own exile organization would challenge the FSLN's control of Nicaragua. These are the people we are today hearing described as Samozists, I think. These so-called Samozists were in a very large number of cases democrats determined precisely to free Nicaragua from any kind of dictatorial control and to establish democratic government in that society, and they have quite naturally been dismayed as their goals have receded ever further into the future as Nicaragua's Government has become progressively an even more repressive military dictatorship headed by some nine military commanders who today govern the country with an iron grip.

85. There is, I think, no better expression of the spirit of intolerance with which Nicaragua is governed today than the threat of Comandante Humberto Ortega Saavedra when he asserted that the opposition would be hanged from lampposts outside of Managua.

86. The promise of elections receded ever further, and finally it was announced that elections would be held in 1985, or not before 1985, and that the discussion of candidates for those elections would be banned until some time in 1984 and punishable by imprisonment—not under ordinary civil law at all, but under a special martial law that accompanied the state of siege.

87. The repression against the Catholic Church continued apace. I think its spirit was most clearly expressed in the response to the visit of the Pope. Pope John Paul II has of course been dismayed by the efforts of the Nicaraguan Government to establish a kind of puppet popular church. That has also dismayed Catholics throughout the region and I suppose indeed throughout the world.

88. In preparation for the Pope's visit an effort was made to delay papal communications and finally to diminish the crowds permitted to hear the Papal Mass. The British magazine *The Economist*, in its edition of 12 March 1983, noted that the Sandinists

“packed a Papal Mass in Managua with their supporters, who heckled the visitor. He was spirited out of Managua to the provinces in order to keep him from appearing too often alongside Managua's anti-Sandinist Archbishop Obando y Bravo. The Pope tried his own brand of passive resistance: the picture showing him with arms folded and bowed in disapproval as Commander Ortega delivered his tirade could not be kept from the front pages.”

However, most ordinary Nicaraguans were kept from contact with the Pope.

89. Perhaps the clearest expression of the attitude of the official Sandinist Government regarding the Pope's visit was made in a radio broadcast from, of course, a Government radio station, in which one of the reporters said:

“Despite the fame ascribed to Vatican diplomacy, the Pope engaged in political aggression, delivering a speech that was really political aggression as well as aggression against the people. This is why the people responded as they did.”

90. The Nicaraguan Government has repressed so many sectors of its own population that it hardly seems fair to single out just one, yet it remains true that the harshness with which they have treated the indigenous peoples of the Atlantic Coast, the Miskito, Suma and Rama Indians, cannot go uncommented upon in any group seriously concerned about the nature of a Government of Nicaragua.

91. The Miskito Indians were forcibly driven from their ancestral homes, their churches burned, their villages burned and in a good many cases their children forcibly separated from them. Thousands fled to Honduras, where they today live in refugee camps—deep inside Honduras, by the way, and not on that border anymore.

Those who did not flee have been herded by the Nicaraguan Government into internment camps where they are overcrowded and underoccupied, and disease is rampant.

92. Actually, the Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua has himself said that it may be just to level some criticism against the first phase, as he called it, of the resettlement of the Miskito Indians in the north of the country. The resettlement was not carried out with as much force as has sometimes been claimed, said the Nicaraguan minister, but nonetheless the mistake was that it happened too quickly; greater attention should have been paid to explaining the necessity for resettlement to the Miskitos. No consent was sought from the Miskitos; no explanations were offered. The Miskitos were simply forced to abandon their homes.

93. The charges that Nicaragua has made against the United States are no more persuasive than the commitments it made to the OAS. The Government of Nicaragua has repeatedly asserted the hostility to it of the Government of the United States. We might almost say that it suffers from an obsession concerning the hostility of the Government of the United States towards the Government of Nicaragua. That obsession, as has frequently been noted, is expressed in its national anthem, in which it refers to us as nothing more nor less than “the enemies of mankind”.

