



## 安全理事会

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### 安全理事会主席的说明

安全理事会第 [2627\(2022\)](#) 号决议第 2 段请第 [1874 \(2009\)](#) 号决议所设专家小组向安理会提交附有结论和建议的最后报告。根据这一要求，安理会主席谨此分发专家小组提交的报告(见附件)。



附件

2023 年 3 月 3 日第 1874 (2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会主席的信

安全理事会第 1874 (2009)号决议所设专家小组谨根据安理会第 2627(2022)号决议第 2 段转递关于专家小组工作的最后报告。

该报告于 2023 年 2 月 3 日提交安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会，委员会于 2023 年 2 月 22 日审议了该报告。

请提请安全理事会成员注意本信和所附报告并将其作为安理会文件分发给荷。

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议  
所设专家小组



## 附文

2023 年 2 月 3 日第 1874(2009)号决议所设专家小组给安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会主席的信

安全理事会第 1874 (2009)号决议所设专家小组谨根据安理会第 2627(2022)号决议第 2 段转递关于专家小组工作的最后报告。

请提请安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议所设委员会成员注意本信和所附报告为荷。

安全理事会第 1874(2009)号决议  
所设专家小组

## 摘要

在本报告所述期间，随着朝鲜半岛局势日益紧张，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国核设施继续生产核裂变材料，但没有核试验的报告。2022 年，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国发射了至少 73 枚弹道导弹和综合弹道与制导技术的导弹，包括 8 枚洲际弹道导弹；其中 42 次发射是在该年最后四个月进行的，包括据报新型洲际弹道导弹的全面试验，以及洲际弹道导弹新型固体燃料发动机试验。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国现在公开用“弹道”描述其许多导弹试验，明显违反了联合国制裁制度。一部新法律述及要更加注重战术核能力、新的首先使用原则和该国核地位的“不可逆转性”。专家小组继续调查涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的技术无形转让问题。

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国于 2022 年 8 月宣布战胜 COVID-19。该国边境基本上仍然关闭，但间歇铁路货运服务已经恢复。2022 年下半年贸易数据有所增长，但仍未达到疫前水平。

精炼石油产品继续通过“直接交付”油轮非法提供给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国专属经济区内的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮。本报告的海事部分重点介绍了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在 2022 年显著加速购置船只(主要是货船)的情况，并介绍了协助购置船只人员所用方法。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国领水内非法船对船进口货物的活动仍在持续。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国煤炭的违禁船对船出口仍在继续。

侦察总局行为体的网络活动仍在继续；2022 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国行为体窃取的加密货币资产价值高于以往任何一年。该国使用日益尖端的网络技术，进入涉及网络金融的数字网络，窃取具有潜在价值的信息，包括用于其武器计划的信息。

专家小组调查了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国明显出口军事通信设备的情况，并已开始对弹药出口的报告进行调查。

该国的人道主义局势继续恶化，联合国制裁造成意外后果，不过这些制裁的相对作用仍然无法与许多其他因素分开。人道主义援助的交付数量有限，联合国在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的人道主义活动采用临时、特别的资金转账方式。专家小组再次在涉朝人道主义组织中做了调查。

专家小组请会员国详细说明其执行联合国制裁的情况，但根据迄今收到的答复，目前只能作初步评估。专家小组感谢那些建设性配合其工作的会员国。

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## 一. 导言

1. 安全理事会第 2627 (2022) 号决议第 2 段请第 1874 (2009) 号决议所设专家小组向安全理事会第 1718 (2006) 号决议所设委员会提交一份载有专家小组调查结果和建议的最后报告。本报告所述期间为 2022 年 7 月 28 日至 2023 年 1 月 27 日。

## 二. 与核计划和弹道导弹计划有关的活动

### 核

2. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续进行生产核裂变材料相关活动，宁边场址的翻修和建造活动正在进行。专家小组观察到丰溪里核试验场的活动持续不断，但没有核试验的报告。

### 核力量新理论

3. 2022 年 9 月 8 日，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国颁布关于核武力政策的法令，其中规定了使用核武器的条件、该国核力量的组成以及其指挥控制安排，并重申了“核力量提质增量”的目标(附件 1)。2022 年 12 月下旬，金正恩强调“大规模生产战术核武器的重要性和必要性”，并要求在 2023 年实现“国家核武库指数级增长”(附件 22)。

4. 金正恩在 2022 年 4 月的阅兵式上表示，“……核力量……应在质量和规模上得到加强，使其能够在任何战争情况下，根据不同行动的目的和使命，以各种手段发挥核作战能力……”(附件 18)。

5. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国继续增加核裂变材料储存、重新开放核试验场、采取新的核政策、进行一系列模拟若干核作战任务的导弹发射，包括使用战术核武器(见第 24 段)，所有这些都表明该国核武器计划明显加快。这符合 2021 年 1 月制定的战略目标，其中强调“根据行动职责和目标的目的发展用作各种手段的战术核武器”。<sup>1</sup>

### 丰溪里试验场

6. 专家小组此前报告了 3 号隧道的重新开放和核试验场配套建筑的建造情况。卫星图像显示，主要行政区内继续建造配套建筑，通往 4 号隧道和指挥中心的道路得到加固。2023 年 1 月初，行政区一处空地上可以看到多名人员。<sup>2</sup>

7. 自专家小组上次报告以来，没有观察到 3 号隧道附近有重大变化，2018 年 5 月拆除的 4 号隧道入口处也没有任何新的挖掘活动(见附件 2)。

<sup>1</sup> S/2022/668，第 3 段和附件 2。

<sup>2</sup> 2022 年 4 月下旬，一家智库报告说在同一地区有人员存在。见 <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/punggye-ri-update-construction-and-volleyball/>。

## 宁边场址

### 轻水反应堆

8. 据一个会员国称, 2022 年 7 月检测到有可能进行了冷却水系统测试。国际原子能机构(原子能机构)总干事 2022 年 9 月 7 日和 11 月 16 日通报称, 原子能机构观察到冷却水系统可能在 2022 年 7 月、9 月底和 10 月初进行测试的迹象。专家小组同一时期在九龙江附近观察到与这些观察结果相符的废水痕迹。<sup>3</sup> 9 月下旬和 10 月下旬还分别观察到挖沟工程和河堤改造活动。自 8 月以来注意到在轻水反应堆以西的周边地区建造了一座新建筑。三座配套建筑的外部工程于 2021 年开始, 到 11 月似乎已经完成(见附件 3)。<sup>4</sup>

### 宁边实验核电站(5 兆瓦(电))

9. 卫星图像显示, 5 兆瓦(电)反应堆还在运行。据观察, 反应堆冷却水持续排放, 2022 年 12 月下旬可以看到涡轮机和发电机厂房可能在排放蒸汽。据观察, 反应堆周围经常有一些车辆, 包括长卡车和一辆很可能是二氧化碳罐车(见附件 4)。

### 50 兆瓦(电)反应堆

10. 未观察到从 50 兆瓦(电)反应堆中显著移除材料。2022 年 12 月下旬的图像显示, 已部分拆除的乏燃料储存建筑附近有车辆活动。<sup>5</sup> 继 4 月至 5 月的挖沟工程之后,<sup>6</sup> 专家小组于 10 月中旬观察到附近建造了一座新建筑, 其用途尚不清楚(附件 5)。

### 放射化学实验室

11. 2022 年 5 月至 10 月, 专家小组继续观察到热电厂烟囱冒烟。鉴于间歇排放, 因而似乎与废物处理或维护活动有关。在整个报告所述期间观察到乏燃料接收建筑<sup>7</sup> 周围有车辆活动。<sup>8</sup> 9 月至 11 月期间, 该建筑附近出现了成堆的不明材料。<sup>9</sup> 在实验区外围开始了新的施工。智库报告说<sup>10</sup>, 位于放射化学实验室东南的一个疑似核废料储存地出现了新的挖掘活动, 这一点得到专家小组证实(见附件 6)。

<sup>3</sup> 一名外部专家告诉专家小组, 存在废水的其他原因可能包括在轻水反应堆以南建造的配套建筑物的排水。

<sup>4</sup> S/2022/132, 第 3 段和附件 3; S/2022/668, 第 7 段和附件 4。

<sup>5</sup> S/2022/132, 第 5 段和附件 5; S/2022/668, 第 9 段和附件 6。

<sup>6</sup> S/2022/668, 第 9 段和附件 6。

<sup>7</sup> 这些车辆可能有几种功能, 包括废物处理、维护和向厂房运送材料。

<sup>8</sup> S/2022/668, 第 10 段和附件 7。

<sup>9</sup> 材料的形状与 2016 年和 2019 年的观察结果不同。<https://www.38north.org/2016/05/yongbyon053116/>, <https://www.38north.org/2019/10/yongbyon100419/>。

<sup>10</sup> <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/yongbyon-update-new-activity-at-building-500-and-rising-waters/> 和 <https://www.38north.org/2022/07/north-koreas-yongbyon-nuclear-center-plutonium-production-continues-despite-heavy-rains/>。

### 宁边核燃料棒组装厂

12. 2022年7月至11月期间,偶尔观察到该厂二氧化铀生产处理厂房冒出蒸汽,这可能表明正在继续生产核裂变材料。<sup>11</sup> 自7月以来,观察到四氟化铀生产处理厂房部分拆除或翻新。6月至7月期间,该厂房南侧部署了一台起重机。该厂房的墙壁和屋顶结构分别于7月和8月开始拆除,12月重铺了屋顶(附件7)。

### 平山铀矿和浓缩厂

13. 在本报告所述期间,铀矿和浓缩厂一直在运营。专家小组注意到其中一个矿场的尾矿堆略有扩大。浓缩厂南侧尾矿池中的固体废物量继续增多。此外还观察到浓缩厂经常有轨道车活动(附件8)。

### 其他场址

14. 专家小组继续监测降仙<sup>12</sup> 据称秘密铀浓缩设施附近的的活动,观察到主建筑附近有几种类型的卡车不断活动(附件9)。

15. 据信永洞堂地区被用于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的核武器开发计划,包括被用作核武器储存设施。专家小组观察到隧道入口附近有小规模活动,入口附近的建筑物周围不断有车辆活动。专家小组证实了对北部地区另一个可能爆炸物储存地的外部观察结果<sup>13</sup> (见附件10)。

### 技术无形转让和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国大学的活动

16. 专家小组继续调查涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的技术无形转让活动,特别是安全理事会第2321(2016)号决议第11段所涵盖的活动领域。

17. 对平壤科技大学与外国大学<sup>14</sup> 之间联系的调查显示,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国一名研究人员毕业于瑞典一所大学的博士课程,随后受雇于瑞典另一家研究机构。这家研究机构告知专家小组,该朝鲜人自2020年4月起被聘为实验室技术员,之后自2021年8月起被聘为博士后研究员,目前月薪为34000瑞典克朗(3281美元)。这违反了安全理事会第2397(2017)号决议第8段关于海外工人的规定。调查工作继续进行(见附件11)。

18. 大不列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国和巴西的院校关于其与平壤科技大学的学术交流的答复表明,没有违反技术无形转让方面的制裁(见附件12)。

19. 德国媒体报道称,<sup>15</sup> 自2017年以来,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国学者与德国马克斯-玻恩非线性光学和短脉冲光谱学研究所学者共合作撰写了9篇学术论文。

<sup>11</sup> S/2022/668, 第11段和附件8。

<sup>12</sup> S/2022/668, 第13段和附件10。

<sup>13</sup> S/2022/132, 第12段和附件11; S/2022/668, 第13段和附件11。

<sup>14</sup> S/2022/668, 第15段和附件12。

<sup>15</sup> <https://www.dw.com/en/despite-un-sanctions-german-research-institute-worked-with-north-korean-scientists/a-63890089>。

两名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国学者——金日成综合大学的 Im Song-Jin<sup>16</sup> 和国家科学院的 Kim Kwang-Hyon<sup>17</sup> ——2008 年至 2012 年期间在该研究所学习，其后一直与该研究所的研究人员合作。这项研究的其他朝鲜民主主义人民共和国合著者也来自金日成综合大学(见附件 13)。

20. 这些朝鲜民主主义人民共和国科学家所进行的研究是否可能用于大规模毁灭性武器和军事用途，这一点存在争议。一个会员国评估说，这 9 项联合研究“预期将成为可应用于先进光学传感器、光学通信、卫星间通信、监视和侦察以及军事专用通信系统的基本理论”，这些研究“属于瓦塞纳尔安排所管制两用物品的基础技术研究……”(见附件 14)。马克斯-玻恩非线性光学和短脉冲光谱学研究所答复说：“这些研究结果没有清晰可辨的两用潜力……本研究所不从事任何与军事有关的研究，也不与追求军事目标的研究组织合作。”(见附件 15)。

### 弹道导弹

21. 弹道导弹计划继续大幅加速。<sup>18</sup> 在本报告所述期间，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国试图在战略和战术层面展示其核武器运载系统的可信性、互补性和战备状态。在各种导弹和新发动机试验增加、弹道导弹和核计划相关基础设施不断改进的同时，官方开展了明确的宣传运动。

22. 2022 年 9 月至 2023 年 1 月 1 日期间，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国至少进行了 24 次弹道导弹或结合弹道和制导技术导弹的发射试验。发射了 35 至 45 枚固体推进剂发动机短程弹道导弹和至少 8 枚液体推进剂发动机弹道导弹(3 枚短程弹道导弹、3 枚中程弹道导弹/远程弹道导弹、2 枚洲际弹道导弹)(见图一表 1 和附件 16 A、16 B 和 25)。<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> 开放研究者与贡献者身份识别码(ORCID): 0000-0001-6277-7200。


<sup>17</sup> 开放研究者与贡献者身份识别码(ORCID): 0000-0003-2909-6686。

<sup>18</sup> 此前报告了截至 2022 年 7 月 27 日的情况(S/2022/668，第 17 段)。

<sup>19</sup> 两名专家认为，没有足够的证据可确定本段所述朝鲜民主主义人民共和国发射的导弹的性质和所用技术。

图一

2019 年 5 月 5 日至 2023 年 1 月 1 日期间弹道导弹或综合弹道和制导技术导弹的发射情况



	2018	2019	2020	2021	Jan. to Aug. 2022	Sep. to 31 Dec. 2022	2022	2023	total on 01 Jan. 2023
Number of solid propellant (SP) BMs, comprising:	0	25	11	5	22	34	56	1	98
SRBM (SP)	0	24	11	4	21	33	54	1	94
SRBM/SLBM (SP)	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	0	3
MRBM-IRBM/SLBM (SP)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Number of liquid propellant (LP) BMs, comprising:	0	0	0	1	9	8	17	0	18
SRBM (LP)	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	3
MRBM-IRBM (LP)	0	0	0	1	3	3	6	0	7
ICBM (LP)	0	0	0	0	6	2	8	0	8
Total number of BMs	0	25	11	6	31	42	73	1	116


资料来源：专家小组。



23. 以前确定的弹道导弹计划主要趋势<sup>20</sup> 得到确认和发展,其中包括改善战略部队的指挥和控制,优化固体和液体推进导弹系统的战备状态,增强多样性、机动性和复原力,以及不断提高洲际弹道导弹专用液体和固体推进剂发动机的效率(见图二表 1,第 26 和 27 段,以及附件 24 和 25)。

图二

在 9 月 25 日至 2023 年至 1 月 1 日期间,从 24 个发射场发射了超过 43 枚弹道导弹。<sup>21</sup> 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国官方声明中至少有 12 项明确提到弹道技术(高亮显示):



资料来源: 朝中社<sup>22</sup> 和会员国。

<sup>20</sup> S/2022/668, 第 20 段。

<sup>21</sup> 测试了各种射程的导弹(根据弹头重量估计在 130 至 15 000 公里之间)(短程弹道导弹、短程弹道导弹/潜射弹道导弹、远程弹道导弹、洲际弹道导弹,包括远程巡航导弹)。弹道导弹使用固体推进剂或液体推进剂发动机,并综合了弹道和制导技术。

<sup>22</sup> 据显示,朝鲜曾修改或伪造照片图像,可能是出于宣传目的。图片来源于 <https://kcnawatch.org/>; <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/63b19095d845f/>; <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1672574939-729238062/kim-jong-un-makes-speech-in-reply-at-ceremony-of-donating-600mm-super-large-multiple-launch-rocket-systems/>; <https://kcnawatch.org/#gallery-249>。

24. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国新核武力政策法令<sup>23</sup> 中所述以及 2021 年以来逐步在公开声明<sup>24</sup> 中描述的对任何区域或洲际目标实施意外核打击的能力，与观察到的战术和战略运载系统的生产、试验和部署相一致(见图三和图五以及附件 24)。

图三

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国邮票公司，特种邮票<sup>25</sup>



资料来源：会员国。

25. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国人民军总参谋部 2022 年 11 月 7 日发表声明解释说，为回应美利坚合众国和大韩民国的军事演习，人民军于 11 月 2 日至 5 日开展了军事行动。然而，那次行动也是试验和强化弹道导弹和核计划的一次机会，例如，被指认的国防科学院(KPe.021)要求朝鲜人民军进行一次重要的弹道导弹试射。<sup>26</sup>

<sup>23</sup> “通过将国家核武力政策编纂成法律，我国向全世界宣布，我们的核武器决不能局限于单一的战争威慑任务，当不可避免的情况出现时，它们将被迫发动先发制人的核打击，并通过实际军事行动证明了这一点。”《劳动新闻》，2022 年 12 月 25 日，可查阅网址：<https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1671955810-811895774/military-miracles-which-demonstrated-to-whole-world-national-prestige-and-honor-of-juche-korea/>。

<sup>24</sup> 见附件 17, 18 和 20-22。

<sup>25</sup> 顶部邮票上的文字翻译：“10 月 4 日，这枚新型地对地远程弹道导弹飞越日本上空，击中了 4 500 公里外的太平洋目标水域……”(见附件 24 B)。

<sup>26</sup> “美国和韩国最近进行挑衅，举行军事演习……人民军总参谋部于 11 月 2 日至 5 日开展了以下相应的军事行动……/应国防科学院的要求，在行动的第二天，人民军进行了重要弹道导弹试射，以验证瘫痪敌方作战指挥系统的特殊功能弹头的运动可靠性。它发射了 5 枚超大型多管发射导弹和各种任务的战术弹道导弹以及 46 枚远程多管发射导弹……”，可查阅 <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1667774164-903270856/report-of-general-staff-of-kpa-on-its-military-operations-corresponding-to-u-s-south-korea-combined-air-drill>。

26. 三件大事突显了洲际弹道导弹计划的新能力。官方展开了自信的宣传，将 11 月 18 日的“新型火星-17 洲际弹道导弹”试验描述为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国弹道导弹计划的巅峰之作。金正恩的女儿在发射试验和随后的发射后庆祝活动中出现在她父亲身边，这似乎在强调该国发出的信息，即其洲际弹道导弹和核计划具有根本性和不可逆转性(见附件 24 E)。<sup>27</sup>

27. 第二和第三件大事涉及洲际弹道导弹/远程弹道导弹发动机研发计划。2022 年 8 月 27 日至 30 日，通过卫星图像检测到，西海(东仓里)卫星发射场的立式发动机试验台上有草烧焦的痕迹。与以往的类似试验一样，<sup>28</sup> 这次试验与弹道导弹液体推进剂发动机的研发有关。2022 年 12 月 15 日，一台新型固体推进剂发动机在西海新建的卧式发动机试验台进行了测试。<sup>29</sup> 发动机的尺寸适合洲际弹道导弹主体，外壳似乎是用复合纤维缠绕而成。据朝鲜中央通讯社报道，它的推力达 140 吨，而且是“基于推力矢量控制技术”；这得到了朝中社照片佐证(如照片属实)(见图四和附件 23)。

<sup>27</sup> 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国于 2022 年 3 月 25 日谎称成功进行了火星-17 超大型洲际弹道导弹满负荷发射(见 S/2022/668，第 21 段及附件 16 和 17)。

<sup>28</sup> 关于 2019 年 12 月 2 日至 8 日的试验，见 S/2020/151，附件 62。这个立式发动机试验台位于西海，北纬 39°39'11.32"、东经 124°42'51.30"，距离新的卧式发动机试验台 220 米。

<sup>29</sup> 新试验台的建设始于 2022 年 11 月 14 日，位于北纬 39°39'06"、东经 124°42'58"。该试验台距离咸兴地区(化学材料研究所和第 17 炸药厂)和传统上开发固体燃料火箭发动机技术的箴进军工复合体相对较远(见 S/2019/171，第 5 段；S/2017/150，第 42-47 段)。

图四  
西海发动机试验台



资料来源：Planet Labs，协调世界时 2022 年 8 月 3 日、9 月 6 日和 12 月 2 日 0428；  
<https://kcnawatch.org/>；朝鲜中央电视台 2022 年 12 月 16 日下午 5 时公报，可查阅 [KCTV Video Archive](#) | [KCNA Watch](#)。

28. 最近进行的一系列短程弹道导弹试验(见图二，表 1，以及附件 16 A、24A-24C 和 25)，以及金正恩 2023 年 1 月 1 日发表的庆祝部署新生产的超大型多管火箭炮系统(短程弹道导弹 KN-25)的贺词，<sup>30</sup> “将韩国全境纳入打击范围，并能够携带战术核弹头”<sup>31</sup> 证实了短程弹道导弹计划在战术核运用能力发展中的作用。

<sup>30</sup> S/2022/668，图十八。

<sup>31</sup> 见附件 21。



29. 据显示，金正恩的女儿不仅参加了 11 月 18 日的新洲际弹道导弹试验(见第 26 段和附件 24 E)，还于 2023 年 1 月 1 日陪同父亲在一个大型设施内视察了 25 枚无弹头的火星-12。另一张显示金正恩和金正植(KPi.066，见附件 24 E)视察至少 24 枚火星-12 弹头的照片有可能展示了这些弹头。据显示，这对父女还在另一处仓库视察了至少 12 个装有 KN-23 弹道导弹的轮式运输竖起发射装置(见图五)。

图五

金正恩及女儿和金正植视察火星-12 远程弹道导弹、火星-12 弹头和 KN-23 短程弹道导弹运输竖起发射装置武器系统



资料来源：2023 年 1 月 1 日朝鲜中央电视台广播的截图。

30. 会员国证实了从弹道导弹发射的不同轨迹中记录的多项技术数据(见表 1 和附件 25)。专家小组通过卫星图像分析了国家宇宙开发局(KPe.029)各种基础设施发展情况以及西海(东仓里)卫星发射场(见附件 23)、平壤通用卫星控制中心周围(北纬 39°2'33.55"、东经 125°42'35.02")和空间科学院(北纬 39°2'30.26"、东经 125°42'26.63")的基础设施。

31. 2022 年 9 月 25 日至 2023 年 1 月 1 日期间 24 次试验的其他技术详情载于表 1 和关于具体发射试验的附件, 包括 9 月 25 日发射的短程弹道导弹/潜射弹道导弹(见附件 24 A), 10 月 4 日发射的远程弹道导弹(见附件 24 B)、11 月 2 日发射的短程弹道导弹(或类似导弹)(见附件 24 C)、11 月 3 日发射的洲际弹道导弹(见附件 24 D)、11 月 18 日发射的洲际弹道导弹(见附件 24 E)和附件 25。

表 1

2022 年 9 月 25 日至 2023 年 1 月 1 日朝鲜民主主义人民共和国发射使用液体和固体燃料推进剂发动机的弹道导弹或综合弹道与制导技术导弹的情况汇总(更多详情见附件 24 和 25; 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的各种官方声明以斜体字表示)

<i>Tests (all) in the year</i>	<i>Tests solid/ liquid since 2018</i>	<i>Tests solid/ liquid in the year</i>	<i>Date and time (local)</i>	<i>Reported type</i>	<i>Number of missiles</i>	<i>Reported launch location</i>	<i>Reported distance travelled (km)</i>	<i>Reported apogee (km)</i>	<i>Remark</i>	<i>Korean Central News Agency classification</i>
1 <sup>st</sup> SP+LP	47 <sup>th</sup> SP	1 <sup>st</sup> SP	2023	Solid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and 1 Jan. 2023</u> :	98-108					
				In 2023:	1					
	15 <sup>th</sup> LP	0 LP	2023	Liquid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and 18 Dec. 2022</u> :	18					
				In 2023: (0) IRBM + (0) ICBM + (0) SRBM:	0					
1 <sup>st</sup>	47 <sup>th</sup> SP	1 <sup>st</sup> SP	1 Jan. 2023 02:50	SRBM KN-25 <i>Super large rocket system (600mm)</i> - solid propellant (SP) engine	1	From Pyongyang Yongsong toward east	400 or 350	100	- "nuclear-capable multiple rocket launcher (MRL) able to strike anywhere in South Korea"(KCNA 2 Jan. 2023)  - "30 were recently deployed in the army" (KCNA 2 Jan. 2023)	"At dawn of January 1, 2023, ... fired one shell towards the east ... with a delivered super-large multiple rocket launcher..." (KCNA DPRK Today 2 Jan. 2022)

Tests (all) in the year	Tests solid/liquid since 2018	Tests solid/liquid in the year	Date and time (local)	Reported type	Number of missiles	Reported launch location	Reported distance travelled (km)	Reported apogee (km)	Remark	Korean Central News Agency classification
40 <sup>th</sup> SP+LP	46 <sup>th</sup> SP	26 <sup>th</sup> SP	2022	Solid fuel BMs fired between 2018 and 31 Dec. 2022:	97~107					
				In 2022:	56~66					
	15 <sup>th</sup> LP	14 <sup>th</sup> LP	2022	Liquid fuel BMs fired between 2018 and 18 Dec. 2022:	18					
				In 2022: IRBM (6) + ICBM (8) + SRBM (3):	17					
18 <sup>th</sup>	29 <sup>th</sup> SP	9 <sup>th</sup> SP	25 Sep. 2022 06:53 or 06:52	- SRBM underwater launch of a small SLBM - SP engine - based on KN-23 SRBM and resembles the small SLBM presented at the military parade on 25 April 2022 and last tested on 7 May 2022 from a submarine.	1	From Taechon Reservoir (in North Pyongan Province) toward the east and splashed down before 07:11 after a less than 18-minute flight.	600 or 650	60 or 50	- max. speed M.5 - irregular trajectory after ballistic trajectory likely KN-23 or KN-24 - resumption of missile launches since 2 CM launches on 17 Aug 2022.	"...from September 25 to October 9... a <u>ballistic missile launching drill</u> under the simulation of loading <u>tactical nuclear warheads</u> at a silo under a reservoir" (KCNA, Rodong Sinmun 10 Oct. 2022)
19 <sup>th</sup>	30 <sup>th</sup> SP	10 <sup>th</sup> SP	28 Sep. 2022 18:10 and 18:17 or 18:20	- SRBM KN-23 or modified - SP engine	2	From Sunan area toward the east and splashed down, possibly from either the Sariwon or Sakkanmol bases	360 or 350 and 300	30 or 50 and 50	- max. speed M.6 - irregular trajectory after ballistic trajectory - time between launches: 7 min	"At the ballistic missile launching drill <u>simulating the loading of tactical nuclear warheads</u> which was staged on September 28 ... " (KCNA, Rodong Sinmun 10 Oct. 2022)
20 <sup>th</sup>	31 <sup>st</sup> SP	11 <sup>th</sup> SP	29 Sep. 2022 20:48 or 20:47 and 20:57 or 20:53	- SRBM KN-23 or modified - SP engine	2	From Sunchon region in South Pyongan Province, toward the east	350 or 300 and 300	50 and 50	- max. speed M.6 or M.5(?) - irregular trajectory after ballistic trajectory - time between launches: 6 min	" <u>Various types of tactical ballistic missiles</u> that were launched on September 29 and October 1 (KCNA, Rodong Sinmun 10 Oct. 2022)



21 <sup>st</sup>	32 <sup>nd</sup> SP	12 <sup>th</sup> SP	1 Oct.2022 06:45 or 06:42 and 07:03 or 06:58	- SRBM KN-23 or modified - SP engine	2	From the Sunan area toward the east	350 or 400 and 350	30 or 50 and 30 or 50	- max. speed M.6 - irregular trajectory after ballistic trajectory - time between launches: 16 min	<i>"Various types of tactical ballistic missiles that were launched on September 29 and October 1 (KCNA, Rodong Sinmun 10 Oct. 2022)</i>
22 <sup>nd</sup>	11 <sup>th</sup> LP	10 <sup>th</sup> LP	4 Oct. 2022 07:23	- new IRBM modified <b>Hwasong-12</b> - liquid propellant (LP) engine. - new type of IRBM not very different from Hwasong-12 but without the 4 vernier engines and with probably a single manoeuvrable nozzle (see KCNA picture)	1	From Mupyong-ri, Jagang Province area (40°36'40.21"N12 6°25'33.31"E) toward the east over Aomori Prefecture Japan from about 7:28 to 7:29 and splashed at 07:44-46 about 3 200 km east of Japan.	4500 or 4600	970 or 1000	- max. speed M.17 - flight Time: 21min - 5 <sup>th</sup> launch of a IRBM since 14 May 2017 - first time Democratic People's Republic of Korea launched a missile over Japanese territory in five years - longest range by any BM test over Japan - the Japanese government issued a public alert - the fully encased nozzle suggest that the image may have been manipulated	- <i>"a decision to send more powerful and clear warning to the enemies on October 4 and took a measure to hit the set water area in the Pacific 4 500 kilometers across the Japanese Islands with new- type ground-to-ground intermediate-range ballistic missile"</i> (KCNA, Rodong Sinmun 10 Oct. 2022)
23 <sup>rd</sup>	33 <sup>rd</sup> SP	13 <sup>th</sup> SP	6 Oct. 2022 06:01 or 06:00 and 06:23 or 06:15	- SRBM KN-23 and KN-25 - SP engine	2	From Samsok area of Pyongyang toward the east and BM1 splashed down at 06:11 and BM2 at 06:32	350 and 800	80 or 100 and 60 or 50	- BM1 max. speed M.5 - BM2 max. speed M.6 - time between launches: 22min - BM2 possible irregular trajectory after ballistic trajectory	<i>At dawn of October 6, the striking drills of super-large multiple rocket launchers and tactical ballistic missiles</i> (KCNA, Rodong Sinmun 10 Oct. 2022)

24 <sup>th</sup>	34 <sup>th</sup> SP	14 <sup>th</sup> SP	9 Oct. 2022 01:48 or 01:47 and 01:58 or 01:53	- SRBM KN-25 - SP engine	2	From Muncheon in Kangwon Province toward the east - These ballistic missiles were very likely to have been launched from the port and harbor area	350 and 350	90 or 100 and 90 or 100	- BM1 max. speed M.5 - time between launches: 10 minutes	<i>"The firing drill of the super-large multiple rocket launchers was waged in simulating the strike of the enemies' main ports at dawn of October 9" (KCNA, Rodong Sinmun 10 Oct. 2022)</i>
25 <sup>th</sup>	35 <sup>th</sup> SP	15 <sup>th</sup> SP	14 Oct. 2022 01:49 or 01:52	- SRBM KN-25 (?) - SP engine	1	From Sunan area toward the east	650	50	- possible irregular trajectory after ballistic trajectory	No statement or information from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
26 <sup>th</sup>	36 <sup>th</sup> SP	16 <sup>th</sup> SP	28 Oct. 2022 11:59 and 12:18	- SRBM - SP engine	2	From Thongchon County (Tongjong-ho) toward the east in the vicinity of Alsom Island.	230	24	- BMs max. speed M.5 - the launch pad is about 60km from the inter-Korean border.	No statement
27 <sup>th</sup>	37 <sup>th</sup> SP	17 <sup>th</sup> SP	2 Nov. 2022 06:51	SRBM and unknown projectiles, possible anti-aircraft missiles - SP engine	4 At least 3 BMs	From Jeongju and Pihyeon-gun (North Pyongan Province) near the west coast toward the west	?	?	- Democratic People's Republic of Korea's military operation counter-response drill - At least 33 missiles, 180 artillery shells, and more jets. Democratic People's Republic of Korea claims it launched 86 projectiles, including 46 "long-range MLRS." (NKnews 14 Nov. 2022)	On 7 Nov. a global statement was released by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: "in the morning ... fired four tactical ballistic missiles loaded with dispersion warheads and underground infiltration warheads at a desert island off the West Sea Barrage" (Report of General Staff of KPA 7 Nov. 2022)

28 <sup>th</sup>	38 <sup>th</sup> SP	18 <sup>th</sup> SP	2 Nov. 2022 08:51 or 08:50	SRBM possible variant of KN-23 - SP propellant engines - at least one was a SA-5 with a single stage liquid motor boosted by 4 jettisonable solid propellant boosters	3 At least 3 BMs	From Wonsan area (in Kangwon Province) near the east coast toward the east: toward southeast of Ulleung island (BM2) landed 26km south of Northern Limit Line (NLL) (57km east of Sokcho and 167km northwest of Ulleung island)	190 or 150 and  200 and  short	150 or 150 and  100 and  50	- irregular trajectory - first time since the division of the Koreas that a BM landed in proximity to the territorial waters of the ROK just south of the NLL (Possible malfunction of missile). An air raid warning in the Ulleung island area 8:54 to 14:00 was issued. - a MS recovered an object on Nov. 6 presumed to be a remnant of SA-5 possibly used as SRBM that Democratic People's Republic of Korea fired on Nov. 2	- No statement but on 7 Nov. a global statement was released by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
29 <sup>th</sup>	39 <sup>th</sup> SP	19 <sup>th</sup> SP	2 Nov. 2022 09:12	Mix SRBM, LRCM and surface-to-air (SA) missiles - SP engine	>10	From Sinpo area (in South Hamgyong Province) toward the east and From Onchon (South Pyongan Province), Hwajin-ri (South Hwanghae Province) toward the West	?	?	- On the 2 Nov., a MS did not detect anything matching Democratic People's Republic of Korea CM claims (ROK JCS 7 Nov. 2022) - The image of CM was a recycled image already published after April 2022 test from mansion beach in Majon. (NKnews 7 Nov. 2022)	"The KPA fired <u>two strategic cruise missiles</u> with the shooting range of 590.5 km at the open sea around 80 km off the coast of Ulsan City of south Korea (35°29'51.6" latitude and 130°19'39.6" longitude) from North Hamgyong Province" (KCNA 7 Nov. 2022)
30 <sup>th</sup>	40 <sup>th</sup> SP	20 <sup>th</sup> SP	2 Nov. 2022 16:30 or 16:00 to 17:10 or 17:00	Mix SA missiles (6) and possible suspected BM - SP engine	<6	From Sondok and Sinpo areas toward the east and from Kwail and Oncheon area toward the west	Very short	50	- 23 missiles were fired into the sea on Wednesday 2 November, the most missiles fired in a single day.	"The morning and afternoon the anti-aircraft missile units of the air force on the east and west coastal areas fired 23 ground-to-air missiles" (KCNA 07 Nov 2022)

31 <sup>st</sup>	12 <sup>th</sup> LP	11 <sup>th</sup> LP	3 Nov. 2022 07:40 or 07:39	New ICBM variant of Hwasong-15 - LP engine. - new ICBM design with liquid propellant engine, - $\propto$ 10101907- - shroud seems more elongated, and the proportion between stages (2) appeared to be different from that of Hwasong-15 - this modified Hwasong-15 seems to be related to the improvement of warhead as a third stage	1	From Sunan area toward the east, fell into the sea at 08:10. It disappeared from the radar before going over Japan	760 or 750	1920 or 2000	- max. speed M.15 - flight time: 30min - possible failure after the second stage separation process before falling into the sea. (Third stage?) - Japan issued evacuation alerts in central prefectures of Miyagi, Yamagata and Niigata at 07:50 - similar sequence as on 25 May involving two SRBMs and one ICBM	"The <u>second day of the</u> <u>operations, the KPA</u> <u>conducted important</u> <u>test-fire of ballistic</u> <u>missile to verify the</u> <u>movement reliability of a</u> <u>special functional</u> <u>warhead paralyzing the</u> <u>operation command</u> <u>system of the enemy.</u> " (KCNA 7 Nov.2022)
32 <sup>nd</sup>	41 <sup>st</sup> SP	21 <sup>st</sup> SP	3 Nov. 2022 08:39  08:51 or 08:48	SRBM KN-25 or KN-23 - SP engine	2  At least 3BMs	From Kaechon area (South Pyongan province) toward the east, splashed down for BM1 at 08:47 and the BM2 at 08:55 near the east coast	330 or 350 and 330 or 350	70 or 50 and 70 or 50	- max. speed M.5 - flight time: 8 min for BM1, 4 min for BM2	"...and it fired five super- large multiple launch missiles and tactical ballistic missiles of various missions and 46 long- range multiple launch missiles " (KCNA 7 Nov. 2022)
33 <sup>rd</sup>	13 <sup>th</sup> LP	12 <sup>th</sup> LP	3 Nov. 2022 21:34 21:39 21:42	SRBM possible old Scud-type missile - LP engine - Hwasong-6/scud-C according to KCNA photos	3	From Koksan (North Hwanghae province) toward the east	490 or 500	130 or 150	- max. speed M.6 - 29 missiles were launched since Wednesday 2 November - 80 rounds of artillery into inter-Korean buffer zone off the eastern coast	"fired five super-large multiple launch missiles and tactical ballistic missiles of various missions and 46 long- range multiple launch missiles..." (KCNA 7 Nov. 2022)



34 <sup>th</sup>	42 <sup>nd</sup> SP	22 <sup>nd</sup> SP	5 Nov. 2022 11:32 to 11:59	SRBM KN-23 and KN-25 - SP engine	4	- From Dongrim in North Pyongan Province toward west at uninhabited island off the West Sea Barrage in the Yellow Sea.	130	20	- max. speed M.5 - According to a MS 7 Nov. report, at least 33 missiles were fired between 2 and 5 November 2022 - on 4 Nov. 180 trails of Democratic People's Republic of Korea warplanes detected	<i>"On the fourth day of the operations, the KPA fired again two tactical ballistic missiles loaded with dispersion warheads and two super-large multiple launch missiles at a desert island off the West Sea Barrage." - "at least 86 missiles were fired between 2 and 5 November 2022. (KCNA Rodong Sinmun 7 Nov. 2022)</i>
35 <sup>th</sup>	43 <sup>rd</sup> SP	23 <sup>rd</sup> SP	9 Nov. 2022 15:31	SRBM possible KN-23 or KN-24 - SP engine	1 or 2	- From Sukchon in South Pyongan Province toward east and struck uninhabited island in water off the coast	290 or 250	30 or 50	- max. speed M.6 - very low altitude	No statement
36 <sup>th</sup>	44 <sup>th</sup> SP	24 <sup>th</sup> SP	17 Nov. 2022 10:48 or 10:47	SRBM - SP engine (?)	1	- From Kangwon province toward northeast	240	47	- max. speed M.4 - the statement of Minister Choe Son hui may be related to the 18 Nov. launch.	Earlier statement (09:07) of Choe Son hui (MOFA): <i>"...the fiercer the DPRK's military counteraction will be, in direct proportion to it..."</i> (KCNA 17 Nov. 2022)

37 <sup>th</sup>	14 <sup>th</sup> LP	13 <sup>th</sup> LP	18 Nov. 2022 10:14 or 10:15	<p>New type ICBM Hwasong-17</p> <p>- LP engine</p> <p>- ㄹ 09151751 – TEL no. 321</p> <p>- BM length 25m diameter 2.8m</p> <p>- 11-axle wheeled TEL 29m long, 4m wide</p> <p>- TEL 321 stored in the aircraft hangar at the west side of the main runway (39° 12' 26" N 125° 39' 58" E)</p> <p>- TEL 321 (annex S/2022/668 Annex 23.2.1) this TEL number was already presented with Hwasong-17 ㄹ 03031203 according to 26 March 2022 footage and Hwasong-17 ㄹ 7220406 at the 10 October 2020 parade.</p> <p>- ㄹ 09151753 – TEL no. 322 presented on the 26 Nov. photo showing the KJU's daughter attending the ceremony. At the military parade 10 Oct.2020 the TEL 322 carried a Hwasong-17 ㄹ 21260405 (S/2022/668 annex 23.2)</p>	1	<p>From Sunan international airport (launch pad at 39°13'18.05"N 125°40'27.49"E) toward east and fell into the sea at 11:23 within Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ)) about 200 km west of Oshima Island in Hokkaido Prefecture</p>	1000	6100 or 6000	<p>- max. speed M.22 (27,166 km/h)</p> <p>- flight time: 69 min</p> <p>- Possible first full capacity successful launch of the Hwasong-17</p> <p>- range estimation of over 15,000km, depending on the warhead weight</p>	<p>"The DPRK strategic forces test-fired a new-type ICBM on Nov. 18"</p> <p>... The test-fire was aimed at checking the reliability of the weapon system and its operation" ... "The new-type ICBM Hwasongpho-17, launched at the Pyongyang International Airport, traveled up to a maximum altitude of 6 040.9 km and flew a distance of 999.2 km for 4 135s [69'55''] before accurately landing on the preset area in open waters" (Rodong Sinmun 19 Nov. 2022)</p>
38 <sup>th</sup>	15 <sup>th</sup> LP	14 <sup>th</sup> LP	18 Dec. 2022 11:13 or 11:11 12:05 or 11:52	<p>MRBM</p> <p>- LP engine.</p> <p>- test possibly related to Military reconnaissance satellites</p>	2	<p>From Tongchang-ri (Sohae) toward northwest</p>	500	500	<p>- the BM resembles the Nodong Hwasong-7 (see S/2014/147, para. 34)</p> <p>- Satellite imagery released by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on this launch needs more analysis</p>	<p>- "The National Aerospace Administration (NADA) of the DPRK conducted an important final-stage test for the development of reconnaissance satellite at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground on December 18" (KCNA 19 Dec. 2022)</p>

39 <sup>th</sup>	45 <sup>th</sup> SP	25 <sup>th</sup> SP	23 Dec. 2022 16:32 or 16:31	SRBM - SP engine	2	From Pyongyang Sunan airport area toward the east splashed down at 16:46	250 and 350 or 300 and 300	50 and 50	- possible irregular trajectory	- No statement or information from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
40 <sup>th</sup>	46 <sup>th</sup> SP	26 <sup>th</sup> SP	31 Dec. 2022 08:00	SRBM KN-25 - SP engine - "Super large rocket system"	3	From Hwanghae province	360		- "nuclear-capable multiple rocket launcher (MRL) able to strike anywhere in South Korea" (KCNA 2 Jan. 2023) - "30 were deployed in the army" (KCNA 2 Jan. 2023)	"The three shells of multiple rocket launchers precisely hit a target island in the east ..., demonstrating their combat performance" (KCNA DPRK Today 2 Jan. 2022)

Source: Member States (MS), the Panel.

### 三. 部门制裁和海上制裁


#### 非法供应精炼石油<sup>32</sup>

##### 精炼石油产品

32. 截至 2023 年 1 月底，一个会员国向委员会正式报告了 2022 年 500 000 桶精炼石油产品年度上限许可量的 21.06%(见图六)。专家小组要求中国根据决议要求，提供有关这些交付的详细情况。中国答复说，中国“一直严格执行向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口精炼石油产品的规定”(见附件 26，OC.317)。

图六

2022 年 1 月至 11 月向委员会正式报告的向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交付精炼石油产品的情况(桶)



资料来源：[www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/supply-sale-or-transfer-of-all-refined-petroleum](http://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/supply-sale-or-transfer-of-all-refined-petroleum)；专家小组。

33. 2022 年 10 月，52 个会员国就有关向南浦石油设施交付精炼石油产品一事致函委员会。这些会员国提供的报告载有 1 月至 8 月期间在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国注册的油轮向南浦交付 45 批精炼石油产品的卫星图像。这些会员国根据这些油轮可能运载的石油估计数量提出了三种设想。他们估计，如果这些船只满载(以 90%的载重吨位运载石油产品)，则截至 8 月 31 日可向南浦交付多达 792 383 桶精炼石油产品(见附件 27)。<sup>33</sup> 委员会两名成员基于程序和方法上的理由，不同意这份报告(见附件 28)。附件 29 载有专家小组按照报告要求对会员国分析所作的审查。

<sup>32</sup> 除非另有说明，Windward 平台上显示的所有卫星图像捕捉日期和时间均为东部标准时间和世界协调时。

<sup>33</sup> 两名专家引述了 52 个会员国的信函，其中计算出，交付量可能在 264 127.5 桶至 792 382.5 桶之间。



34. 精炼石油产品主要由悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的油轮运往南浦，自冠状病毒病(COVID-19)大流行暴发以来一直如此。<sup>34</sup> 少数据悉“直接交付”的船只<sup>35</sup> 继续向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮移交精炼石油产品(见第 36-40 段)。

货船改装用于扩大精炼石油产品进口

35. 专家小组之前报告说，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国可能正在非法改装一些货船，用于运输石油产品，这是该地区燃料走私的一种已知方法(见附件 30)。

可疑船只的行为模式

36. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的专属经济区继续被用于涉及朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮的非法船对船移交精炼石油产品。<sup>36</sup> 图七显示了一个会员国观察到的 2022 年发生此类移交的地点。

图七

2022 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法船对船移交精炼石油的地区



资料来源：会员国。

注：从暖色到冷色表示非法海上移交密度递减。

37. “直接交付”船只 *Unica*(国际海事组织(海事组织): 8514306)和 *New Konk*(海事组织: 9036387)都继续在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国专属经济区内交付精炼石油。更多详情见图八所示 *New Konk* 动向和附件 31。


<sup>34</sup> 2022 年 10 月下旬，一家智库在南浦观察到一艘可能悬挂外国国旗的油轮，但这艘船到本报告所述期间结束时可能已经转入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船队。

<sup>35</sup> 该术语用于描述以前向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口运送精炼石油的无船旗、非朝鲜籍油轮。

<sup>36</sup> S/2022/668，第 35 和 36 段；S/2022/132，第 40 和 41 段。

38. 若干指标表明, *New Konk*、*Unica* 号和其他直接交付船只接受统一协调。*New Konk* 的船对船移交地点与先前拍摄到的 *Unica* 所在地点相同。*New Konk* 以 *Lifan* 作为船名传送信号时使用的海事移动业务标识码 457400047 也曾被 *Unica* 作为 *Haishun 2* 航行时使用。专家小组继续调查与这些船只和其他直接交付船只有关的协助方。<sup>37</sup>

图八  
2022 年 9 月至 11 月 *New Konk* 驶往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国专属经济区的航行路线



资料来源: Windward; 内嵌图像, Planet Labs, 由专家小组附加说明。



资料来源: Windward; 图像, Planet Labs, 由专家小组附加说明。

<sup>37</sup> S/2022/668, 第 62 段。

39. 以前报告的 *New Konk* 和 *Unica* 的作业方式仍然是：使用已知的伪造识别信息，在运输非法燃料期间停泊在三沙湾地区，在台湾海峡与已知的中间船只进行船对船移交，然后驶往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国专属经济区，向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国油轮移交石油。专家小组更新了“直接交付”船只传输的欺诈性识别信息清单(见表 2 和附件 32)。<sup>38</sup>

表 2

## 传送欺诈性识别信息的直接交付船只

NAME	IMO NUMBER	TRANSMITTING AS	MMSI	LAST PSC INSPECTED**
DIAMOND 8	9132612	CHANGSHUN 8	457222000	September 2017
		SHUNLI	457111000	
NEW KONK	9036387	M0USON,	511444000	July 2018
		F.LONLINE	312162000	
		LIFAN	312360680 457400047	
		HAIZHOU 168	667001397	
		FU YUAN YU 98	667001800	
SUBBLIC	8126082	HAI ZHOU 168	667001397	May 2004
UNICA	8514306	LITON	457106000	No data
		HAISHUN2	457400047	
		TAIAN	457400047	

\*\* PSC(港口国管制)

资料来源：专家小组。

40. 尽管专家小组的许多报告详细记录了这些船只违反制裁的活动，但联合国未指认这些没有悬挂船旗的船舶。<sup>39</sup> 专家小组继续鼓励有关当局对可能在其领水内停泊或航行的这些船舶进行调查并向专家小组通报情况。

## 船只销售和购置情况

41. 在本报告所述期间，专家小组调查了多起朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置船只的案件。安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 14 段禁止直接或间接向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国供应、销售或转让船只。专家小组继续追踪疑似被朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置或被转让给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国控制的其他有关船只。

42. 表 3 载有 2020 年以来朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置并正式悬挂国旗的船只的最新清单。<sup>40</sup> 表 4 列有据评估已转让给该国控制但尚未正式悬挂国旗的船只；这些船只长时间从事非法商品运输，并在正式悬挂国旗之前出现在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国领水内。在所有这些情况中，这些船只都违反了联合国决议。

<sup>38</sup> S/2022/132，第 44 段。

<sup>39</sup> 最后一次指认船只是在 2018 年。见 [www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/1718\\_designated\\_vessels\\_list\\_final.pdf](http://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/1718_designated_vessels_list_final.pdf)。

<sup>40</sup> S/2022/668，第 73 段和表 5。

## 43. 船只购置呈现类似的模式:

(a) 船只通过多个中介方出售, 通常包括主要位于特定第三国的第三方经纪人作为最后一步;

(b) 船只由不具网络足迹的公司销售;

(c) 船只由掩盖最终用户实益所有权以混淆与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国之间联系的公司销售;

(d) 海事组织网站上缺乏关于卖方和最终买方的最新信息;

(e) 取消船旗并使用不同船旗来交付船舶。

44. 与以往的情况不同, 专家小组注意到, 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国明显加快了对最近购置船只悬挂旗帜的速度。

45. 该地区的船只买卖普遍十分复杂, 包括中间人、经纪人并且没有进行买方核实。利用这种复杂性进行船只买卖, 使得难以查明向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出售船只的情况。鉴于该国持续购置船只, 而且参与船只销售的各方有可能意外逃避制裁, 专家小组建议在船只销售过程中应采用最佳做法和尽职调查步骤(见第 97 段)。

表 3

2020-2022 年悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的正式注册购置船舶(见附件 33)<sup>a</sup>

Year 2022					
	IMO number	Ship name	Type	DWT	Previously referenced in Panel reports
1	8355786	RAK WON 1 (ex- AN HAI 6)	Cargo	5075	Current report
2	9054779	SA HYANG SAN 1 (ex- TOMI HARU)	Cargo	5000	Current report
3	9054767	SO BAEK SU (ex- TOYO HARU)	Cargo	5838	Current report
4	8357112	MO RAN BONG 2 (ex- LIN DA 8)	Cargo	5211	Current report
5	8594540	SONGRIM (ex- HUM WONSIN)	Cargo	3800	Current report
6	8594552	RAK NANG 2 (ex- SHUNCHANG 78)	Cargo	3062	Current report
7	9125308	CHOL BONG SAN 1 (ex- OCEAN SKY)	Tanker	5807	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132)
Year 2021					
8	8356120	TAE DONG MUN 2 (ex- JIANG PENG 337)	Cargo	2790	Yes (S/2022/668)
Year 2020					
9	8865121	SIN PHYONG 5 (ex- WOO JEONG)	Tanker	3295	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132, S/2021/777)
10	9016430	SU RYONG SAN (ex- CJK OSAKA)	Cargo	4519	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132)
11	8602763	TAE PHYONG 2 (ex- MIING ZHOU 6)	Cargo	26,013	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132, S/2021/777, S/2021/211)
12	8651178	MU PHO (ex- DOUBLE LUCKY)	Cargo	2980	Yes (S/2022/668)
13	9045962	UN HUNG (ex- VIFINE)	Tanker	1978	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132, S/2021/777, S/2020/151)
14	9340257	KANG HUNG (ex- SUN MIRACLE)	Cargo	3800	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132)
15	9340271	RA SON 6 (ex- SUN HUNCHUN)	Cargo	3800	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2021/777)
16	7636638	XIN HAI (ex- WOL BONG SAN)	Tanker	4969	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2021/777, S/2021/211)
17	9011399	TAE DONG MUN (ex- POLE STAR 1)	Cargo	5137	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2021/211)

Year 2020					
	IMO number	Ship name	Type	DWT	Previously referenced in Panel reports
18	9162318	TO MYONG (ex- RI HONG)	Cargo	8773	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132, S/2020/211, S/2020/840)
19	9018751	TAE PHYONG (ex- GREAT WENSHAN)	Cargo	26,369	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2021/211, S/2020/840)
20	9020003	PUK DAE BONG (ex- HUA FU)	Cargo	10,030	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2019/171)

表 4

据认为已由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置或在其控制下的船只。下表并不详尽。专家小组继续调查疑似被朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置的其他船只。

Year 2022					
	IMO number	Ship name	Type	DWT	Previously referenced in Panel reports
21	8669589	HENG XING	Tanker	3250	Yes (S/2022/668) -Sailing de-flagged as of November 2021 -Appeared in DPRK in 2022
22	8356584	ANNI, transmitting as DPRK-flagged KYONG SONG 3	Cargo	5000	-Current report -Sailing de-flagged as of June 2022. -Transmitted on DPRK identifier as KYONG SONG 3 -Appeared in DPRK in 2022
23	8891297	SF BLOOM, transmitting as DPRK-flagged PU YANG 2	Container	3285	-Current report -Sailing de-flagged as of March 2022. -Transmitted on DPRK identifier as PU YANG 2 -Appeared in DPRK in 2022

<sup>a</sup> 据报，专家小组调查的这些船只中有一些在从事被制裁活动时悬挂其以前的船旗。该表列有这些船只改挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船旗的正式年份(往往是追溯性改挂)。

资料来源：专家小组，S&P Global 和海事组织记录。<sup>41</sup>

注：蓝色高亮部分表示本报告中的最新资料。

### 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置/获得转让的油轮

46. 在专家小组调查的 2019 年以来朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置的油轮中，以下油轮在 2022 年下半年继续协助朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法获取精炼石油(见表 5 以及附件 27 和 34)。

表 5

朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置的油轮 2022 年 6 月至 8 月继续交付非法石油

IMO number	Ship name	DPRK Flag date	DWT	Date of refined petroleum offload at Nampo, DPRK
8817007	SIN PHYONG 2 (ex- TIANYOU)	August 2019	2105	22 June 2022 ( <i>inter alia</i> )*
8910378	KWANG CHON 2 (ex- SEN LIN 01)	October 2019	1159	22 July 2022 ( <i>inter alia</i> )*
8669589	HENG XING	De-flagged since November 2021	3250	10 August 2022 ( <i>inter alia</i> )*
9045962	UN HUNG (ex- VIFINE)	August 2020	1978	12 August 2022 ( <i>inter alia</i> )*
7636638	WOL BONG SAN (ex- XIN HAI)	March 2020	4969	21 August 2022
8865121	SIN PHYONG 5 (ex- WOO JEONG)	October 2020	3295	27 August 2022 ( <i>inter alia</i> )*

\* 指专家小组报告的此前在 2022 年其他场合也交付精炼石油的油轮。

资料来源：会员国和专家小组。从海事组织记录中获得的船舶信息。

<sup>41</sup> 2022 年 12 月船旗状态。



朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置的货船

*An Hai 6*(现称<sup>42</sup> *Rak Won 1*)

47. 专家小组继续对 *An Hai 6*(海事组织编号: 8355786)进行调查, 2022 年 6 月中旬该船位于南浦闸门外。会员国当局证实, 该船之前在釜山港停泊供部分船员下船时没有装卸货物。卫星图像显示, 该船当时已装载集装箱货物和车辆(见图九)。据一个会员国评估, 这些车辆是推土机。在抵达釜山之前, *An Hai 6* 已经在几个中国港口/港区(包括一个船厂)停泊过。海事跟踪数据显示, *An Hai 6* 于 2022 年 5 月 1 日左右在江苏省通州湾新区登记了吃水变更, 显示可能装载了货物。在釜山之后, *An Hai 6* 向西和向北航行, 然后抵达朝鲜民主主义人民共和国(图十)。

48. *An Hai 6* 被朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置后, 于 2022 年最后一个季度以 *Rak Won 1* 为船名停靠中国港口, 包括龙口港区。

图九


2022 年 5 月 18 日和 6 月 20 日, *An Hai 6* 载货抵达釜山, 抵达南浦闸门外时货物配置相同



资料来源: (左)空中客车防务及航天公司; (右)Planet Labs, 由专家小组附加说明。

图十

2022 年 4 月至 6 月 *An Hai 6* 的国际航线



资料来源: Windward, 由专家小组附加说明; 内嵌图像, Planet Labs。

<sup>42</sup> 适用于悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只。

相关实体和个人

49. *An Hai 6* 登记在马绍尔群岛注册的珍洋海运有限公司(下称“珍洋海运”)名下, 单一船东, 由一名 24 岁的中国公民担任董事。代表珍洋海运注册的合格中介机构列出的地址位于福建省福州市。<sup>43</sup> 售货单显示, 悬挂中国国旗的 *Bi Xiang 66* 在出售给珍洋海运之前, 由船东转让给葫芦岛 Bixiang 船务有限公司, 两者在中国辽宁省的地址相同。珍洋海运尚未对专家小组的询问作出答复。

船厂


50. 专家小组正在调查在将所有权移交给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国之前停靠台州市园山船务工程有限公司(下称“台州园山船务”)的几艘货船(见附件 37)。<sup>44</sup> 与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置的其他船只一样, *An Hai 6* 在出售给珍洋海运后在船厂停留了一段时间(大约两个月)。船厂尚未作出答复。

船员转乘

51. 在离开中国后, *An Hai 6* 在釜山停靠, 让船员下船。专家小组注意到, 从两个不同来源获得的船员名单存在差异, 表明所提供的名单可能不完全准确。在 *An Hai 6* 抵达朝鲜民主主义人民共和国之前, 专家小组请中国提供关于船上其余船员的资料。船只跟踪信息显示, 2022 年 5 月 22 日至 6 月 1 日期间当船只在西朝鲜湾时, 自动识别系统信号不明(见图十一)。专家小组注意到, 在该船进入南浦之前, 任何剩余的外国船员都必须下船, 很可能是通过船舶转乘(见图十一)。<sup>45</sup>

图十一

2022 年 5 月至 6 月 *An Hai 6* 和指派船员活动情况不明



资料来源: Windward, 由专家小组附加说明。

<sup>43</sup> 这些中介机构通常是服务提供商, 包括: 律师事务所、企业组建服务和航运公司。

<sup>44</sup> 中文: 台州市园山船务工程有限公司。


<sup>45</sup> 另见 *SF Bloom* 船员转乘(第 77 段)

52. 关于该船抵达朝鲜民主主义人民共和国之前的海关、集装箱和货物信息以及船员所在地点，中国答复称，“*An Hai 6* 于 2022 年数次停靠中国港口，船上装载丝绸、家具和其他民生货物。未发现违禁物品。船员下船属于正常轮调”（见附件 26，OC.163/OC.191/OC.312）。

53. 2022 年 7 月之前，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国在 *An Hai 6* 上悬挂旗帜，后来该船一直以 *Rak Won 1* 船名传送信号（见图十二）。<sup>46</sup> 该船于 8 月开始在中国港口停靠。

图十二

2022 年 8 月 11 日和 12 日，*An Hai 6*（现称 *Rak Won 1*）在南浦通用散货码头传输信号



资料来源：S&P Global，由专家小组附加说明；内嵌图像，会员国。

54. 更多详情见附件 35。

*Anni*（又称<sup>47</sup> *Kyong Song 3*）

55. 另一艘货船 *Anni*（海事组织编号：8356584）在抵达朝鲜民主主义人民共和国时也沿用相同的模式（见图十三和十四）。*An Hai 6* 和 *Anni* 分别于 2022 年 6 月和 7 月在南浦闸门外被发现，时间相隔不到一个月。这两艘船：

- (a) 之前都是悬挂中国国旗的船舶，在沿海航线航行；
- (b) 均在转让给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国前几个月出售给在马绍尔群岛注册的实体；
- (c) 出售后均在台州海门的同一船厂停靠；
- (d) 在纽埃挂旗进行单次交付航行，中途在釜山停靠更换船员，然后出发前往日本的推定买家；

<sup>46</sup> 海事组织记录。船旗信息已追溯更新。

<sup>47</sup> 适用于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国控制下并使用朝鲜识别信息传输信号的船只。




(e) 但结果却是沿着一条完全不同的航线到达朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。

56. 被收购后, *Anni* 作为悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的 *Kyong Song 3* 传输信号, 并与悬挂外国旗帜的船只进行船对船移交(见附件 36)。鉴于 *An Hai 6* 和 *Anni* 的购置性质相同, 专家小组评估认为, 这两艘船很可能系由同一网络采购。调查工作继续进行。

图十三


2022 年 5 月至 8 月 *Anni* 的国际航行路线



资料来源: S&P Global 的海事服务网站, Windward, 由专家小组附加说明。内嵌图像, Google Earth Pro(仅为定位目的提供的图像, 不是自动识别系统传输日期的图像)。

图十四

2022 年 8 月 22 日, 在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国西海水闸地区, *Anni* 同朝鲜民主主义人民共和国其他船只锚泊一处, 使用其以前的识别信息 *Rong Gang 1* 进行信号传输



资料来源: S&P Global 的海事服务网站, 由专家小组附加说明。

57. 专家小组已致函有关会员国、实体和个人。

58. 马绍尔群岛协助专家小组获得了所要求的文件。大韩民国证实，这两艘船都在釜山更换了部分船员，没有装卸货物。纽埃船舶登记处证实，它曾为这两艘船悬挂了单次交付航行的船旗，但有数次，它没能提供令人信服的尽职调查。调查工作继续进行。

59. 中国答复说，*Anni* 记录了“……2022 年在中国的一次离港停靠……其后再也没有在中国领水看到过。中国没有发现任何违反安全理事会决议的活动”(见附件 26, OC.185)。

60. *An Hai 6* 和 *Anni* 的注册船东珍洋海运和 Wuzhou 航运有限公司尚未作出答复。台州园山船务尚未作出答复。

*Tomi Haru* (现称 *Sa Hyang San 1*) 和 *Toyo Haru* (现称 *So Baek Su*)

61. 专家小组开始根据一些指标调查两艘以前悬挂帕劳国旗的船只 *Tomi Haru* (海事组织编号: 9054779) 和 *Toyo Haru* (海事组织编号: 9054767)，它们目前分别作为悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的 *Sa Hyang San 1* 和 *So Baek Su* 航行，此前它们在南浦水域以新的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国自动识别系统传输信号，而且它们以前曾出现在相关船厂。与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有联系的实体过去曾拥有和管理过这些船只。*Tomi Haru* 在 2014 年至 2015 年期间以 *Lucky Star 9* 作为船名航行时，<sup>48</sup> 曾到过在香港注册的旭日国际海运有限公司<sup>49</sup> (下称“旭日国际”)(见第 64-69 段)旗下运营的几个朝鲜民主主义人民共和国港口，这表明与该船的联系一直存在。

船厂

62. 自动识别系统传输显示，2021 年 11 月至 2022 年 1 月期间，这两艘船抵达位于中国石岛的荣成市远通船舶修造有限公司(下称“荣成市远通船舶”)。<sup>50</sup> *Tomi Haru* 在船厂停止了自动识别系统传输，其后出现在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域，而 *Toyo Haru* 在向北航行后停止了传输(见图十五)。2021 年至 2022 年期间，其他几艘货船停靠该船厂后出现在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域(见图十六和附件 38)。专家小组先前跟踪的其他货船在被该国控制之前就位于这一带。<sup>51</sup> 专家小组正在调查该船厂内可能已被朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置的其他悬挂外国旗的船只，其中包括 *Sf Bloom* (海事组织编号: 8891297)(见第 73-82 段)。

<sup>48</sup> 这些港口访问是在 2016 年和 2017 年实施广泛产业货物禁令的决议之前进行的。

<sup>49</sup> 中文：香港旭日国际海运有限公司。

<sup>50</sup> 中文：荣成市远通船舶修造有限公司。

<sup>51</sup> [S/2021/777](#)，第 78 段。

图十五

2022 年 1 月, *Toyo Haru* 和 *Tomi Haru* 出现在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域之前停靠在石岛船厂



资料来源: Windward, 由专家小组附加说明; 内嵌图像, Planet Labs。

图十六

2021 至 2022 年荣成市远通船舶内的 *Toyo Haru*、*Tomi Haru* 和 *Ocean Sky*



资料来源: Google Earth Pro, 会员国, Maxar Technologies, 由专家小组附加说明。

63. 卫星图像显示, *Toyo Haru* 在船厂期间安装了一台起重机(见图十七), 很可能提供了更大的工作负荷能力。<sup>52</sup>

<sup>52</sup> 取代了原有的转臂起重机。

图十七  
2021 年 12 月至 2022 年 1 月，*Toyo Haru* 号在荣成市远通船舶进行改装




资料来源：Maxar Technologies，由专家小组附加说明。

所有权和管理

64. *Tomi Haru* 和 *Toyo Haru* 在被朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置之前均由香港永祥船务有限公司<sup>53</sup> (下称“香港永祥”)管理，董事为中国公民 Gao HB 先生。<sup>54</sup> 这两艘船以前分别以 *Lucky Star 9* 和 *Lucky Star 8* 作为船名航行，归相同公司所有和管理(见图十八)。旭日国际曾是 *Tomi Haru* 和 *Toyo Haru* 的船舶管理人。<sup>55</sup> 中国公民 Feng ZW 先生曾是在塞舌尔注册的领航国际海运有限公司<sup>56、57</sup> 的前所有人，也曾担任旭日国际的创始董事。Feng 先生亦为一家名称相似的新加坡注册公司领航国际海运私人有限公司的董事，Gao 先生于 2020 年接替 Feng 先生成为领航国际(香港)的所有人。

图十八  
*Toyo Haru* 和 *Tomi Haru* 所有权和管理关系<sup>58</sup>



资料来源：专家小组。

<sup>53</sup> 中文：香港永祥船务有限公司。  
<sup>54</sup> 根据香港公司注册处记录。  
<sup>55</sup> 旭日国际还管理了 *Lucky Star 7* (海事组织编号：9004073)，该船一年后悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗，所用船名为 *Kum Ya*。  
<sup>56</sup> 中文：领航国际海运有限公司。  
<sup>57</sup> 公司于 2020 年 1 月登记为解散。  
<sup>58</sup> 根据公司注册处记录。

65. 专家小组致函相关会员国、实体和个人，包括帕劳、中国、荣成市远通船舶、Gao 先生和 Feng 先生。

66. 帕劳尚未作出答复。

67. 中国答复说，“由于专家小组提供的有关 *Tomi Haru* 和 *Toyo Haru* 的资料缺乏细节，中国主管部门无法进行有效调查”（见附件 26，OC.305）。

68. 荣成市远通船舶、Gao 先生和 Feng 先生尚未作出答复。

69. 其他详情载于附件 39 和 40。

#### 其他购置船只

70. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国还分别于 2022 年 4 月和 10 月购置了此前悬挂中国国旗的 *Lin Da 8* 和 *Hum Wonsin* 货轮。<sup>59</sup> 没有发现这些船只以前的商业自动识别系统轨迹。在收购之后，这些船只被指定了海事组织编号，成为悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的 *Mo Ran Bong 2*（海事组织编号：8357112）和 *Songrim*（海事组织编号：8594540）。此外，10 月，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置了另一艘悬挂中国国旗的货船 *Shun Chang 78 / Sun Chang 78*（见附件 41）。该船指定的国际海事组织编号为 8594552，目前所用船名为 *Rak Nang 2*。2022 年 5 月，在 *Sun Chang 78* 被收购之前，专家小组曾跟踪到该船在椒岛附近朝鲜民主主义人民共和国领水内使用中国指定的海事移动业务标识码 412427130 传输信号（见第 88 段）。

71. 专家小组注意到这样一个现象，被收购的船只在国内航线上航行时没有使用指定的海事组织编号或自动识别系统信号。如果朝鲜民主主义人民共和国不正式在这些船上悬挂旗帜，将其编入船队，那么这些船只就不会显示商业上可获取的收购证据。

72. 专家小组要求中国提供关于上述船舶的资料，包括船舶登记、实益所有人、海关资料、船舶离开中国水域之前的买卖情况。专家小组还请中国当局向船东转达问题。中国答复说，这些船舶离开后，“*Moran Bong 2* 和 *Songrim* 运输了……玻璃、面粉、白糖和其他民生货物……不知道这些船只更名”，而且“中国没有发现任何证据表明 *Shun Chang 78* 参与了船对船走私。该船自 2021 年 11 月以来一直处于注销状态”（见附件 26，“海事活动”，OC.308 和 OC.307）。

#### 逃避制裁及其协助方

##### *Sf Bloom*，又称 *Pu Yang 2*

73. 专家小组开始调查当时悬挂帕劳国旗的集装箱船 *Sf Bloom*（海事组织编号：8891297），之前该船于 2022 年 7 月 30 日在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域作为悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的 *Pu Yang 2* 传输信号。与 *An Hai 6* 一样，卫星图像上也观察到 *Sf Bloom* 在进入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域之前在中国港口

<sup>59</sup> 海事组织记录。




装货。与 *Tomi Haru* 和 *Toyu Haru*(及其他)一样, *Sf Bloom* 也曾在 2021 年 12 月至 2022 年 1 月期间停留于荣成市远通船坞(附件 38)。

#### 船舶航行和货物

74. 有两艘船合作混淆了 *Sf Bloom* 的航线, 使得 *Sf Bloom* 得以在海事数据库未查觉的情况下将货物运入南浦。悬挂中国国旗的 *Tong Kang*(海事移动业务标识码: 412326350)是一艘长度与 *Sf Bloom* 号相似的船, 在 *Sf Bloom* 号附近以数字方式操纵自己的自动识别系统识别信息, 使其看似 *Sf Bloom*, 从而使 *Sf Bloom* 号及其货物能够前往南浦港而不被查觉。2022 年 2 月 16 日前后, 两艘船同时连续几天没有自动识别系统传输信号, 之后 *Tong Kang* 使用 *Sf Bloom* 的数字配置文件进行传输, 给人的印象是 *Sf Bloom* 从中国鲅鱼圈港向南航行, 而不是驶往朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域的实际目的地(见图十九)。一个会员国报告说, *Sf Bloom* 在这次航行中从鲅鱼圈向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送了非法货物(见图二十)。

图十九

2022 年 2 月至 3 月, *Tong Kang* 用 *Sf Bloom* 的识别信息及虚假船名“9”传输信号



资料来源: Windward, 由专家小组附加说明。



图二十

2022 年 3 月 3 日、4 月 19 日和 5 月 15 日的 *Sf Bloom*，南浦




资料来源：会员国。

75. *Tong Kang* 从 2022 年 2 月 20 日起使用 *Sf Bloom* 的识别信息传输信号，于 3 月恢复使用自己的数字配置信息，但继续传输 *Sf Bloom* 的海事组织编号。该船于 2022 年 4 月停止传输。

76. 自 2022 年 8 月以来 *Sf Bloom* (作为悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的 *Pu Yang 2* 传输信号) 一直在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和中国港口/港区之间航行 (见图二十一)。专家小组注意到，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只在运输合法货物 (可能是人道主义货物) 时往往会发送其登记的识别信息。

图二十一

2022 年 10 月至 11 月 *Pu Yang 2* 的港口/港区停靠情况

资料来源：Windward，由专家小组附加说明；内嵌图像，会员国。

### 船员转乘

77. 专家小组此前曾报告说，有关船只出现在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国之前的最后一个停留地是在石岛附近。<sup>60</sup> 在 2022 年 2 月与 *Sf Bloom* 汇合之前，*Tong Kang* 也在同一石岛地区。*Tong Kang* 向南航行时发送 *Sf Bloom* 海事组织编号，于 2022 年 3 月 3 日在越南海防港区附近锚泊，一天后离开。专家小组另行获得的船员资料显示，海防港是 *Sf Bloom* 船员最初登船地点。专家小组注意到，与 *An Hai 6* 一样，外国船员必须在船舶进入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国之前下船。鉴于 *Tong Kang* 在 3 月份曾前往海防，该船可能在去朝鲜民主主义人民共和国途中送返 *Sf Bloom* 的原先船员。

### 协助方

78. *Sf Bloom* 的前任船东和运营商大连 Taiyuan 国际船舶代理有限公司(下称“大连 Taiyuan”)在 2012 年至 2014 年期间是该船的船舶管理人，大连太原此前曾因牵涉货船 *Enterprise* (海事组织编号：9153331)而被调查。*Enterprise* 多次出口原产于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的煤炭，后来在 2022 年 9 月改挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗。<sup>61</sup>

79. 据报总部设在台中的 Hong Chuan 国际物流有限公司(下称“Hong Chuan”)自 2012 年以来也是该船的技术管理人。<sup>62</sup> 专家小组注意到，Hong Chuan 的电子邮件地址与大连 Taiyuan 的名称相似。Hong Chuan 也将专家小组之前调查涉及的另一实体列为转交地址。Hong Chuan 运营的另外两艘船后来也悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗：*Chong Dan* (海事组织编号：8661719)，所用船名为 *Lucida*

<sup>60</sup> S/2021/211，第 70-72 段和附件 38。

<sup>61</sup> S/2021/777，第 81 段和附件 40。


<sup>62</sup> 没有官方公司注册记录的痕迹。提供的地址是一栋住宅楼。

189, 大连 Taiyuan 当时是该船的技术管理人; *Tae Dong Gang 1*(海事组织编号: 8672110), 所用船名为 *Ocean Hope*。中华永宝有限公司(下称“中华永宝”)是 *Sf Bloom* 悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗之前已知的最后一个外国船东和运营商,<sup>63</sup> 它是一家总部设在香港的空壳实体, 只有一艘船舶注册在其名下, 没有任何网络足迹(见图二十二)。

80. 这一模式与专家小组先前的调查结果相一致, 即相同的个人和实体网络假借空壳公司参与逃避针对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的制裁。

图二十二

*Sf Bloom* 所有权和管理之间关系<sup>64</sup>



资料来源: 专家小组。

81. 专家小组致函相关会员国、实体和个人, 包括帕劳、中国、越南、中华永宝和宏川国际。越南答复说, 关于 *Tong Kang*, 越南主管部门“正在相互密切合作, 检查并核实相关信息”, 并且将向专家小组通报最新情况。中国答复说, “*Tong Kang* 处于注销状态, 中国主管部门的调查仍在进行中”(见附件 26, OC.311)。帕劳、中华永宝和 Hong Chuan 国际尚未作出答复。

82. 更多详情载于附件 42。

## 扣留指认船只

### *Petrel 8*

83. 专家小组注意到, 联合国指认的 *Petrel 8*(海事组织编号: 9562233)所用船名为 *Retrel 8*,<sup>65</sup> 于 2022 年 7 月 1 日前后驶近印度尼西亚领水。纽埃船舶登记处为

<sup>63</sup> 海事组织记录。

<sup>64</sup> 根据公司注册处记录。

<sup>65</sup> *Petrel 8* 在 2017 年被指认后, 未用其识别信息传输信号。2022 年 3 月, 海事数据库的追踪记录显示, 该船在离开渤海地区驶向宁波-舟山水域时, 曾短暂以其先前的科摩罗海事移动业务标识码传输信号, 所用船名为 *Haiyan 8*。

该船挂旗为从中国宁德到印度尼西亚的单次交付航行。*Petrel 8* 在 2017 年 10 月被指认后不久就停止发送自动识别系统信号。<sup>66</sup> 印度尼西亚在 *Petrel 8* 进入其领水时因一项行政违规而扣留了该船。印度尼西亚当局提供了购买 *Petrel 8* 的印度尼西亚公司的资料。印度尼西亚船东证实，该船于 2021 年在第三国拍卖，<sup>67</sup> 于 2022 年初通过外国经纪人购得。这家印度尼西亚公司表示，它“……从未意识到该船仍被列在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国制裁名单上”。

#### 尽职调查

84. 专家小组以前曾建议船舶登记处对船舶单次交付航行挂旗进行尽职调查，船舶单次交付航行是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置船舶时采用的常见做法。纽埃船舶登记处为 *An Hai 6*、*Anni* 和指认船只 *Petrel 8* 进行单次交付航行挂旗。虽然船舶登记处提供了所要求的资料，但专家小组注意到，在自动识别系统传输显示 *Anni* 和 *An Hai 6* 没有前往据称的最终目的地时，未曾进行基本的尽职调查，包括船舶追踪。船舶登记处也没有进行适当的核查，以便对这两艘船执行限制运输条件，其中登记处单次交付航行“有一个严格的不可谈判的要求，即不允许运输任何货物/乘客……”此外，尽管其网站将 *Petrel 8* 列为受制裁船舶，但该船仍然被挂旗为单次交付航行。

85. 一名被列为香港注册的 Li Quan 船务有限公司董事的 Wei TT 女士在拍卖后出售了 *Petrel 8*，她也与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国购置的其他船只有联系。<sup>68</sup> 专家小组已致函 Wei 女士，在等待答复。更多详情载于附件 43。对该船及其销售的调查仍在继续。

#### 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国领水作为船对船移交区

##### 购置货船从事船对船移交

86. 椒岛周围水域仍然是船对船移交货物的活跃区域。<sup>69</sup> 一个会员国提供的卫星图像显示，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只 *Kyong Song 3*(原 *ANNI*)与悬挂中国国旗的 *Zhenyangxin*(海事移动业务标识码：413272340)于 2022 年 9 月进入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国领水进行船对船移交(见图二十三)。<sup>70</sup> 在移交过程中，只有 *Kyong Song 3* 传输自动识别系统信号。安全理事会决议禁止协助或从事与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只船对船移交任何供应、销售或转让往来于该国的货品或物项。

87. 专家小组要求中国当局提供有关 *Zhenyangxin* 的信息，包括该船在相关调查时间段所在位置、活动和货物的详细情况。中国答复说，“没有发现任何证据表

<sup>66</sup> S/2018/171，第 51 段和附件 5-2。

<sup>67</sup> 专家小组注意到该船在几个船舶销售网站上出售。一家船舶销售网站确认该船属于法拍的受制裁船舶。

<sup>68</sup> S/2021/211，第 40-42 段和附件 24，以及 S/2020/840，第 33 和 58 段。

<sup>69</sup> 如专家小组在 2022 年卫星图像上所观察到的情况。另见 S/2022/668，第 35-36 段；


<sup>70</sup> 离椒岛大约 14 海里。



明 *Zhenyangxin* 参与船对船走私” (见附件 26 “海上活动”, OC.310)。详情载于附件 44。

图二十三

2022 年 8 月和 9 月 *Zhenyangxin* 号航行路线, 以及在椒岛附近与悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的 *Kyong Song 3* 进行船对船移交的情况




