



# General Assembly

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## Seventy-ninth session

Agenda item 98 (oo)

### General and complete disarmament: nuclear disarmament verification

## Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 December 2024

[on the report of the First Committee ([A/79/408](#), para. 114)]

### 79/240. Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in particular the paragraphs relevant to nuclear disarmament and to verification,<sup>1</sup>

*Recalling also* its resolution [62/21](#) of 5 December 2007, in which it took note of the report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification,<sup>2</sup> as well as the reports of the Secretary-General of 1990<sup>3</sup> and 1995,<sup>4</sup> and the report of the Disarmament Commission outlining general principles of verification elaborated upon or added to those stated in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,<sup>5</sup>

*Recalling further* its resolution [71/67](#) of 5 December 2016, in which it, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States and to establish a group of governmental experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, and its resolution [74/50](#) of 12 December 2019, in which it, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States and to establish a group of governmental experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues, including, inter alia, the concept of a Group of

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<sup>1</sup> Resolution [S-10/2](#), paras. 30, 31, 50, 91 and 92.

<sup>2</sup> [A/61/1028](#).

<sup>3</sup> [A/45/372](#) and [A/45/372/Corr.1](#).

<sup>4</sup> [A/50/377](#) and [A/50/377/Corr.1](#).

<sup>5</sup> [A/51/182/Rev.1](#).



Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, as well as the reports of the aforementioned groups of governmental experts,<sup>6</sup>

*Recalling* its resolution [78/239](#) of 22 December 2023, in which it welcomed the report of the Group of Governmental Experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues,<sup>7</sup> and, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States and encouraged Member States to continue work on nuclear disarmament verification issues,

*Welcoming* the report of the Secretary-General containing the substantive views of Member States on the report of the Group of Governmental Experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues,<sup>8</sup>

*Recalling* its resolution [78/22](#) of 4 December 2023, in which it, inter alia, invited Member States to continue efforts to apply developments in science and technology for disarmament-related purposes, including the verification of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation instruments, and to make disarmament-related technologies available to interested States,

*Reaffirming* the shared commitment to further progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and that all States Members of the United Nations should be enabled to actively engage on an equal footing to this end,

*Recognizing* that measures in the field of disarmament should be undertaken as a matter of urgency with a view to halting and reversing the arms race and to give the necessary impetus to efforts designed to achieve genuine disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

*Recalling* the unequivocal undertaking of nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons<sup>9</sup> are committed under article VI thereof,<sup>10</sup>

*Recalling also* that all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have committed to the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations,<sup>11</sup>

*Reaffirming* that, since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and supportive of the measures of disarmament and arms limitation, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security,

*Recognizing* that the decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament is the political will of States, especially the nuclear-weapon States,

*Recognizing also* that credible multilateral nuclear disarmament verification capabilities will be instrumental to providing assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons,

*Underlining* that work on nuclear disarmament verification is not an end in itself and is not a prerequisite, precondition or substitute for progress in nuclear

<sup>6</sup> [A/74/90](#) and [A/78/120](#).

<sup>7</sup> [A/78/120](#).

<sup>8</sup> [A/79/93](#).

<sup>9</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 729, No. 10485.

<sup>10</sup> *2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document*, vol. I ([NPT/CONF.2010/50 \(Vol. I\)](#)), part I, *Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions*, para. 79.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, action 2 of the action plan.

disarmament, and that such work should aim to promote and facilitate progress in nuclear disarmament,

*Recognizing* that, while the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement entered into by contracting parties depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement, collaborative multilateral work on tools, technologies, methodologies and procedures that could further contribute to nuclear disarmament verification can provide benefits in support of the long-term goal of nuclear disarmament,

*Convinced* of the particular relevance of enabling States, on a voluntary basis, to participate in nuclear disarmament verification discussions,

*Recognizing* that work on nuclear disarmament verification must conform to applicable international legal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations, national safety and security requirements and the need to protect otherwise sensitive information,

*Mindful* of the role of verification in existing bilateral and multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control agreements, and of the need to avoid any possible duplication of efforts so that any further work on nuclear disarmament verification builds on the existing accumulated scientific and technical knowledge and capabilities, especially in the area of nuclear verification and safeguards, keeping in mind their competence and mandate,

*Aware* that a considerable amount of knowledge and positive contributions on nuclear disarmament verification has already been assembled by past and ongoing initiatives and partnerships among Member States, and stressing the importance of incorporating, as appropriate, their experiences, knowledge and lessons learned in future multilateral discussions on the topic in the context of the United Nations,

*Noting* the fundamental importance of disarmament education and capacity-building to address nuclear disarmament verification challenges and related issues,

*Underlining* that equal opportunities for equitable geographical representation and participation should be provided for in nuclear disarmament verification education, training and capacity-building, taking into account the special needs of interested developing countries, upon their request, to participate in the relevant efforts,

*Noting* the contribution of civil society and academic and research communities to nuclear disarmament verification,

*Underlining* that equal opportunities for women and men should be provided for in nuclear disarmament verification education, training and capacity-building,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States, in writing, on the establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification within the United Nations, building on the relevant documents on the matter, particularly the reports of the groups of governmental experts referred to in the present resolution;

2. *Encourages* Member States, in providing their views, to focus on the possible merits, objectives, mandate and modalities for such a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with a view to ensuring that all Member States have the opportunity to engage on the matter and provide their views, to also convene three in-person informal meetings on the topic, two of which should be held at United Nations Headquarters in New York and one at the United Nations Office at Geneva;

4. *Also requests* the Secretary-General to also take into account the views of relevant intergovernmental organizations entrusted with the verification of disarmament or non-proliferation obligations;

5. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its eightieth session for further discussion by Member States a substantive report containing possible options for the establishment of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification within the United Nations, taking into account the views submitted by Member States in writing and through the three informal in-person meetings, with separate annexes containing those submissions in accordance with paragraph 1 of the present resolution;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its eightieth session, under the item entitled “General and complete disarmament”, the sub-item entitled “Nuclear disarmament verification”.

*55th (resumed) plenary meeting  
24 December 2024*

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