94. Nicaragua's Government has charged repeatedly that the United States supported the Government of Anastasio Somoza and offered implacable opposition to its rise. The facts are that the United States Government, which provided no economic or military aid to the Somoza régime during its struggle for survival, acted immediately to assist the Nicaraguan revolutionary Government on its accession to power. From 19 July 1979, when the FSLN triumphed, to 30 September 1979, the United States provided a total of \$24.6 million in emergency relief and recovery assistance. This emergency assistance consisted of emergency food and medical supplies, often shipped by air, assistance in housing reconstruction and a grant of grain to provide for emergency food supplies. From July 1979 through January 1981 approximately \$118 million in direct United States assistance was provided to the new Government of Nicaragua. In addition to bilateral aid the United States actively supported all loans to Nicaragua by multilateral lending institutions, helping them to receive from the Inter-American Development Bank \$262 million in loans from mid-1979 to the end of 1980, an amount almost double what the Somoza Government had received in the preceding 20 years.

95. During the first year and a half of its life, the Sandinist Government of Nicaragua received more economic aid from the United States than from any other country. It is absolutely false to suggest that the Government of the United States attempted in fact to oppose and damage the Government of Nicaragua in its efforts to liberate the people of Nicaragua from a semi-military dictatorship, the régime of Somoza. It is also absolutely false to suggest that it was the Reagan Administration which ter-

minated aid to Nicaragua. It was in fact in the last months of the Carter Administration that the decision to cease United States aid to Nicaragua was made, and it was made because the Government of Nicaragua was repeatedly and systematically found to be violating its agreement not to co-operate with or support terrorism or violence in other countries or to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries. It was also violating its commitments to establish democracy and freedom for its own peoples.

96. The Government of Nicaragua claims that it is a peace-loving State surrounded by threatening neighbours. The facts, again, are very different. The facts are that the Government of Nicaragua has since its accession to power concentrated on building a military machine, unequalled now or ever, in Central America. A rapid arms buildup was undertaken immediately after the Sandinists came to power, which arms buildup threatens the security of its neighbours. With a population of 2.7 million people, Nicaragua now has active-duty forces that number approximately 25,000, at least twice the size of Somoza's National Guard, with another 50,000 reservists and militia. To accommodate and train this force, large numbers of military garrisons have been built and enormous quantities of arms have been imported from the Soviet bloc. Some 2,000 Cuban military and internal-security advisers are in Nicaragua; several hundred Nicaraguans are training or have completed training in Cuba and other Eastern European countries. Sophisticated weapons, including Soviet-made T-55 tanks, amphibious ferries, helicopters and transport aircraft, have been added to Nicaragua's arsenal, giving Nicaragua a military establishment which obviously far exceeds its own defence needs and far exceeds any military force ever seen in Central America.

97. In contrast, Costa Rica has no standing army, and Honduras, which has a million more people than Nicaragua, has total forces of about 17,500.

98. Nicaragua charges that the United States, aided by Honduras, is now intervening in its internal affairs and threatening the peace of the region. This assertion has been heard here, of course, before: it was indeed about a year ago—I believe on 25 March 1982 [2335th meeting]—that we heard the complaint of Mr. Daniel Ortega Saavedra that the United States was about to launch “an imminent large-scale military intervention against his country”. In his letter requesting a meeting of the Security Council [S/14913] he wrote of an

“ever-increasing danger of a large-scale military intervention by the armed forces of the United States [which] constitutes a grave threat to the independence and sovereignty of the Central American countries and to international peace and security”.

At that time, he spoke of the interventionist strategy of the Government of the United States and he said that his Government had clear evidence of the United States intention to attack Nicaragua directly and to intervene directly in El Salvador.