资料来源: Windward, 由专家小组附加说明; 内嵌图像, 会员国。

88. 卫星图像还显示, 所购船只 *Toyo Haru* 和 *Shun Chang 78 / Sun Chang 78* 在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国领水内与悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只进行了船对船移交(见图二十四和二十五)。

图二十四

2022 年 3 月至 4 月悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的 *Ever Glory* 的航行路线,<sup>71</sup> 以及在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国西海水闸与 *Toyo Haru* 号和 *Jiang Shen Fu 6988* 号进行船对船移交的情况




资源来源: Windward; 内嵌图像, 会员国, 由专家小组附加说明。

<sup>71</sup> *Ever Glory* 于 2017 年停止使用其指定识别信息传输信号。它很可能使用专家小组跟踪的其他识别信息传输信号, 包括以 *Brightshine* 作为船名。

图二十五

2022 年 5 月 30 日，椒岛附近 *Shun Chang 78*、*Toyo Haru* 和悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的 *Paek Yang San* 号




资料来源：图像，会员国；地图，专家小组。

### 浮吊船

89. 专家小组在其前一份报告<sup>72</sup> 中描述了椒岛附近所发生船对船移交的三船配置，可能涉及浮吊船。有一次，浮吊船之一 *Jiang Shen Fu 6899* (海事移动业务标识码:413860946) 以其中文海事移动业务标识码传输信号(图二十六)(另见附件 45)。卫星图像显示，2022 年 8 月 27 日，椒岛附近出现一批浮吊船(图二十七)。安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 7 段禁止向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国供应、销售或转让列入协调制度编码 89(“船舶、船只和浮动结构”)的轮船，包括浮动起重机。第 2375 (2017)号决议第 11 段禁止与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只进行任何船对船移交。中国答复说，它“没有发现任何证据表明 *Jiang Shen Fu 6988* 参与船对船走私。没有任何关于 *Ever Glory* 在中国停靠港口或信息申报的记录”(见附件 26, OC.306)。

图二十六

2022 年在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国领水作业的浮吊船




资料来源：会员国；专家小组附加说明的地图。

<sup>72</sup> S/2022/668，第 35 和 36 段以及附件 26。



图二十七

2022 年 8 月 27 日，椒岛附近悬挂不明旗帜的浮吊船集群



资料来源：会员国。

## 违禁物项和商品的非法海上贸易

### 运输车辆

90. 一个会员国提供了三批货物的卫星图像，这些货物包括卡车和其他物项，由两艘悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只和一艘悬挂中国国旗的船只运载，于 2022 年 5 月到达朝鲜民主主义人民共和国(见图二十八)。悬挂朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国旗的船只“*Kum San Bong*”号(海事组织编号：8810384)和“*Kum San Bong 3*”号(海事组织编号：8518962)自 2022 年 5 月起进出中国港口/港区。海事数据库显示“*Peng Lu 9*”号(海上移动通信业务标识码：412454160)在抵达南浦之前，曾航行国内航线并停靠多个中国港口或港区。自抵达南浦以来未再发出信号。专家小组请中国当局提供资料，说明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只在 2022 年 5 月之前的过往航行路线及所载货物。专家小组还请求提供以下资料：“*Peng Lu 9*”号的所有权、管理、运输和海关文件，以及三艘船之间是否存在与所载货物和采购有关的任何联系。中国答复称“‘*Kum San Bong*’号和‘*Kum San Bong 3*’号 2022 年运输了眼镜等民生物资，在交付的货物中未发现卡车。在宁波舟山水域未发现两船的任何活动”；“中国没有发现任何证据表明‘*Peng Lu 9*’号参与了卡车走私”(见附件 26，OC.203 和 OC.205)。

91. “*Kum San Bong*”号和“*Kum San Bong 3*”号此前由在香港注册的实体管理，这些实体有重叠关系，而且还管理过朝鲜民主主义人民共和国后来购得的其他船只。两艘船在不由朝鲜民主主义人民共和国管理时，所列的所有人和管理人均均为外国实体。这些实体可能是幌子或空壳公司，此前确认的“*Kum San Bong*”号的情况就是如此，<sup>73</sup> Xin Sea Shipping Co Ltd 公司为该船所列地址是一个位于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的“转交”地址。利用空壳和幌子公司进行层层嵌套的商业交易是一种已知的逃避制裁策略。详情载于附件 46。

<sup>73</sup> S/2017/150，附件 13-4。

图二十八

2022 年 5 月向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口卡车和其他物项



资料来源：会员国。

#### 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国煤炭

92. 已知的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只继续向宁波舟山水域出口煤炭，但没有发出自动识别系统信号。附件 47 至 51 载有相关调查的详细信息。

#### 船只的伪装

93. 一个会员国向专家小组提供的信息显示，被联合国指认的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只“*Mi Rim 2*”号(海事组织编号：9361407)<sup>74</sup> 被伪装成“*Song Gwan*”号，该船船体上绘有“SG”字样(见图二十九)。船舶跟踪信息显示，“*Song Gwan*”号在宁波舟山水域间歇性发出信号，六周后离开该地区。详情载于附件 52。

<sup>74</sup> 该船还受资产冻结限制。

图二十九

2022 年 8 月 30 日伪装成 “Song Gwan/SG” 号的 “Mi Rim 2” 号船只



资料来源：会员国。

## 渔业问题

### 捕鱼权转让

94. 一个会员国于 2021 年 6 月至 7 月期间在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域及其周边访谈了 4 艘中国拖网渔船<sup>75</sup> 的船员。根据该会员国提供的信息，一张在这些水域使用的渔业捕捞许可证没有规定任何捕捞配额限制，其有效期为 2021 年 12 月底。2021 年 5 月至 12 月期间的捕捞许可证价格涨至 300 万元人民币(约合 45 万美元)，比专家小组此前报告的价格高出 5 至 9 倍。<sup>76</sup> 据称，渔船如果向中间人付款，便可无证在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域作业(见附件 53)。中国答复说，“如果专家组提出的事件存在，则一定是非法活动。中方对此类非法活动的立场非常明确，一旦事件得到证实，将依法依规采取必要措施……然而，专家组提供的信息含糊不清，缺乏实质性证据，使中国当局难以开展深入调查”(见附件 26，OC.319)。

### 可能的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海产食品出口

95. 专家小组对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国 2022 年 4 月至 9 月贸易统计数据的数据分析<sup>77</sup> 显示，该国向两个会员国出口了海产食品(协调制度编码 03)(见表 6)。厄瓜多尔答复说，该国“国家机构确认，[海产食品]进口报关单将朝鲜民主主义人民

<sup>75</sup> 据称其中一艘拖网渔船的两艘随行船只在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国水域被一艘公务船只“检查并扣押”。

<sup>76</sup> S/2021/777，第 82 段和附件 41。

<sup>77</sup> 专家小组使用国际贸易中心的贸易图分析朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的贸易统计数据。贸易图中的所有贸易数据均为各会员国海关当局报告的数据。

共和国登记为原产国是填制错误”，因此厄瓜多尔和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国之间没有贸易。尼日利亚尚未答复专家小组的询问。

表 6  
朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海产食品(协调制度编码 03)出口贸易统计(2022 年 4 月-9 月)

Month	Importing Member State	Approximate Value (USD)
April	Nigeria	351,000
June	Ecuador	409,000
September	Ecuador	50,000

资料来源：国际贸易中心贸易图，2023 年 1 月 27 日查阅。

建议

96. 由于海上贸易是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国采购和销售受制裁商品的主要载体，提醒公共和私营部门在各级执行与船舶运营和商品交易有关的监管标准和尽职检查，特别是已查明水域内<sup>78</sup> 涉及违禁或受限制产品和服务的船舶运营和商品交易。前几次报告所载的海事建议仍然具有现实意义。

97. 专家小组建议从事船只销售的各方遵循以下最佳做法：

- (a) 签订合同前：
  - (一) 确保通过经认可的国内船只经纪人进行交易；
  - (二) 核实船只的最终/终点目的地和订约方身份(例如航运公司和租船方)；
  - (三) 核实交易伙伴经纪人的身份以及当事方过往交易记录的相关资料；
  - (四) 在整个交易过程中，保存所有文件和尽职核实流程的妥善记录；
- (b) 签订合同时：
  - (一) 核实船只收货方(接收方)的所有信息、详细联系方式和身份；
  - (二) 试图获得一份确认声明，其中申明遵守了安全理事会有关决议(声明和条款可作为附加条款列入合同)；
  - (三) 采用基于风险的方法，不与无法指望其履行此类合同义务的对手方进行交易；
- (c) 船只移交后：
  - (一) 委托买方向有关当局和国际海事组织通报其购买行为/所有权；
  - (二) 向国际海事组织提交关于船只出售和所有权变更的最新信息，并在国际海事组织全球综合航运信息系统网站上进行核实；

<sup>78</sup> S/2021/777，第 57 段和图八。

(三) 如有可能导致逃避制裁的情况, 包括关闭自动识别系统信号, 提醒有关国家当局。

98. 专家小组建议委员会根据安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 14 段关于禁止直接或间接向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国供应、销售或转让新的或旧的船只的规定, 指认以下朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只:<sup>79</sup>

- (a) *Rak Won 1* (海事组织编号: 8355786);
- (b) *Sa Hyang San 1* (海事组织编号: 9054779);
- (c) *So Bake Su* (海事组织编号: 9054767);
- (d) *Mo Ran Bong 2* (海事组织编号: 8357112);
- (e) *Songrim* (海事组织编号: 8594540);
- (f) *Rak Nang 2* (海事组织编号: 8594552);
- (g) *Chol Bong San 1* (海事组织编号: 9125308);
- (h) *Tae Dong Mon 2* (海事组织编号: 8356120);
- (i) *Sin Phyoung 5* (海事组织编号: 8865121);
- (j) *Su Ryong San* (海事组织编号: 9016430);
- (k) *Tae Phyoung 2* (海事组织编号: 8602763);
- (l) *Mu Pho* (海事组织编号: 8651178);
- (m) *Un Hung* (海事组织编号: 9045962);
- (n) *Kang Hung* (海事组织编号: 9340257);
- (o) *Ra Son 6* (海事组织编号: 9340271);
- (p) *Xin Hai* (海事组织编号: 7636638);
- (q) *Tae Dong Mun* (海事组织编号: 9011399);
- (r) *To Myong* (海事组织编号: 9162318);
- (s) *Tae Phyoung* (海事组织编号: 9018751);
- (t) *Puk Dae Bong* (海事组织编号: 9020003);
- (u) *SF Bloom*, 别名 *Pu Yang 2* (海事组织编号: 8891297)。

<sup>79</sup> 专家小组注意到, 自 2017 年以来朝鲜民主主义人民共和国获得了更多船只。专家小组提议将 2020 年作为起始日期, 因为专家小组当时整合了自该日期以后购得的被调查船只清单。

99. 专家小组建议委员会根据下述安全理事会有关决议指认下列船只：

- (a) *Heng Xing* (海事组织编号：8669589)，依据是第 2397(2017)号决议第 14 段和第 5 段，其中安理会禁止在没有报告的情况下向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法转让精炼石油；
- (b) *Anni*，别名 *Kyong Song 3* (海事组织编号：8356584)，依据是第 2397(2017)号决议第 14 段和第 2375(2017)号决议第 11 段，其中安理会规定，不得协助或从事与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国船只船对船移交任何向该国或从该国供应、出售或转让的物品或物项的任何活动。

100. 专家小组再次建议指认下列“直接交货”船只：

- (a) *New Konk* (海事组织编号：9036387)，依据是第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段和第 2375(2017)号决议第 11 段；
- (b) *Unica* (海事组织编号：8514306)，依据是第 2397(2017)号决议第 5 段和第 2375(2017)号决议第 11 段。

#### 贸易统计和海关问题

101. 2022 年<sup>80</sup> 记录的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易总额高于 2021 年总额。现有数据<sup>81</sup> 显示，2022 年前三季度贸易额达到了 2020 年贸易总额的 83%左右(见图三十)，按年计算很可能已超过 2020 年。专家小组评估认为，这主要是由于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国和中国之间的铁路货运恢复；<sup>82</sup> 2022 年前三季度，与中国的贸易约占朝鲜民主主义人民共和国对外贸易的 96%。然而，即使根据现有的 2022 年贸易统计数据，这一数额也只是疫情前贸易额的一小部分(分别为 2019 年和 2018 年同期的 25%和 29%)。


<sup>80</sup> 总体而言，2023 年 1 月 27 日可查阅截至 2022 年 9 月的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易统计数据。随着越来越多的会员国向国际贸易中心贸易图等相关贸易统计平台报告其与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的贸易，统计数据将继续变化。

<sup>81</sup> 专家小组注意到，公布的贸易数字中存在由于国家代码使用错误而错报的情况(见第 108 段)，会员国海关当局将对这些情况进行纠正。

<sup>82</sup> S/2022/668，第 97 和 98 段。



图三十  
2018-2022 年录得的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易额  
(Millions of United States dollars)



资料来源：国际贸易中心贸易图，2023 年 1 月 27 日查阅。


102. 现有的 2022 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易月度统计数据显示，丹东与新义州之间的铁路货运量影响了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易总额(见图三十一)。由于铁路货运因疫情原因暂停，贸易额在 4 月达到峰值后急剧下降。不过从 7 月开始，贸易额转而上行，到 9 月份，铁路货运被证实已经恢复。<sup>83</sup>

<sup>83</sup> 见 [www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/xwfw\\_665399/s2510\\_665401/2511\\_665403/202209/t20220926\\_10771910.html](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202209/t20220926_10771910.html)。

图三十一

2022 年 1-9 月朝鲜民主主义人民共和国贸易统计数据(月度)

(Millions of United States dollars)



资料来源：国际贸易中心贸易图，2022 年 12 月 31 日查阅。

103. 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与俄罗斯联邦之间的跨图们江货运列车服务于 2020 年 2 月停运，2022 年 11 月恢复。截至 2022 年底，观察到经铁路从哈桑站向图们江站运送了至少三车厢的小型货物，列车随后返回俄罗斯联邦。<sup>84</sup> 尽管俄罗斯联邦于 2022 年 4 月暂停公布其海关统计数据，但该国告知专家小组，“2022 年俄罗斯向[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国]交付了活动物(马)、食品、面粉、药品。从中国运来了原产国为[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国]的乐器”(见附件 54)。

104. 公开来源的贸易统计数据显示，2022 年前 9 个月记录的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国前五大出口商品分别是：(a) 矿石和炉渣(协调制度编码 26)；(b) 钢铁(协调制度编码 72)；(c) 矿物燃料和油(协调制度编码 27)；(d) 丝绸(协调制度编码 50)；(e) 玻璃(协调制度编码 70)。同期朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进口的前五大商品分别是：(a) 塑料(协调制度编码 39)；(b) 橡胶(协调制度编码 40)；(c) 微生物油脂(协调制度编码 15)；(d) 烟草(协调制度编码 24)；(e) 药品(协调制度编码 30)。如专家小组前几次报告所述，这些统计数字不包括朝鲜民主主义人民共和国非法进出口的货物，如煤和精炼石油等(见第 46 段和第 90-92 段)。

<sup>84</sup> 见 [www.38north.org/2022/11/first-traffic-observed-on-north-korea-russia-railway-link-in-several-years](http://www.38north.org/2022/11/first-traffic-observed-on-north-korea-russia-railway-link-in-several-years) 和 [www.38north.org/2022/12/a-north-korean-rail-yard-near-russia-springs-to-life](http://www.38north.org/2022/12/a-north-korean-rail-yard-near-russia-springs-to-life)。

105. 专家小组继续根据有关决议监测朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的违禁进出口情况。<sup>85、86</sup> 本报告主要涵盖 2022 年 4 月至 9 月期间。

106. 根据国际贸易中心的各国贸易数据记录，一些商品似乎属于制裁类别。专家小组询问了 16 个会员国与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国交易的情况，以及任何出口到该国或从该国进口的货物被拒绝清关或扣押的详细情况。<sup>87</sup> 关于专家小组用于监测部门禁令执行情况的受限制商品协调制度编码清单，见附件 56。

107. 专家小组还继续请会员国海关当局提供资料，说明其实际履行制裁义务的情况，例如要求检查往来朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的所有货物，并在发现违禁品时予以扣押和处置。从会员国收到的有关这些做法的资料不足。

108. 16 个会员国中有一些表示，它们没有与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的贸易活动记录，贸易统计有误，而造成错误的主要原因是在各自海关申报过程中错误使用了国家代码。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的国家代码(KP)被当作实际贸易伙伴大韩民国的国家代码(KR)错误输入。一个会员国称，所进行的交易符合联合国制裁制度(见附件 26 (OC.301)、57 和 58)。<sup>88</sup>

109. 专家小组仍在等待巴巴多斯、波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那、加拿大、印度尼西亚、马达加斯加、荷兰、尼日利亚、南非、西班牙、泰国和乌干达的答复，并注意到一些国家在确定某些物项是否被禁止进出朝鲜民主主义人民共和国方面仍面临挑战。专家小组打算继续对公开来源的统计数据 and 会员国提供的数据进行比较分析，以查明任何可能的差异并调查其原因。

## 建议

110. 专家小组再次建议国际标准化组织和各会员国采取适当措施，包括针对各国海关当局开展外联活动，以防止错误使用国家代码。

111. 专家小组再次建议会员国精简进出口管制清单，并使用非正式的违禁商品清单作为辅助材料(见附件 56)。

112. 专家小组再次建议会员国海关当局利用上述清单为其管辖范围内的贸易代理人提供信息，以进行尽职调查，特别是在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国等受制裁管辖区附近处理此类商品时。

113. 专家小组再次建议，对于在部门禁令问题上需要援助的会员国，委员会应考虑信息外联活动。

<sup>85</sup> 赞比亚和洪都拉斯关于贸易统计的答复见 S/2022/668，附件 45。赞比亚提到，由于“数据获取有误”，贸易统计不准确；洪都拉斯核实了贸易数据，并强调已采取措施对源自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的货物实行严格管制。另见附件 55。

<sup>86</sup> 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的渔业产品贸易见第 95 段，小武器和轻武器贸易见第 118-121 段。

<sup>87</sup> 根据现有统计数据，27 个会员国报告了与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的贸易；其中 15 个会员国与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的贸易涉及限制类协调制度编码下的商品。

<sup>88</sup> S/2022/132，第 127 至 129 段。

## 四. 禁运、被指认的实体和个人以及海外工人


### 禁运

#### *Global Communications (Glocom)/Pan Systems*

114. 根据专家小组的初步调查、一个会员国提供的信息和媒体报道，<sup>89</sup> Glocom 公司<sup>90</sup> 仍在运营(见图三十二)，并继续提供和推销越来越多类型的军用无线电、战场雷达和软件控制系统。Glocom 公司的新产品种类有所增加。<sup>91</sup>

图三十二

Glocom 网页



资料来源：<https://glocom-corp.com>。

115. 据一个会员国称，2022 年 6 月，两批 Glocom 无线电设备被运往埃塞俄比亚国防部总局，供埃塞俄比亚国防军使用。埃塞俄比亚媒体于 2022 年 11 月 5 日刊登了武装部队总参谋长 Birhanu Jula 元帅使用疑似 Glocom 电台通信设备的照片(图三十三和附件 59)。<sup>92</sup> 专家小组就这一报道询问了埃塞俄比亚，但尚未收到答复。

<sup>89</sup> 见 [www.fanabc.com/archives/164987](http://www.fanabc.com/archives/164987)。

<sup>90</sup> S/2022/132，第 135 至 137 段，附件 18 和 65；以及 S/2022/668，第 108 段。

<sup>91</sup> 2020 年 2 月，该公司提供 7 套军用无线电系统，但这一数字在 2021 年 2 月增加到 11 套，2023 年 1 月增加到 15 套。此外还提供 4 类雷达、4 类软件、13 类(军用)系统和 8 类(军用通信)配件。

<sup>92</sup> 见 <https://note.com/cccp1917/n/n86757c1d04ca>。

图三十三  
来自埃塞俄比亚媒体的照片



资料来源：[www.fanabc.com/archives/164987](http://www.fanabc.com/archives/164987)，经专家小组编辑。

116. 设在美利坚合众国马萨诸塞州的 Privacy Protect Business Development 公司注册了 Glocom 网站的域名证书。专家小组再次致函该公司，但尚未收到答复。

117. 专家小组再次致函厄立特里亚，<sup>93</sup> 询问该国据称采购 Glocom 设备一事，但尚未收到答复。

#### 疑似朝鲜民主主义人民共和国小武器和轻武器贸易

118. 安理会制裁决议禁止朝鲜民主主义人民共和国进出口常规武器，包括小武器和轻武器。<sup>94</sup> 专家小组注意到一个智库评估认为，安全理事会对该国的武器禁运总体上正在产生预期效果，<sup>95</sup> 与此同时专家小组调查了近年来朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与几个会员国之间的物项交易，这些物项可能被认为属于“军火和有关物资”类别。

119. 根据联合国商品贸易统计数据库，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与塞浦路斯、萨尔瓦多、斐济、尼日尔、菲律宾以及特立尼达和多巴哥进行了可能被视为“军火和有关物资”的物项贸易(见表 7)。

<sup>93</sup> S/2022/132，第 137 段。

<sup>94</sup> 安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议，第 8 段；第 1874(2009)号决议，第 9 和 10 段；以及第 2270(2016)号决议，第 8 段。

<sup>95</sup> 见 [www.38north.org/2022/09/north-koreas-trading-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons-open-source-information-analysis-of-sanctions-implementation](http://www.38north.org/2022/09/north-koreas-trading-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons-open-source-information-analysis-of-sanctions-implementation)。

表 7  
朝鲜民主主义人民共和国可能的军火和有关物资贸易统计<sup>96</sup>

Member State	Year	Import from/export to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	HS code	Amount (United States dollars)
Cyprus	2017	Export	9303	11 661
	2018			7 721
El Salvador	2017	Import	9306	59 858
Fiji	2020	Import	9301	487 170
	2019		9304	214 115
	2021			168 577
	2019		9306	743 550
	2020			861 723
Niger	2016	Import	9304	37 544
	2017		9301	172
Philippines	2016	Export	9304	29 552
			9305	39 795
Trinidad and Tobago	2015	Import	9304	35 973
			9305	1 089
			9306	1 598

资料来源：<https://comtradeplus.un.org>。

120. 塞浦路斯、萨尔瓦多及特立尼达和多巴哥答复称，与大韩民国的这些物项贸易被误记为与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的贸易(附件 61-63)。

121. 斐济、尼日尔和菲律宾尚未答复。

关于朝鲜民主主义人民共和国武器出口的未经证实报告

122. 自 2022 年 9 月以来，美国官员公开声称(附件 64)朝鲜民主主义人民共和国向俄罗斯联邦出口弹药(炮弹、步兵火箭弹和导弹)。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国、俄罗斯联邦和涉嫌实体一直否认这些指控(见附件 65-67)。

123. 2023 年 1 月美国政府发布图像，据称涉及用火车向俄罗斯联邦运送步兵火箭弹。作为调查的一部分，专家小组分析了 2022 年 11 月 18 日从俄罗斯联邦驶入朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的一列火车的卫星图像(见附件 68)。<sup>97</sup> 调查继续进行。

124. 一个会员国报告称，2022 年年中，一家名为“Royal Shune Lei Co. ltd”的缅甸公司作为经纪人，从被联合国指认的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国矿业发展贸易公司(KPe.001)为缅甸军方进口武器。专家小组已致函缅甸常驻联合国代表团，请其提供资料。调查继续进行。

<sup>96</sup> 协调制度编码为 9301 和 9303-9306 的产品标签见附件 60。

<sup>97</sup> 一名专家认为，由于调查尚处早期阶段，对此案的评估为时过早。




## 奢侈品禁令执行情况

125. 边境的部分重新开放为可能的奢侈品转让创造了条件，此类消费品重新出现在外币商店和市场。媒体图片显示，品牌酒精饮料在 2022 年开业的“Ryugyong Golden Plaza”<sup>98</sup> 等奢侈品商店有售(见图三十四和附件 69)。

图三十四

平壤“Ryugyong Golden Plaza”内的进口威士忌和其他饮料



资料来源：《朝鲜民主主义人民共和国新闻》。


126. 专家小组调查了关于平壤 Rim Mi Yong Aeguk Sonnae Hall 百货公司——它由 Rim Mi Yong Aeguk 合资公司经营——和相关在线零售商“Apnal”的媒体报道。根据报道<sup>99</sup> 和实地观察，它们继续零售某些可能属于奢侈品的物项(见图三十五和附件 69)。2022 年，包括酒精饮料(如苏格兰威士忌和德国原产伏特加)在内的新供应品运达该商店。

<sup>98</sup> 该设施的初期建造曾与新加坡公司 OCN/“T Specialist”有关，专家小组此前调查过该公司 (S/2019/171，第 142-144 段和附件 72；S/2020/151，第 157、161 和 162 段；以及 S/2020/840，第 96 段和附件 41-43)。

<sup>99</sup> 见 [www.nknews.org/pro/new-photos-give-first-look-inside-renovated-japanese-luxury-store-in-pyongyang](http://www.nknews.org/pro/new-photos-give-first-look-inside-renovated-japanese-luxury-store-in-pyongyang) 和 [www.nknews.org/pro/expanding-japan-linked-mall-online-shop-in-pyongyang-targets-modern-tastes](http://www.nknews.org/pro/expanding-japan-linked-mall-online-shop-in-pyongyang-targets-modern-tastes)。

图三十五

2022 年秋季 Rim Mi Yong Aeguk Sonnae Hall 在售的进口商品



资料来源：《朝鲜民主主义人民共和国新闻》，由专家小组附加说明。

127. 据报道，Rim Mi Yong Aeguk 合资公司与一家“名为 Mirai 的日本公司”合作。商店的标识使用日语，但地址登记为平壤(见图三十六)。据报道，公司所有人或受益人是一名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国裔个人。专家小组请日本提供资料，但无法证实媒体的说法(日本的答复载于附件 70)。

图三十六

商店发行的礼品卡和价格标签上的“Mirai”公司标识



资料来源：《朝鲜民主主义人民共和国新闻》。

128. 媒体报道<sup>100</sup>称，进口酒精饮料于2022年秋季重新出现在零售市场上(见附件71)。一般来说酒精饮料不是受制裁商品，但其中一些可被视为奢侈品。<sup>101</sup> 中国海关统计数据显示，2022年6月至10月期间中国向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口了价值320多万美元的酒精饮料，但没有提供饮料品牌和规格信息(见附件72)。中国对专家小组的询问答复说，“酒精饮料不在禁止向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出口的物项清单上，决议未授权专家小组解释奢侈品的范围”(见附件26，OC.300)。

129. 关于对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国专业摄影记者使用佳能和尼康相机的调查，<sup>102</sup> 专家小组收到了会员国就相关情况作出解释的三份答复(见附件73)。

130. 专家小组继续调查2020年9月下旬有意向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国运送雷克萨斯运动型多用途车等豪华车辆一事，<sup>103</sup> 以及另一起民用航空总局企图购买四辆丰田豪华运动型多用途车的事件。专家小组尚未收到据称所涉中国实体的答复，但丰田汽车公司答复说，“丰田公司及其中东或中国经销商都没有涉及专家小组请求中提及的任何公司或个人的交易记录……丰田公司或任何汽车制造商都难以追踪通过非官方交易和二次销售非法转让车辆的情况”。

<sup>100</sup> 见 [www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-imports-2m-in-alcohol-from-china-exports-huge-sum-of-tungsten/](http://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-imports-2m-in-alcohol-from-china-exports-huge-sum-of-tungsten/)。

<sup>101</sup> 专家小组指出，奢侈品的确定属于会员国的职权范围。

<sup>102</sup> S/2022/668，第111段。

<sup>103</sup> S/2021/777，第147段。

## 建议

131. 专家小组再次建议会员国考虑更新其出口管制清单，以符合安全理事会第 1718(2006)、1874(2009)、2094(2013)、2270(2016)和 2321(2016)号决议目标的方式反映违禁奢侈品清单，但要避免不必要地扩大清单范围，目的是在贸易恢复后，不限制向平民供应未受禁止的货物，并且不产生负面的人道主义影响。

132. 专家小组再次建议会员国鼓励本国从事奢侈品出口的商业实体和国民在合同中列入防止转运到朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的条款。

## 军需工业部(KPe.028)

133. 专家小组此前报告了与军需工业部有关联的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术工人 Song Rim，此人一直通过销售语音钓鱼黑客应用程序以及运营多个海外服务器和因特网协议地址赚取外汇。<sup>104</sup> 据报，Song Rim 自 2020 年 7 月起在中国销售语音钓鱼黑客应用程序。根据决议，<sup>105</sup> 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国海外工人应由收容会员国遣返。

134. 专家小组从一个会员国获悉，Dandong Hongshengan Clothing Co., Ltd. 公司代表、中国国民 Wu ZhuJing 为 Song Rim 提供了语音钓鱼应用程序非法交易的中介服务，并协助向 Song Rim 付款。另一名中国国民、Yiwu Gangchao Trading 公司所有人 Wang Feng 将他的银行账户借给了多名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术工人，并提供经济援助。此外，一个由中国人 Hong Yong 领导的语音钓鱼犯罪团伙据信从 Song Rim 那里购买了语音钓鱼黑客应用程序，该团伙经营六个本地语音钓鱼呼叫中心。在 Song Rim 管理的语音钓鱼黑客应用的命令和控制服务器中发现了 Hong Yong 犯罪团伙的多名成员，其中包括一名叫 Jin ChengHao 的成员。Hong 和 Jin 都被列入了国际刑事警察组织(国际刑警组织)红色通告。<sup>106</sup>

135. 针对专家小组关于 Song Rim 的询问，中国答复称“没有发现任何证据表明 Song Rim 参与了在中国境内销售钓鱼软件或运营钓鱼呼叫中心的活动”(见附件 26, OC.226)。

## 侦察总局(KPe.031)

### 领导

136. 据会员国称，2022 年 6 月，Ri Chang Ho 中将(1967 年生)被确认担任侦察总局<sup>107</sup> 局长和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国劳动党中央委员会委员。在 2022 年 4 月 25 日朝鲜民主主义人民共和国人民军建军纪念日的阅兵式上，Ri 象征性地走在侦察部队方队的最前面，这意味着他被任命为侦察总局局长。

<sup>104</sup> S/2022/668，第 121 和 122 段以及附件 51 和 52。

<sup>105</sup> 安全理事会第 2270(2016)号决议，第 14 段；以及第 2397(2017)号决议，第 8 段。

<sup>106</sup> 有关 Song Rim 的更多信息和有关中国相关人员的详细信息见附件 74 和 75。

<sup>107</sup> 关于侦察总局的作用，见 S/2020/840，附件 48。




## 网络威胁行为体

137. 据一个会员国称，并经另一个会员国证实，大多数网络威胁行为体隶属于侦察总局第三局的下属组织。<sup>108</sup> 这些网络威胁行为体包括 Kimsuky、Lazarus Group 和 Andariel 等团体(见图三十七)。<sup>109</sup> 在本报告所述期间，这些行为体继续开展针对目标受害者的非法活动，以创造收入(第 159-169 段)并索取对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国、包括对其武器计划有价值的信息。<sup>110、111</sup>

图三十七

侦察总局组织结构中的网络威胁行为体(非详尽)



资料来源：会员国，由专家小组附加说明。

注：白色，侦察总局第三局内部的官方网络单位/办公室；黄色，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体/网络安全行业使用的名称。

\* 根据会员国描述的网络单位。

138. 一家网络安全公司的报告显示，Kimsuky 使用虚假人物的电子邮件分发含有朝鲜民主主义人民共和国相关材料的恶意 Word 文件。这些 Word 文件引诱受害者打开附件并点击链接；这样，犯罪人就有机会获得关于受害者计算机及其内容的信息。在另一起案件中，观察到 Kimsuky 使用的“AppleSeed”后门恶意软件被发送给一家军事基地维修公司和多家与核电站有关的公司，该软件允许受损计算机接收外部攻击者的命令。这款后门恶意软件还被伪装成订购单和请求表单。

<sup>108</sup> 据会员国评估，侦察总局包括六个局：陆空监视(第一)、信息分析(第二)、技术监视(第三)、外国情报(第五)、朝韩事务(第六)和支助(第七)；第四局据说不存在。

<sup>109</sup> 本节中使用的网络威胁行为体及其攻击活动的名称在网络安全行业中广泛使用。

<sup>110</sup> 这些索取信息、包括非法获取敏感技术的企图可能违反安全理事会第 1718(2006)号决议第 8(a)(二)段和第 2270(2016)号决议第 27 段。

<sup>111</sup> 专家小组通过利用会员国提供的信息、查阅公开来源资料以及与网络安全智库和公司接洽，调查了近 40 起已知的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行动要案(见附件 76)。

“AppleSeed”一旦在电脑上运行，就会向外部发送用户帐户凭证、网络信息(如因特网协议地址)甚至文件夹和文件等信息。<sup>112</sup>

139. 一家网络安全公司告知专家小组，观察到 Kimsuky (该公司称之为“Sharptongue”)部署恶意软件，使用名为“SHARPEXT”的恶意浏览器扩展程序攻击电子邮件和窃取信息。<sup>113</sup> “SHARPEXT”恶意软件为 Chrome 和 Edge 浏览器安装的扩展程序无法被电子邮件服务检测到，并且由于浏览器已经使用多因素验证保护进行身份验证，因此安全措施在保护受损账户方面不起作用。据报，“SHARPEXT”的攻击对象是多个会员国中从事核武器工作和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国认为对其国家安全至关重要的其他领域工作的组织。

140. 2022 年 12 月，大韩民国国家警察厅发布公告称，<sup>114</sup> Kimsuky 在 2022 年 4 月至 10 月期间锁定了 892 名外交政策相关专家，试图窃取个人数据和电子邮件名单。49 名受害者受骗登录了虚假网站，从而将登录信息暴露给了网络威胁行为体，但警察厅提到，攻击者未能窃取敏感信息。黑客通过清洗受害者的 IP 地址和使用设在 26 个会员国的 326 个迂回服务器，为追踪设置障碍。警察厅还解释说，这是他们第一次发现 Kimsuky 使用勒索软件。13 家公司的 19 台服务器受到影响，其中两家公司向该团伙支付了价值 250 万韩元(1 980 美元)的比特币作为赎金。

141. 一家网络安全公司发现 Lazarus Group 使用 Windows 木马程序套件，它是一个恶意软件包，旨在利用戴尔固件驱动程序中的漏洞，对个人计算机进行未经授权的访问。攻击目标包括一名航空航天公司雇员。据该网络安全公司称，<sup>115</sup> 攻击使用名为“BLINDINGCAN”的 HTTP(S)后门程序，<sup>116</sup> 以利用影响戴尔 DBUtil 驱动程序<sup>117</sup> 的“CVE-2021-21551”漏洞。<sup>118</sup> 该后门恶意软件作为全功能的远程访问木马程序，可使受损机器的安全监控失效。该公司进一步评估认为，Lazarus Group 以特定类型的行业为重点对象，如航空航天和国防，以及传统金融和加密货币，目标是访问被入侵公司的内部知识库。

142. 据一家信息技术公司的网络安全部门称，<sup>119</sup> Lazarus Group (别名 ZINC) 使用恶意版本的开源应用程序，如 PuTTY、KiTTY、TightVNC 和 Sumatra PDF

<sup>112</sup> 公司报告的链接见附件 77。

<sup>113</sup> 见 [www.volexity.com/blog/2022/07/28/sharptongue-deploys-clever-mail-stealing-browser-extension-sharpext](https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/07/28/sharptongue-deploys-clever-mail-stealing-browser-extension-sharpext)。

<sup>114</sup> 大韩民国国家警察厅的新闻稿(韩文)见附件 78。

<sup>115</sup> 见 [www.welivesecurity.com/2022/09/30/amazon-themed-campaigns-lazarus](https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/09/30/amazon-themed-campaigns-lazarus)。

<sup>116</sup> 美利坚合众国网络安全和基础设施安全局发布了关于“BLINDINGCAN”的恶意软件分析报告。见 [www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-232a](https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-232a)。

<sup>117</sup> 戴尔已针对此漏洞提供了安全更新(见 [www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-uk/000186019/dsa-2021-088-dell-client-platform-security-update-for-an-insufficient-access-control-vulnerability-in-the-dell-dbutil-driver](https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-uk/000186019/dsa-2021-088-dell-client-platform-security-update-for-an-insufficient-access-control-vulnerability-in-the-dell-dbutil-driver))。

<sup>118</sup> 有关“CVE-2021-21551”漏洞的详细信息见 [www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2021-21551](https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2021-21551)。

<sup>119</sup> 见 [www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/29/zinc-weaponizing-open-source-software](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/09/29/zinc-weaponizing-open-source-software)。



阅读器，将攻击目标锁定为工程师和技术支持人员。<sup>120</sup> ZINC 以间谍活动和数据盗窃为主要目标开展恶意的社会工程学攻击。攻击目标是多个会员国不同行业——包括国防和航空航天——组织的雇员。攻击者最初通过 LinkedIn 与个人取得联系，一旦与目标对象建立了一定程度的信任，就通过 WhatsApp 上的持续通信发送恶意负载。

143. 据多家网络安全公司称，<sup>121</sup> 2022 年 2 月至 7 月期间，Lazarus Group 将多个会员国的能源供应商锁定为攻击目标，利用 Log4j (别名 Log4Shell) 中的漏洞入侵暴露在互联网上的 VMware Horizon 服务器。<sup>122</sup> 攻击者一旦取得进入受害者网络的最初立足点，就会部署名为“VSingle”和“YamaBot”<sup>123</sup> 的恶意软件，以建立长期持久访问。还观察到该网络威胁行为体使用另一个名为“MagicRAT”的远程访问木马程序进行侦察和窃取凭证。<sup>124</sup> 据报，这些攻击的主要目标是建立对受害者网络的长期访问，这“与 Lazarus 针对关键基础设施和能源公司的过往入侵活动一致……目的是窃取专有知识产权”。

144. 根据一家网络安全公司的报告，已知被 Lazarus Group 广泛使用的“Dtrack”后门恶意软件已部署到欧洲和拉丁美洲的目标组织中。该恶意软件允许黑客上载、下载、启动或删除受害主机上的文件。“Dtrack”工具集内有一个键盘记录器、一个屏幕截图制作器和一个用于收集受害者系统信息的模块。对“Dtrack”的最新修改允许植入该恶意软件，使其隐藏在看似合法的程序中。报告中提及，教育、化学品制造、政府研究中心和政策机构、信息技术服务提供商、公用事业提供商和电信部门是主要目标。<sup>125</sup>

145. 一家网络安全公司最近在 2022 年 11 月发表的一份报告<sup>126</sup> 提到，“另一个……活跃在乌克兰的高级持续性威胁组织是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的 Lazarus。它于 2022 年 6 月针对一个政府实体发起攻击”。据报，该次攻击是“旨在窃取知识产权的传统网络间谍活动”。专家小组对这一事件的调查仍在继续。

146. 涉及 Kimsuky 和 Lazarus Group 间谍活动的更多案件载于附件 79。

<sup>120</sup> 另一家网络安全公司也报告了使用 PuTTY (网络通信协议) 武器化版本实施的攻击。见 [www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/dprk-whatsapp-phishing](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/dprk-whatsapp-phishing)。KiTTY (另一种网络通信协议) 和 Sumatra PDF 阅读器的武器化版本可用于安装 ZetaNile (别名 BLINDINGCAN)。TightVNC (虚拟网络计算) 是一款用于远程访问和控制另一台机器的应用程序。

<sup>121</sup> 见 <https://blog.talosintelligence.com/lazarus-three-rats>。

<sup>122</sup> 网络安全和基础设施安全局发布了关于 VMware Horizon 服务器中的 Log4Shell 漏洞的警告通知。见 [www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-174a](https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-174a)。

<sup>123</sup> 日本国家网络应急小组最近将“YamaBot”归为 Lazarus Group 所为。见 <https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2022/07/yamabot.html>。

<sup>124</sup> 专家小组在 S/2022/668 号文件第 124 和 125 段中报告了类似的手法。

<sup>125</sup> 见 <https://securelist.com/dtrack-targeting-europe-latin-america/107798>。

<sup>126</sup> 见 [www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/eset\\_apr\\_activity\\_report\\_t22022.pdf](https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/eset_apr_activity_report_t22022.pdf)。

### Sok Kha 的同伙

147. Sok Kha 是侦察总局的一名情报官员，曾在柬埔寨经营酒店、赌场、餐馆和酒吧。柬埔寨当局此前关停了 Sok Kha 的生意，冻结了相关银行账户，并试图采取法律行动将 Sok Kha 送审。然而，Sok Kha 于 2020 年 11 月离开了柬埔寨。<sup>127</sup>

148. 专家小组从一个会员国获悉，有五人可能是 Sok Kha 在侦察总局的同伙，他们继续在柬埔寨开展商业活动，其中多数持朝鲜民主主义人民共和国护照。他们是 Kim Nam Ryong、Jon Sung Jin、Pak Jin Song、Jo Won Jong 和 Han Ji Yon。<sup>128</sup> 据说 Jon 经营的 C.H. World Travel Co., Ltd 公司此前注册在 Sok Kha 名下。柬埔寨尚未答复专家小组的询问。调查继续进行。

### 万寿台创作社(KPe.050)<sup>129</sup>

149. 出售万寿台创作社的艺术品违反安全理事会第 2371(2017)号决议第 3 段，应予冻结资产或扣押。

150. Beijing Chaoyi Online Cultural Exchange Co., Ltd 公司(Painted Arirang，见附件 81)<sup>130</sup> 和 Dandong Jinping Korea Cultural Art Co., Ltd 公司(见附件 83 和 84)<sup>131</sup> 有在线平台出售朝鲜民主主义人民共和国画作，包括万寿台创作社的产品。Painted Arirang 邀请朝鲜民主主义人民共和国艺术家在其北京工作室创作和销售作品(见附件 82)，这违反安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段。专家小组没有关于销售或艺术家佣金的证据，且尚未收到相关公司的答复。

151. 一个会员国提供了与一篇媒体报道<sup>132</sup> 有关的资料，该报道称，万寿台创作社的一些画作被带出朝鲜民主主义人民共和国展览，此后下落不明。专家小组正在继续调查可能存在的逃避制裁行为。

### 海外工人

152. 专家小组继续调查在国外赚取收入的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民(海外工人)。

### 老挝人民民主共和国

153. 专家小组此前报告，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国信息技术工人 Oh Chung Song 与其他多名信息技术工人一起从迪拜逃往万象。<sup>133</sup> 老挝人民民主共和国证实，Oh 于 2021 年 12 月 14 日抵达万象，另外八人“可能与他一起进入了[老挝人民

<sup>127</sup> S/2022/132，第 162 至 165 段以及附件 75 和 76。

<sup>128</sup> 这五名同伙的详细信息见附件 80。

<sup>129</sup> 别名“万寿台海外开发会社”。

<sup>130</sup> 中文名称：北京朝艺在线文化交流有限公司(画说阿里郎)。

<sup>131</sup> 中文名称：丹东金坪高丽文化艺术品有限公司。

<sup>132</sup> 见 [https://news.jtbc.co.kr/article/article.aspx?news\\_id=NB12081480](https://news.jtbc.co.kr/article/article.aspx?news_id=NB12081480)。

<sup>133</sup> S/2022/668，第 142 段。

民主共和国]”。据老挝人民民主共和国称，Oh 是作为老挝人民民主共和国与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国教育文化交流项目的一名专家抵达该国的，“临时访问是项目计划活动的一部分”。另外，专家小组收到了关于 Oh 可能在老挝人民民主共和国开展的活动的资料。专家小组就 Oh 的“临时访问”作了进一步询问，包括他逗留的时间和他与项目有关的签证状况。专家小组还请老挝人民民主共和国提供关于另外八人的补充资料。调查继续进行。

154. 据一个会员国称，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民继续在老挝人民民主共和国的餐馆工作。专家小组向老挝人民民主共和国发出了几次询问，但尚未收到答复。

#### 柬埔寨

155. 专家小组一直在调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Ri Chol Nam<sup>134</sup> 的活动，他从事若干为朝鲜民主主义人民共和国创收的商业活动。

156. 据柬埔寨当局称，Ri 于 2005 年抵达柬埔寨，他使用多本朝鲜民主主义人民共和国护照(护照号码为 645431352、290321100、654420454 和 109120342)，多次前往东南亚和东北亚的多个城市。2016 年，Ri 在柬埔寨设立了“Pyongyang Unhasu Co., Ltd”公司，<sup>135</sup> 经营餐饮、非专业批发贸易和货币兑换服务等多种业务。2019 年 12 月，该公司从商业登记册中除名，2020 年 1 月，柬埔寨当局关闭了该公司的银行账户。该公司注册文件显示欺诈性的国籍信息，提到大韩民国，但登记了平壤地址。Ri 的柬埔寨居留签证于 2019 年 12 月到期，柬埔寨当局于 2022 年 1 月告知专家小组，他们正试图逮捕 Ri 并将他驱逐回朝鲜民主主义人民共和国(见附件 85-87)。

157. 据一个会员国称，Ri 从事潜在的武器销售以及与钻石和黄金销售有关的中介活动，他还与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国国民 Kim Se Un 从事非法金融活动，Kim Se Un 是“U.J Import Export Co., Ltd”公司<sup>136</sup> 主管。Ri 还涉嫌代表朝鲜民主主义人民共和国出售军事相关设备，包括购买和转售第三国防弹背心。据报告，Ri 在离开柬埔寨后一直往返于越南、老挝人民民主共和国和中国。专家小组已向这些会员国发出询问。

158. 越南答复称，Ri 于 2022 年 4 月至 6 月期间持公务护照在越南逗留，随后离境前往另一东南亚国家。他的旅行目的是访问在越南的一名朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外交官。Ri 于 2022 年 6 月出境后曾申请 3 个月单次入境签证，以便从第三国再次入境，越南拒绝了这一申请。越南“迄今未发现 Ri Chol Nam 先生在越南境内任何违反相关……安全理事会决议的行为”。中国“未发现 Ri Chol Nam 在中国境内从事违反安全理事会决议的活动的任何证据”(见附件 88 和附件 26, OC.254)。

<sup>134</sup> 리철남, 出生日期: 1974 年 11 月 4 日。

<sup>135</sup> 柬埔寨企业登记册显示，Pyongyang Unhasu 于 2016 年更名为“Nikapich Restaurant Co. Ltd”，截至 2023 年 1 月已被除名。Nikapich Restaurant Co. Ltd 的主要经营活动是餐馆、夜总会和各种商品批发(见附件 87)。

<sup>136</sup> 柬埔寨当局于 2019 年 12 月注销了该公司(见 S/2020/151，第 139 段和附件 38)。

## 五. 金融


### 通过网络活动非法创收

159. 专家小组继续调查朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络行为体违反安全理事会金融制裁的情况。非法获得的虚拟资产受到区块链匿名性和行为体故意通过加密货币交易所掩饰资产转移情况的双重保护。

160. 据媒体报道，<sup>137</sup> 大韩民国当局估计，自 2017 年以来，国家支持的朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络威胁行为体在全球窃取了价值约 12 亿美元的虚拟资产，其中仅 2022 年就窃取约 6.3 亿美元。一家网络安全公司评估认为，2022 年朝鲜民主主义人民共和国通过网络犯罪获得了价值超过 10 亿美元(窃取时的价值)的网络货币，是 2021 年总收益的两倍多(见图三十八)。近几个月加密货币美元价值的变动可能影响这些估计数，<sup>138</sup> 但两项估计都表明，2022 年是朝鲜民主主义人民共和国虚拟资产盗窃创纪录的一年。

图三十八

2022 年与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有关的黑客攻击，按盗取资产总价值和黑客攻击总次数分列



资料来源：Chainalysis。

161. 美国当局继 2022 年 5 月首次对一家混币器公司 Blender 实施双边制裁后，<sup>139</sup> 又对另一家名为 Tornado Cash 的虚拟货币混币器公司实施制裁，明确原因是“其参与清洗[朝鲜民主主义人民共和国]黑客在迄今已知最大规模的

<sup>137</sup> 见 <https://apnews.com/article/technology-crime-business-hacking-south-korea-967763dc88e422232da54115bb13f4dc>。

<sup>138</sup> 专家小组使用被盗时声明的美元价值进行估计，除非有令人信服的证据表明需采取其他估计方法。

<sup>139</sup> S/2022/668，第 147 段。

一起虚拟货币抢劫案中窃取的 6 亿多美元中的一部分”。<sup>140</sup> 这两次指认表明，去中心化协议也应遵守中心化服务须遵守的合规义务。

162. 在本报告所述期间，勒索软件网络攻击和针对加密货币公司和交易所的黑客攻击仍在继续。网络威胁行为体使用的技术已更加复杂，从而使追踪被盗资金变得更困难。

#### 勒索软件

163. 专家小组此前报告称，“Maui”勒索软件被用于攻击公共卫生部门中的组织，该软件被认为来自朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络威胁行为体。<sup>141</sup> 2022 年 7 月，美国当局宣布扣押了从美国多个卫生相关组织勒索的价值 50 万美元的比特币。一家网络安全公司得出结论认为，“Maui”勒索软件攻击的方法与 Andariel 在过去活动中使用的方法非常相似。该公司进一步指出，<sup>142</sup> “Maui”勒索软件攻击并不针对特定行业，其受害者包括来自多个会员国的公司。

164. 一家网络安全公司观察到，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国一个自称“H0lyGh0st”的威胁行为体在一轮以金钱为动机的广泛攻击中，通过分发勒索软件向多个会员国的中小型公司勒索赎金。该组织的标准方法是对目标设备上的文件进行加密，使用文件扩展名“.h0lyenc”向受害者发送文件样本作为证据，然后要求以比特币支付赎金，以换取恢复文件访问权。作为勒索策略的一部分，他们还威胁称，如果勒索目标拒绝付款，他们将在社交媒体上公布受害者数据，或将数据发送给受害者的客户。该网络安全公司以“DEV-0530”指称“H0lyGh0st”，并评估认为“DEV-0530”似乎与 Andariel 进行沟通与合作。<sup>143</sup>

#### 加密货币行业

165. 对 Harmony 区块链 Horizon 跨链桥的黑客攻击(2022 年 6 月)<sup>144</sup> 被认为是 Lazarus Group 所为，因为使用的方法与针对 Axie Infinity 的 Ronin 网络的黑客攻击(2022 年 3 月)<sup>145</sup> 非常相似。据包括几家网络安全公司在内的多个消息来源称，<sup>146</sup>

<sup>140</sup> 见 [www.state.gov/imposing-sanctions-on-virtual-currency-mixer-tornado-cash](https://www.state.gov/imposing-sanctions-on-virtual-currency-mixer-tornado-cash) 和 <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0916>。

<sup>141</sup> S/2022/668，脚注 138 和附件 66。

<sup>142</sup> 见 <https://securelist.com/andariel-deploys-dtrack-and-maui-ransomware/107063>。

<sup>143</sup> 见 [www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/07/14/north-korean-threat-actor-targets-small-and-midsize-businesses-with-h0lygh0st-ransomware](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/07/14/north-korean-threat-actor-targets-small-and-midsize-businesses-with-h0lygh0st-ransomware)。

<sup>144</sup> S/2022/668，第 147 和 148 段。

<sup>145</sup> 联邦调查局也证实，这起黑客攻击事件是 Lazarus Group 所为。见 [www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-confirms-lazarus-group-apt38-cyber-actors-responsible-for-harmonys-horizon-bridge-currency-theft](https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-confirms-lazarus-group-apt38-cyber-actors-responsible-for-harmonys-horizon-bridge-currency-theft)。

<sup>146</sup> 见 [www.coindesk.com/tech/2023/01/16/north-korean-hacking-group-tied-to-100m-harmony-hack-moves-41000-ether-over-weekend](https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2023/01/16/north-korean-hacking-group-tied-to-100m-harmony-hack-moves-41000-ether-over-weekend) 和 [https://twitter.com/zachxbt/status/1614771861266792449?ref\\_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1614771861266792449%7Ctwgr%5Eb27203be4def19edc30a61133549fcccbbfe6c8d%7Ctwcon%5Es1\\_&ref\\_url=https%3A%2F%2Fdecrypt.co%2F119315%2F1azarus-group-moves-41000-ethereum-nabbed-harmony-bridge-hack](https://twitter.com/zachxbt/status/1614771861266792449?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1614771861266792449%7Ctwgr%5Eb27203be4def19edc30a61133549fcccbbfe6c8d%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fdecrypt.co%2F119315%2F1azarus-group-moves-41000-ethereum-nabbed-harmony-bridge-hack)。



2023 年 1 月 13 日，该组织转移了在 Horizon 跨链桥黑客攻击中窃取的约一半资产，按以太币计量的价值为 6 340 万美元。<sup>147</sup> 该组织使用 Railgun<sup>148</sup> 将这些资金存入三个不同的加密货币交易所。<sup>149</sup> 在这次转账过程中，查明了 Lazarus Group 的 350 多个单独钱包地址。<sup>150</sup> 相关交易所阻止了转账并冻结了账户，在此过程中追回了 124 个比特币，当时价值为 260 万美元。<sup>151</sup>

166. 据报，Lazarus Group 还开展了一轮鱼叉式网络钓鱼攻击，以感染运行苹果 MacOS 操作系统的设备，攻击目标锁定为金融科技部门的开发人员，方式是将夹带恶意软件的 PDF 文件伪装成加密货币交易所 Coinbase 的招聘广告进行分发。根据一家网络安全公司发布的一串推文，<sup>152</sup> Lazarus Group 的恶意软件一旦启动就会发送三个文件，分别是捆绑包 FinderFontsUpdated.app、下载器 safarifontagent 和一个诱饵 PDF 文件。诱饵 PDF 文件通过加载恶意动态链接库文件，最终使网络威胁行为体能够向受感染设备发送命令。本轮攻击以加密货币开发人员为目标，很可能是为了给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国创造非法收入。<sup>153</sup>

167. 另一家网络安全公司警告称，Lazarus Group 对加密货币用户进行了恶意软件攻击。据观察，网络威胁行为体在不存在的品牌“BloxHolder”下传播虚假的加密货币应用程序。这些应用程序会投放“AppleJeus”恶意软件，<sup>154</sup> 用于对网络进行初始访问，并最终窃取加密货币。本轮攻击始于 2022 年 6 月，当时设立了一个名为“bloxholder.com”的网站，它是合法网站 HaasOnline (haasonline.com) 的克隆网站。攻击者利用该网站分发伪装成 BloxHolder 应用程序的 Windows 程序 MSI 文件，该 MSI 文件被用于安装“AppleJeus”恶意软件。<sup>155</sup>

168. 一家网络安全公司观察到，BlueNoroff 使用新的恶意软件和经更新的投放技术——包括新的文件类型和绕过微软“网络标记”(MotW)防御的方法——发起了新的攻击，BlueNoroff 据悉是 Lazarus 的一个子团体。BlueNoroff 分发含诱饵微软 Office 文档的光盘映像(.iso)和虚拟硬盘(.vhd)文件。这使他们能够规避“网络标记”警告——Windows 通常会在用户试图打开从互联网下载的文档时显示该警

<sup>147</sup> 41 000 个以太币。

<sup>148</sup> Railgun 是“为专业交易员和分散式金融用户提供的智能合约，为加密货币交易增加隐私保护”。见 [www.railgun.org/#/](http://www.railgun.org/#/)。

<sup>149</sup> 币安、火比和欧易。

<sup>150</sup> 见 [www.chainabuse.com/report/0a2e8e00-00e2-4749-9b00-ceb1c6202d33](http://www.chainabuse.com/report/0a2e8e00-00e2-4749-9b00-ceb1c6202d33)。

<sup>151</sup> 见 [https://twitter.com/cz\\_binance/status/1614887319177428992?s=20](https://twitter.com/cz_binance/status/1614887319177428992?s=20)。

<sup>152</sup> 见 <https://twitter.com/esetresearch/status/1559553324998955010?lang=en>。

<sup>153</sup> 该网络安全公司评估认为，这款 MacOS 恶意软件与 Lazarus Group 的“In(ter)ception 行动”(见 S/2020/840 第 117 段和脚注 79)有关，后者以类似方式将知名航空航天和军事组织锁定为攻击目标。

<sup>154</sup> S/2020/151，第 181 段。关于“AppleJeus”恶意软件的详情另见 [www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-048a](http://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-048a)。

<sup>155</sup> 见 [www.volexity.com/blog/2022/12/01/buyer-beware-fake-cryptocurrency-applications-serving-as-front-for-applejeus-malware](http://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/12/01/buyer-beware-fake-cryptocurrency-applications-serving-as-front-for-applejeus-malware)。



告。该公司评估认为，BlueNoroff 试图通过网络钓鱼感染目标组织，以拦截加密货币转账并清空账户。此外，作为网络攻击的一部分，该黑客组织注册了模仿知名银行和风险投资公司的假域名。<sup>156</sup>

#### 非同质化代币

169. 专家小组此前指出，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国网络威胁行为体有可能窃取非同质化代币，以此作为一个不断增长的收入来源。<sup>157</sup> 一家网络安全公司发现了近 500 个钓鱼网站域名，其中最值得注意的是伪装成合法的非同质化代币相关项目和平台的网站，该公司认为这些域名的部署是 Lazarus Group 所为。攻击者还获取了可使其直接进入受害者加密钱包的数据，目的是直接通过非同质化代币转账对此类代币的投资者进行诈骗。<sup>158</sup>

#### 建议

170. 专家小组建议根据安全理事会第 2094(2013)号决议第 27 段和第 2270(2016)号决议第 43 段指认以下个人，理由是此人在违禁武器计划中发挥作用并提供支持：Ri Chang Ho (리창호)将军，侦察总局局长，该组织下属网络单位(被称为 Lazarus Group、Kimsuky、Andariel 等)不断从事非法创收和获取敏感信息的活动。侦察总局于 2016 年 3 月被指认。

171. 专家小组强调其以往建议：

(a) 会员国机构以及金融机构、企业和虚拟资产服务提供商适当关注加强网络清洁，包括要求所有尝试访问加密货币交易所的加密货币用户设置更高的默认阈值，如交易的双因素身份验证；

(b) 会员国尽快执行金融行动特别工作组关于虚拟资产的指导意见，该指导意见力求通过对这些资产和虚拟资产服务提供商提出反洗钱和打击资助恐怖主义行为的要求，防止资助大规模毁灭性武器扩散；

(c) 遭受网络攻击的任何实体尽快向适当的法律当局报告并与之接触，发布事件公告，并与事件相关机构、包括区块链分析公司配合，以增加追回一些被盗资产的可能性。

172. 专家小组建议会员国考虑通过国家立法作出网络安全指令，以执行“了解客户”协议，并收紧虚拟资产服务提供商注册程序。

173. 专家小组建议会员国加强合作、促进对话并增进信息共享，特别是在其所在地理区域内，以应对网络犯罪造成的日益严重的情报和金融威胁。这方面包括：

<sup>156</sup> 见 <https://securelist.com/bluenoroff-methods-bypass-motw/108383>。

<sup>157</sup> S/2022/668，第 151 段。

<sup>158</sup> 见 <https://slowmist.medium.com/slowmist-our-in-depth-investigation-of-north-korean-apt-large-scale-phishing-attack-on-nft-users-362117600519>。

(a) 通过金融服务信息共享和分析中心([www.fsisac.com](http://www.fsisac.com))等组织与其他金融机构分享与威胁有关的信息；

(b) 由联合国毒品和犯罪问题办公室、金融行动特别工作组等组织以及各家网络公司为金融机构举办网络安全培训。

## 六. 制裁的意外人道主义后果

174. 安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 25 段重申，联合国制裁无意对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平民造成不利的人道主义后果，也无意对决议没有禁止的活动，包括经济活动与合作、粮食援助和人道主义援助产生不利后果或作出限制，并强调指出朝鲜民主主义人民共和国须充分满足该国人民的生活需要，对此负有首要责任。2022 年 12 月通过的第 2664(2022)号决议强调“尽可能减少[制裁]无意中产生的负面人道后果的需要”，并为此提出了措施建议。<sup>159</sup>

### 人道主义状况

175. 专家小组确认，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国关闭边境导致缺乏完全可靠的数据，因此观察员和人道主义组织无法报告该国境内的情况。专家小组还注意到，缺乏一种将多边制裁的后果与其他因素区分开来的方法。这妨碍了对制裁效果的定量和定性评估。

176. 2022 年下半年，由于农作物收成不佳、国家边境继续关闭以及缓解这些因素的外部援助数额减少，人道主义状况的几个关键指标有所恶化。气候条件和市场结构表现不佳<sup>160</sup> 阻碍了粮食的获取，导致粮食产量下降 4%，儿童营养状况恶化。<sup>161</sup>

177. 专家小组向人道主义组织发出了调查问卷(附件 89)，匿名结果见附件 90。在一系列观点中有一些认为，政府的关闭边境政策、COVID-19 的影响以及制裁后果导致 2022 年全年人们获得消费品、医疗保健、清洁水和环境卫生设施的机会减少。社会脆弱性继续加深，该国面临关键资源短缺。

178. 8 月，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国当局宣布成功战胜了 COVID-19 疫情。尽管数据有限，但联合国各组织表示，隔离措施和 470 万例报告病例加剧了人道主义危机。<sup>162</sup>

<sup>159</sup> 这项决议可能不会对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国民众受制裁的影响产生较大影响，因为它主要涉及资产冻结和旅行禁令。

<sup>160</sup> 见 [www.nknews.org/2022/12/drop-in-north-korean-crop-output-aggravates-domestic-food-shortages-report](http://www.nknews.org/2022/12/drop-in-north-korean-crop-output-aggravates-domestic-food-shortages-report)。

<sup>161</sup> 见 [www.unicef.org/documents/east-asia-and-pacific-humanitarian-situation-report-no-1-31-march-2022](http://www.unicef.org/documents/east-asia-and-pacific-humanitarian-situation-report-no-1-31-march-2022)。

<sup>162</sup> 见 [www.38north.org/2022/08/north-korea-appears-to-have-managed-its-covid-19-outbreak-what-comes-next](http://www.38north.org/2022/08/north-korea-appears-to-have-managed-its-covid-19-outbreak-what-comes-next)。

179. 虽然难以确切说明,但根据专家小组以往的结论<sup>163</sup> 和人道主义行为体提供的信息,专家小组认为,毋庸置疑,联合国制裁无意中影响了人道主义状况,尽管制裁的相对影响在 2020 年之后可能有所减弱。<sup>164</sup>

### 人道主义组织的业务

180. 各人道主义组织向专家小组提供的答复反映了边境继续关闭带来的困难,以及这些组织对联合国制裁和 1718 制裁委员会对其工作所造成影响的不同看法。这些组织指出,尤其令人关切的问题是 COVID-19 有关的限制措施,以及缺乏使人道主义行动得以开展的银行业务渠道。<sup>165</sup>

181. 2022 年 10 月中旬,联合国促成了一项一次性措施,向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国驻纽约代表团转移了价值 100 万美元的欧元,以帮助缺乏足够财政准备金的联合国驻朝鲜民主主义人民共和国组织支付驻地工作人员的工资和业务费用。

182. 人道主义组织赞赏委员会为精简豁免程序而采取的措施,一些组织建议扩大该程序,对产品和组织实行“一揽子”和“永久”豁免。大多数组织预计朝鲜民主主义人民共和国不会在 2023 年开放,少数担心朝鲜民主主义人民共和国今后将只允许有限准入。

183. 联合国儿童基金会和世界卫生组织都向该国提供了医疗援助,<sup>166、167</sup> 大韩民国援助组织报告称,有价值 440 万美元的私人人道主义援助抵达朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。<sup>168</sup> 然而人道主义事务协调厅报告称,2022 年记录的人道主义援助仅为 230 万美元,而 2021 年为 1 400 万美元,2020 年为 4 030 万美元。<sup>169</sup>

<sup>163</sup> S/2020/151, 第 209 段; S/2021/777, 第 174 段; S/2022/132, 第 188 和 189 段; S/2022/668, 第 121 和 122 段以及附件 51 和 52。

<sup>164</sup> 在 S/2020/151 号文件第 209 段中,专家小组在疫情之前得出结论认为,制裁对平民的人道主义需求造成的意外后果可能包括以下方面:受制裁影响行业就业者的生计来源减少;社会边缘化加剧,因为精英阶层为应对联合国和其他制裁而加强对稀缺资源的控制,并在某些情况下将这些资源用于民众需求以外的目的;农业设备持续短缺和燃料匮乏使本已很低的农业机械化水平进一步下降;医疗供应链中断的情况增加。

<sup>165</sup> 专家小组从与非政府组织的访谈中了解到,在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国境内的债务给各组织造成了沉重负担,它们无法支付建筑物租金、购买新的援助物资和支付雇员工资,一些雇员因资金问题而被解约或干脆离开了所在组织。应当指出,朝鲜民主主义人民共和国方面虽然没有公开宣传,但确实承担了人道主义援助代表处运作的当地费用,这表明朝鲜民主主义人民共和国有兴趣继续合作,以便在没有提出请求的情况下获得人道主义援助。

<sup>166</sup> 见 [www.nknews.org/2023/01/unicef-delivers-25-containers-of-medical-and-nutritional-aid-to-north-korea](http://www.nknews.org/2023/01/unicef-delivers-25-containers-of-medical-and-nutritional-aid-to-north-korea)。

<sup>167</sup> 见 [www.nknews.org/2022/08/unicef-aid-reaches-north-korean-capital-after-almost-two-year-delay](http://www.nknews.org/2022/08/unicef-aid-reaches-north-korean-capital-after-almost-two-year-delay)。

<sup>168</sup> 见 [www.nknews.org/2022/12/seoul-says-it-sent-state-sponsored-humanitarian-aid-to-north-korea](http://www.nknews.org/2022/12/seoul-says-it-sent-state-sponsored-humanitarian-aid-to-north-korea)。

<sup>169</sup> 见 <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/118/summary/2022> 和 <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230120004000325#:~:text=N.%20Korea%20received%20US%242.3%20mln%20in%20humanitarian%20aid, due%20to%20the%20coronavirus%20pandemic%2C%20data%20showed%20Sunday>。

## 建议

184. 专家小组建议委员会考虑对人道主义援助行为体和人道主义相关商品实行可续期和长期豁免。
185. 专家小组强调，迫切需要重建一个持久的银行业务渠道，以便可持续地恢复在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的人道主义行动。
186. 专家小组重视联合国有关机构一年两次就制裁的意外影响进行通报，建议委员会继续这一做法。
187. 专家小组再次建议安全理事会继续处理各种问题和流程，减轻制裁对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平民和人道主义援助行动可能造成的意外不利影响。
188. 专家小组建议委员会和其他相关利益攸关方以务实态度考虑豁免目前受制裁的选定出口，这些出口的收益可用于为人道主义供应品供资。
189. 专家小组建议委员会考虑更积极地与向朝鲜民主主义人民共和国提供人道主义援助的民间社会开展外联，以帮助执行安全理事会第 2664(2022)号决议，包括为编写秘书长的报告提供投入。

## 七. 国家执行情况报告

### 会员国报告相关决议执行情况的现况

190. 截至 2023 年 1 月 27 日，有 66 个会员国提交了关于安全理事会第 2397(2017)号决议第 8 段执行情况的报告，81 个会员国提交了关于第 2397(2017)号决议第 17 段执行情况的报告，95 个会员国提交了关于第 2375(2017)号决议执行情况的报告，90 个会员国提交了关于第 2371(2017)号决议执行情况的报告，107 个会员国提交了关于第 2321(2016)号决议执行情况的报告，115 个会员国提交了关于第 2270(2016)号决议执行情况的报告。尽管报告总数有所增加，但专家小组注意到，仍有很多会员国(127 个)未就第 2397(2017)号决议提交报告。
191. 2022 年 11 月，专家小组向会员国发出了关于 2022 年制裁制度实际执行情况的调查问卷(见附件 92)，并以附件形式提供了委员会关于会员国在这方面义务的指导说明(见附件 93)。专家小组对答复的初步评估载于附件 94。

## 八. 建议

192. 建议综合清单见附件 95。

**Annex 1: Comparison of newly-adopted “Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces”<sup>1</sup> in September 2022 and earlier “Law on Further Consolidating the Position of the Self-Defense Nuclear Weapons State”<sup>2</sup> adopted in 2013**

<b>New Law (2022)</b>	<b>Earlier Law (2013)</b>
<p><b>1. Mission of Nuclear Forces</b></p> <p><b>The nuclear forces of the DPRK shall be a main force of the state defence which safeguards the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country and the lives and safety of the people from outside military threat, aggression and attack.</b></p> <p><b>1) The nuclear forces of the DPRK shall regard it as their main mission to deter a war by making hostile forces have a clear understanding of the fact that the military confrontation with the DPRK brings about ruin and give up attempts at aggression and attack.</b></p> <p><b>2) The nuclear forces of the DPRK shall carry out an operational mission for repulsing hostile forces' aggression and attack and achieving decisive victory of war in case its deterrence fails.</b></p>	<p>1. The nuclear weapons of the DPRK are just means for defence as it was compelled to have access to them to cope with the ever-escalating hostile policy of the U.S. and nuclear threat.</p>
<p><b>2. Constitution of Nuclear Forces</b></p> <p><b><u>The nuclear forces of the DPRK shall be composed of different kinds of nuclear warheads, delivery means, command and control system</u> and all the personnel, equipment and facilities for the system's operating and updating.</b></p>	<p>2. They serve the purpose of deterring and repelling the aggression and attack of the enemy against the DPRK and dealing deadly retaliatory blows at the strongholds of aggression until the world is denuclearized.</p>
<p><b>3. Command and Control of Nuclear Forces</b></p> <p><b><u>1) The nuclear forces of the DPRK shall obey the monolithic command of the president of the State Affairs of the DPRK.</u></b></p> <p><b><u>2) The president of the State Affairs of the DPRK shall have all decisive powers concerning nuclear weapons. The state nuclear forces command organization</u></b></p>	<p>3. The DPRK shall take practical steps to bolster up the nuclear deterrence and nuclear retaliatory strike power both in quality and quantity to cope with the gravity of the escalating danger of the hostile forces' aggression and attack.</p>

<sup>1</sup> In Korean, 조선민주주의인민공화국 핵무력정책에 대하여

<sup>2</sup> In Korean, 자위적 핵보유국의 지위를 더욱 공고히 할 데 대하여

New Law (2022)	Earlier Law (2013)
<p><b><u>composed of members appointed by the president of the State Affairs of the DPRK shall assist the president of the State Affairs of the DPRK</u></b> in the whole course from decision concerning nuclear weapons to execution.</p> <p>3) In case the command and control system over the state nuclear forces is placed in danger owing to an attack by hostile forces, <b><u>a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately</u></b> to destroy the hostile forces including the starting point of provocation and the command according to the operation plan decided in advance.</p>	
<p><b>4. Execution of Decision on Use of Nuclear Weapons</b></p> <p>The nuclear forces of the DPRK shall immediately execute an order of using nuclear weapons.</p>	<p>4. The nuclear weapons of the DPRK can be used only by a final order of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army to repel invasion or attack from a hostile nuclear weapons state and make retaliatory strikes.</p>
<p><b>5. Principle of Using Nuclear Weapons</b></p> <p>1) The DPRK shall regard it as its main principle to use nuclear weapons as the last means in order to cope with outside aggression and attack seriously threatening the security of the country and the people.</p> <p>2) The DPRK shall neither threaten non-nuclear weapons states with its nuclear weapons nor use nuclear weapons against them unless they join aggression or attack against the DPRK in collusion with other nuclear weapons states.</p>	<p>5. The DPRK shall neither use nukes against the non-nuclear states nor threaten them with those weapons unless they join a hostile nuclear weapons state in its invasion and attack on the DPRK.</p>
<p><b>6. Conditions of Using Nuclear Weapons</b></p> <p>The DPRK can use nuclear weapons in the following cases:</p> <p>1) <b><u>In case an attack by nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction was launched or drew near is judged</u></b></p>	<p>6. The DPRK shall strictly observe the rules on safekeeping and management of nukes and ensuring the stability of nuclear tests.</p>



New Law (2022)	Earlier Law (2013)
<p>2) <u>In case a nuclear or non-nuclear attack by hostile forces on the state leadership and the command organization of the state's nuclear forces</u> was launched or drew near is judged</p> <p>3) <u>In case a fatal military attack against important strategic objects</u> of the state was launched or drew near is judged</p> <p>4) In case the need for operation for preventing the expansion and protraction of a war and taking the initiative in the war in contingency is inevitably raised.</p> <p>5) In other case an inevitable situation in which it is compelled to correspond with catastrophic crisis to the existence of the state and safety of the people by only nuclear weapons is created.</p>	
<p><b>7. Regular readiness of nuclear forces</b> The nuclear forces of the DPRK shall be regularly ready for action so that if an order to use nuclear weapons is issued, it can immediately execute it in any conditions and circumstances.</p>	<p>7. The DPRK shall establish a mechanism and order for their safekeeping and management so that nukes and their technology, weapon-grade nuclear substance may not leak out illegally.</p>
<p><b>8. Safe maintenance, management and protection of nuclear weapons</b></p> <p>1) The DPRK shall establish a thorough and safe system of storing and managing nuclear weapons to make sure that all the processes such as storage and management, the assessment of their lifespan and performance and their updating and dismantlement are conducted in conformity with administrative and technical regulations and legal procedures, and shall guarantee its implementation.</p> <p>2) The DPRK shall take thorough protective steps for fear that nuclear weapons, technology and equipment concerned, nuclear substances, etc. will leak out.</p>	<p>8. The DPRK shall cooperate in the international efforts for nuclear non-proliferation and safe management of nuclear substance on the principle of mutual respect and equality, depending on the improvement of relations with hostile nuclear weapons states.</p>

New Law (2022)	Earlier Law (2013)
<p><b>9. Qualitative and quantitative increasing and upgrading of nuclear forces</b></p> <p>1) The DPRK shall constantly assess outside nuclear threats and the change in the posture of international nuclear forces and correspondingly <b><u>upgrade and beef up its nuclear forces in a qualitative and quantitative way in response to it.</u></b></p> <p>2) The DPRK shall regularly update its strategy of using nuclear weapons according to different situations to enable its nuclear forces to reliably perform their mission.</p>	<p>9. The DPRK shall strive hard to defuse the danger of a nuclear war and finally build a world without nukes and fully support the international efforts for nuclear disarmament against nuclear arms race.</p>
<p><b>10. Non-proliferation</b></p> <p>The DPRK, as a responsible nuclear weapons state, shall neither deploy nuclear weapons in the territory of other countries nor share them and not transfer nuclear weapons, technology and equipment concerned and weapon-grade nuclear substances.</p>	<p>10. The related institutions shall take thorough practical steps for implementing this ordinance.</p>
<p><b>11. Others</b></p> <p>1) The Law of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK "On further consolidating the position of the self-defence nuclear weapons state" adopted on April 1, 2013 shall be invalid.</p> <p>2) Relevant organs will take technical measures to execute the law.</p> <p>3) None of the articles of the law shall be interpreted to restrain or limit the exercise of the DPRK's just right to self-defense.</p>	

Source: The original text of "Law on DPRK's Policy on Nuclear Forces" was extracted from KCNA, <http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/5f0e629e6d35b7e3154b4226597df4b8.kcmsf> and highlighted by the Panel, "Law on Further Consolidating the Position of the Self-Defense Nuclear Weapons State" was cited from <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1451896124-739013370/law-on-consolidating-position-of-nuclear-weapons-state-adopted/>.

**Annex 2: Activities at Punggye-ri nuclear test site (41° 16' 35" N 129° 05' 18" E)**

\*In the annexes of the nuclear section, annotations in red boxes are recent observations, while those with yellow characters in black boxes are previous observations.

**Annex 2.1: Renovation of the main administrative area continued (41° 16' 41" N 129° 05' 15" E)**

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 29 June 2022 and 18 August 2022.





Source: Maxar Technologies, 17 November 2022; Planet Labs Inc., 19 May 2018 and 22 October 2018.



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 5 December 2022; Maxar Technologies, 1 January 2023.



**Annex 2.2:** Tunnel 3 (41°16'35"N129°05'18"E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 24 August 2022 and 29 September 2022.





Source: Maxar Technologies, 20 October 2022 and 8 January 2023.

**Annex 2.3:** Activities near Tunnel 4 (41°16'47"N129°05'08"E)

A landslide appeared to collapse the access road to Tunnel 4 at the end of July 2022 and the reconstruction of the road and retaining wall was observed.



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 30 July 2022 and 10 August 2022.





Source: Maxar Technologies, 8 January 2023.

**Annex 2.4:** Bypass road construction between Command Center and Southern Support area  
(41°13'37"N129°06'34"E, 41°13'13"N129°06'27"E)

A think-tank reported<sup>3</sup> that a bypass was constructed between the southern support area and the command centre in order to mitigate flood damage and to maintain access to the command centre. The Panel also has observed construction of the road and believes that this pre-existing road or trail has been renovated or cleared.



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 2 July 2022 and 7 September 2022.

<sup>3</sup> See <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/punggye-ri-update-flood-mitigation/>.



**Annex 3: Activities at LWR (39° 47' 39" N 125° 45' 18" E)**

Source: Maxar Technologies, 30 September 2022.



- 1) Construction of buildings (39° 47' 39" N 125° 45' 18" E, 39° 47' 43" N 125° 45' 15" E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 22 July 2022 and 11 August 2022.



Source: Maxar Technologies, 17 November 2022

2) Riverbank modification (39° 47' 38" N 125° 45' 21" E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 18 October 2022, 26 October 2022 and 4 November 2022.



#### Annex 4: Activities at 5MW(e) reactor (39° 47' 51" N 125° 45' 20" E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 22 July 2022; Planet Labs Inc., 18 September 2022; Maxar Technologies, 27 September 2022.



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 29 October 2022 and 4 November 2022.





Source: Maxar Technologies, 17 December 2022 and 29 December 2022.

**Annex 5: Activities at 50MW(e) reactor (39° 47' 20" N 125°45'46"E)**



*Source:* Maxar Technologies, 29 December 2022.





Source: Planet Labs Inc., 26 October 2022; Maxar Technologies, 19 October 2022 and 17 November 2022.

**Annex 6: Radiochemical Laboratory and Coal-fired thermal plant (39° 46' 50" N 125° 45' 08" E)**



Source: Maxar Technologies, 17 November 2022.



## 1) Smoke from thermal plant (39° 46' 33" N 125° 45' 27" E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 22 July 2022, 20 August 2022, 20 September 2022 and 8 October 2022.

2) Vehicular activities around the spent fuel receipt building (39° 46' 50" N 125° 45' 08" E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 22 July 2022 and 7 September 2022.





Source: Maxar Technologies, 7 September 2022 and 19 September 2022.

3) New construction (39° 46' 43" N 125° 45' 09" E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 20 August 2022; Maxar Technologies, 19 October 2022; Maxar Technologies, 17 November 2022.



4) Suspected nuclear waste storage site (aka: Building 500) (39° 46' 49" N 125° 45' 24" E)

A think tank reported that previous excavation activity was observed at the east side of the facility in April 2016.<sup>4</sup> The Panel corroborated this observation.

According to the IAEA, this facility was not declared by the DPRK in its initial report submitted to the Agency in May 1992.<sup>5</sup> As the IAEA learned from a Member State that DPRK had disguised the facility by using camouflage, the Agency requested access to the facility in order to determine undeclared plutonium separation activities by analysing nuclear waste from the past reprocessing campaign.

IAEA visited the site in September 1992, although IAEA officials were not allowed to take samples and photographs of the facility because it was a military site.<sup>6</sup> Despite repeated requests by the Agency for additional access to the facility, DPRK continued to refuse.



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 11 April 2016, 12 June 2022 and 20 June 2022.

<sup>4</sup> See <https://www.38north.org/2016/05/yongbyon053116/>.

<sup>5</sup> See [https://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1032\\_web.pdf](https://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1032_web.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> See The Institute for Science and International Security, *Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle*.

**Annex 7: Activities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant (39°46'15"N 125°44'57"E)**



Source: Maxar Technologies, 22 July 2022.




1) Dismantlement or renovation of UF4 production process building (39° 46' 10" N 125° 44' 55" E)

According to the IAEA, production of UF<sub>4</sub> for conversion to natural uranium metal was conducted in this building until 1992 and was subject to the freeze under the Agreed Framework between 1994 and 2002. However, due to extensive corrosion of the equipment and interior of the building, IAEA assessed that building have not been used since 2002.<sup>7</sup>



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 8 June 2022 and 20 August 2022.

<sup>7</sup> See IAEA, GOV/2022/40-GC(66)/16, para. 22.



Source: Maxar Technologies, 7 September 2022, 17 November 2022 and 29 December 2022.




2) Plumes of steam from UO<sub>2</sub> production process building (39° 46' 12" N 125° 44' 55" E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 10 August 2022 and 4 November 2022; Maxar Technologies, 30 November 2022.


**Annex 8: Activities at Pyongsan Uranium Mine and Concentration Plant (Location of the possible yellowcake production building at 38° 19' 04" N 126° 25' 54" E)**



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 29 October 2022.




1) Expansion of the piles of tailings at the mine (38° 19' 58" N 126° 27' 21" E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 28 July 2022, 20 September 2022 and 19 December 2022.

2) Tailings pond of Pyongsan Uranium Concentration Plant (38° 18' 40" N 126° 25' 46" E)

Images captured during the reporting period showed that solid waste in the tailings pond located to the south of the concentration plant continued to expand through pipes or ditches. A think tank reported that these pipes and ditches were laid on top of the accumulated solid waste and a slurry of solid/liquid is distributed from the pumphouses.<sup>8</sup>




Source: Planet Labs Inc., 16 May 2022 and 29 October 2022; Maxar Technologies, 19 December 2022.

<sup>8</sup> See <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/current-status-of-the-pyongsan-uranium-concentrate-plant-nam-chon-chemical-complex-and-january-industrial-mine/> and <https://www.csis.org/analysis/pyongsan-uranium-concentrate-plant-nam-chon-chemical-complex-0>.




3) Railcar activities at Pyongsan Uranium Concentration Plant (38° 19' 03" N 126° 25' 56" E)



Source: Planet Labs Inc., 30 July 2022; Maxar Technologies, 1 September 2022; Planet Labs Inc., 29 October 2022; Maxar Technologies, 19 December 2022.

Annex 9: Activities at Kangson (38° 57' 26" N 125° 36' 43" E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 22 July 2022, 7 September 2022, 19 October 2022 and 29 December 2022.



**Annex 10: Activities at Yongdoktong (40°01' 51" N 125°18' 28" E)**

Source: Google Earth Pro, 27 September 2022.



1) Activities near the entrances of the tunnels (40° 01' 51" N 125° 18' 28" E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 27 September 2022, 19 October 2022 and 29 December 2022.




2) Possible storage site for explosives (40° 03' 16" N 125° 18' 11" E)



Source: Maxar Technologies, 29 December 2022.

## Annex 11: Reply from the research institute in Sweden



University Director

2022-10-04



Coordinator of the Panel of Experts  
established pursuant to Security Council  
Resolution 1874 (2009)

*By email only*

Reference:



Dear



In reference to your letter dated 1 September 2022 in which you requested assistance in providing you with certain information, please find below as requested:

1. An individual with that name was employed as a laboratory technician at [REDACTED] between 23 April 2020 and 24 August 2021 and is currently employed as a postdoctoral researcher as of 25 August 2021. His employment will terminate on the 24 August 2023. His salary is SEK 34 000 per month, and he has no other benefits than holiday entitlement.
2. There are no wider academic exchanges between [REDACTED] and universities in DPRK nor have any other students or academics been accepted or employed at [REDACTED]
3. No other DPRK students or academics are currently studying or involved in research at [REDACTED]
4. [REDACTED] preventive measures to prevent unintentional proliferation and informs and educates its employees on making risk assessments of scientific studies, collaborations, and dual-use items; goods and technologies that may be used for both civilian and military purposes.

For [REDACTED] it is important to prevent the misuse of academic knowledge for military purposes or for illegal weapons of mass destruction programs. Dual-use items may not be exported outside the EU without a license from the Swedish Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP). In some special cases, transfer within the EU of such items also requires a license. [REDACTED] must ensure that all handling of dual-use items is carried out in accordance with applicable export control laws and regulations.



Page: 2 / 2

Furthermore, [REDACTED] International Relations Office works with responsible internationalization and risk assessment of international collaborations.

As a preventive measure, there are also guidelines for export control available at [REDACTED] outlining the responsibility and the support available regarding these issues. Moreover, there is information available for researchers and teachers regarding regulations and how to risk assess international partnerships.

- [REDACTED]
5. [REDACTED] mission is to conduct education and research. Questions about visits, residence, citizenship and asylum are the responsibility of Sweden's central immigration authority, the Swedish Migration Agency, which is a Swedish government administrative authority. [REDACTED] therefore kindly refers you to contact the Swedish Migration Agency for an answer to this question.

[REDACTED] has nothing further to add at this point and trusts the above proves useful and satisfactory.

Yours sincerely,

[REDACTED]  
Acting University Director

Source: The Panel.

## Annex 12: Replies from institutes in the United Kingdom and Brazil

### 1) Reply from the University in the United Kingdom

[REDACTED]  
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts  
United Nations Headquarters  
Siege  
New York NY10017  
USA

28<sup>th</sup> September 2022

Dear [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

I write on behalf of Professor [REDACTED], President and Vice-Chancellor of the [REDACTED], in response to your letter of 1 September 2022. You refer in that letter to a previous letter dated 19 May 2022, and I do need to take this opportunity to note that we have no record of having received your previous correspondence.

In your letter of 19 May 2022, you asked four questions directed at clarifying the extent of academic exchanges between the [REDACTED] and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) research institutions, notably the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology (PUST). Our response in Appendix 1, attached, seeks to respond fully to the first three questions. I should also add that we are not aware of any formal collaboration arrangements between DPRK institutions, including PUST, and the [REDACTED]

Responding to question four, the three students in question were here for only a short, six-month, study-abroad undergraduate study programme. These undergraduate studies would have only involved access to widely published open-access information, and we can therefore be confident that none of their studies would or could have contributed in any way to proliferation in the sensitive areas you have asked about. The [REDACTED] does not routinely recruit students from the DPRK. In the rare instances, covered above, where any students holding DPRK nationality have studied here, we are confident we have complied with all relevant British Government guidance and legislation. All international students are subject to UK Government visa regulations. Student visas are issued by the UK Home Office, and can only be issued where the applicant has provided a Confirmation of Acceptance for Studies from the UK university they hold a place with. We provide all necessary information to facilitate the UK Government's scrutiny and assessment of applications.

In responding to your request we have consulted our Data Protection Officer to ensure that sharing the personal data is necessary and proportionate. Under the UK General Data Protection Regulations together with the Data Protection Act (DPA) 2018 we have identified UK GDPR Article 6(1)(e) as our lawful basis for processing this personal data and Article 9(2)(g) (substantial public interest), as a specific condition for processing special category data, with the linked condition in paragraph 10 of Schedule 1 of the DPA 2018 (preventing or detecting unlawful acts).



We are relying on this condition because:

- ☐ the disclosure (sharing) is necessary for the purposes of preventing or detecting an unlawful act;
- ☐ asking for the individual's consent would prejudice those purposes; and
- ☐ the disclosure is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest.

I trust you find this a comprehensive response to your enquiries. Please do not hesitate to get in touch again should you have any further queries.

Yours sincerely



**Vice-President (External Engagement)**



**APPENDIX 1***Date of compilation: 21<sup>st</sup> September 2022***1. Confirmation of students named in Annex 1**

Our records indicate a match with the students named in Annex 1 of the UN letter.

■ [REDACTED]

- ☐ Was registered with the University between 24<sup>th</sup> September 2018 and 11<sup>th</sup> March 2019
- ☐ Registered on the route: UCD00004: Biosciences Module Only – UG
- ☐ Completed the following modules

■ [REDACTED]	Clinical Immunology And Immunohaematology
■ [REDACTED]	Introduction To Mathematical Biology
■ [REDACTED]	Man And The Environment
■ [REDACTED]	Management Of Scientific Research

■ [REDACTED]

- ☐ Was registered with the University between 24<sup>th</sup> September 2018 and 11<sup>th</sup> March 2019
- ☐ Registered on the route: UCD00004: Biosciences Module Only – UG
- ☐ Completed the following modules:

■ [REDACTED]	Clinical Immunology And Immunohaematology
■ [REDACTED]	Introduction To Mathematical Biology
■ [REDACTED]	Man And The Environment
■ [REDACTED]	Management Of Scientific Research

■ [REDACTED]

- ☐ Was registered with the University between 24<sup>th</sup> September 2018 and 11<sup>th</sup> March 2019
- ☐ Registered on the route: UCD00004: Biosciences Module Only – UG




- ☐ Completed the following modules:

[REDACTED]	Clinical Immunology And Immunohaematology
[REDACTED]	Introduction To Mathematical Biology
[REDACTED]	Man And The Environment
[REDACTED]	Management Of Scientific Research

## 2. Current students at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	Enrolled	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	Economics BSc	North Korean	UK	Overseas	[REDACTED]

- ☐ [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- ☐ [REDACTED]
- First registered on 19<sup>th</sup> September 2022
  - Is expected to complete her programme in June 2025
  - Is on an 'Exempt Family Member' vignette, so they are exempt from immigration requirements as someone in their immediate family is here in a Diplomatic capacity
  - Is not eligible for the University's scholarships and bursaries due to overseas status.



## 2) Reply from the institute in Brazil

To	United Nations [REDACTED] Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)
From	Professor Robe [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
Reference	S/AC.9/2000/PE/OC.177

September 26<sup>th</sup>, 2022

Dear [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is a nonprofit organization created in 1980 by professors from the Business Administration Department of the [REDACTED], Brazil's foremost state-owned research university, with the original mission of supporting the development and dissemination of management knowledge in Brazil through consulting, executive education, and extension activities. Anticipating a need for skilled managers in a changing environment, in 1993 [REDACTED] designed and launched the first International Executive MBA in Brazil, currently still a flagship program of the institution.

[REDACTED] has signed many partnerships over the years with important universities and business schools all around the world, such as [REDACTED], among others.

On May 13<sup>th</sup>, 2015 FXX signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Graduate School of Pyongyang University of Science & Technology, located in Pyongyang, D.P.R. Korea.

On November 11<sup>th</sup>, 2016, more than a year after the MOU was signed, The United Nations' Security Council approved the Resolution 2123, which suspends scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the DPRK except for medical exchanges unless in specified cases exempted by the 1718 Committee or in all other cases notified to the Committee in advance.



On June 20<sup>th</sup>, 2016, two North Korean students ( [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] ) had already graduated from [REDACTED]'s International MBA.

The Security Council Resolution was introduced in the Brazilian legal system through Presidential Decree No. 9,033, dated April 19<sup>th</sup>, 2017. By that time, two other North Korean students had already started their MBA studies at [REDACTED] ( [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] , the two students mentioned in the letter).

The two students were already in Brazil and had started their studies at [REDACTED] before the Decree was in force and were allowed to complete the MBA. Once they were already living in Brazil, spent money and efforts to adapt to a new culture, and had not violated any rule, and the Decree was not in force, the retroaction of the rule could not harm them.

In view of this, [REDACTED] did not notify the Committee in advance, as the Resolution was not in force in the Brazilian legal system. To clarify, [REDACTED] has not maintained academic relations of any nature with Graduate School of Pyongyang University of Science & Technology, or any other DPRK institution, since the Decree No. 9,033/2017 came into effect.

Furthermore, we would like to point out that all the classes taken by the North Korean students are related to the field of business and administration and are not associated to any of the fields that could contribute to the DPRK nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems, in accordance with paragraph 17 of The United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2270 (2016) and paragraph 10 of 2321 (2016).

In this regard, we would like to respond the questions posed by the Panel:

- 1) **Any confirmation of the information in Annex 1. Have these named students from PUST participated in graduate studies of any sort at [REDACTED]?**

We confirm that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have graduated from [REDACTED]'s International MBA. They were enrolled at [REDACTED] from March 13<sup>th</sup>, 2017 to August 28<sup>th</sup>, 2018.

Two other students had already graduated from the same program, on June 20<sup>th</sup>, 2016, before the Security Council Resolution 2321 (2016) came into existence. Their names are [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

- 2) **Information on the current status of any academic exchanges between [REDACTED] and PUST. How many PUST students or academics have studied at or visited [REDACTED] since 2016?**

[REDACTED] currently has no academic relationship of any kind with Graduate School of Pyongyang University of Science & Technology, or any other DPRK institution.

- 3) **Are there other DPRK students or academics currently studying or involved in research at [REDACTED], which could be considered as falling under the paragraph 11 of the resolution 2321(2016) mentioned above? If so, please provide names, any academic affiliation in DPRK, course and thesis titles, the period of affiliation with the University and details about these individuals' source(s) of income whilst in Brazil, including sponsorship or scholarships (if applicable);**

There are no other DPRK students or academics currently studying or involved in research at [REDACTED].

- 4) **Information on any preventive measures taken by [REDACTED] to determine that any scientific or technical studies undertaken by any DPRK students or academics would not contribute to the DPRK's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, ballistic missile-related or other WMD programmes; and**

[REDACTED]'s courses do not address any issue or matter that could contribute to DPRK proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, ballistic missile-related or other weapon of destruction programs.

[REDACTED] is a business school, teaches subjects only related to the field of Business and Administration.

- 5) **Information about their immigration (departure) after they received Masters (if applicable).**

[REDACTED] has no information on the immigration (departure) of its alumni.

We remain at your disposal for any further clarification.

Yours faithfully,

Professor [REDACTED]  
President of [REDACTED]

Annexes:

1. Information about DPRK students:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

*Source:* Panel, redacted by the Panel.

## Annex 13: Joint studies of DPRK scholars with MBI

### 1) List of papers

No	Title and we reference	Journal or source of information	Authors
1	Deep subwavelength flow-resonant modes in a waveguide-coupled plasmonic nanocavity	<i>Physical Review B</i> Volume 101, Issue 24 15 June 2020 <a href="https://journals.aps.org/prb/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevB.101.245420">https://journals.aps.org/prb/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevB.101.245420</a>	<u>Pae Ji-Song</u> <u>Im Song-Jin</u> <u>Song Kil-Song</u> <u>Ri Chol-Song</u> <u>Ho Kum-Song</u> <u>Han Yong-Ha</u>
2	Nanoscale magnetization and third-order nonlinearity by the plasmon-induced inverse Faraday effect in graphene-covered semiconductors	<i>Physical Review B</i> Volume 100, Issue 15 15 October 2019 <a href="https://journals.aps.org/prb/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevB.100.155404">https://journals.aps.org/prb/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevB.100.155404</a>	<u>Ri Chol-Song</u> <u>Im Song-Jin</u> <u>Pae Ji-Song</u> <u>Ho Kum-Song</u> <u>Han Yong-Ha</u>
3	Magnetoplasmonic isolators based on graphene waveguide ring resonators	<i>Physical Review B</i> Volume 100, Issue 4 15 July 2019 <a href="https://journals.aps.org/prb/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevB.100.041405">https://journals.aps.org/prb/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevB.100.041405</a>	<u>Pae Ji-Song</u> <u>Im Song-Jin</u> <u>Ri Chol-Song</u> <u>Ho Kum-Song</u> <u>Song Gil-Song</u> <u>Han Yong-Ha</u>
4	All-optical magnetization switching by two-frequency pulses using the plasmon-induced inverse Faraday effect in a magneto-plasmonic structure	<i>Physical Review B</i> Volume 99, Issue 4 15 January 2019 <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.04230.pdf">https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.04230.pdf</a>	<u>Im Song-Jin</u> <u>Pae Ji-Song</u> <u>Ri Chol-Song</u> <u>Ho Kum-Song</u>
5	Ultracompact high-contrast magneto-optical disk resonator side-coupled to a plasmonic waveguide and switchable by an external magnetic field	<i>Physical Review B</i> Volume 98, Issue 4 15 July 2018 <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.00539.pdf">https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.00539.pdf</a>	<u>Pae Ji-Song</u> <u>Im Song-Jin</u> <u>Ho Kum-Song</u> <u>Ri Chol-Song</u> <u>Sok-Bong Ro</u>
6	Switchable plasmonic routers controlled by external magnetic fields by using magneto-plasmonic waveguides	<i>Scientific Reports</i> volume 8, Article number: 10584 (2018) 12 July 2018 <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-28567-8#citeas">https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-018-28567-8#citeas</a>	<u>Ho Kum-Song</u> <u>Im Song-Jin</u> <u>Pae Ji-Song</u> <u>Ri Chol-Song</u> <u>Han Yong-Ha</u>
7	Ultrafast Nonlinear Optical Effects of Metal Nanoparticles Composites	Nanoplasmonics - fundamentals and applications IntechOpen (2017) <a href="https://cdn.intechopen.com/pdfs/54303.pdf">https://cdn.intechopen.com/pdfs/54303.pdf</a>	<u>Kim Kwang-Hyon</u>
8	Third-order nonlinearity by the inverse Faraday effect in planar magnetoplasmonic structures	<i>Physical Review B</i> Volume 96, Issue 16 15 October 2017 <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.06961.pdf">https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.06961.pdf</a>	<u>Im Song-Jin</u> <u>Ri Chol-Song</u> <u>Ho Kum-Song</u>
9	Magnetically-tunable cutoff in asymmetric thin metal film plasmonic waveguide	<i>Applied Physics Letters</i> Volume 111, Issue 7 15 August 2017 <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.06255.pdf">https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.06255.pdf</a>	<u>Im Song-Jin</u> <u>Ri Chol-Song</u> <u>Pae Ji-Song</u> <u>Han Yong-Ha</u>

\*DPRK scholars are underlined and bold.

Source: Max-Born Institute, <https://mbi-berlin.de/p/joachimherrmann> (annotated by the Panel).

**2) List of DPRK scholars and their affiliations contributing abovementioned papers**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Department</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>
<b>Im Song-Jin</b>	Department of Physics	Kim Il Sung University
<b>Pae Ji-Song</b>		
<b>Song Kil-Song</b>		
<b>Ri Chol-Song</b>		
<b>Ho Kum-Song</b>		
<b>Han Yong-Ha</b>		
<b>Song Gil-Song</b>		
<b>Ro Sok-Bong</b>		
<b>Kim Kwang-Hyon*</b>	Institute of Lasers Institute of Physics	State Academy of Science

\*The publication of Kim Kwang-Hyon in 2017 showed that he was affiliated with Institute of Lasers, State Academy of Science, but the publication in 2022 showed Institute of Physics, State Academy of Science.

*Source:* The Panel.



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**Annex 14: Assessment by Member States (Excerpt)****[Member State 1]****Assessment of the potential application of laser research conducted by the Max-Born-Institute and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the development of weapons of mass destruction and/or military capabilities**

[MS1] has assembled the opinions of domestic experts on strategic items and nuclear materials. Some of the experts have stated that the nine joint studies listed in Annex 1 of the Panel's letter are expected to be fundamental theories that can be applied to advanced optical sensors, optical communication, inter-satellite communication, surveillance and reconnaissance, and military special-purpose communications systems.

They also indicated that Professor Song-Jin Im's group and Dr. Kwang-Hyon Kim's research are related to the technologies applicable to advanced optical sensors, optical communication, and lasers, which fall under the basic technology research of the dual-use items controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement, such as optical sensors, devices, and lasers.

In addition, all of the experts assessed that the joint studies are unlikely to be applied to uranium enrichment technology. /END/

*Source:* Member State.

**[Member State 2]**

It is not possible this stage to further link the research in the publications to WMD / BM directly as the research is fundamental and generally theoretical and as such is a long way from application.

It would be difficult for us to confirm whether this technology is being used for means in contravention of existing sanctions and we are not currently able to link this research directly to BM development.

We do note the following points.

- Theoretical and fundamental research could have nano-optical applications for advanced processing and optical computing.
- Collaboration with a highly regarded Research Institute such as Max-Born will give a level of credence to the collaborators from DPRK; access to Internationally recognized peer reviewed journals; feedback and tutoring in fundamental and theoretical physics.
- Advanced data processing and high performance computing developments will have military applications including WMD type projects in the future.
- Max -Born collaboration opens up opportunity to translate theoretical to experimental research for nano-optical photonics. The fundamental nature suggests a long term interest for DPRK which would require experimental verification i.e. laboratory based before being scaled and applied.

*Source:* Member State.

## Annex 15: Reply from MBI

MAX-BORN-INSTITUT FÜR NICHTLINEARE OPTIK UND KURZZEITSPEKTROSKOPIE IM FVB E.V.



To: [REDACTED]  
 Coordinator of the Panel of Experts  
 established pursuant to Security Council  
 Resolution 1874 (2009)

Name Prof. [REDACTED]

☎ [REDACTED]  
 email: [REDACTED]

Berlin, 17. Januar 2023

Dear [REDACTED]

on 2.12.2022 we have received your letter on behalf of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874, expressing concern about a number of publications that MBI researchers Dr. [REDACTED] and Dr. [REDACTED] have produced together with DPRK researchers. We comment on your questions as follows:

- 1) Confirmation of, or explanation or comment on, the information contained in the media report in Annex 1. How was this joint research funded?

As correctly reported by Deutsche Welle on November 28th 2022, one of our scientists (Dr. [REDACTED]) has continued a scientific cooperation with DPRK scientists after the UN Security Council resolution of November 2016.

Dr. [REDACTED] continued to work for us beyond his retirement with a reduced job share. He has continued his theoretical research work and has continued publishing papers with his MBI affiliation. As a retiree, he no longer had access to the resources at MBI to perform computational work to test his theoretical ideas. Therefore, he decided to resume his collaboration with a DPRK researcher (Dr. Im) who previously worked with him at MBI from 2008 to 2010. This collaboration led to 7 of the 9 papers that are listed in Annex 2. Paper 7 in Annex 2 is not the result of research that was carried out after 2016, but is an invited review article together with the other DPRK researcher who worked at MBI from 2009 to 2012 (Dr. Kim), as well as with Dr. [REDACTED]'s previous MBI colleague Dr. [REDACTED], who is still working for MBI. Paper 7 had already been submitted at the time of the UN Security Council resolution (on September 21st 2016). Paper 1 is a paper that was published by Dr. Im and co-workers without involvement of Dr. [REDACTED], and was submitted and published after Dr. [REDACTED] terminated his collaboration with DPRK researchers at the request of the MBI Directorate. The MBI Directorate has asked Dr. [REDACTED] to contact the editors of Physical Review B in order to get his name removed from the author list. We note that Dr. Im and Dr. Kim originally came to the MBI on their own initiative via fellowship programs funded by German organizations, independently of any institutional cooperation. These visits were completed in 2012.

Within Germany, the funding for the research work and the publications that were published after the UN Security Council resolution was limited to a modest supplement of Dr.

Prof. Dr. [REDACTED]

Prof. [REDACTED]



Max-Born-Institut, Max-Born-Straße 2 A, D-12489 Berlin, Tel.: +49 30/6392 1505, Fax: +49 30/6392 1519

Seite 2 zum Schreiben vom 17. Januar 2023



██████'s reduced job share. The work in the DPRK was not at any time financially supported by MBI. In particular, no expenses were incurred, e.g. for the computational work. In a few cases, the Institute has covered the open access publication cost within the usual scope of the Institute.

While the existence of the joint publications is correctly described in the Deutsche Welle article, MBI strongly disagrees with the suggestion in the article that MBI has permitted a research collaboration with North-Korea with a dual-use risk. The subject of this cooperation were theoretical calculations and modelling of the physical properties of a special form of optically excited matter, so-called plasmons. These purely theoretical results have not been experimentally tested, nor technologically applied. Like all research results produced at MBI, these are fundamental research results that have been published in the freely accessible scientific literature. In the view of MBI, there is no recognizable dual-use potential of these research results.

We emphasize that MBI conducts basic research for civilian purposes only on the interaction of light with matter, and uses lasers in combination with methods of ultrafast nonlinear spectroscopy and structure research. MBI does not engage in any research with military relevance and does not collaborate with research organizations that pursue military goals. MBI vehemently rejects any suggestion of a possible connection between MBI's research activities and the nuclear weapons program in North-Korea.

- 2) Further information regarding the abovementioned DPRK academics (their specific expertise, their affiliation in DPRK, their contact details);

Because the cooperation related exclusively to the specific publications, the Institute does not have a conclusive overview of the scientists' affiliation within DPRK. As far as we know the specific expertise of Prof. Song Jin Im is on the theory of nonlinear optical phenomena in nano-plasmonic devices, magneto-plasmonic nanostructures, plasmonic waveguides, and the next generation of magnetic memory devices. Prof. Im is currently a professor at the department of physics, Kim Il Sung University, Pyongyang. His e-mail address is ██████@ryongnamsan.edu.kp

The specific expertise of Dr. Kwang-Hyon Kim is topological photonic crystal fibers and systems, material sciences, and solid state physics. He is affiliated with the ██████. We do not have further contact information for him.

- 3) Information on the current status of any wider academic exchanges between your institute and DPRK universities. Have any DPRK students or academics studied at or visited your institute since 2016, and if so, please provide details? What other collaborative academic work has your institute conducted with DPRK academics, institutions or universities?

There have been no academic exchanges of MBI staff with DPRK universities since the Security Council resolution was passed other than listed under (1). There have been no visits from DPRK students or academics to MBI since Dr. Kim left in 2012, and there has been no other collaborative work.



- 4) Please explain the relative scientific contributions of the research teams involved in the co-authored research. What did the DPRK academics contribute (in terms of expertise or experimental data)? What data was provided to the DPRK academics in the process of joint research?

In line with what was described in response to question 1), the collaboration consisted of computational work that was carried out by the DPRK academics on the basis of theoretical ideas put forward by Dr. [REDACTED]. The computational work was conducted using software that was developed by the DPRK academics. No transfer of software or other form of technology transfer took place.

- 5) Details regarding any preventive measures taken by your institute to determine that any scientific or technical studies undertaken by academics at your institute with any DPRK students or academics would not contribute to the DPRK's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, ballistic missile-related or other WMD programmes.

In 2018 MBI has adapted its internal processes with respect to export control regulations and the institute has asked for advice from the German Federal Office for Economic and Export Controls (BAFA), which is responsible for technology transfer and the export of scientific results.

In 2019, the MBI requested Dr. [REDACTED] to end his collaboration with DPRK academics, on the basis of increasing concerns in the MBI Directorate. We emphasize that the MBI did not detect a contribution to the DPRK's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, ballistic missile-related or other WMD programmes within the publications.


Sincerely yours,



Managing Director, Division A, MBI



Director, Division B, MBI



Digital unterschrieben  
von Dr. Nicole Münnich  
Datum: 2023.01.17  
14:24:43 +01'00'

Managing Director FVB


**Annex 16A: From 25 September 2022 to 1 January 2023, between 35 and 45 solid propellant engine SRBMs and at least 8 liquid propellant engine BMs (3 SRBMs, 3 MRBM/IRBMs, 2 ICBMs) were launched**

The first BM launched in this report period, on 25 September, was similar to the new small SLBM previously launched on 7 May 2022 and identified by the DPRK as “*a new-type of submarine-launched ballistic missile*” (see S/2022/668, figure XVII). The ICBM launched on 18 November was named by the DPRK as “*a new-type ICBM Hwasong-17*”. The SRBMs KN-25 launched on 31 December 2022 and 1<sup>st</sup> January 2023 was described by the DPRK’s statements (in italics here and below) as a “*nuclear-capable multiple rocket launcher (MRL) able to strike anywhere in South Korea*”. **In the following list of 24 launch tests, at least twelve made explicit reference to ballistic technology:**

- 1) the 25 September BM test from 06:53 (1 SRBM) was “...*a ballistic missile launching drill under the simulation of loading tactical nuclear warheads at a silo under a reservoir*” (see annex 24A)
- 2) the 28 September BM test from 18:10 (2 SRBMs) was “...*at the ballistic missile launching drill simulating the loading of tactical nuclear warheads which was staged on September 28*”
- 3) the 29 September BM test from 20:48 (2 SRBMs) was “...*various types of tactical ballistic missiles that were launched on September 29 and October 1*”
- 4) the 1 October BM test from 06:45 (2 SRBMs) was “...*various types of tactical ballistic missiles that were launched on September 29 and October 1*”
- 5) the 4 October BM test from 07:23 (1 IRBM) was “...*a new-type ground-to-ground intermediate-range ballistic missile*” (see annex 24B)
- 6) the 6 October BM test from 06:01 (2 SRBMs) was “...*at dawn of October 6, the striking drills of super-large multiple rocket launchers and tactical ballistic missiles*”
- 7) the 9 October BM test from 01:48 (2 SRBMs) was “...*the firing drill of the super-large multiple rocket launchers*”
- 8) a detected BM test on 14 October from 01:49 (1 SRBM) was not specifically reported by the DPRK but 2 long-range cruise missile (LRCM) tests on the same day were, “...*2 LRCM launches expanding nuclear weapons units’ capabilities*”
- 9) a detected BM test on 28 October from 11:59 (2 SRBMs) was not specifically reported by the DPRK
- 10) the 2 November BM test from 06:51 (4 SRBMs) was “...*fired four tactical ballistic missiles loaded with dispersion warheads and underground infiltration warheads*...”
- 11) a detected BM test on 2 November from 08:51 (3 SRBMs and Surface to Air (SA) was not specifically reported by the DPRK (see annex 24C)

- 12) the 2 November BM test from 09:12 (several SRBMs, CM and SA) was not specifically reported by the DPRK, only “...*the KPA fired two strategic cruise missiles*”
- 13) the 2 November BM test from 16:30 (around 6 BMs and SA) was not specifically reported by the DPRK only “... *and in the morning and afternoon the anti-aircraft missile units*” (see annex 24C)
- 14) the 3 November BM test from 07:40 (1 ICBM) was “...*conducted important test-fire of ballistic missile*” (see annex 24D)
- 15) the 3 November BM test from 08:39 (2+ SRBMs) was “... *fired five super-large multiple launch missiles and tactical ballistic missiles*” (see annex 24D)
- 16) the 3 November BM test from 21:34 (3 liquid propellant SRBMs) was “... *five super-large multiple launch missiles and tactical ballistic missiles*” (see annex 24D)
- 17) the 5 November BM test from 11:32 (4 SRBMs) was “...*, the KPA fired again two tactical ballistic missiles loaded with dispersion warheads and two super-large multiple launch missiles*” (see annex 24D)
- 18) the 9 November BM test from 15:31 (2 SRBMs) was not specifically reported by the DPRK
- 19) the 17 November BM test from 10:48 (1 SRBM) was not specifically reported by the DPRK
- 20) the 18 November BM test from 10:14 (1 ICBM) was “...*the DPRK strategic forces test-fired a new-type ICBM on Nov. 18*”; (see annex 24E)
- 21) the 18 December BM test from 11:13 (2 MRBMs) was “...*an important final-stage test for the development of reconnaissance satellite at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground on December 18*”
- 22) the 23 December BM test from 16:32 (2 SRBMs) was not specifically reported by the DPRK
- 23) the 31 December BM test (3 SRBMs KN-25) was “*The three shells of multiple rocket launchers precisely hit a target island ... demonstrating their combat performance*”
- 24) the 1 January BM test from 02:50 (1 SRBM KN-25) was “*At dawn of January 1, 2023, a long-range artillery sub-unit in the western area of the Korean People's Army fired one shell ... with a delivered super-large multiple rocket launcher*”

**Annex 16B: Percentage of ballistic missile launches by missile type and fuel type from 5 May 2019 to 1 January 2023**



Source: The Panel.



## Annex 17: KCNA reporting of Kim Jong Un's January 2021 speech at 8th Party Congress (excerpt related to military objectives)

Source: <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1610502377-14004652/great-programme-for-struggle-leading-korean-style-socialist-construction-to-fresh-victory/?t=1665001072714>

Excerpts relevant to BMs:

*...for possessing the completely new nuclear capabilities aimed at attaining the goal of modernization of the nuclear force...*

*...intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic rockets of Hwasongpho series and submarine-launched and ground-based ballistic rockets of Pukkuksong series were manufactured in our own style*

*...review the already accumulated nuclear technology developed to such a high degree as to miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical ones and to complete the development of a super-large hydrogen bomb ...*

*...was accomplished four years after the line of simultaneously promoting economic construction and nuclear build up was set forth and one year after the Seventh Congress of the Party...*

*...to develop a global strike rocket with more powerful warheads and an improved warhead control system...*

*... new cutting-edge weapon systems were developed in the sector of national defence science ...*

*...developed the super-large MLRS, ...*

*... develop ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons including new-type tactical rockets and intermediate-range cruise missiles ...*

*... achieved such successes as developing world-class anti-air rocket complex, ...*

*... perfecting the guidance technology for multi-warhead rocket at the final stage, finished research into developing warheads of different combat missions including the hypersonic gliding flight warheads for new-type ballistic rockets ...*

*... in the modernization of medium-sized submarine was set correctly ...*

*... that the design of new nuclear-powered submarine was researched ...*

*... means of reconnaissance and detection and military reconnaissance satellite were completed,*

Full text:

Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-style Socialist Construction to Fresh Victory On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at Eighth Congress of WPK

Date: 09/01/2021 | Source: Minju Choson KCNA

*The report detailed the historic course of masterminding a great revolutionary turn for possessing the completely new nuclear capabilities aimed at attaining the goal of modernization of the nuclear force.*

*Under the direct guidance of the Party Central Committee, intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic rockets of Hwasongpho series and submarine-launched and ground-based ballistic rockets of Pukkuksong series were manufactured in our own style to meet their unique operational missions. This gave a clearer*

*description of the status of our state as a nuclear weapons state and enabled it to bolster its powerful and reliable strategic deterrent for coping with any threat by providing a perfect nuclear shield.*

*In the period under review the already accumulated nuclear technology developed to such a high degree as to miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical ones and to complete the development of a super-large hydrogen bomb. By succeeding in the test-fire of ICBM Hwasongpho-15 on November 29, 2017, the Party Central Committee declared with pride to the world the accomplishment of the historic cause of building the national nuclear force and the cause of building a rocket power.*

*The great cause of building the national nuclear force, which was impossible to achieve even in 20 to 30 years in terms of existing formula, was accomplished four years after the line of simultaneously promoting economic construction and nuclear build up was set forth and one year after the Seventh Congress of the Party. This is a miracle unprecedented in history and the exploit of greatest significance in the history of the Korean nation the Seventh Central Committee performed for the Party and revolution, the country and people and posterity.*

*The Party Central Committee achieved new great victories by vigorously leading the struggle for upgrading the nuclear force even after the great historic November event in 2017.*

*Recalling that the Party Central Committee decided to develop a global strike rocket with more powerful warheads and an improved warhead control system and carried out this historic task by relying on the patriotism and loyalty of national defence scientists, the report affirmed that the new-type gigantic rocket on an 11-axis self-propelled launcher displayed during the military parade in celebration of the 75th founding anniversary of the Party fully demonstrated the ultra-modernity and great striking capability of our nuclear force.*

*The accomplishment of the great cause of building the national nuclear force and its continued development constitute a victory of the organizational and leadership abilities of the Party Central Committee headed by Kim Jong Un and a great victory of the national defence scientists and all other Koreans who waged a death-defying struggle with an indomitable faith in independence and valiant spirit.*

*The report reviewed the fact that new cutting-edge weapon systems were developed in the sector of national defence science one after another to cope with the enemy's desperate arms buildup, thus making our state's superiority in military technology an irreversible one and putting its war deterrent and capability of fighting a war on the highest level.*

*The national defence science sector developed the super-large MLRS, a super-power attack weapon the world's weaponry field had never known and proceeded to develop ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons including new-type tactical rockets and intermediate-range cruise missiles whose conventional warheads are the most powerful in the world.*

*This enabled us to gain a reliable edge in military technology.*

*National defence scientists and workers in the munitions industry properly set the orientation of developing main tank of our style following the world's development trends and have begun to enter a new track of development while upgrading production processes. They also achieved such successes as developing world-class anti-air rocket complex, self-propelled gun howitzer and anti-armour weapons.*

*The report also noted that in the period under review the sector of national defence scientific research was conducting research into perfecting the guidance technology for multi-warhead rocket at the final stage, finished research into developing warheads of different combat missions including the hypersonic gliding flight warheads for new-type ballistic rockets and was making preparations for their test manufacture.*

*The report made public with pride that the standard of the goal in the modernization of medium-sized submarine was set correctly and it was remodelled experimentally to open up a bright prospect for remarkably enhancing the existing subsurface operational capabilities of our navy, that the design of new nuclear-powered submarine was researched and was in the stage of final examination and the designing of various electronic weapons, unmanned striking equipment, means of reconnaissance and detection and military reconnaissance satellite were completed, and that other achievements were made in national defence research of gigantic significance in developing the People's Army into a powerful one with the strongest military muscle in the world.*

*The report evaluated that the bold leap forward brought about in the national defence science and munitions industry made sure that the country ranked high in the world in terms of defence capabilities, and, at the same time, it was of great significance in realizing the strategic plan of the Party Central Committee for developing the overall Korean revolution.*

*The report said that a great advance was made in the work of turning the People's Army into elite forces in the period under review.*

**Annex 18: Kim Jong Un's speech at a military parade held in celebration of 90<sup>th</sup> founding anniversary of KPA, 25 April 2022**

*"... but our nukes can never be confined to the single mission of war deterrent even at a time when a situation we are not desirous of at all is created on this land..."; "... if any forces try to violate the fundamental interests of our state, our nuclear forces will have to decisively accomplish its unexpected second mission..."*

Source: <http://kcna.kp/kp/article/q/e30da1bef4848c57353068fea9c7860f.kcmsf>

Excerpt relevant to the BMs:

*In particular, the nuclear forces, the symbol of our national strength and the core of our military power, should be strengthened in terms of both quality and scale, so that they can perform nuclear combat capabilities in any situations of warfare, according to purposes and missions of different operations and by various means...*

*To cope with the rapidly-changing political and military situations and all the possible crises of the future, we will advance faster and more dynamically along the road of building up the self-defensive and modern armed forces, which we have followed unwaveringly, and, especially, will continue to take measures for further developing the nuclear forces of our state at the fastest possible speed.*

*The fundamental mission of our nuclear forces is to deter a war, but our nukes can never be confined to the single mission of war deterrent even at a time when a situation we are not desirous of at all is created on this land.*

*If any forces try to violate the fundamental interests of our state, our nuclear forces will have to decisively accomplish its unexpected second mission.*

*The nuclear forces of our Republic should be fully prepared to fulfil their responsible mission and put their unique deterrent in motion at any time.*

Full text :



**Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Speech at Military Parade Held in Celebration of 90th Founding Anniversary of KPRA**

Pyongyang, April 26 (KCNA) -- The respected Comrade

Kim Jong Un made a speech at the military parade held in celebration of the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army (KPRA) on April 25, Juche 111 (2022).

The following is the full text of the speech:

All the brave officers and men of the armed forces of our Democratic People's Republic of Korea,  
Officers and men of the units participating in the military parade,



*Comrade war veterans, exemplary soldiers and merited persons invited to this square of celebration,*

*Esteemed Pyongyang citizens,*

*Dear comrades,*

*Today we are holding a grand military parade in celebration of an anniversary, significant and glorious for our great Party, state and people.*

*At this moment overflowing with the glory of the long history of our army building, we are all here filled with a great pride in having the armed forces that firmly defend the Party, the revolution, the country and the people and reliably guarantee peace and stability.*

*Seeing the dependable elite units massed in this Kim Il Sung Square with their victorious colours and feeling, through them, the level of the modern character of the armed forces of our Republic, all the people across the country will realize once again the profound and great significance the birth of their country's first genuine armed forces 90 years ago had in the history of our revolution and nation and will have in the future development of our state and people.*

*The founding of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army was an event of national significance that declared a death-defying resistance against imperialism under the unfurled banner of winning national liberation and independence by our own efforts, as well as a historic event that ushered in a new era of the Juche revolution that relies on powerful revolutionary armed forces.*

*The major meaning of this event is not confined only to the fact that our people, who were forced to live a pitiable life in the turmoil of history, could have their own national army and the hope of their revival; it also lies in the fact that the event declared at home and abroad the steadfast idea of anti-imperialist revolution of the Korean revolutionaries to settle accounts to the end and by force of arms with those who infringed upon the dignity and sovereignty of our nation and their unyielding will to win the people's freedom and liberation and the revolution's victory without fail by the internal forces.*

*History has clearly proved that this determination and will the Korean revolutionaries opted for to carve out the destiny and future of their people was absolutely correct.*

*The revolutionary weapons the fine sons and daughters of our people held aloft in the forests of Paektu were an expression of the soaring spirit of independence of the Korean nation, their hope and the great banner of their unity, as well as the force that loaded the mettle of self-dependence and Herculean strength in the tear-stained fists of the Korean people.*

*Thanks to these armed ranks, a far-reaching plan of the Korean revolution was matured, the unyielding spirit and formidable strength with which to prevail over the imperialist tyranny were nurtured, and the great traditions, basic and everlasting in the development of our revolution, were created.*

*The ideology, faith and traditions, which our revolutionary army cherished and succeeded from the outset of its founding, constituted the basis of the spiritual strength and ever-victorious guarantee that made it possible to display an undying heroic and self-sacrificing spirit in defending the Party, the revolution, the territory and the people in the fiercest-ever anti-imperialist confrontation, in the first line of grim class struggle and in the ever-changing circumstances of history, mindful of its intrinsic revolutionary and class nature and mission. This army achieved the great cause of the country's liberation and nation's revival through an unprecedented bloody struggle, repulsed the armed aggression by the US-led allied imperialist forces and defended with honour the sovereignty, dignity and safety of the country with an unrivalled heroic spirit; it has recorded ever-victorious feats while defending the ruling Party, the government, the territory and the people throughout the*

*historical course of the socialist revolution and construction with an ennobling self-sacrificing spirit. Our Party and people regard it as a source of their greatest honour and pride to have such a brave, steely and loyal army.*

*All our priceless gains, plus everything else on this land, are associated, first of all, with the services of our revolutionary army. This we should keep in mind.*

*Not only as the main force for national defence but also as a powerful force for national development, our revolutionary army, true to the Party's intentions, has always made devoted efforts to carry out the ambitious revolutionary undertakings aimed at attaining lofty ideals. By doing so, it has performed such great exploits, which no others could do, in creating a new history of socialist construction and enhancing the dignity and honour of our great state. Regarding it as its lifeblood and top honour to be faithful to the Party, the government and the people, our revolutionary army has kept the lineage of the Korean revolution safe and sound and defended the ideology and cause of the Workers' Party of Korea resolutely, and reliably guaranteed the existence and development of our state and the welfare of our people. Thanks to these exploits of lasting value it has performed over the past 90 years, the annals of the Korean revolution spanning a century are resplendent with victory and glory.*

*We will remember for all ages that our great armed forces have always opened up the way for advance in the vanguard at each of the difficult revolutionary stages and that the glorious and worthwhile victories of our Republic have been won at the cost of the priceless blood and sweat our revolutionary army shed and the noble self-sacrifice it made.*

*The glorious history of our armed forces is embodied in the proud and honourable successors, that is, the officers and men from the elite units of the Republic's armed forces, who will march in fine array across this square of victors, and all other soldiers standing guard at the air, ground and naval posts and performing feats of labour at sites of grand socialist construction throughout the country.*

*Availing myself of this meaningful opportunity, I, on behalf of our Party and government, would like to pay noble tribute to the anti-Japanese revolutionary forerunners and martyrs of the People's Army, who dedicated their precious lives in the struggle for national sovereignty and independence and the people's liberation, for the build-up of the revolutionary armed forces and for the victorious advance of the socialist cause. I also offer hearty congratulations to all the officers and men of the Korean People's Army and all other members of the armed forces of our Republic, who are making a great journey of faithful succession to their revolutionary forerunners.*

*In addition, I would like to offer heartfelt thanks to all the families on this land, which have had their dear husbands and children stand at the forefront of national defence.*

*Comrades,*

*The glorious 90-year journey our revolutionary armed forces have made safeguarding the prosperity and development of the country by force of arms, should be continued for another hundred, nay a thousand years.*

*In the era we are living in now, we should continue to exalt the glory of the powerful army and change to be more powerful at a fast speed incomparable with the past 90 years.*

*In the present world where different forces collide fiercely with one another, a nation's dignity and sovereignty and reliable genuine peace are guaranteed by powerful defence capability that can overpower any enemy.*

*We should continuously grow stronger.*

*There is no satisfaction or accomplishment in cultivating strength for defending ourselves, and, whoever we confront, our military supremacy should be more secure.*

*The revolution demands this, and the future of all the generations to come depends upon this.*

*Our general line of building the revolutionary armed forces is to make the People's Army an ever-victorious army.*

*An ever-victorious army—this must be the eternal name of our People's Army and shine as a priceless honour belonging only to our revolutionary armed forces.*

*The People's Army should hold fast to our Party's orientation and general line of army building and dynamically open up a new phase of its development.*

*To do so, it should define it as the core target to strengthen itself politically and ideologically and make itself strong in military technology, and give a stronger impetus to consolidating itself into an army, strong in ideology and faith, which is absolutely loyal to the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea and boundlessly faithful to its revolutionary cause and into an elite force possessed of courage, capability and self-confidence for responding to any type of war and crisis without any hesitation.*

*Strengthening it politically and ideologically is the main aspect and first strategic task of our building of the army.*

*The political and ideological preparedness of the army and the ideological and spiritual preparedness of the masses of the soldiers, the motive force of the armed forces, are basic in the effort to make our revolutionary army fulfil its mission as the army of the Party, people and class and actively respond to any type of war and crisis.*

*The staunch revolutionary spirit and class awareness of the army we have to further cultivate in the future will play a decisive role in building up the fighting efficiency of our army and defence capabilities of the nation.*

*The unique character of our revolution is that one generation of the revolution is continually replaced by another and we have to face for a long period of time the imperialists who grow ever more ferocious with each passing day. This presents it as a crucial strategic task of army building and anti-imperialist struggle to stoutly carry on the baton of the great revolutionary ideology and spirit which originated in Paektu. When we carry out this task as the core in army building, we will surely be able to maintain and consolidate the qualitative supremacy of our revolutionary armed forces.*

*All the Party organizations and political bodies of the People's Army should continue to stoke up the flames of the ideological revolution and focus their all-out effort on cultivating the revolutionary ideology and spiritual strength of the soldier masses.*

*Regarding it as our top-priority task to develop the People's Army into an army strong in ideology and faith, we should prepare all the service personnel to be ideological guardsmen who fight only in line with the revolutionary ideology and will of the Party Central Committee, who cherish staunch class awareness and indomitable fighting spirit as part of their mental qualities, and who never allow a single misfire or an inch of deviation from the centre of the target designated by the Party Central Committee.*

*We should also strongly push ahead with building it up into an army strong in military technology with a view to radically improving its fighting efficiency.*

*The global trend of military development and rapidly-changing style of warfare at present demand that we modernize our army at a faster rate in terms of military technology.*

*Holding aloft the slogan of modernizing the army, we should strive to the utmost to develop our People's Army into a powerful army equipped with highly advanced military technology.*

*By pressing ahead with the modernization of the military talents training system, we should bring up a larger number of officers who are fully capable of commanding units of different arms and services at all levels. And we should make all the units and sub-units of the army fully ready to carry out any combat missions by modernizing their operation and combat training.*

*The sectors of defence science and munitions industry should continue to develop and deploy for actual combat cutting-edge military hardware of new generations so as to ceaselessly increase the military power of the People's Army.*

*In particular, the nuclear forces, the symbol of our national strength and the core of our military power, should be strengthened in terms of both quality and scale, so that they can perform nuclear combat capabilities in any situations of warfare, according to purposes and missions of different operations and by various means.*

*The prevailing situation demands that more proactive measures be taken to provide a firm and sustained guarantee for the modern character and military technological supremacy of our Republic's armed forces.*

*To cope with the rapidly-changing political and military situations and all the possible crises of the future, we will advance faster and more dynamically along the road of building up the self-defensive and modern armed forces, which we have followed unwaveringly, and, especially, will continue to take measures for further developing the nuclear forces of our state at the fastest possible speed.*

*The fundamental mission of our nuclear forces is to deter a war, but our nukes can never be confined to the single mission of war deterrent even at a time when a situation we are not desirous of at all is created on this land.*

*If any forces try to violate the fundamental interests of our state, our nuclear forces will have to decisively accomplish its unexpected second mission.*

*The nuclear forces of our Republic should be fully prepared to fulfil their responsible mission and put their unique deterrent in motion at any time.*

*Comrades, officers and men of the People's Army,*

*Our armed forces are now fully prepared for any type of war.*

*If any forces attempt military confrontation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, they will be perished.*

*All the armed forces of the DPRK, with the heroic Korean People's Army as their core, should always firmly believe in their cause, march forward valiantly against all challenges filled with confidence, remain faithful to their sacred mission of defending the safety, dignity and happiness of the people, and securely guarantee the development of our socialism by maintaining their invincible military supremacy.*

*All the officers and men of the armed forces of the Republic,*

*As long as your hearts are pulsating with the precious blood and noble spirit of the revolutionary forerunners and as long as the revolutionary armed forces are always standing at the vanguard of the revolution as the embodiment of the ideology and will of the Workers' Party of Korea and of the strength of our state and people, the cause of socialism of our own style will be ever-victorious in the future, too.*



*Commanding officers and men of the KPA and all other armed forces of the DPRK,*

*For the safety and happiness of our great people,*

*For the eternal glory and victory of our great state,*

*Let us fight vigorously.*

*Long live our great revolutionary armed forces!*

*Long live our great country, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea! -0-*

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**Annex 19: Nuclear doctrine, the 7 September 2022 law on the “state policy on the nuclear forces”**

**- Article 2. Constitution of Nuclear forces:** *The nuclear forces of the DPRK shall be composed of different kinds of nuclear warheads, delivery means, a command-and-control system and all the personnel, equipment and facilities for operating and updating that system.*

**- Article 3.3. Command and Control of Nuclear Forces:** *In case the command-and-control system over the state nuclear forces is placed in danger owing to an attack by hostile forces, a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately to destroy the hostile forces including the origin of provocation and the commanding leadership according to the operation plan decided in advance*

**- Article 5.2. Principle of using nuclear weapons:** *The DPRK shall neither threaten non-nuclear weapons states with its nuclear weapons nor use nuclear weapons against them unless they join aggression or attack against the DPRK in collusion with other nuclear weapons states.*

**- Article 6. Conditions of using nuclear weapons:** 6.1: *“In case it is judged that an attack by nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), was launched or is imminent;...”*; 6.2: *“... In case it is judged that a nuclear or non-nuclear attack by hostile forces against the state leadership and the command organization of the state’s nuclear forces was launched or is imminent...”*; 6.3: *“...In case it is judged that a fatal military attack against important strategic objects of the state was launched or is imminent...”*; 6.4: *“In case the need for an operation to prevent an expansion and protraction of war, ...”*; 6.5: *“In other cases where a catastrophic crisis has occurred that threatens the existence of the state and the safety of the people, ...”*

Source:

<http://rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?MTJAMjAyMi0wOS0xMC1OMDAyQDExQDBATnVjbGVhciBGb3JjZXNAMEAx=&and=https://www.nknews.org/pro/full-text-how-north-korea-transformed-its-nuclear-doctrine-law/>

[KCNA](#) [KCNA.kp \(En\)](#)

Source: <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1662687258-950776986/law-on-dprks-policy-on-nuclear-forces-promulgated/>

### *Law on DPRK's Policy on Nuclear Forces Promulgated*

*Date: 09/09/2022 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) | Pyongyang, September 9 (KCNA) -- The law of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK on the state policy on the nuclear forces was promulgated on September 8.*

*According to the law, the DPRK, as a responsible nuclear weapons state, opposes all forms of war including nuclear wars and aspires to build a peaceful world in which the international justice is realized.*

*The nuclear forces of the DPRK are a powerful means for defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and fundamental interests of the state, preventing a war on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia and ensuring the strategic stability of the world.*

*The nuclear posture of the DPRK is guaranteed by the reliable, effective and matured nuclear deterrence, defensive and responsible nuclear forces policy and flexible and purposeful strategy for using nuclear weapon capable of actively coping with any existing and developing nuclear threats in future.*

*The opening of the DPRK's policy on the nuclear forces and legal stipulation of the use of nuclear weapons are aimed to reduce the danger of a nuclear war to the maximum by preventing misjudge among nuclear weapons states and misuse of nuclear weapons.*

*The Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK decides as follows in order to make the nuclear forces, the backbone of the state defence capacity, and discharge their heavy mission in a responsible manner.*

### *Mission of Nuclear Forces*

*The nuclear forces of the DPRK shall be a main force of the state defence which safeguards the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country and the lives and safety of the people from outside military threat, aggression and attack.*

*1) The nuclear forces of the DPRK shall regard it as their main mission to deter a war by making hostile forces have a clear understanding the fact that the military confrontation with the DPRK brings about ruin and give up attempts at aggression and attack.*

*2) The nuclear forces of the DPRK shall carry out an operational mission for repulsing hostile forces' aggression and attack and achieving decisive victory of war in case its deterrence fails.*

### *2. Constitution of Nuclear Forces*

*The nuclear forces of the DPRK shall be composed of different kinds of nuclear warheads, delivery means, command and control system and all the personnel, equipment and facilities for the system's operating and updating.*

### *Command and Control of Nuclear Forces*

*The nuclear forces of the DPRK shall obey the monolithic command of the president of the State Affairs of the DPRK.*

*The president of the State Affairs of the DPRK shall have all decisive powers concerning nuclear weapons.*

*The state nuclear forces command organization composed of members appointed by the president of the State Affairs of the DPRK shall assist the president of the State Affairs of the DPRK in the whole course from decision concerning nuclear weapons to execution.*

*In case the command and control system over the state nuclear forces is placed in danger owing to an attack by hostile forces, a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately to destroy the hostile forces including the starting point of provocation and the command according to the operation plan decided in advance.*

### *Execution of Decision on Use of Nuclear Weapons*

*The nuclear forces of the DPRK shall immediately execute an order of using nuclear weapons.*

### *Principle of Using Nuclear Weapons*

*The DPRK shall regard it as its main principle to use nuclear weapons as the last means in order to cope with outside aggression and attack seriously threatening the security of the country and the people.*

*The DPRK shall neither threaten non-nuclear weapons states with its nuclear weapons nor use nuclear weapons against them unless they join aggression or attack against the DPRK in collusion with other nuclear weapons states.*

#### *Conditions of Using Nuclear Weapons*

*The DPRK can use nuclear weapons in the following cases:*

*In case an attack by nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction was launched or drew near is judged*

*In case a nuclear or non-nuclear attack by hostile forces on the state leadership and the command organization of the state's nuclear forces was launched or drew near is judged*

*In case a fatal military attack against important strategic objects of the state was launched or drew near is judged*

*In case the need for operation for preventing the expansion and protraction of a war and taking the initiative in the war in contingency is inevitably raised.*

*In other case an inevitable situation in which it is compelled to correspond with catastrophic crisis to the existence of the state and safety of the people by only nuclear weapons is created.*

#### *7. Regular readiness of nuclear forces*

*The nuclear forces of the DPRK shall be regularly ready for action so that if an order to use nuclear weapons is issued, it can immediately execute it in any conditions and circumstances.*

#### *8. Safe maintenance, management and protection of nuclear weapons*

*1) The DPRK shall establish a thorough and safe system of storing and managing nuclear weapons to make sure that all the processes such as their storage and management, the assessment of their lifespan and performance and their update and dismantlement are conducted in conformity with administrative and technical regulations and legal procedures, and shall guarantee its implementation.*

*2) The DPRK shall take thorough protective steps for fear that nuclear weapons, technology and equipment concerned, nuclear substances, etc. will leak out.*

#### *9. Qualitative and quantitative increasing and upgrading of nuclear forces*

*1) The DPRK shall constantly assess outside nuclear threats and the change in the posture of international nuclear forces and correspondingly upgrade and beef up its nuclear forces in a qualitative and quantitative way in response to it.*



2) *The DPRK shall regularly update its strategy of using nuclear weapons according to different situations to enable its nuclear forces to reliably perform their mission.*

*10. Non-proliferation*

*The DPRK, as a responsible nuclear weapons state, shall neither deploy nuclear weapons in the territory of other countries nor share them and not transfer nuclear weapons, technology and equipment concerned and weapon-grade nuclear substances.*

*11. Others*

*1) The Law of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK "On further consolidating the position of the self-defensive nuclear weapons state" adopted on April 1, 2013 shall be invalid.*

*2) Relevant organs will take technical measures to execute the law.*

*3) None of the articles of the law are explained to restrain or limit the exercise of the DPRK's just right to self-defense. -0-*

*www.kcna.kp (Juche111.9.9.) -----*

## **Annex 20: Statement on 10 October 2022: Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Military Drills of KPA Units for Operation of Tactical Nukes**

Official DPRK statement on *the operation of tactical nukes staged military drills* from September 25 to October 9

Source: <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1665471853-933771973/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-guides-military-drills-of-kpa-units-for-operation-of-tactical-nukes/>

Excerpts on BMs:

*There took place a ballistic missile launching drill under the simulation of loading tactical nuclear warheads at a silo under a reservoir in the northwestern part of the DPRK at dawn of September 25.*

*The drill was aimed at confirming the order of taking tactical nuclear warheads out and transporting them and of managing them in a rapid and safe way at the time of operation, checking the reliability of the overall management system, making the units acquire launching capabilities of the ballistic missile at the underwater silos and inspecting their rapid response posture.*

*The tactical ballistic missile flew in the air above the set target ... along the appointed orbit, and the reliability of warhead exploding was clearly proved at the set altitude*

*Through the drill, the orientation of building a planned silo beneath the reservoir was confirmed.*

*At the ballistic missile launching drill simulating the loading of tactical nuclear warheads which was staged on September 28 for the purpose of neutralizing the airports in the operation zones of south Korea, the stability of overall system related with the operation of warheads was proved. Various types of tactical ballistic missiles that were launched on September 29 and October 1 hit the set targets with the combination of air explosion and direct precision and dispersion strike, proving the accuracy and might of our weapon systems.*

*In order to cope with the unstable situation of the Korean peninsula, the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea adopted a decision to send more powerful and clear warning to the enemies on October 4 and took a measure to hit the set water area in the Pacific 4 500 kilometers across the Japanese Islands with new-type ground-to-ground intermediate-range ballistic missile.*

*At dawn of October 6, the striking drills of super-large multiple rocket launchers and tactical ballistic missiles for verifying the might of functional warheads were conducted in simulation of striking the enemies' main military command facilities, and the firing drill of the super-large multiple rocket launchers was waged in simulating the strike of the enemies' main ports at dawn of October 9*

*Through seven times of launching drills of the tactical nuclear operation units ...*

Full text:

Date: 10/10/2022 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) |

*Pyongyang, October 10 (KCNA) -- The units of the Korean People's Army (KPA) for the operation of tactical nukes staged military drills from September 25 to October 9 in order to check and assess the war deterrent and nuclear counterattack capability of the country, which comes to be a severe warning to the enemies.*

*The military drills were carried out amid the ongoing dangerous military drills staged by large-scale combined naval forces, including U.S. carrier, Aegis destroyer and nuclear-powered submarine in the waters off the Korean Peninsula.*

*The U.S., based on an agreement to provide more intensive extended deterrence to south Korea against the DPRK's adoption of the law on the policy of state nuclear forces, brought the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier*

*Ronald Reagan task force into the waters off the Korean Peninsula as the first demonstration on September 23 to stage joint naval drills with south Korea ... from September 26 to 29 and joint anti-submarine drills together with Japan and south Korea on September 30.*

*The U.S. dispatched again the nuclear carrier task force in the waters ... to stage combined missile defence exercise on October 6 and naval combined mobile exercise on Oct. 7 and 8, taking a regretful attitude further escalating the tension in the region while openly posing a military threat to the DPRK.*

*In this period, the so-called south Korean military chief let loose such unreasonable and provocative remarks as the "existence" of our power, baldly revealing his will for confrontation.*

*Under such inevitable circumstances, the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), after discussing the politico-military situation prevailing on the Korean Peninsula and its future in the latter half of September, decided to organize military drills under the simulation of an actual war at different levels in order to check and improve the reliability and combat power of our state war deterrence and send a strong military reaction warning to the enemies.*

*Kim Jong Un , general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and chairman of its Central Military Commission, guided the military drills on the spot.*

*Members of the Party Central Military Commission observed the drills.*

*There took place a ballistic missile launching drill under the simulation of loading tactical nuclear warheads at a silo under a reservoir in the northwestern part of the DPRK at dawn of September 25.*

*The drill was aimed at confirming the order of taking tactical nuclear warheads out and transporting them and of managing them in a rapid and safe way at the time of operation, checking the reliability of the overall management system, making the units acquire launching capabilities of the ballistic missile at the underwater silos and inspecting their rapid response posture.*

*The tactical ballistic missile flew in the air above the set target ... along the appointed orbit, and the reliability of warhead exploding was clearly proved at the set altitude.*

*Through the drill, the orientation of building a planned silo beneath the reservoir was confirmed.*

*At the ballistic missile launching drill simulating the loading of tactical nuclear warheads which was staged on September 28 for the purpose of neutralizing the airports in the operation zones of south Korea, the stability of overall system related with the operation of warheads was proved. Various types of tactical ballistic missiles that were launched on September 29 and October 1 hit the set targets with the combination of air explosion and direct precision and dispersion strike, proving the accuracy and might of our weapon systems.*

*In order to cope with the unstable situation of the Korean peninsula, the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea adopted a decision to send more powerful and clear warning to the enemies on October 4 and took a measure to hit the set water area in the Pacific 4 500 kilometers across the Japanese Islands with new-type ground-to-ground intermediate-range ballistic missile.*

*At dawn of October 6, the striking drills of super-large multiple rocket launchers and tactical ballistic missiles for verifying the might of functional warheads were conducted in simulation of striking the enemies' main military command facilities, and the firing drill of the super-large multiple rocket launchers was waged in simulating the strike of the enemies' main ports at dawn of October 9.*

*Through seven times of launching drills of the tactical nuclear operation units, the actuality of the nuclear combat forces of our state and its militant effectiveness and actual war capabilities, which is fully ready to hit and wipe out the set objects at the intended places in the set time, were displayed to the full.*

*The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un highly appreciated that our nuclear combat forces holding an important mission of war deterrent maintains high alert of rapid and correct operation reaction capabilities and nuclear response posture in unexpected situation at any time.*

*He said that he was firmly convinced that he can entrust the paramount military duty of deterring war and holding the initiative in the war to any tactical nuclear operation units through the drills for an actual war. This is the verification of the operation posture of our war deterrent and, at the same time, an occasion that proved the reliability of the thorough preparedness of the state nuclear defence posture, and an obvious warning and clear demonstration of informing the enemies of our nuclear response posture and nuclear attack capabilities, he added.*

*He said that the busy military moves of the enemies are being focused at this time, too, and such the U.S. and the south Korean regime's steady, intentional and irresponsible acts of escalating the tension will only invite our greater reaction, and we are always and strictly watching the situation crisis.*

*Saying that the enemies have still talked about dialogue and negotiation while posing military threats to us, but we have no content for dialogue with the enemies and felt no necessity to do so, he stated that, above all, we should send a clearer signal to the enemies escalating the regional situation by involving the huge armed forces in any time with more powerful and resolute will and action.*

*He added that we would sharply watch the instable security circumstance on the Korean peninsula and all military moves of the enemies which cannot be overlooked and strongly take all military countermeasures if necessary.*

*He expressed belief and conviction that the nuclear combat forces of the DPRK would maintain their strongest nuclear response posture and further strengthen it in every way, well aware of the important duty of defending the dignity, sovereignty and right to existence of our state. -0-*

[www.kcna.kp](http://www.kcna.kp) (Juche111.10.10.)



## Annex 21: Speech at Ceremony of Donating 600mm Super-large Multiple Launch Rocket System

Date: 01/01/2023 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) | <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1672543895-380674944/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-makes-reply-speech-at-ceremony-of-donating-600mm-super-large-multiple-launch-rocket-system/>

Excerpts on BM programme:

***...has donated to our Party, along with the hearts of all the working class in the munitions industry, 30 units of 600mm super-large multiple launch rocket system, ...***

***That military hardware, which the working class in the munitions industry have donated to the Party and revolution today, has a high capability of overcoming complicated terrain conditions, great manoeuvrability and an ability to conduct a surprise and precision launch of multiple rockets in terms of military technology; and as it has south Korea as a whole within the range of strike and is capable of carrying tactical nuclear warhead, it will discharge in future the combat mission of overpowering the enemy as a core, offensive weapon of our armed forces...***

Full text:

Pyongyang, January 1 (KCNA) -- The respected Comrade Kim Jong Un made a reply speech at the ceremony of donating 600mm super-large multiple launch rocket system on December 31, Juche 111 (2022).

*The full text of the reply speech is as follows:*

*Comrades attending this event as representatives of the working class in the munitions industry,*

*Other dear comrades,*

*We have reviewed our struggle in the arduous year of 2022 and risen up for a fresh struggle in the coming new year. At this moment standing in fine array in the yard of the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea for the first time after the founding of this state and our Party are the core means of strike, which our working class in the munitions industry have built through a struggle for increased production of loyalty and which would form the backbone of our armed forces.*

*They are, indeed, a precious and encouraging donation.*

*They are powerful in that they will give a fresh strength and courage to the whole country as it greets a new year, will further amplify the historic significance of the plenary meeting of our Party, and will strike another terror and shock into the enemy.*

*All the working class in the munitions industry and their representatives,*

*The working class, scientists and officials in the defence industry, with indefatigable and limitless energy and sense of mission, fully displayed the infinite revolutionary zeal and mettle and the thoroughgoing and perfect pattern of creation, which are the original features and a symbol of the working class in the munitions*

industry. They thus have made an outstanding contribution to the advance and development of our revolution till the last day of the arduous year of 2022. On behalf of the Central Committee of the Party and the government of the Republic and along with the hearts of all the Party members and other people and soldiers of the People's Army across the country, I extend warm thanks to them.

Indeed, I always cannot but feel solemn and respectful to think about the unparalleled patriotism, faithfulness and creativity of our working class in the munitions industry and their heroic struggle for increased production, and extend warm thanks and thanks and make a deep bow to them.

Comrades, have a look at them.

I really feel invigorated.

I feel unwittingly invigorated to see them. I think this is not merely because I am aware of their value and might but because they are permeated with the patriotism and loyalty of our working class who devote their all to our revolution in the severe struggle and in the face of trials and because I am proud that we have made the unique Juche-type weapons by our own wisdom and efforts.

Having accepted as the demand of the revolution and people, and of their lives, the determination and plan of the Party Central Committee to raise the supremacy of our armed forces on to the highest level without any hesitation and without any letup, the working class in the munitions industry rose up as one with a resolve to build a larger number of 600mm multiple launch rocket system units to be supplied to the People's Army, and launched a campaign of loyalty in late October.

As was the same case when this kind of weapon, which the world had never imagined, was born three years ago, our working class in the munitions industry, this time, too, performed miraculous feats day after day by displaying a super-powerful spirit.

I have heard that the relevant complex, while stepping up the production for attaining the crucial targets in bringing about a revolution in the defence industry which had been set forth at the Eighth Party Congress, assembled one, even two, gigantic units in addition every two days, in the course of which it created a surprising production record.

As it had done in the past, this factory, in the recent struggle for increased production, too, fully demonstrated its tradition and trait of always supporting the Party and promoting the country's prosperity with loyalty and practice, thereby giving birth to these proud crystallizations of patriotism and loyalty.

This year the working class in the munitions industry have worked admirably, indeed.

Unlike any of the earlier years, this year was the most arduous period, and our state was faced with the worst-ever challenges in its history. But the defence industry rose up and supplied as many as 5 000 farm machines to our cooperative farms, which was a strong support to the agricultural front. This is quite inspiring, and that is not all.