99. We assured the Government of Nicaragua at that time that we had absolutely no intention of engaging in a large-scale military invasion of its country. The facts are, of course, as we pointed out then, that Nicaragua is the country in Central America which is involved in a major effort to destabilize other Governments. The efforts of the Government of Nicaragua to destabilize the Government of El Salvador are so clear that they cannot any longer be denied even by the Government of Nicaragua, which, for many months—indeed, we might say years—steadfast in the face of ever-greater evidence, denied the truth of this assertion. The Government of Nicaragua has sought to destabilize the Government of El Salvador by sending large and continuing shipments of arms into that country, over 200 tons in 1981. By providing training and support to El Salvador's guerrillas and directing guerrilla military actions in El Salvador from command and control centres inside Nicaragua, Nicaragua has so repeatedly violated Honduran sovereignty and territory with covert shipment of arms over its borders that it is literally the case that one loses count of the instances. Nicaragua has also engaged in the effort to foment guerrilla forces inside Honduras and has stocked arms inside Honduras. Some 10 tons of explosives and small arms, and thousands of rounds of ammunition, sophisticated communications equipment, uniforms, propaganda and trucks and cars for transporting arms had been uncovered in safe houses in Honduras by the end of 1982.

100. Nicaragua has also systematically violated the rights of Costa Rica by attempts to deny it use of the San Juan River. It has violated Costa Rica's borders and made arrogant threats that attempt to deny Costa Rica the right to the development of its own territory.

101. Nicaragua has not been interested in confirming the facts about the activities or intentions of its neighbours. The Nicaraguan Government, for example, rejected an invitation from the United States and Honduras to observe the joint military exercises held in the region. On 18 February 1983 the Honduran Government invited the Sandinist Minister for External Relations [see S/15613] to inspect exile camps allegedly located in southern Honduras, and on 23 February the Sandinist régime rejected the offer.

102. In fact, the Nicaraguan Government has recently become quite open about its own approach to its neighbours. Radio Venceremos, broadcasting from Managua, recently said, “Our war is and will continue to be national, but we view our plans in the framework of a regional conflict to which there are interests of the people of Central America, the Caribbean and Latin America.” They asserted in that same programme that “The rebels throughout the area have imported arms through all the routes we could. We have used all of Central America and other countries for those purposes.” *The Washington Post* commented that the broadcast appeared to support charges made by the Reagan Administration that the insurgency found in other Central American countries was encouraged, armed and participated in obviously by the Government of Nicaragua.



103. The Government of Nicaragua has repeatedly declined to participate in efforts of its neighbours—including the United States, let me say, but certainly not only or principally us—to find peaceful solutions to the conflicts which plague the area.

104. On 4 October 1982, in San José, there was articulated the so-called Final Act<sup>4</sup> in which the democratic States of the region, for the first time, set forth conditions they regarded as essential to achieve peace in Central America. Those conditions, endorsed by the democratic States of the region and, I may add, by the United States as well, provide, we believe, a standing invitation and a solution, a plan, for the resolution of the problems and insecurity that afflict the region.

105. Those conditions include an end to foreign support to terrorists and subversive elements working for the violent overthrow of other countries, that is, all countries would forgo violent or subversive activities inside any other country; an absolute end to arms trafficking—all arms trafficking from outside the area would cease; a ban on the importation of heavy weapons and limitation of all armaments and forces to those required for defence would apply to all Governments; the withdrawal of all foreign military and security advisers and troops under fully verifiable and reciprocal conditions—all countries would withdraw all foreign advisers and troops; absolute respect for the principle of non-intervention and the peaceful solution of disputes—all countries would agree not to intervene in the affairs of other countries and to resolve their disputes without recourse to force; respect for human rights, including fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion and the right to organize political parties, labour unions and other organizations; and the establishment of democratic, representative and participatory institutions through free and regular elections in an atmosphere of political reconciliation within each State.

106. One of the most striking facts about the San José declaration and the principles set forth therein as the basis for peaceful resolution of all the problems of the region is their resemblance to the commitments made by the FSLN at the moment of its accession to power—the commitments made in its letter to the OAS. In proposing to the Government of Nicaragua that it join with other countries of the region in the affirmation of those principles, one proposes only that it join in the reaffirmation of the principles with which it announced its own arrival in power.

107. That distinguished Englishman John Stuart Mill believed that a people's quest for liberty is an irrepressible drive: it may be put down once, twice, repeatedly, but never permanently. The recent political history of Nicaragua clearly illustrates the truth in John Stuart Mill's vision.

108. Having valiantly fought to overthrow a despotic military dictatorship, the Nicaraguans momentarily breathed the exhilarating air of freedom. This triumph of freedom over tyranny, of the people over its oppressors,

was tragically short in the case of Nicaragua. The long-suffering Nicaraguan people saw their hopes for freedom and human rights gradually suffocated by yet another form of tyranny. To a people well versed in forms of despotism, the new developments after the triumph of Sandinism were ominously familiar.

109. The emerging pattern was easily recognizable: a few self-appointed individuals, lacking popular support, resorted to armed violence to maintain themselves in power. Instead of popular support, the new Government increasingly relied on military means; instead of consultation, it relied on coercion; instead of respecting human rights, it chose to trample them; instead of allowing for the free play of the political forces of the society, it systematically sought to destroy them. Is it any wonder, then, that the Nicaraguan people, versed as they are in recognizing tyrants, would increasingly turn against those whom they originally believed to be their liberators? Is there any surprise in the fact that the Nicaraguans, thirsty for real freedom, are now once more ready to fight for it as they did in the past? I believe not.

110. *Somocismo* and *Sandinismo* turn out not to be unlike each other. They are both military dictatorships denying the Nicaraguan people their human rights and human freedoms, their political rights and political freedoms. The fact is that the right to repression which is sought here today by the Government of Nicaragua cannot be granted by anybody. The right to repression is not a human right or a political right.

111. The violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty, the right to intervene in the internal affairs of others, cannot be granted by this body to the Government of Nicaragua or any other Government. It violates the Charter of the United Nations. It violates the commitments of this body to all its members.

112. There were references by the representative of Nicaragua to the political will of the United States Government. There were references also to the will of the Nicaraguan people to be free and independent. I should like to say that the political will of the present United States Government is no different from the political will of the people of Nicaragua to be free and independent.

113. An appeal was made by the representative of the Government of Nicaragua that the United States put an end to its efforts at support for internal disturbances inside Nicaragua. I should like to make an appeal to the Government of Nicaragua to put an end to its repression of its own people, to put an end to its destabilization of its neighbours, to affirm instead its political will for freedom as promised to the people of Nicaragua, as promised to the fellow members of the OAS and as, indeed, claimed by the Government of Nicaragua before this body. We appeal to the Government of Nicaragua to be true to its own promises to provide its own people those human rights, those freedoms, that fundamental respect and opportunity for peace and prosperity which it promised and which we all hope so fervently it will find.

114. I should like, in closing, to affirm the political will of the Government of the United States to join with other members of this hemisphere, or this body, or to stand aside while other members of this hemisphere—and of Central America, specifically—work out solutions which provide for precisely those guarantees promised by the Sandinist Government to its people: respect for human rights, respect for good-neighbourliness, respect for the right of peoples to choose their own governments through competitive and free elections.

115. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Nicaragua, who has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

116. Mr. TINOCO (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Nicaragua does not wish to tax unduly the time or patience of the Council, and therefore we shall refer briefly only to certain elements which we deem fundamental, so that representatives may have a more accurate understanding of what has really happened and is happening with respect to acts of aggression against the Nicaraguan Revolution.

117. With regard to some of the observations made by the representative of Honduras, I wish merely to make a few brief comments. I should like to draw to the Council's attention the coincidence between the way Honduras views the activities of the Somoza counter-revolutionary bands—presenting them as an internal matter, a civil war—and the same way of viewing the matter that we have heard from the representative of the United States. I submit this to the Council merely as food for thought.

118. The representative of Honduras pointed out that there is a problem of arms in Nicaragua, that there has to be international supervision and control of armaments, and so forth. He has attempted to present Nicaragua as arming itself unduly and threatening its neighbours. We should like to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that that on numerous occasions the Government of Nicaragua has stressed the fact that the attitudes of aggression against Nicaragua and the problem of fomenting the counter-revolution against the Sandinist revolutionary process does not come only from our neighbours in Central America. The determining, fundamental factor of destabilization in Central America is precisely the role played by the present United States Administration, on the basis of the parameters which were expressed on 15 July 1980 in the Republican Party's platform.