*Many munitions factories and enterprises have waged a tenacious struggle, making undaunted efforts in high spirits with a firm determination to defend the Party and revolution by means of unmatched military capabilities, and thus made a tangible contribution to increasing our state's defence capabilities incomparably in 2022, a year full of adversities.*

*I have been immensely grateful to and deeply admiring our working class in the munitions industry for their ardent patriotism and loyalty with which they have worked for the Party and revolution throughout the year. And as we see now, the complex, by working with loyalty and pure conscience up to the last day of the year, has donated to our Party, along with the hearts of all the working class in the munitions industry, 30 units of 600mm super-large multiple launch rocket system, the main weapon of strike that our Party was most desirous of and our army waited for most anxiously.*

*This represents an eye-opening success that has demonstrated to the whole world the unusual patriotism and loyalty, inexhaustible potentialities and revolutionary fighting mettle of our working class in the munitions industry, who have shouldered full responsibility for the development of the military technology of the armed forces of our Republic.*

*We should never forget their historic services and painstaking efforts.*

*Comrades,*

*Our working class in the munitions industry regard the valuable title, revolutionary industry of the Workers' Party of Korea, which cannot be bartered for anything, as a source of their exceptional honour and pride. As we see, they are always honourable and faithful to the cause of the Party and revolution.*

*That we have such a self-supporting defence industry which displays such heroism and possesses characteristic features and absolute strength is something no other country in the world can have or build even though it wants to, and this is a source of pride of prides of our Party.*

*All of our working class in the munitions industry always accept it as their main duty to relieve our Party of its anxiety and worry, prioritize before anybody else the problems of its concern, even though they number thousands or tens of thousands, support it without any conditions attached and carry them out without yielding. They are true revolutionaries and patriots and model heroes.*

*Comrades,*

*That military hardware, which the working class in the munitions industry have donated to the Party and revolution today, has a high capability of overcoming complicated terrain conditions, great manoeuvrability and an ability to conduct a surprise and precision launch of multiple rockets in terms of military technology; and as it has south Korea as a whole within the range of strike and is capable of carrying tactical nuclear warhead, it will discharge in future the combat mission of overpowering the enemy as a core, offensive weapon of our armed forces.*

*As we can hand additional 30 units of offensive military hardware of great importance over to the People's Army units at a time thanks to the devoted struggle of the working class in the munitions industry for increased production, I cannot suppress surging excitement and emotion.*

*Extending warm thanks again to our working class in the munitions industry, I would like to conclude by making an ardent appeal to them.*

*Our Party and the government of our Republic have declared their resolute will to respond with nuke for nuke and an all-out confrontation for an all-out confrontation in order to deal with the enemy's rash acts and reckless moves.*

*Our working class in the munitions industry should surely guarantee this declaration of ours, this staunch will to deal with the enemy, with matchless sword, spear and shield.*

*All the revolutionary fighters in the munitions industry should harden their indomitable faith and militant spirit with which to carry out unto death the grand strategy of defence development set out by the Party Central Committee, and turn out as one and strive in the efforts to produce powerful Juche-type weapons which will absolutely overwhelm the US imperialist aggressive forces and their puppet army.*

*Our revolution and the prevailing situation demand that we, by concentrating our efforts on ensuring continuous development of our defence industry, increase the state's defence capabilities without interruption so as to fully guarantee a reliable and solid security environment for the development of socialism.*

*As long as we have our laudable and trustworthy working class in the munitions industry, who challenge difficulties and impossibilities on the strength of Juche to bring about transformations and leaps, and the great people, who are rallied around the Party with one mind and one will, our Party's cause of building a powerful army is sure to succeed.*

*Full of courageous mettle and due self-assurance, let us all fight with redoubled courage and great confidence to bring earlier even greater victory and glory by launching a more gigantic struggle and working new miracles.*

*The year of 2022 is drawing to a close, an unforgettable year when we have struggled and advanced undauntedly for our revolution, socialism, braving all sorts of trials. At this moment, I extend warm greetings of the new year of 2023 to all of our working class in the munitions industry, defence scientists, officials and their dear families who have provided a distinctive and significant finale to this year through this meaningful donating ceremony.*

*Thank you. -0-*

*www.kcna.kp (Juche112.1.1.)*



## Annex 22: Report on 6th enlarged plenary meeting of 8th WPK Central Committee

Date: 01/01/2023 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) | Source: <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1672543894-200963704/report-on-6th-enlarged-plenary-meeting-of-8th-wpk-central-committee/>

Excerpts related to the BM programme:

***... the official legalization of the DPRK's policy on its nuclear force at the most appropriate and crucial time ...***

***... however, if it fails to deter, it will carry out the second mission, which will not be for defense***

***... a task was raised to develop another ICBM system whose main mission is quick nuclear counterstrike.***

***... it highlights the importance and necessity of a mass-producing of tactical nuclear weapons and calls for an exponential increase of the country's nuclear arsenal, the report said, clarifying the epochal strategy of the development of nuclear force and national defence for 2023 with this as a main orientation.***

***...the National Aerospace Development Administration will launch the first military satellite of the DPRK at the earliest date possible by pushing ahead with the full preparation for a reconnaissance satellite and its vehicle in progress at the final stage, the report pointed out ...***

Full text:

*Pyongyang, January 1 (KCNA) -- The vigorous development of the sacred Korean revolution pioneered and advancing with the most just mission and far-reaching ideal is firmly guaranteed by the wise guidance of the Workers' Party of Korea which sets forth scientific path and clear practical strategy at each period and at every stage and leads to thorough and perfect implementation.*

*Our Party members, working people and service personnel have honorably defended the year 2022 full of all the unprecedented challenges and threats with the indomitable spirit and perseverance peculiar to the great Korean people under the militant banner of the ever-victorious WPK. They are recollecting with great pride and self-confidence the days when they have overcome the most difficult hardships with stubborn wisdom in the gigantic course for a comprehensive development of socialist construction.*

*In 2022 filled with manifold trials, our Party members, working people and officers and men of the People's Army have waged a heroic struggle to defend the validity of their cause and their dignity and honor, thus powerfully demonstrating the potentiality of the DPRK, its spirit and the staunch character of the Korean revolution. And through the process of making remarkable and meaningful progress, they came to believe their own strength more firmly, find out the main links of changes more clearly and map out the road of overall development more vividly.*

*Under the present situation of aspiring after a new advance after successfully overcoming the dangerous and urgent difficulties decisive of the existence of the state, the Korean revolution has persistently faced unavoidable obstacles which can be overcome only by the correct and seasoned leadership of the WPK and the united, powerful and courageous struggle of the Korean people.*

*The Sixth Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the WPK was held at the office building of the Party Central Committee, the supreme headquarters of the revolution, from December 26 to 31, Juche 111 (2022) to clarify the positive and scientific policy orientation for dynamically leading the Korean-*

*style socialism to a fresh change and development by thoroughly applying the idea of independence, self-sustenance and self-reliance, the invariable guidelines of the Korean revolution.*

*Kim Jong Un , general secretary of the WPK, was present at the plenary meeting.*

*When Kim Jong Un appeared at the platform, stormy cheers of "Hurrah!" broke out in the meeting hall.*

*All the participants extended the highest glory to the respected Comrade Kim Jong Un , the great leader of our Party and revolution and the banner of all glories and victories of our state and people, who has confidently led the socialist cause to radical overall development while ushering in a heyday of strengthening the whole Party with his transparent idea of independence and distinguished leadership activities, holding fast to the helm of the Juche revolution.*

*Present there were members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee, members and alternate members of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee and members and alternate members of the WPK Central Committee. Officials of the departments of the Party Central Committee and leading officials of ministries, national institutions, provincial level leadership bodies and cities and counties and major industrial establishments were present as observers.*

*The presidium of the meeting was elected with members of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee.*

*The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK authorized Kim Jong Un to preside over the meeting.*

*Kim Jong Un appreciated that the WPK has pushed ahead with socialist construction more dynamically and extensively by further increasing the enthusiasm of the whole Party and all the people for struggle, while overcoming the difficulties and hardship equivalent to the ten-year struggle since the 8th Congress of the WPK. He said it is the most precious experience that the WPK correctly grasped the peculiarities of the internal and external environment of the Korean revolution during this course and confirmed our revolutionary principle, methodology and orientation of advance.*

*He said that the plenary meeting should serve as an occasion for opening a wide avenue for the development of the state and giving the people greater confidence and optimism by clarifying the path of new leap forward and mapping out the most correct and effective strategy on the basis of the experience, lessons and substantial advance accumulated through the stubborn struggle in 2022.*

*Stressing the need for the members of the leadership body of the Party Central Committee to display a high sense of responsibility and activeness to this end, he declared the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Party Central Committee open.*

*The plenary meeting put the following matters on its agenda items:*

- 1. On review of the implementation of major Party and state policies in 2022 and the work plan for 2023*
- 2. Organizational matter*
- 3. On the fulfillment of the state budget for 2022 and the draft state budget for 2023*
- 4. On strengthening the Party guidance over the revolutionary schools*
- 5. On the five-point line of party building in the new era*

*The plenary meeting unanimously approved the agenda items.*

*The plenary meeting discussed the first agenda item "On review of the implementation of major Party and state policies in 2022 and the work plan for 2023".*

*Kim Jong Un made a report on the first agenda item.*

*In his report he appreciated the successes made in 2022 in which our Party and people have made steady and powerful progress while waging an arduous struggle in firm unity.*

*The remarkable successes and progress have been made in the activities of our Party and its self-strengthening.*

*The Party Central Committee directed the general orientation of the Party activities to the thorough implementation of the decisions of the Fourth and Fifth plenary meetings of the Eighth Party Central Committee, and powerfully led the whole Party and all the people to continuous advance and development with its leading and superb leadership practice in the face of the sudden and severe changes in internal and external situation. It also further refined its leadership ability by thoroughly maintaining its leadership traits of responding courageously and promptly, and developed the united might of the revolutionary ranks onto a remarkably high level.*

*Substantial measures were taken to reinforce the key links in strengthening the Party work throughout the Party and a theory of party building in the new era guaranteeing the eternal future of the Party was established, providing a powerful weapon for the rosy development of the Party.*

*The settlement of the historic task of making the world clearly recognize the strategic position of the DPRK to provide an eternal security through the official legalization of the DPRK's policy on its nuclear force at the most appropriate and crucial time--this is a demonstration of the transparent stand of independence and the idea of self-defence of the WPK, which has greater significance than any political event in the view of steering the change of the world political structure and in the view of putting the track of the development of the state on a new high level.*

*The report analyzed and evaluated the dramatic changes made in developing the defence capabilities and in the struggle against the enemy.*

*It is the great pride of the Party, the DPRK government and the people to make the DPRK's great power more certain and build up powerful and matchless military muscle by making a strenuous struggle for bolstering up the defence capabilities.*

*The basic principle of defending the national interests and raising the national prestige of the WPK was successfully implemented despite the trend of the eventful and changeful international political situation, thus dealing a severe blow at the U.S. imperialists' high-handed and arbitrary practices and policy toward the DPRK in line with the Party's strategic plan and resolution.*

*The report referred to the remarkable progress made in the economic construction and cultural construction in the year 2022.*

*Splendid successes symbolizing the struggle of the year 2022 have been made in the construction of the Hwasong and Ryonpho areas, which were the most important tasks in the field of construction, and projects of great significance in economic growth and improvement of the people's living standard were inaugurated.*

*The drive for implementing the new programme for rural revolution started dynamically, model houses representing the new era of rural development were built in cities and counties across the country and a positive drive was launched to improve economic management and raise the country's ability to cope with crisis and the country's level of civilization.*

*2022 was a time which was by no means meaningless and we have made clear advance, the General Secretary said, adding that certain successes made in all the work of the Party and state are a praiseworthy victory won only by our great people who have displayed the spirit of self-reliance and fortitude and the creativity while stoutly enduring the grave national crises, and the immortal feats to shine long in the history of the country forever.*

*He extended warm thanks to all the Party members and other people across the country on behalf of the Party Central Committee for having firmly defended and implemented the Party policies with the most powerful and courageous struggle unprecedented in history, thus demonstrating the honor, dignity and prestige of the state before the whole world and glorifying the year 2022 as a year of an important milestone in opening a new surging phase of our revolution.*

*Saying that 2023, which is to carry out the tasks of the third year of key significance in implementing the five-year plan set forth at the Eighth Congress of the Party and mark the 70th anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War and the 75th founding anniversary of the Republic, is an important year in the course of our socialist development and the history of the DPRK, he set it as the general direction of new year's work to further expand and develop the all-people struggle to open a new phase in socialist construction so as to lay a decisive guarantee for the fulfillment of the five-year plan.*



*He stressed the need to turn the year 2023 into a year of great turn and change to be remarkably recorded in the course of development of the DPRK by redoubling the fighting spirit displayed in 2022 and making all efforts to attain this year's goal and fulfill the new long-term tasks.*

*The General Secretary indicated all the tasks for ensuring stable development of the national economy and bringing about a substantial change in the improvement of the people's living standard.*

*The report defined the year 2023, which faces the higher goals and huge tasks for accomplishing the five-year plan for national economic development, as a year of making a big stride in the development of the national economy, a year of attaining key goals in increasing production, carrying out the strategy of readjustment and reinforcement and improving the people's living standard, and set it as the main task of economic work to mainly complete the plan for readjustment and reinforcement decided by the Party Congress while pepping up production in all sectors and units.*

*The General Secretary said that the WPK has made strenuous efforts to thoroughly embody the idea of self-sustenance laid down by President Kim Il Sung and eliminate defeatism and mysticism in technology in the whole course of socialist construction since the foundation of the state. He reprimanded that however, the tendency of such old idea still remains among some economic officials as incurable and indigenous diseases with clever disguise.*

*The plenary meeting dealt a resolute and heavy blow to the outdated idea of trying to bargain the principle of self-reliance, not abandoning dependence on the technology of others, and recognized that it is necessary to continue the struggle to wipe out all the remnants of wrong ideas which are obstructing our work under the pretense of objective circumstances.*

*The General Secretary ardently and militantly called upon the workers, scientists and technicians of core sectors for the successful development of the national economy to overcome the difficulties of the revolution by their own efforts, holding high the fighting spirit and banner of the 1960s and 70s once again.*

*The report set as the main targets the economic indices and 12 major goals to be attained by all sectors of the national economy in the new year and specified the ways for attaining them. It stressed the need to focus the operation and guidance on making the implementation of this year's plan lead to the implementation of the medium- and long-term strategy for economic development.*

*Setting it as the first major policy task to build more dwelling houses, a revolution that brings about epochal changes and a project greatly favored by the people, the report stressed the need to build a new street composing of 3 700 flats along with the construction of 10 000 flats of the second stage in the Hwasong area by building up the capital city in a bolder way in the third year of the construction of 50 000 flats in Pyongyang City. It also stressed the need to direct greater efforts to the construction of rural dwelling houses on the basis of the experience accumulated in the year 2022.*

*The report raised it as a policy task to bring about a substantial change in the people's living which the Party attaches most importance to and is pushing forward with much effort, and detailed the important tasks and ways to which the agricultural sector should give priority.*

*It called for finding a realistic and rational work system and method and unconditionally carrying them out in light industry, regional industry, public service, fishery, urban management and other sectors directly related to the people's living so that the policies of the Party and state can reach the people correctly.*

*The report stressed the need to thoroughly adhere to the Party's principle of attaching importance to and prioritizing science and technology, clearly understanding the importance of science and technology playing a locomotive role in developing the national economy and improving the people's living standard, and set forth the orientation of innovation to raise the country's scientific and technological level to a new higher level.*

*It dealt with the principles and ways to amplify the successes and experience gained in education, public health and all other fields for developing socialist culture in the course of the struggle of the year 2022 and to overcome deviations.*

*The General Secretary stressed the need to actively organize and properly lead the socialist patriotic movement and the revolutionary mass movement, the powerful driving force for the prosperity and development of the state.*

*Noting that priority should be paid to firmly adhering to and inheriting the tradition of loyalty peculiar to the Korean revolution and the tradition of patriotism peculiar to our state, and the revolution should be advanced by dint of loyalty and patriotism, he clarified the principled issues arising in actively organizing and conducting various popular patriotic movements to be conducted by the Party and working people's organizations.*

*The report clarified the crucial policy resolution on giving spurs to strengthening the self-defensive capabilities on the basis of the analysis of the present situation of the inter-Korean relations and the external challenges seriously threatening regional peace and security.*

*The U.S. and other hostile forces have recently been hit hard by the rapid development of the military muscle of the DPRK and the promulgation of the peerless nuclear law in the world. Though seized with fear and uneasiness due to the DPRK's toughest counteraction, they are now keen on isolating and stifling the DPRK, unprecedented in human history.*

*In 2022 the U.S. frequently deployed various nuclear strike means in south Korea at the level of constant deployment, increasing the level of military pressure on the DPRK to the maximum. And, at the same time, it is pushing forward the realization of triangular cooperation with Japan and south Korea on a full scale while working hard to establish a new military bloc like Asian version of NATO under the signboard of "tightening alliance".*

*Under the pretext of coping with any "threat", south Korea is hell-bent on imprudent and dangerous arms buildup while busying itself with hostile military moves to pose a confrontational challenge.*

*The prevailing situation calls for making redoubled efforts to overwhelmingly beef up the military muscle to thoroughly guarantee the sovereignty, security and fundamental interests of the Republic in response to the worrying military moves by the U.S. and other hostile forces precisely targeting the DPRK.*

*Stressing the importance of bolstering the nuclear force, the report made clear that our nuclear force considers it as the first mission to deter war and safeguard peace and stability and, however, if it fails to deter, it will carry out the second mission, which will not be for defense.*

*According to the strategy and plan for bolstering up nuclear force of the Party and the DPRK government to firmly safeguard the Republic's absolute dignity, sovereignty and right to existence, a task was raised to develop another ICBM system whose main mission is quick nuclear counterstrike.*

*Now that the south Korean puppet forces who designated the DPRK as their "principal army" and openly trumpet about "preparations for war" have assumed our undoubted enemy, it highlights the importance and necessity of a mass-producing of tactical nuclear weapons and calls for an exponential increase of the country's nuclear arsenal, the report said, clarifying the epochal strategy of the development of nuclear force and national defence for 2023 with this as a main orientation.*

*The National Aerospace Development Administration will launch the first military satellite of the DPRK at the earliest date possible by pushing ahead with the full preparation for a reconnaissance satellite and its vehicle in progress at the final stage, the report pointed out.*

*The report raised it as a major task to boost the political and ideological and military and technical strength of the People's Army, the main force of the national defense capabilities.*

*In accordance with the army-building orientations put forward at the 8th Party Congress and major Party meetings, it is necessary to make the year 2023 marking the 70th anniversary of the victory in the great Fatherland Liberation War and the 60th anniversary of advancement of the slogan "A-match-for-a-hundred" as a year of strengthening the political and ideological might of the armed forces of the Republic in every way and a year of bringing about a change in making preparations to mobilize for war and enhancing the actual war capacity.*

*The report highly appreciated the devoted efforts and feats by the workers, scientists and officials in the munitions industrial sector who creditably carried out the major national defense policy-oriented tasks set forth by the Party through the whole year's super-intense drive for production and scientific research, and laid down next year's goals of developing and producing weapons and equipment.*

*The report made clear the main tasks faced by the sectors in charge of affairs with the south and foreign affairs on the basis of the analysis of the external circumstances of the Korean revolution.*

*As the structure of international relations has been apparently shifted to the "new Cold War" system and a push for multipolarization is further expedited, the report stressed the principles of external work to be thoroughly adhered to by the Party and the DPRK government to raise national prestige, defend national rights and safeguard national interest and to protect regional peace and security.*

*Notably, the report put forward the detailed orientations of responding to the U.S. and other enemy on shifting to the actual action of more reliably and surely cementing our physical force on the principle of struggle against the enemy - might for might, frontal match - and it sounded a note of warning against those*

*countries which started joining the U.S. with its partnership strategy to deprive the DPRK of its sacred dignity and sovereignty.*

*The General Secretary in his report raised the important issues arising in solidifying and developing our state and social system and giving play to its advantages and might.*

*When the socialist legal system has been further improved and strengthened, the original features of our system as the genuine people's country that the law defends the people and the people observe the law can be preserved, Party policies and state policies can be properly implemented and the purity of the revolutionary ranks and the consolidation of the Korean-style socialism can be defended and maintained.*

*Raised in the report were the principled issues arising in readjusting the state management structure system in a practical way and in improving the work attitude and style of officials as required by the changing and developing circumstances and the intensified struggle for socialist construction.*

*The General Secretary indicated important items, orientations of improvement and principled issues for preserving and solidifying the political climate peculiar to the Party and substantially guaranteeing the prospective development of the Party by boosting the combat efficiency of Party organizations at all levels and improving Party work and personnel management in a fundamental manner.*

*A change should be made in the work of all the Party organizations and officials and, in particular, the provincial Party committees, the political staff of relevant regions and their chief secretaries.*

*The General Secretary concluded his three-day report, warmly appealing to the leading officials, who are fully responsible for the work of all fields of the revolution and the destiny of Party policies, to make decisive progress in carrying out their duties to live up to the trust and expectations of the Party and the people with their high sense of loyalty and devoted service at the most critical and responsible time in the history of the development of the Republic and thus powerfully demonstrate to the world how the WPK shouldering the destiny of the country and the people overcomes trials and advance towards a greater victory through new year's struggle.*

*All the participants expressed full support and approval with a big clap to the report which proudly reviewed the all-people struggle of 2022 that made brilliant achievements in the spirit of fortitude and clearly indicated our advance orientations and keys to making a leap forward under the changing revolutionary situation.*

*The General Secretary's passionate report full of confidence in victory that calls for shaping the future of socialist construction in our own way and by our own efforts from A to Z serves as an undying militant banner that makes it possible to further boost the great and inexhaustible strength of single-minded unity between the Party and the people, thus using the absolute power and admirably steering the struggle, dynamically achieve substantial change of development for national prosperity.*

*The propositions put by Premier of the Cabinet Kim Tok Hun to the measures taken for improving and cementing the overall state affairs including the economic field were heard and leading officials of various fields made speeches and written speeches at the meeting.*



*Based on the idea and spirit of the important report by the General Secretary, two-day sectional workshops and consultative meetings took place to establishing, in a scientific and detailed way, a thoroughgoing and correct implementation plan for next year's colossal fighting tasks.*

*The cadres of the Party and the government guided the sectional workshops and consultative meetings.*

*The Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee finally deliberated the opinions on the draft decision, examined the deliberation of the draft state budget for the new year and discussed the issue of taking important measures for the development of major sectors of the national economy.*

*The plenary meeting unanimously adopted the resolution on the first agenda item.*

*The plenary meeting discussed the organizational matter as the second agenda item.*

*Members and alternate members of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee were recalled and by-elected.*

*Jon Sung Guk, Kim Tu Il, Song Yong Gon and Pak Song Chol were by-elected as members of the C.C., WPK from alternate members and Pang Tu Sop, Choe Chol Ung, Pak Myong Son, Ri Yong Sik, Paek Song Guk, Kim Yong Su, Kim Yong Hwan, Ri Ho Rim, Ho Chol Yong, Yu Jin, Sin Ki Chol, Kim Sang Gon and Ri Hye Jong as members of the C.C., WPK.*

*By-elected as alternate members of the C.C., WPK were Kim Yong Sik, Thae Hyong Chol, Kim Chang Sok, Jo Sok Chol, Jong Yong Nam, Ri Song Bom, Kim Phyong Hyon, Won Kyong Mo, Sin Song Guk, An Sung Hak, Ho Chol Ho, Song Myong Hun, Pae Song Guk, Kim Kum Chol, O Chol Su, Choe Son Il, Kim Son Guk, Jang Se Il, Ri Kyong Il, Jon In Chol, Kim Tu Hong, Pak In Gi, Yu Chol U, Kim Song Chol, Choe Tu Yong and Ryang Kil Song.*

*Recalled and by-elected were members and alternate members of the Political Bureau of the C.C., WPK.*

*Pak Su Il was by-elected as member of the Political Bureau of the C.C., WPK and Ju Chang Il, Ri Hi Yong, Kim Su Gil, Kim Sang Gon and Kang Sun Nam as alternate members of the Political Bureau of the C.C., WPK.*

*Dismissed and elected were secretaries of the C.C., WPK.*

*Pak Jong Chon was dismissed and Ri Yong Gil was elected as secretary of the C.C., WPK.*

*Recalled and by-elected were vice-chairmen of the WPK Central Military Commission.*

*Pak Jong Chon was recalled and Ri Yong Gil was by-elected as vice-chairman of the WPK Central Military Commission.*

*Recalled and by-elected were vice-chairmen of the WPK Central Inspection Commission.*

*Kim Sang Gon was by-elected as vice-chairman of the WPK Central Inspection Commission.*

*Dismissed and appointed were department directors and first vice department director of the C.C., WPK.*

*O Il Jong, Kim Sang Gon, Kim Yong Su and Ri Hye Jong were appointed as department directors of the C.C., WPK, and Kim Yong Sik as first vice department director of the C.C., WPK.*

*Dismissed and appointed were chief secretaries of provincial Party committees.*

*Kim Su Gil was appointed as chief secretary of the Pyongyang City Committee of the WPK, Pak Thae Dok as chief secretary of the South Hwanghae Provincial Committee of the WPK and Paek Song Guk as chief secretary of the Kangwon Provincial Committee of the WPK.*

*Dismissed and appointed were cadres of the government organs.*

*Kim Chol Ha was appointed as minister of Chemical Industry, Kim Chang Sok as minister of Light Industry, Jo Sok Chol as chairman of the Quality Control Commission and Ri Yong Sik as director of the Political Bureau of the Cabinet and concurrently chief secretary of its Party committee.*

*Dismissed and appointed were some commanding officers of the armed forces organs.*

*Pak Su Il was appointed as the chief of the Korean People's Army General Staff, Kang Sun Nam as minister of National Defence of the DPRK and Ri Thae Sop as minister of Public Security.*

*In the debate on the third agenda item, the plenary meeting finally deliberated the fulfillment of the state budget for 2022 and the draft state budget for 2023, examined and submitted by the state budget assessment group, and approved to bring them to the 8th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly.*

*The plenary meeting discussed the fourth agenda item "On strengthening the Party guidance over the revolutionary schools" and unanimously approved a relevant resolution.*

*The plenary meeting discussed the fifth agenda item "On the five-point line of party building in the new era".*

*Kim Jong Un made a report on the fifth agenda item.*

*It is an important issue for our Party, which has covered a long ruling course of nearly 80 years with its important mission to be responsible for the destiny and future of the Korean people, to provide powerful guidelines for firmly preserving its revolutionary character and nature and remarkably enhancing its leading and vanguard role on the basis of directly facing up to the changes of the times and examining the Party's reality.*

*The idea and theory of Party building in the new era, originally advanced by the General Secretary, included the revolutionary essence, content and valuable experience of the building of organization, ideology and leadership art which has been accumulated historically, suggested all urgent problems arising in the practice of Party work and solved them scientifically. So, they won full support and approval of the Party officials and members in a few months after their announcement.*

*The work was executed to newly frame the theoretical system on the Party building with political, organizational, ideological, disciplinary and work-style building and enrich and regularize their contents.*

*In particular, the struggle to open up a new era of strengthening the whole Party provided a solid springboard for steadily and stably developing the Party building, including the overall and detailed refinement of the fighting capabilities of the Party organizations at all levels and the intensification of the political awareness and role of the party officials and members.*

*It is a reliable force and a solid foundation for strengthening the party that the Party has its organizations and millions of its members, who are working hard to establish a sound and clear political climate, rallied close around its Central Committee organizationally and ideologically and in moral obligation, and tens of millions of people have absolutely trusted the Party as the ever-victorious guide and the great mother, following it in one mind.*

*It is raised as an appropriate and matured issue to define the five-point orientation for party building in the new era as the Party's line, in accordance with the new requirements of the developing revolution, the continuity of the trend confirmed in the historical course and the scientific and objective confirmation of its feasibility.*

*Expressing the belief that the WPK would be able to constantly maintain and strengthen its character and nature and discharge its sacred mission and responsibility for the people forever if the five-point orientation based on the theory of Party building in the new era is confirmed as the line of the party building of the WPK, the General Secretary courteously proposed to the plenary meeting to formally define the Party building orientation in the new era in which the will of the whole Party is integrated as the Party's line.*

*A resolution on defining the five-point orientation based on the General Secretary's unique idea and theory of party building as the WPK's line of party building in the new era was adopted with unanimous applause.*

*Kim Jong Un made a concluding speech.*

*Our struggle is an unprecedented great cause of not only enduring the difficulties facing it and maintaining itself but advancing toward new changes and development and the overall development of socialist construction.*

*In the new year, too, our struggle will face trials and difficulties which are not easy to overcome, but we should vigorously advance towards a new horizon of development of the state with firm confidence in our cause and faith in our own strength.*

*We will resolutely tide over the challenges and difficulties facing us by our own efforts and accelerate the advance into a new era as planned, decided and scheduled by us, not by any fortunes or help from outside.*

*The General Secretary declared the plenary meeting closed, expressing firm belief that its decisions would lead to steady implementation and substantial changes and a new heyday of the development of the Party and the revolution would be ushered in forever thanks to the high Party spirit, revolutionary spirit and devotion of all the participants.*

*All the participants broke into stormy cheers, looking up to the august General Secretary of the WPK who opened up a broad avenue for strengthening the whole Party and achieving national prosperity and has vigorously guided the work with his rare ideological and theoretical wisdom, seasoned art of leadership and tireless devotion, and solemnly took a pledge of invariable loyalty to the revolutionary cause following the Party Central Committee while setting up their minds full of new confidence and will before the ordeals to be faced again for the great state and people.*

*The Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the WPK, which fully demonstrated the mature leadership ability of our Party confidently leading the socialist cause of Korean style and added fresh courage and vigour to the dynamic advance of our state along the road chosen by itself and to the indomitable fighting spirit of our people, will shine long in the sacred history of the Juche revolution as a significant occasion that made an important turning point peculiar to the victorious path of our revolution.*


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*www.kcna.kp (Juche112.1.1.)*










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## Annex 23: Infrastructure developments of the National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA, KPe.029) at the Sohae (Tongchang-ri) satellite launching ground<sup>9</sup>












<sup>9</sup> See S/2020/840, para. 17 and annex 13, and S/2020/151, para. 198 and annex 62, and the Panel analysis is corroborated by the CSIS report “New Engine Test Stand and Construction Progress at Sohae Satellite Launching Station available” at <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/probable-new-engine-test-stand-and-construction-progress-at-sohae-satellite-launching-station/>.




Sohae Satellite launch station worksites (from north to south)	JULY-AUGUST 2022	SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2022	NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2022
<p><b>New rail warehouse</b> 39° 40' 51" N 124° 42' 49" E and <b>possible problem</b> during the roof construction 39° 40' 51" N 124° 42' 49" E. <b>New building</b> 39° 40' 50" N 124° 42' 53" E at 100m east of this railway warehouse. Cargo railcars visible on 23 October 39° 40' 25" N 124° 42' 33" E at the north of the old rail warehouse 39° 40' 19" N 124° 42' 29" E.</p>	 <p>3 Jul. 2022</p>	 <p>16 Oct. 2022      18 Oct. 2022</p>	 <p>25 Oct. 2022      28 Oct. 2022      2 Dec. 2022</p> <p>2 Dec. 2022</p>
<p>Source:</p>	<p>Planet Labs Inc. 3 July 2022 02:53 UTC</p>	<p>Planet Labs Inc. 16 October 2022 05:49 UTC; 18 October 05:11 UTC</p>	<p>Planet Labs Inc. 25 October 02:00 UTC, 28 October 05:39 UTC, 2 December 2022 04:28 UTC,</p>
<p><b>Ongoing worksites</b> (39° 40' 29" N 124° 42' 44" E) 145m east and another (39° 40' 27" N 124° 42' 36" E) 135 m <b>south of the administration and security headquarters</b> (39° 40' 30" N 124° 42' 39" E) (see S/2020/840 Para. 17. Annex 13 and S/2020/151 para. 198 annex 62) <b>Cargo railcars visible</b> at 39° 40' 25" N 124° 42' 33" E from 7 October to 18 November at the north of the old rail warehouse 39° 40' 19" N 124° 42' 29" E</p>	 <p>3 Aug. 2022</p>	 <p>25 Oct. 2022</p>	 <p>2 Dec. 2022</p>
<p>Source:</p>	<p>Planet Labs Inc. 3 August 2022 05:33 UTC</p>	<p>Planet Labs Inc. 25 October 2022 02:00 UTC</p>	<p>Planet Labs Inc. 2 December 2022 04:28 UTC</p>
<p><b>New building construction</b> (39° 39' 48" N 124° 42' 37" E) 460 m south of the <b>control center</b> (39° 40' 03" N 124° 42' 40" E) which was erased in October and has since been rebuilt and <b>worksite or storage area</b> (39° 39' 51" N 124° 42' 20" E) at the beginning of the road leading to this new house</p>	 <p>3 Jul. 2022</p>	 <p>7 Sep. 2022</p>	 <p>2 Dec. 2022</p>
<p>Source:</p>	<p>Planet Labs Inc. 3 July 2022 02:53 UTC</p>	<p>Planet Labs Inc. 7 September 2022 05:46 UTC</p>	<p>Planet Labs Inc. 2 December 2022 04:28 UTC;</p>



Sohae Satellite launch station worksites (from north to south)	JULY-AUGUST 2022	SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2022	NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2022
<b>Worksite</b> (39° 40' 07" N 124° 42' 33" E) 255 m east of the horizontal processing building (39° 40' 11" N 124° 42' 25" E)	 <p>23 Aug. 2022</p>	 <p>25 Oct. 2022</p>	 <p>2 Dec. 2022</p>
Source:	Planet Labs Inc. 23 August 2022 05:44 UTC;	Planet Labs Inc. 25 October 2022 02:00 UTC	Planet Labs Inc. 2 December 2022 04:28 UTC;
<b>Construction of an underground facility or tunnel</b> (length about 500 m, width 30m) with a <b>north-west entrance</b> at (39° 39' 55" N 124° 43' 00" E) and <b>south-east entrance</b> (39° 39' 44" N 124° 43' 15" E)	 <p>23 Aug. 2022</p>	 <p>25 Oct. 2022</p>	 <p>2 Dec. 2022</p>
Source:	Planet Labs Inc. 23 August 2022 05:44 UTC;	Planet Labs Inc. 25 October 2022 02:00 UTC	Planet Labs Inc. 2 December 2022 04:28 UTC;
<b>New facility</b> 400m northwest of the launch pad such as housing, warehouse (39° 39' 46" N 124° 42' 05" E) and north (39° 39' 43" N 124° 42' 17" E). <b>New facility</b> (39° 39' 38" N 124° 42' 13" E) 150 west of the launch pad (39° 39' 36" N 124° 42' 19" E) and (39° 39' 34" N 124° 42' 17" E) 90 m southwest probably to replace the former fuel and oxidizer buildings located respectively at 39° 39' 35" N 124° 42' 17" E and 39° 39' 34" N 124° 42' 19" E. <b>Two new cylinder tanks (14m diameter) are visible</b> (39° 39' 33" N 124° 42' 13" E possible other fluid tank) 175 m southwest of the launch pad.	 <p>31 Aug. 2022</p>	 <p>25 Oct. 2022</p>	 <p>2 Dec. 2022</p>
Source:	Google Earth 31 Aug. 2022	Planet Labs Inc. 25 October 2022 02:00 UTC;	Planet Labs Inc. 2 December 2022 04:28 UTC;

Sohae Satellite launch station worksites (from north to south)	JULY-AUGUST 2022	SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2022	NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2022
<p>Activity is detected on the launch pad with the storage of equipment and <b>the rail-mounted transfer structure</b> which has moved 50 m (39° 39' 36" N 124° 42' 24" E) to the west from its original position on the side of the processing building (39° 39' 35" N 124° 42' 25" E), its outer walls have been removed, only its internal structure is visible waiting for a new coating. So, <b>the underground rail transfer access</b> is visible, length 20 m and width 4m. <b>Equipment</b> are storage at the base (39° 39' 35" N 124° 42' 22" E) of the <b>umbilical tower</b> (39° 39' 36" N 124° 42' 20" E).</p> <p>Source:</p>	 <p>31 Aug. 2022</p> <p>Google Earth 31 Aug. 2022</p>	 <p>25 Oct. 2022</p> <p>7 Oct. 2022</p> <p>Planet Labs Inc. 7 October 02:57 UTC, 25 October 2022 02:00 UTC;</p>	 <p>2 Dec. 2022</p> <p>+/- 20m</p> <p>Planet Labs Inc. 2 December 2022 04:28 UTC;</p>
<p>according to a MS, <b>the vertical engine test stand</b> (39° 39' 10" N 124° 42' 51" E) was used in summer on 27 August 2022 (MS) The panel corroborated the information because of the trace of burnt grass observable at the back of the vertical test stand after that date.</p> <p>Source:</p>	 <p>24 Aug. 2022</p> <p>6 Sep. 2022</p> <p>Planet Labs Inc. 24 Aug. 2022, 05:35 UTC and 6 Sep. 2022, 05:37 UTC</p>	 <p>6 Sep. 2022</p> <p>Planet Labs Inc. 6 Sep. 2022, UTC</p>	 <p>2 Dec. 2022</p> <p>Planet Labs Inc. 2 December 2022 04:28 UTC;</p>
<p><b>extend of the road</b> from the vertical engine test stand east side 39° 39' 13" N 124° 42' 56" E to a building near the coast 39° 39' 25" N 124° 43' 28" E where a construction site is very active as well as the new road construction</p> <p>Source:</p>	 <p>31 Aug. 2022</p> <p>Google Earth 31 Aug. 2022</p>	 <p>25 Oct. 2022</p> <p>Planet Labs Inc. 25 October 2022 02:00 UTC;</p>	 <p>Maxar 9 Dec. 2022</p>



Sohae Satellite launch station worksites (from north to south)	JULY-AUGUST 2022	SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2022	NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2022
<p>The new horizontal engine test stand (39° 39' 06" N 124° 42' 57" E) under construction until December 2022, was used on <b>16 December 2022</b> to test a <u>wound-filament encased engine</u> (see S/2021/777 Para. 18 and annex 18-2, about the Pukguksong-5) <u>with a tested engine diameter of about 2 m</u>. The KCNA images are consistent to show a possible <u>Thrust Vector Controlling (TVC)</u> technology because a <u>flex-bearing is visible</u> and <u>no visible jet deflector</u>. The presence of Kin Jong Un marked the importance of this stage</p>	 <p>3 Aug. 2022</p>	 <p>14 Nov. 2022</p>	 <p>16 Dec. 2022</p>
<p>Source:</p>	<p>Planet Labs Inc. 3 August 2022 05:33 UTC</p>	<p>Planet Labs Inc. 14 November 2022 05:54 UTC</p>	<p>Planet Labs Inc. 2 December 2022 04:28 UTC; KCNA on 16 Dec. 2022, <a href="https://kcnawatch.org/">https://kcnawatch.org/</a> and KCTV - 5 PM Bulletin <a href="https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/639c7a13ac1fa/">https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/639c7a13ac1fa/</a></p>



**Annex 24: Analysis of the available data on the SRBM/SLBM launched on 25 September 2022 (annex 24A), on the IRBM launched on 4 October 2022 (annex 24B), on SRBMs (or similar) launched on 2 November 2020 (annex 24C), on the ICBM launched on 3 November 2022 (annex 24D), and the ICBM launched on 18 November 2022 (annex 24E).**

**Annex 24A. 25 September 2022 (local time): A SRBM launched in an easterly direction from the Taechon Reservoir (North Pyongan Province). The DPRK claimed that “...a ballistic missile launching drill under the simulation of loading tactical nuclear warheads at a silo under a reservoir”<sup>10</sup> and provided statements and photographs in the following days referring to it.**


1. According to KCNA information and photographs<sup>11</sup> released on 10 October 2022, the SRBM design is based on KN-23 and KN-24 SRBMs, and it is similar to the small SLBM presented at the military parade on 25 April 2022 and last tested on 7 May 2022 from a submarine or a submersible test stand barge (see S/2022/668 Para. 24, Figure 17). From the photos of Kim Jong Un’s location on the reservoir dam to watch the launch, the Panel identified his location a few meters west of the eastern end of the dam (39° 58’ 24” N 125° 31’ 21” E), and the launch area to the north of a line from west (39° 59’ 10” N 125° 31’ 03” E) to east (39° 59’ 11” N 125° 31’ 10” E) (see figure 3).
2. The Panel has identified a possible support area with a mobile pier/platform where the platform or the system used to launch the missile could have been prepared (39° 59’ 08” N 125° 29’ 42” E) located 2.7 kilometres north-west of the dam. Two other sites that could be used for support activities related to this specific BM sub-programme are located near the pier area, respectively 400 m (39° 58’ 58” N 125° 29’ 39” E) and less than 2 km away by road (39° 58’ 50” N 125° 30’ 14” E) (see figure 24A below).
3. The reported flight performance of the SRBM tested are consistent with the statement published by the DPRK. However, the initial phase of the launch presented by the photos taken at the water surface (nevertheless comparable to those taken at sea during the launch of the same SLBM on 19 October 2021, see S/2022/132 annex 20-2) do not make it possible to specify the conditions of ejection and ignition of the missile with regard to the declarations of the DPRK concerning a “*launching drill under the simulation of loading tactical nuclear warheads at a silo under a reservoir*”. The analysis of the metadata excerpt from the EXILE-file of the photos of the published by KCNA taken by “*Kim Hyunok829 on Sept. 25, 2022, with a Canon EOS-1D X Mark II (424029000179)*”<sup>12</sup> confirmed the date of the launch as well as the photo taken from altitude with a Canon EOS-1D X Mark II (364028000060).
4. At the time of the test, Kim Jong Un was on the dam (see para. above) with officials.

<sup>10</sup> Statement on for the operation of **tactical nukes staged military drills** from **September 25 to October 9** <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1665471853-933771973/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-guides-military-drills-of-kpa-units-for-operation-of-tactical-nukes/>; See annex 6 on statement 10 October 2022

<sup>11</sup> <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1665471853-933771973/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-guides-military-drills-of-kpa-units-for-operation-of-tactical-nukes/> and KCNA pictures <https://kcnawatch.org/>

<sup>12</sup> See article from NK NEWS: “What metadata reveals about North Korea’s latest long-range missile test” available at <https://www.nknews.org/pro/what-metadata-reveals-about-north-koreas-latest-long-range-missile-test/>

**Figure 24A: Launch of a SRBM (similar to new small solid-fuel SLBM, presented at the military parade on 25 April 2022)<sup>13</sup> on 25 September 2022 from the surface of area (1.) observed from the dam (5.) and with three possible support sites (2., 3., 4.)**



Source: KCNA 10 October 2022; Maxar 29 September 2022; Planet Labs Inc. 27 September 2022, 01:58 UTC; Google earth 15 September 2021; 18 September 2019 S/2022/668 Figure 17; S/2022/132 Annex 20-2 KCTV, 20 October 2021

<sup>13</sup> It was probably derived from SRBMs KN-23 and KN-24. According to several Member States, two of its most recent possible test launches were on 9 October 2021 and 7 May 2022, when it was declared tested as “a new-type of submarine-launched ballistic missile”. It was unveiled at the “Self-Defence 2021” exhibition on 11 October 2021

**Annex 24B. 4 October 2022, 07:23 (local time): one launch of an IRBM, the DPRK claimed that the BM was “...a new-type ground-to-ground intermediate-range ballistic missile...”**

1. On 4 October 2022, the DPRK conducted its 5<sup>th</sup> test launch since 14 May 2017 of an IRBM which appeared to be an upgraded version of the Hwasong-12 and described as an “*a new-type ground-to-ground intermediate-range ballistic missile*” (Rodong Sinmun 10 Oct. 2022). As with previous test launches, the test was conducted without any forewarning and constituted a safety hazard for vessels and aircraft in the relevant areas. According to two Member States, the missile was launched at 07:23 (local time), from the Mupyong-ri (aka Jonchon) area in Jagang Province in an easterly direction. According to this Member States the flight distance was around 4600 km with a maximum altitude of 1000 km. The flight time was 21 minutes, and the maximum speed of the missile was Mach 17. The missile flew over Aomori prefecture (Japan) at around 7:28 - 7:29 and its possible reentry vehicle splashed down at 07:44 - 07:46 about 3 200 km east from Japan. This was the longest recorded range of a DPRK BM over Japan. Considering the potential threat, the Japanese government issued a public alert. DPRK BMs have now overflown Japan three times, on 29 Aug 2017, 15 Sep 2017, and 4 Oct 2022. (See figure 24B below)
2. According to KCNA photos <sup>14</sup> released on 10 October 2022, the IRBM appeared to be a new version of the Hwasong-12, but without the 4 vernier engines and with a single manoeuvrable encased nozzle. The preparation of the TEL was under the scrutiny of Kim Jong Un at the well-known launch point located by the Panel at 40°36'40.21"N 126°25'33.31"E, the same location as the Hwasong-12 launch on 30 January 2022 and the Hwasong-14 launch on 28 July 2017. As demonstrated in KCNA pictures of the launch, both the slightly modified shroud and the main missile body (that of a single-stage liquid-fuelled missile) closely resembled the single-stage IRBM Hwasong-12 without vernier engines (aka KN-17) tested on 30 January 2022, 29 August and 15 September 2017.<sup>15</sup> The burnt gas had the characteristic elongated plume-like shape and colours of the combustion of a liquid propellant (orange and yellow colours, see S/2017/150 para.36).<sup>16</sup> (See figure 24B below)
3. According to the DPRK this launch test was a result of “*a decision to send more powerful and clear warning to the enemies on October 4 and took a measure to hit the set water area in the Pacific 4 500 kilometers across the Japanese Islands with **new-type ground-to-ground intermediate-range ballistic missile***”.<sup>17</sup> Moreover a stamp was specially produced by North's Korea Stamp Corp to celebrate : “*the new-type ground-to-ground IRBM hit the target waters in the Pacific 4,500 kilometers away across the Japan on Oct. 4 in accordance with the decision made by the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea.*”<sup>18</sup>

<sup>14</sup> KCNA pictures <https://kcnawatch.org/>

<sup>15</sup> Hwasong-12 has been successfully tested on 30 January 2022, 29 August and 15 September 2017, see S/2022/668 Para.24 annex 15; S/2022/132 annex 12; S/2021/777 para.26, S/2019/171 para.174; S/2018/171 para.7, 12; S/2017/742 para.7-13.

<sup>16</sup> According to Jane's Intelligence Review “*North-Korea test multiple long-range missile systems*” available at [https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/BSP\\_8038-JIR](https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/BSP_8038-JIR), “*the published launch photo shows a flame and exhaust colour consistent with hypergolic propellant combination of unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (NTO), as well as a reddish cloud that is typical for nitrogen-based propellants at engine ignition*”

<sup>17</sup> See KCNA and Rodong Sinmun 10 Oct. 2022, available at <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1665469970-543643927/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-guides-military-drills-of-kpa-units-for-operation-of-tactical-nukes/>

<sup>18</sup> See Figure 4 and [www.korstamp.com.kp/stamps/leadership-en-Sp5440.html](http://www.korstamp.com.kp/stamps/leadership-en-Sp5440.html)

4. The reported flight performance of the missiles tested is consistent with the statements and images published by the KCNA on 10 October and 7 November 2022 (see figure 24B).<sup>19</sup> Member States confirmed the similarities identified between this missile and the Hwasong-12, but the images could have been manipulated in particular at the level of the engines with an encased nozzle.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> “...a decision to send more powerful and clear warning to the enemies on **October 4** and took a measure to hit the set water area in the Pacific 4 500 kilometers across the Japanese Islands with new-type **ground-to-ground intermediate-range ballistic missile**” (KCNA 10 October 2022) available at <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1665469970-543643927/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-guides-military-drills-of-kpa-units-for-operation-of-tactical-nukes/>

<sup>20</sup> The maximum length of the IRBM Hwasong-12 is around 17.4 m, its diameter around 1.65 m and its engine derived from the RD-250 (S/2021/211 para.17 and S/2018/171 paras.13-14). Its range was estimated at 4 500 km with a 500kg warhead, (see CSIS “Missile defense project”, available at <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hwasong-12/> and Jane's Defence Weekly January 31, 2022, available [https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/BSP\\_12569-JDW](https://customer.janes.com/Janes/Display/BSP_12569-JDW))



**Figure 24B: Launch test of a possible modified Hwasong-12 IRBM from a 6-wheel TEL on 4 October 2022** from same location as the Hwasong-12 launch test on 30 January 2022, and as the Hwasong-14 launch test on 28 July 2017, at Mupyong-Jonchon 65 factory (40° 36' 41" N 126° 25' 33" E). The stamp produced by the DPRK to celebrate the IRBM flight over Japan and its recorded trajectory.



Source: KCNA 10 October and 7 November 2022. Planet Labs Inc. 12 October 2022, 07:00 UTC


**Annex 24C. 2 November 2022 from 06:51 to 17:10 (local time): More than 7 BMs were launched in addition to a wide range of missiles and projectiles, the DPRK claimed that it “...fired four tactical ballistic missiles loaded with dispersion warheads and underground infiltration warheads at a desert island off the West Sea Barrage...”**

1. On 2 November, the DPRK conducted several BM launches or equivalent from 06:51 to 17:10 (loc.). According to Member States, at 06:51, 4 SRBM; at 08:50 at least 3 SRBMs or equivalent; at 09:12 a mix of SRBM, LRCM and SA missiles; at 13:27 more than 100 artillery shells; and between 16:30 and 17:10 a mix of SRBM and SA missiles were launched. As with previous test launches, the tests were conducted without any forewarning and constituted a safety hazard for vessels and aircraft in the relevant areas.
  - a. 3 or 4 SRBM were launched at 06:51 (local time) from Jeongju and Pihyeon-gun (North Pyongan Province) near the west coast toward the west.
  - b. 2 or 3 SRBM were launched at 08:51 from Wonsan area (in Gangwon-do) near the east coast toward the east and the second toward southeast Ulleungdo landed 26km south of Northern Limit Line (NLL, 57km east of Sokcho and 167km northwest of Ulleung). The flight distance of the SRBMs was between 150 and 200 km with a maximum altitude between 50 and 150 km. On the 6 November, a member state recovered remnant of missile that was a SA-5 with a single stage liquid motor boosted by 4 jettisonable solid propellant boosters. Such SA missile could be also used as ground-to ground missile. (See Figure C.1 below)
  - c. A mix of at least 10 missiles were launched at 09:12 From Nakwon, Jeongpyeong, Sinpo area (in south Hamgyong Province) toward the east and from Oncheon (south Pyongan), Hwajin-ri (South Hwanghae) toward the West (in the sea).
  - d. Less than 6 missiles, as a mix of SA missiles, SRBM and possible LRCM were launched between 16:30 and 17:10 from Sondok and Sinpo areas (eastern coast) toward the east in the Sea and from Kwail and Onchon area toward the west (in the sea). According to a Member State, the flight distance was very short with a maximum altitude 50 km.
2. According to KCNA photos and statement released on 7 November 2022 (see annex 8)<sup>21</sup>, the DPRK’s report on the 06:51 launches are consistent with the Member States reported flights, “in the morning of the first day of the operations, missile units in North Phyongan Province **fired four tactical ballistic missiles loaded with dispersion warheads and underground infiltration warheads** at a desert island off the West Sea Barrage, and in the morning and afternoon the anti-aircraft missile units of the air force on the east and west coastal areas fired 23 ground-to-air missiles while staging an exercise to annihilate air targets at different altitudes and distances” (See figure 24C below)

<sup>21</sup> KCNA Report of General Staff of KPA on Its Military Operations Corresponding to U.S.-South Korea Combined Air Drill <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1667774164-903270856/report-of-general-staff-of-kpa-on-its-military-operations-corresponding-to-u-s-south-korea-combined-air-drill/> and photos from 2 – 5 Nov. 2022 available at <https://kcnawatch.org/>.



Figure 24C: SRBM fired possibly on 2 November 2022



Source: DPRK photographs from 2 – 5 Nov. 2022 available at <https://kcnawatch.org/>; Map: Member State, SA-5 photographs: A Member State, annotated by the Panel


**Annex 24D. 3 November 2022 from 07:40 to 21:42 (local time): The DPRK launched a 7<sup>th</sup> ICBM, the DPRK claimed that “...the KPA conducted important test-fire of ballistic missile...”. From 3 to 17 November, several SRBMs were launched (See annex 25 and table 25)**

1. From 3 to 17 November, the DPRK conducted several BM launches or SA missiles with ballistic trajectories. As with previous test launches, the tests were conducted without any forewarning and constituted a safety hazard for vessels and aircraft in the relevant areas. According to Member States:
  - a. On 3 November, a new ICBM was launched at 07:40 (local time) from Sunan area toward the east, fell into the sea at 08:10. It disappeared from the radar over the sea before going over Japan. (See Para. 23 below)
  - b. 2 or 3 SRBMs were launched at 08:39 to 08:51 (or 08:48) from Kaechon area (South Pyongan province) toward the east, splashed down for the first at 08:47 and the second at 08:55 near the east coast. SRBM KN-25 and KN-23 were likely launched. DPRK claimed to fire “...*five super-large multiple launch missiles and tactical ballistic missiles of various missions and 46 long-range multiple launch missiles* ...” (KCNA 7 November 2022).
  - c. 3 SRBMs with liquid propellant engines (possible SCUD-C) were launched at 21:34, 21:39 and 21:42 from Koksan (north Hwanghae province) toward the east.
  - d. On 5 November, 4 SRBMs were launched between 11:32 and 11:59 from Dongrim (North Pyongan Province) towards the west at an uninhabited island off the West Sea Barrage in the Yellow Sea. SRBM KN-25 and KN-23 were likely launched, DPRK claimed to fire “*On the the fourth day of the operations, the KPA fired again two tactical ballistic missiles loaded with dispersion warheads and two super-large multiple launch missiles at a desert island off the West Sea Barrage.*” (KCNA 7 November 2022).
  - e. On 9 November, 1 or 2 SRBMs were launched at 15:31 from Sukchon (South Pyongan Province) towards the east and struck an uninhabited island off the coast of the North's South Hamgyong Province. SRBM KN-23 and KN-24 were likely launched.
  - f. On 17 November, 1 SRBM was launched at 10:48, from Kangwon province towards the east or northeast and splashed down.
2. According to KCNA photographs <sup>22</sup> released on 7 November, the ICBM launched on 3 November appeared to be a new version of the Hwasong-15 whose number was ㄸ 10101907. Its shroud seemed more elongated, and the proportion between stages (2) appeared to be different from that of earlier Hwasong-15s. (See figure 24D) According to Member States the flight distance was around 750 km with a maximum altitude of around 2000 km. The flight time was 30 minutes, and the maximum speed of the missile was Mach 15. The possible reentry vehicle or debris splashed down at around 08:10. According to a Member State, a possible failure occurred after the second stage separation. Nevertheless, Japan issued evacuation alerts in central prefectures of Miyagi, Yamagata and Niigata at 07:50. (See figure 24D below)

<sup>22</sup> KCNA pictures <https://kcnawatch.org/>.



3. According to the DPRK this launch test was dedicated to “...conducted important test-fire of **ballistic missile** to verify the movement reliability of a special functional warhead paralyzing the operation command system of the enemy.” (KCNA 7 Nov.2022). This statement could help to understand the conditions for second stage separation if there was no failure. This would involve either creating the conditions for a high-altitude nuclear explosion to induce the nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NEMP) or testing a third stage as a vehicle for possible MIRV.
4. The reported flight performance of the missiles tested would not be fully consistent with the statements and images published by the KCNA 7 November 2022. Member States have not yet confirmed the comparison with the Hwasong-15, and the images could have been manipulated in particular at the level of the shroud and warhead.

**Figure 24D: The BM launches from 3 to 17 November 2022**

Source: KCNA 7 November 2022 available at <https://kcnowatch.org/> ; S/2018/171 Para. 10 Figure II launch Hwasong-15 on 29 November 2017

**Annex 24E. 18 November 2022, 10:14 (local time): One launch of ICBM in an easterly direction from the Sunan International Airport. The DPRK claimed that “the DPRK strategic forces test-fired a new-type ICBM on November 18” and provided statements, photographs and videos in the following days referring to it as the “new-type ICBM Hwasong-17”.**

1. On 18 November 2022, the DPRK conducted its 8<sup>th</sup> ICBM-class ballistic missile launch in 2022, identified as a “new type of ICBM Hwasong-17”, according to Member States. In the following days, KCNA released a lot of information on this launch. As was the case for previous test launches, it was conducted without any forewarning and constituted a safety hazard for vessels and aircraft in the relevant areas. The missile was launched at around 10:14 (local time) from a 11-axle TEL in the Pyongyang Sunan International Airport towards the east. According to Member States the flight distance was around 1000 km with a maximum altitude of 6100 km. The flight time was 69 minutes, and the maximum speed of the missile was Mach 22. The possible reentry vehicle splashed down at around 11:23 in the Japan’s exclusive zone (EEZ) (loc) about 200 km west of Oshima Island in the Hokkaido Prefecture. (See annex 25 and table 25)
  
2. According to KCNA information and a KCTV video<sup>23</sup> released afterwards, the new-type Hwasong-17 had the number “ㄸ 09151751” and its TEL the number “321”<sup>24</sup>, after being removed from the aircraft hangar (located by the Panel at 39° 12’ 26” N 125° 39’ 58” E) under the scrutiny of Kim Jong Un accompanied by his daughter between sunrise and about 09:30<sup>25</sup>, it moved to the launch point located by the Panel at 39° 13’ 18” N 125° 40’ 28” E, in the curve between the main southern runway and the northern runway, where the black traces of burnt gas on the tarmac was clearly visible after the launch. The launch sequence was watched by Kim Jong Un, his wife, daughter and other officials from a 57 m high hill located by the panel at 39° 13’ 21” N 125° 39’ 35” E, 1.3 km west of the launch pad. (See figure 24E-1 on the analysis of launch operation)

<sup>23</sup> KCTV footage from 08:02:40 to 08:09:29 on 10 November 2022 - Source: <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/6378e15fccee0/>  
 KCNA pictures <https://kcnawatch.org/>.

<sup>24</sup> The TEL No. 321 was already presented with Hwasong-17 No. ㄸ 03031203 according to 26 March 2022 footage and with Hwasong-17 number ㄸ 7220406 at the 10 October 2020 parade. see annex S/2022/668 Annex 23.2.1.

<sup>25</sup> The analysis of NKnews on the KCNA metadata (EXIF files) of the published photos showed that the ICBM was outside of the hangar after 09:28, see NKnews 23 November 2022 available at <https://www.nknews.org/pro/what-metadata-reveals-about-north-koreas-latest-long-range-missile-test>.



**Figure 24E-1: Analysis of new type of ICBM Hwasong-17 launch operation**

Source: Planet Labs Inc., 2 November 2022, 05:32 UTC, 17 November 2022, 02:02 UTC, and 18 November 2022, 02:01 UTC; Google Earth, 28 August 2022 (tarmac light colour 39°13'18.58"N 125°40'27.33"E); KCNA <https://kcnawatch.org/>; <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/6378e15fcee0/>; <https://kcnawatch.org/>; Google Earth, 22 March 2016 (Hangar).




3. The Sil-li ballistic missile support facility (39° 10' 53" N 125° 39' 50" E) located 2 kilometres south-west of Pyongyang Sunan International Airport (see S/2022/668 Para.21 Annex 17 and S/2020/840 para. 16 annex 12), identified as the site where new Hwasong-17 ICBMs were likely assembled, stored and fueled in 2022, was logically involved in the preparation of this new-type Hwasong-17 ICBM, which could be an improved version of the Hwasong-17, a test of which failed on 16 March 2022.
4. The reported flight performance of the missiles tested is consistent with the statements and images published by the DPRK in KCTV, Rodong Sinmun and KCNA on 19 November and after<sup>26</sup>. Thus, the success of the test was possibly related to the improvement<sup>27</sup> of the Hwasong-17 series when the DPRK described it as *"The test-fire was aimed at checking the reliability of the weapon system and its operation."* (Rodong Sinmun 19 Nov. 2022) (see figure 24E-2 Hwasong-17 story).

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<sup>26</sup> "The missile, launched from the Pyongyang International Airport, flew **999.2 kilometers for 4,135 seconds** at an apogee of **6,040.9km** and landed in the international waters..." (KCNA 19 November 2022).

<sup>27</sup> "In detail one by one, from the appearance of the missile and the issue of selecting an engine, to the self-propelled issue of the launch vehicle and the preparation of the underground launch site, to the method of painting the missile." (KCNA - Rodong Sinmun 27 Nov. 2022).

**Figure 24E-2: A pictorial account of the new type of ICBM Hwasong-17 launch operation on 18 November 2022, from dawn to 10:14 (Loc.) (from KCTV and KCNA images)**



Source: <https://kcnawatch.org/kctv-archive/6378e15fccee0/> , <https://kcnawatch.org/> and <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2022/11/18d.html>

5. The DPRK has acknowledged this missile as its main intercontinental nuclear warhead delivery system, which it described in the following statement: “...*succeeded in developing and perfecting the new-type ICBM Hwasongpho-17, the world’s strongest strategic weapon, and made a wonderful leap forward in the development of the technology of mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles*” (Rodong Sinmun 27 Nov. 2022).
6. At the time of the test preparation (before 10:14 Loc.), Kim Jong Un was accompanied by his daughter to inspect the missile and then joined his wife with her to watch the launch from an observatory located 1.3 km west of the launch pad. The presence of Kim Jong Un’s daughter next to her father at the launch test and at the subsequent post-launch celebration adds to the DPRK’s message about the irreversible and essential nature of the ICBM and nuclear programmes (see figure 24E-3).

#### DPRK entities and individuals involved in the ballistic missile launches

7. The celebrations in the days following the launch featured a Hwasong-17 (No. ㄹ 09151753 on its TEL no. 322<sup>28</sup>) according to the DPRK’s statements and photographs, and was an opportunity to honour those who contribute “*to successful test-fire of New-type ICBM Hwasong-17*”, such as **Kim Jong Sik (KPi.066)**, deputy chief of the Munitions Industry Department of the Workers' Party of Korea and **General Jang Chang Ha (KPi.037)** the chief of the **Academy of National Defense Science(KPe.021)**, “*and leading officials in the national defence scientific research sector and commanding officers of the Red Flag Company*” (Rodong Sinmun 19 Nov 2022) (see figure 24E-3).

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<sup>28</sup> At the military parade 10 Oct.2020 the TEL with number 322 carried a Hwasong-17 number ㄹ 21260405 (S/2022/668, annex 23.2).

Figure 24E-3: Photograph of the TEL No. 321 surrounded by the technical and operational team after the launch of the ICBM on 18 November and photo of another new-type ICBM Hwasong-17, No.

ㄹ 09151753 on the TEL No.322 presented at the event dedicated to honouring contributors of the new-type ICBM Hwasong-17 programme



Source: <https://kcnawatch.org/#gallery-26>



8. Others responsible for the BM programme were also promoted <sup>29</sup> such as:
- Col. General Kang Kyong Ho
  - Lieut. General Choe Pyong Wan
  - Maj. Generals Choe Chol Ung, Kim Sun Chol, Ha Jong Guk, Pang Hyon Chol, Kim Chang Rok, Kim Man Sop, Yu Chol U, Ri Kyong and Ri Yong Sok, and
  - Jo Yong Won, Ri Il Hwan, Jon Hyon Chol, Ri Chung Gil


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<sup>29</sup> KCNA Rodong sinmun\_Order of Chairman of WPK Central Military Commission on 27 November 2022 available at <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1669617249-429162022/order-of-chairman-of-wpk-central-military-commission/>.



**Annex 25: Launch tests from May 2019 to January 2023**


**Table 25: Summary of launches of BMs or missiles combining ballistic and guidance technology with liquid (LP) and solid fuel (SP) propellant engines by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as at 27 January 2023.** (In the table, pale yellow background for solid propellant engine BMs and pale green background for liquid propellant engine BMs; various official DPRK statements are in *italics*)

Tests (all) in the year	Tests solid/liquid since 2018	Tests solid/liquid in the year	Date and time (local)	Reported type	Number of missiles	Reported launch location	Reported distance travelled (km)	Reported apogee (km)	Remark	Korean Central News Agency classification
1	47	1	2023	Solid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and 1 Jan. 2023</u> :  In 2023:	98~108  1					
	15	0	2023	Liquid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and 18 Dec. 2022</u> :  In 2023: (0) IRBM + (0) ICBM + (0) SRBM:	18  0					
1	47	1	1 Jan. 2023 02:50	SRBM KN-25  - SP  Super large rocket system (600mm)	1	From Pyongyang Yongsong area West coast toward east	400 or 350	100	- nuclear-capable multiple rocket launcher (MRL) able to strike anywhere in South Korea  - 30 were recently deployed in the army (KCNA 2 Jan. 2023)	"At dawn of January 1, 2023, a long-range artillery sub-unit in the western area of the Korean People's Army fired one shell towards ... with a delivered <b>super-large multiple rocket launcher</b> [or "...with a newly deployed super-large MRL"]" (KCNA DPRK Today 2 Jan. 2023)


Test s (all) in the year	Tests solid / liquid in the year since 2018	Tests solid/ liquid in the year	Date and time (local)	Reported type	Number of missiles	Reported launch location	Reported distance travelled (km)	Reported apogee (km)	Remark	Korean Central News Agency classification
40	46	26	2022	Solid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and 31 Dec. 2022:</u>	97~107					
				In 2022:	56~66					
	15	14	2022	Liquid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and 18 Dec. 2022:</u>	18					
				In 2022: IRBM (6) + ICBM (8) + SRBM (3):	17					
1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	05 Jan. 2022 08:10 or 08:07	MRBM or SRBM = HGV - LP - "Hypersonic glide vehicle warhead" disclosed at the missile exhibition "Self-Defence 2021" on 11 October 2021, before the 5 January launch test. (KCNA) - Re-entry vehicle seems to be a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) - 6-axle wheeled TEL	1	From an inland area in Jagang Province, eastward into waters off the east coast 	500 or more	50	-The shape of the warhead of the missiles tested on 28 September and on 5 January were different. It is judged to be one of the other types of missiles first unveiled in October.  -The main body of the missile appeared to be made from a liquid propellant booster that resembled, but shorter than, the single-stage Intermediary Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Hwasong-12.  - Max speed between mach 3 and 6  - Final verification but not serial production	the hypersonic gliding warhead "The missile made a 120 km lateral movement from the initial launch azimuth" and "precisely hit a set target 700 km away," (KCNA, 7 Jan. 2022)



2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	11 Jan. 2022	<p>- HSBM or MRBM or SRBM = HGV</p> <p>- LP</p> <p>- “Hypersonic glide vehicle warhead” disclosed at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021, before the 11 January launch test.</p> <p>- Re-entry vehicle seems to be a <b>MaRV</b></p> <p>- 6-axle wheeled TEL</p>	1	<p>From an inland area in Jagang Province, eastward into waters off the east coast</p> 	700	60	<p>- Max speed: Mach 10 (3400m/s).</p> <p>- Possible irregular trajectory including change to the direction of north</p> <p>- The shape of the warhead similar to the that of the BM tested on 5 January.</p> <p>- The main body of the missile appeared to be made from a liquid propellant booster that resembled, but shorter than, the single-stage IRBM Hwasong-12.</p> <p>- Final verification but not serial production</p>	<p>“The hypersonic missile weapon system... ...600 kilometres and 240-kilometre acute circular... hit the target in the waters 1,000 kilometres away” (KCNA, 12 January 2022)</p>
3 <sup>rd</sup>	21 <sup>st</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	14 Jan. 2022	<p>SRBM (KN-23)</p> <p>- SP</p> <p>- It appears to be the same type of SRBM <b>KN-23</b> recently tested twice as a railway-borne missile system on 15 Sept. 2021 and 14 Jan. 2022. It has been displayed at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021</p> <p>- railway car</p>	2	<p>From the Uiju area (Possibly located in the rectangle S-W corner 40°13'10"N124°34'02"E, N-E corner 40°13'06"N124°33'57"E), north-eastward into waters off the east coast and impacting an uninhabited island (possible target location 40°38'50"N129°33'02"E)</p> 	430 or 400	36 or 50	<p>- New railway-borne missile system already tested on 15 Sept'2021</p> <p>- Time between launches: 11 minutes</p> <p>- Max speed: mach 6</p> <p>- Trajectories were comparable in range and manoeuvre to previous tests in 2019-2020, including a detected “pull-up manoeuvre”.</p> <p>- The use of a railway-borne launcher gives DPRK a mode of transport for a variety of missiles which can be rapidly deploy and launch from anywhere on their rail network providing another option for concealing and launching its missile force.</p>	<p>“Firing drill of railway-borne missile Regiment” or “Firing Drill for Inspection of Railway Mobile Missile Regiment” (KCNA, 15 January 2022)</p>

4 <sup>th</sup>	22 <sup>nd</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	17 Jan. 2022	<b>SRBM (KN-24)</b>  08:49 and 08:52 or 08:50 and 08:54  - SP - It appears to be the same type of SRBM KN-24 tested on 21 March 2021 and that has been displayed at the missile exhibition "Self-Defence 2021" on 11 October 2021. It was also called "Hwasong-11 Na" or Hwasong-11 B" NKnews on 18 January 2022 - Track TEL	2	From the area of Pyongyang-Sunan airport area (Possibly located at 39°15' 44"N125°40'34"E trace of burnt gas), north-eastward into waters off the east coast and impacting an uninhabited island (possible target location 40°38' 50"N129°33'02"E")  	300 or 380	50 or 42	- Time between launches: 3 or 4 minutes - Max speed: mach 5 - The possible fired location if confirmed was very close to the location of the Hwasong-12 launch test site on 29 August 2017 (S/2019/171 para. 174 annex 84) - The track TEL chassis may be based on the DPRK Pokpung-ho battle tank chassis (derived from T62 and T72),	"Two tactical guided missiles" "to confirm the weapons system's accuracy" (KCNA, Jan 18, 2022)
5 <sup>th</sup>	23 <sup>rd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	27 Jan. 2022	<b>SRBM (KN-23)</b>  08:00 and 08:05  - SP - displayed at the missile exhibition "Self-Defence 2021" on 11 October 2021 and tested several times since 4 May 2019 - 4-axle wheeled TEL	2	From the area of Hamhung (39°48'45"N127°39'50"E, same launch pad as the one used for the SRBM KN-24 launch test on 10 August 2019) eastward into waters off the east coast and impacting the uninhabited Al-som Island (40°38'50.49"N129°32'55.73"E)	190	20	- Level of operational testing - Time between launches: 5 minutes - Very depressed trajectory - Kim Jong Un was nearby Hamhung inspecting a site for the Ryonpho Vegetable Greenhouse Farm and a possible missile factory, the "February 11 <sup>th</sup> Plant of the Ryongsong machine complex" <sup>30</sup>	"Surface to surface tactical guided missile" "confirming the power of conventional warhead" (Rodong Jan 28, 2022)


<sup>30</sup> SRBM KN-24 launch test on 10 August 2019 (39° 48' 45" N 127° 39' 50" E) - the Ryonpho Vegetable Greenhouse Farm (39°47'23.27"N 127°32'9.36"E) and the "February 11<sup>th</sup> Plant of the Ryongsong machine complex" (39° 55' 10" N 127° 39' 09" E)

6 <sup>th</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	30 Jan. 2022 07:52	- IRBM Hwasong-12 - LP - Identified by MSs as an IRBM sharing characteristics with the Hwasong-12 last tested on 29 August and 15 September 2017 - 6-axle wheeled TEL	1	From same launch pad as for the Hwasong-14 launch on 28 July 2017, Muphyong-ri in Jonchon county (40°36'41"N126°25'33"E) eastward into waters off the east coast after a 30-minute flight 	800 or 790	2 000	- Launched in a lofted orbit and identified through KCNA pictures as the IRBM Hwasong-12 - 800 km is the longest flight of BMs since 2017. <sup>31</sup> - Re-entry vehicle speed: Mach 16 <sup>32</sup> - The main engine still seems to be derived from RD-250 engine with 4 vernier engines. (See S/2018/171, paras. 14-15, figure 3) - It is in the stage of practical use and production whose last test has been described as "operational trial of a Hwasong-12 production unit" (KCNA Jan. 31, 2022) <sup>33</sup> .	"Test-fire of <b>Hwasong 12</b> -type Ground-to-ground Intermediate- and Long-range <b>Ballistic Missile</b> Held" (Rodong Sinmun 31 Jan., 2022)
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<sup>31</sup> Hwasong-12 (aka KN17) theoretical range could be up to 5 000 km. Lofted trajectories in May, August and September 2017 (last test) over the Japanese territory. KCNA reported that DPRK claims "that the Hwasong-12 is meant to serve as a medium-long range strategic ballistic missile with a range of 3,000 – 4,000 km capable of reaching Guam." ... The military plans to attack Guam "through simultaneous fire of four Hwasong-12 intermediate-range strategic ballistic rocket". NKnews on 14 August 2017 available at <https://www.nknews.org/2017/08/kim-jong-un-briefed-on-guam-attack-plan-at-strategic-force-command-kcna/?t=1654210722275>


<sup>32</sup> Article "Hwasong-12 test signals troubling new phase in North Korea's missile programs" NKPRO on 31 January 2022 available at <https://www.nknews.org/pro/hwasong-12-test-signals-troubling-new-phase-in-north-koreas-missile-programs/?t=1654208852886>.

<sup>33</sup> "It confirmed the accuracy, safety and operational effectiveness of the Hwasong-12 weapon system under production". (KCNA Pyongyang Times 31 Jan., 2022) Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said the launch of the "Hwasong-12-type surface-to-surface intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile" was organised by the Academy of Defence Science (ADS), the Second Economic Committee, and other institutions. It added that the launch aimed to verify the Hwasong-12's deployment and accuracy and was conducted by the "highest-angle launch system from the northwestern part of the country" towards the east of the Korean Peninsula.

7 <sup>th</sup>	5 <sup>th</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>	27 Feb. 2022	<p><b>- new ICBM Hwasong-17</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- LP</li> <li>- flying as a suborbital satellite launcher with the flight features of long-range BM</li> <li>- with the RD-250 liquid propellant engines for the first stage.</li> <li>- identified as ICBM-class by several MSs or ICBM-capable platform such as the super large BM “Hwasong-17” (see row “5 March” below)</li> <li>- ICBM Hwasong-17 confirmed by MS</li> </ul>	1	<p>From the Pyongyang Sunan international airport area (launch pad at 39°13'17"N125°40'17"E because of visible trace of burnt gas on the tarmac after the launch) toward the east into waters near the east coast of the DPRK</p> 	300 or 320	600 or 620	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Lofted trajectory</li> <li>- If the images taken from space were genuine, the test launch was intended to test the functions of a reconnaissance satellite. According to MSs, such test was likely probable but, delivery rockets for satellite launches use technologies that are basically identical and compatible with those of ballistic missiles (see row “5 March”)</li> <li>- It may have been launched for the purpose of verifying some function before conducting a launch test at the maximum range of the missile (see row 5 March”)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- no KCNA’s image of the launcher,</li> <li>- “NADA and Academy of Defense Science conducted an important test Sunday under the plan of developing a <b>reconnaissance satellite</b>”<sup>34</sup></li> </ul>
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<sup>34</sup> “Vertical and oblique photographing of a specific area on the ground” with cameras that will be “installed on the reconnaissance satellite.” (Rodong Sinmun and KCNA, 28 February 2022)



8 <sup>th</sup>	6 <sup>th</sup>	5 <sup>th</sup>	5 Mar. 2022	<p><b>- new ICBM Hwasong-17</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- LP</li> <li>- flying as a suborbital satellite launcher with the flight features of long-range BM</li> <li>- with the RD-250 liquid propellant engines for the first stage.</li> <li>- identified as ICBM class by several Member States or as ICBM-capable platform such as the super large BM "Hwasong-17"<sup>35</sup></li> <li>- Several MSs evaluated the BM as the Hwasong-17, and a MS assesses that this may have been launched for the purpose of verifying some function before conducting a launch test at the maximum range of the missile<sup>36</sup></li> <li>- ICBM Hwasong-17 confirmed by MS</li> </ul>	1	<p>From the Pyongyang Sunan international airport area (launch pad at 39° 13' 17" N 125° 40' 18" E clearly visible trace of burnt gas on the tarmac after the launch) toward the east into waters near the east coast of the DPRK after a 40-minute flight.</p> 	270 or 300	560 or 550	<p>- Lofted trajectory</p> <p>- If the images taken from space were genuine, the test launch was intended to test the functions of a reconnaissance satellite. According to MSs, such test was likely probable but, delivery rockets for satellite launches use technologies that are basically identical and compatible with those of ballistic missiles.<sup>37</sup></p> <p>- Kim Jong Un, Deputy Dpt. Director Kim Jong Sik (KPi.066), Dpt. Director Yu Jin of Party Central Committee officials visited the satellite control center (SCC) in the week of the 5 March launch (39°2'33.55"N125°42'35.02"E) probably on 9 March.<sup>38</sup> He visited the Sohae satellite launching ground on probably 10 March.<sup>39</sup></p>	<p>- no KCNA's image of the launcher</p> <p>- "NADA and Academy of Defence Science Conduct Another Important Test for Developing Reconnaissance Satellite"<sup>40</sup></p>
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<sup>35</sup> MSs evaluated the 28 February and 5 March missile as the new ICBM Hwasong-17 shown at the October 2020 Military parade and mounted on a 11-wheeled TEL (S/2022/840, para.17, and S/2021/777, annex 18.2). In particular, the thermal signature of the engines analysis (one, two or four nozzles) could differentiate Hwasong-17 from others.

<sup>36</sup> According to a MS, the 28 February and 5 March missiles have at least the same or longer range compared to ICBM-class missiles previously launched by DPRK (Hwasong-14 and 15), but further details are still under analysis. A MS assesses that the delivery system could have failed partially or that the test could have been aimed at testing a Post Boost Vehicle equipment, aimed at putting satellites into orbit or at developing MIRV capabilities.

<sup>37</sup> E.g. technologies for the separation of multi-stage propelling devices, attitude control and guidance control. MSs add that the space programme could also serve the improvement of DPRK's ICBM capabilities:

1. Suborbital flight tests are not common for a space programme and could point to a dual objective.

2. Recent launches could also have been used to test technologies useful for a MIRV capacity.

3. It is considered likely that the DPRK should soon transform one of its ICBMs (Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15 or Hwasong-17) which have shown propulsive maturity based on the RD-250 boosters into a space launch vehicle, consequently replacing its Unha SLV used in all its most recent space launches. As such, it would constitute yet another violation of UNSCRs.

<sup>38</sup> Rodong Sinmun, 10 March 2022, <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1646883133-164884312/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-inspects-national-aerospace-development-administration-nada/?t=1656438970198>

<sup>39</sup> KCNA, 11 March 2022, <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1646992923-861239615/respected-comrade-kim-jong-un-inspects-sohae-satellite-launching-ground/?t=1656438872679>.


<sup>40</sup> "Through the test, the NADA confirmed the reliability of data transmission and reception system of the satellite, its control command system and various ground-based control systems" (KCNA and Rodong Sinmun, 6 March 2022).

9 <sup>th</sup>	7 <sup>th</sup>	6 <sup>th</sup>	16 Mar. 2022 09:30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- new ICBM Hwasong-17</li> <li>- LP</li> <li>- identified as ICBM-class by several MSs also as the super large BM "Hwasong-17" whose photos and video would be released after the ICBM launch on 24 March</li> <li>- 11-axle wheeled TEL</li> <li>- ICBM Hwasong-17 test failure confirmed by MS</li> </ul>	1	From the Pyongyang Sunan international airport area (launch pad at 39°11'18"N125°40'00"E) same area as two ICBM system tests on 27 Feb. and 5 March possible destruction around 20km altitude	failed	failed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ICBM launch test according to several MS, <b>failed after some seconds flight and exploded at an altitude of less than 20km.</b> 1<sup>st</sup> stage failure</li> <li>- BM's debris fell in or near Pyongyang posing a threat to population; last time a MRBM test has failed was in 2017</li> <li>- Liquid propellant missile is also confirmed because of the typical color of the vapour seen over Pyongyang<sup>41</sup></li> <li>- According to MSs and the Panel images analysis, this BM tested on 16 March 2022 is the ICBM Hwasong-17 that was presented by KCTV on 25 March as the ICBM tested on 24 March. Thus, the 25 March KCTV broadcast incorporated older footage of the launch sequences of the Hwasong-17.</li> <li>- The "Sil-li Ballistic Missile Support Facility", identified by the CSIS and the Panel (see S/2020/840 Para. 16) as being possibly related to the BM programme, is clearly presented as involved in the repeated ICBM testing on 27 February, 5 March, 16 March, 24 March, 4 May, and 25 May 2022.</li> <li>- First ICBM launch test without detaching it from the TEL.</li> <li>- Trucks activity detected after failure</li> </ul>	No statement or information from DPRK (first no-statement in 2022)
-	-	-	20 Mar. 2022 at 7:20	- MLRS with solid propellant engine	4	From South Pyongan Province area toward west coast	?	?	- for about 1 hour <sup>42</sup>	No statement or information from DPRK


<sup>41</sup> A NKnews article on 16 March 2022 reported that "*The images seen by NK News shows a red-tinted ball of smoke at the end of a zig-zagging rocket launch trail in the sky above Pyongyang. Smaller trails appear to extend straight down toward the ground*" available at <https://www.nknews.org/2022/03/north-korea-tries-and-fails-to-launch-another-projectile-jcs/>

Another NKnews article on 16 March 2022 reported that "*the coloring matches [a] dispersed liquid oxidizer, suggesting a liquid-fuel propellant was used. The projectile may have experienced a thruster failure... "reddish-orange smoke" is commonly associated with liquid fuel...*" NKnews 16 March 2022 available at <https://www.nknews.org/2022/03/exclusive-north-korean-projectile-debris-fell-near-pyongyang-after-test-failure/?t=1655215602820>. The orange and yellow colour is often associated with the combustion of liquid fuel propellants, (see S/2017/150 para. 36). However, specific ablative coatings inside an engine's combustion chamber can produce gases whose colours can also be reddish orange

<sup>42</sup> Possible KN-09, 240 mm 300 mm multiple rocket launcher. This rocket test was questioned as a possible violation of the Sept. 2018 inter-Korean military agreement if the launch occurred near the border with South Korea (NKnews 20 Mar., 2022) and Reuters at <https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/nkorea-fires-multiple-rocket-launcher-south-says-2022-03-20/>




10 <sup>th</sup>	8 <sup>th</sup>	7 <sup>th</sup>	24 Mar. 2022 14:34 or 14:33	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- possible modified ICBM <b>Hwasong-15</b></li> <li>- LP</li> <li>- called by the DPRK "<b>Hwasong-17</b>" but rather an upgraded "Hwasong-15" with a lighter payload.<sup>43</sup></li> <li>- 11-axle wheeled TEL (9-axle if Hwasong-15)</li> <li>- ICBM <b>Hwasong-15</b> confirmed by MS</li> </ul>	1	<p>From the Pyongyang Sunan International Airport area same area as the three ICBM system tests on 27 Feb., 5 and 16 March. On 24 March likely from 39° 11' 19" N 125° 40' 01" E, toward the east and splash down at around 15:44 after a 71-minute flight, inside Japan EEZ some 170 km west of Cape Tappi, Oshima Peninsula of Hokkaido.</p> <p>- According to MSs and</p> <p>Panel's analysis, on 25 March the DPRK presented photos and videos of an earlier Hwasong-17 test, such as those of 27 February, 5 March and 16 March but mentioning the 24 March test as the reference.</p> 	1080 or 1100	6200 or 6000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The data recorded and analysed by MSs are considered as the best to date and consistent with the ability of the ICBM to travel over 15,000 km. However, it is identified as modified Hwasong-15 rather than a Hwasong-17- the thermal signature analysis of this launch possibly identified two engine nozzles (Hwasong-15) instead a four-engine nozzle (Hwasong-17) as the photos and video released after the 24 March had shown. Must be confirmed.</li> <li>- According to a MS it appeared to be identical to those launched on 27 Feb. and 5 Mar.</li> <li>- To carry out this deception manoeuvre, the DPRK had to reduce the payload of the Hwasong-15 to achieve a trajectory comparable to that of the more powerful Hwasong-17.</li> <li>- Comparatively, the test of ICBM Hwasong-15 on 29 Nov. 2017 (53-min flight, lofted trajectory, range of 950 km and max altitude of 4 475km, see S/2018/171, tab.1, para.9)</li> <li>- the missile test was officially under the guidance of Kim Jong Un- (KCNA, 25 Mar., 2022)</li> </ul>	<p>"<b>Hwasongpho-17</b>, a new type of intercontinental <b>ballistic missile</b> of the DPRK strategic forces"</p> <p>Flight: 67minutes Altitude: 6248.5km Distance: 1090km (KCNA, 25 March 2022)</p>
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<sup>43</sup> ROK Ministry of Defense stated on 29 March 2022 "Although the projectile fired on March 24 looks like the Hwasong-17 due to the increase in its top altitude and flight time, our assessment is that it is more similar to the Hwasong-15 than the Hwasong-17." See also Yonhap News Agency, available at <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20220329008052325?section=national/defense>.


11 <sup>th</sup>	24 <sup>th</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>	16 Apr. 2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- new SRBM</li> <li>- SP</li> <li>- resembled but smaller than KN-23 and KN-24 and as ground-based version it resembled the new, smaller SLBM launched on 19 October 2022.</li> <li>(Single-stage system) (S/2002/132 annex 20.2)</li> <li>- From a quadruple canister mounted on a small 3-axle wheeled TEL presented at the next military parade on 25 April 2022.</li> </ul>	2	<p>From possibly the Majon beach near the residence of Kim Jong Un at Chakto-dong, same as for SRBM launch tests on 27 January 2022 and 10 August 2019, 39° 48' 45" N 127° 39' 50" E), eastward into waters off the east coast and impacting the uninhabited Island as possible target at 110 km Nan-do Island 40° 18' 50" N 128° 45' 44" E 109 km from launchpad</p>	110	25	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The first time the DPRK has presented an SRBM as a tactical nuclear weapon delivery system.</li> <li>- Max speed mach 4</li> <li>- Flight time 60s</li> <li>- probably level of operational testing</li> <li>- Time between launches: 21 minutes</li> <li>- Also described as Close-Range ballistic Missile (CRBM, range &lt;300km))</li> <li>- Kim Jong Un was accompanied by Kim Jong Sik (KPi.066) <sup>44</sup></li> </ul>	"New-type tactical guided weapon" ... <b>strengthening the effectiveness of tactical nuclear operation.</b> " (Voice of Korea April 17, 2022)
12 <sup>th</sup>	9 <sup>th</sup>	8 <sup>th</sup>	04 May 2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ICBM</li> <li>- LP</li> <li>- with liquid propellant engine.</li> <li>- possible <b>Hwasong-15 or 17</b> launched below its full capacity and on a standard rather than lofted trajectory</li> <li>- ICBM Hwasong-17 confirmed by MS</li> </ul>	1	<p>From the Pyongyang Sunan International Airport area same as the four previous ICBM system tests toward the east and splash down before 12:24 after a less than 21-minute flight</p> <p>- Location: Possibly from 39° 13' 14" N 125° 39' 55" E because of burnt gas trace at the north edge of the main runway.</p> 	470 or 500	780 or 800	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Max speed about mach 11 around 13600 km/h</li> <li>- Medium-resolution satellite imagery showed what appears to be vehicles gathering on or around 30 April and 3 May 3 at Sunan's northern airfield around the same location vehicles were seen through satellite imagery after the failed 17 March test.</li> </ul>	No statement or information from DPRK (second no-statement in 2022)

<sup>44</sup> Deputy Department Director of the Central Committee of the WPK and commanding personnel of the Ministry of National Defence of the DPRK and the commanders of the large combined units of the Korean People's Army, see Voice of Korea, 17 April 2022.



13 <sup>th</sup>	25 <sup>th</sup>	5 <sup>th</sup>	07 May 2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>New SLBM/SRBM</b></li> <li>- SP</li> <li>- Derived from KN-23 (or KN-24); similar to the new small SLBM tested on 19 October 2021 and presented at the Self-defense exhibition and at the military parade on 25 April 2022</li> </ul>	1	<p>From a submarine (8.24 Yongung SSBA) or a submersible test stand barge in the sea at large off the coast of Sinpo toward the east and splash down before 14:25 after a less than 18-minute flight.</p> 	600	60 or 50	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Possibly launched from the 8.24 Yongung SSBA.</li> <li>- Irregular trajectory</li> <li>- 3<sup>rd</sup> SLBM test since 2018</li> </ul>	No statement or information from the DPRK (third no-statement in 2022)
14 <sup>th</sup>	26 <sup>th</sup>	6 <sup>th</sup>	12 May 2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>SRBM</b></li> <li>- SP</li> <li>- probably the <b>KN-25</b> (super large multiple rocket launcher)</li> </ul>	3	<p>From the Pyongyang Sunan International airport area</p> 	360 or 350	90 or 100	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Max speed mach 5</li> <li>- Level of operational testing</li> <li>- Time between launches: almost simultaneous</li> <li>- Possible depressed trajectory needs be confirmed</li> </ul>	No statement or information from the DPRK (fourth no-statement in 2022)
15 <sup>th</sup>	10 <sup>th</sup>	9 <sup>th</sup>	25 May 2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>ICBM</b></li> <li>- LP</li> <li>- <b>Hwasong-17</b> ICBM confirmed by MS</li> <li>- 6<sup>th</sup> ICBM</li> </ul>	1	<p>From the Pyongyang Sunan International Airport area, Location: possibly from 39°13'14"N125°39'55"E because TEL shape was visible 30 minutes before launch time and the cleaning of burnt gas trace at this location was completed.</p> 	360 or 300	540 or 550	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Series of tests point out the frequency and diversity of tests, first time that a liquid and a solid propellant BM are launched at the same time.</li> <li>- The simultaneous launch of several types of systems resembles an operational test to evaluate the operational combination of weapon systems.</li> <li>- Not intercontinental-range flight pattern as on Feb. 27 and March 5 launches possibly to test MIRV or the reconnaissance satellite or the first stage of an ICBM booster<sup>45</sup></li> </ul>	No statement or information from the DPRK (fifth no-statement in 2022)



<sup>45</sup> According to MS and see also <https://www.nknews.org/pro/why-north-korea-launches-long-range-missiles-on-medium-range-trajectories/?t=1670961118886>







16 <sup>th</sup>	27 <sup>th</sup>	7 <sup>th</sup>	25 May 2022	- SRBM  06:37 - SP  06-42 - likely new modified KN-23	2 <sup>46</sup>	From the Pyongyang Sunan International Airport area, toward the east and splash down  Burnt gas trace visible at Sil-li 39°10'52"N125°39'43"E after 28 May 2022 [30 Aug. 2022]	? and 20 and 760 or 60 or 750 50	- Vanished because of suspect failure or irregular orbit with possible depressed trajectory  - 23rd ballistic missile in 2022 <sup>47</sup> , one of the most intensive test campaigns	No statement or information from the DPRK (sixth no-statement in 2022)	
17 <sup>th</sup>	28 <sup>th</sup>	8 <sup>th</sup>	5 June 2022	- SRBM  - SP  9:06 - 4 different SRBM types (probably KN-23, KN-24, KN-25 and new modified KN-23) 9:10 9:15 9:24 9:30 9:41	6=  1 1 1 1 1 1	From different locations: from the vicinity of east coast at 9:10, from west coast at 9:06, 9:15 and 9:30, from inland at 9:24, 9:41 (Sunan, Kaechon likely at 39° 45' 11" N 125° 54' 02" E almost the same location as the SRBM test on 10 Sep. 2019, Tongchang-ri, Hamhung), toward the east and splashdown 	110 to 670 or 350 300 400 350 400 300	25 to 90 or 50 50 50 100 50 100	- Possibly some include irregular trajectory  - Max speed from M3-M6  - First time so many different missiles and ranges are combined at the same time  - Operational training to fire SRBMs of different ranges and strike capabilities using the tactics of the former Soviet Union <sup>48</sup>	No statement or information from the DPRK (seventh no-statement in 2022)
?	?	?	5 June 2022	- SRBM to be confirmed	2	Same area	short Very low	- Possible 2 other SRBMs detected	No statement	

<sup>46</sup> On 24 May 2022, the DPRK launched three missiles: one ICBM and two SRBMs. <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0801> (27 May, 2022)






<sup>47</sup> Ibid. including **six ICBMs**





<sup>48</sup> Frequency and diversity: every 9 days a BM test but no report on the last 5 tests.



18 <sup>th</sup>	29 <sup>th</sup>	9 <sup>th</sup>	<p><b>25 Sep. 2022</b></p> <p>06:53 or 06:52</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- SRBM underwater launched of the small SLBM</li> <li>- SP</li> <li>- based on KN-23 SRBM and resemble the small SLBM presented at the military parade on 25 April 2022 and lastly tested on 7 May 2022 from a submarine</li> </ul> 	1	<p>From Taechon Reservoir (in North Pyongan Province toward the east and splashed down before 07:11 after a less than 18-minute flight.</p> 	600 or 650	60 or 50	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Max speed M.5</li> <li>- Irregular trajectory after ballistic trajectory likely KN-23 or KN-24</li> <li>- Resumption of BM launch since 2 CM launches on 17 Aug 2022.</li> <li>- According to the metadata (EXIF file), the photo of the launch at the water level surface was taken by Kim Hyunok829 on 25 Sept. 2022, with a Canon EOS-1D X Mark II (424029000179) (NKnews, 23 Nov. 2022)</li> <li>- The aerial photo taken on 25 Sept. 2022, with a Canon EOS-1D X Mark II (364028000060) (NKnews, 23 Nov. 2022)</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>"The operation of tactical nukes staged military drills from September 25 to October 9", "a ballistic missile launching drill under the simulation of loading tactical nuclear warheads at a silo under a reservoir"</u></b></p> <p>(KCNA, Rodong Sinmun, 10 Oct. 2022)</p>
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

19 <sup>th</sup>	30 <sup>th</sup>	10 <sup>th</sup>	28 Sep. 2022 18:10 and 18:17 or 18:20	- SRBM KN-23 or modified - SP 	2 From Sunan area toward the east and splashed down, possibly from either the Sariwon or Sakkanmol bases (janes) 	360 or 350  300	30 or 50  50	- Max speed M.6 - Irregular trajectory after ballistic trajectory. "pull-up" manoeuvres - Time between launches: 7 min	"At the ballistic missile launching drill <b>simulating the loading of tactical nuclear warheads</b> which was staged on <b>September 28</b> for the purpose of neutralizing the airports in the operation zones of south Korea, the stability of overall system related with the operation of warheads was proved." (KCNA, Rodong Sinmun, 10 Oct. 2022)
20 <sup>th</sup>	31 <sup>st</sup>	11 <sup>th</sup>	29 Sep. 2022 20:48 or 20:47 and 20:57 or 20:53	- SRBM KN-23 or modified - SP 	2 From DPRK's Sunchon region in South Pyongan Province, toward the east 	350 or 300  300	50	- Max speed M.6 or M.5(?) - Irregular trajectory after ballistic trajectory - Time between launches: 6 min	" <b>Various types of tactical ballistic missiles</b> that were launched on <b>September 29 and October 1 ...</b> " (KCNA, Rodong Sinmun, 10 Oct. 2022)
21 <sup>st</sup>	32 <sup>nd</sup>	12 <sup>th</sup>	1 Oct. 2022 06:45 or 6:42 07:03 or 06:58	- SRBM KN-23 or modified - SP 	2 From the Sunan area toward the east 	350 or 400 and 350	30 or 50 and 30 or 50	- Max speed M.6 - Irregular trajectory after ballistic trajectory - Time between launches: 16 min	" <b>Various types of tactical ballistic missiles</b> that were launched on <b>September 29 and October 1...</b> " (KCNA, Rodong Sinmun, 10 Oct. 2022)









22 <sup>nd</sup>	11 <sup>th</sup>	10 <sup>th</sup>	4 Oct. 2022 07:23	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- new IRBM modified Hwasong-12</li> <li>- LP.</li> <li>- new type of IRBM not very different from Hwasong-12 without the 4 vernier engines and with a single manoeuvrable nozzle (see KCNA picture)</li> </ul>  	1	<p>From Mupyong-ri, Jagang Province area toward the east over Aomori Prefecture Japan from about 7:28 to 7:29 and splashed down at 07:44-46 about 3 200 km east of Japan.</p> <p>- 40°36'40.21"N 126°25'33.31"E</p> 	4500 or 4600	970 or 1000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Max speed M.17</li> <li>- Flight Time: 21min</li> <li>- 5th launch of a IRBM since 14 May 2017 (possible Hwasong-12) because the recorded BM trajectory is equivalent of a range equal to or greater than that of an IRBM missile.</li> <li>- First time DPRK launched a missile over Japanese territory in five years</li> <li>- Longest range by any BM test over Japan</li> <li>- The Japanese government has issued a public alert</li> <li>- The absence of a vernier motors at the bottom of the missile and the fully encased nozzle suggest that the image may have been manipulated</li> <li>- The new stamp featured a phrase saying the North's "new-type ground-to-ground IRBM hit the target waters in the Pacific 4,500 kilometers away across the Japan on Oct. 4 in accordance with the decision made by the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea." (Yonhap 14 Nov 2022 from North's Korea Stamp Corp)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- "a decision to send more powerful and clear warning to the enemies on <b>October 4</b> and took a measure to hit the set water area in the Pacific 4 500 kilometers across the Japanese Islands with <b>new-type ground-to-ground intermediate-range ballistic missile</b>"</li> <li>(KCNA, Rodong Sinmun 10 Oct. 2022)</li> </ul>
23 <sup>rd</sup>	33 <sup>rd</sup>	13 <sup>th</sup>	6 Oct. 2022 06:01 or 06:00 and  06:23 or 06:15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- SRBM KN-23 and KN-25</li> <li>- SP</li> </ul> 	2	<p>From Samsok area of Pyongyang toward the east and BM1 splashed down at 06:11 and BM2 at 06:32</p> 	350 and  800	80 or 100 and  60 or 50	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- BM1 max speed M.5</li> <li>- BM2 max speed M.6</li> <li>- TBL: 22min</li> <li>- BM2 possible irregular trajectory after ballistic trajectory</li> </ul>	<p>"At dawn of <b>October 6</b>, the <b>striking drills of super-large multiple rocket launchers and tactical ballistic missiles</b>" ...</p>




24 <sup>th</sup>	34 <sup>th</sup>	14 <sup>th</sup>	9 Oct. 2022  01:48 or 01:47 and  01:58 or 01:53	- SRBM KN-25  - SP 	2	From Muncheon in Kangwon Province toward the east  - These ballistic missiles were very likely to have been launched from the port and harbor area 	350 and  350	90 or 100 and  90 or 100	- BM1 max speed M.5  - 7 <sup>th</sup> test in the 2 last week  - Time between launches: 10 minutes  - Kim Jong Un guided at least 7 missile tests between 25 September and 9 October.  - From Oct. 10 anniversary to U.S.-ROK Vigilant Storm - 5 missiles, 810 artillery shells, 10 MRLS and more jets (NKnews 14 Nov. 2022)	<b><u>"The firing drill of the super-large multiple rocket launchers</u></b> was waged in simulating the strike of the enemies' main ports at dawn of <b>October 9"</b> (KCNA, Rodong Sinmun 10 Oct. 2022)	
			12 Oct. 2022	LRCM	1	- the missile flew for about 2 hours and 50 minutes with a range of 2,000 km (KCNA)	2000			"a test fire for a long-range strategic cruise missile operationally deployed for the tactical nuclear operation unit of People's Army" (KCNA 13 Oct. 2022)	
25 <sup>th</sup>	35 <sup>th</sup>	15 <sup>th</sup>	14 Oct. 2022  01:49 or 01:52	- SRBM KN-25 (?)  - SP 	1	From Sunan (suburbs of Pyongyang) toward the east 	650	50	- Possible irregular trajectory after ballistic trajectory  - Artillery drill in parallel 130 rounds fired from 01:20 to 01:25 from Majong dong and 40 rounds from 02:57 to 03:07 from Kuup-ri (close to ML) and 390 rounds from eastern and western coasts into the inter-korean buffer zone, and 250 rounds on 17 Oct.  - DPRK warplanes detected on 13 Oct. 2002 at the south of Tactical Action Line	No statement or information from the DPRK but on 13 Oct. KCNA, Rodong Sinmun reports 2 LRCM launches (2000 km) "expanding nuclear weapons units capabilities".	
-	-	-	24 Oct. 2022 05:14	MLRS	10						



26 <sup>th</sup>	36 <sup>th</sup>	16 <sup>th</sup>	28 Oct. 2022  11:59 and  12:18	- SRBM  - SP	2	From Thongchon County (Tongjong-ho) toward the east in the vicinity of Alsom Island.  The launch pad is about 60km from the inter-korean border. 	230	24	- BMs max speed M.5	No statement or information from the DPRK
27 <sup>th</sup>	37 <sup>th</sup>	17 <sup>th</sup>	2 Nov. 2022  06:51	SRBM and unknown projectiles, possible anti-aircraft missiles  - SP 	4  At least 3 BMs	From Jeongju and Pihyeon-gun (North Pyongan Province) near the west coast toward the west	-	-	- North Korea's military operation counter-response drill - At least 33 missiles, 180 artillery shells, and more jets. North Korea claims it launched 86 projectiles, including 46 "long-range MLRS." (NKnews 14 Nov. 2022)  - 23 missiles were fired throughout the day  - "in the <u>morning of the first day</u> of the operations, missile units in North Phyongan Province fired <b>four tactical ballistic missiles loaded</b> with dispersion warheads and underground infiltration warheads at a desert island off the West Sea Barrage" (KCNA. Report of General Staff of KPA 7 Nov. 2022)	- No statement or information from the DPRK but a global statement was released by the DPRK on 7 Nov. 2022:  - "and in <u>the morning and afternoon</u> the anti-aircraft missile units of the air force on the east and west coastal areas fired 23 ground-to-air missiles..." (KCNA, 7 Nov. 2022)

28 <sup>th</sup>	38 <sup>th</sup>	18 <sup>th</sup>	2 Nov. 2022	SRBM possible variant of KN-23  08:51 or  08:50  - SP  - one was a SA-5 with a single stage liquid motor boosted by 4 jettisonable solid propellant boosters 	3  At least 3 BMs	From Wonsan area (in Kangwon Province) near the east coast toward the east: <u>toward southeast Ulleungdo (BM2) landed 26km south of Northern Limit Line (NLL) (57km east of Sokcho and 167km northwest of Ulleung island)</u> 	190 or 150 and 200 and short	150 or 150 and 100 and 50	- Irregular trajectory  - First time since the division of the Korean peninsula that a BM landed in proximity to the territorial waters of the ROK just south of the NLL (possible malfunction of missile). An air raid warning in the Ulleungdo area 8:54 to 14:00 was issued.  - "The ROK military recovered an object on Nov. 6 presumed to be a remnant of a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) that North Korea fired in its Nov. 2 provocation" (ROK JCS Nov 2022) indeed it is <b>StA SA-5</b> (ROK image 6 Nov. 2022). "The ROK defense ministry announced the results of an interagency analysis of the debris of a missile that North Korea fired southward on Nov. 2 past the Northern Limit Line (NLL) ..." (ROK via Yonhap 9 Nov. 2022)	- No statement or information from the DPRK but on 7 Nov. a global statement was released by the DPRK
29 <sup>th</sup>	39 <sup>th</sup>	19 <sup>th</sup>	2 Nov. 2022	Mix SRBM, LRCM and SA missiles  09:12  - SP	>10	From Nakwon, Jeongpyeong, Sinpo area (in South Hamgyong Province) toward the east  From Oncheon (South Pyongan Province), Hwajin-ri (South Hwanghae Province) toward the West	-	-	- On the 2 Nov, ROK did not detect anything on DPRK's CM claims (ROK JCS 7 Nov. 2022)  - The image of CM was a recycled image already published after April 2022 test from mansion beach in Majon. (NKnews 7 November 2022)	"the KPA fired <u>two strategic cruise missiles</u> with the shooting range of 590.5 km at the open sea around 80 km off the coast of Ulsan City of south Korea (35°29'51.6" latitude and 130°19'39.6" longitude) from North Hamgyong Province" (KCNA 7 Nov. 2022)
30 <sup>th</sup>	40 <sup>th</sup>	20 <sup>th</sup>	2 Nov. 2022	Mix SA missiles (6) and possible suspected BM  16:30 or 16:00 to  17:10 or 17:00  - SP	<6	From Seondeok and Sinpo areas (eastern coast Japan) toward the east  From Kwail and Oncheon area toward the west 	Very short	50	- 23 Missiles were fired into the sea on 2 November, the most missiles fired in a single day.	"the morning and afternoon the anti-aircraft missile units of the air force <u>on the east and west coastal areas</u> fired 23 ground-to-air missiles" (KCNA, 07 Nov 2022)





31 <sup>st</sup>	12 <sup>th</sup>	11 <sup>th</sup>	3 Nov. 2022 07:40 or 07:39	New ICBM variant of Hwasong-15 - LP - according to KCNA picture: new ICM design with liquid propellant engine - ㄹ 10101907 - shroud seems more elongated, and the proportion between stages (2) appeared to be different from that of Hwasong-15 	1	From Sunan area near the west coast toward the east, fell into the sea at 08:10. It disappeared from the radar over the sea before going over Japan 	760 or 750	1920 or 2000	- 7 <sup>th</sup> ICBM in 2022. - Max speed: M.15 - Flight time: 30min - Possible failure after the second stage separation process before falling into the sea. (third stage ?) - Japan issued evacuation alerts in central prefectures of Miyagi, Yamagata and Niigata at 07:50 - Similar sequence as on 25 May involving two SRBMs and one ICBM - This modified Hwasong-15 seems to be related to the improvement of warhead as a third stage.	"... the <u>second day</u> of the operations, the KPA conducted <u>important test-fire of ballistic missile to verify the movement reliability of a special functional warhead paralyzing the operation command system of the enemy.</u> " (KCNA 7 Nov.2022)
32 <sup>nd</sup>	41 <sup>st</sup>	21 <sup>st</sup>	3 Nov. 2022 08:39  08:51 or 08:48	SRBM KN-25 OR KN-23 (similar) - SP - probably 2 of the "five super-large multiple launch missiles and tactical ballistic missiles" 	2	From Kaechon area (South Pyongan province) toward the east, splashed down for BM1 at 08:47 and the BM2 at 08:55 near the east coast 	330 or 350	70 or 50	- Max speed M.5 - Flight time: 8 min for BM1, 4 min for BM2 - DPRK is trying to keep pace	"...and it fired five super-large multiple launch missiles and tactical ballistic missiles of various missions and 46 long-range multiple launch missiles ..." (KCNA 7 Nov. 2022)  Pak Jong-chon, North Korea's top military official, who, in an issued statement, demanded the US and ROK to stop the Vigilant Storm exercises..."a big mistake ...aggressive provocation" (KCNA, 3 Nov. 2022)
33 <sup>rd</sup>	13 <sup>th</sup>	12 <sup>th</sup>	3 Nov. 2022 21:34  21:39  21:42	SRBM possible older Scud-type missile - LP - Hwasong-6/scud-C according to KCNA photos 	3	From Koksan (North Hwanghae province) toward the east 	490 or 500	130 or 150	- Max speed: M.6 - 29 missiles were launched since 2 November including 6 on 3 November - 80 rounds of artillery into inter-Korean buffer zone off the eastern coast	"fired five super-large multiple launch missiles and tactical ballistic missiles of various missions and 46 long-range multiple launch missiles" (KCNA, 7 Nov. 2022)


34 <sup>th</sup>	42 <sup>nd</sup>	22 <sup>nd</sup>	5 Nov. 2022 11:32 to 11:59	SRBM KN-23 and KN-25 - SP 	4	- From Dongrim in North Pyongan Province toward west at uninhabited island off the West Sea Barrage in the Yellow Sea. (West of Nampo Bay)	130	20	- Max speed: M.5 - According to MS 7 Nov. report, at least 33 missiles were fired between 2 and 5 Nov. 2022 - On 4 Nov. 180 trails of DPRK warplanes detected	"On the <u>fourth day</u> of the operations, the KPA fired <u>again two tactical ballistic missiles loaded with dispersion warheads</u> and <u>two super-large multiple launch missiles</u> at a desert island off the West Sea Barrage... at least 86 missiles were fired between 2 and 5 November 2022" (KCNA, 7 Nov. 2022)
35 <sup>th</sup>	43 <sup>rd</sup>	23 <sup>rd</sup>	9 Nov. 2022 15:31	SRBM possible KN-23 or KN-24 - SP 	1 or 2	- From Sukchon in South Pyongan Province toward east and struck uninhabited island off the coast of the South Hamgyong Province	290 or 250	30 or 50	- Max speed: M.6 - Very low altitude	
36 <sup>th</sup>	44 <sup>th</sup>	24 <sup>th</sup>	17 Nov. 2022 10:48 or 10:47	SRBM - SP (?) 	1	- From Kangwon province toward northeast	240	47	- Max speed: M.4 - The statement of Minister Choe Son Hui may be related to the 18 Nov. launch..	Earlier statement (09:07) of Minister Choe Son Hui (MOFA): "...the fiercer the DPRK's military counteraction will be, in direct proportion to it..." (KCNA, 17 Nov. 2022)

37 <sup>th</sup>	14 <sup>th</sup>	13 <sup>th</sup>	18 Nov. 2022 10:14 or 10:15	<p>New type ICBM Hwasong-17</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- LP</li> <li>- 〒 09151751 – TEL no. 321</li> <li>- BM length 25m diameter 2.8m</li> <li>- TEL 29m long, 4m wide</li> <li>- the F-15 confirmed in the air what is presumed to be related to the recently launched ballistic missile.</li> </ul>  <p><a href="https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2022/11/18d.html">https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2022/11/18d.html</a></p>	1	<p>From Sunan International Airport (launch pad at 39°13'18.05"N 125°40'27.49"E from 11-axle wheeled TEL no. 321), toward east and fell into the sea at 11:23. Within Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ)) about 200 km west of Oshima Island in Hokkaido Prefecture</p>   <p><u>Kim Jong Sik KPi.066</u></p>  <p><u>Jang Chang Ha KPi.037</u></p>	1000	<p>6100 or 6000</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 8<sup>th</sup> ICBM in 2022.</li> <li>- Max speed: M.22 (27,166 km/h)</li> <li>- Flight time: 69min</li> <li>- Possible first successful launch of the Hwasong-17</li> <li>- It is named by the DPRK as the new ICBM Hwasong-17 (Rodong Sinmun, 19 Nov. 2022)</li> <li>- Range estimation of over 15,000km, depending on the warhead weight , When calculated based on the flight trajectory, the mainland of the United States will be included in the range</li> <li>- The size and shape of the shroud is for multiple warheads and possible supported by a boost vehicle...</li> <li>- “the trajectory is quite similar” to the 24 March launch of a Hwasong-15 ICBM.</li> <li>- More than 50 missiles in Oct and Nov (NKnews)</li> <li>- Kim Jong Un guided the Hwasong-17 launch accompanied by his wife and daughter.</li> <li>- TEL 321 stored in the aircraft hangar at the west side of the main runway (39° 12' 26" N 125° 39' 58" E)</li> <li>- TEL 321 see annex S/2022/668 Annex 23.2.1, this TEL no. was already presented on Hwasong-17 〒 03031203 according to 26 March 2022 footage and on Hwasong-17 number 〒 7220406 at the 10 October 2020 parade.</li> <li>- Jo Yong Won,</li> <li>- Ri Il Hwan,</li> <li>- Jon Hyon Chol,</li> <li>- Ri Chung Gil,</li> </ul>	<p>“The DPRK strategic forces test-fired a new-type ICBM on Nov. 18”</p> <p>“The test-fire was aimed at <u>checking the reliability of the weapon system and its operation</u>”</p> <p>“The new-type ICBM Hwasongpho-17, launched at the Pyongyang International Airport, travelled up to a maximum altitude of 6 040.9 km and flew a distance of 999.2 km for 4 135s [69'55''] before accurately landing on the preset area in open waters ... ”</p> <p>“The test-fire clearly <u>proved the reliability of the new major strategic weapon system to be representative of the DPRK's strategic forces and its powerful combat performance as the strongest strategic weapon in the world</u>”</p> <p>- “representative of the DPRK's strategic forces and its powerful combat performance as the strongest strategic weapon in the world”</p> <p>he urged the national defence scientific research sector to put more vigorous spurs to the development of Juche-based strategic weapons of Korean-style and the ICBM units and all the units for the operation of tactical nukes to intensify their training with high vigilance so as to perfectly discharge their important strategic duty in any situation and at any moment”</p> <p>“a crucial milestone in bolstering up the nuclear forces of the DPRK, together with his beloved daughter and wife”, (Rodong Sinmun, 19 Nov. 2022)</p> <p>“Succeeded in developing and perfecting the new-type ICBM Hwasongpho-17, the world's strongest strategic weapon, and made a wonderful leap forward in the</p>
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										involved in weapons research. (NKnews 29 Nov. 2022) -Maj. Generals: Choe Chol Ung, Kim Sun Chol, Ha Jong Guk, Pang Hyon Chol, Kim Chang Rok, Kim Man Sop, Yu Chol U, Ri Kyong and Ri Yong Sok	
38 <sup>th</sup>	15 <sup>th</sup>	14 <sup>th</sup>	18 Dec. 2022 11:13 or 11:11 12:05 or 11:52	MRBM - LP - test possibly related to military reconnaissance satellites - resembles the Nodong Hwasong-7 	2	From Tongchang-ri (Sohae) toward northeast 	500	500	- According to KCNA's picture the BM resembles the Nodong Hwasong-7 (see S/2014/147 para. 34) - Satellite imagery released by the DPRK on this launch needs more analysis. ( <a href="https://www.nknews.org/pro/south-korean-outlets-censor-north-korean-satellite-images-of-seoul-area/">https://www.nknews.org/pro/south-korean-outlets-censor-north-korean-satellite-images-of-seoul-area/</a> )	<i>"The National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA) of the DPRK conducted an important final-stage test for the development of reconnaissance satellite at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground on December 18"</i> (KCNA 19 Dec. 2022) - 500 km from Sohae (Rodong Sinmun 20 Dec. 2022) - <i>"The National Space Development Agency announced that it would finish preparing the first military reconnaissance satellite by April 2023"</i> (Rodong Sinmun, 19 Dec. 2022)	

39 <sup>th</sup>	45 <sup>th</sup>	25 <sup>th</sup>	23 Dec. 2022 16:32 or 16:31	SRBM	2	From Pyongyang Sunan airport area toward the east splashed down at 16:46 	250 or 300 and 350 or 300	50 and 50	- Possibly an irregular trajectory	- No statement or information from the DPRK
40 <sup>th</sup>	46 <sup>th</sup>	26 <sup>th</sup>	31 Dec. 2022 08:00	SRBM KN-25 “Super large rocket system”	3	- from Hwanghae province	360		- Nuclear-capable multiple rocket launcher (MRL) able to strike anywhere in ROK - 30 were recently deployed in the army (KCNA 2 Jan. 2023)	“The three shells of multiple rocket launchers precisely hit a target island ..., demonstrating their combat performance” (KCNA, DPRK Today, 2 Jan. 2023)

4	20 3 2021			Solid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and</u> <u>19 Oct. 2021</u> : 41 In 2021: 5						
	1 1 2021			Liquid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and</u> <u>28 Sep. 2021</u> : 1 In 2021: 1						
	18 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	25 Mar. 2021	New SRBM (modified KN-23) - SP - It appears to be the new SRBM, and TEL displayed during the military parade on 14 January 2021 and identified as a possible modification and enlargement of the previously displayed and tested KN-23 SRBM	2	Hamju south Hamgyong area Near Sondok (2 airfields Sondok and Yonpo (Ryonpo))	450 600	60 Less 100	- New 5 axle wheeled TEL (if 26 March 2021 KCNA pictures are genuine. See 14 Jan 2021 military parade (Panel) - TBL: 19 minutes (0706-0725) (MS) - Possible depressed with pull-up trajectory 18 <sup>th</sup> SRBM launch test since 04 May 2019 (around 35 SRBM) (Panel) falling into waters outside Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (MS)	"New-type tactical guided missiles" or "new-type tactical guided projectile"
	19 <sup>th</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	15 Sep. 2021	SRBM. - SP - It appears to be either the previously displayed and tested SRBM <b>KN-23</b> tested as a railway-borne missile system that has been displayed at the missile exhibition "Self-Defence 2021" on 11 October 2021 or possibly the modified and enlarged version of KN-23	2	From a railcar at the entrance of a tunnel located at 39°16'31"N 126°48'17"E in Yangdok area of South Phyongan Province, <sup>49</sup> eastward into waters off the east coast but inside Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone.	800	60	- New railway-borne missile system - Time between launches: 5 minutes - The trajectories were the longest of the solid fuel ballistic missiles tested since 2019, with a "pull-up manoeuvre" detected. - If it was the KN-23 it showed increased range compared to previous tests, probably because of a reduced payload. - The use of a railway-borne launcher gives DPRK a mode of transport for a variety of missiles which they can rapidly deploy and launch from anywhere on their rail network providing another option for concealing and launching its missile force.	"The Railway Mobile Missile Regiment" <sup>50</sup> (KCNA, Voice of Korea 19 Sept 2021)

<sup>49</sup> According to a MS, the location could be at 39°16'2.04"N 126°47'17"E. This assessment of the coordinates is slightly different to the Panel's analysis of the KCNA video which gives an idea of the length of the tunnel and the curve of the track.

<sup>50</sup> "The Railway Mobile Missile Regiment took part in the drill with a mission to move to the central mountainous area and strike the target area 800 kilometres away early on the morning of September 15, KCNA, Voice of Korea, 19 September 2021.

1 <sup>st</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	28 Sep. 2021 06:40 or 06:38	<b>MRBM HWASONG-8 “Hypersonic glide vehicle HGV”</b> - LP - disclosed at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021, after the 28 September launch test. (KCNA) -SRBM or MRBM -Missile total length is around 14.5 m for a body diameter of 1.4 m. - Re-entry vehicle length is around 4.7m for a rear diameter of around 0.9 m. - 6-axle wheeled TEL	1	From North's Mupyong-ri, Jagang province eastward into waters off the east coast	200	60	- The mention by DPRK of a “missile fuel ampoule” used in liquid propellant ballistic missiles enables the missile to be loaded with propellant at the factory (KCNA) - The main body of the missile appeared to be made from a liquid propellant booster that resembled, but shorter than, the single-stage Intermediary Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Hwasong-12. - The possible HGV resembled an already existing HGV <sup>51</sup> . It appears to be at an early stage of development stage of development that would require considerable time for actual deployment. -It's known to have flown at a speed of around Mach 3 at that time	Academy of Defense Science conducted the first test fire of the hypersonic Hwasong-8 missile from Toyang-ri, Jagang Province, on Tuesday 28 Sep.(KCNA 29 Sep.2021) <sup>52</sup>
20 <sup>th</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	19 Oct. 2021 10:17 or 10:15	<b>New SLBM/SRBM</b> - SP - It appears to be a new Short-range Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile that has been displayed at the missile exhibition “Self-Defence 2021” on 11 October 2021.  Missile length, without tube adaptor, is around 6.8 m for a body diameter of 1 m	1	From a Gorae/Sinpo class submarine (or a submersible test stand barge) located in the area of Sinpo (South Hamgyong Province), eastward into waters off the east coast	600 or 430	60 or 50	New smaller SLBM, 2 <sup>nd</sup> SLBM test since 2018 - A pull-up manoeuvre has been detected but with no significant horizontal movement. -Its design is smaller than the SLBM Pukguksong missile series and resembled those of the SRBM KN-23 and KN-24 as well as having similar flight characteristics. It could be fielded	“a new-type of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)”. (KCNA, 20 Oct) <sup>53</sup>

<sup>51</sup> This HGV is a solid propellant hypersonic missile showcased by a Member State at a military parade in 2019

<sup>52</sup> KCNA 29 Sep. 2021: “the navigational control and stability of the missile in the active section as well as its technical specifications, including the guiding manoeuvrability and the gliding flight characteristics of the detached hypersonic gliding warhead”. “The engine as well as of missile fuel ampoule that has been introduced for the first time” was “ascertained,”

<sup>53</sup> Rodong Sinmun /ANDS 20 Oct 2021: The DPRK stated that it has “successfully” conducted a test-firing of a new-type of submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) “The new SLBM ... will greatly contribute to our country's defense technology advancement and the Navy's underwater operational capabilities”;

KCNA 20 Oct: “The Academy of National Defense Science conducted the test-launch from “8.24 Yongung” where its first SLBM was successfully launched five years ago to demonstrate the military muscle of the DPRK”... “It clarified that the new type SLBM, into which lots of advanced control guidance technologies including flank mobility and gliding skip mobility are introduced, will greatly contribute to putting the defense technology of the country on a high level and to enhancing the underwater operational capability of our navy,”

								<p>in multiple launch tubes from a larger DPRK ROMEO-class submarine that increase an offshore strike capability.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- The missile was reportedly launched from an experimental <b>Gorae/Sinpo-B class ballistic missile submarine called "8.24 Yongung"</b>, whose launch tube may have been adapted for a smaller SLBM than Pukguksong type.</li><li>- However, the missile may have been launched from a submersible test stand barge.</li></ul>	
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4	17 4 2020			Solid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and</u> <u>29 Mar. 2020</u> : 36 In 2020: 11						
	0 0 2020			Liquid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and</u> <u>2020</u> : 0 In 2020: 0						
	14 <sup>th</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	02 Mar.2020 1237 hours	SRBM (KN-25); - SP - same as II and IV (24 Aug., 10 Sept., 31 Oct. and possibly 28 Nov. 2019)	2	Wonsan area	240	35	- Probably an operational training test integrated into a military exercise - Wheeled TEL with four launch tubes (if KCNA pictures are genuine; images resembled those from 28 Nov. 2019) - TBL: 20 seconds	Multiple-launch rocket – long-range artillery
	-	-	From 28 Feb. to 2 Mar 2020	MLRS (KN-09) 240 mm 300 mm - SP	unknown	14 km from eastern Wonsan area 39°9'19.66"N 127°36'26.85"E	-	-	- Operational training test for artillery and MLRS during “joint strike military drills” (see S/2020/840 annex 7, figure 7-1)	Joint strike military drills
	15 <sup>th</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	09 Mar.2020 0736 hours	SRBM (KN-25); same as I and IV - SP	3 (or 2)	Sondok area	200	50	- Probably one KN-25 launch failed. Member States only counted two BMs - TBL: 20 seconds and 1 minute	Front-line long-range artillery
	-	-		MLRS (KN-09) 240 mm 300 mm - SP	2	Sondok area	-	-	- Possibly two KN-09 were also launched	Front-line long-range artillery
	16 <sup>th</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>	21 Mar.2020 0645 and 0650 hours	SRBM (KN-24); same as 10 and 16 August 2019 - SP	2	Pyongan area; near Sonchon according to a Member State	410	50	- Possible depressed with pull-up trajectory - TBL: 5 minutes	Tactical guided weapon
	17 <sup>th</sup>	4 <sup>th</sup>	29 Mar.2020 0610 hours	SRBM (KN-25); same as I and II - SP	2	Wonsan area	230	30	- Tracked TEL (if KCNA photographs are genuine; images showed a tracked 6-tube TEL instead of a wheeled 4-tube TEL) - TBL: 20 seconds	Super-large multiple rocket

13	Solid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and</u> 13 13 2019 28 Nov. 25 2019: 25 In 2019:									
	Liquid fuel BMs fired <u>between 2018 and</u> 0 0 2019 2019: 0 In 2019 0									
	1 <sup>st</sup>	I.	4 May 2019 0830 and 1050 hours	New SRBM (KN-23); same as II, III and VI - SP	2	Hodo Peninsula N 39°24'32.25", E 127°31'53.63"	200- unknown (Possibly 240 to 400)	50- unknown (Possibly 40 to 60)	- One launch probably not fully successful - Four-axle wheeled TEL type 1 <sup>54</sup> - TBL: 2h20	<i>Tactical guided weapons</i>
	-	-	4 May 2019	MLRS 240 mm 300 mm (KN-09) - SP	unknown		70-240		Rockets were tested	<i>Large-calibre long- range multiple rocket launchers</i>
	2 <sup>nd</sup>	II.	9 May. 2019 1630 and 1650 hours	New SRBM (KN-23); same as I, III and VI - SP	2	Kusong area N 40°01'47", E 125°13'38"	420; 270	50; unknown Possibly 40	- Tracked TEL similar to T-72 tank <sup>55</sup> - TBL: 20 minutes	<i>Long-range strike means</i>
	3 <sup>rd</sup>	III.	25 Jul. 2019 0530 and 0600 hours	New SRBM (KN-23); same as I, II and VI - SP	2	Hodo Peninsula N 39°24'31", E 127°32'03"	430; 690	50; 50	- Wheeled TEL type 2 <sup>56</sup> - TBL: 30 minutes	<i>New-type tactical guided weapon</i>
	4 <sup>th</sup>	IV.	31 Jul. 2019 0510 and 0530 hours	New SRBM (possibly KN-23) or new MLRS (possibly 400 mm); same as V - SP	2	Wonsan/Kalma area	250; 250	30; (?)	- Tracked- TEL - TBL: 20 minutes	<i>New-type large-calibre multiple launch guided rocket system</i>
	5 <sup>th</sup>	V.	2 Aug. 2019 0300 and 0320 hours	New SRBM (possible KN-23) or new MLRS (possibly 400 mm); same as IV - SP	2	Hamhung area (Possibly Yonghung area)	220; (?)	25; (?)	- KCNA pictures show blurry MRL image not verified as for this test; possibly tracked TEL - TBL: 20 minutes	<i>New-type large-calibre multiple launch guided rocket system</i>

<sup>54</sup> According to a MS, the transporter erector launcher parallels previous models of Iskander. Both transporter erector launchers used a WS200 chassis. In the assessment of another MS, "the caterpillar version is just a prototype" and the wheeled chassis that was used is new and could be derived from other MSs chassis. "The organization or the design is inspired by Iskander TEL."

<sup>55</sup> According to a MS, this tracked, or caterpillar transporter erector launcher version could be just a prototype.

<sup>56</sup> According to a MS, this wheeled transporter erector launcher type 2 could be a future operational version.

6 <sup>th</sup>	VI.	6 Aug. 2019 0520 and 0540 hours	New SRBM (KN-23); same as I, II and III - SP	2	Kwail airfield N 38°24'54.98", E 125°1'43.00"	450; 450	37; 37	- Wheeled TEL type 2; the missile flew over DPRK territory from west to east - TBL: 20 minutes (See S/2020/151 annex 58.2)	<i>New-type tactical guided missiles</i>
7 <sup>th</sup>	VII.	10 Aug. 2019 0530 and 0550 hours	New tactical missile similar to ATACMS (KN-24); <sup>57</sup> same as VIII - SP	2	Hamhung/ Hungnam N 39°48'44.32", E 127°39'49.68"	400; 400 (Possibly 430)	48; 48	- Tracked TEL <sup>58</sup> (see S/2020/151 annex 58.3) - TBL: 20 minutes	<i>New weapon</i>
8 <sup>th</sup>	VIII.	16 Aug. 2019 0800 and 0820 hours	New tactical missile similar to ATACMS (KN-24); same as VII - SP	2	Tongchon area N 39°03'33", E 127°46'44"	230; 230	30; 30	- Tracked TEL - TBL: 16 minutes (See S/2020/151 annex 58.4)	<i>New weapon</i>
9 <sup>th</sup>	IX.	24 Aug. 2019 0640 and 0700 hours	New MLRS <sup>59</sup> using "super-large" heavy rocket (600 mm, KN-25); same as X - SP	2	Sondok airfield N 39°44'37.05", E 127°28'23.79"	380; 380	97; 97	- Eight-axle wheeled TEL <sup>60</sup> - TBL: 17 minutes (see S/2020/151 annex 58.5)	<i>Super-large multiple rocket launcher</i>
10 <sup>th</sup>	X.	10 Sept. 2019 0650 and 0710 hours	New MLRS using "super-large" heavy rocket (600 mm, KN-25); same as IX - SP	2	Kaechon airfield N 39°45'8.46", E 125°53'59.06"	330; 330	50; 60	- One flight test failed <sup>61</sup> Eight-axle wheeled TEL; KCNA picture of 31 Oct. launch was in fact from 10 Sept. - TBL: 19 minutes (see S/2020/151 annex 58.6)	<i>Super-large multiple rocket launcher</i>
11 <sup>th</sup>	XI.	2 Oct. 2019 0710 hours	New SLBM/MRBM <sup>62</sup> Pukguksong-3 - SP Estimated potential range 1,700 km (see S/2020/151 annex 58.7)	1	Wonsan - Yonghung Bay	450	910	1st SLBM test since 2018 Submerged barge	<i>New-type SLBM Pukguksong-3</i>

<sup>57</sup> The Panel notes that the system resembles such surface-to-surface missile systems as the Army Tactical Missile System or the King Dragon 300 (see S/2020/151, table 3 and annex 59).

<sup>58</sup> Built on the Pokpung-ho battle-tank chassis, which was designed in the DPRK and resembles the T-62

<sup>59</sup> Four launch tubes; ballistic missile trajectory not aerodynamic, but small canards attached. The rocket is a guided battlefield missile

<sup>60</sup> According to a MS, the eight-axle wheeled transporter erector launcher of KN-25 is based on the KN-23 chassis (stretched chassis) with an armoured cabin specifically designed in the DPRK.

<sup>61</sup> Several MSs stated that one flight test had failed and crashed inland, but that the other had headed towards Alsom Island; three out of four tubes had been used. One tube could have been defective (a Korean Central News Agency photograph shows that the upper cap was off but that the missile had not been fired, as the bottom cap was still in place).

<sup>62</sup> The submarine-launched ballistic missile is the naval adaptation of the Pukguksong-2 medium-range ballistic missile, but with a different re-entry vehicle and payload section.

12 <sup>th</sup>	XII.	31 Oct. 2019	New MLRS <sup>63</sup> using “super-large” heavy rocket (600 mm, <b>KN-25</b> ) - SP	2	Sunchon airfield N 39°24’48”, E 125°53’18”	370; 370	90; 90	- Wheeled TEL - TBL: 3 minutes	<i>Super-large multiple rocket launcher</i>
13 <sup>th</sup>	XIII.	28 Nov. 2019	New MLRS using “super-large” heavy rocket (600 mm, <b>KN-25</b> ) - SP	2	Ryonpo area of Sondok airfield or Ryonpo airfield	380; unknown (Possibly 380)	97; unknown (Possibly 50)	- Wheeled TEL - TBL: 30 seconds	<i>Super-large multiple rocket launcher</i>

Source: Member States and the Panel. Abbreviations: Member State (MS), Korean Central News Agency (KCNA)

<sup>63</sup> The Korean Central News Agency picture of the 31 October 2019 launch is in fact a picture from 10 September 2019. What was fired on 31 October 2019 was a new large-calibre canister-launched short-range ballistic missile, according to a MS.

**Annex 26: China's responses to the Panel****Permanent Representative of China's Letter to the Panel**

New York, 19 January 2022

Respected Coordinator and experts,

I am writing to you to acknowledge the receipt of your previous letters regarding the requests to investigate suspected violations of the Security Council Resolutions on the DPRK and share with you China's feedback.

China has been strictly implementing the Resolutions and fully supports the work of the Panel. In this regard, relevant Chinese authorities have conducted thorough investigations on the issues raised by the Panel. You may find the details of the investigations in the document enclosed herewith. I hope these feedback could be reflected in the Panel final report in a faithful and comprehensive manner.

I would also like to take this opportunity to emphasize that China has made great efforts in implementing the Resolutions and sustained great losses. It is suggested that the Panel carry out its assessments and analysis in line with its mandate as specified in the related Resolutions, and refrain from including unverified information in the report.

Panel of Experts

Established pursuant to resolution 1874

New York



I look forward to continuing working with you to contribute to the implementation of the Security Council Resolutions and the political solution to the Peninsula issue.

Warm regards,



Zhang Jun

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary  
Permanent Representative  
of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations

The following are China's verbatim responses to the Panel's requests for information (RFI) in the reporting period. The Panel's outgoing correspondence (OC) numbers are used as reference throughout the main text of this report.

## **China's Feedback to the 1874 Panel of Experts**

### **1. Refined petroleum products (OC.317)**

China has always been strictly implementing the provisions of exporting refined petroleum products to the DPRK. After the adoption Security Council Resolution 2397, the Chinese side immediately published relevant notifications so as to ensure that the activities of Chinese enterprises and individuals are consistent with the resolutions. China has been notifying the 1718 Committee of the amount of China's exports of refined petroleum products to the DPRK. Chinese enterprises do not and will not carry out transactions with sanctioned individuals and entities.

China attaches great importance to protecting the information and privacy of trading parties involved in the international trade, which is an internationally accepted practice. Given the persistent leakage of the POE report and the lack of adequate information security measures, China will not be able to provide relevant information until its security is fully guaranteed.

China has previously provided a clear response on this issue and hope

the Panel would not send letter on same questions repeatedly.

## **2. Iron and textiles (OC.301)**

The Chinese customs have taken a series of effective measures, including necessary inspection of inbound and outbound goods, to ensure full compliance with the Security Council Resolutions. Such measures have been duly implemented.

China has made several explanations to the Panel regarding its questions about the customs data. According to the data from China, goods imported from the DPRK under HS Codes of Chapter 50 were silk yarn and silk waste. These are raw materials, not textiles prohibited for import by the Security Council. Meanwhile, goods imported from the DPRK under HS Codes of Chapter 72 were not iron or iron ores. The Panel should accurately interpret the Resolution and refrain from mentioning in its report issues not related to the Resolution.

## **3. Alcoholic beverages (OC.300)**

Alcoholic beverages are not on the list of items prohibited for export to the DPRK, and the Resolution didn't authorize the Panel to interpret the scope of luxury goods. The Panel should accurately interpret the Resolution and act according to its mandate.

## **4. Money laundering activities (OC.254)**

China has made thorough investigations according to the information provided by the Panel and found no evidence that Ri Chol Nam conducted activities in violation of Security Council Resolutions within Chinese borders. The authenticity and accuracy of the information provided could not be verified, and such information should not be included in the Panel report.

#### **5. Phishing software (OC.226)**

China has made thorough investigations according to the information provided by the Panel and found no evidence that Song Rim was involved in the selling of phishing software or in the operation of phishing call centers within Chinese borders.

#### **6. Maritime activities**

China attaches great importance to maritime irregularities related to the DPRK and cracks down on ship-to-ship smuggling according to its laws and regulations. The Chinese transportation, customs, marine police, and other relevant authorities have investigated the issues raised by the Panel. We found that some of the vessels mentioned by the Panel have no record of port calls in China in 2022, and the vessels recorded were loaded with livelihood goods, not items prohibited by the Security Council. The Panel should fulfill its mandate in a prudent and responsible manner by carefully

screening the information provided by individual countries, and refrain from including unconfirmed information in its report. Detailed findings are as follows:

(1) OC.315 *TAE YANG* entered Dalian port empty-loaded from Nampo port in July 2022 and left Dalian port loaded with rice, rubber, washing powder, and other livelihood goods in the same month.

*ZAI ZHOU 2* entered Longkou port empty-loaded from Nampo port in July 2022 and December 2022, and left Longkou port loaded with tires, plastic pellets, furniture, and other groceries in the same months.

China found no activities in violation of the DPRK-related Security Council Resolutions by the abovementioned vessels, and they were not found in Ningbo waters.

(2) OC.313 *CHOL BONG SAN* entered Longkou port empty-loaded from Nampo port in June 2022, and left Longkou port loaded with soda ash, plastic film, and other livelihood goods in the same month. No activities in violation of the DPRK-related Security Council Resolutions were found.

(3) OC.314 There have been no records of port calls or information declarations in China for Vessels *ASIA HONOR* and *FLOURISHING*.

(4) OC.316 There have been no records of port calls and information declarations in China for Vessel *MI RIM 2*.



(5) OC163/OC191/OC312 *AN HAI 6* made several port calls in China in 2022 and the vessel was loaded with silk, furniture, and other livelihood goods. No prohibited items were founded. The disembarkation of its crew was a normal rotation.

(6) OC.305 Due to the lack of details in the information provided by the Panel relating to *TOMI HARU* and *TOYO HARU*, Chinese authorities were not able to conduct effective investigations. Considering that, the Panel should not include the above-mentioned information in the report.

(7) OC.306 China didn't find any evidence that *JIANG SHEN FU 6988* was involved in ship-to-ship smuggling. There have been no records of port calls or information declarations in China for *EVER GLORY*. The Panel should not include the above-mentioned information in the report.

(8) OC.307 China didn't find any evidence that *SHUN CHANG 78* was involved in ship-to-ship smuggling. The vessel has been in a status of cancellation since November 2021. The Panel should not include the above-mentioned information in the report.

(9) OC.310 China didn't find any evidence that *ZHEN YANG XIN* was involved in ship-to-ship smuggling. The Panel should not include the above-mentioned information in the report.

(10) OC.311 *TONG KANG* is in a status of cancellation and the

investigation by Chinese authorities is still ongoing. The Panel should not mention this vessel in the report.

(11) OC.309 The investigations on *JIANG AN 16* is still ongoing. The Panel should not include in the report the information mentioned in its letter to the Chinese Mission.

(12) OC.203 *KUM SAN BONG* and *KUM SAN BONG 3* transported glasses and other livelihood goods in 2022, and trucks were not found in their deliveries. No activities were found by the two vessels in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters.

(13) OC.205 China didn't find any evidence that *PENG LU 9* was involved in the smuggling of trucks.

(14) OC.185 The Niue-flagged vessel *ANNI* has only one record of leaving port call in China in 2022. It declared to leave Taizhou port for Yokohama port in June 2022 and was not seen in Chinese territorial waters ever since. China found no activities in violation of the DPRK-related Security Council Resolutions by the vessel.

(15) OC.208 The DPRK-flagged vessel *PU YANG 2* arrived at Yantai port from Nampo loaded with silicon iron in August 2022 and left Yantai port in the same month. It arrived at Longkou port empty-loaded from Nampo in September 2022 and left Longkou port loaded with groceries in

the same month. China found no activities in violation of the DPRK-related Security Council Resolutions by the vessel.

(15) OC.308 *MO RAN BON 2* and *SONGRIM* transported to and from Chinese and the DPRK ports loaded with glass, flour, white sugar, and other livelihood goods. China found no activities in violation of the DPRK-related Security Council Resolutions by these vessels, and is not aware of the renaming of these vessels.

(16) OC.190 China found no evidence that the DPRK-flagged vessels were modified in the shipyards within Chinese territory. China is concerned that allegations from the Panel were based on assumptions rather than facts, and urges the Panel to conduct its work based on mandate and evidence. Information based on assumption should not be included in the report.

(17) OC.319 China has been earnestly fulfilling its international obligations. The Chinese fishing authorities and Chinese coastal provinces have taken measures to ensure that Chinese fishery enterprises and Chinese fishermen comply with relevant Security Council Resolutions. Should the incidents raised by the Panel exist, they must be illegal activities. China's position on such illegal activities is very clear, and necessary measures will be taken according to laws and regulations once the incidents are confirmed. However, information provided by the Panel is vague and lacks substantial

evidence, making it hard for Chinese authorities to conduct in-depth investigations.

## **Annex 27: Letter to the 1718 Committee of 52 Member States regarding the oil cap, their report and accompanying imagery**

October 21, 2022

Dear Ambassador Juul,

On behalf of the Republic of Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, State of Kuwait, the Republic of Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Republic of Malta, the Federated States of Micronesia, Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Palau, Peru, the Republic of Poland, Portugal, the State of Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, Spain, Türkiye, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States, I have the honor to submit to the 1718 Committee a request for the Committee Secretary to take the actions described in operative paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 because the aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK in 2022 has exceeded the annual cap of 500,000 barrels. Attached, please find a report, sponsored by the above Member States, detailing observations of illicit North Korean refined petroleum imports, which exceed the 500,000 barrel refined petroleum cap set in UNSCR 2397. In total, we have documented 45 unreported deliveries of refined petroleum products to DPRK ports between January 1 and August 31, 2022. When aggregated, these deliveries represent 792,382.5 barrels of illicit imports. We are providing imagery as evidence for all of these cases.

Specifically, we request the following actions be taken:

- We request the 1718 Committee Secretary issue a public note verbale to all UN Member States that the aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK in 2022 has exceeded the cap set by the Security Council and inform Member States that they must immediately cease selling, supplying, or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year.
- We request the Chair to issue a Committee press release to inform the general public of this information.
- We further request this note verbale and press release include a call for all Member States to immediately exercise enhanced vigilance regarding the DPRK attempting to procure additional refined petroleum products and to prevent illicit ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum products to vessels owned, controlled, or acting on behalf of or working in cooperation with the DPRK.



- We further request the 1718 Committee Secretary update the website to include the illicit refined petroleum imports in our report and show that the aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK in 2022 has exceeded the cap set by the Security Council using the conversion rate and other information in the report.

We request the Chair circulate our report to the 1718 Committee and our proposals for Committee action by October 24, 2022 under the regular 5-day NOP process. We thank you in advance for your assistance.

*(Signed)*

*[Permanent Representatives of Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Micronesia, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States of America to the United Nations]*

**REPORT TO THE UN 1718 COMMITTEE:**  
**THE DPRK'S BREACH OF THE UNSCR 2397 REFINED PETROLEUM CAP**

The Republic of Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, State of Kuwait, the Republic of Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Republic of Malta, the Federated States of Micronesia, Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Palau, Peru, the Republic of Poland, Portugal, the State of Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, Spain, Türkiye, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States remain gravely concerned regarding large-scale evasion of restrictions the UN Security Council has imposed on the Democratic Republic of Korea's (DPRK) import of refined petroleum products. UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2397, operative paragraph (OP) 5, limits the DPRK to importing no more than 500,000 barrels of refined petroleum products per year. Any Member State supplying, selling, or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK is required to submit reports to the UN 1718 Committee informing it of the transfers every 30 days in order to allow the Committee to maintain an accounting of the DPRK's imports.

Moreover, UNSCR 2375 OP 11 prohibits UN Member States from engaging in ship-to-ship (STS) transfers with any DPRK-flagged vessel of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from the DPRK. Nevertheless, DPRK-flagged vessels continue to conduct STS transfers on a regular basis as the DPRK's primary means of importing refined petroleum. The information in this report demonstrates that the DPRK has exceeded the UNSCR 2397 annual 500,000 barrel cap for 2022.

This submission further affirms previous submissions from 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 (see S/AC.49/2018/NOTE.213, S/AC.49/2019/NOTE.134, S/AC.49/2020/COMM.254, S/AC.49/2021/NOTE.105) and Panel of Experts reporting (see maritime sections of S/2018/171, S/2019/171, S/2019/691, S/2020/151, S/2020/840, S/2021/211, S/2021/777, and S/2022/132) that exhaustively demonstrated and detailed the illicit practices employed by the DPRK to circumvent UNSCR-mandated restrictions on its ability to import refined petroleum products. As a result, this report will not seek to repeat in detail the specific information the DPRK's evasive practices outlined in previous formal submissions to the UN 1718 Committee. These practices continue unabated, but the DPRK utilizes an ever-evolving fleet of vessels under its flag or its direct control to perpetrate pervasive and ongoing sanctions evasion.

This report demonstrates that the DPRK continues to conduct UN-prohibited STS transfers and imports of refined petroleum that are not reported to the 1718 Committee as required, and again this year has exceeded the UNSCR 2397 OP 5 refined petroleum products cap of 500,000 barrels per annum. This report supplies images and import volume data for vessels that continue to make deliveries of refined petroleum into DPRK ports and in the DPRK's territorial sea, without these deliveries being reported to the UN 1718 Committee. STS transfers of any cargo are explicitly prohibited by UNSCR 2375, so the relevant Member States involved in supplying refined petroleum products to DPRK tankers fail to report these volumes to avoid self-incrimination. As a result, the UN 1718 Committee's official accounting of the DPRK's imports vastly underrepresents the volume of refined petroleum products that actually enter the DPRK. The overarching purpose of UNSCR 2397's provision limiting the DPRK's ability to import refined petroleum products is to limit the DPRK's ability to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles, which are a

threat to international peace and security and are prohibited by numerous UNSCRs. The restriction on the DPRK's refined petroleum products imports is critical to ensuring that the DPRK chooses to halt these prohibited programs and completely denuclearize. If the DPRK is able to continue evading international sanctions, it has little incentive to make such choices. As long as the DPRK continues to import refined petroleum products in excess of the UN-mandated cap with limited accountability at the UN, UNSCR 2397 OP 5 will remain ineffectual – which also undermines both the DPRK UNSCRs as well as the UN 1718 Committee.

These deliveries have significantly contributed to a substantial breach of the 500,000 barrel annual cap set by UNSCR 2397. We estimate that, this year alone, the DPRK has imported over 792,000 barrels via 45 confirmed tanker deliveries as of August 31. Again in 2022, refined petroleum transfers to the DPRK utilized DPRK-flagged vessels, a change from previous years when foreign-flagged delivery vessels directly unloaded petroleum at DPRK ports. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, oil was acquired by DPRK-flagged ships from foreign flagged vessels via STS, and those laden DPRK-flagged ships then underwent quarantine measures outside of the lock-gates near DPRK ports prior to delivering their petroleum cargoes.

As discussed in previous submissions on the DPRK's breach of the import cap in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021, this report cannot provide an exact figure for each delivery of refined petroleum products to the DPRK, as that information is not readily available to any UN Member State other than the DPRK. This report instead calculates how much petroleum was acquired by the DPRK based on each vessel's dead weight tonnage, with estimates for each ship at three different levels of cargo storage capacity – 90 percent, 60 percent, and 30 percent of the vessels dead weight tonnage. It is highly likely that DPRK tankers deployed in search of precious and limited refined petroleum and fuel via STS transfers or engaging in direct deliveries would arrive in DPRK ports with as much of their cargo capacities full (i.e. 90 percent calculation). The expenditure of scarce resources and fuel consumption by the tanker itself, the risks of tanker disruption or interdiction, and the DPRK's dependence on importing refined petroleum would not justify the tanker in question returning to port with less than 90 percent of its cargo storage capacity filled.

We are providing images of 45 deliveries of refined petroleum products to DPRK ports, which, when aggregated, represent 792,383 barrels of illicit imports – constituting a clear breach of the cap imposed by UNSCR 2397 OP 5, based on the 90 percent metric. Even if each of these tankers delivered only 60 percent of their capacity in these 45 deliveries, which would be neither financially nor logistically sound, the estimated volume (528,255 barrels) would still represent a breach of the annual cap. Table 1 below documents each of these transfers and provides an associated volume. Table 2 below graphically depicts the DPRK's import of refined petroleum between January 1 and August 31, 2022.

**TABLE 1: DPRK-FLAGGED VESSELS THAT HAVE DISCHARGED IN 2022**

<b>Delivery Date</b>	<b>Vessel</b>	<b>IMO</b>	<b>FLAG</b>	<b>90% Laden</b>	<b>60% Laden</b>	<b>30% Laden</b>
1/6/2022	CHIL BO SAN	8711021	DPRK	1,799.1	1,199.4	599.7
1/14/2022	YU SON	8691702	DPRK	3,058.2	2,038.8	1,019.4
1/14/2022	SAM MA 2	8106496	DPRK	1,557.9	1,038.6	519.3
1/14/2022	SONG WON	8613360	DPRK	1,890.9	1,260.6	630.3
1/14/2022	PO CHON	8848276	DPRK	3,184.2	2,122.8	1,061.4

1/14/2022	SAE BYOL	8916293	DPRK	1,035.0	690.0	345.0
1/19/2022	YU JONG 2	8604917	DPRK	1,085.4	723.6	361.8
1/29/2022	SONG WON	8613360	DPRK	1,890.9	1,260.6	630.3
1/29/2022	AN SAN 1	7303803	DPRK	2,702.7	1,801.8	900.9
2/6/2022	PU RYONG	8705539	DPRK	2,600.1	1,733.4	866.7
2/6/2022	SIN PHYONG 2	8817007	DPRK	1,894.5	1,263.0	631.5
2/10/2022	SIN PHYONG 5	8865121	DPRK	2,965.5	1,977.0	988.5
2/10/2022	YU SON	8691702	DPRK	3,058.2	2,038.8	1,019.4
2/10/2022	CHONG RYONG SAN	NO IMO	DPRK	1,591.2	1,060.8	530.4
2/20/2022	KWANG CHON 2	8910378	DPRK	1,043.1	695.4	347.7
3/3/2022	SONG WON	8613360	DPRK	1,890.9	1,260.6	630.3
3/3/2022	PU RYONG	8705539	DPRK	2,600.1	1,733.4	866.7
3/8/2022	YU SON	8691702	DPRK	3,058.2	2,038.8	1,019.4
3/11/2022	HENG XING	8669589	DPRK	2,925.0	1,950.0	975.0
3/11/2022	PU RYONG	8705539	DPRK	2,600.1	1,733.4	866.7
3/14/2022	SONG WON	8613360	DPRK	1,890.9	1,260.6	630.3
3/22/2022	SONG WON 2	8312497	DPRK	4,499.1	2,999.4	1,499.7
3/26/2022	YU SON	8691702	DPRK	3,058.2	2,038.8	1,019.4
3/31/2022	CHON MA SAN	8660313	DPRK	3,208.5	2,139.0	1,069.5
4/7/2022	PO CHON	8848276	DPRK	3,184.2	2,122.8	1,061.4
4/15/2022	SIN PHYONG 2	8817007	DPRK	1,894.5	1,263.0	631.5
4/23/2022	SIN PHYONG 5	8865121	DPRK	2,965.5	1,977.0	988.5
5/15/2022	PU RYONG	8705539	DPRK	2,600.1	1,733.4	866.7
5/22/2022	JI SONG 6	8898740	DPRK	1,125.0	750.0	375.0
5/31/2022	PU RYONG	8705539	DPRK	2,600.1	1,733.4	866.7
6/17/2022	SAM JONG 2	7408873	DPRK	2,256.3	1,504.2	752.1
6/17/2022	KUM UN SAN	8720436	DPRK	1,863.0	1,242.0	621.0
6/22/2022	KWANG CHON	8605026	DPRK	1,769.4	1,179.6	589.8
6/22/2022	SIN PHYONG 2	8817007	DPRK	1,894.5	1,263.0	631.5
6/25/2022	SIN PHYONG 1	8532413	DPRK	735.3	490.2	245.1
7/16/2022	NAM SAN 8	8122347	DPRK	2,835.0	1,890.0	945.0
7/22/2022	KWANG CHON 2	8910378	DPRK	1,043.1	695.4	347.7
7/22/2022	YU JONG 2	8604917	DPRK	1,085.4	723.6	361.8
8/4/2022	SAM JONG 1	8405311	DPRK	1,498.5	999.0	499.5
8/4/2022	SONG WON 2	8312497	DPRK	4,499.1	2,999.4	1,499.7

8/10/2022	HENG XING	8669589	Likely DPRK	2,925.0	1,950.0	975.0
8/12/2022	UN HUNG	9045962	DPRK	3,316.5	2,211.0	1,105.5
8/21/2022	WOL BONG SAN	7636638	DPRK	4,472.1	2,981.4	1,490.7
8/27/2022	SIN PHYONG 5	8865121	DPRK	2,965.5	1,977.0	988.5
8/27/2022	SIN PHYONG 9	8916293	DPRK	1,035.0	690.0	345.0
<b>Subtotal (BBL)</b>				<b>792,382.5</b>	<b>528,255.0</b>	<b>264,127.5</b>

**Table 2: DPRK Seaborne Petroleum Imports based on Percentage of Delivering Vessel's Deadweight Tonnage (BBLs)**




Given the information provided herein, we request that the 1718 Committee immediately make an official determination that the aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK in 2022 has exceeded the 500,000 barrel annual cap and inform Member States that they must immediately cease selling, supplying, or transferring refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year. Similarly, the Panel of Experts is requested to review this report's analysis and underlying information in order to make a determination in its next report on the volume of refined petroleum product imports to the DPRK and the associated implications for the implementation of UNSCR 2397's refined petroleum product import cap.


See Appendix 1 for more information on vessels that have discharged refined petroleum in 2022.




APPENDIX 1 - VESSELS THAT HAVE DISCHARGED REFINED PETROLEUM IN 2022






































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**Annex 28: Positions of China and the Russian Federation on the letter from 52 Member States regarding the oil cap****Communication dated 31 October 2022 from the delegation of China to the Committee**

Dear colleagues,

The Committee should take actions on the basis of solid evidence and sufficient facts instead of estimation and assumption. It is neither scientific nor prudent for the report to draw such a conclusion that the annual limit of refined petroleum has been exceeded. Thus, China would like to put this proposal on hold.

**Communication dated 31 October 2022 from the delegation of the Russian Federation to the Committee**

Dear colleagues,

Russia took note of the proposal on refined petroleum cap.

We would like to recall the provisions of the Security Council's resolution 2397 (2017), which stipulates that the Committee notifies all Member States when an aggregate amount of refined petroleum products sold, supplied, or transferred to the DPRK of 75, 90 and 95 per cent of the aggregate yearly amounts of 500 000 barrels have been reached, and only in the latter case (95 per cent), such notification is accompanied by an information about the requirement to immediately cease further deliveries of refined petroleum products to the DPRK for the remainder of the year. In the absence of the aforementioned notification in the Committee, export of refined petroleum products to the DPRK does not contravene the requirements of the 1718 sanctions regime.

We understand the concerns expressed by the Member States in their letter. At the same time it is not possible to verify the accuracy of the provided information and its conclusions. Therefore Russia would like to put this proposal on hold.

## Annex 29: The Panel's review of the report submitted by 52 Member States

1. In their report, the 52 Member States wrote “*the Panel of Experts is requested to review this report's analysis and underlying information in order to make a determination in its next report on the volume of refined petroleum product imports to the DPRK and the associated implications for the implementation of UNSCR 2397's refined petroleum product import cap.*” The Panel has been able to agree to the following.<sup>64</sup>

2. The Panel has no independent data sources to corroborate the estimates made in the Member States' letter. DPRK tankers rarely employ AIS transmissions and are thus extremely difficult to track on maritime monitoring systems, and only DPRK could confirm the exact quantity and types of refined petroleum products delivered by each tanker.

3. Deadweight tonnage (DWT) is the total of the weights of a vessel's cargo, fuel, fresh water, ballast water, provisions, and crew. According to industry standards, a vessel's estimated maximum cargo capacity is approximately 90% of its DWT (as stated on the website of the International Maritime Organization), although a vessel which was deliberately stripped back and sailing dangerously might carry more than 90% of its DWT. There is no way to estimate precisely the number of barrels of unknown oil products carried as cargo by a tanker, and the precision in the Member States' calculations is arithmetical, rather than scientific. In its review and in table 29, the Panel has therefore rounded down the figures provided in the Member States' letter to the nearest 10000 barrels.

4. The Member States' estimates presume the carriage of “refined petroleum” to include diesel and/or fuel oil, as both of these products are recognized by government and industry to be within the category “refined petroleum”. The estimates in the letter use a conversion rate of 7.5 barrels per metric ton, the average conversion rate of gasoline, kerosene, gas oil/diesel and residual fuel oil used by the United Nations.<sup>65</sup> The product basket rate used by the United Nations for unknown petroleum products is 7.98 barrels per metric ton; however this rate includes LPG.<sup>66</sup> The Member States' calculations do not consider LPG because the DPRK fleet consists primarily of tankers designed to carry less viscous (and not gaseous) cargoes; it does not have the specialized vessels required to carry LPG. Using the United Nations product basket rate including LPG, would increase the barrels per metric ton and would inaccurately inflate the estimated discharge amounts.

<sup>64</sup> One expert only agrees with the first three paragraphs of this annex and does not agree to the final sentence of the third paragraph. Another expert additionally disagrees with the fifth paragraph.

<sup>65</sup> <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/supply-sale-or-transfer-of-all-refined-petroleum>

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

5. The Member States' estimates are based on observed deliveries in only the first eight months of the year. There could have been more unobserved deliveries of refined petroleum to Nampo in this period (at night, or under cloud cover), but not fewer. In addition, these estimates include only deliveries made to oil facilities at Nampo. DPRK has limited oil facilities at other ports to which further deliveries may have been made, and a think-tank collected imagery showing the SAEBYOL (IMO: 8916293) delivering petroleum products to oil facilities in Chongjin in late August 2022. The same think-tank has collected imagery (figure 29) detailing 9 further deliveries of petroleum products to Nampo between October-December 2022; if those tankers had been fully laden (90% DWT), the think-tank has estimated that more than 140,000 barrels of petroleum products could have been delivered in the period.

**Figure 29: Imagery of refined petroleum products to Nampo, October - December 2022** (no deliveries observed in September)




*Source:* Airbus Defence and Space, Planet Labs, Maxar Technologies, RUSI

6. Finally, because the Panel is currently unable to distinguish between licit deliveries of refined oil products reported to the 1718 Committee, and illicit deliveries, the amounts of oil products in table 2 of main text might either be part of the estimated deliveries in table 29 or they should be added to the estimates.



**Table 29: 52 Member States' estimates of deliveries (rounded down to nearest 10,000 barrels) of refined oil products, Nampo, January-August 2022**



Source: 52 Member States, the Panel.

### Annex 30: Modifications to enable fuel smuggling

The Panel attaches an example of an instance of a vessel that appears to have been modified in a rudimentary manner to smuggle fuel.

**Figure 30: Vessel with closeups showing likely concealed fuel tanks, East China Sea, October 2020\***



\*Redactions, the Panel.

*Source:* Member State.


### Annex 31: Suspected illicit refined petroleum transfers by NEW KONK and UNICA in DPRK EEZ, September - November 2022

In November 2022, two fraudulent known identifiers, the Belize-associated F.LONLINE (MMSI: 312162000) and Mongolia-associated LIFAN (MMSI: 457400047), began transmitting days apart sailing in Chinese territorial waters. Both identifiers were used by the direct delivery vessel NEW KONK, as previously reported by the Panel.

NEW KONK, transmitting as F.LONLINE<sup>67</sup>, sailed out of Sansha Bay waters where it last transmitted in May 2022. The vessel then sailed through the Taiwan Strait before conducting dark activity<sup>68</sup> along the same latitude as Tainan port, over four days, between 4 and 9 November 2022. Two days later, 'LIFAN' began transmitting in the Wenzhou area, China, as it sailed north before dropping AIS transmission in the Hangzhou Bay area by 13 November 2022.

NEW KONK next appeared anchored in the DPRK's EEZ four days later and was observed on 17 November 2022 within approximately a mile of the DPRK-flagged PAEK MA (IMO: 9066978), a tanker documented by the Panel to have delivered refined petroleum at Nampo on multiple occasions (figure 31A), indicating possible transfers. This is a known location where the UNICA had in the past also anchored and conducted ship-to-ship transfers with other DPRK tankers, and more recently in September 2022 (figure 31B).

**Figure 31A: NEW KONK and DPRK-flagged PAEK MA, at ship-to-ship transfer area, DPRK EEZ, 17 November 2022**




<sup>67</sup> S/2022/132, paras. 45-46 and 59-63 and annex 39.

<sup>68</sup> This term refers to a period of unaccounted activity between two AIS transmissions.

Source: Planet Labs; inset map coordinates, Windward, annotated by the Panel.

**Figure 31B: UNICA and DPRK-flagged MU BONG 1, at ship-to-ship transfer area, DPRK EEZ, 25 September 2022**



Source: Member State.


The modus operandi of NEW KONK and UNICA mirrors the same voyage pattern of suspect tankers the Panel had investigated - departure from Sansha Bay; ship-to-ship transfer conducted in the Taiwan Strait; ship-to-ship transfer with DPRK tankers in the Korea Bay, the latter transfers often conducted without AIS transmission. While the Panel had reported on the direct delivery vessel UNICA's (IMO: 8514306) near monthly transmissions in or near the DPRK EEZ for its suspected illicit oil delivery voyages, NEW KONK had made a few voyages to the DPRK EEZ in 2022, including in January 2022 as observed by the Panel (figure 31C).<sup>69</sup>

<sup>69</sup> NEW KONK was last observed by the Panel transmitting over several occasions in Korea Bay waters in the last quarter of 2021, and in January 2022. S/2022/668, para. 41 and annexes 28.1 and 32.6.



**Figure 31C: NEW KONK in the DPRK EEZ, 2022**

*NEW KONK transmitting as LIFAN, January 2022<sup>70</sup>*




Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

<sup>70</sup> S/2022/668, annex 34.




NEW KONK and UN HUNG, together with UNICA and HENG XING (see also annex 32) in the location where ship-to-ship transfers occur, DPRK EEZ

21 January 2022



17 February 2022



Source: Member State.

Several indicators suggest that NEW KONK, UNICA and other direct delivery vessels reported by the Panel to have previously delivered refined petroleum to the DPRK likely come under common coordination. For instance, NEW KONK's ship-to-ship transfer location was the same area where UNICA was previously captured on satellite imagery. The same MMSI: 457400047 used by NEW KONK when it was transmitting as LIFAN was also used by UNICA when it was sailing as HAISHUN 2. The Panel's investigations into the facilitators associated with various direct delivery vessels, including NEW KONK and UNICA, remain ongoing.<sup>71</sup>

*Source:* The Panel.

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<sup>71</sup> S/2022/668, para. 62.

## Annex 32: Direct delivery vessels transmitting on fraudulent identifiers

The following table updates the list<sup>72</sup> of fraudulent identifiers transmitted by direct delivery vessels investigated by the Panel. This list is by no means exhaustive and contains Panel observations on maritime tracking databases to date. These transmissions have also been separately corroborated in specific instances with observations made by monitoring assets of Member States as well as by satellite imagery.

**Table 32: Direct delivery vessels transmitting on fraudulent identifiers**

NAME	IMO NUMBER	TRANSMITTING AS	MMSI	LAST PSC INSPECTED**
DIAMOND 8	9132612	CHANGSHUN 8	457222000	September 2017
		SHUNLI	457111000	
NEW KONK	9036387	MOUSON,	511444000	July 2018
		F.LONLINE	312162000	
		LIFAN	312360680	
		HAIZHOU 168	457400047	
		FU YUAN YU 98	667001397	
SUBBLIC	8126082	HAI ZHOU 168	667001800	May 2004
UNICA	8514306	LITON	667001397	No data
		HAISHUN2	457106000	
		TAIAN	457400047	

\*\*PSC (Port State Control)

Source: The Panel.

<sup>72</sup> S/2022/132, para. 44.

**Annex 33: Acquired ships sailing under DPRK flag, 2020-2022\*****Table 33A: Officially registered ships sailing under DPRK's flag**

Year 2022					
	IMO number	Ship name	Type	DWT	Previously referenced in Panel reports
1	8355786	RAK WON 1 (ex- AN HAI 6)	Cargo	5075	Current report
2	9054779	SA HYANG SAN 1 (ex- TOMI HARU)	Cargo	5000	Current report
3	9054767	SO BAEK SU (ex- TOYO HARU)	Cargo	5838	Current report
4	8357112	MO RAN BONG 2 (ex- LIN DA 8)	Cargo	5211	Current report
5	8594540	SONGRIM (ex- HUM WONSIN)	Cargo	3800	Current report
6	8594552	RAK NANG 2 (ex-SHUNCHANG 78)	Cargo	3062	Current report
7	9125308	CHOL BONG SAN 1 (ex- OCEAN SKY)	Tanker	5807	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132)
Year 2021					
8	8356120	TAE DONG MUN 2 (ex- JIANG PENG 337)	Cargo	2790	Yes (S/2022/668)
Year 2020					
9	8865121	SIN PHYONG 5 (ex- WOO JEONG)	Tanker	3295	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132, S/2021/777)
10	9016430	SU RYONG SAN (ex CJK OSAKA)	Cargo	4519	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132)
11	8602763	TAE PHYONG 2 (ex- MIING ZHOU 6)	Cargo	26,013	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132, S/2021/777, S/2021/211)
12	8651178	MU PHO (ex- DOUBLE LUCKY)	Cargo	2980	Yes (S/2022/668)
13	9045962	UN HUNG (ex – VIFINE)	Tanker	1978	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132, S/2021/777, S/2020/151)
14	9340257	KANG HUNG (ex- SUN MIRACLE)	Cargo	3800	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132)
15	9340271	RA SON 6 (ex- SUN HUNCHUN)	Cargo	3800	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2021/777)
16	7636638	XIN HAI (ex- WOL BONG SAN)	Tanker	4969	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2021/ 777, S/2021/211)
17	9011399	TAE DONG MUN (ex- POLE STAR 1)	Cargo	5137	Yes

					(S/2022/668, S/2021/211)
Year 2020					
	IMO number	Ship name	Type	DWT	Previously referenced in Panel reports
18	9162318	TO MYONG (ex- RI HONG)	Cargo	8773	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2022/132, S/2020/211, S/2020/840)
19	9018751	TAE PHYONG (ex- GREAT WENSHAN)	Cargo	26,369	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2021/211, S/2020/840)
20	9020003	PUK DAE BONG (ex- HUA FU)	Cargo	10,030	Yes (S/2022/668, S/2019/171)

\*A number of these vessels investigated by the Panel had been reported sailing under their previous flags when conducting sanctionable activity. The table lists the official year in which the vessels were, often retroactively, re-flagged under the DPRK.