119. We should like to emphasize that Nicaragua is developing a policy that is eminently one of defence, that the development of its lines of defence is in keeping with the nature of the regional and extraregional threat hovering over Nicaragua. One cannot think that this statement is unfounded if one recalls all the many inventories of facts, declarations, activities, attacks and acts of aggression over the last few months against Nicaragua.

120. The problem therefore is not merely one of the animosity of some neighbours in the area. It is the prob-

lem of clear-cut policies and attitudes against the Nicaraguan Revolution by the United States Administration, and any political regional solution obviously must take these two elements into account.

121. The representative of Honduras referred also to the fact that his country is greatly prepared to seek a solution through dialogue. He said that Nicaragua was never willing to engage in dialogue. He said that he wanted to avail himself of this opportunity so that something specific and concrete might emerge from this forum that would begin the process of discussion of the problems confronting our bilateral relations. I shall therefore put a concrete proposal to the representative of Honduras for transmittal to his Government. We propose to him that the proposal of peace and negotiation presented by the Governments of Mexico and Venezuela in October of last year—which was rejected by his Government—be taken up again and that the process of discussion between our two countries may thus begin.

122. I should like to remind the representative of Honduras that in October last year the Presidents of Mexico and Venezuela offered to President Suazo Córdova of Honduras and to Commander Ortega Saavedra, Coordinator of the Governing Junta of Nicaragua, to meet—all four together—on 13 October at Caracas to discuss the problems. I should also like to recall that that meeting was rejected by the President of Honduras, who said that he had a meeting with Honduran businessmen in the port of Tela, in Honduras.

123. The truth is that, behind what could be considered as the confusion of peace proposals within the interests at play in the region, there has been a systematic attitude on the part of the Honduran Government and the United States Government to ignore and reject the specific proposals designed to deal with the specific problems in the present situation in Central America. Let us look at the precise facts.

124. What happened when the initiative of the Mexican and Venezuelan Governments was taken for a meeting of the four Presidents, including those of Nicaragua and Honduras? Immediately afterwards another move was begun for parallel negotiations, with the statement that there was nothing bilateral to negotiate, as was said by the representative of Honduras, that the talks must deal with the general problems of Central America, the Central American crisis, and that we should all get together. But there was nothing about talks on the specific and real problems affecting the region.

125. Recently we had the initiative of the Colombian, Mexican, Panamanian and Venezuelan Governments<sup>1</sup> that was also designed to deal with specific problems—the crisis in El Salvador and the problem of relations between Honduras and Nicaragua—and once again there were moves to set up collateral machinery to dilute these concrete efforts that serious and responsible Governments of the Latin American region and been making.



126. I repeat: the Government of Nicaragua is ready; it invites the Government of Honduras to take up once again the proposal of the Mexican and Venezuelan Governments, unless it continues to believe that there are no bilateral problems and that we must speak in generalities.

127. With regard to the alleged exaggerated arms build-up in Nicaragua, we do not deny that our country is arming itself, in keeping with the threats surrounding it. These defensive measures are being presented as threats to neighbouring countries, and the representative of Honduras has pointed out, *inter alia*, that 100 or 1,000 anti-aircraft batteries have been set up in Nicaragua. I do not know whether this information is accurate, but I should like to ask him: what is the fear of these anti-aircraft batteries? Does Honduras ponder invading the Nicaraguan skies with its air force? Is it thinking of using the 10 military runways in Honduras, the 38 fighter aircraft and the 39 transport aircraft and the 50 tactical training support aircraft it possesses—the most powerful air force in Central America? We repeat that the Nicaraguan Revolution is developing its defences in an eminently defensive manner—and I beg to be excused for being redundant—in order to ensure the independence and territorial integrity of our country and the very existence of our Revolution.