\*Blue highlight indicates updated information in the present report.

Source: The Panel. Ship information obtained from S&P Global and IMO records.<sup>73</sup>

### Vessels assumed acquired by the DPRK / under DPRK control

The table below is not exhaustive. The Panel continues to investigate other vessels suspected to have been acquired by the DPRK.

**Table 33B: Vessels assumed to have been acquired by the DPRK / under DPRK control**

Year 2022					
	IMO number	Ship name	Type	DWT	Previously referenced in Panel reports
21	8669589	HENG XING	Tanker	3250	Yes (S/2022/668) -Sailing de-flagged as of November 2021 -Appeared in DPRK in 2022
22	8356584	ANNI, transmitting as DPRK-flagged KYONG SONG 3	Cargo	5000	-Current report -Sailing de-flagged as of June 2022. -Transmitted on DPRK identifier as KYONG SONG 3 -Appeared in DPRK in 2022
23	8891297	SF BLOOM, transmitting as DPRK-flagged PU YANG 2	Container	3285	-Current report -Sailing de-flagged as of March 2022. -Transmitted on DPRK identifier as PU YANG 2 -Appeared in DPRK in 2022

\*Blue Highlight indicates updated information in the present report.

Source: The Panel. Ship information obtained from S&P Global and IMO records<sup>74</sup>

<sup>73</sup> Accessed in December 2022.

<sup>74</sup> Ship flag status in December 2022.



**Annex 34: Tankers acquired by the DPRK continuing to deliver illicit oil, June-August 2022****Table 34**

IMO number	Ship name	DPRK Flag date	DWT	Date of refined petroleum offload at Nampo, DPRK
8817007	SIN PHYONG 2 (ex- TIANYOU)	August 2019	2105	22 June 2022 ( <i>inter alia</i> )*
8910378	KWANG CHON 2 (ex- SEN LIN 01)	October 2019	1159	22 July 2022 ( <i>inter alia</i> )*
8669589	HENG XING	De-flagged since November 2021	3250	10 August 2022 ( <i>inter alia</i> )*
9045962	UN HUNG (ex- VIFINE)	August 2020	1978	12 August 2022 ( <i>inter alia</i> )*
7636638	WOL BONG SAN (ex- XIN HAI)	March 2020	4969	21 August 2022
8865121	SIN PHYONG 5 (ex- WOO JEONG)	October 2020	3295	27 August 2022 ( <i>inter alia</i> )*

\*Denotes tankers reported by the Panel that also delivered refined petroleum on other prior occasions in 2022.

*Source:* Member State and the Panel. Ship information obtained from IMO records.

## Annex 35A: AN HAI 6 nka DPRK-flagged RAK WON 1

The Panel continued to investigate the de-registered Niue cargo ship, AN HAI 6 (IMO: 8355786) that arrived outside Nampo lockgate, DPRK, by June 2022 and located at Nampo port by 11 August 2022. The vessel was officially flagged under the DPRK fleet in July 2022.<sup>75</sup> Investigations into the ship began when it transmitted on its Niue identifiers outside the Nampo Lockgate, DPRK, since mid-June 2022. The Panel began tracing the vessel's voyage history as well as determining its cargo and where that cargo was loaded, along with any associated suspected sanctions violation activities.

### *Ship voyage and Cargo*

The International Maritime Organization's (IMO) website lists AN HAI 6 as flagged under Niue's ship registry from April to May 2022. The Panel's maritime tracking of AN HAI 6 showed it was recorded at: Qidong port area, China; outside Luoyuan Bay area, China; around the Busan port anchorage area, Republic of Korea (ROK); and in the DPRK's territorial waters. Prior to April 2022, Panel research indicated the vessel was at a shipyard in Taizhou (Haimen) area in 2022. AN HAI 6 was previously registered as a Chinese vessel sailing as China-flagged BI XIANG 66.<sup>76</sup>

Sailing as BI XIANG 66, the vessel made a port call at Taizhou, Zhejiang Province, around 16 March 2022 on a maritime database platform before dropping transmission shortly after. Around 29 April 2022, AN HAI 6 transmitted further north on its newly assigned IMO number, under the Niue flag at Tongzhou Bay New Area around 29 April 2022. Low resolution imagery on 2 May 2022 indicated cargo onboard the vessel as it sailed out of port (figure 35A-1). This was also the location where AN HAI 6 registered a draft change on a maritime database platform, indicating cargo had been loaded.

<sup>75</sup> There is often a lag time between the submission of ships being officially flagged under the DPRK and when it appears on the IMO's database. Therefore, IMO records would not necessarily reflect the ship as DPRK-flagged at the time of flagging, but only upon receipt of the official date of flagging from the relevant flag State.

<sup>76</sup> IMO records.

**Figure 35A-1: AN HAI 6 departing Tongzhou Bay New Area, China, with undefined cargo onboard and a registered draft change of cargo loaded, 2 May 2022**



*Source:* Windward; inset imagery, Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel.

According to information provided by ROK authorities, AN HAI 6 was at Busan port for a partial crew disembarkation, but no cargo was loaded or offloaded. This information corroborated documentation separately provided by Niue Ship Registry regarding the submitted voyage plan of a stopover at Busan port in its single delivery voyage, purportedly with Yokohama, Japan, as the delivery destination (annex 35B). Satellite imagery subsequently provided by a Member State indicated containers and bulldozers were part of the cargo onboard (figure 35A-2).


**Figure 35A-2: AN HAI 6 with cargo on board, Korea Bay, 27 May 2022**



*Source:* Member State.

By August 2022, the vessel, still transmitting as AN HAI 6, was berthed at Nampo's Bulk Terminal (figure 35A-3). The vessel began making port calls to Chinese ports one month later (figure 35A-4).

**Figure 35A-3: AN HAI 6 aka RAK WON 1 transmitting at Nampo General Bulk Terminal, DPRK, 11-12 August 2022**



Source: S&P Global's Seaweb, annotated by the Panel; inset imagery, Member State

**Figure 35A-4: RAK WON 1 at Longkou port, in October and November 2022**



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

According to Niue Ship Registry, AN HAI 6 was registered “... on 18 April 2022 for a single delivery voyage from Nantong, China to Yokohama, Japan with request for two stops at Ningde, China and Busan, Korea for bunkering and crew change respectively” (annex 35B). The ship registry added that vessel was inspected at Nantong, China, and was de-registered when the registry stated they received notification on 23 May 2022 of the vessel’s arrival at its destination in Japan; the latter information was misleading.

The Panel notes that AIS was kept on throughout for AN HAI 6 until it reached Korea Bay waters. Ship registries would have at their disposal tracking information provided by various service providers to ensure vessel monitoring. The fact that the AN HAI 6 sailed west and north, in a very different (opposite) direction following its departure from Busan indicated poor due diligence.

With regards its cargo, the ship registry indicated “No awareness of any cargo onboard the vessel as NSR’s single delivery voyage registration has a strict non-negotiable requirement that no cargo/passenger will be allowed in view of the relaxed requirement”. Elsewhere, the ship registry indicated “No Ship Manager was appointed as this is only required on a voluntary basis for single delivery voyages registrations”.

The Panel also wrote to Palau, China, the Marshall Islands, and the associated entities and individuals as relevant parties to the ship and cargo, with a focus on the investigative time of interest (April to June 2022) prior to the ship’s appearance in the DPRK.

Palau has yet to reply.

*China replied “AN HAI 6 made several port calls in China in 2022 and the vessel was loaded with silk, furniture, and other livelihood goods. No prohibited items were founded”.*

### *Crew transfers*


Documentation obtained by the Panel from relevant counterparties showed the crew’s ports of embarkation were at Nantong on or around 30 April 2022 and Taizhou on or around 31 April 2022. Half of the crew disembarked at Busan port. Panel investigations showed unaccounted AIS transmission of close to 10 days when the vessel was in the Korea Bay (figure 35A-5). The Panel’s comparison of crew lists from separate sources showed discrepancies, indicating either of the list(s) may not have been fully accurate at one stage. AN HAI 6 was next recorded on maritime databases located outside of Nampo lockgate by June 2022. AN HAI 6 was officially registered by the DPRK under its fleet in July 2022.<sup>77</sup>

The Panel sought assistance from Chinese authorities on the remaining crew insofar as the crew may also be able to shed light on the ship’s movement, cargo and ship pilotage between late May and June 2022 when the ship appeared outside Nampo lockgate. China replied “The disembarkation of its crew was a normal rotation”.

<sup>77</sup> IMO records. Flag information was updated retroactively a few months later the IMO’s website, typically upon receipt of the flag State’s submission.



**Figure 35A-5: AN HAI 6's voyage following partial crew disembarkation and dark activity in Korea Bay prior to appearing in the DPRK**



*Source:* Windward, annotated by the Panel.

### *Shipyard*

AN HAI 6 was at Taizhou (Haimen) Yuanshan Shipyard (hereafter “Taizhou Yuanshan Shipyard”), located at Zhejiang Province, between February and March 2022.<sup>78</sup> This was the same shipyard where another Niue-flagged ship ANNI (IMO: 8356584) was located in April 2022, along with a previously-investigated DPRK-acquired cargo ship SU RYONG SAN (IMO: 9016430), sailing then on its former name CJK OSAKA, which was anchored at the shipyard on or around 4 August 2020 before arrival in the DPRK.<sup>79</sup> The Panel requested detailed information from the shipyard (see also annex 37), which has yet to reply.

<sup>78</sup> Maritime database records.

<sup>79</sup> S/2022/132, para. 76 and annexes 51 and 61.

*Associated entities and individuals*

A Bill of Sale obtained by the Panel indicated that the ship, sailing as China-flagged BI XIANG 66, was transferred from its owners to Huludao Bixiang Shipping Co., Ltd, with both sharing the same address in Liaoning Province, China, prior to its onward sale to Pearl Marine Shipping (annex 35C). The Panel notes the practice of registering shell companies for purposes of transfer of ownership in name prior to a sale or purchase is not uncommon and adds to the complexity of tracing vessel ownership.

Marshall Islands assisted the Panel in its investigations with the relevant documentation. According to the Trust Company of the Marshall Islands, Inc. (TCMI), AN HAI 6 was registered to the Marshall Islands' incorporated Pearl Marine Shipping Co., Limited (hereafter "Pearl Marine Shipping"), a single ship-owner, with a 24-year-old Chinese national as its Director. The Qualified Intermediary registering on behalf of Pearl Marine Shipping lists and address in Fuzhou City, Fujian Province.<sup>80</sup> Pearl Marine Shipping has yet to reply on its vessel sale, cargo and ship activity.

The Panel retains an interest on individuals associated with Niue Ship Registry Pte Ltd, a Singapore-incorporated company operating on behalf of Niue Ship Registry. Investigations continue.

*Source:* The Panel.

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<sup>80</sup> These intermediaries are typically service providers including: law firms, business formation services, and shipping firms





Prescribed by the Commissioners of Customs & Excise with the consent Of the Secretary Of State for Trade *Form No. 10A* X..S.79 A

## BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)

IMO Number	Name of Ship	Official number, Year and Port of Registry	Whether a Sailing, Steam or Motor Ship	Horse Power of Engines, if any
8355786	BI XIANG66	030422000003, 2005, China	Motor ship	1765 KW


	meters	cm	Number of Tons	
Length .....	98	40	Gross	Net
Breadth .....	15	80	2998	1679
Depth .....	7	00		


And as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and the Register Book.

We, (a)Huludao Bixiang Shipping Co., Ltd., hereinafter "the Transferor" having our registered office at Room 1903, unit 1, building 9-2, Haiyi North Road, Longgang District, Huludao City, Liaoning Province, China in consideration of the sum of USD 1,340,000 ( say United States Dollars one million three hundred and forty thousand only) and other good and valuable consideration paid to us by (b)PEARL MARINE SHIPPING CO.,LIMITED, Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road, Ajeltake Island, Majuro, Marshall Islands MH96960 . (hereinafter the "Transferee") of the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, hereby transfer all shares, in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances, to the Transferee.

Further, we, the Transferor for ourselves and our successors covenant with the Transferee and its (c) assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, (d) charters, cargoes, stowaways, mortgages and maritime liens, claim or any other debts whatsoever.

In witness whereof we have duly executed this Bill of Sale on this 15 day of January 2022

By:   
Title: Director



(a) Name in full of Body of Corporate, (b) Full name(s) and address(es) of transferee(s) with their description in the case of individuals, and adding "as joint owners" where such is the case.(c) "his", "their" or "its", (d) If any subsisting encumbrance add "save as appears by the registry of the said ship", (e) Signatures and description of witness, i.e. Director, Secretary, etc. (as the case may be).

NOTE - A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship; and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences.

NOTE - Registered Owners or Mortgagees are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British Ships inform of any change of residence on their part.

Source: The Panel.




## Annex 36A: ANNI, aka DPRK-flagged KYONG SONG 3

### *Ship voyage and cargo*

The then Palau-flagged ANNI (IMO: 8356584), a 13-year old cargo ship, closely mirrored AN HAI 6's transition to the DPRK's fleet (figure 36A-1). The vessel, under its previous registration as China-flagged RONG GANG 1, sailed a domestic route. RONG GANG 1 registered a port call at Taizhou Yuanshan Shipyard in Zhengjiang Province on 2 March 2022, the same location where ANNI's AIS transmission was located the following day. RONG GANG 1's last AIS transmission was 1 May 2022 in the same location. By mid-June, ANNI, transmitting under the Niue flag, sailed out of the shipyard, registering Ningde as its next destination,<sup>81</sup> followed by Busan. It then sailed the same route turning westwards towards the East China Sea before dropping transmission in the direction of Korea Bay. By 8 July 2022, ANNI was located outside Nampo, DPRK. Just a month prior, AN HAI 6 was located in the same waters.

**Figure 36A-1: ANNI's international voyage route, May-August 2022**



Source: S&P Global Seaweb, Windward, annotated by the Panel. Inset imagery Google Earth Pro (imagery provided only for location purposes, not at date of AIS transmission).

When ANNI was still at the shipyard, a draft change was recorded on a maritime database on 14 June 2022, indicating a possible loading of cargo. Satellite imagery subsequently provided by a Member State showed ANNI with closed cargo holds when it was located outside Nampo on 21 July 2022 (figure 36A-2). By 29 August 2022, ANNI began transmitting on maritime databases as the DPRK ship KYONG SONG 3, south-west of Cho-do island.

<sup>81</sup> The vessel did not appear to go into port.

**Figure 36A-2: ANNI at West Sea Barrage, outside Nampo, DPRK, 21 July 2022**



*Source:* Member State.

As with the case of AN HAI 6, ROK authorities confirmed ANNI was at Busan port for a partial crew disembarkation, with no cargo loaded or offloaded. Authorities replied that there was no documentation regarding the cargo that was submitted to maritime authorities as the vessel had entered port for crew change purposes. ANNI departed the same day it arrived, on 25 June 2022, with the destination of Yokohama, Japan. Niue Ship Registry provided the same information for ANNI's submitted voyage plan in its single delivery voyage.

According to Niue Ship Registry, ANNI was registered for a single delivery voyage on 29 April 2022 from Taizhou, China to Yokohama, Japan with two requested stops at Ningde and Busan for bunkering and crew change respectively. The ship registry stated that *"After receiving UNSC letter ... dated 23 June 2022 regarding the vessel AN HAI 6 (IMO 8355786), and finding that the vessel shared a similar request for stops at Ningde, China and Busan, Korea on its delivery voyage to Yokohama, Japan, NSR took the initiative to close the vessel's registration on 27 June 2022 due to potential breach of UN sanctions"*.

The Panel also wrote to the Marshall Islands, Palau, China and the associated entities and individuals as relevant parties to the ship and cargo.

Marshall Islands assisted the Panel in its investigations with the relevant documentation. As part of its reply, the Trust Company of the Marshall Islands, Inc. (TCMI) confirmed Wuzhou Shipping Co., Ltd (hereafter "Wuzhou Shipping") as the Marshall Islands incorporated non-resident domestic entity for

ANNI, with a Chinese national as its Director. The Qualified Intermediary who submitted the application for Wuzhou Shipping lists a mailing address in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, China. Wuzhou Shipping has yet to reply, including on its vessel sale, its cargo and ship activity.

Palau has yet to reply.

China replied *“The Niue-flagged vessel ANNI has only one record of leaving port call in China in 2022. It declared to leave Taizhou port for Yokohama port in June 2022 and was not seen in Chinese territorial waters ever since. China found no activities in violation of the DPRK-related Security Council Resolutions by the vessel”*.

#### *Crew transfers*

Similar to AN HAI 6, ANNI registered a gap in AIS transmission as the ship sailed north through the Yellow Sea, before it retransmitted outside Nampo by 8 July 2022.

#### *Ship-to-ship transfer*

Following its arrival in the DPRK, KYONG SONG 3 was observed on satellite imagery conducting ship-to-ship transfer with the China-flagged ZHENYANGXIN in DPRK waters on 1 September 2022, in further contravention of Security Council resolutions. See annex 44 for details.

*Source:* The Panel.

## Annex 36B: Bill of Sale of ANNI

Prescribed by the Commissioners of Customs & Excise with the consent of the Secretary Of State for Trade *Form No. 10A* X.S.79 A

## BILL OF SALE (Body Corporate)

IMO Number	Name of Ship	Official number, Year and Port of Registry	Whether a Sailing, Steam or Motor Ship	Horse Power of Engines, if any
8356584	RONG GANG I	20086242226, 2009, China	Motor ship	1765 KW


	meters	cm	Number of Tons	
Length	96	50	Gross	Net
Breadth	15	80	2997	1678
Depth	7	40		

And as described in more detail in the Certificate of the Surveyor and/the Register Book.

We, (a) Jiangsu Hesheng Shipping Co., Ltd., hereinafter "the Transferor" having our registered office at 38 Qingnian West Road, Nantong City, Jiangsu Province, China in consideration of the sum of USD 1,380,000 (say United States Dollars one million three hundred and eighty thousand only) and other good and valuable consideration paid to us by (b) Wuzhou Shipping Co., Ltd., Trust Company Complex, Ajeltake Road Ajeltake Island, Majuro, Marshall Islands MH96960. (hereinafter the "Transferee") of the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, hereby transfer all shares, in the Ship above particularly described, and in her boats and appurtenances, to the Transferee.

Further, we, the Transferor for ourselves and our successors covenant with the Transferee and its (c) assigns, that we have power to transfer in manner aforesaid the premises hereinbefore expressed to be transferred, and that the same are free from all encumbrances, (d) charters, cargoes, stowaways, mortgages and maritime liens, claim or any other debts whatsoever.

In witness whereof we have duly executed this Bill of Sale on this 15 day of March 2022.

By:   
Title: Director

(a) Name in full of Body of Corporate, (b) Full name(s) and address(es) of transferee(s) with their description in the case of individuals, and adding "as joint owners" where such is the case. (c) "his", "their" or "its". (d) If any subsisting encumbrance add "save as appears by the registry of the said ship". (e) Signatures and description of witness, i.e. Director, Secretary, etc. (as the case may be).

NOTE - A purchaser of a registered British Vessel does not obtain a complete title until the Bill of Sale has been recorded at the Port of Registry of the ship; and neglect of this precaution may entail serious consequences.

NOTE - Registered Owners or Mortgagees are reminded of the importance of keeping the Registrar of British Ships informed of any change of residence on their part.

Source: The Panel.

**Annex 37: Taizhou (Haimen) Yuanshan Shipyard**

The following ships were located at Taizhou Yuanshan Shipping Project Limited Company (hereafter “Taizhou Yuanshan Shipyard”), at Zhejiang Province, China, in 2021-2022, before their acquisition by the DPRK.

AN HAI 6 (IMO: 8355786) nka DPRK-flagged RAK WON 1

**Figure 37-1: AN HAI 6 sailing as BI XIANG 66 at Taizhou Yuanshan Shipyard, 8 March 2022**



*Source:* Windward; inset imagery Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel.



ANNI (IMO: 8356584) aka DPRK-flagged KYONG SONG 3

ANNI then sailing as RONG GANG 1, was at Taizhou Yuanshan Shipyard between April and June 2022, sailing out by mid-June 2022 (figure 37-2). The vessel started transmitting as ANNI on its Niue-registered identity on 3 May 2022 at the same location.

**Figure 37-2: ANNI sailing as RONG GANG 1 at Taizhou Yuanshan Shipyard, 8 April 2022**




*Source:* AIS signal: S&P Global, Windward; satellite imagery, Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel.

### CJK OSAKA, nka DPRK-flagged SU RYONG SAN

Another cargo ship, CJK OSAKA, investigated by the Panel in 2021, called at Taizhou Haimen Shipyard around August 2021 before arriving in DPRK. The vessel has since joined the DPRK fleet, sailing as SU RYONG SAN.

**Figure 37-3: SU RYONG SAN sailing as CJK Osaka at Taizhou (Haimen) Yuanshan Shipyard, China, July - August 2020**



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; inset imagery Google Earth Pro (Imagery provided only for location purposes, not at date of AIS transmission).

The Panel wrote to the legal representative and majority shareholder of Taizhou Yuanshan Shipyard,<sup>82</sup> seeking information on the vessels including the individuals and entities that requested work undertaken, nature of the works undertaken, cargo and crew information and possible commonality of associations of individuals connected to these vessels. Taizhou Yuanshan Shipyard has yet to reply.

*Source:* The Panel.

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<sup>82</sup> A Mr. Ye ZL, according to public company documentation.

### **Annex 38: Rongcheng Yuantong Shipyard**

The Panel has previously investigated multiple vessels that visited the same shipyards / ship repair facilities / docks both before and after their involvement in sanctions evasion. These shipyards were located along the Baima river in Fujian, China (used by the “direct delivery” tankers as well as vessels associated with identity laundering operations); and at a ship repair dock along the Chao Phraya river in Thailand (used by vessels that underwent complex vessel identity laundering operations).

The Panel’s past reports have listed vessel modifications for sanctions evasion purposes, including: physical changes, modification of vessel type, and outfitting of equipment for obfuscation purposes such as the installation of second or multiple AIS transponders onboard vessels. Where shipyards perform such services for suspect vessels, they facilitate sanctions evasion. The Panel has focused on shipyard(s) that have hosted several ships connected to the DPRK, including through vessel acquisition, and vessels that have conducted sanctionable activities.

In investigating current and previous cargo ships that were acquired by the DPRK, the Panel noted Jiangjiabu Rongcheng Yuantong Ship Repairing Co., Ltd (hereafter “Rongcheng Yuantong Shipyard”) located at Shidao, as a shipyard where several vessels were last located before they subsequently appeared in the DPRK. These included (see also figures 38-1 to 38-3):

- (i) TOMI HARU (IMO: 9054779), nka DPRK-flagged SU RYONG SAN 1
- (ii) TOYU HARU (IMO: 9054767), nka DPRK-flagged SO BAEK SU
- (iii) SF BLOOM (IMO: 8891297), aka DPRK-transmitted PU YANG 2
- (iv) OCEAN SKY (IMO: 9125308), nka DPRK-flagged CHOL BONG SAN 1


The above vessels were located at Rongcheng Yuantong Shipyard on various occasions and with varying durations between 2021 and 2022. For instance: prior to their appearance in DPRK territorial waters in mid-June 2022, both TOMI HARU and TOYO HARU were located at the shipyard in January 2022 before appearing in the DPRK in June and in April 2022 respectively; SF BLOOM was at the shipyard at least between December 2021 and January 2022. SF BLOOM was observed on satellite imagery in DPRK territorial waters by early March 2022; and OCEAN SKY transmitted at the shipyard over several months during the second half of 2021 before appearing under the DPRK fleet in April 2022. All these vessels were flagged / transferred to the DPRK thereafter, with TOMI HARU, TOYO HARU and SF BLOOM also conducting sanctionable activities (see relevant main text sections and annexes).

**Figure 38-1: TOMI HARU and TOYO HARU, Rongcheng Yuantong Shipyard, 17 January 2022**




*Source:* Member State.



**Figure 38-2: SF BLOOM, Rongcheng Yuantong Shipyard, December 2021**

*Source:* S&P Global's Seaweb; inset imagery, Maxar Technologies, annotated by the Panel.

**Figure 38-3: OCEAN SKY, Rongcheng Yuantong Shipyard, 1 October 2021**

*Source:* Maxar Technologies, annotated by the Panel.


The Panel sought information on the above-mentioned ships including, the individual(s) and/or entity(s) that requested work undertaken on the vessel; details of all works undertaken; relevant documentation, payment information for services rendered; and information of cargo and crew. The Panel also sought additional information on other foreign-flagged vessels suspected to have been acquired by the DPRK. Rongcheng Yuantong Shipyard has yet to reply.

*Source:* The Panel.

### Annex 39: TOMI HARU, nka DPRK-flagged SA HYANG SAN 1

TOMI HARU (IMO: 9054779), a 30-year-old cargo ship, was flagged under the Palau Ship Registry from November 2016 to February 2022. It was registered as flagged under the DPRK on August 2022 as SA HYANG SAN 1,<sup>83</sup> although the ship was already in DPRK territorial waters by 19 June 2022 (figure 39) and had begun transmitting a DPRK-associated MMSI prior to its official flagging<sup>84</sup>. Its last port of call prior to appearing in DPRK waters was at a shipyard at Shidao (see annex 38) in January 2022.

**Figure 39: TOMI HARU's voyage to the DPRK, January - June 2022**



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; inset imagery, Planet Labs.

#### *Ownership and management*

The Panel's investigations have shown that sanctions evaders capitalize on the maritime industry's complex ownership and operator arrangements to prevent easy linkages. To do so, different paper companies are often set up with different nominee directors, while indirect linkages persist with the ownership and / or management. This appeared to be the case for the ownership and management of TOMI HARU. The Seychelles-incorporated SL International Shipping Co Ltd (hereafter "SL International") served as registered owner of TOMI HARU since December 2013, while it was sailing as LUCKY STAR 9.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> INMARSAT data.

LUCKY STAR 9 visited DPRK ports between 2014 and 2015, prior to resolutions in 2016 and 2017 that prohibited the import and export of a wide swathe of sectoral goods. The Hong Kong incorporated Sunny International Shipping Co Ltd (hereafter “Sunny International”), served as the ship’s operator from December 2013 till May 2019 when HongKong Yong Xiang Shipping Ltd (hereafter “HongKong Yong Xiang”) took over. A Chinese national Mr. Feng ZW served as the previous founding director of Sunny International. Mr. Feng was also the owner of SL International till 2020 when he was replaced by another Chinese national, Mr. Gao HB, of HongKong Yong Xiang, as SL International’s owner, the last listed ship manager<sup>85</sup> prior to TOMI HARU’s transfer to the DPRK. Sunny International had also managed the DPRK-flagged KUM YA (IMO: 9004073) when it was sailing as then Cambodia-flagged LUCKY STAR 7, prior to its transfer to the DPRK in 2016.

The Panel wrote to the relevant Member States, entities and individuals, including Palau, China, Mr. Gao, Mr. Feng, and Rongcheng Yuantong Shipyard.

Palau has yet to reply.

China replied that *“Due to the lack of details in the information provided by the Panel relating to TOMI HARU and TOYO HARU, Chinese authorities were not able to conduct effective investigations. Considering that, the Panel should not include the above-mentioned information in the report”*.

Rongcheng Yuantong shipyard has yet to reply.

Mr. Gao has yet to reply. Mr. Feng has yet to reply.

Investigations continue.

*Source:* The Panel.


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<sup>85</sup> IMO records.

## Annex 40: TOYO HARU nka DPRK-flagged SO BAEK SU

TOYO HARU (IMO: 9054767), a 31-year-old cargo ship, was flagged under the Palau Ship Registry from September 2015 to December 2021.<sup>86</sup> It was registered as flagged under the DPRK on October 2022 as SO BAEK SU,<sup>87</sup> although the ship was already in DPRK territorial waters in April and May 2022 conducting prohibited ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK vessels, as observed on satellite imagery (figures 40-1 and 40-2). Like TOYO HARU, its last port of call before dropping AIS signal in Korea Bay waters was at a shipyard at Shidao, China (see annex 38), in January 2022. AIS transmission recorded TOYO HARU at the said shipyard since 29 November 2021. Prior to that, it was at Luoyuan Bay harbor's outer anchorage area on 21 November.

**Figure 40-1: TOYO HARU conducting ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK-flagged EVER GLORY, facilitated by the China-flagged floating crane JIANG SHEN FU 6988, 3 April 2022**



Source: Member State.

<sup>86</sup> IMO records.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.



**Figure 40-2: TOYO HARU conducting ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK-flagged PAEK YANG SAN (IMO: 9020534) and then China-flagged SHUN CHANG 78 (IMO: 8594552), 30 May 2022**



*Source:* Member State.

TOYO HARU was berthed at Nampo by 24 August 2022 (figure 40-3), all but confirming its acquisition by the DPRK despite only being officially flagged a few months later.

**Figure 40-3: TOYO HARU berthed at Nampo port, 24 August 2022**



*Source:* Member State.

Like the other acquired vessels the Panel investigated in this report, in addition to violating the relevant Security Council resolution on ship-to-ship transfers, the ship also sailed to Chinese ports following acquisition. SO BAEK SU's last location was at Dalian cargo vessel anchorage area, arriving by 26 December 2022.<sup>88</sup>

### *Ownership and Management*

Like TOMI HARU (IMO: 9054779) (see preceding annex), TOYO HARU was managed by HongKong Yong Xiang Shipping Ltd. TOYO HARU and TOMI HARU also shared the same previous technical manager, the Hong Kong-incorporated Sunny International Shipping Co Ltd, when they sailed as LUCKY STAR 8 and LUCKY STAR 9 respectively.

Palau has yet to reply.

China replied that *“Due to the lack of details in the information provided by the Panel relating to TOMI HARU and TOYO HARU, Chinese authorities were not able to conduct effective investigations. Considering that, the Panel should not include the above-mentioned information in the report”*.

Rongcheng Yuantong shipyard has yet to reply.

Mr. Gao has yet to reply. Mr. Feng has yet to reply.

Investigations continue.

*Source:* The Panel.

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
<sup>88</sup> Maritime database information as of 4 January 2023.

## Annex 41: SHUN CHANG 78 / SUNCHANG 78, nka DPRK-flagged RAK NANG 2

The Panel first noted the China-flagged SHUN CHANG 78 / SUNCHANG 78's<sup>89</sup> (MMSI: 412427130) presence in DPRK territorial waters when it transmitted outside Nampo in mid-June 2022. It next transmitted along the Taean River at Nampo port in July, where it remained dry-docked, through August (figures 41-1 and 41-2). The DPRK officially flagged SHUN CHANG 78 in October, four months after its arrival at Nampo, when the vessel received an IMO number 8594552 in accordance with IMO procedures, sailing as RAK NANG 2.

**Figure 41-1: SHUN CHANG 78's voyage, May - June 2022**

Maritime tracking showed SHUN CHANG 78, a 10-year old bulk carrier, sailing north through the Yellow Sea on 25 May 2022, prior to its arrival in the DPRK in June



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

<sup>89</sup> These vessel names are used interchangeably.

**Figure 41-2: SHUN CHANG 78's location, dry-docked at Nampo, July – August 2022**

Source: AIS signal overlay, Windward; Satellite imagery, Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel.




Source: AIS signal overlay, Windward; Satellite imagery, Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel; inset imagery, Member State.



Prior to its arrival at Nampo, SHUN CHANG 78 was located along the same stretch of the Yangtze River in the Nantong area where other vessels<sup>90</sup> investigated in this report were also previously located. Port analysis indicate SHUN CHANG 78 was moored pier side at a loading area near Jingjiang port. Subsequent satellite imagery obtained from a Member State showed SHUN CHANG 78 also transited at Shidao's port waiting area on 21 April 2022 during the time when its AIS signal was dropped (figure 41-3). A Member State also provided satellite imagery of SHUN CHANG 78<sup>91</sup> conducting ship-to-ship transfer with the DPRK-flagged PAEK YANG SAN (IMO: 9020534) and with TOYO HARU near Cho-do Island on 30 May 2022. See also relevant sections of main text and its annexes for this ship-to-ship transfer.

**Figure 41-3: SHUN CHANG 78's voyage, April to August 2022**



<sup>90</sup> TONG KANG (MMSI: 412326350) see also relevant main text and annexes relating to SF BLOOM (IMO: 8891297); and ZHENGYANXIN (MMSI: 413272340)

<sup>91</sup> Prior to its flagging under the DPRK.



*Source:* Windward; Google Earth Pro; inset monochromatic imagery, Member State, annotated by the Panel.

The Panel requested information from China on SHUN CHANG 78 including: confirmation on the vessel's ship registration; ship sale where applicable; customs and shipping documentation of any cargo onboard; beneficial ownership information; and last known AIS transmission prior to its departure from China. Given the lack of available information on the owners and managers of SHUN CHANG 78, the Panel sought China's assistance to convey a list detailed questions including on the vessel sale to the owners and managers.

The Panel notes that Security Council resolutions bans all ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK vessels as well as (new and used) vessel sale to and acquisition by the DPRK, which includes "*ships, boats and floating structures*".

China replied "*China didn't find any evidence that SHUN CHANG 78 was involved in ship-to-ship smuggling. The vessel has been in a status of cancellation since November 2021. The Panel should not include the above-mentioned information in the report*".

*Source:* The Panel.

### Annex 42A: SF BLOOM, nka PU YANG 2 (IMO: 8891297)

SF BLOOM and another vessel cooperated to obfuscate the former's voyage to the DPRK between February and March 2022 while carrying illicit cargo. A few months later, SF BLOOM began transmitting as the DPRK-flagged PU YANG 2 at Nampo on 30 July 2022. Entities and individuals associated with ships from several cases the Panel previously investigated<sup>92</sup> reappear in the SF BLOOM case, indicating that these sanctions evasion networks remain active.


According to information received from Palau, the ship's then flag registry, SF BLOOM was de-registered on 11 March 2022 from its registry at the request of the owner on the basis of the vessel's sale and transfer to a new (unknown) flag (see annexes 42B-42D).

The Panel's investigations are summarized below:

#### Figure 42A-1: SF BLOOM and TONG KANG, February 2022

- SF BLOOM was at Bayuquan port between 7 and 15 February 2022 where it picked up large cylindrical cargo.
- SF BLOOM sailed towards Korea Bay waters where it dropped AIS transmission on 16 February 2022 as it headed in an easterly direction.
- TONG KANG was in the vicinity on the same date.

#### *SF BLOOM and TONG KANG's voyage in February 2022*



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.


<sup>92</sup> S/2021/777, para. 81 and annex 40, in association with ENTERPRISE (IMO: 9153331), a DPRK acquired ship.

## February - April 2022 voyage : TONG KANG and SF BLOOM

### TONG KANG

- Panel investigations found that TONG KANG, a ship of similar length as SF BLOOM, manipulated its AIS identifiers to mimic SF BLOOM's digital signature.
- TONG KANG's spoofing of SF BLOOM's AIS identity gave the appearance on maritime platforms that SF BLOOM had sailed from Bayuquan to Hai Phong, Vietnam, rather than to its actual destination, the DPRK.
- While spoofing SF BLOOM's identifiers, TONG KANG also transmitted on a fraudulent ship name "9" on 20 February 2022, while sailing south out of the Yellow Sea, reaching Hai Phong waters by 4 March.

**Figure 42A-2: TONG KANG transmitting on SF BLOOM's identifiers and a fraudulent ship name "9", February – March 2022**



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

### February – April 2022: SF BLOOM's actual location

- Meanwhile, the actual SF BLOOM, loaded with cylindrical cargo, sailed without AIS signal towards the DPRK, reaching its waters by 23 February 2022 (figure 3a).
- Satellite imagery provided by a Member State showed SF BLOOM on 3 March 2022 anchored in DPRK waters with the same cargo it loaded at Bayuquan, China.
- After appearing to have undergone a quarantine period, SF BLOOM entered Nampo port through the lockgate on 19 April, three weeks after it was observed in DPRK waters (figure 42A-4).

**Figure 42A-3: SF BLOOM on 23 February 2022, Nampo Lockgate, DPRK**



Source: Maxar Technologies

**Figure 42A-4: SF BLOOM on 3 March, 19 April and 15 May 2022, Nampo, DPRK**

3 March 2022



19 April 2022




15 May 2022

Source: Member State.

TONG KANG, March – April 2022

- TONG KANG, transmitting as ‘SF BLOOM’ following its visit outside Hai Phong port area, Viet Nam, resumed transmitting on its legitimate identity on 8 March 2022 as it sailed north toward Zhoushan, China, though still transmitting SF BLOOM’s IMO number intermittently. No maritime platforms reviewed by the Panel have recorded TONG KANG’s transmissions since 20 April where the vessel last transmitted in the Hangzhou Bay area.

**Figure 42A-5: TONG KANG switching back to its identifiers in Chinese waters, 8 March 2022**




Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.



### PU YANG 2 (formerly SF BLOOM), August - November 2022


After entering the DPRK's fleet, PU YANG 2 began calling at Chinese ports including Dalian and Longkou. For example, in September 2022, the vessel made a round trip from Nampo to Longkou port and back again, transmitting AIS signal for the most part of its journey.

**Figure 42A-6: PU YANG 2's port / port area calls, September 2022**



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

**Figure 42A-7: PU YANG 2's port / port area calls, October – November 2022**



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; inset imagery, Member State.

### *Ownership and Management*

SF BLOOM's current and previous owners and operators have been tied to several DPRK sanctions evasion cases previously investigated by the Panel (see relevant section in this report's main text). The Panel wrote to the relevant Member States, entities and individuals, including Palau, China, Vietnam, Sino Ever Treasure Ltd, and Hong Chuan International Logistics Co Ltd.

The Panel sought information from Palau including: de-registration information, ship voyage and AIS details, crew list and vessel ownership, management and sale information while under its flag. Palau has yet to reply.

The Panel sought information from Viet Nam including: TONG KANG's activities in Hai Phong waters and identifier validation and other pre-arrival information submitted by the ship. Viet Nam replied that *"Regarding the request of the PoE to provide information about the vessel named TONG KANG (MMSI: 412326350), the Vietnamese authorities are working closely with each other to check and verify related information. We will keep the PoE informed as soon as we receive official information from our capital"*.


The Panel sought information from China including: customs, shipping information, ordering customers and exports details of cargo loaded on SF BLOOM at Bayuquan port in February 2022; as well as information with regards vessel registration status, beneficial ownership information, and AIS tracks for TONG KANG. China replied that *"TONG KANG is in a status of cancellation and the investigation by Chinese authorities is still ongoing. The Panel should not mention this vessel in the report."* China also replied: *The DPRK-flagged vessel PU YANG 2 arrived at Yantai port from Nampo loaded with silicon iron in August 2022 and left Yantai port in the same month. It arrived at Longkou port empty-loaded from Nampo in September 2022 and left Longkou port loaded with groceries in the same month. China found no activities in violation of the DPRK-related Security Council Resolutions by the vessel"*.

For Sino Ever Treasure and Hong Chuan International, the Panel requested information on SF BLOOM including: beneficial ownership details, due diligence process on its counterparties, end-user verification, account of the ship's activities and associated entities of interest linked to their businesses. Sino Ever Treasure has yet to reply. Hong Chuan International has yet to reply.

*Source:* The Panel.

**Annex 42B: SF BLOOM (aka PU YANG 2)'s onward sale***Certificate and application for closure of ship registry for SF BLOOM, 10-11 March 2022*

CERTIFICATE | CERTIFICADO | 证书 | СЕРТИФИКАТ | ΠΙΣΤΟΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟ | CERTIFICAT



## REPUBLIC OF PALAU

### CERTIFICATE OF CLOSURE OF REGISTRY

Vessel Name: SF BLOOM	
IMO No or ID No: 8891297	Port of Registry: MALAKAL HARBOR
Call Sign: T8A3653	Official No: P046261
MMSI No: 511 100 499	Vessel Type: MULTIPURPOSE CARGO SHIP


**Ownership Details:**


Name:	Residence:	IMO No:
SINO EVER TREASURE LIMITED	UNIT A, 3/F, CHEONG SUN TOWER, 116-118 WING LOK STREET, SHEUNG WAN, 116002, HONG KONG, HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PRC	5238411


I hereby certify that the registration of the above-mentioned ship as a ship navigating under the Republic of Palau Flag was terminated on the date given below and an entry was made in the merchant ship register to this effect.


The reason for de-registration is: VESSEL SOLD / UNKNOWN NEW FLAG


Issued On: 11/03/2022

Issued At: 

Issued By: 



Certificate No: 

Deputy Registrar: 



Electronic Signature



Scan to verify this document or visit [www.palauflag.com](http://www.palauflag.com)



PISR C-199  
Rev. 08.09.20

Palau International Ship Registry

[www.palauflag.com](http://www.palauflag.com)

**APPLICATION FOR THE CLOSURE  
OF THE REGISTRY**

**PART 1. VESSEL PARTICULARS**

Vessel Name:	SF BLOOM	Official Number:	P046261
IMO Number:	8891297	Call Sign:	T8A3653

**PART 2. OWNER INFORMATION**

Name of Owner:	SINO EVER TREASURE LIMITED		
Address:	UNIT A, 3/F., CHEONG SUN TOWER, 118-118 WING LOK STREET, SHEUNG WAN, HONG KONG	Company Name:	SINO EVER TREASURE LIMITED
		Citizenship:	P.R.China

**PART 3. APPLICANT INFORMATION**

Name of Applicant:	GAO, [REDACTED]		
Address:	Liaoning china	Company Name:	SINO EVER TREASURE LIMITED
		Citizenship:	P.R.China

**PART 4. REASON FOR DE-REGISTRATION OF THE VESSEL:**

Sold

**PART 5. NEXT FLAG THE VESSEL WILL BE REGISTERED UNDER:**

Unknown

**PART 6. DOCUMENTS REQUIRED**

Please kindly issue:	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Certificate of Closure of Registry	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Deletion Closure of Registry CSR (submit A.016 Application for Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR))
----------------------	--	--

**PART 7. OATH AND DECLARATION OF THE APPLICANT**

I, (Name of the Applicant) **GAO, [REDACTED]**

do hereby swear and confirm that I am authorized person to act on behalf of the company and/or the Shipowners of the subject vessel as per Part 2 and that all information contained in this application is true and correct.





I confirm that Shipowner will return to the Palau International Ship Registry valid Provisional or Permanent Certificate of Registry currently issued for the ship, to the office of the Palau International Ship Registry in Piraeus Greece for deletion. The applicant is aware that the Original DELETION Certificate will not be released until the valid Provisional or Permanent Certificate of Registry issued by the Palau International Ship Registry is returned to the latter..

Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Authority under which this document is signed (if applicable) \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date 2022. 3. 10

Approved By: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Place: \_\_\_\_\_

PISR A008  
Rev. 31.03.20  
Page 1 of 2



Source: The Panel; annotations and redactions by the Panel



# Annex 42C: SF BLOOM (aka PU YANG 2)'s Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR)

Application for CSR record for SF BLOOM following request for ship registry closure due to vessel sale, 11 March 2022

**APPLICATION FOR CONTINUOUS SYNOPSIS  
RECORD (CSR)**

**DOCUMENT NUMBER: 10**  
**FOR THE SHIP WITH IMO NUMBER: 8891297**





**PART 1. INFORMATION**

Dates should be in the format yyyy/mm/dd

1.	This Document applies from (date):	2022.3.10
2.	Flag State:	PALAU
3.	Date of registration with the State indicated in 2	2021.7.5
4.	Name of Ship:	sf bloom
5.	Port of Registration:	MALAKAL HARBOR
6.	Name of current registered owner(s) Registered Address(es):	SINO EVER TREASURE LIMITED UNIT A, 3/F., CHEONG SUN TOWER, 116-118 WING LOK STREET, SHEUNG WAN, HONG KONG
7.	Registered owner identification number:	6238411
8.	If Applicable, name of current bareboat charterer(s) Registered Address(es):	
9.	Name of Company (International Safety Management): Registered Address(es)	SINO EVER TREASURE LIMITED UNIT A, 3/F., CHEONG SUN TOWER, 116-118 WING LOK STREET, SHEUNG WAN, HONG KONG
10.	Company Identification Number:	6238411
11.	Name of all classification societies with which the ship is classed:	
12.	Administration/Government/Recognized Organization which issued Document of Compliance: Body which carried out audit (if different)	IRS
13.	Administration/Government/Recognized Organization which issued Safety Management Certificate Body which carried out audit (if different):	IRS
14.	Administration/Government/Recognized Organization which issued International Ship Security Certificate Body which carried out audit (if different):	IRS
15.	Date on which the ship ceased to be registered with the State indicated in 2:	2022.3.10
16.	Remarks (insert relevant information as appropriate):	

**PART 2. THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THIS RECORD IS CORRECT IN ALL RESPECTS**

Issued by the Company or Master	GAO, [REDACTED]	<div style="background-color: black; width: 150px; height: 100px; margin: 0 auto;"></div> Signature of authorized person
Date of Issue:	2022.3.11	
Name of authorized person:	GAO, [REDACTED]	

PISR A.016  
Rev 07.05.2019  
Page 1 of 2

Source: The Panel; annotations and redactions by the Panel



## Annex 42D: SF BLOOM (aka PU YANG 2)'s management

The technical management company of SF BLOOM that prior managed SF BLOOM. Hong Chuan International Logistics Co Ltd (hereafter "Hong Chuan International") was also the ship manager since 2012 under the Tanzania (Zanzibar) and Cambodian flags. Hong Chuan International shared a similar name in its email address to the former ship manager, the Dalian, Liaoning-based Dalian Taiyuan International Shipping Agency Co Ltd, when the ship was sailing as DOUBLE HAPPINESS 1 from 2012 to 2014.



**GOVERNMENT OF ZANZIBAR**  
**CONTINUOUS SYNOPSIS RECORD (CSR)**  
 Document number 8 for the ship with IMO Number 8891297



Information		
1	This document applies from (date):	2021-06-26
2	Flag State:	Tanzania
3	Date of registration with the State indicated in 2:	2016-06-16
4	Name of ship	TOWIN
5	Port of registration:	Zanzibar
6	Name of current registered owner(s): Registered address(es):	PARK RICH SHIPPING LIMITED 1/F, LAND LOT NO 42, TONG SHEUNG TSUEN, TAI PO LAM CHUEN, NEW TERRITORIES, Hong Kong
7	Registered owner(s) identification number:	6089461
8	If applicable, name of current registered bareboat charterer(s): Registered address(es):	N/A
9	Name of Company (International Safety Management): Registered address(es): Address(es) of its Safety Management activities (if different):	HONG CHUAN INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS COMPANY LTD 11F-3, # 168, TAH TUNG ST. WESTERN DISTRICT, TAICHUNG CITY, [REDACTED]
10	The Company Identification number:	5679614
11	Name(s) of all classification societies with which the ship is classed:	COSMOS MARINE BUREAU INC
12	Administration / Government / Recognised Organisation which issued the Document of Compliance: Body which carried out the audit (if different):	COSMOS MARINE BUREAU INC. COSMOS MARINE BUREAU INC.
13	Administration / Government / Recognised Organisation which issued the Safety Management Certificate: Body which carried out the audit (if different):	COSMOS MARINE BUREAU INC. COSMOS MARINE BUREAU INC.
14	Administration / Government / Recognised Organisation which issued the International Ship Security Certificate: Body which carried out the audit (if different):	COSMOS MARINE BUREAU INC. COSMOS MARINE BUREAU INC.
15	Date on which the ship ceased to be registered with the State indicated in 2:	2021-06-26
16	Remarks:	Transfer at owner's request to known flag:

This is to certify that this record is correct in all respects.

Issued by the Administration of the **Government of Zanzibar**.

Issued at Zanzibar on 2021-06-26



Registrar of ships

This document was received by the ship and attached to the ship's CSR file on the following date: .....

Source: The Panel; annotations and redactions by the Panel.

## **Annex 43A: Detained designated vessel PETREL 8 (IMO: 9562233)**

### *Ownership and management*

Li Quan Shipping Co Ltd (hereafter “Li Quan Shipping”) was PETREL 8’s registered owner and manager<sup>93</sup> since January 2017. While under its management, the vessel was designated by the UN.<sup>94</sup> The Director of Li Quan Shipping is a Ms. Wei TT. Primary source documentation<sup>95</sup> related to the PETREL 8’s recent vessel sale of 2021 showed Wei as the company’s Director and shareholder. Wei’s name has also appeared in association with previous investigations conducted by the Panel. The following ships with DPRK connections featured in the Panel’s reports have been associated with Wei:

- (A) PETREL 8 (IMO: 9562233), de-flagged
- (B) SAMZIN 8 (nka SAM JIN 8) (IMO: 8810578) DPRK-flagged
- (C) NORTHERN LUCK (IMO: 9061227) DPRK-flagged

In addition to PETREL 8, SAMZIN 8 was investigated by the Panel for having exported DPRK-origin coal in 2020 at Ningbo-Zhoushan waters. The Hong Kong-incorporated Ji Chen Ship Management Co. Ltd was the last recorded entity<sup>96</sup> serving as SAM JIN 8’s ship operator and technical manager, prior to its flagging in August 2019 as the DPRK vessel SAM JIN 8. SAMZIN 8 was sailing as unknown-flagged since April 2017, while corporate registry records show Ji Cheng Ship was dissolved in January 2018.<sup>97</sup> Wei was listed as the contact for Ji Chen Ship.<sup>98</sup>

Ji Chen Ship was also the previous registered owner and manager of two other ships that were flagged under the DPRK:

- KUM SONG 7 (IMO: 8739396) when it was sailing as ZHONG LIAN 9 prior to its transfer to the DPRK in July 2016, and
- KUM SONG 3 (IMO: 8661850) when it was sailing as LONG GANG 7 prior to its transfer to an unknown entity in December 2016 before being flagged under the DPRK fleet in 2017.

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<sup>93</sup> IMO records.

<sup>94</sup> The Panel reported PETREL 8 as exporting DPRK-original coal to Bayuquan port. See S/2018/171, para. 51 and annex 5-2.


<sup>95</sup> Obtained by the Panel from a relevant party as part of its investigations.

<sup>96</sup> IMO records.

<sup>97</sup> Corporate registry records.

<sup>98</sup> Information held on file.

NORTHERN LUCK has been featured in Panel reports for having exported DPRK-origin coal. Li Quan Shipping transferred ownership and management of NORTHERN LUCK (when it was sailing as WAN LONG HAI) to DPRK entities in August 2016. Dalian Longgang Shipping Co Ltd, associated with Wei,<sup>99</sup> remained listed as the registered owner of NORTHERN LUCK following the transfer.<sup>100</sup>



*Source:* The Panel.

Investigations continue.

<sup>99</sup> Dalian Longgang Shipping Co Ltd and Long Gang Shipping Co Ltd share the same address. Information kept on file.

<sup>100</sup> IMO records. Dalian Longgang Shipping is listed on a maritime database as a subsidiary / associated company of the Hong Kong-incorporated Long Gang Shipping Co Ltd.

## Annex 43B: Deletion Certificate of PETREL 8 (IMO: 9562233) following vessel auction, 5 November 2021

The Panel notes that PETREL 8 was listed under IMO records as unknown-flagged as of October 2017 by Comoros, following the vessel's designation.



### DELETION CERTIFICATE CERTIFICAT DE RADIATION

Cert.No. 21/DEL/1300233/0 268

The National Agency of Maritime Affairs of the Union of Comoros hereby certifies that the ship mentioned below was registered under the ownership of:

*L'Agence Nationale des Affaires Maritimes de l'Union des Comores certifie par la présente que le navire mentionné ci-dessous a été enregistré comme étant propriété de ::*

Name <i>Nom</i>	LI QUAN SHIPPING CO., LIMITED
Address <i>Adresse</i>	HONGKONG

In accordance with Article 41.3 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 2001 regarding the International Ship Registry, this ship has been deleted from the Comoros ship registry. At the time of the deletion, the ship was free of all registered encumbrances, mortgages and maritime liens or any other debts or claims whatsoever.

*Conformément à l'article 41.3 de l'Ordonnance relative à la Marine Marchande et à l'immatriculation Des Navires, 2001, ce navire a été radié du registre international des navires de l'Union des Comores. Au moment de la radiation, le navire était libre de toute servitude, hypothèque, et privilège maritime, et quitte de toute autre créance ou réclamation.*

Name of Ship <i>Nom du Navire</i>	Official Number <i>Numéro Officiel</i>	Port of Registry <i>Port d'Immatriculation</i>
PETREL 8	13 00 233	MORONI
Type of Ship <i>Type de Navire</i>	Gross Tonnage <i>Tonnage Brut</i>	IMO Number <i>Numéro OMI</i>
BULK CARRIER	7078	9562233

Issued in Moroni On 05<sup>th</sup> Day of November Year 2021  
*Délivré à le Jour de de l'an*



Form No. DEL/01\_00

Date of issuance: 01/2019

Source: The Panel.

## Annex 43C: Single Delivery Voyage conditions of carriage for PETREL 8



Certificate No.  
LL-22DAL2208SDV\_EXP

### INTERNATIONAL LOAD LINE EXEMPTION CERTIFICATE

Issued under the provisions of the  
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON LOAD LINES, 1966,  
as modified by the Protocol of 1988 relating thereto  
under the authority of the Government of

NIUE

by INTERNATIONAL SHIP CLASSIFICATION

**Particulars of ship**

Name of Ship	Distinctive Number or Letters	Port of Registry	Length (L) as defined in article 2(8) (in metres)	IMO Number
PETREL 8	E6YS2	ALOFI	126.58	9562233

**THIS IS TO CERTIFY:**

That the ship is exempted from the provisions of the Convention, under the authority conferred by article ☐ 6(2)/ ☒ 6(4) <sup>a</sup> of the Convention referred to above.

The provisions of the Convention from which the ship is exempted under article 6(2) are:

The voyage for which exemption is granted under article 6(4) is:

From: NINGDE, CHINA

To: JAKARTA, INDONESIA

Conditions, if any, on which the Exemption Certificate is granted under either ☐ article 6(2) or ☒ article 6(4):

**Remarks:**

This vessel shall only proceed on one single delivery voyage without any passenger or cargo from Ningde, China to Jakarta, Indonesia (or any port of refuge)

This certificate is valid until 18 AUGUST 2022

Issued at NINGDE, CHINA on 18 MAY 2022

Signature, name and stamp of authorized official issuing the certificate

<sup>a</sup> In accordance with IMO ship identification number scheme adopted by the Organization by resolution A.600 (15).  
<sup>b</sup> Delete as appropriate

ISCLASS/LLC EXEMPTION/MAR 2014 /REV.4

Note: ISClass assumes no responsibilities and shall not be liable for any loss, damage, directly or indirectly caused by the information in this document.

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Page 1 of 1

Digitized by Ingeniur CamScanner

Source: The Panel.



## Annex 43D: Port clearance certificate for departure of PETREL 8

## 国际航行船舶出口岸许可证

No. 220802020015439231

存 根	船 名	海燕8	国 籍	纽埃
	驶往港	雅加达	驶离时间	2022-06-11 10:30

签 发 人

2022 年 06 月 11 日



No. 220802020015439231

中 华 人 民 共 和 国

国际航行船舶出口岸许可证

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA PORT CLEARANCE

船 名 Name of Ship	海燕8	国 籍 Nationality	纽埃
	PETREL 8		Niue
驶往港 Next Port	雅加达 Jakarta	驶离时间 Time of Departure	2022-06-11 10:30

签 章: 白马港海事处

Issued by:

时 间:

Date and time:

2022-06-11 10:30:00

备注

Remarks

1、本证自签发时起24小时内有效。

This clearance remains valid within 24 hours from the time issued.

2、本证涂改无效


Correction will render this clearance invalid.

Source: The Panel.

### Annex 43E: Ship voyage of PETREL 8


PETREL 8 was sailing dark following its departure from China in June 2022, re-transmitting on its Niue-associated MMSI as it entered Indonesian territorial waters on 1 July 2022. The ship also briefly transmitted as ‘RETREL 8’ while sailing in the high seas.

**Figure 43E: PETREL 8’s transmissions, sailing as ‘RETREL 8’ on its Niue-assigned MMSI, June-July 2022**



Source: (top) S&P Global’s Seaweb; (bottom) Windward.

**Annex 43F: Photograph of PETREL 8 at anchor, Indonesian waters, 7 August 2022**




*Source:* Social media.

#### Annex 44: China-flagged ZHENYANGXIN (MMSI: 413272340) in ship-to-ship transfer with KYONG SONG 3 (formerly ANNI)

Following its transfer to the DPRK, ANNI sailing as DPRK-flagged KYONG SONG 3, conducted a ship-to-ship transfer on 1 September 2022<sup>101</sup> (see also annex 36 for details). Maritime databases showed the vessel with over four days of dark activity west of Cho-do Island, sailing as KYONG SONG 3 (figure 44-1). Subsequent satellite imagery provided by a Member State showed KYONG SONG 3 engaged in ship-to-ship transfer with the China-flagged ZHENYANGXIN on 1 September 2022 (figure 44-2). Security Council resolutions ban any facilitation or engagement of ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK vessels of any goods or items that are supplied, sold or transferred to or from the DPRK.

**Figure 44-1: ANNI as KYONG SONG 3, outside Nampo, DPRK, August-September 2022**



*Source:* Windward, annotated by the Panel.

<sup>101</sup>

IMO records.

**Figure 44-2: Satellite imagery of ship-to-ship transfer west of Cho-do Island between ZHENYANGXIN and KYONG SONG 3 showing cargo on board the latter, 1 September 2022**



Source: Member State.

The Panel's research into ZHENYANGXIN indicates the vessel is a China-flagged cargo ship with MMSI number: 413272340. ZHENYANGXIN registered over 13 days' lack of an AIS transmission during the time when it was recorded on satellite imagery in DPRK waters. Satellite imagery showed the vessel conducting a ship-to-ship transfer with KYONG SONG 3, facilitated by a floating crane. ZHENYANGXIN had different items onboard (figure 44-2). The vessel has continued to call at a number of Chinese ports / port areas following this ship-to-ship transfer. Prior to its appearance in the DPRK, ZHENYANGXIN made a port call at Lianyungang port.<sup>102</sup>

The Panel requested information from Chinese authorities on ZHENYANGXIN, including confirmation of its identifiers, location of the ship where it registered unaccounted AIS signal during the material time where it was in DPRK waters engaged in ship-to-ship transfer, ownership information of the vessel, customs documentation and information of cargo onboard the ship before it departed China.

<sup>102</sup>

Maritime database AIS tracking.



Given that lack of available information on the owners and managers of ZHENYANGXIN, the Panel also sought Chinese authorities' assistance to convey requested information to the vessel's owner(s) that would explain the presence of the ship in DPRK waters or verifiable evidence that show otherwise, shipping and customs documentation carried on board the ship, relevant transaction and transfer information including payment information, the ordering customer(s) and exports of the cargo on board the vessel.

China replied *"China didn't find any evidence that ZHEN YANG XIN was involved in ship-to-ship smuggling. The Panel should not include the above-mentioned information in the report"*.

*Source:* The Panel.

## Annex 45: JIANG SHEN FU 6899 (MMSI: 413860946)

The Panel first noted the presence of the China-flagged JIANG SHEN FU 6988 in June 2022 when tracking AN HAI 6 (IMO: 8355786) outside Nampo Lockgate (figure 45-1). Maritime databases contained limited information on the vessel, with a reported length of 43 meters. Subsequent satellite imagery provided by a Member State showed the vessel to be a floating crane.

**Figure 45-1: JIANG SHEN FU 6988 outside Nampo Lockgate, June 2022**




*Source:* Marine Traffic; Redaction, Panel.

\*Investigations are still underway on another vessel that transmitted on a Chinese-associated MMSI. The vessel's name has been redacted on the map.

The Panel's tracking of JIANG SHEN FU 6988 indicated the vessel previously sailed on Chinese domestic routes, operating primarily in the Nantong area. The vessel last transmitted in Chinese territorial waters in early 2021.<sup>103</sup> By 2022, JIANG SHEN FU 6988 was operating in DPRK territorial waters, including facilitating transfers involving a DPRK vessel (figure 45-2).

<sup>103</sup>


Windward.

**Figure 45-2: Floating crane JIANG SHEN FU 6988 operating in DPRK territorial waters, 2022**

Source: Member State; map annotation by the Panel.


Panel tracking information showed that when EVER GLORY conducted its ship-to-ship transfer on 3 April 2022 in the West Sea Barrage area, a DPRK vessel transmitting fraudulent identifiers as BRIGHTSHINE and PK@@@ was located in the vicinity. The same fraudulent transmissions were recorded in October and November transmitting in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters and near Shidao respectively (figures 45-3 and 45-4). This vessel also transmitted at other Chinese port areas in 2022 where DPRK vessels had been present. EVER GLORY ceased transmitting on its assigned identifiers in 2017.

**Figure 45-3: DPRK vessel fraudulently transmitting as 'BRIGHTSHINE' / PK@@@@ at vicinity where EVER GLORY conducted ship-to-ship transfer with TOYO HARU and JIANG SHEN FU 6988, April 2022**



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

**Figure 45-4: DPRK vessel fraudulently transmitting as 'PK / PK@@@@@ (MMSI: 45441864) transmitting at Ningbo-Zhoushan and near Shidao, October - November 2022**



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

The Panel asked Chinese authorities for confirmation of the vessel's ship registration, dimensions and last known AIS transmission as well as information of the owners / operators / charterers of the floating crane. The Panel was also asked if the individual(s) and / or entity(s) that owned / operated and / or chartered JIANG SHEN FU 6988 also owned other floating cranes that had unaccounted AIS transmissions over a significant period. The Panel has yet to ascertain whether JIANG SHEN FU 6988 has been acquired by the DPRK and transmitted on its old identifiers. However, given the activity and location of the floating crane, it has most likely come under DPRK control.

The Panel notes that Security Council resolutions bans all ship-to-ship transfers with DPRK vessels as well as (new and used) vessel sale to and acquisition by the DPRK, which includes “*ships, boats and floating structures*”.

China replied “*China didn't find any evidence that JIANG SHEN FU 6988 was involved in ship-to-ship smuggling. There have been no records of port calls or information declarations in China for EVER GLORY. The Panel should not include the above-mentioned information in the report*”.

*Source:* The Panel.



## Annex 46: Export of transportation vehicles to the DPRK

The Panel received satellite imagery from a Member State showed two DPRK-flagged cargo ships, KUM SAN BONG (IMO: 8810384) and KUM SAN BONG 3 (IMO: 8518962), and the China-flagged PENG LU 9 (MMIS: 412454160), all anchored inside Nampo Lockgate in May 2022, laden with trucks and other unidentified items. According to the Member State, these vessels were last observed in Chinese territorial waters prior to their appearance in the DPRK.

### DPRK-flagged KUM SAN BONG


*May 2022*

The DPRK-flagged KUM SAN BONG was located inside the Nampo Lockgate on 1 May 2022 laden with what was reported to be at least four trucks (figure 46-1). According to a Member State, KUM SAN BONG was at anchor in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area prior to its arrival at Nampo. Panel ship tracking showed the ship traveling dark during this period. KUM SAN BONG has transmitted AIS signal and called at several Chinese port/port areas since then. For instance, on 5 September 2022, KUM SAN BONG transmitted outside the Nampo Lockgate before re-transmitting in Hangzhou Bay waters a week later. (figure 46-2).

**Figure 46-1: KUM SAN BONG laden with trucks, with remaining hatch closed, Nampo, 1 May 2022**



*Source:* Member State.

**Figure 46-2: DPRK-flagged KUM SAN BONG's voyage, September 2022**

*Source:* Windward, annotated by the Panel.

### DPRK-flagged KUM SAN BONG 3

Like KUM SAN BONG, the DPRK-flagged KUM SAN BONG 3 was located inside the Nampo Lockgate in May 2022. It was observed on satellite imagery on 17 May with trucks, with what appeared to be covered holds at either end. A Member State information indicated KUM SAN BONG 3 was likewise at anchor in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area prior to its arrival at Nampo. Panel ship tracking showed the ship traveling dark during this period. Since then, like KUM SAN BONG, the KUM SAN BONG 3 has transmitted AIS signal and called at several Chinese port/port areas.<sup>104</sup> For instance, the vessel was located at Weihai waters on 8 September 2022, a day after having departed Nampo. The vessel returned to DPRK waters by 13 September 2022 (figure 46-4).

<sup>104</sup>


AIS tracking on maritime databases.

**Figure 46-3: KUM SAN BONG 3 laden with trucks, with unidentified covered items, Nampo, 17 May 2022**



*Source:* Member State.

**Figure 46-4: DPRK-flagged KUM SAN BONG 3's voyage, September 2022**



*Source:* S&P Global's Seaweb.

The Panel sought the relevant Chinese authorities' assistance into the trucks and other cargo(es) loaded onto the KUM SAN BONG and KUM SAN BONG 3 prior to the ships' arrival in the DPRK in May 2022. As both vessels have continued to visit Chinese ports and/or port areas since May 2022, the competent Chinese maritime authorities would have information concerning the ships' past voyages.

China replied "*KUM SAN BONG and KUM SAN BONG 3 transported glasses and other livelihood goods in 2022, and trucks were not found in their deliveries. No activities were found by the two vessels in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters*".

*Associated entities:*

Panel investigations into the history of the vessels' ownership and management indicated the two vessels shared common Hong Kong-incorporated entities, including during and around the times when both vessels were flagged out between DPRK ownerships. Sanctions evaders often set up shell or front companies to layer and mask their connections. The Panel has yet to determine whether the same individuals (or associates) behind the ships previously may have continued to be associated with the export of the suspected trucks / prohibited cargo(es) or involved in its transportation.

China-flagged PENG LU 9

PENG LU 9 was located inside the Nampo Lockgate in May 2022. It was observed on satellite imagery on 16 May, a day earlier than KUM SAN BONG 3, likewise laden with trucks (figure 46-5).


Panel research showed PENG LU 9 transmitting as a 99m long Chinese cargo ship without an IMO number. Prior to its appearance in Nampo, the vessel had sailed on Chinese domestic coastal routes, including Haiyan and Dalian ports in January 2022 (figure 46-6). PENG LU 9 last recorded an AIS transmission at the port anchorage area at Weihai in the same month. The vessel has not transmitted since September 2022.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>105</sup>

Based on commercial maritime tracking information as of December 2022.


**Figure 46-5: PENG LU 9 laden with trucks and unidentified items, Nampo, 16 May 2022**



Source: Member State.



**Figure 46-6: PENG LU 9's (MMSI: 412454160) voyage where the vessel last transmitted AIS signal, January 2022**



Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel.

The Panel sought information from Chinese authorities concerning PENG LU 9's: ship registration status; voyage and its cargo prior to May 2022; as well as PENG LU 9's ownership management, shipping and customs documentation. Given the similarity of cargo carried onboard, the same timing that KUM SAN BONG, KUM SAN BONG 3 and PENG LU 9 appeared in the DPRK, and lack of AIS transmission on commercial databases of PENG LU 9 since January 2022, the Panel also sought Chinese authorities' information on any link between the three vessels associated with their cargo and their procurement.

China replied "*China didn't find any evidence that PENG LU 9 was involved in the smuggling of trucks*".

## Annex 47: Export of DPRK-origin coal via ship-to-ship transfer

The Panel's reports since 2019 have referenced the presence of DPRK vessels exporting their coal cargo via ship-to-ship transfers in Chinese territorial waters, particularly in Ningbo-Zhoushan. These vessels, tracked by the Panel, continue to travel without AIS signal for the most part of their illicit journey to export coal, and resume transmission only at their subsequent stop-overs at Chinese ports surrounding the Bohai Sea *enroute* back home, where, typically, humanitarian cargo is loaded at port.<sup>106</sup> In several instances, DPRK vessels have not transmitted AIS signal at all and information of their illicit activity can only be observed via high resolution satellite imagery.

The DPRK-flagged vessels TAE YANG (IMO: 8306929) (annex 48) and ZAI ZHOU 2 (IMO: 8774047) (annex 49) that had previously exported DPRK-origin coal in Chinese territorial waters continued their illicit activity. These vessels:

- transmitted AIS signals only during their last voyage leg between Chinese ports surrounding the Bohai Sea and at Nampo in 2022;
- dropped AIS signal after both vessels loaded coal at Nampo port, as they sailed dark to export their coal cargo in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters.

The DPRK-flagged ASIA HONOR previously reported as having exported coal at Ningbo-Zhoushan waters on at least two occasions<sup>107</sup> and known to transmit on a fraudulent identity, continued to do so in mid-2022. Details are at annex 50. DPRK-flagged CHOL BONG SAN (IMO: 8713457) likewise exported bagged cargo assessed by a Member State to be coal,<sup>108</sup> in the same waters. Details are at annex 51.

*Source:* The Panel.

<sup>106</sup> S/2021/777, paras. 100-104 and annex 46.


<sup>107</sup> S/2022/132, paras. 86-87, and S/2021/211, para. 62 and annex 34.

<sup>108</sup> Loaded at Songnim, a known coal-loading terminal in the DPRK.

## Annex 48: Voyage of DPRK-flagged vessel TAE YANG (IMO: 8306929) exporting illicit coal

In April 2022, TAE YANG loaded coal at Nampo port and was located at Ningbo-Zhoushan waters by mid-May, traveling without AIS signal. The vessel resumed AIS transmission after eight weeks when it arrived at Dalian port with cargo holds open and empty. AIS was kept on its return journey to Nampo (see figure 48).

**Figure 48: DPRK-flagged TAE YANG's voyage, April - July 2022**



Source: Windward; (right) satellite imagery: Planet Labs, annotated by the Panel; (left) satellite imagery: Member State.

\*Dotted lines denote no AIS transmissions recorded.

Having illicitly exported coal in an earlier part of their voyage, TAE YANG is subject to paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017) that stipulates the seizure, inspection and impoundment of any vessel at port where there were reasonable grounds of its involvement in sanctioned activities.

The Panel continued to seek the assistance of China on the DPRK vessels' export of coal in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, including information on cargo offloaded by DPRK vessels through ship-to-ship transfer in those waters, the receiving vessels' identifiers, entities and individuals that own, operate and procure any of the cargo from the DPRK vessels, and the relevant shipping documentation and financial transactions. All the vessels were reported by a Member State to be laden with coal, where they remained for a period of time when in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area.


China replied that "*TAE YANG entered Dalian port empty-loaded from Nampo port in July 2022 and left Dalian port loaded with rice, rubber, washing powder, and other livelihood goods in the same month.*"

*Source:* The Panel.

## Annex 49: Voyage of DPRK-flagged vessel ZAI ZHOU 2 (IMO: 8306929) exporting illicit coal

In May 2022, the DPRK-flagged ZAI ZHOU 2 loaded coal at Nampo and travelled without AIS signal, reaching Ningbo-Zhoushan waters by July, showing laden coal cargo on satellite imagery. The vessel departed Ningbo-Zhoushan area for Longkou port after off-loading its coal cargo, based on Member State information. ZAI ZHOU 2 transmitted AIS signal only at Longkou port where it loaded bagged cargo for a return trip to Nampo (see figure 49-1).

**Figure 49-1: DPRK-flagged ZAI ZHOU 2's (IMO: 8774047) voyage, May - August 2022**



*Source:* Map and colored satellite imagery (shown only for location purposes and not reflective on actual AIS transmission date): Windward; monochromatic satellite imagery: Member State.

\*Dotted lines denote no AIS transmissions recorded.



**Figure 49-2: ZAI ZHOU 2 laden with coal, Nampo, 22 May 2022**




*Source:* Member State.

**Figure 49-3: ZAI ZHOU 2 laden with coal in holds, Ningbo-Zhoushan area, 8 July 2022**



*Source:* Member State

**Figure 49-4: ZAI ZHOU 2 exporting DPRK-origin coal in the past, 5 October 2021<sup>109</sup>**



Source: Member State.

<sup>109</sup>

S/2022/132, paras.83-85 and annex 56.

Having illicitly exported coal in an earlier part of its voyage, ZAI ZHOU 2 is subject to paragraph 9 of resolution 2397 (2017) that stipulates the seizure, inspection and impoundment of any vessel at port where there were reasonable grounds of its involvement in sanctioned activities.

The Panel continued to seek the assistance of China on the DPRK vessels' export of coal in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, including information on cargo offloaded by DPRK vessels through ship-to-ship transfer in those waters, the receiving vessels' identifiers, entities and individuals that own, operate and procure any of the cargo from the DPRK vessels, and the relevant shipping documentation and financial transactions. All the vessels were reported by a Member State to be laden with coal, where they remained for a period of time when in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area.

China replied "*ZAI ZHOU 2 entered Longkou port empty-loaded from Nampo port in July 2022 and December 2022, and left Longkou port loaded with tires, plastic pellets, furniture, and other groceries in the same months. China found no activities in violation of the DPRK-related Security Council Resolutions by the abovementioned vessels, and they were not found in Ningbo waters.*"


*Source:* The Panel.

## Annex 50: Illicit coal export carried on board DPRK-flagged ASIA HONOR (IMO: 8405220)

Maritime databases showed ASIA HONOR's (IMO: 8405220) transmission on 2 May 2022 as A123 and as A H for the duration of its voyage southwest between the Republic of Korea and Japan. It retransmitted on 29 May 2022 in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters where it also remained for part of August 2022. In April when the ASIA HONOR had not transmitted an AIS signal, it was observed on satellite imagery by a Member State loading coal at Chongjin port, DPRK. It remained laden on 17 August at Ningbo-Zhoushan waters as observed on a commercial satellite imagery platform. By 20 August, it was underway in the Korea Bay, arriving outside Nampo lockgate three days later, unladen (figure 50-1). In 2021 and 2020, the Panel reported ASIA HONOR conducting similar voyages from Chongjin to export its illicit coal. ASIA HONOR had also exported coal on other occasions at least since 2019 (figure 50-2).

**Figure 50-1: DPRK-flagged ASIA HONOR's voyage, April – August 2022**

*April - June 2022*



Source: Windward; (top) satellite imagery: Member State; (bottom) satellite imagery: Maxar Technologies, with annotations by the Panel.



August 2022: Nampo Lockgate, DPRK




Source: Member State.

**Figure 50-2: ASIA HONOR'S previous exports of coal**

*May – June 2021*





August 2020<sup>110</sup>February – March 2019<sup>111</sup>

Source: Member State.

110 S/2021/211.

111 S/2019/691.

### *Associated entities*

Panel analysis of the management entities show common association common behind several DPRK-flagged vessels. For instance, ASIA HONOR which was last managed and operated by HongXiang Marine Hong Kong Ltd<sup>112</sup> (hereafter “HongXiang Marine”), an entity sanctioned by the United States Department of the Treasury in February 2018,<sup>113</sup> was also the last known entity (with exception of NEW DAWN) that managed the following vessels before they were flagged under the DPRK in 2018, and where the Panel had since documented their exports of coal to waters in Ningbo-Zhoushan:

- (i) FLOURISHING (IMO: 8421315)
- (ii) HORIZON STAR (IMO: 9017123)
- (iii) NEW DAWN (IMO: 9135494)
- (iv) ORIENTAL TREASURE (IMO: 9115028)
- (v) TAE DONG MUN nka POLE STAR 1
- (vi) PAEK MA (IMO: 9066978)

NEW DAWN was sold by HongXiang Marine to another company, Win Trade Worldwide Ltd (hereafter “Win Trade”) in April 2017 based on IMO records. Panel research however indicated that Win Trade was previously listed as the ship owner and register in 2011, indicating possible linkages throughout the various ownership changes recorded. Win Trade was also the listed as registered owner of ASIA HONOR as of 2010 until its flagging by the DPRK in November 2018 (IMO records).

The Panel continued to seek the assistance of China on the DPRK vessels’ export of coal in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, including information on cargo offloaded by DPRK vessels through ship-to-ship transfer in those waters, the receiving vessels’ identifiers, entities and individuals that own, operate and procure any of the cargo from the DPRK vessels, and the relevant shipping documentation and financial transactions. All the vessels were reported by a Member State to be laden with coal while they remained for a period of time in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area.

China replied “*There have been no records of port calls or information declarations in China for Vessels ASIA HONOR and FLOURISHING.*”

*Source:* The Panel.

<sup>112</sup> Struck off in June 2018 on the Hong Kong company registry.


<sup>113</sup> <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0297>

**Annex 51: Coal export carried on board DPRK-flagged CHOL BONG SAN (IMO: 8713457)**

Prior to the export of suspected bagged coal cargo in 2022, the Panel's ship tracking showed CHOL BONG SAN as having sailed a similar route in 2020 when it transmitted at Nampo in July 2020 before next transmitting two months later in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters in mid-September 2020. The vessel proceeded to sail northwards towards the Shandong Peninsula where it dropped transmission on 19 September 2020. Its next recorded transmission on a commercial maritime platform was eighteen months later in April 2022 (see figure 51-1).

**Figure 51-1: CHOL BONG SAN's voyage, April - August 2022**

*Songnim - Ningbo-Zhoushan – Longkou - Nampo*



*Source:* S&P Global's Seaweb, Windward; imagery, Google Earth Pro, Member State, Maxar Technologies, annotated by the Panel.

According to the Member State which provided the Panel with satellite imagery, CHOL BONG SAN had loaded bagged cargo assessed likely to be coal, at Songnim,<sup>114</sup> DPRK, before undertaking its coal export to Ningbo-Zhoushan waters between May and June 2022. Panel analysis of the sailing route fits the pattern of other DPRK ships the Panel has tracked that exported coal. CHOL BONG SAN's location in May 2022 also showed it was at the Maji Shan anchorage area, Ningbo-Zhoushan, a previously reported anchorage area where DPRK vessels exporting coal were known to have anchored and exported their coal.<sup>115</sup> The vessel arrived at Ningbo-Zhoushan by 5 May 2022 laden and off-loaded its cargo by mid-June 2022 in the same waters. It was sitting high when it entered Longkou port with its rear cargo hold empty (figure 51-2).

**Figure 51-2: CHOL BONG SAN laden, Ningbo-Zhoushan, May-June 2022**



*Source:* Member State.

<sup>114</sup> A known coal-loading terminal in the DPRK.

<sup>115</sup> S/2021/777, para.90, figures XIII and XIV, and annex 44.



CHOL BONG SAN returned to Chinese waters by 19 December 2022 at Quanshandao near Lanshan and was next recorded on maritime database transmitting at Laizhou port south of Longkou by 30 December 2022.

The Panel continued to seek the assistance of China on the DPRK vessels' export of coal in Ningbo-Zhoushan waters, including information on cargo offloaded by DPRK vessels through ship-to-ship transfers in those waters, the receiving vessels' identifiers, entities and individuals that own, operate and procure any of the cargo from the DPRK vessels, and the relevant shipping documentation and financial transactions. All the vessels were reported by a Member State to be laden with coal while they remained for a period of time in the Ningbo-Zhoushan area.

China replied "*CHOL BONG SAN entered Longkou port empty-loaded from Nampo port in June 2022, and left Longkou port loaded with soda ash, plastic film, and other livelihood goods in the same month. No activities in violation of the DPRK-related Security Council Resolutions were found*".

*Source:* The Panel.

**Annex 52: Vessel disguise – MI RIM 2 as “SONG GWAN” / “SG”**


The Panel had observed a vessel ‘SG’ on maritime databases briefly transmitting in the DPRK’s EEZ as well as at the West Sea Barrage in 2021 and 2022. In October 2022, the Panel received information from a Member State providing photographs that showed a cargo vessel with ‘SG’ painted in its hull but transmitting MI RIM 2’s IMO number 9361407. Maritime databases showed the vessel transmitting the name ‘SONG GWAN’ had also previously transmitted as ‘SG’.

The Panel notes that as with other designated vessels, MI RIM 2 had stopped transmitting on its assigned identifiers. MI RIM 2 was designated on 21 June 2017 and subject to an asset freeze as a vessel controlled by the DPRK designated entity, Ocean Maritime Management Company (OMM).

The Panel’s tracking information showed the vessel sailing into Ningbo-Zhoushan waters before dropping transmission for over six weeks. The Panel wrote to China seeking assistance on the activities of ‘SONG GWAN’ along with any ship-to-ship transfers conducted when it was its territorial waters at Ningbo-Zhoushan.

China replied *“There have been no records of port calls and information declarations in China for Vessel MI RIM 2”*.

In December 2022, MI RIM 2, still sailing as SONG GWAN and on a different voyage, dropped transmission for about two weeks before re-transmitting at the same latitude as the Nantong area, China. It sailed back in the same direction towards the DPRK’s east coast, dropping transmission for a day around the same area where it was last photographed in August 2022.

**Figure 52: Designated MI RIM 2's voyage sailing as SONG GWAN / SG***August - October 2022**December 2022**Source: Windward, annotated by the Panel; inset photograph, Member State.*

### Annex 53: Information on a Member State's interview of crew members onboard trawlers fishing in DPRK waters

A Member State provided the Panel with the information below, which includes four interview results with the crew members onboard Chinese trawlers involved in fishing in DPRK waters between June and July 2021.

#### 1) List of vessels

辽丹渔25697 (Liao Dan Yu 25697)

昌海渔2116 (Chang Hai Yu 2116)

辽丹渔36013 (Liao Dan Yu 36013)

辽丹渔23365 (Liao Dan Yu 23365)

#### 2) Interview results (Member State's translation)

##### 辽丹渔25697 (Liao Dan Yu 25697)

Interview result	
Date	24-Jun-2021
Location	34°44.9'N 129°12.7'E
Name of the boat	辽丹渔25697 (Liao Dan Yu 25697) (displayed on both sides of the bridge, explained during hearing) (The boat's name on the bow has been concealed.)
Nationality	China (holding ROK flag)
Tonnage of the boat	269 tonnes (as answered)
Home port	南排河 (Port of registry indicated on stern) 丹东 (Dandong, as answered)
Port of departure	丹东 (Dandong)
Date of departure	20-Apr-2021
Date of return	27-Jun-2021 or 28-Jun-2021
AIS information /MMSI number	-
Type of fishing	Trawl (Two large ships pulling bottom trawl)
Fishing grounds	Waters of North Pacific (around N50°10.0' E148°12.0')

Duration of fishing	-
Number of the crew	13 (all Chinese)
Company name	丹东北几海有限公司(Dan Dong Bei Ji Hai Co.)
Number of consorts	4 (Two of the four consorts were captured by North Korea.)
Operation in North Korean waters	We stayed in North Korean waters, but did not operate there.
Permit in North Korean waters	No
Method of obtaining permit	-
Location and price of permit	-
Purchasing fishing rights from North Korea is a violation of UN resolutions.	I am well aware of it.
Other answers from the boat	<p>Q: Are you coming from North Korean waters?</p> <p>A: We are returning to China from North Pacific Ocean.</p> <p>On the way, we were waiting in the sea area of N38°37.0' E132°32.0' as instructed by the company.</p> <p>On or about June 10, two of our colleague ships were intercepted and captured by a North Korean official vessel while sailing in North Korean waters. The reason for the seizure was that the vessels were suspected of carrying the novel coronavirus into North Korean waters. The colleague ships are still detained and have not been heard from. As a result of this incident, we have been on standby at the above location as instructed by the company.</p> <p>Q: Why are you returning to China?</p> <p>A: There is a crew member who has gone mentally ill, so we are bringing him home.</p> <p>When we asked a question about the North Korean waters, he raised the topic of the Pacific waters and dodged the answer to our question.</p>

Source: Member State.



## 昌海渔2116 (Chang Hai Yu 2116)

Interview result	
Date	25-Jun-2021
Location	34°46.2'N 129°20.2'E
Name of the boat	昌海渔2116 (Chang Hai Yu 2116)(as answered) (The ship's name displayed on the bow:●●●●●307)
Nationality	China
Tonnage of the boat	48 tonnes (as answered)
Home port	羊口 海口(海南省)(Haikou,Hainan)(as answered)
Port of departure	海口(Haikou)
Date of departure	6-May-2021
Date of return	The ship will return to port as it is not possible to operate in Russian or North Korean waters. The scheduled return date is unknown.
AIS information /MMSI number	-
Type of fishing	Trawl (Two large ships pulling bottom trawl)
Fishing grounds	waters of Russia (around N42°02' E131°36') or waters of North Korea
Duration of fishing	May to November or December, but there is no specific period.
Number of the crew	14 (all Chinese)
Company name	(Private ownership)
Number of consorts	1
Operation in North Korean waters	No
Permit in North Korean waters	No
Method of obtaining permit	Details unknown, but obtained through an intermediary.
Location and price of permit	-
Purchasing fishing rights from North Korea is a violation of UN resolutions.	I don't know.

<p>Other answers from the boat</p>	<p>Q: Why are you returning to China? A: The price of fishing permits in North Korean and Russian waters has skyrocketed, and because of the low catch, it is unprofitable. Last year the price of a fishing permit in North Korean waters was 700,000-800,000 yuan, but this year the price has risen to 3 million yuan. I've heard that the price for a fishing permit in Russian waters this year is 1.7 million yuan.</p> <p>Q: Why is there a difference between the name of the ship on the hull and the name of the ship we heard? A: The number 307 on the hull is the number given to us by the intermediary.</p> <p>Q: How can you obtain a fishing permit for North Korean waters? A: Through the radio, the intermediary tells us the price in Chinese, and if you negotiate and agree with the price, we transfer the amount in Renminbi and then the permit will be issued. There are no paper permits.</p>
------------------------------------	---

Source: Member State.

## 辽丹渔36013 (Liao Dan Yu 36013)

Interview result	
Date	18-July-2021
Location	38°29.8'N 132°11.0'E
Name of the boat	辽丹渔36013 (Liao Dan Yu 36013)
Nationality	China (The Chinese flag was flown on the bow of the ship.)
Tonnage of the boat	100 tonnes (as answered), Presumption: 200 tonnes
Home port	南排河 (Port of registry indicated on stern) 丹东 (Dandong, as answered)
Port of departure	丹东 (Dandong)
Date of departure	4-Jun-2021
Date of return	Unknown
AIS information /MMSI number	-
Type of fishing	Trawl (Two large ships pulling bottom trawl)
Fishing grounds	waters of North Korea
Duration of fishing	Scheduled from receipt of permission until the end of December
Number of the crew	13 (all Chinese)
Company name	(Private management)
Number of consorts	Our consort is on their way to pick up supplies.
Other answers from the boat	<p>Q: Do you have a Permit to operate in North Korean waters? A: No, we are drifting to get one, will get one in a week</p> <p>Q: Is there a quota for fishing permits? A: No limit.</p> <p>Q: Where do you receive the permits? A: Not sure.</p> <p>Q: Are the surrounding Chinese fishing boats also waiting for permits? A: I don't know about the other boats.</p>

Source: Member State.


## 辽丹渔23365 (Liao Dan Yu 23365)

Interview result	
Date	18-July-2021
Location	38°29.5'N 132°9.3'E
Name of the boat	辽丹渔23365 (Liao Dan Yu 23365)
Nationality	China
Tonnage of the boat	90 tonnes (as answered), Presumption: 200 tonnes
Home port	丹东(Dandong, as answered) 皂埠(Port of registry indicated on stern)
Port of departure	丹东(Dandong)
Date of departure	20-Apr-2021
Date of return	Unknown
AIS information /MMSI number	-
Type of fishing	Trawl (Two large ships pulling bottom trawl)
Fishing grounds	Unknown
Duration of fishing	From receipt of permission until the end of December
Number of the crew	14 (all Chinese)
Company name	-
Reason for drifting	Waiting for North Korean permits to be issued
Display of the National Flag	Chinese flag was flown on the bow of the ship.
Other answers from the boat	<p>Q: Is there a limit on the fishing quota for permits? A: There is a time limit of until the end of December, but there is no limit on the amount or species of fish caught.</p> <p>Q: Where do you receive the permits? A: I don't know the details, but it is in the north.</p> <p>Q: When are the permits scheduled to be issued? A: I heard that we will get it in three days.</p> <p>Q: From whom did you hear that? A: I heard it from my family.</p> <p>Q: Are the Chinese fishing boats around us also waiting for permits? A: Probably so.</p>

Source: Member State.

### 3) Permitted fishing areas in the DPRK waters in 2021 and vessels locations

The Panel notes that permitted fishing areas in the DPRK waters in 2021 are white-colored area (see below). According to another Member State, the designated entrance/exit point to the permitted fishing areas of the DPRK in 2021 is ①, the locations of the fishing vessels interviews by Member State were ②, ③ and ④.



Source: Member States and Google Earth Pro.



**Annex 54: Russian Federation's reply to the Panel's enquiry on trade with the DPRK**

В связи с запросом группы экспертов ОС. сообщаем следующее.

Российские таможенные органы осуществляют надлежащий контроль за применением ограничительных мер, установленных резолюциями СБ. Согласно сведениям из таможенных информационных ресурсов, в 2022 году из России в КНДР поставлялись живые животные (лошади), пищевые продукты, мука, фармацевтическая продукция. Из Китая поставлялись музыкальные инструменты, страной происхождения которых является КНДР.

*(unofficial translation)*

In connection with the request of the Panel of Experts, we report the following.

The Russian customs authorities exercise appropriate control over the application of restrictive measures established by the Security Council resolutions. According to information provided from customs information resources, in 2022, live animals (horses), food products, flour, pharmaceutical products were delivered from Russia to the DPRK. Musical instruments, whose country of origin was the DPRK, were delivered from China.

**Annex 55: Additional replies from Member States on trade statistics in the Panel's previous report (S/2022/668, annex 45)**

**Zambia**



Permanent Mission of The Republic of Zambia To The United Nations  
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Tel: (212) 888-5770 Fax: (212) 888-5213  
E-mail: zambia@un.int

**Ref No. ZM/NY/Q/104/7/4**

**No. 110/2022**

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zambia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) and has the honour to refer to Reports dated between January and September, 2021 and also Report dated 3 June, 2022, respectively, in which it was reported by the Panel of Experts that Zambia had engaged in trade with the DPRK.

The Permanent Mission of Zambia wishes to inform you that the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) has advised that the reported trade between Zambia and the DPRK is inaccurate. The reasons for the inaccuracy arose from wrongful data capture. Owing to this realization, the ZRA has since implemented a system-based control to ensure that the North Korea country code is not wrongly used for future transactions. The Panel of Experts may wish to refer to the attached documents, for ease of reference.

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zambia to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), the assurances of its highest consideration.

22<sup>nd</sup> August, 2022, New York, NY

██████████  
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established  
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)  
United Nations Headquarters  
New York, NY 10017  
██████████



## Honduras

\*\*\* MISIÓN PERMANENTE DE HONDURAS ANTE  
\*\*\* NACIONES UNIDAS EN NUEVA YORK  
GOBIERNO DE LA REPÚBLICA

\*\*\* H  
Secretaría de  
Relaciones  
Exteriores  
y Cooperación  
Internacional  
Gobierno de la República

**REF: MHONU/PE1874CS/099/2022**

La Misión Permanente de Honduras ante Naciones Unidas saluda atentamente al Panel de Expertos establecido de conformidad a la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad y tiene el honor de referirse a la comunicación S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.160, mediante la cual se solicita respuesta del Estado de Honduras sobre ciertos puntos sobre la implementación de las medidas impuestas a la República Popular Democrática de Corea (RPDC), por resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad, sobre incidentes de incumplimiento a las mismas.

Al respecto, en seguimiento a la Nota No. REF: MHONU/PE1874CS/060/202 de fecha 2 de agosto de 2022, la Misión Permanente de Honduras ante Naciones Unidas tiene a bien remitir al Panel de Expertos un informe elaborado por las instancias nacionales competentes, conforme a los ítems enumerados en la tabla I de la Carta S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.160. Es importante destacar, que la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores y Cooperación Internacional de Honduras está coordinando esfuerzos con las instituciones nacionales pertinentes para el cumplimiento efectivo de las resoluciones emitidas por el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas.

El Estado de Honduras reitera su compromiso y cooperación con el Panel de Expertos, asimismo desea que la información adjunta sea manejada con total confidencialidad, por lo que se solicita que sea del uso exclusivo del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas y el Comité 1718.

En cuanto a la presentación del Informe Nacional con las medidas de aplicación de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas sobre la República Popular Democrática de Corea, se informa que la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores y Cooperación Internacional de Honduras está en proceso de recabo de información, una vez este compilado se remitirá por esta vía.

La Misión Permanente de Honduras ante Naciones Unidas aprovecha la oportunidad para expresar al Panel de Expertos establecido de conformidad a la resolución 1874 (2009) del Consejo de Seguridad, las seguridades de su más alta y distinguida consideración.



Nueva York, 18 de octubre de 2022

Al  
Panel de Expertos  
establecido de conformidad a la resolución 1874 (2009)  
Consejo de Seguridad  
Naciones Unidas  
Nueva York, Nueva York

**MUY IMPORTANTE**

**Respuesta del Estado de Honduras a la Carta S/A.49/2022/PE/OC.160 de fecha 23 de junio de 2022**

Conforme a los ítems enumerados en la Tabla 1 de la Carta S/A.49/2022/PE/OC.160 de fecha 23 de junio de 2022, el Estado de Honduras brinda respuesta a los puntos específicos:

1. La Administración Aduanera de Honduras registró tres (3) declaraciones de mercancías de productos pertenecientes al capítulo 72 del Arancel Centroamericano de Importación, con origen de la República Popular Democrática de Corea y con procedencia de El Salvador y México, con un valor FOB total declarado de USD \$47,626.25 y declaradas en las posiciones arancelarias: 7210.61.10.00.01 (El Salvador) y 7216.33.00.00.00 (México), en el período comprendido de octubre 2021 a marzo 2022;
2. La Administración Aduanera de Honduras realizó la validación de los controles aplicados a las importaciones de las mercancías proveniente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea, determinando que no se aplicó el control de rigor para las importaciones proveniente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea debido a que en la DISPOSICIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA ADUANAS-DNOA-91-2020 no se encuentra incluido las mercancías del capítulo 72: FUNDICIÓN, HIERRO Y ACERO del Arancel Centroamericano de Importación;
3. La Administración Aduanera de Honduras de forma inmediata procedió a lo siguiente:
  - a) Revisión y actualización de la DISPOSICIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA ADUANAS-DNOA-91-2020, a fin de incluir las medidas sectoriales contenidas en la Resolución 2371(2017) y las demás resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas sobre la República Popular Democrática de Corea, tomando en cuenta los cambios realizados mediante la DISPOSICIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA NO. ADUANAS-DNOA-010-2022 (RESOLUCIÓN NO. 450-2021 (COMIECO-EX) Y TABLAS DE CORRELACIÓN DE SEXTA A SEPTIMA ENMIENDA)



Bulevar Kuwait, contiguo a la  
Corte Suprema de Justicia (CSJ),  
Tegucigalpa, Honduras.  
Tel.: (504) 2236-0200/0300

- b) Actualización de la medida de control en el sistema informático – Módulo de Gestión de Riesgo – de la Administración Aduanera de Honduras, a fin de garantizar la correcta aplicación de las Resoluciones emitidas por el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas sobre la República Popular Democrática de Corea
- c) Intercambio de comunicación con la Dirección General de Aduanas de la República de El Salvador con el fin de obtener las Declaraciones de Mercancías de Exportación de los productos nacionalizados en la Aduana El Poy, y así poder cotejar la información declarada en El Salvador con la declarada en Honduras.

Se comunica al Panel de Expertos que la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores y Cooperación Internacional de Honduras está coordinando esfuerzos con las Instituciones Nacionales pertinentes para el cumplimiento efectivo de las resoluciones emitidas por el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas.

El Estado de Honduras reitera su compromiso y cooperación con el Panel de Expertos, asimismo desea que la información previamente transmitida sea manejada con total confidencialidad, por lo que se solicita que sea del uso exclusivo del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas y el Comité 1718.-

Respecto a la presentación del Informe Nacional con las medidas de aplicación de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas sobre la República Popular Democrática de Corea, la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores y Cooperación Internacional de Honduras está en proceso de recabo de información, una vez este compilado se remitirá por esta vía.



*Translated from Spanish*

Very important

**Republic of Honduras**

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation**

**Response of the Government of Honduras to letter S/A.49/2022/PE/OC.160 dated 23 June 2022**

The Government of Honduras would like to provide the following response to specific points included in table 1 of letter S/A.49/2022/PE/OC.160 dated 23 June 2022:

1. The Customs Administration of Honduras recorded three declarations of goods falling under chapter 72 of the Central American Import Tariff with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as the country of origin and El Salvador and Mexico as the countries of provenance, with a total declared FOB value of 47,626.25 USD and declared under Harmonized System (HS) codes 7210.61.10.00.01 (El Salvador) and 7216.33.00.00.00 (Mexico), for the period from October 2021 to March 2022.
2. The Customs Administration of Honduras validated the controls applied to the imports of goods originating from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, determining that the strict control did not apply for the imports from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea because goods under chapter 72 of the Central American Import Tariff (foundry, iron and steel) are not included in customs administrative decision DNOA-91-2020.
3. The Customs Administration of Honduras immediately took the following measures:
  - (a) Revised and updated customs administrative decision DNOA-91-2020 to include the sectoral measures contained in resolution 2371(2017) and the other Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, taking into consideration the changes introduced through customs administrative decision DNOA-010-2022 (Decision No. 450-2021 (COMIECO-EX) and correlation tables six to seven amended).
  - (b) Updated the control measure in the risk management module of the computer system of the Customs Administration of Honduras, in order to ensure the proper implementation of the Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
  - (c) Communicated with the General Directorate of Customs of the Republic of El Salvador in order to obtain the declaration of export goods for the products nationalized at the El Poy Customs, and thus to be able to compare the information declared in El Salvador with that declared in Honduras.

The Government of Honduras would like to inform the Panel of Experts that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Honduras is coordinating efforts with the relevant national institutions for the effective implementation of the Security Council resolutions.

The Government of Honduras reiterates its commitment and cooperation with the Panel of Experts and its desire that the information previously transmitted be handled with total confidentiality, and therefore requests that such information be used exclusively by the Security Council and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006).

With regard to the presentation of the national report on measures taken to implement the Security Council resolutions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Honduras is in the process of gathering information; once the information is compiled, it will be submitted through this channel.

## Annex 56: List of HS Codes the Panel applies to monitor the sectoral ban

Below is the list of HS codes assigned for each category of goods under sectoral ban by relevant UN Security Council resolutions. This list supersedes S/2018/171, annex 4, as amended by S/2018/171/Corr.1. This list does not include items banned by previous resolutions such as arms embargo, dual-use items and luxury goods. See <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/prohibited-items> for the complete list of prohibited goods.

### a. Items prohibited from being exported to the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
<b>Condensates and natural gas liquids</b>	<b>2709</b>	Oils; petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals	Para. 13 of 2375 (2017)
	<b>2711</b>	Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons	
<b>Industrial machinery</b>	<b>84</b>	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	<b>85</b>	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
<b>Transportation vehicles<sup>116</sup></b>	<b>86</b>	Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signaling equipment of all kinds	Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	<b>87</b>	Vehicles; other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof	
	<b>88</b>	Aircraft, spacecraft and parts thereof <sup>117</sup>	
	<b>89</b>	Ships, boats and floating structures	
<b>Iron, steel and other metals</b>	<b>72-83</b>		Para. 7 of 2397 (2017)
	<b>72</b>	Iron and steel	
	<b>73</b>	Articles of iron or steel	
	<b>74</b>	Copper and articles thereof	
	<b>75</b>	Nickel and articles thereof	
	<b>76</b>	Aluminum and articles thereof	
	<b>78</b>	Lead and articles thereof	
	<b>79</b>	Zinc and articles thereof	
	<b>80</b>	Tin and articles thereof	
	<b>81</b>	Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof	
	<b>82</b>	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	
	<b>83</b>	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	

<sup>116</sup> Pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 2321 (2016) and paragraph 14 of resolution 2397 (2017), States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of new helicopters, new and used vessels, except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis.

<sup>117</sup> Shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).

## b. Items prohibited from being imported from the DPRK

Item	HS Codes	Description	Resolutions
<b>Coal</b>	<b>2701</b>	Coal; briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels manufactured from coal	Para. 8 of 2371 (2017)
<b>Iron Ore</b>	<b>2601</b>	Iron ores and concentrates, including roasted iron pyrites	
<b>Iron</b>	<b>72</b>	Iron and steel ( <b>7201-7229</b> )	
<b>Iron and Steel products</b>	<b>73</b>	Articles of Iron and steel ( <b>7301-7326</b> )	
<b>Gold</b>	<b>261690</b>	Gold ores and concentrates	Para. 30 of 2270 (2016)
	<b>7108</b>	Gold (incl. put plated), unwrought, semi-manufactured forms or powder	
	<b>710811</b>	Gold powder, unwrought	
	<b>710812</b>	Gold in other unwrought forms	
	<b>710813</b>	Gold in other semi-manufactured forms	
	<b>710820</b>	Monetary gold	
<b>Titanium</b>	<b>2614</b>	Titanium ores and concentrates	Para. 28 of 2321 (2016)
<b>Vanadium</b>	<b>2615</b>	Vanadium ores and concentrates	
<b>Rare Earth Minerals</b>	<b>2612</b>	Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates [ <b>261210</b> and <b>261220</b> ]	
	<b>2617</b>	Ores and concentrates, [Nesoi code <b>261790</b> - Other Ores and Concentrates]	
	<b>2805</b>	Alkali metals etc., rare-earth metals etc., mercury	
	<b>2844</b>	Radioactive chemical elements and isotopes etc.	
<b>Copper</b>	<b>74</b>	Copper and articles thereof ( <b>7401-7419</b> )	
	<b>2603</b>	Copper ores and concentrates	
<b>Zinc</b>	<b>79</b>	Zinc and articles thereof ( <b>7901-7907</b> )	
	<b>2608</b>	Zinc ores and concentrates	
<b>Nickel</b>	<b>75</b>	Nickel and articles thereof ( <b>7501-7508</b> )	
	<b>2604</b>	Nickel ores and concentrates	
<b>Silver</b>	<b>2616100</b>	Silver ores and concentrates	Para. 9 of 2371 (2017)
	<b>7106, 7107</b>	Silver unwrought or semi manufactured forms, or in powdered forms; base metals clad with silver, not further worked than semi-manufactured	
	<b>7114</b>	Articles of goldsmiths or silversmiths' wares or parts thereof, of silver, whether or not plated or clad with other precious metal	
<b>Seafood (including fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms)</b>	<b>3</b>	Fish and crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates ( <b>0301-0308</b> )	Para. 10 of 2371 (2017)
	<b>1603</b>	Extracts and juices of meat, fish or crustaceans, mollusks or other aquatic invertebrates)	
	<b>1604</b>	Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs	
	<b>1605</b>	Crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared or preserved	
<b>Lead</b>	<b>78</b>	Lead and articles thereof ( <b>7801-7806</b> )	Para. 10 of 2371 (2017)
<b>Lead ore</b>	<b>2607</b>	Lead ores and concentrates	

<b>Textiles (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products)</b>	<b>50-63</b>		Para. 16 of 2375 (2017)
	<b>50</b>	Silk, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	<b>51</b>	Wool, fine or coarse animal hair, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof; horsehair yarn and woven fabric	
	<b>52</b>	Cotton, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	<b>53</b>	Vegetable textile fibres nesoi; yarns and woven fabrics of vegetable textile fibres nesoi and paper	
	<b>54</b>	Manmade filaments, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	<b>55</b>	Manmade staple fibres, including yarns and woven fabrics thereof	
	<b>56</b>	Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	
	<b>57</b>	Carpets and other textile floor covering	
	<b>58</b>	Fabrics; special woven fabrics, tufted textile fabrics, lace, tapestries, trimmings, embroidery	
	<b>59</b>	Textile fabrics; impregnated, coated, covered or laminated; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use;	
	<b>60</b>	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	
	<b>61</b>	Apparel and clothing accessories; knitted or crocheted;	
	<b>62</b>	Apparel and clothing accessories; <i>not</i> knitted or crocheted;	
	<b>63</b>	Textiles, made up articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	
<b>Agricultural products</b>	<b>07</b>	Vegetables and certain roots and tubers; edible	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
	<b>08</b>	Fruit and nuts, edible; peel of citrus fruit or melons	
	<b>12</b>	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit, industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder	
<b>Machinery</b>	<b>84</b>	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	Para. 6 of resolution 2397 (2017)
<b>Electrical equipment</b>	<b>85</b>	Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles	
<b>Earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia</b>	<b>25</b>	Salt; sulphur; earths, stone; plastering materials, lime and cement	
<b>Wood</b>	<b>44</b>	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	
<b>Vessels</b>	<b>89</b>	Ships, boats and floating structures	

c. For paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 2397 (2017), the Panel uses the following HS codes. The Panel notes that annual caps are placed for the two items below.

- HS 2709: crude oil [cap: 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons ]
- HS 2710, HS 2712 and HS 2713: refined petroleum products [ cap: 500,000 barrels ]

Source: The Panel.



**Annex 57: Comparison table of International Trade Statistics and replies**  
**provided by Members States on trade with the DPRK**

\*\* Note: DPRK Trade Statistics and Member State's reply cover the six-month period of April-September 2022/  
 Highlighted are restricted commodities.

As of 30 January 2023  
\* Unit : Thousand US\$

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
1	Barbados	0	1,234		980 (HS Code 84) 129 (HS Code 85) 50 (HS Code 72) 17 (HS Code 34) 3 (HS Code 89)	
2	Belgium, Kingdom of	0	82			(Not Restricted)
3	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	11		6 (HS Code 84)	
4	Brazil, Federative Republic of	0	54			(Not Restricted)
5	Bulgaria, Republic of	0	1			(Not Restricted)
6	Canada	343	127	71 (HS Code 76) 30 (HS Code 85) 3 (HS Code 84) 2 (HS Code 82)	8 (HS Code 85)	
7	China, PRC	352,774	58,482	4,149 (HS Code 2710) 1,848 (HS Code 2713) 7 (HS Code 2712)	13,576 (HS Code 72) 3,051 (HS Code 30)	Silk(HS Code 50) are raw materials, not textiles while goods imported from the DPRK under HS Code 72 are not iron or iron ores
8	Croatia, Republic of	0	5			(Not Restricted)
9	Denmark, Kingdom of	0	32			(Not Restricted)
10	Ecuador	0	553		459 (HS Code 03)	Importer wrongly registered DPRK as the country of origin in the customs declaration / No trade with the DPRK
11	El Salvador	0	36		4 (HS Code 84)	
12	Finland		13			(Not Restricted)
13	Hungary	1	0			(Not Restricted)
14	Indonesia, Republic of	0	306		77 (HS Code 84) 72 (HS Code 85) 13 (HS Code 73)	
15	Italy	173	73			(Not Restricted)
16	Japan	0	3			(Not Restricted)
17	Madagascar, Republic of	0	6		1 (HS Code 84)	

No.	Member State(MS)	Trade Volume w/ DPRK		Restricted HS Code Trade w/ DPRK		MS Reply
		Export to	Import from	Export to	Import from	
18	Netherlands, Kingdom of the	495	31		12 (HS Code 73) 3 (HS Code 85)	
19	Nigeria	0	923		351 (HS Code 03) 2 (HS Code 30)	
20	Peru	2	9			(Not Restricted)
21	Poland, Republic of	267	4			(Not Restricted)
22	South Africa, Republic of	16	227		108 (HS Code 34) 71 (HS Code 85) 12 (HS Code 38) 11 (HS Code 84) 3 (HS Code 60) 2 (HS Code 63)	
23	Spain, Kingdom of	154	3		2 (HS Code 85) 1 (HS Code 84)	
24	Thailand, Kingdom of	20	10		7 (HS Code 85) 2 (HS Code 84)	
25	Uganda, Republic of	985	2,385		159 (HS Code 84) 52 (HS Code 35)	
26	United Kingdom	0	430		258 (HS Code 84)	imports from ROK, country code was incorrectly submitted
27	United States	0	29			(Not Restricted)

Source: ITC Trade Map, accessed on 27 January 2023, annotated by the Panel.

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**Annex 58: Replies from Member States****China****Iron and textiles (OC.301)**

The Chinese customs have taken a series of effective measures, including necessary inspection of inbound and outbound goods, to ensure full compliance with the Security Council Resolutions. Such measures have been duly implemented.

China has made several explanations to the Panel regarding its questions about the customs data. According to the data from China, goods imported from the DPRK under HS Codes of Chapter 50 were silk yarn and silk waste. These are raw materials, not textiles prohibited for import by the Security Council. Meanwhile, goods imported from the DPRK under HS Codes of Chapter 72 were not iron or iron ores. The Panel should accurately interpret the Resolution and refrain from mentioning in its report issues not related to the Resolution.

## United Kingdom

Reply - Outgoing Communication #332 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

I'm writing in response to your communication #332 of 1 December 2022.

Colleagues in Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) have reviewed the shipments that you identified and have found that all three lines have been confirmed to be imports from **South Korea (KR)**, via the US, Germany and Romania; in each case the country code was incorrectly submitted. The relevant trade statistics have now been amended.

On behalf of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, I'd like to express our continued appreciation for the work of the Panel of Experts in their work to support the 1718 Committee.

## Annex 59: Comparison of radio communications systems used by the Ethiopian Military with products advertised by Glocom




According to the analysis by an outside expert consulted by the Panel, the communications equipment pictured below is likely to be radio communications systems advertised by Glocom on its website. The Panel has corroborated this observation.

Source: <https://www.fanabc.com/archives/164987> (annotated by the Panel).

- ① **GR-310 VHF/UHF SATCOM Manpack Radio**
- ② **GA-10A Officer Handset**
- ③ **Tactical Headset (A8100-TH1)**
- ④ **GA-310-AT-04 Manpack SATCOM antenna**




## 1. GR-310 VHF/UHF SATCOM Manpack Radio



Source: Glocorn, <https://glocorn-corp.com/index.php/product/detail?p=gr-310>.

- ① Terminal connectors
- ② Terminal connectors
- ③ Display/Control panel and buttons
- ④ Handles
- ⑤ Connector to antenna
- ⑥ Knob
- ⑦ Side cover with specific design

## 2. GA-10A Officer Handset




This handset is introduced as optional equipment to GR-310.

Source: Glocom, <https://glocom-corp.com/index.php/product/detail?p=gr-310>.

- ① Shape of earpiece
- ② Shape of mouthpiece and cable connection


### 3. Tactical Headset (A8100-TH11)



Source: Glocom, <https://glocom-corp.com/index.php/product/detail?p=gr-8100hv>.

- ① Microphone
- ② Earphone
- ③ Hair band
- ④ Microphone
- ⑤ Transmitter

#### 4. GA-310-AT-04 Manpack SATCOM antenna



Source: Glocom, <https://glocom-corp.com/index.php/product/detail?p=gr-8100hv>.

- ① Possible handle to adjust the position of antenna
- ② Blade-shape antenna
- ③ Octagon-shape antenna

**Annex 60: Product label of HS Codes 9301, 9304, 9305 and 9306**

HS Code	Product Label
9301	Military weapons, incl. sub-machine guns (excluding revolvers and pistols of heading 9302 and cutting and thrusting weapons of heading 9307)
9303	Other arms and similar devices which operate by the firing of an explosive charge (for example, sporting shot-guns and rifles, muzzle-loading firearms, very pistols and other devices designed to project only signal flares, pistols and revolvers for firing blank ammunition, captive bolt humane killers, line-throwing guns)
9304	Spring, air or gas guns and pistols, truncheons and other non-firearms (excluding swords, cutlasses, bayonettes, and similar arms of heading 9307)
9305	Parts and accessories of arms (military weapons, pistols, revolvers, shotguns, rifles etc.) of headings 9301 To 9304
9306	Bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles, cartridges and other ammunition and projectiles and parts thereof, incl. buckshot, shot and cartridge wads



**Annex 61: Reply from Cyprus**

Dear Mr. [REDACTED]

We are referring to your attached letter of 9 November 2022 addressed to our Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York, His Excellency Mr. Andreas Hadjichrysanthou, regarding transactions you have identified in the UN's Commodity Trade (Comtrade) Statistics Database that may be considered to fall within the category of 'arms and related materiel' sent from Cyprus to DPRK between 2017 and 2018, and have the honour to share the below information.

The Republic of Cyprus' Customs and Excise Department (Ministry of Finance) has confirmed that certain exports towards the Republic of Korea (KR) for the years 2017 and 2018 were wrongly listed under code KP (Democratic People's Republic of Korea). This has also been verified by our Trade Service (Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry).

More specifically, the wrong listings concerned four exports by the same company, PHILIPPOS CONSTANTINIDES TRADING CO. LTD, authorized by the Department of Commerce under licenses CY 093/17, CY 493/17, CY 232/18 and CY 407/18.

Please see the below summary for each of this export licenses and also note that more information, such as contact details of involved entities and technical specifications of the goods, is included in the attached document 'Customs documents and credit invoices – South Korea exports wrongfully listed for DPRK'.

**CY 093/17**

Goods exported: One Beretta shotgun – DT11 12GA 71CM

Purpose: shooting competition

Value: EUR 5200

Date of license: 7 March 2017 (attachment '2017-CY-093-17')

Date of invoice: 9 March 2017

**CY 493/17**

Goods exported: One Beretta shotgun - 12GA model DT11 SKEET

Purpose: for use by an athlete

Value: EUR 5500

Date of license: 23 November 2017 (attachment '2017-CY-493-17')

Date of invoice: 7 December 2017

**CY 232/18**

Goods exported: One Beretta shotgun – 12GA model DT11 SKEET – Black edition

Purpose: for use in shooting competition

Value: EUR 6700

Date of license: 13 July 2018 (attachment '2018-CY-232-18')

Date of invoice: 17 July 2018

**CY 407/18**

Goods exported: Two Beretta shotguns - 12GA model DT11 SKEET

One Beretta shotgun - 12GA model DT11 TRAP

Purpose: for use in shooting competition

Value: EUR 16300 (16000 according to invoice)

Date of license: 13 December 2018 (attachment '2018-CY-407-18')

Date of invoice: 28 January 2019

We remain at your disposal for any further clarifications.

Best regards,

**Charilaos PALMAS**

**Security Policy Department**

**tel.:** +357 22 [REDACTED] | **cell:** +357 96 [REDACTED] | **email:** [REDACTED]

 <p><b>REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS</b> <b>MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS</b></p> <p>&gt;&gt;&gt;     @CYPRUSMFA   WWW.MFA.GOV.CY</p> 	<p>Presidential Palace Avenue, 1447, Nicosia, Cyprus</p> <p><a href="http://www.mfa.gov.cy">www.mfa.gov.cy</a></p> <p>   </p> <p><a href="https://www.instagram.com/CyprusMF">@CyprusMF</a> <a href="#">A</a></p>
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**Annex 62: Reply from El Salvador**

Dear Mr. [REDACTED]

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to SCR 1874(2002)

I hope you are doing well. The Panel of Experts requested information about a transaction allegedly sent to El Salvador by the DPRK in 2017 and I am following up on that request.

Please find attached the response from the General Directorate of Customs of the Ministry of Finance of El Salvador. As explained in the note, a transaction was registered on April 06, 2017 in which the declarant stated the merchandise origin was the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The merchandise was subjected to further physical inspection in accordance with the applicable resolutions of the UNSR of the DPRK. As the supporting documentation indicated, the merchandise was not a product of the DPRK, but rather of the Republic of Korea (ROK). The importer was sanctioned with a penalty for providing inaccurate information regarding the origin of the merchandise. Detailed supporting documentation is provided in the annexes (22 pages).

I would appreciate confirmation that this message has been received, so our national institutions can be notified. In case further information is needed, feel free to contact me.

Best wishes for a very joyous holiday season to you and all the members of the Panel.

Very respectfully,



## Annex 63: Reply from Trinidad and Tobago



**PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK**  
633 Third Avenue, 12<sup>th</sup> Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017  
Tel: 212-697-7620; Fax: 212-682-3580; Email: [trto@un.int](mailto:trto@un.int)

INT: 2/4/8

8 December 2022

Mr [REDACTED]  
Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to  
Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Dear Mr [REDACTED]

I should like to refer to your letter dated 9 November 2022 requesting the assistance of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago in providing information concerning identified transactions of items which may be considered to fall within the category of "arms and related materiel" sent from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to Trinidad and Tobago in 2015.

In this connection, based on a review of invoices, as well as conversations with the respective importers, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago wishes to advise that the DPRK was erroneously selected by each importer as the country of origin. This error can occur since the options presented for country selection are based on the official country names as opposed to their common names.


Furthermore, the analysis conducted by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago revealed that the import trends demonstrate that trade is typically conducted with South Korea, and not the Democratic Republic of Korea.

In this regard, please see the enclosed invoice pertaining to the shipment referenced in the aforementioned correspondence from the Panel of Experts, which show the country of origin as the Republic of Korea (South Korea) as follows:

- a) **HS Code 9304** - Spring, air or gas guns and pistols, truncheons and other non-firearms (excluding swords, cutlasses, bayonettes and similar arms of heading 9307), valued at USD35,973 or EUR30,387;
- b) **HS Code 9305** - Parts and accessories of arms (military weapons, pistols, revolvers, shotguns, rifles etc. of headings 9301 to 9304), valued at USD1,089 or EUR690; and
- c) **HS Code 9306** - Bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles, cartridges and other ammunition and projectiles and parts thereof, incl. buckshot, shot and cartridge wads, valued at USD1,598 or EUR1,350.

Given that the enclosed invoice contains sensitive information as a result of negotiations between the supplier and importer, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago requests that the information provided is treated with the highest standards of confidentiality and should be used solely for the information of the Security Council and the 1718 Committee.

I avail myself of this opportunity to reaffirm the support of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago to the work of the Security Council and the effective implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), and convey to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Dennis Francis', with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.

**Dennis Francis**  
**Ambassador/Permanent Representative**



**Annex 64: US official statements****① 6 September 2022**

U.S. State Department deputy spokesperson Vedant Patel told a news briefing on Tuesday that Russia "is in the process of purchasing millions of rockets and artillery shells from North Korea for use in Ukraine."

However, White House national security spokesperson John Kirby said a short time later there were "no indications that that purchase has been completed and certainly no indications that those weapons are being used inside of Ukraine."

Calling it a "potential purchase," Kirby told a briefing: "Our sense is it could include literally millions of rounds, rockets and artillery shells from North Korea. That's what our information gives us - it could be on that scale."

<https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-is-buying-artillery-ammunition-nkorea-report-2022-09-06/>

**② 2 November 2022**

"In September, the (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) publicly denied that it intended to provide ammunition to Russia," the National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications John Kirby said in a statement to CNN.

"However, our information indicates that the DPRK is covertly supplying Russia's war in Ukraine with a significant number of artillery shells, while obfuscating the real destination of the arms shipments by trying to make it appear as though they are being sent to countries in the Middle East or North Africa."

<https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/02/politics/north-korea-russia-ammunition/index.html>

③ 22 December 2022

### **Statement by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield**

United States Mission to the United Nations  
Office of Press and Public Diplomacy  
For Immediate Release  
December 22, 2022

### **Statement by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Russia's use of Weapons Illegally Acquired from the DPRK and Iran in its Brutal War Against Ukraine**

It is despicable that Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is now using weapons procured from the DPRK and Iran – in violation of UN Security Council resolutions – to pursue its war of aggression against Ukraine.

The United States can confirm that the DPRK has completed an initial arms delivery to the Russian private military company known as Wagner, which paid for the equipment and currently has thousands of troops deployed to Ukraine. Last month the DPRK delivered infantry rockets and missiles into Russia for use by Wagner. In part because of our sanctions and export controls, Wagner is searching around the world for arms suppliers to support its military operations in Ukraine. We assess that the amount of materiel delivered to Wagner will not change battlefield dynamics in Ukraine, but we are concerned that the DPRK is planning to deliver more military equipment to Wagner.

For years, the Kremlin has used the Wagner Group to support its dangerous and destabilizing foreign policy while attempting to maintain deniability in the Middle East, Africa, and Ukraine. Wagner's purchase of weapons from the DPRK to wreak destruction in Ukraine also contributes to instability on the Korean peninsula by giving the DPRK funds it can use to further develop its prohibited weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. These transfers occur as Pyongyang has launched an unprecedented number of ballistic missiles this year – a serious violation of multiple Security Council resolutions for which the Security Council must hold the DPRK accountable. Russia is not only defending the DPRK as it engages in unlawful and threatening behavior, Russia is now a partner to such behavior.

The United States intends to raise the DPRK's and Russia's violations of UN Security Council resolutions in future meetings of the Security Council and will share information of this violation with the Council's 1718 Sanctions Committee. We also continue to call on the UN Secretariat to send a team to Ukraine to investigate Russia's and Iran's violations of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, Annex B, especially given Russia's renewed use this month of Iranian drones against Ukraine's infrastructure.

<https://usun.usmission.gov/statement-by-ambassador-linda-thomas-greenfield-on-russias-use-of-weapons-illegally-acquired-from-the-dprk-and-iran-in-its-brutal-war-against-ukraine/>

④ 20 January 2023

MR. KIRBY (NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications):

I also want to discuss a little bit North Korea's ongoing support for Russia's military operations against Ukraine by providing arms and ammunition to Wagner.

In part because of our sanctions and export controls, Russia is searching for arms from foreign countries, including through Wagner.

In recent weeks, we have seen North Korea — sorry — we have seen North Korean officials falsely deny that they have provided arms to Wagner.

As we have said publicly, North Korea delivered infantry rockets and missiles into Russia for use by Wagner toward the end of last year.

So, today we are releasing imagery of this initial delivery. This imagery shows that on November 18th, five Russian railcars traveled from Russia to North Korea. On the next day, November 19th, North Korea loaded those railcars with — railcars with shipping containers, and the train returned to Russia.

Now, while we assess that the amount of material delivered to Wagner has not changed battlefield dynamics in Ukraine, we do expect that it will continue to receive North Korean weapons systems.

We obviously condemn North Korea's actions, and we urge North Korea to cease these deliveries to Wagner immediately.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2023/01/20/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-and-nsc-coordinator-for-strategic-communications-john-kirby-8/>

**Annex 65: DPRK statements****1** 8 November 2022[조선어](#) / [English](#) / [中国語](#) / [Русский](#) / [Español](#) / [日本語](#)

## **Press Statement of Vice Director for Military Foreign Affairs of DPRK Ministry of National Defence**

Pyongyang, November 8 (KCNA) -- The vice director for Military Foreign Affairs of the Ministry of National Defence of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued the following press statement on Monday:

Recently, the U.S. is persistently spreading a groundless "rumor of arms dealings" between the DPRK and Russia in a bid to make it a fait accompli at any cost.

The vice-director general of the General Bureau of Equipment of the Ministry of National Defence of the DPRK had already denounced the U.S. for its "rumor of arms dealings" as a plot-breeding story against the DPRK.

We regard such moves of the U.S. as part of its hostile attempt to tarnish the image of the DPRK in the international arena by invoking the illegal "sanctions resolution" of the UNSC against the DPRK.

We once again make clear that we have never had "arms dealings" with Russia and that we have no plan to do so in the future.

The U.S. should not pull up the DPRK without any reason. -0-

www.kcna.kp (Juche111.11.8.)

<http://www.kcna.kp/en/article/q/655a3c30289d0b5e7228f799f83e0bd9.kcmsf>

② 23 December 2022

## Statement of Spokesperson for DPRK Foreign Ministry

Date: 23/12/2022 | Source: KCNA.co.jp (En) | [Read original version at source](#)

Pyongyang, December 23 (KCNA) -- A spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) issued the following press statement on Friday: The U.S. is now trying to cook up a "presidential statement" of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemning the DPRK's exercise of the right to self-defence. The DPRK has already and clearly warned that such foolish attempt of the U.S. may entail a very undesirable consequence. It will be defiance of the DPRK's sovereignty and a grave interference in its affairs to adopt any document taking issue with the DPRK's legitimate right to self-defence by abusing the name of the UN, whether it is "presidential statement" or anything else. To usurp the right to self-defence, the core of national sovereignty, is the gravest challenge to a sovereign state, as it means that it would not recognize the sovereignty of the DPRK, and a very dangerous act that the DPRK has to counter with action. The DPRK is closely watching the reckless moves of the U.S. which is making uninterrupted irresponsible provocations.

<http://kcna.co.jp/item/2022/202212/news23/20221223-10ee.html>



**Annex 66: Russian Federation statement (9 November 2022)**

Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, Moscow,  
November 9, 2022

Question: More fake news has been planted, this time through statements by US officials about the alleged delivery of North Korean artillery munitions for their use in the special military operation in Ukraine. How would you comment on this?

Maria Zakharova: We have taken note of the statements made by some US officials, including NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby, who said that the United States has information that indicates North Korea is covertly supplying Russia with artillery shells for their use in Ukraine. US State Department Spokesman Ned Price has mentioned Washington's plans to impose additional sanctions against Pyongyang in this connection. As usual, they have not provided reliable proof of these allegations. The thing is that there isn't any because everything US officials say is nothing other than more lies, fake news and speculation that they spread in the West about Russia. They just wanted to adopt new sanctions, and they have found a pretext.

[https://www.mid.ru/ru/press\\_service/spokesman/briefings/1837618/?lang=en](https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/spokesman/briefings/1837618/?lang=en)

## **Annex 67: Wagner Group (22 December 2022)**

### **Founder of the Wagner private military group Yevgeny Prigozhin**

«К сожалению, господин Кирби делает достаточно много заявлений, основанных на домыслах. Всем известно, что Северная Корея уже давно не поставляет никаких вооружений в Российскую Федерацию. И таких попыток даже не делалось. Поэтому поставки оружия из КНДР - не что иное, как сплетни и домыслы...»

(Unofficial translation)

“Unfortunately, Mr. Kirby makes quite a lot of statements based on speculation. Everyone knows that North Korea has not supplied any weapons to the Russian Federation for a long time. And such attempts were not even made. Therefore, the supply of weapons from the DPRK is nothing but gossip and speculation.”


Source : [https://t.me/concordgroup\\_official/194](https://t.me/concordgroup_official/194)

## Annex 68: The Panel's imagery analysis

The Panel observed on satellite imagery the presence of a train at stations in the Russian Federation and then in DPRK on 18 November 2022. The Panel cannot confirm the claim that the train was used to transport ammunition.<sup>118</sup>

### Image 1

Five railcars (total length approx. 95m) were observed near Khasan station in Russian side on 18 November 2022 at 1:27 UTC. (between 42°25'53"N130°38'41"E - 42°25'51"N130°38'42"E)




<sup>118</sup> Two experts are convinced it is premature to include any assessments by the Panel before exercising due diligence in collecting evidence and conducting investigation according to the Panel's standard.

Source: Planet Labs Inc; (inset imagery) US Government, annotated by the Panel.

## Image 2

Five railcars (total length approx. 95m) and probable locomotive (at the western end of train) were observed at Tumangang, DPRK, at 5:19 (UTC) and 5:25 (UTC) (four hours later than image 1) (between  $42^{\circ}24'54''\text{N}130^{\circ}37'24''\text{E}$  -  $42^{\circ}24'53''\text{N}130^{\circ}37'29''\text{E}$ )



Source: Planet Labs Inc; annotated by the Panel.



## Annex 69: Media images suggesting the presence of luxury goods in DPRK

The following pictures are taken from media articles which appear to show the presence of luxury goods in DPRK shops. The Panel is investigating the routes by which these goods arrive in DPRK and the possible related sanctions evasion.







Source: <https://www.nknews.org/pro/new-north-korean-luxury-department-store-opens-in-capital-after-years-of-delays/>;  
<https://www.nknews.org/pro/new-photos-give-first-look-inside-renovated-japanese-luxury-store-in-pyongyang/>;  
<https://www.nknews.org/pro/expanding-japan-linked-mall-online-shop-in-pyongyang-targets-modern-tastes/>;  
<https://www.nknews.org/pro/new-photos-give-first-look-inside-renovated-japanese-luxury-store-in-pyongyang/>;  
<https://www.nknews.org/pro/expanding-japan-linked-mall-online-shop-in-pyongyang-targets-modern-tastes/>

**Annex 70: Reply from Japan**

PERMANENT MISSION OF JAPAN  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
NEW YORK

6 January 2023

[REDACTED]

The Government of Japan highly values the work of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1874 (hereinafter “the Panel”) as well as that of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1718 (hereinafter “the 1718 Committee”), and reaffirms its commitment to cooperate with the Panel to ensure the full and strict implementation of all relevant UNSCRs against North Korea.

Upon instructions from the capital, I have the honour to share Japan’s response, as attached, to your letter dated 8 November 2022 (Reference: S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.246) with respect to information on Ms. Rim Mi Young.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Government of Japan reaffirms its commitment to continue working closely with the Panel and the 1718 Committee. Should the Panel have any inquiries, please contact the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations.

Please accept the assurance of my highest esteem.



Kimihiro ISHIKANE  
Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary  
Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations

[REDACTED]

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts  
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

1. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED].
2. In any case, Japan's Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) prohibits the export to North Korea of all goods, not just those prohibited by relevant Security Council resolutions, and we will continue to thoroughly enforce such measures, including border control. Since the introduction of these measures, we have been asking for understanding and cooperation of related entities to ensure that the full ban on exports to North Korea is enforced. Since the autonomous measures against North Korea were initiated in 2006, we have been issuing reminders and requests for cooperation to industry associations (about 1,000 organizations) and local customs offices every one to two years (at a time when the measures under Article 10 of FEFTA are extended. At first, every six months, more recently every two years). In addition, training on trade management, including sanctions against North Korea, is conducted annually, with participation of customs officials and police officers.
3. The Government of Japan has also implemented measures which strongly restrict the flow of funds from Japan to North Korea, including steady implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions which prohibit transfer of any financial or other assets or resources to or from North Korea that contribute to North Korea's nuclear-related and other prohibited activities, as well as Japan's own measures including the prohibition of payment to North Korea. If a payment was made by a resident of Japan to a resident of North Korea, it would constitute a violation of FEFTA.
4. The Government of Japan will continue to thoroughly implement such measures.

**Annex 71: Media images of imported alcoholic beverages**



*Source:* NK News.

## Annex 72: Imports of alcoholic beverages by DPRK from China (April-September 2022)

Month	HS Code	Commodity	Trading partner	Quantity (Litre)	Supplimentary Quantity	Supplimentary Unit	US dollar
202207	22041000	Sparkling wine of fresh grapes	Korea,DPR	1680	1680	Kilogram	2,961
202207	22042100	Othr wine&grape must with fermentation prvntd by alchl, containersjÜ2L	Korea,DPR	2016	2016	Kilogram	9,059
202207	22042200	Othr wine&grape must with fermentation rvntd by alchl, 2LE%containersjÜ10L	Korea,DPR	14400	13824	Kilogram	21,654
202207	22082000	Spirits from distilled grape wine or marc	Korea,DPR	3690	3365	Kilogram	8,722
202207	22083000	Whiskies	Korea,DPR	7213	6496	Kilogram	28,034
202207	22086000	Vodka	Korea,DPR	8481	7633	Kilogram	23,012
202208	22030000	Beer made from malt	Korea,DPR	83351	84363	Kilogram	121,012
202208	22042100	Othr wine&grape must with fermentation rvntd by alchl, containersjÜ2L	Korea,DPR	43958	43037	Kilogram	132,365
202208	22082000	Spirits from distilled grape wine or marc	Korea,DPR	64846	61199	Kilogram	1,230,932
202208	22083000	Whiskies	Korea,DPR	37732	35527	Kilogram	608,553
202208	22084000	Rum&other spirits by distilling fermented ugar cane products	Korea,DPR	180	164	Kilogram	1,915
202208	22085000	Gin&Geneva	Korea,DPR	180	164	Kilogram	1,631
202209	22042100	Othr wine&grape must with fermentation prvntd by alchl, containersjÜ2L	Korea,DPR	25107	24911	Kilogram	197,095
202209	22060090	Other fermented beverages£»mixtures of fermented beverages and non-alcoholic beverages, nes	Korea,DPR	15924	15946	Kilogram	79,529
202209	22082000	Spirits from distilled grape wine or marc	Korea,DPR	14848	13763	Kilogram	151,689
202209	22083000	Whiskies	Korea,DPR	22878	21481	Kilogram	412,149
202209	22085000	Gin&Geneva	Korea,DPR	2520	2298	Kilogram	3,363
202209	22086000	Vodka	Korea,DPR	38811	35922	Kilogram	185,167
202209	22087000	Liqueurs and cordials	Korea,DPR	89	81	Kilogram	1,900
202209	22089010	Tequila, Mezcal	Korea,DPR	36	33	Kilogram	444

Source: General Administration of Customs, PRC



**Annex 73-1: Letter from the Permanent Mission of Japan**

PERMANENT MISSION OF JAPAN  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
NEW YORK

22 July 2022

[REDACTED]

The Government of Japan highly values the work of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1874 (hereinafter "the Panel") as well as that of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1718 (hereinafter "the 1718 Committee"), and reaffirms its commitment to cooperate with the Panel to ensure the full and strict implementation of all relevant UNSCRs against North Korea.

Upon instructions from the capital, I have the honour to share Japan's response, as attached, to your letter dated 9 June 2022 (Reference: S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.106) with respect to information on the sales of Canon and Nikon cameras in Japan.

The Government of Japan reaffirms its commitment to continue working closely with the Panel and the 1718 Committee. Should the Panel have any inquiries, please contact the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations.

Please accept the assurance of my highest esteem.



Kimihiro ISHIKANE  
Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary  
Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations

[REDACTED]

Coordinator of the Panel of Experts  
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

**Japan's response  
regarding the information on the sales of Canon and Nikon  
cameras in Japan**

1 Japan's Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act prohibits the export to North Korea of all goods, not just those prohibited by Security Council sanctions, and we will continue to thoroughly enforce such measures, including border control. Since the introduction of these measures, we have been asking for the understanding and cooperation of related entities to ensure that the full ban on exports to North Korea is enforced. Since the economic sanctions against North Korea were initiated in 2006, we have been issuing reminders and requests for cooperation to industry associations (about 1,000 organizations) and local customs offices every one to two years (every extension of its own sanctions under Article 10 of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act. At first, every six months, more recently every two years). In addition, trade management training, including North Korean sanctions, is conducted annually, with customs officials and police officers participating.

2 We are aware that both Canon and Nikon have thorough distribution controls and have responded to the Panel's inquiry in extremely good faith. With respect to the sale of consumer products, such as the subject of the inquiry, there is nothing unnatural about the situation in which a manufacturer is unable to trace the distribution of products beyond the retailer. The issue of the transfer of samples or inspection equipment, which the Panel's letter describes as "operations that may be illegal" is whether the products were properly handled after being delivered to the disposal companies in China or Malaysia. Thus we understand those occurred outside of Japan.

3 In any case, as stated above, the Government of Japan will thoroughly enforce the ban on exports to North Korea of all goods, not only prohibited goods under Security Council sanctions, in accordance with Japan's domestic laws.

**Annex 73-2: Reply from the Permanent Mission of China (concerning cameras)**

“The investigation requirement of the letter is beyond the mandate of related resolutions. The DPRK-related Security Council resolutions do not include camera in the list of prohibited luxury goods, nor do they give mandate to the panel to explain the scope of luxury goods. The information from the media is far from accurate”.



### Annex 73-3: Letter from the Permanent Mission of Singapore



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE  
UNITED NATIONS | NEW YORK

12 August 2022

[REDACTED]  
Coordinator  
Panel of Experts  
established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Dear [REDACTED]

I refer to your letter (S/AC.49/2022/PE/OC.108) dated 9 June 2022 which requested assistance from the authorities of the Republic of Singapore in a possible investigation of the alleged transfer of a Japanese Nikon camera obtained by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) through wholesale or retail channels in Singapore, as well as relevant information on any such investigation. The Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009) had provided information that the camera was sold to a Singapore company, Alan Photo, on 18 July 2012.

Our authorities' checks have not uncovered any evidence that Alan Photo had directly or indirectly supplied, sold or transferred the camera to the DPRK. Alan Photo has also declared that the company does not have dealings with the DPRK.

Singapore reiterates our commitment to upholding our international obligations under the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). We regularly update our legislation to give full effect to the relevant UNSCRs on the DPRK, including in relation to the supply, sale or transfer of luxury goods to the DPRK. In addition, Singapore has suspended trade with the DPRK since November 2017. All commercial imports, exports, transshipment, or transit of goods from or destined for the DPRK are prohibited.


Please let me know if you require any further information. Singapore will continue to be of assistance to the Panel where possible. Thank you.

Yours sincerely,

**MARK SEAH**  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

## Annex 74: Additional information on Song Rim

### Location of Song Rim's office in Dandong, China



- Coordinates: 39°57' 51.3" N 124° 11'07.7"E

Source: Member State, annotated by the Panel.



## Annex 75: Information on Chinese associates of Song Rim

### ① Wu ZhuJing (吴洙景)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o DOB : Mar. 20, 1974</li> <li>o Occupation : Representative of <u>Dandong Hongshengan Clothing Co., Ltd.</u> (丹东宏盛安服装有限公司)</li> <li>o Phone No. : [REDACTED]</li> <li>o WeChat ID : [REDACTED]</li> <li>o Major activities               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Posted online ads on a website for advertising DPRK-made software</li> <li>- Suspected of brokering the illicit trade of voice phishing applications for Song Rim, and delivered development payments to Song</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
---	--

### Online ad for DPRK-made software posted by Wu ZhuJing

컴퓨터,핸드폰 프로그램,게임을 제작합니다

위챗(微信)에 공유

불조심 | 2022.05.26 16:43:28

댓글: 0 | 조회: 657 | 추천: 0

지역: 中国 辽宁 丹东

분류: 서버/사이트 제작·양도

주소복사 | <https://life.moyiza.kr/bizinfo/4372685>

분류	서버/사이트 제작·양도
지역	中国 辽宁 丹东
전화번호	15174187510
회사명	단둥롄경상무유한공사

안녕하세요 ,  
저희회사는 요녕성 단둥에 위치한 무역회사입니다 .  
평양에 컴퓨터 관련 인재들을 모아서 컴퓨터 프로그램,핸드폰 프로그램  
을 제작합니다 ,  
품목은 코딩:환경업무프로그램 ,경영업무프로그램 ,각종 게임,  
  
다매체:handamin,letas,flash,moho,story.



이상 프로그램이나 게임제작이 필요하신분은 아래 연락처로 연락 주세요 .


핸드폰:15174187510  
wechat:tx15174187510


Source :

[https://life.moyiza.kr/bizinfo/4372685?\\_gl=1\\*vbuu6y\\*\\_ga\\*MjEzMDk1Nzg2My4xNjY2ODI1MTM0\\*\\_ga\\_XYRM2KYNVS\\*MTY2NjgyNTEzNC4xLjAuMTY2NjgyNTEzNC42MC4wLjA](https://life.moyiza.kr/bizinfo/4372685?_gl=1*vbuu6y*_ga*MjEzMDk1Nzg2My4xNjY2ODI1MTM0*_ga_XYRM2KYNVS*MTY2NjgyNTEzNC4xLjAuMTY2NjgyNTEzNC42MC4wLjA)

Website of Dandong Hongshengan Clothing Co., Ltd.

 hongshengan@163.com  +86-151 7418 7510

 中文



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首页 > 联系我们

产品

羽绒服

户外服装

制服


童装

女性着装

棉衣

毛呢大衣

特色产品

 男士酒店接待服 [更多](#)


公司:	丹东宏盛安服装有限公司
地址:	中国辽宁省丹东市镇安区变压器村二组355号
电话:	+86-151 7418 7510
电子邮件:	hongshengan@163.com

Wu Zhujing

职位	总经理
手机	+86-15174187510
电子邮件	hongshengan@163.com
QQ	2637866167
微信	TX15174187510

Source : <http://cn.dd-hsa.com/>

## ② Wang Feng (王峰)

 <p>&lt; WeChat profile photo &gt;</p>	<p>o Occupation : Owner of <u>Yiwu Gangchao Trading</u> (义乌港朝贸易商行)</p> <p>* Address of the trading firm : Room #402, Line 1, Building #40, <u>Zongtang 1qu</u>, <u>Jiangdongjie</u>, <u>Yiwushi</u>, <u>Jinhua</u>shi, <u>Zhejiang</u> Province</p>
	o Phone No. : [REDACTED]
	o WeChat ID : [REDACTED]
	o Major activities
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Serves as the representative of <u>gangchaomaoyi</u>, which Song Rim registered as his workplace on <u>LinkedIn</u> profile</li> <li>- Suspected of lending his Chinese bank account to North Korean IT <u>agents</u>, and exchanging foreign currency paid for DPRK's SW development on behalf of the <u>DPRK</u> IT workers</li> </ul>

## Information about Yiwu Gangchao Trading

港

义乌市港朝贸易商行

开业

经营者: 王峰

邮箱: 暂无邮箱 (获取全网邮箱(1))

成立日期: 2020-11-03

统一社会信用代码: 92330782MA2JYUQ19C

简介: 义乌市港朝贸易商行成立于2020年11月03日, 注册地位于浙江省金华市义乌市江东街道李塘一区40幢1单元402(自主申报), 法定代表人为王峰, 经营范围: ... 展开

电话: 暂无电话 (获取全网电话(5))

网址: 暂无网址

地址: 浙江省金华市义乌市江东街道李塘一区40幢1单元402(自主申报) (附近公司)

企业风险

自身风险 0

关联风险 0

变更记录 0

情报动态

实时查看企业一手动态

直观看清·企业关系

发现商业关系

新开网站·发现商机

NEW 138\*\*\*\*6745

一键获取·批量企业信息

批量查企业

30+ 搜索条件

高级查企业

基本信息

重点关注

知识产权

经营状况

企业发展

数据解读

企业新闻


工商注册

查看工商变更记录 >


经营者	王峰	经营状态	开业	成立日期	2020-11-03
注册资本	-	实缴资本	-	审核/年检日期	2020-11-03
统一社会信用代码	92330782MA2JYUQ19C	组织机构代码	MA2JYUQ1-9	纳税人识别号	92330782MA2JYUQ19C
企业类型	个体工商户	营业期限	长期有效	工商注册号	330782630118670
所属行业	批发业	登记机关	义乌市市场监督管理局	行政区划	浙江省金华市义乌市
参保人数	-			曾用名	-
注册地址	浙江省金华市义乌市江东街道李塘一区40幢1单元402(自主申报) 查看地图				
经营范围	一般项目: 日用品销售; 玩具销售; 服装服饰零售(除依法须经批准的项目外, 凭营业执照依法自主开展经营活动)。				

Source : [https://aiqicha.baidu.com/company\\_detail\\_35347384018499](https://aiqicha.baidu.com/company_detail_35347384018499)

## ③ Hong Yong (洪勇)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Name : Hong Yong</li> <li>o DOB : June 1, 1985</li> <li>o Major activities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Operating more than 6 voice phishing call centers in Tianjin and Shandong, China</li> <li>- Purchased hacking apps and personal information of ROK nationals from North Korean IT organizations, and delivered them to his call centers to be used for voice phishing crimes.</li> <li>- Names of multiple members of Hong Yong's crime ring were found in the Command &amp; Control server of the voice phishing hacking app that is managed by Song Rim.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
---	--

## ④ Jin ChengHao (金成浩)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Name : Jin, ChengHao</li> <li>o DOB : Jan. 19, 1983</li> <li>o Major activities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Key member of Hong Yong's crime ring / manages call centers.</li> <li>- His name was found on the contact list of a smartphone registered in the Command &amp; Control server of the hacking app that is managed by Song Rim.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
---	--

Source : Member State, annotated by the Panel.

**Annex 76: List of DPRK cyberthreat actors' malicious activities in 2022 monitored by the Panel**

RGB Unit	Case Name	SPH	KAC	VAS	VAS Value	Publicized Month
Kimsuky	Distribution of KONNI RAT	√	√			January
BlueNoroff	Snatchcrypto Campaign	√		√	N/A	January
Kimsuky	Distribution of xRAT	√	√			February
Kimsuky	APT attacks using DPRK related documents	√				February
Kimsuky	APT attacks using VBS Script disguised as PDF	√				March
Kimsuky	APT attacks using Word Files about Cryptocurrency	√				March
Lazarus Group	Attacks using Trojanized DeFi applications	√		√		March
Lazarus Group	Axie Infinity Hack (Ronin Hack)			√	173,600 ETH 25.5 mil. USD Coin	March
Lazarus Group	Exploiting INITECH Process	√				April
Kimsuky	APT attacks using disguised Word File	√				April
Lazarus Group	Targeting Chemical Sector (Operation Dream Job)	√	√			April
Stonefly	Targeting Energy and Military Sectors	√	√			April
Kimsuky	APT attacks using Disguised Press Release	√				May
Lazarus Group	Exploiting Log4Shell Vulnerability (NukeSped)	√	√			May
BlueNoroff	BEAF, PXJ, ZZZ, ChiChi Ransomware attacks			√	N/A	May
Lazarus Group	Harmony Hack (Horizon Brigde Hack)			√	85,500 ETH	June
Andariel	Maui Ransomware attacks			√	N/A	July
Kimsuky	SharpTongue deploying SHARPEXT	√	√			July
Kimsuky	AppleSeed attack on Mil. Maintenance Company		√			July

Note: RGB Reconnaissance General Bureau, SPH Significant Phishing, KAC knowledge acquisition and espionage, VAS virtual asset seizures.



RGB Unit	Case Name	SPH	KAC	VAS	VAS Value	Publicized Month
Kimsuky	Disguised AppleSeed distribution	√	√			July
Andariel	H0lyGh0st Ransomware attack			√	N/A	July
Kimsuky	AppleSeed on Nuclear Energy related Industries	√	√			August
Kimsuky	APT attacks using Word File w/ External Links	√	√			August
Lazarus Group	Attack targeting Apple's MacOS users	√				August
Lazarus Group	Amazon-themed campaigns (Dell)	√	√			September
Lazarus Group	ZINC weaponizing open-source software	√	√			September
Lazarus Group	Three RATs attack	√	√			September
Lazarus Group	Rootkit Malware attack using BYOVD	√				October
Lazarus Group	DLL Side-Loading attack	√				October
Kimsuky	Fastfire, FastViewer and FastSpy	√				October
Lazarus Group	Attacks targeting digital asset firms	√		√	N/A	October
Lazarus Group	Dtrack malware attack	√				November
Lazarus Group	Targeting Ukraine Entities		√			November
Lazarus Group	AppleJeus Attacks	√		√	N/A	December
Kimsuky	Attacks against foreign policy experts	√		√	1980 USD worth of bitcoins	December
BlueNoroff	Attacks bypassing MotW	√		√	N/A	December
Lazarus Group	Phishing attacks on NFT users	√		√	N/A	December

Source: The Panel.

## **Annex 77: Links to reports from Ahnlab's ASEC**

### **Kimsuky Group**

[Word File Provided as External Link When Replying to Attacker's Email \(Kimsuky\)](#)

(2 August 2022)

[AppleSeed Being Distributed to Maintenance Company of Military Bases \(Kimsuky\)](#)

(28 July 2022)

[원자력 발전소 관련 기업 대상으로 AppleSeed 유포 \(Kimsuky\)](#)

(27 October 2022)

[AppleSeed Disguised as Purchase Order and Request Form Being Distributed \(Kimsuky\)](#)

(11 July 2022)

### **Lazarus Group**

[Lazarus Group Uses the DLL Side-Loading Technique \(mi.dll\) \(Lazarus\)](#)

(12 October 2022)

[Analysis-Report-on-Lazarus-Groups-Rootkit-Attack-Using-BYOVD \(Lazarus\)](#)

(5 October 2022)

**Annex 78: ROK National Police Agency's press release (26 December 2022) on Kimsuky's spearphishing investigation results**

**경찰청**

## 보도자료

다시 도약하는 대한민국  
함께 잘사는 국민의 나라

보도 일시	2022. 12. 26.(월) 조간	누리망·방송	2022. 12. 25.(일) 09:00
담당 부서	국가수사본부 사이버수사국 사이버테러대응과	책임자	총경 정석화 (02-3150-0053)
		담당자	경정 이규봉 (02-3150-1459)

**기자·국회의원실 등 사칭 전자우편 발송사건,  
북 해킹조직 소행으로 확인**

**- 교수 등 49명의 전자우편 감시, 일부 업체 서버에는 랜섬웨어 유포 -**

경찰청 국가수사본부(사이버수사국)에서는 지난 4. 28. 발송된 『제20대 대통령직 인수위원회』 출입기자를 사칭한 전자우편 및 『태영호 국회의원실』 비서를 사칭한 전자우편(5. 7.), 『국립외교원』을 사칭한 전자우편(10. 26.)에 대한 수사결과, 2013년부터 파악된 북한의 특정 해킹조직 소행으로 확인하였다.

북한 해킹조직은 국내외 무차별 해킹을 통해 26개국 326대(국내 87대)의 서버 컴퓨터를 강악하며 사이버테러를 위한 기반을 확보하였고, 이들 수사기관의 추적을 회피하기 위한 아이피(IP) 주소 세탁용 경유지로 이용하였다.

북한 해킹조직은 IP주소를 세탁한 뒤, 기자·국회의원실 등을 사칭하며 피싱 사이트로 유도하거나 악성 프로그램을 첨부한 전자우편을 외교·통일·안보·국방 전문가에게 발송하였다. 이러한 사칭 전자우편은 최소 892명에게 발송되었다.

피싱 사이트에 접속해 자신의 아이디와 비밀번호를 입력한 외교·통일·안보·국방 분야 종사자 49명이 확인되었으며, 북한 해킹조직은 이들 피해자의 송·수신 전자우편을 실시간으로 감시하며 첨부 문서와 주소록 등을 빼내 간 것으로 파악되었다.

- 1 -

특히, 이번 수사로 북한 해킹조직이 금품 요구 악성 프로그램(랜섬웨어)을 유포한 사실이 국내에서는 최초로 확인되었다. 강악한 서버 중 일부에는 랜섬웨어를 감염시켜 금전을 요구하였으며, 확인된 피해 규모는 국내 13개 업체의 서버 10대이다.

경찰청 등 정부 기관은 그간 국내외 민간 보안업체에서 일명 ‘김수기(Kimsuky)’ 등으로 명명한 북한의 특정 해킹조직을 여러 차례 수사한 바 있으며, 이번 사건 또한 기존 북한발로 규명된 『한국수력원자력 해킹 사건(2014년)』 및 『국가안보실 사칭 전자우편 발송사건(2016년)』과 비교하여, △ 공격 근원지의 아이피(IP) 주소 △ 해외 사이트의 가입정보 △ 경유지 침입·관리 수법 △ 악성 프로그램의 특징 등이 같고, △ 북한어휘를 사용하는 점, △ 범행 대상이 외교·통일·안보·국방 전문가로 일관된 점 등을 근거로 같은 북한 해킹조직의 소행으로 판단하였다.

경찰청은 피해자와 소속 기업에 피해 사실을 통보하고, 한국인터넷진흥원 및 백신업체와 협력하여 피싱 사이트를 차단하는 한편, 관계기관에 북한 해킹조직의 침입 수법·해킹 도구 등 관련 정보를 제공하여 정보보호 정책 수립에 활용하도록 하였다.

경찰청은 북한의 이러한 시도가 앞으로도 지속할 것으로 예상되므로 전산망에 대한 접근통제, 전자우편 암호의 주기적 변경 및 2단계 인증 설정, 다른 국가로부터의 접속 차단 등 보안 설정 강화를 당부하였다.

또한, 경찰청은 앞으로도 치안 역량을 총동원하여 조직적 사이버 공격을 탐지·추적함과 동시에 관계기관과 긴밀히 협력하여 피해 방지를 위해 노력해 나아갈 계획이다.

붙임) 1. 사건 개요도

2. 기자·국회의원실 사칭 전자우편



붙임 1 사건 개요도


## 북한발 사칭이메일 유포사건 개요도






## 붙임 2 사칭 전자우편

### ○ 국회의원실 사칭 전자우편



## ○ 기자 사칭 전자우편



**Annex 79: Other espionage-related activities of Kimsuky and Lazarus Group**

A cybersecurity company reported that Kimsuky has been using three different Android malware strains to target its victims.<sup>119</sup> This malware was named as malware families 'FastFire', 'FastViewer', and 'FastSpy'. The 'FastFire' malware was disguised as a Google security plugin, and the 'FastViewer' malware as 'Hancm Office Viewer'. 'FastSpy' was based on AndroSpy, a type of Android remote-access-tool. Once launched the malwares enable the adversary to seize control of the targeted devices, intercept phone calls and SMS, track users' locations, harvest documents, capture keystrokes, and record information from the mobile's camera, microphone, and speaker. The hackers also logged in using the victims IP. Attribution of these malwares to Kimsuky was based on overlaps with server domains previously used by the group.

In another case, cybersecurity firm reports acquired by the Panel demonstrates that the Lazarus Group has been using a 'DLL<sup>120</sup> Side-Loading attack technique' which abuses legitimate applications in the initial compromise stage to bypass the detection of security software in order to pave the way for the next stage of the attack process. In addition, the Lazarus Group also utilized vulnerable driver modules in its attack process to disable all internal monitoring systems of a victim's computer, including anti-virus programmes.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> <https://medium.com/s2wblog/unveil-the-evolution-of-kimsuky-targeting-android-devices-with-newly-discovered-mobile-malware-280dae5a650f>

<sup>120</sup> <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/dynamic-link-library>

<sup>121</sup> See annex 77 for links to the firm's reports.

**Annex 80: Information on Sok Kha's associates**

No.	Name*	Date of Birth	Passport No. and Expiry Date		Note
①	<b>KIM</b> Nam Ryong	Oct. 7, 1990	DPRK Passport (PA) 390230070	April 28, 2025	-
②	<b>JON</b> Sung Jin	May 24, 1980	DPRK Passport (PA) 390230067	April 28, 2025	This individual holds two DPRK passports with different DoB
		July 27, 1981	DPRK Passport (PA) 108481360	Dec. 24, 2023	
③	<b>PAK</b> Jin Song	Feb. 1, 1981	DPRK Passport (PA) 390230064	April 28, 2025	-
④	<b>JO</b> Won Jong	April 7, 1994	Ecuadorian Passport 0930266648	Mar. 29, 2024	This DPRK individual holds a foreign passport
⑤	<b>HAN</b> Ji Yon	Mar. 15, 1995	DPRK Passport (PA) 109137555	Feb. 10, 2024	This individual holds another foreign passport
			Cambodian Passport N01673074	July 8, 2029	

\* Capitalized and bold text represents last name of the individual.

## Annex 81: Corporate registry of Beijing Chaoyi Online Cultural Exchange Co., Ltd (Brand name: Painted Arirang)



The screenshot shows the Aiqicha (爱企查) corporate registry page for Beijing Chaoyi Online Cultural Exchange Co., Ltd. (北京朝艺在线文化交流有限公司). The page includes a search bar at the top with the company name entered. Below the search bar, the company's basic information is displayed, including its status (开业), legal representative (沈莲花), registered capital (50万元), and unified social credit code (91110102742311502X). The page also features a sidebar with various tools like 'Download Report' (下载报告), 'Risk Monitoring' (风险监控), and 'Follow' (关注). The main content area provides a detailed introduction to the company, its business scope, and contact information. At the bottom, there is a section for 'Enterprise Risk' (企业风险) and 'Intelligence Dynamic' (情报动态).



This block provides a summary of the company's key information:

- Company Name:** 北京朝艺在线文化交流有限公司 (Beijing Chaoyi Online Cultural Exchange Co., Ltd.)
- Status:** 开业 (Operating)
- Legal Representative:** 沈莲花 (Shen Lianhua)
- Registered Capital:** 50.0万 (500,000 RMB)
- Establishment Date:** 2002-08-28
- Address:** 北京市西城区广安门内大街6号枫桦豪景A座1-802室 (Room 1-802, Fenghuahaojing A Building, No. 6 Guang'anmennei Dajie, Xicheng District, Beijing)
- Business Scope:** 组织文化艺术交流活动 (不含演出); 技术开发、技术咨询、技术转让; 信息咨询 (不含中介服务); 销售...
- Trademark Name:** 画说阿里郎 (Hua Shuo Ali Lang)


Source: 爱企查





**Figure 82-2: Painting produced by Mansudae Art Studio**


The following part of this webpage explains that the artist of this painting is currently a creator at Mansudae Art Studio.



Source: <http://www.hsall.net/product/1328.html> (Accessed on 2 January 2023).

**Figure 82-3: Painting produced by Mansudae Art Studio**


The following part of this webpage explains that the artist of this painting is assigned to the Oil Painting Creation Group of Mansudae Art Studio.



Source: <http://www.hsall.net/product/1331.html> (Accessed on 2 January 2023).

**Figure 82-4: Painting produced by Mansudae Art Studio**

The following part of this webpage explains that the artist of this painting is a creator at Mansudae Art Studio.




Source: <http://www.hsall.net/product/1449.html> (Accessed on 2 January 2023).

**Figure 82-5: Painting produced by Mansudae Art Studio**

The following part of this webpage explains that the artist of this painting was assigned to Mansudae Art Studio as a creator in the Oil Painting Creation Group.