128. With respect to another point that has so often been repeated by the representative of the Government of Honduras, as well as the representative of the United States Government, with regard to the invitation which Minister Paz Barnica sent to Minister D'Escoto Brockmann to come to Honduras and see if there were training camps, I should like to recall the following. Firstly, the invitation was sent to Minister D'Escoto Brockmann knowing full well that he was on official travel in Canada and proceeding from there to the New Delhi meeting; but, in any case, that is of little importance. Secondly, an "invitation" was casually issued to Nicaragua to go and look at the training camps in Honduras at the same time that there was begun a process of massive infiltration of counter-revolutionary forces against Nicaragua. Thirdly, I should like to inform the representative of Honduras that it is not certain—or that there is no information—that the Government of Nicaragua has not replied to the Honduran proposal.

129. The Government of Nicaragua gave an official written answer—signed by the Acting Minister for External Relations of Nicaragua, Mrs. Nora Astorga—in the following terms: first, it was recalled that Minister D'Escoto Brockmann was away from Nicaragua; secondly, it was pointed out that we felt that military observation work was not really the proper function of diplomatic personnel, and we proposed that a military delegation of Nicaragua could get together with a delegation from Honduras to determine where these camps were or had been located, the camps of the guards who at that time had been infiltrating across the border between Honduras and Nicaragua. We should also like to point out, because there must be no doubts, that we prefer not to

say where we would go but, rather, when we get to Tegucigalpa both delegations would take a helicopter and then go and search precisely for traces of those camps. This note was written and signed by the Acting Minister of Nicaragua. I regret that the representative of Honduras has no information and that his Minister has not sent it to him, just as the representative of the United States was not aware of it either.

130. With reference to some of the comments made by the representative of the United States I shall be somewhat more brief. I note the coincidentally identical points of view expressed by the representatives of the United States and Honduras on how to interpret the offensive or aggressive phenomenon now being suffered by Honduras. Regrettably, the representative of the United States devoted 80 per cent of her statement to lecturing on moral issues and democracy in trying to demonstrate that there was not democracy, but a repressive régime, in Nicaragua.

131. First of all, I should like to point out that my delegation would be pleased if this exhaustive analysis on human rights and the internal situation in Nicaragua could some day be made by the representative of the United States on some countries friendly to that country, perhaps Chile or South Africa. However, what is serious is not that an attempt was made to paint my country as a land of repression where there is no democracy. What is dangerous is that this has a logic which could be tragic, if it is not already. In a few words the representative of the United States first tried to demonstrate that there was no democracy in Nicaragua, secondly, did not bother to refute or demonstrate that there was no aggression against Nicaragua and, thirdly, in conclusion, said that for her country it was not a problem of aggression when it was the case of a country which, according to its political and moral canons, was not democratic.

132. We wish to point out this very dangerous logic because we believe that it is in keeping with the lack of depth with respect to the affirmations and indications that the Nicaraguan delegation has provided. Nothing was said about whether or not there were camps in Florida and that there are still camps in Florida; nothing was said about whether or not \$20 million has been given—at least, that is what is known publicly—to assist the counter-revolution; no concern was shown as to clarification of the nature of the statements which I quoted in my statement.

133. Finally, I should like to point out that once again we are hearing the argument that Nicaragua, in denouncing and citing all these specific facts, is obsessed by one thing, as the United States representative said; that the Nicaraguans are paranoid, that the United States is a meek lamb and that it is neither implementing nor financing any plan against the Nicaraguan Government; that there was no invasion of my country by United States troops in 1856; neither was there an invasion of my country by United States troops in 1909, nor was there a third invasion of my country by United States troops in 1913 and there was no fourth invasion of my country by United States troops in

1927, an invasion that was resisted by Augusto César Sandino and from whose resistance the Sandinist People's Revolution took its values and principles.

134. These are some of the problems and points that the delegation of Nicaragua wanted to raise, for the sake of clarity.

135. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Honduras has asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I call on him.

136. Mr. ORTEZ COLINDRES (Honduras) (*interpretation from Spanish*): We are pleased indeed that we are already speaking of peace and not solely of arming ourselves to defend that peace.

137. The Government of Honduras has issued many invitations to the Government of Nicaragua for a dialogue. The representative of Nicaragua himself was a Deputy Minister when the Government of Honduras, through its Minister for External Relations, Mr. Paz Barnica, requested the initiation of dialogue and the ending of the *status quo* that had developed. Honduras, since Nicaragua was not going to come to our territory, was prepared to go to Nicaragua. On that day, I informed the Council [S/15487] that Minister D'Escoto Brockmann had said that he had a trip planned and was therefore unable to receive our Minister. That trip, as it happened, was not a trip to Canada, but to the funeral of Comrade Brezhnev. However, with the characteristic talent of Nicaragua, its representative here held talks at presidential level. Our Minister arrived in Nicaragua and made a statement which differed from the point of view of Nicaragua.

138. Nicaragua has a problem: it is constantly charging that counter-revolutionary troops or forces are coming out of Honduras. Honduras asserts that this is not so. Therefore we are engaged in one of those games that in international law is called political ping-pong: one side says yes and the other no. It is easy to speak of accepting proposals, as he himself said—and here I use his words—to discuss “bilateral problems” and not to speak in “generalities”. No, the Government of Honduras did not want to discuss bilateral problems in a limited fashion.

139. It is not true, I affirm it—and I can send the Council the President of the Republic's written reply—that the Mexican and Venezuelan initiative has been rejected. The President of the Republic of Honduras had a very solemn commitment on the day of the visit. One hundred Honduran businessmen had been kidnapped in San Pedro Sula—not in Tela, the city mentioned by the Nicaraguan representative—and were being held there on the very day that the outgoing President of Mexico had set as a date for a meeting. One hundred, whose businesses represented 83 per cent of Honduras' gross national product, had been kidnapped by guerrillas. We have proof that Nicaraguan guerrillas took part in that event. Consequently, it would have been most difficult for us to have failed to attend a demonstration of 300,000

people that had been convened to welcome the President and express solidarity with him, and the sorrow of a nation at the kidnapping—including the Chairman of the Central Bank of Honduras, the Minister of the Economy and the Minister of Finance—and we regret that the date could not be changed for the sake of conciliation.

140. The problem differs in the following way. Nicaragua considers that the problem is limited to the border between Honduras and Nicaragua. As I ventured to say in my preliminary statement, we believe that this is a regional problem. Arms go from Nicaragua to El Salvador. That is clear.

141. There are other implications too at this time; in fact there are accusations that Commander Zero, who was the hero of the Sandinist revolution, is coming in from the southern front of Costa Rica. Moreover, the interests of a sister country, Guatemala, are involved.

142. We have not wished to turn ourselves practically into a guardian, a police watch-dog for Nicaraguan interests on the border between Honduras and Nicaragua. We want the five countries involved in the conflict to sit down together. We have channels of communication and basic interests, and we are happy to know that countries of great prestige, such as Mexico and Venezuela, are taking an interest. Therefore the balance is very easy: let us not discuss merely bilateral problems, since we do not want to circumscribe our role to that of being a watch-dog for the interests of the Sandinist Government. Let us talk about the interests of the whole region, without an agenda, without limitations, because we must talk about real things at this time, not minor border incidents. On the contrary, we want to talk about arms; we want to talk about how many airplanes we are going to request, when the MiGs are going to arrive; we want to avoid having to buy Phantoms. We need to know exactly which and what amounts of arms are considered offensive and defensive. We want to talk about international supervision, whereby serious countries commit themselves to guaranteeing that supervision. We want to talk about the departure of the 1,000 men from a country in the Caribbean who are now advisers, so that the 55 technicians that they want to send to El Salvador may leave. All these problems have regional implications.

143. I have no doubt that my country's Government—I am anticipating its saying so—will agree. I do not need consultations. I am sorry, I am not being pedantic; I am expressing a democratic conviction. We are quite willing at any time to sit down in a meeting—not a meeting limited to bilateral matters, but one involving the five countries of the region that are concerned and high-level observers, among which it would give us great pleasure to see sister countries like Mexico and Venezuela. That is one basic point.

144. Another fundamental aspect which we see here is the following. I do not know why at all times attempts

are made to create the impression that we have an understanding of some kind with the United States in this respect. That is not the case. I wonder which two countries among those that are speaking here are aligned. Are we aligned with the United States, or is Nicaragua aligned with an extra-continental Power? When we speak of alignment, the bilateral problem seems to be a very small one indeed.

145. We need a body such as the United Nations, such as the Security Council—serious people, such as those sent to Lebanon or other troubled areas—to guarantee a serious regional pact. I have specific instructions. The Honduran Government would accept any regional dialogue with the participation of these five countries and other peripheral countries which could be accepted but which I shall not specify now.

146. We are not aligned with the Government of the United States. I want most sincerely to say that the entire campaign to make it seem that Honduras is a puppet is false in its entirety. Yes, we have bilateral and regional agreements; they are for purposes of defence. This is one of the fundamental reasons why we have accepted \$30 million in assistance to expand our airports. How, I would ask, can the Honduran Government stop 60 Soviet-made tanks? We do not have as large an army as you do, and of necessity we must look for alternatives. One of the fundamental things we want to do and discuss is arms limitation and international supervision of an agreement to that end, a commitment whereby all countries—autonomously, without being puppets of Russia or the United States—agree to stop bringing weapons into Central America. Money is in too short supply to be wasted on weapons. Bear in mind that tax reform in my country has generated \$30 million, which could be spent on a single airplane when our people are suffering from poverty, when one is always thinking of regional attacks. Let us once and for all reach a regional agreement.

147. Therefore, I should like to say that our offer stands. We think the Secretary-General, one of the world's most moral men, and the Security Council could avail themselves of this opportunity to establish this dialogue free of limitations to deal with the substance of the matter. For us it is not a matter of watching over a border. We did not do that for Somoza and we are not going to do it for the Sandinists. We do not have people for that. Our aircraft are not for surveillance of all those who are fighting on their own territory. We cannot intervene with 2,000 soldiers, so they say, who would leave our borders because we do not have aircraft to carry them. We have not even been able to obtain the

means on the international markets to purchase transport aircraft.

148. Therefore, to be specific, we should like to say that we are prepared to begin unlimited regional dialogue in which we would deal with the departure of foreign technicians, arms limitation and the international control of borders, because all this costs money. When we had a conflict with El Salvador, it cost 3 million pesos every three months to have international observers from the OAS. With ten observers of that kind the entire tax reform of my country would go out the window. A single jet consumes about \$300,000 worth of fuel just flying from one city to another. We cannot lose sight of this reality.

149. We have an independent policy. The United States Government has not imposed anything upon us, nor is it pushing us to have airports. We have asked for international assistance for airports because our Government cannot invest its resources to the extent of \$30 million, and it is logical that we should look for that money wherever we can. Ours is the only country in Latin America that does not have an international airport. I say that with sadness. In an era when you can leave any part of the world—Japan, for example—and within 12 hours can land anywhere you desire, the airport of our capital, Tegucigalpa, is a menace. We pray to God every time we fly into or out of it. Anyone who knows Central America can understand that. Individuals have great difficulty in getting insurance because of the major risks involved in landing. We are the only country that does not have a railroad in its capital, and we do not have an inter-American highway. We have enormous mountains; we are the Central American Switzerland: the Switzerland of the guerrillas. We have guerrillas from Nicaragua, from El Salvador and Guatemala. Well, what can we do, being the country we are? Close the doors to them? Could we be so inhuman as to expel those 35,000 men struggling for freedom? Had we done so, you would not be in power in Nicaragua.

*The meeting rose at 7.20 p.m.*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See A/38/68, annex.

<sup>2</sup> General Assembly resolution 217 A (III).

<sup>3</sup> *American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San José, Costa Rica"*, OAS Treaties Series No. 36 (Washington, D.C., Organization of American States, 1970).

<sup>4</sup> Final Act of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the countries interested in the promotion of democracy in Central America and the Caribbean. For the text, see Jack W. Hopkins, ed., *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record* (New York and London, Holmes & Meier, 1984), vol. II, 1982-1983, pp. 867-873.

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