Studio as a creator in the Oil Painting Creation Group.



Source: <http://www.hsall.net/product/1329.html> (Accessed on 2 January 2023).

### Figure 82-6: Customised portrait service

The following shows Painted Arirang's "Customization of Portrait Painting Services". It says "The client must contact our customer service when customizing a realistic portrait. We will arrange for you to come to our "Painted Arirang" creative base as soon as possible, and the North Korean artist will take a number of photos of you on site and then discuss with you to determine the material. Depending on the popularity and level of the painter, the price is also based on the size required by the client; the general price is between 10,000 (USD 1,470) and 30,000 RMB (USD 4,420), and it takes about a month."





HOT

画说阿里郎 | 在线展厅 | 朝鲜油画 | 朝鲜国画 | 朝鲜画家

请输入搜索内容

购买流程 | 售后服务 | 定制服务

定制服务

肖像画服务的定制:

1 委托人定制写实肖像时须与我们客服联系, 我们尽快安排您到我们“画说阿里郎”创作基地, 在现场由朝鲜美术家为其拍摄多张照片后与本人商量确定素材。依据画家的知名度和级别, 还根据委托人要求的尺寸定价:一般价格为10000-30000之间, 大概需要一个月时间。

风景及特定作品的定制:

1 委托人需要定制风景作品时, 可先把希望的风景风格和尺寸发给我们, 我们将按您的需求在数据库找类似图片发给您供选择。关于定制价格我们会根据委托人的要求和画家的级别知名度而定。

2 委托人定制其他题材作品时具体与我们的客服联系, 作品尺寸超大或需画家到委托人现场作画时需要提前与我们客服联系。

客服电话: 010-6357-3588 13911300781

Source: <http://www.hsall.net/intro/4.html> (Accessed on 2 January 2023).

## Annex 83: Corporate registry of Dandong Jinping Korea Cultural Art Co., Ltd

The screenshot displays the corporate profile of Dandong Jinping Korea Cultural Art Co., Ltd. on the Aiqicha platform. The page includes the company's name, registration details, contact information, and various business metrics.

**Company Name:** 丹东金坪高丽文化艺术品有限公司

**Registration Details:** 开业, 曾用名, A级纳税人(2021), 小微企业, 变更提醒 9条

**Contact Information:** 电话: 15840217123, 邮箱: zcbjmyc-2125045@126.co...

**Address:** 辽宁省丹东边境经济合作区商贸旅游区A1区 (三层301号)

**Business Scope:** 工艺品; 会议及展览服务; 文化艺术咨询服务; 货物及技术进出口; 利用互联网销售美术品、工艺品、文化用品; 电子商务。

**Key Metrics:** 自身风险 0, 关联风险 0, 变更提醒 9, 查看风险, 情报动态, 2022-08-31 新增 其他工商信息 变更, 查看动态

**Basic Information:** 基本信息 28, 重点关注 10, 知识产权 6, 企业发展 2, 经营状况 8, 数据解读, 新闻资讯

**Related Information:** 爱企查图谱, 工商注册, 风险洞察, 股东信息 3, 股权穿透图, 主要人员 2, 企业受益股东, 疑似实际控制人, 最终受益人 1, 对外投资 0, 控股企业 0, 变更记录 14

**Other Data:** 企业年报 7, 分支机构 1, 总公司 0

Source: 爱企查

**Annex 84: Website of Dandong Jinping Korean Culture Art Co., Ltd**

According to information provided to the Panel by a research center, Dandong Jinping Korean Culture Art Co., Ltd has an online platform for the sale of DPRK paintings, including the products of Mansudae Art Studio (see figures 84-1 and 84-2). The company website shows that the company builds cooperation platforms for artist exchanges, artwork customization, art collection consultation, and art exhibition planning involving DPRK artworks. The company hosted an exhibition of DPRK artwork in April 2021 and invited DPRK artists from the Mansudae Art Studio.

**Figure 84-1: Painting and artist from the Mansudae Art Studio**

网站首页 关于我们 资讯中心 朝鲜油画 朝鲜水墨 画家作品 画廊展览 在线留言 联系我们

当前位置：首页 > 朝鲜油画 > 风景

《冬日河边》 1340x830mm  
发布时间：2020/04/16

Artist

Price: Negotiable

Currently, Artist of Mansudae Art Studio


地址：北京居然之家（北四环店）一号馆一层东创艺术廊1-1-033  
联系电话：400-0425-737

作品：《冬日河边》  
作者：[Redacted]  
规格：朝鲜油画艺术家  
规格：1340x830mm  
价格：1850x920mm  
画家介绍：  
[Redacted]  
朝鲜油画艺术家  
1960年11月17日出生于朝鲜平壤市西浦区也庆洞  
1984年8月毕业于朝鲜平壤美术学院油画系  
现任万泰创作社画家  
作品代表作品：《第七号》《浪花和燕子》《近景秋景图》  
服务：  
藏品保证  
收藏类油画出具收藏证书及作者合影；  
凡购买藏品提供专业收藏及升值分析指南；  
凡购买藏品均赠送定制精美画册  
宗旨：  
以专业团队打造艺术交流、艺术品定制、艺术收藏咨询、艺术展览策划等合作平台。

*Source:* <http://www.ipcxyspom/index.php?m=cn&c=Productgzf&a=view&id=773>.

丹东金坪高丽文化艺术品有限公司 400-0425-737

关于我们 资讯中心 朝鲜绘画 朝鲜水墨 画家作者 高丽青瓷 在线留言 联系我们




**画家作者**

当前位置：首页 > 画家作者 > 朝鲜功勋艺术家

功勋艺术家  
发布时间：2020/04/16

The artist name as meritorious artist.



1960年11月17日出生于朝鲜平壤市西城区长庆洞 1984年8月毕业于朝鲜平壤美术大学绘画系  
现任万寿台创作社画家  
油画代表作品：《海七宝》《莲花和鸭子》《达摩祖师渡海》

Currently, Artist of Mansudae Art Studio

上一条：洪天基-朝鲜功勋艺术家


返回列表

联系我们  
地址：北京居然之家（北四环店）一号馆一层原创艺术街1-1-033  
热线电话：400-0425-737

Source: <http://www.jpcxysp.com/index.php?m=cn&c=Case&a=view&id=399>.



**Figure 84-2: Painting and artist from the Mansudae Art Studio**



Source: <http://www.jpcxysp.com/index.php?m=cn&c=Product&a=view&id=551>.

丹东金坪高丽文化艺术品有限公司 400-0425-737

关于我们 资讯中心 朝鲜油画 朝鲜水墨 画家作者 高丽青瓷 在线留言 联系我们

画家作者

朝鲜功勋艺术家

朝鲜一级画家

朝鲜二级画家

请输入... 资讯中心

联系我们

地址：北京居然之家（北四环店）一号馆一层原艺术街1-1-033

联系电话：400-0425-737

朝鲜功勋艺术家

1963年3月19日出生于朝鲜平壤市顺川江区；

1987年毕业于朝鲜平壤美术学院朝鲜画系；

多次参加过国内展览会并授予金奖；

参加过中国、日本、俄罗斯举办的展览会；

特别参加过丹东举办的朝中博览会，万寿台创作社美术展览1届、2届、3届；

中国、俄罗斯以及几内亚、尼日利亚、厄立特里亚、埃塞俄比亚等非洲国家进行过创作活动；

该画技法纯熟，格调代度尤为精妙，在朝鲜国内的展览会上展出了很多优秀的风景画作品，创作出了许多国家馆藏画，几次受到了金奖。在俄罗斯、中国、非洲等国家都经过一段时期的创作生活，在日本、俄罗斯、柬埔寨进行的展览会上，作品都被收藏；

万寿台创作社 油画创作团 美术家

上一类：金实 朝鲜功勋艺术家

下一类：金德顺 朝鲜功勋艺术家

返回列表

友情链接：百度

The artist name as meritorious artist.

Mansudae Art Studio Oil Painting Creation Group

Source: <http://www.jpcxysp.com/index.php?m=cn&c=Case&a=view&id=413>.





## Annex 86: Incorporation document of Pyongyang Unhasu Co., Ltd

**ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION**  
**PYONGYANG UNHASU CO., LTD.**  
 CAPITAL: 20,000,000 Riels

**CHAPTER I**  
**FORM-BUSINESS OBJECTIVE-NAME-HEAD OFFICE-DURATION**

**ARTICLE 1: FORM OF THE COMPANY**

A business company is created by:

<b>Mr. RI CHOL NAM</b>	Profession	: Businessman
	Nationality	: Republic of Korea
<b>Ri Chol Nam</b>	Address	: Chukjon-1Dong, Mankyongdae District, Pyongyang, DPR Korea.
	Passport No,	: 654420454 dated 25-12-2014

The sole owner of the company, in the form of a single member private limited company as indicated below by its capital and shares.

Since the date of commercial registration, the company has legal personality and has become a legal person that has its own rights, name, address, and is under the supervision of the applicable laws of the Kingdom of Cambodia in accordance with these articles of incorporation.

**ARTICLE 2: BUSINESS OBJECTIVE**

The company shall perform the following activities:

- 561 Restaurants and mobile food service activities
  - 56101 Restaurants and restaurant cum night clubs
- 469 Non-specialized wholesale trade
  - 46900 Wholesale of a variety of goods without any particular specialization n.e.c.
- 464 Wholesale of household goods
  - 46431 Wholesale of pharmaceutical and medical goods
- 521 Warehousing and storage
  - 52100 Warehousing and storage services
- 649 Other financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding activities
  - 64991 Money-changing services
- 781 Activities of employment placement agencies
  - 78100 Activities of employment placement agencies(2)
- 731 Advertising
  - 73100 Advertising(1)
- 551 Short term accommodation activities
  - 55101 Hotels and resort hotels
- 791 Travel agency and tour operator activities
  - 79110 Travel agency activities

**ACCOUNT**  
 24 JAN 2018  
**CLOSED**


**Business objective**

- Restaurants and restaurant cum night clubs
- Whole sale of variety of goods without any particular specialization
- Wholesale of pharmaceutical and medical goods
- Warehousing and storage services
- Money-changing services
- Activities of employment placement agencies
- Advertising
- Hotels and resort hotels
- Travel agency activities

**ABA BANK**  
**FOUL KORK BRANCH**  
 Verified true copy  
 Date: 09/08/16

Source: Cambodia (Annotated by the Panel).

## Annex 87: Corporate registry of Nikapich Restaurant Co. Ltd



**ចុះបញ្ជីពាណិជ្ជកម្ម**  
BUSINESS REGISTRATION

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE

[HOME](#)
[INFORMATION](#)
[ONLINE SERVICES](#)

### View Local Company Details

**និកាភិច រេស្តូរ៉ង់ ឯ.ក** (00009590) **ក្រុមហ៊ុនឯកជនទទួលខុសត្រូវមានកម្រិត**

NIKAPICH RESTAURANT CO., LTD. (00009590) Private Limited Company

If you want to maintain this company you must obtain authority from an authorised person

[Remove from My Watched Items](#)

General Details	Addresses	Directors
Company Name (in Khmer)	<b>និកាភិច រេស្តូរ៉ង់ ឯ.ក</b>	
Company Name (in English)	NIKAPICH RESTAURANT CO., LTD.	
Original Entity Identifier		
Company Status	Struck Off	
Incorporation Date	27-Apr-2016	
Tax Identification Number (TIN)	K005-901636937	
Tax Registration Date	16-Mar-2018	
Annual Return Last Filed on	26-Nov-2019	

### Business Activities

Business Objective	561 Restaurants and mobile food service activities
Main Business Activities	56101 Restaurants and restaurant cum night clubs
Business Objective	469 Non-specialized wholesale trade
Main Business Activities	46900 Wholesale of a variety of goods without any particular specialization n.e.c.
Business Objective	464 Wholesale of household goods
Main Business Activities	46431 Wholesale of pharmaceutical and medical goods

### Number of Employees

Male

Female

Number of Cambodian Employees


Number of Foreign Employees

[Hide company name history](#)

Previous Name	PYONGYANG UNHASU CO., LTD.
Previous Name	<b>ប៊ូយ៉ាង អ៊ុនហាស៊ូ</b>
Start Date	27-Apr-2016 00:00:00
End Date	09-Dec-2019 00:00:00

Previous name of Nikapich Restaurant Co. Ltd





ព្រះរាជាណាចក្រកម្ពុជា

ROYAUME DU CAMBODGE

ព្រះបរមរាជវាំង

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE

ព្រះបញ្ជីពាណិជ្ជកម្ម

BUSINESS REGISTRATION

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[INFORMATION](#)
[ONLINE SERVICES](#)

## View Local Company Details

**នីកាភីច រេសតូរ៉ាន់ ឯ.ក (00009590) ក្រុមហ៊ុនឯកជនទទួលខុសត្រូវមានកម្រិត**

NIKAPICH RESTAURANT CO., LTD. (00009590) Private Limited Company

If you want to maintain this company you must obtain authority from an authorised person

[Remove from My Watched Items](#)

[General Details](#)
[Addresses](#)
[Directors](#)

Director 1

Name ( Khmer ) [REDACTED]

Name ( English ) [REDACTED]

Postal Registered Office Address ផ្ទះលេខ ៣៦អីម, ផ្លូវលេខ ២, Champu Voan, Chom Chao, Por Sen Chey, Phnom Penh, Cambodia

Telephone (+855) 12-1939720

Chairman of the Board of Directors Chairman of the Board of Directors

[Hide Former Directors](#)

Director 1

Name ( Khmer ) [Missing]

Name ( English ) Ri Chol NAM

Postal Registered Office Address Chukjen-1 Dong, Mankyongdae District, Pyongyang, Korea, Democratic People's Republic Of

Telephone [No Country Code] [No Area Code]-016320399

Chairman of the Board of Directors Chairman of the Board of Directors

Ceased 23-Aug-2018

Source: Cambodia corporate registry.

## Annex 88: Replies from Member States

### 1) Viet Nam

Mr. Ri Chol Nam, born in 1974, nationality: the DPRK, entered Viet Nam with the service passport which has the same number as indicated by the Panel of Expert in its letter dated 09th November 2022 by air from [REDACTED] on 5<sup>th</sup> April 2022.

His purpose of travel was to visit [REDACTED], Counselor of the Embassy of the DPRK in Viet Nam. In accordance with the visa-exemption agreement between Viet Nam and the DPRK, the DPRK service passport holder does not require a visa to visit Viet Nam for a period of up to 30 days. As such, Ri Chol Nam entered Viet Nam with his son. [REDACTED] (as stated in the Note dated 22<sup>nd</sup> March 2022 of the Embassy of the DPRK in Viet Nam applying for visa [REDACTED], the purpose [REDACTED] visit was to accompany his farther on his way returning to the DPRK after completing his assignment as Taekwondo coach in Cambodia). Later on, at the request of the Embassy of the DPRK in Viet Nam, Mr. Ri Chol Nam and his son were extended their stay in Viet Nam for another 1 month/time for 2 times til 23rd June 2022. Mr. Ri Chol Nam and his son exited from Viet Nam via Noi Bai International Airport to [REDACTED] on 21<sup>st</sup> June 2022.

After that, Viet Nam denied Mr. Ri Chol Nam and his son's request for 3-month single entry visa for re-entering into Viet Nam (from [REDACTED]) for the purpose to "visit the Embassy of the DPRK and work with Viet Nam Sports Administration, Ministry of Cultures, Sports and Tourism to discuss on Taekwondo training to prepare for the 33rd SEA game".

Through review and investigation, Viet Nam has not found Mr. Ri Chol Nam having any check-in at lodging facilities in Viet Nam, any violation of the Viet Nam's rules and regulation regarding immigration and national security or financial transactions and cooperation with any (business) entities in Viet Nam.

Viet Nam also has so far not found any violation of relevant United Security Council resolutions by Mr. Ri Chol Nam in Viet Nam. His entry and stay in Viet Nam were fully in compliance with Viet Nam's relevant laws and regulations.

On this occasion, Viet Nam would like to reaffirm its commitment to fulfilling its obligation under Security Council resolutions, including those related to the DPRK.

*Source:* Member State, redacted by the Panel.

## 2) China

China “*has made thorough investigations according to the information provided by the Panel and found no evidence that Ri Chol Nam conducted activities in violation of Security Council Resolutions within Chinese borders. The authenticity and accuracy of the information provided could not be verified, and such information should not be included in the Panel report*”.

Source: Member State.

## **Annex 89: Questionnaire for humanitarian organisations that have worked in the DPRK**

For this reporting period the Panel asked some reformulated questions addressing the impact of COVID-19 and the closed borders on organizational operations, and also each group's estimate of when they might be able to resume operations in DPRK.

- 1) What is your assessment of the effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?
- 2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.
- 3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations since DPRK borders were closed in early 2020? Where you able to continue keep some operations still proceeding with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period?
- 4) When, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in DPRK? Do you expect to return operations to the same level you had in pre-COVID time period? Why or why not?
- 5) Please provide detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's COVID-19 response, stipulating one or two of the most important factors.
- 6) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs?
- 7) What could be further improved in the exemption process, or the sanctions regime that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?
- 8) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?

## **Annex 90: Responses from humanitarian organisations**

### **[Organisation 1]**

**1) What is your assessment of the effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?**

- a. [Org.1] general assessment is that people in DPRK are suffering from a combination of border closures and sanctions against the country. The limitations to humanitarian operations as an effect of the sanctions, exacerbated by the imposed Covid-19 related regulations, have abruptly [Org.1] ability to contribute to local initiatives since mid-2021. We are concerned that humanitarian support cannot reach people in need, which are expected to be a large part of the population. This is a general understanding of the situation based on media articles, reports and sharing of information among peers.

**2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.**

- a. The pandemic has caused the DPRK government to establish extremely diligent measures to prevent any movement of either goods or people across their border, as well as movement within the country. Since closing of borders, routine vaccinations for children and pregnant women are negatively affected, which will impact their general health status. Recurring natural hazards such as heavy rainfalls and storms negatively influence food stocks and living conditions, including shelters, while health-related complications increase. An already fragile health system has little capacity to respond and treat Covid-19 related implications.



**3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period?**

- a. [Org.1] has been kept in place since the closing of the borders. [Org. 1] left DPRK in December 2020 as the last international staff in country. Due to the Covid-19 restrictions along with the lack of a functioning banking channel, operations have been very limited. Primary focus has been to procure emergency items and supporting emergency preparedness activities. The items have been purchased outside DPRK and are waiting for import approval since one year back. We are unsure about the exact reasons for such a lengthy approval process. Only two months back, [Org. 1] was notified that Covid-19 related materials such as thermometers, face shields and gloves will not be granted approval for import without a clear justification. In addition, some capacity building activities in terms of supplying information materials and developing training resources have been ongoing. The central problem for [Org.1] is the inability to get money into DPRK and to pay off the incurred debt to [team of Org.1], as well as paying for the transportation of contingency items.

**4) If you had to pause your operations in the DPRK due to the COVID-19 pandemic, when, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK?**

**Do you expect to return operations to their pre-COVID levels? Why or why not?**

- a. This is highly unpredictable, but [Org.1] stands ready to re-establish international presence in Pyongyang when borders open. The situation on the ground and resumption of support must be assessed once back in country, following discussions on collaboration and main needs with our counterpart [Org.1] Operations will most likely go back to normal levels or higher since there seems to be of interest by partners and donors to reengage.

**5) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's COVID-19 response.**

a. The effects of the sanctions have mainly impacted the ability to contribute to the work of the [Org.1] due to the inability to transfer funds for the operations. The absence of a banking channel along with the unwillingness and overcompliance of banks and suppliers have made it almost impossible to continue funding programs in country, including Covid-19 response activities. [Org.1] is in a situation with increasing financial debt to the ... and inability to continue support to community-based activities for improved basic health, clean water and livelihoods.

**6) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?**

a. The approval process has been much improved and speedier during the last four years which is most appreciated. The complex cumulative effects of the number and multiple types of sanctions seem to influence political willingness to fund humanitarian operations in DPRK. There is a general hesitancy by donors and private actors, especially banks, to have any involvement with the country. We would argue for a general exception of humanitarian aid in the UN Security Council resolutions to avoid any misinterpretation and reduce over-compliance. Humanitarian organizations must be able to deliver humanitarian assistance in a way that does not compromise the humanitarian principles. There is a need for a permanent banking channel for humanitarian funding.

**7) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?**

a. N/A

**[Organisation 2]**

I commend the Panel's continued efforts to investigate non-compliance with the sanctions measures and the issues concerning the unintended impact of sanctions on the civilian population of the DPRK. [Org.2] strongly supports the Panel's mission to gather, examine, and analyze information regarding the effects of the UN sanctions as well as the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK. In regard to the Panel's questions, it has become increasingly difficult to

exclusively examine the impact of the UN sanctions on the civilian population of the DPRK due to the COVID-19 outbreak and the DPRK's subsequent restrictions.

The aim of this correspondence is to examine the opportunity cost of money spent by the DPRK on the missile and nuclear programs that could have otherwise been allocated to support its citizens' health, nutrition, and human security during the COVID-19 pandemic. This is problematic not only because it impedes dealing with the nationwide COVID-19 crisis, but also because it threatens global security while violating multiple UN Security Council resolutions.

[Org.2] respectfully submits the following observations to the Panel based on our experience, expertise, and current understanding. Our response below addresses questions 1 and 2 from the list of questions provided by the Panel, as these questions most directly pertain to our activities.

**1) What is your assessment of the effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?**

In our previous correspondence with the Panel, we emphasized how one of the main factors that contributes to the dire humanitarian situation in the DPRK is how “the DPRK has deliberately chosen to prioritize the regime’s security at the expense of the population’s health and well-being.” We also highlighted how the DPRK has continued to develop its nuclear missile program despite the multiple UN Security Council Resolutions, contributing to a “significant portion of state expenditures” and negatively affecting the flow of foreign aid into the country. The priority that the DPRK places on the nuclear weapons program rather than on the health, nutrition, and human security of the civilian population perpetuates the dire humanitarian situation in the DPRK.

According to data from the [Org.2] the DPRK has spent around \$1.6 billion on its nuclear weapons program over the past 50 years. These expenditures include \$600 to \$700 million on a uranium refinery in Pyongsan, nuclear fuel manufacturing and reprocessing facilities, a nuclear reactor and a light-water reactor at Yongbyon, and \$200-\$400 million making centrifuges and building a uranium enrichment facility.

The UN has passed nearly a dozen resolutions condemning the DPRK for its nuclear pursuits and imposing sanctions. The imposed sanctions are purposefully designed to cut off sources of funding for the missile and nuclear development programs. These measures include the ban of the trade in arms and military equipment, dual-use technologies, the freezing of assets of individuals involved in the country’s nuclear program, a cap on DPRK labor exports, and a cap on imports of oil and refined petroleum products, among others. These sanctions do explicitly allow for humanitarian assistance ([CFR, 2022](#)).

These sanctions limit the financial power of the DPRK leadership and the regime’s sustenance. Although the UN sanctions limit the financial power and sustenance of the DPRK regime, **these sanctions may not directly affect the lack of health, nutrition, and human security of the DPRK citizens. The DPRK government is allocating their limited funds to its nuclear and missile programs rather than to the health, nutrition, and human security of its people**, and this decision is negatively impacting its citizens, much more so than any conceivable effect of UN sanctions.

To illustrate this proposition, we can look at this year’s arms development expenditures versus food shortage. This year alone, the DPRK has spent about 2% of its GDP on missile launches, which translates into as much as \$650 million. Between \$208-\$325 million was spent on ammunition, fuel, and other materials, while the rest was spent on labor and other expenses. These funds could have been used to buy between 510,000 and 840,000 tons of rice, which is enough to cover 59-98% of the annual food shortage ([Kobara, 2022](#)).

If we look more specifically at the missiles fired within just one day this year, November 2, 2022, the numbers are significant. There were 25 missiles fired, costing around \$2-\$3 million each, which totals up to \$50-\$70 million total. In 2019 alone, the DPRK imported \$70 million worth of rice from China (Kim and Yang, 2022).

Looking at these expenditures more cumulatively, the patterns observed in this year's data hold true: "The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization reported in 2021 that an estimated **860,000 tons of food are still annually needed in the country.**" This means that the \$1.1 billion to \$1.6 billion the DPRK has spent on nuclear development could have been used to **make up for the rice deficit for one and a half to two years or corn for three to four years**, according to the [Org.2] estimate (Suzuki 2022).

However, it must be said that it is still possible that the UN sanctions may have **unintended negative effects** on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK. For example, a number of the sanctions including "export restrictions on the textile, fishing, and coal industries and bans on working abroad disproportionately affect North Koreans who depend on these economies," rather than the targeted elites.

What we know for sure is that the DPRK is struggling more than before due to bad harvests in 2022, and it was already dependent on imports to feed its population (Food and Agriculture Organization Report, September 2022). With the strengthening of border control at the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, informal markets have had a harder time acquiring food, putting more pressure on the 'official' means to get food. In such a situation, it is essential to allocate funds for food imports; yet, the government is clearly keen on directing its funds to missile development rather than the welfare of its citizens. **It is a question of will, not capacity.** Despite the financial burden of the UN sanctions, the DPRK government has sufficient funds to ensure a more stable food supply but refuses to allocate adequate funds to such a purpose.

Furthermore, the DPRK attempts to evade these UN sanctions through illicit overseas labor, leading to further human rights violations on the civilian population. The DPRK forces its overseas workers to deposit their earnings into accounts controlled by the government (Ruggiero and Scarlatou, 2022). According to a report by the Biden administration, the DPRK "withholds up to 90 percent of wages of overseas workers which generates an annual revenue to the government of hundreds of millions of dollars" (Biden Administration Report). This exploitation of labor earns hard currency for the DPRK government, which is then used to fund the nuclear weapons program (Ruggiero and Scarlatou, 2022). The DPRK's exploitation of the labor and security of its citizens demonstrates the government's decision to prioritize the funding for the nuclear weapons program over the well-being of the DPRK civilian population.

Cyberattacks are another tactic that the DPRK utilizes to fund the nuclear program while bypassing the sanctions. From 2011 to 2020, the DPRK "stole more than \$1 billion worth of cryptocurrency," and "\$400 million worth of crypto coins" in 2021. These cyberattacks used to steal millions of dollars



for the regime while the citizens suffer from food insecurity and health disparities reveal how the DPRK government values its stability over its citizens (Park, 2022; Young, 2022). Both cyberattacks and the use of illicit overseas workers are essential strategies for the DPRK to fund the nuclear weapons program, despite the UN sanctions and the resulting human and labor rights violations of its citizens.

Although the UN sanctions may have unintended negative effects on the civilian population, the DPRK government's priority on the nuclear weapons program directly affects the human security, food security, and health of the civilian population. The UN sanctions can "frequently delay and suspend the delivery of international humanitarian aid" (What to Know About Sanctions on North Korea, 2022). However, the DPRK often refuses to accept this aid (Zwirko, 2022). As previously stated, if the DPRK were to reallocate the \$1.6 billion budget for the nuclear weapons program, it could ensure enough rice and corn for the civilian population for several years (Suzuki 2022). Additionally, these funds could have been reallocated to provide COVID-19 relief and vaccines to protect the health of its citizens (Kobara 2022). The DPRK's allocation of funds for the nuclear weapons program while also rejecting foreign aid and vaccines for over two years demonstrates how the DPRK's priority on the nuclear weapons program exacerbates the unintended negative effects of the UN sanctions on the citizens of the DPRK.

**2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.**

In previous correspondence in July 2022 and December 2021, we expressed concern about the humanitarian risk caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, since the DPRK has a deficient healthcare infrastructure, is affected by severe food insecurity, and is suffering from an economic crisis. After two years of claiming no confirmed COVID-19 cases, the DPRK disclosed a nationwide outbreak last May and launched emergency epidemic prevention measures. However, only a few cases have been confirmed as COVID-19 since then, with the rest attributed to an “unidentified fever.” In previous correspondence submitted in July, we mentioned that official statistics indicated a cumulative total of 4.7 million cases in a country of 25 million, with only 74 deaths reported as of July 7 ([38 North, 2022](#)). The numbers have stayed consistent as recently as December 8, since the official statistics have not been updated by the government since last July ([Worldometer, 2022](#)). Along with the absence of official statistics, the inability to conduct independent assessments within the DPRK hinders other countries, institutions and aid organizations from not only estimating the current COVID-19 situation, but also from providing humanitarian assistance in an effective manner. Meanwhile, experts have cast doubt on the exceedingly low COVID-19 fatality rate claimed by the DPRK, compared to that of countries with decent public health institutions and a high vaccination rate ([Martyn Williams, 2022](#)).

Yet on August 11, the DPRK announced that it had succeeded in defeating the virus without vaccines, as Kim called it the “greatest miracle.” Subsequently, on August 13, the DPRK government lifted the mask mandate and social distancing regulations. However, it is the DPRK’s preferred narrative to say the outbreak has been brought under control. The government needed to craft a victorious anti-pandemic story in order to control the plotline and achieve its objectives. Supposedly, one of the regime’s objectives is to boost Kim’s legitimacy and enhance domestic control over the population to quell public discontent caused by economic hardship and border closures. On top of that, by fabricating a victorious conclusion, the DPRK aimed to signal to the world that “it is self-reliant under its *Juche* ideology”, proving it to those who doubted the DPRK’s capability to contain an outbreak on its own ([Khang Vu, 2022](#)).

It is perplexing to see how the DPRK has been reluctant to reveal the facts regarding COVID-19, since the public health infrastructure in the DPRK is fragile, especially outside of Pyongyang and other major cities. Public health experts including WHO have noted that its healthcare system is not equipped to deal with a massive outbreak. Moreover, they have argued that it is extremely difficult to provide a proper analysis of the most closed country where we do not have access to the necessary data ([Maria Cheng, 2022](#)). During the peak of the outbreak in May, state TV broadcast infomercials about “home remedies such as honey tea” and recommended that people “see doctors if they have breathing problems ([UN Human Rights Council, 2022](#)).” Other testimonies show how unable and incompetent the DPRK is in dealing with public health issues. In October, Elizabeth Salmón, the special rapporteur on human rights in the DPRK, expressed her concerns about people’s access to

healthcare given the fragile state of the health system, plagued by unreliable electricity supply, lack of equipment, and lack of access to basic medicine, which has reportedly been further limited during the prolonged border shutdown ([Elizabeth Salmón, 2022](#)).

Although the DPRK has announced its “victory” over COVID-19 in August, Kim Jong Un claimed that “not a single vaccine has been administered in our country.” The DPRK has reportedly refused to receive millions of vaccines from foreign countries in the past two years, which implies their lack of “technical preparedness” and supply shortages, according to the global vaccine alliance Gavi. The situation seemingly changed when Kim announced last September that they would begin distributing COVID-19 vaccines officially for the first time during fall 2022, having been wary of the virus spreading during the winter ([Zwirko, 2022](#)). Gavi has also reported the DPRK had supposedly administered at least some vaccines originating from China in June. It remains uncertain, however, whether it has started any vaccine campaign or whether there are any prospects for opening any time soon ([Fretwell, 2022](#)).

According to recent satellite imagery analysis and the Chinese authorities, several trains started moving between China’s city of Dandong and the DPRK’s Sinuiju as goods piled up at a disinfection center near the border ([Reuters, 2022](#)). Beijing’s foreign ministry also announced in late September that bilateral land trade had resumed after a five-month hiatus last month ([Zwirko, 2022](#)). Despite this, the DPRK government has significantly raised the level of its border security, restricting travel and trade, using COVID-19 as a pretext, according to *Human Rights Watch* in November ([2022](#)). A series of satellite images indicates that the increased border security has almost entirely stopped unauthorized cross-border economic activity, which has contributed to severe shortages of food, medicine, and other necessities. The reduced cases of DPRK citizens who seek asylum abroad are also attributed to the strengthening of border control. The DPRK government has used purported COVID-19 measures to further repress the citizens of the DPRK, which violates the right to freedom of movement and other rights ([Lina Yoon, 2022](#)).

In the meantime, international aid organizations and countries including the United States and the Republic of Korea have attempted to make multiple aid shipments to the DPRK to alleviate the COVID-19 situation in the country. Nevertheless, they have been consistently refused by the DPRK’s government. In October, UNICEF sent a large humanitarian shipment to the DPRK that included goods such as medical supplies, as it was granted a second exemption from UN sanctions against the DPRK ([Bremer, 2022](#)). UNICEF has been one of the few aid organizations that has been able to ship supplies to the DPRK after it shut its borders in early 2020. Once a shipment crosses the border, it will likely be held at a storage facility for several months. Considering the organization’s most recent aid shipment took more than a year to reach the country, however, it is unclear when the latest health and nutrition supplies will reach the DPRK’s neediest. And it is impossible to make that determination without international UNICEF staff members on the ground. The lack of transparency continues to be the major obstacle to the efficient disbursement of humanitarian assistance that reaches the most vulnerable segments of the population first. On the other hand, the Republic of Korea approved two new deliveries of humanitarian aid to the DPRK last October, according to the ROK Ministry of Unification, which was the fourth aid delivery that had been approved under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration ([Bremer, 2022](#)). Regardless of the sender, the DPRK appears unlikely to accept the aid as it still exerts strict COVID-19 border controls, which have resulted in very few humanitarian shipments reaching DPRK shores over the last three years ([Bremer, 2022](#)).

What makes the circumstances worse is the fact that all foreign aid workers had departed the DPRK as of March 2021, which means that the citizens of the DPRK are the only ones able to handle and distribute aid supplies that enter the country, making it difficult to track the whereabouts of the aid shipment. In her first report to the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Elizabeth Salmón, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, noted that “the DPRK’s self-imposed COVID-19 restrictions led to the departure of all international humanitarian staff from the country (Salmón, 2022).”

The pandemic grievously threatens the human security of the people of the DPRK, especially their health and food security. Since the DPRK has been exerting heavier controls on the movement of supplies and people, it may further constrain the population’s ability to obtain food, and a few cases of death from starvation are reported [by Org.2] the previous Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, claimed that “prolonged border closures and restrictions on movement in-country have decimated the market activity that has become essential for the general population to access basic necessities (UN Human Rights Council, 2022).” Since the country’s agriculture has been heavily dependent on its human labor, it is likely that the COVID-19 outbreak and related lockdown spurred difficulties with mobilizing enough people to plant crops. Prior to the outbreak of COVID-19, it was reported that the authorities had managed to mobilize as planned. With draconian restrictions on inter-regional travel and strengthened surveillance, farm mobilizations across the regional boundaries have been suspended, and local authorities rely on labor solely from within their own districts (Mun Dong-Hui, 2022).

It is apparent that the DPRK has been taking advantage of the pandemic to tighten controls and oppress its citizens, abusing their right to access to information, right to health, and suppressing the freedom of movement of its citizens. Its government continues to impose severe restrictions on basic freedoms to allegedly contain the spread of the virus. Kim Yeong-soo, a professor of Political Science and International Studies at Sogang University, said, “North Korean residents obtained food through rations in the past, but since the Arduous March, they have been securing food from the marketplace. The operations of the marketplace have since been restricted by the COVID-19 pandemic, severely affecting the food supply of the middle class in particular.” (Jeong, 2022). Multiple sources have reported that the DPRK authorities have closed the market in many areas, including in Pyongyang and cities adjacent to the DPRK and Chinese border, with the majority of the places not having been allowed to open until now. “The North has been in serious economic difficulties since a total border lockdown early in the coronavirus pandemic. Yoo Seong-ok, a former chief of the Institute for National Security Strategy, said, “The North is launching provocations to create a warlike atmosphere and quell domestic discontent with economic difficulties” (Kim and Yang, 2022).

COVID-19 and the subsequent closure of borders has worsened the DPRK’s economic situation. Even amidst these deteriorating conditions, Kim’s choice lies in his nuclear and missile force, not food. The DPRK is consistent with its strategy of advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities to gain recognition for its status as a nuclear power and to increase its bargaining power with the United States. It is a strategy that leaves ICBMs, not food, to future generations. Some say that the food situation is relatively stable, and that large scale fatalities will not occur immediately. Sources within the DPRK escapee community who are in contact with sources inside the country have informed [Org.2] that, in absolute terms, the level of human insecurity may be comparable to the mid to late-1990s, the days of the “Arduous March,” the great famine that devastated the DPRK. However, in relative terms, the people of the DPRK are doing better, as they have developed the survival skills

necessary to overcome economic adversity, by engaging in barter and other informal economic exchanges.

Rather than complementing aid with commercial food imports to alleviate food shortages, the DPRK has deliberately chosen to prioritize the regime's security at the expense of the population's health and well-being.

Furthermore, the analysis of the DPRK's budget allocation in the context of the pandemic must consider the claim that the DPRK uses its international trade to procure the funds to finance its missiles and nuclear programs, as mentioned in the 2017 UNSC Resolution 2397.

The economic impact of COVID-19 on the DPRK's economy is clearly felt on its international trade levels. Both import and export levels of the DPRK, while already reduced since 2018 due to the UN sanctions, declined significantly with the COVID-19 pandemic ([Lee 2022](#)). However, the DPRK is still heavily investing in its military power, while the government dedicates less budget or attention to COVID-19 relief.

If there were a shift in the DPRK's budget allocation from military spending to COVID-19 relief, the humanitarian impact of COVID-19 on the DPRK could be limited. "The money North Korea spent launching missiles this year could have been used to procure 20 million to 32.5 million coronavirus vaccine doses, according to KIDA. That would be enough to give each North Korean citizen one round of vaccination, the institute said." ([Kobara 2022](#)) Having previously refused vaccine offers from international aid groups, the DPRK announced in September 2022 a national vaccination campaign to start in the fall. ([Zwirko 2022](#)) However, since the official announcement, there has been no update on the vaccination campaign or information on where the DPRK would get the vaccine from, or its financial cost. Therefore, while COVID-19 has a clear economic and humanitarian impact on the DPRK, the DPRK seems to be prioritizing its military power over reducing the impact of the pandemic on its population.

**In closing, [Org.2] would like to take this opportunity to highlight the likelihood of the injection of hard currency into the DPRK's nuclear and missile development, which otherwise should have been directed to address the humanitarian crisis caused by the pandemic.** The DPRK's rejection of foreign aid while allocating funds to the nuclear weapons and missile programs demonstrates how the DPRK's prioritization of such programs worsens any possible unintended negative effects of the UN sanctions on its citizens. Moreover, the economic and humanitarian impact of COVID-19 has been exacerbated by the funding allocation to nuclear weapons and missiles, focusing on military power over health and human security, with only a recent official commitment to stronger COVID-19 relief.

[Org.2] wishes to emphasize the egregious human rights situation in the DPRK. [Org.2] continues to support human rights initiatives in the DPRK [Org.2 activities] including international access to DPRK detention facilities, increased transparency, and in-country access for human rights organizations as well as humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable groups in the DPRK. [Org.2] respectfully recommends that the Panel ask organizations requesting sanctions exemptions for specific information on the intended locations of the disbursement of humanitarian aid as well as its beneficiaries. This will facilitate better monitoring of humanitarian aid and allow to determine more accurately whether the aid prioritizes the most vulnerable DPRK citizens.



To broaden the horizon for further dialogue and address the dire human rights situation in the DPRK, [Org.2] recommends allowing in-country visits by the Special Rapporteur or representatives of the UN OHCHR). Resolution 49/22 adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in April 2022 called on the DPRK in paragraph 30 to “allow international staff to operate in the country so that the international community can provide assistance based on independent needs assessments, including of vulnerable populations in detention centers, and a monitoring capacity, consistent with international standards and humanitarian principles and in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions.” It would promote more inclusive and sustainable strategies to support the health, nutrition, and human security of DPRK citizens.

Thank you very much for the invitation to submit an advisory opinion, and for your kind consideration. Should you be interested in a virtual meeting to further discuss the information provided, please feel free to contact [Org.2]. I would greatly appreciate an opportunity to continue this conversation and share more details about our work and mission.

**[Organisation 3]**

Thank you for initiating this consultative process to assess the unintended impact of sanction measures, as well as of the COVID-19 pandemic and related countermeasures, on the Humanitarian situation and operations in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). We very much appreciate the initiative taken by the 1718 Committee and [Org.3] appreciate your leadership and guidance on behalf of the Panel of Experts to engage in a meaningful dialogue at this juncture. [Org.3] has been actively engaged and working in DPRK on community based programming to address the key challenges related to food insecurity, childhood nutrition, disaster risk reduction (DRR) and water sanitation and hygiene (WASH) programmes since [date].

Based on the conditions of the UN Security Council's resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017), [Org.3] has streamlined its standard operating procedures (SOPs) to comply with the obligatory UNSC policies and process. We actively pursued the derogation approval processes through the [Member State authority] as the competent member state authority responsible for the monitoring of the Sanctions. The guidance and collaboration [of Member State] on derogations from the UN Sanctions Committee 1718 has always proved to be an effective and collaborative support to [Org.3] adhering to the mandatory process and smooth submission.

[Org.3] successfully received three UNSC approvals; two in 2019 and one in 2020 from the 1718 Committee for the derogation of all humanitarian supplies falling under the restricted Harmonised Standard (HS) Codes on a half yearly basis. The cooperation and approval from the 1718 Committee and support [Org.3's] ensured timely humanitarian assistance in [DPRK province] and [DPRK province] up to 2021. Currently our biggest challenge is the strict lockdown of the country as a result of COVID-19 preventative measures. As you may be aware, the majority of humanitarian programmes have been suspended with limited international staff on the ground since early 2020. Supplies into the country (restricted only to China & Russia) have been severely hampered, which has no doubt put a huge strain on food supply, the health system and water and sanitation services. In addition, these restrictions have severely limited [Org.3] and the International Community's ability to assess and verify the level of humanitarian need on the ground.

Please see further details in response to the specific questions raised:

**1) What is your assessment of the effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?**

There is an immense need to provide emergency relief and development to the most vulnerable people in DPRK in a timely manner to save lives and uplift the lives of the people.

The UN OCHA's Needs and Priorities Report for 2022 estimates that 11 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. The World Food Program (WFP) estimates that 40 percent of the population is undernourished and according to the Global Hunger Index (GHI) 2022, DPRK scored 24.9, a level of hunger that is serious. It is important to emphasise also that up-to-date data is not available and that the situation is likely to be worse than estimates indicate. The biggest humanitarian challenges facing the country include chronic food insecurity; lack of access to basic health services; declining conditions in water and sanitation, and hygiene (WASH); malnutrition and high vulnerability to natural disasters.

The unintended consequences of the sanctions continue to have a major impact on the humanitarian operations coupled with the gradual decline in funding. Other factors such as the disruption to the banking channel as the result of the sanctions; the delay in supply chains due to the border restrictions for the transportation of vital goods; inflation in the prices of humanitarian goods and a steady decline in donor funding due to restricted working environments have all complicated and delayed humanitarian responses. The situation gets more challenging in the case of rapid-onset-emergencies, where the humanitarian response needs to be swift to respond in real-time to needs. The capacity to secure supplies to deliver a timely humanitarian response is restricted and complicated by access issues and compliance issues relating to UNSC sanctions. While there is a mechanism of humanitarian exemptions of banned items for UN agencies and INGOs, the approval process of UNSC adds another layer to the huge logistical challenges of bringing the much needed relief assistance to the people in a timely manner. As detailed under question six below, modifications to the sanction approval timelines would be welcomed to expedite the process of delivery of humanitarian supplies once the country opens up.

**2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.**

The humanitarian situation in the DPRK is characterized by chronic food insecurity and lack of access to lifesaving essential basic services with profound impacts on the most vulnerable. The situation has been exacerbated during the global pandemic. DPRK, with its fragile health system took a more protective stand to shield the country from the spread of the pandemic. COVID-19 related restrictions, especially the closure of the border, further hampered the already complex and challenging humanitarian operations on the ground, with international staff unable to return to the country, and the entry of humanitarian supplies severely restricted. The ongoing border closures and the resulting suspension of most humanitarian programmes, means that the humanitarian situation is likely to have worsened significantly in 2022, and will continue to deteriorate through 2023.

The ongoing socio-economic and other challenges resulting from COVID-19 are likely to reverse the meagre development gains made in previous years and result in additional people requiring humanitarian support and deeper vulnerabilities. Natural disasters such as drought, floods and storms are recurring phenomena in the country, compounding vulnerabilities and food insecurity, and increasing the need for humanitarian assistance. There have been some reports of food imports [two Member States] but these are unverified, and there is no information on how the food items are being distributed across the country and if it reached those most in need.

Due to COVID-19 restrictions, field monitoring has not been possible and no verifiable data on the humanitarian situation is available, therefore the data is tentative and subject to adjustment once access is restored.

**3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period?**

DPRK has been under strict lockdown since early January 2020. [Org.3] staff left in [Month] by crossing the border by land to China. Since then, [Org.3] and other agencies have been waiting for the borders to re-open to resume full operations. [Org.3] was able to remotely deliver some ongoing activities (including COVID response activities with [another Organisation] in [years], however, it was not possible in 2022 with no international staff in-country throughout the year. As a result, projects were either suspended or terminated impacting the delivery of food security & agriculture, WASH and DRR activities.

Despite this context, [Org.3] has still maintained its presence in DPRK with limited national staff supervised remotely by [another Organisation]. The difficulty in accessing cash in country to support the remaining national staff has been a huge challenge, not only for [Org.3] but also to the UN and other INGOs. [Org.3] continues to accrue administration operational costs and once the country reopens, these costs will be considered.

**4) If you had to pause your operations in the DPRK due to the COVID-19 pandemic, when, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? Do you expect to return operations to their pre-COVID levels? Why or why not?**

It is anticipated that the country will re-open again in quarter three of 2023 and [Org.3] is cautiously optimistic that international staff will be able to return. There have been reports of a 'return plan' being drafted by the UN Permanent Representative to DPRK, following meetings with the DPRK Ambassador in Bangkok. The on-going DPRK response planning for 2023 is based on the assumption that the border will open at least in the third quarter of 2023. Resuming operations to pre-COVID levels will take time. There may be significant quarantine periods for international staff entering the country as well as long quarantine periods for imported goods. Therefore the priority first step upon re-entry will be to conduct detailed needs assessment to understand the needs on the ground and to scale up operations as quickly as possible.



**5) Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's COVID-19 response.**

In [Year] [Org.3] joined with the [another organization] to respond to the COVID preparedness at the community level, under the [another organization] in DPRK. Between [months], [another organization] COVID-19 preparedness response facilitated the distribution of PPE material/hygiene kits to 314 kindergartens, nurseries, schools and clinics, benefitting 12,394 children and community members.

However, as the monitoring and access to the field by the international team has been restricted since January 2020, monitoring and verification of data was limited. Due to the strict COVID restrictions, [Org.3] faced delays in procuring humanitarian supplies which resulted in the UNSC derogation approval received in April 2020 expiring, as it was valid for up to six months. This meant that COVID response, WASH and other activities could not be continued.

**6) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?**

Looking at the post- COVID-19 scenario when the border re-open and the increasing complexity of the operational environment as a result, it would be extremely helpful to extend the validity of the approval process to allow for expected delays in procurement and other processes.

Further, the consideration of a 'blanket waiver' for local procurement for humanitarian operations would be welcome to avoid the delays in meeting the priority needs for effective humanitarian assistance, once the border opens.

**7) Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?**

The list of sanctioned items from agricultural machinery to simple vegetable garden hand tools affect many aspects of everyday life and present serious challenges to social economic and development in the country. This impacts the most vulnerable people who live in remote villages and have very limited access for food, WASH, health supplies, and fuel for cooking and heating in winter. A review of the UN sanctions mechanisms would be welcome to make it more streamlined with wider inclusion to cover humanitarian supplies to reach the most vulnerable in timely manner. Apart from the supply of sanctioned items, many if not all the humanitarian agencies have been forced to suspend their operations due to the limitation of cash supply in the country. It would be very timely and progressive if a decision to pursue an operational banking channel was facilitated to ensure the continuity of the actions with cash flow possibilities for humanitarian operations.

Given the global crisis that COVID-19 has created and the unique consequences in DPRK, we must all work together to prevent further suffering and increasing vulnerability of communities. In order to do this, [Org.3] must be able to plan and coordinate our operations effectively and efficiently. We also require greater cooperation and support to secure entry for international staff and ensure international staff can move with fewer restrictions inside and outside the country. This will require continued bilateral engagement with relevant authorities and diplomatic missions to emphasise the negative consequence on the humanitarian assistance and negotiate for a formal arrangement in this regard.

Thanking you again for the opportunity to engage in these critical discussions in relation to the impact of sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic on DPRK. We cannot underestimate the importance of greater cooperation and coordination to ensure humanitarian programming can resume and continue to deliver to the most vulnerable communities in DPRK.

**[Organisation 4]****1. What is your assessment of the effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?**

In the current situation of the country's self-imposed border closure and self-imposed import restrictions, we deem that the UN sanctions currently do not have a major direct effect on the humanitarian situation. On the other hand, we can assume that the humanitarian impact of the DPRK's self-isolation because of COVID-19 is severe and threatens to undo some of the progress made in areas such as food security, nutrition and health. However, it has to be noted that any assessment of the impact within the DPRK of the COVID-19 pandemic or the country's border closure is based on assumptions rather than evidence at this point. No foreigner has visited the areas outside Pyongyang since 22 January 2020. Very little reliable information trickles out of the country.

**2. How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment**

The restricted movement of people is a concern especially for those requiring medical treatment, be it for chronic conditions, severe acute malnutrition (children) or tuberculosis. The supply of medical equipment and drugs is another concern. None of the international humanitarian actors that used to support the country's health system has been able to import and distribute any goods since June 2020. Schools have been closed for extended periods, leading to a lot of missed classes, and possibly also to children missing out on food hand-outs that are usually provided at schools. The World Food Programme informed that it has exhausted its in-country stocks in March 2021. The strict border closure further affects the livelihood of small traders and industries relying on cross-border trade and imported goods.

**3. What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period?**

The COVID-19 pandemic preventive measures taken by the DPRK Government have strongly affected the ability of [Org.4], the UN system and other international actors to deliver humanitarian goods and assistance.

[Org.4] had to put its activities in the DPRK on hold (we refer here to our previous responses from November 2021 for the detailed timeline). The office in Pyongyang is running with minimal staffing looking after the maintenance of the premises and other assets. The last international humanitarian worker left Pyongyang in March 2021. An independent monitoring of the situation is impossible.

A recent positive development has been the delivery to DPRK in October 2022 of a stock of PPE gear (Personal Protective Equipment) destined for hospitals. It received clearance at the [a Member State's] border, where it was blocked since August 2020. No other activity is currently implemented.

**4. If you had to pause your operations in the DPRK due to the COVID-19 pandemic, when, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? Do you expect to return operations to their pre-COVID levels? Why or why not?**

The first and main condition to be able to resume humanitarian operations in the DPRK will be the reopening of borders. As long as they are closed and no international staff is allowed to enter into DPRK, the current minimal activities (maintenance of the premises and other assets) will continue. As for now, there is no signal for any development in that direction or a time horizon for a potential reopening of the border. Without such a signal, it is difficult and too early to assess the level of operations that will take place once they could resume. Their feasibility and the DPRK humanitarian needs at that moment will have to be taken into account.

**5. Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's COVID- 19 response.**

As stated above, the strict border closure imposed by DPRK has had more impact on the difficulties to respond to COVID-19 than the UN sanctions. For example, the stock of PPE gear was allowed to enter into the country after waiting for clearance from the DPRK authorities for two years, meaning the humanitarian exemption from the 1718 Committee had to be extended several times.

**6. If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?**

In some cases, in the past, the approval process was lengthy and required a lot of information to be collected. However, there has been a significant improvement in the approval process for humanitarian exemptions in the course of the last years. We are satisfied with the procedures, and highly appreciate the extension of the validity of the exemptions from six months to one year. We further appreciate the improvements to the exemption process made through Implementation Assistance Notice No. 7. We welcome the joint call to work together to sustainably resolve the banking channel. This matter has further increased in urgency, as cash-carry in the current situation is not a feasible option.

**7. Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?**

There is room for improvement in the implementation of sanctions as follows:

- (i) establishment of a humanitarian international banking channel, and we refer here to our letter of May 2022 on that matter. We need a way to legally bring cash into DPRK to be able to pay local expenses. Without being able to pay our debts, we put at risk our cooperation with local partners.
- (ii) consideration of a "green list" of humanitarian goods for which multi-year exemptions could be granted (for example: water pipes, plastic sheeting for agriculture, personal protective equipment etc.).

As stated in your letter, the information above is provided to the Panel on the condition that it will be kept confidential and used solely for the purposes of the Panel's mandate. upon our approval, information may be included in reports of the Panel to the 1718 Committee and the Security Council.

We hope that this information is useful and remain at your disposal fur any further question.



**[Organisation 5]****1. What is your assessment of the effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?**

Prolonged UN and bilateral sanctions have contributed to the weakening of the country's health system and thus negatively affecting the humanitarian situation of the country. Much needed work to strengthen the health system, including procurement of critical medical equipment, medical consumables and essential drugs, and human resource development initiatives by the government have been challenged.

The sanctions also have brought immense challenges on the work of the UN Agencies and other humanitarian organizations. Lack of a functional banking channel leading to acute liquidity crunch has severely constrained critical in-country activities. Consequently, with limited in-country funds, the focus has been supporting and responding to humanitarian crisis such as medical emergencies, floods and typhoons rather than assistance to strengthen and develop the country's health system which are crucial for appropriate humanitarian work in the health sector. As a result, the health sector lacks the resources to develop strategies that would have been able to prevent and mitigate shocks and emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

As an example, the procurement of laboratory equipment is delayed and the new technologies like genomic sequencing could not be introduced which is required for detection of COVID-19 and its variants, impacting the national diagnostic capacity. Diagnosis of communicable disease such as detection of drug resistance TB suffered setback due to sanctions imposed on metal items thus cartridges which are used could not be procured unless sanction clearance is obtained.

These challenges resulted in poor utilization of resources, for example, GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance support under Health System Strengthening Project 2 for year 4 and 5 remained mostly unused due to dual effect of COVID-19 and UN sanction.

**2. How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.**

The government of DPRK closed its international borders (air, sea and land) in a bid to prevent the entry of the novel coronavirus into the country when [Org.5] in January 2020. As of date, the borders continue to remain closed although limited supply of essential health commodities are now being allowed on a case-by-case basis.

Sustained border closure has had a profound negative impact on the flow of supplies, which the DPRK population heavily relied on to supplement the government efforts. For example [Org.5] to supplement medicines for primary health care services and health care during emergency situations, respectively. [activities of Org.5]. Such support ceased when the borders were closed.

Several shipments of essential medicines, medical consumable, and critical medical equipment [activities of Org.5] most of which were approved by the Sanctions Committee were held up at different locations incurring large expenses on storage charges and customs demurrage. Multiple shipments including medicine and consumables expired while being held up costing more money to dispose such shipments.

Resultantly, an already weak health system has been further weakened due to lack of medicines, supplies and support, that would translate into higher risk for the already vulnerable population because of reduced country capacity in managing diseases/health issues.

**3. What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period?**

Other than normal office administrative work, limited activities [Org.5] could be supported remotely in [year]. However, some of these were discontinued in 2021 due to a change in country policy and donor's conditionality. Other significant support provided remotely include [activities of Org.5]. Few procurements were done in early [year] [activities of Org.5].

The national staff [Org.5] continued to report to work, except during the strict lockdown and movement control in Pyongyang due to Covid-19 outbreak.

- 4. If you had to pause your operations in the DPRK due to the COVID-19 pandemic, when, if at all, do you expect to be able to resume your operations in the DPRK? Do you expect to return operations to the pre-COVID levels? Why or why not?**

[Org.5] due to UN sanctions and later due to Covid- 19 pandemic and given the absence of borders and allow international staff to return to the country. At this point in time, it is not possible to estimate when the borders will reopen.international staff in country, the scale of operations has been narrowed down to very limited critical functions. This would change when the country opens its

Upon reopening, the operations will gradually return to pre-covid levels. However, the full-scale operations will be possible only with some relaxation of sanction measures or collectively finding a solution to some of the unintended consequences of the sanctions such as absence of a banking channel for UN/international organization based in DPRK.

- 5. Please provide any detailed information about how the implementation of UN sanctions may have impacted your organization's COVID-19 response.**

The capacity [of Org.5] was markedly reduced before the pandemic as the Government decided to limit the number of international staff. This was based on the low programme implementation and budget utilization capacity because of the UN sanctions. Limited capacity due to suboptimal staff presence led to challenges in providing the initial support to the country in response to the pandemic. This was further aggravated when all international staff had to leave the country, resulting only in remote support through the national staff in country.

- 6. If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?**

[Org.5] has been able to obtain humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 committee in the past as required, generally very rapidly when required. We also appreciate the fact that the exemptions may now be provided for a period longer than 6 months, (up to 18 months) for instance when the applicant provides a well-founded justification such as transportation delays related to a pandemic. This development is very helpful and welcome. Thanks to the fast-track approval process used during the Covid-19 pandemic, [Org.5 activities] is another positive example of the flexibility and quick response demonstrated by the UN Sanctions Committee.

- 7. Are there other issues, needs, or organizational viewpoints regarding the humanitarian impact of UN sanctions on your work in the DPRK that you want to share with the Panel?**

One of the major challenges in [Org.5's] work in DPRK has been the absence of a viable banking channel to transfer much needed funds for in-country operations and programmatic implementation. This is an unintended negative impact of the UN sanctions, and we would like to urge all stakeholders to find a rapid solution to this matter and resolve this major challenge.

#### **[Organisation 6]**

- 1) What is your assessment of the effect of UN sanctions on the humanitarian situation in the DPRK? What sources of data and information do you draw from as the basis for this assessment?**

In the absence of international humanitarian workers in DPRK since 2020, it has not been possible to undertake any assessments of the humanitarian situation and it would therefore be difficult to assess any impact of sanctions at this time. The continued lack of an adequate banking channel to facilitate local payments results in a need for Government willingness to accrue certain costs for future repayment on behalf of international humanitarian agencies.

**2) How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected the economic and humanitarian spheres, and in what way have they influenced the overall humanitarian situation in the DPRK? If possible, please include information or examples that support your assessment.**

There is limited data or insight on the impact of COVID-19 inside DPRK. However, the pandemic prevention measures introduced by the Government of DPRK, notably border closures and lengthy periods of quarantine and disinfection for all supplies, and related lockdowns in key transit points in [one Member State], have indirectly impacted the humanitarian situation. For example, there has been greatly reduced immunization of children since 2020, due to vaccines being out-of-stock. No children in DPRK have been vaccinated against measles/rubella (MR), polio or TB in 2022, and no tetanus/diphtheria vaccine has been available for women. The number of children receiving treatment for malnutrition has fallen; only 1 in 10 under five (5) years with acute malnutrition has received standard nutrition treatment by the third quarter of the year, this is a similar proportion to the same period in 2021, but compared to 1 in 3 in 2020, and more than 9 out of 10 in 2019. Micronutrient supplementation for children has had to be restricted to one (1) round instead of the planned two (2), due to supply shortages. Capacity building and direct technical assistance from international personnel have also been put on hold in most cases.

**3) What has been the scope of your organization's operations in the DPRK since its borders were closed in early 2020? Were you able to continue some humanitarian operations with local staff? What problems, if any, have you encountered in this time period?**

Since 2021 it has been possible for some agencies to move a significant amount of humanitarian supplies into the country. However, stock levels remain low and there has been an inevitable reduction in both coverage and quality of key humanitarian services.

**4) If your operations require humanitarian exemption approvals from the 1718 Committee, has the approval process met your needs? What could be further improved in the exemption process or the sanctions regime itself that would better meet your operational needs and objectives in addressing the humanitarian problems of DPRK?**

Based on experience, [Org.6] has no concerns with regards the current process for humanitarian exemptions.

## **Annex 91: Member States' responses**

In this reporting period the Panel also received two additional responses to its earlier humanitarian questionnaire.<sup>122</sup> We are thankful to the two Member States whose comments are anonymized here.

### **[Member State 1]**

The entry and import restrictions imposed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) due to the Covid-19 pandemic have made the provision of humanitarian assistance in accordance with the underlying humanitarian principles impossible. Therefore, all humanitarian projects supported by [MS1] have been suspended for the time being.

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<sup>122</sup>

S/2022/668, annex 68.1



**[Member State 2]**

Following the DPRK's decision to close its borders in 2020 in response to the Covid-19 pandemic ... most diplomatic missions in the DPRK remain shut and the lack of international presence in the country has made it extremely challenging to gain an understanding of the current humanitarian situation, where more than 40% of the population was already food insecure pre-pandemic. Without doubt the most fundamental impact on the dire humanitarian situation in the DPRK is its Government's decision to divert its resources from providing for the needs of its people into its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes. The DPRK's decision to launch a record number of missiles in 2022, including eight ICBMs, comes at huge financial cost, further aggravating the likely growing humanitarian crisis.

All responsible proponents of sanctions should monitor their effects wherever possible. Despite the continued temporary closure, [activities of MS] set out below are the areas where we have continued to track and monitor the situation in the DPRK.

In [year], [MS2] conducted an analysis on the effect of UN Sanctions on the DPRK economy. The findings provided us with valuable up to date [MS2] analysis of the impacts of sanctions on the DPRK economy from 2017 to 2019 and helped improve our understanding of these impacts. Whilst remaining cautious on data confidence, overall, the data provided compelling evidence that the DPRK state now has fewer resources as a result of sanctions.

The analysis found that for humanitarian impacts, there was no compelling evidence within economic data to suggest that the hardship already experienced by the DPRK people drastically increased in 2017-19 as a result of sanctions.

Overall GDP pointed to fewer opportunities for growth, but not wholesale loss of income. Agricultural prices remained stable (although we note the FAO/WFP found high levels of food insecurity at that time, including as a result of climatic factors and post-harvest losses).

This data offered a baseline as of 2019 for assessing sanctions on DPRK. The Covid- 19 pandemic and border shut-down since 2020 are inevitably having dramatic additional impacts on DPRK's economy and humanitarian situation. However, while impacts cannot be completely disentangled, it is clear that any steep change in trajectory of these indicators in 2020-21 would most likely reflect pandemic controls including border closures, not sanctions.

Other key evaluation points from the analysis included:

The 2016-17 sanctions regime has had, and continues to have an effect on the economy, acting in support of counter proliferation efforts and political signalling towards DPRK by the international community.

While the precise impact is impossible to confirm, the evidence indicates the DPRK state had fewer resources at its disposal in 2019 as a result of sanctions than if they had not been applied. Sanctions have reduced the overall size of the economy and have limited economic growth in DPRK.

Sanctions on key exports and imports have led to a steep decline in their respective reported trade despite large scale smuggling/illicit trade. As the DPRK Government looked to adapt, there has also been a significant change in the composition of the traded goods sector towards non-sanctioned sectors such as tourism, construction, and agriculture. The effect on prices has been ambiguous. Whilst observable price data suggested prices remained fairly constant, there were some signs that the cost of living may have increased towards the end 2019.

The impacts on other important aspects of the economy are less clear. Data gaps remain in analysis on the effects of sanctions on government revenues, gross foreign currency reserves, and the labour market. Overseas labour

data is too unreliable to make policy conclusions. If absolute numbers estimated are correct, the activity of overseas labourer groups continues to generate a significant proportion of revenue for the state.

There is evidence to suggest an increase in state-sponsored cyber activity between 2015 and 2019. As a source of illicit revenue, this activity is difficult to monetise, though even conservative estimates indicate that this activity may go some way towards addressing the DPRK Government's budget shortfalls.

Your letter also asked about possible proposals for the UN Security Council and other UN organizations that might mitigate any negative impact of UN sanctions

Panel of Experts reports have highlighted the issue of banking channels and the need to find a way for the humanitarian community to access funds in-country once operations recommence; we therefore hope a solution can be found soon to address this important issue to enable agencies to rapidly engage as soon as they are permitted to re-enter the DPRK.

Due to Covid-19 restrictions in the DPRK over the last two and a half years and the resulting severe difficulty in transfer of goods into the country, we also continue to fully support requests from humanitarian organisations for timeframe extensions of the exemptions for authorisation, procurement and shipment of materials and equipment and medical supplies to respond to Covid-19 and natural disasters in the country. We also welcome the adoption of SCR 2664 introducing a humanitarian carve out to all UN asset freezes.

Close coordination continues between [MS2] and UN agencies and NGOs on plans to resume work in the DPRK. [MS2] has also offered bilateral assistance to the DPRK in response to its Covid-19 outbreak in May 2022; however, we are yet to receive a response. Once the international community regains access to the country to conduct a needs assessment, [MS2] will consider how else we might provide further support in addition to our current assistance contributions through the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund [MS2 activities].

We welcome the ongoing engagement between the Panel of Experts and UN agencies and NGOs to assess the impact of sanctions on their operations and improve them where possible. Given deep concerns about the likely dire humanitarian situation in the DPRK, we believe the most effective immediate action that could be taken would be for the DPRK government to permit humanitarian agencies to re-enter the country to conduct a comprehensive needs assessment and provide assistance and support. This will also enable monitoring of the impact of sanctions directly.

## Annex 92: Sanctions implementation questionnaire, November 2022

The Panel sent the following questionnaire to UN Member States in late November 2022:

1. Please provide brief details of any action taken by your state in 2022 in the following categories:

a: arrests, prosecutions or convictions of individuals or entities involved in breaches of the UN's DPRK sanctions regime<sup>123124</sup>;

b: customs inspections and seizures of restricted or prohibited goods destined for or originating from DPRK;

c: inspections, interdictions or seizure of vessels or aircraft believed to be involved in DPRK sanctions evasion;

d: any other executive actions (assets seizure, expulsion, prevention of entry or transit, etc.) taken against any designated individual, entity or vessel in connection with DPRK sanctions evasion, or those acting on behalf of designated individuals or entities;

e: the results of any actions taken to monitor possible sanctions evasion activities by DPRK officials with diplomatic accreditation in your state;

f: the results of any actions taken to monitor possible sanctions evasion activities by any DPRK students of technical or scientific subjects in your state;

g: any actions taken to repatriate DPRK workers in your state or, if repatriation has not been possible, an account of how you have dealt with obligations on such workers;

h: actions taken to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula and to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue.

2. Please provide brief details of any problems your state has encountered in the implementation of the UN's DPRK sanctions regime.

3. Notification and reporting. Please provide brief details of your state's actions on the following:

a: is your state up-to-date in its notification obligations to the 1718 Committee regarding DPRK sanctions implementation?

b: if you have received requests for information (RFIs) relating to the DPRK sanctions regime from the Panel of Experts this year, please provide a reference to your response (letter number/date), or an indication of when the Panel can expect to receive your response.<sup>125</sup>

<sup>123</sup>The Panel is only responsible for monitoring, promoting and facilitating the implementation of UN sanctions, although recognises that executive action taken as a result of bilateral or other multilateral sanctions regimes may overlap with the aims of the UN's regime. In such cases, the Panel would be interested to hear of any such implementation action taken by your state.

<sup>124</sup>If the provisions of the UN sanctions regime are not formally incorporated into your state's domestic legislation, please note actions taken under your own legislation which correspond to the aims of the UN resolutions.

<sup>125</sup>If your State has overdue responses to earlier RFIs, the Panel would be grateful to receive them.

c: has your state found any of the recommendations to Member States contained in the Panel's 2022 reports (S/2022/132 and S/2022/668) useful and in what way?<sup>126</sup> Have they been implemented?

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<sup>126</sup> The Panel's interest in the implementation of its recommendations goes back more than one year. We would be interested to hear about the practical value of our recommendations since 2017.

## Annex 93: Fact Sheet compiling certain measures imposed by the Security Council, April 2018

respect each other's sovereignty and exist peacefully together, and that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments.<sup>5</sup>

Paragraph 27 of resolution 2397 (2017) reiterates the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large, and the commitment of the Security Council to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomes efforts by Committee members as well as other States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialogue and stresses the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula and beyond.<sup>6</sup>

Paragraph 27 of resolution 2397 (2017) urges further work to reduce tensions so as to advance the prospects for a comprehensive settlement.<sup>7</sup>

Paragraph 2 of resolution 2397 (2017) underscores the imperative of achieving the goal of complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.<sup>8</sup>

### I. **Arms and related materiel embargo**

#### a) *Export to the DPRK*

States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of **all arms and related materiel**, including **small arms and light weapons and their related materiel**.<sup>9</sup>

#### b) *Export by the DPRK*

The DPRK shall cease the export of **all arms and related materiel**, and States shall prohibit the procurement of such arms and related materiel from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK.<sup>10</sup>

#### c) *Conventional arms – repair*

States shall prevent **the shipment of items to or from the DPRK for repair**, servicing, refurbishing, testing, reverse-engineering, and marketing, regardless of whether ownership or control is transferred.<sup>11</sup>

#### d) *Conventional arms – dual use*

States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their

<sup>5</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 26.

<sup>6</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 27.

<sup>7</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 27.

<sup>8</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 2.

<sup>9</sup> See resolution 1718 (2006), paragraph 8 (a) and resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 6.

<sup>10</sup> See resolution 1718 (2006), paragraph 8 (b) and resolution 1874 (2009), paragraph 9.

<sup>11</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 7.



territories, of additional items set out in the **list of conventional arms dual-use items** which is to be updated every 12 months.<sup>12</sup>

## **II. Embargo on items, materials, equipment, goods and technology relevant to nuclear-, ballistic missile-, and other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes**

States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer **to the DPRK**, through their territory or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of:

- Items relevant to **nuclear-related programmes** set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 2;<sup>13</sup>
- Items relevant to **ballistic missile-related programmes** set out in S/2014/253;
- Items relevant to **other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes** set out in S/2006/853 and S/2006/853/Corr.1;
- Additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology that could contribute to DPRK's nuclear-, ballistic missile- and other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, determined by the Security Council or the Committee.<sup>14</sup>

States shall also prohibit the procurement of all the above **from the DPRK** by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK.<sup>15</sup> The Security Council reaffirmed that resolution 1540 (2004) obligates all States to take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials, and notes that these obligations are complementary to the obligations in the resolutions to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to DPRK's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.<sup>16</sup>

## **III. Catch-all provisions related to prohibited items**

### *a) Arms and related materiel catch-all provision*

The measures imposed by the arms and related materiel embargo shall also apply to any item, except food or medicine, if the state determines that such item could directly contribute to the development

<sup>12</sup> Approved by the Committee pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 5 of resolution 2371 (2017), and paragraph 5 of and resolution 2375 (2017). See [S/2016/1069](#), [S/2017/760](#) and [S/2017/829](#) on the website of the Committee at <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/prohibited-items>.

<sup>13</sup> Available with S/2014/253, S/2006/853 and S/2006/853/Corr.1 on the website of the Committee at <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/prohibited-items>

<sup>14</sup> See resolution 1718 (2006), paragraph 8 (a) (ii), resolution 2094 (2013), Annex III, resolution 2321 (2016), Annex III and resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 4. See also S/2017/822, approved by the Committee pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 2375 (2017), on the website of the Committee at <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1718/prohibited-items>.

<sup>15</sup> See resolution 1718 (2006), paragraph 8 (b).

<sup>16</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 37.

of the DPRK's operational capabilities of its armed forces, or to exports that support or enhance the operational capabilities of armed forces of another Member State outside the DPRK.

This provision shall cease to apply to the supply, sale or transfer of an item, or its procurement, if:

- The State determines that such activity is exclusively for humanitarian purposes or exclusively for livelihood purposes which will be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue, and also not related to any activities prohibited by the resolutions, provided that the State notifies the Committee in advance of such determination and also informs the Committee of measures taken to prevent the diversion of the item for such other purposes, or
- The Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that a particular supply, sale or transfer would not be contrary to the objectives of the resolutions.<sup>17</sup>

b) *Dual-use catch-all provision*

States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to or from the DPRK or its nationals, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories of **any item if the State determines that such item could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other weapons of mass destruction programmes, other activities prohibited by the resolutions or to the evasion of measures imposed by the resolutions (hereafter "evasion of sanctions")**.<sup>18</sup>

c) *Determined by State catch-all provision*

The resolutions also prohibit the transfer of **any items if a State relevant to a transaction has information** that provides reasonable grounds to believe that a designated individual or entity is the originator, intended recipient or facilitator of the item's transfer.<sup>19</sup>

#### IV. Ban on certain financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance

States shall prevent any transfers **to the DPRK** by their nationals or from their territories, or **from the DPRK** by its nationals or from its territory, of financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the following items:<sup>20</sup>

- Arms and related materiel;
- Items, materials, equipment, goods and technology relevant to nuclear-, ballistic missile-, or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes (see section II above for details);
- Any item if the State determines that such item could contribute to the DPRK's prohibited programmes or activities or to the evasion of sanctions.

<sup>17</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 8.

<sup>18</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 27.

<sup>19</sup> See resolution 2087 (2013), paragraph 9.

<sup>20</sup> See resolution 1718, paragraph 8 (c); resolution 1874 (2009), paragraphs 9 and 10; resolution 2094 (2013), paragraphs 7, 20, and 22; and resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 6.



These measures **also apply to brokering or other intermediary services**, including when arranging for the provision, maintenance or use of prohibited items in other States or the supply, sale or transfer to or exports from other States.<sup>21</sup>

States are also prohibited from engaging in the hosting of trainers, advisors, or other officials for the purpose of military-, paramilitary- or police-related training.<sup>22</sup>

#### **V. Proliferation networks**

States shall expel DPRK diplomats, government representatives, other DPRK nationals acting in a governmental or representative office capacity, and foreign nationals that are working on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity or of an individual or entity assisting in sanctions evasions or violating the resolutions or of an individual working on behalf of or at the direction of a DPRK bank or financial institution for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK or to the individual's state of nationality respectively, consistent with applicable national and international law, provided that these measures shall not impede the transit of representative of the Government of the DPRK to the United Nations Headquarters or other UN facilities to conduct United Nations business. These measures shall not apply with respect to a particular individual if:

- The presence of the individual is required for fulfilment of judicial process;
- The presence of the individual is required exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes; or
- The Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis that the expulsion of the individual would be contrary to the objectives of the resolutions.<sup>23</sup>

States shall close the representative offices of designated entities and prohibit such entities, as well individuals or entities acting for or on their behalf, directly or indirectly, from participating in joint ventures or any other business arrangements.<sup>24</sup>

States are called upon to exercise enhanced vigilance over DPRK diplomatic personnel so as to prevent such individuals from contributing to the DPRK's prohibited programmes or activities, or to the evasion of sanctions.<sup>25</sup>

#### **VI. Ban on specialized teaching and training and suspension of scientific and technical cooperation**

States shall prevent **specialized teaching or training** of DPRK nationals within their territories or by their nationals of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including teaching or training in advanced physics, advanced computer simulation and related computer sciences, geospatial navigation, nuclear engineering, aerospace engineering, aeronautical engineering and related disciplines.<sup>26</sup> Such specialized teaching or training includes, but is not limited to advanced materials

<sup>21</sup> See resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 7.

<sup>22</sup> See resolution 1874 (2009), paragraph 9; and resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 9.

<sup>23</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraphs 13 and 14; and resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 33.

<sup>24</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 15.

<sup>25</sup> See resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 24.

<sup>26</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 17.

science, advanced chemical engineering, advanced mechanical engineering, advanced electrical engineering and advanced industrial engineering.<sup>27</sup>

States shall suspend **scientific and technical cooperation** involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the DPRK **except for medical exchanges unless:**

- a) In the case of scientific or technical cooperation in the fields of nuclear science and technology, aerospace and aeronautical engineering and technology, or advanced manufacturing production techniques and methods, **the Committee has determined on a case-by-case basis** that a particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programmes; or
- b) In the case of all other scientific or technical cooperation, the State engaging in scientific or technical cooperation determines that the particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programmes and **notifies the Committee in advance** of such determination.<sup>28</sup>

## VII. Assets freeze

States shall, in accordance with their respective legal processes, freeze **the funds, other financial assets and economic resources** which are on their territories that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities designated by the Committee or by the Security Council. States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of such persons or entities.<sup>29</sup>

States shall also, in accordance with their respective legal processes, freeze all **the funds, other financial assets and economic resources**<sup>30</sup> outside of the DPRK that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by entities of the Government of the DPRK or the Worker's Party of Korea, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, that the State determines are associated with the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by the resolutions.

All States except the DPRK shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of such individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them.<sup>31</sup>

States shall also impose the assets freeze on the following:

<sup>27</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 10.

<sup>28</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 11 (a) and (b).

<sup>29</sup> See resolution 1718 (2006), paragraph 8 (d).

<sup>30</sup> Paragraph 12 of resolution 2270 affirms vessels (including maritime vessels) as "economic resources". Annex III of the same resolution provides a list of vessels controlled or operated by the Ocean Maritime Management (OMM) at the time, as economic resources subject to the assets freeze measures (paragraph 23). The list of these vessels, with more identifying information, is available on the Committee website, at [https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/vessels\\_list\\_-\\_e\\_final.pdf](https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/vessels_list_-_e_final.pdf).

<sup>31</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 32.



- Any individuals or entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of the designated individuals and entities;
- Entities owned or controlled by designated individuals and entities, including through illicit means.<sup>32</sup>

The assets freeze does not apply to financial or other assets or resources that have been determined by relevant States to be:

- Necessary for basic expenses, after notification to the Committee and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee;<sup>33</sup>
- Necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States and has been approved by the Committee;<sup>34</sup>
- Subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, after the Committee has been notified;<sup>35</sup>
- In the case of assets outside of the DPRK that are owned or controlled by entities of the Government of the DPRK or the Worker's Party of Korea, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, that the State determines are associated with the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities prohibited by the resolutions:
  - Required to carry out activities of the DPRK's missions to the United Nations and its specialized agencies and related organizations or other diplomatic and consular missions of the DPRK;
  - Required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, denuclearization or any other purpose which is consistent with the objectives of the resolution 2270 (2016) and determined by the Committee in advance on a case-by-case basis;<sup>36</sup>

The assets freeze does not apply with respect to financial transactions with the DPRK Foreign Trade Bank or the Korea National Insurance Corporation, designated by resolution 2371 (2017), if such transactions are solely for the operation of diplomatic or consular missions in the DPRK or humanitarian assistance activities that are undertaken by, or in coordination with, the United Nations.<sup>37</sup>

## VIII. Travel ban

States shall prevent (restrict) the entry into or transit<sup>38</sup> through their territories of:

<sup>32</sup> See resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 8.

<sup>33</sup> See resolution 1718 (2006), paragraph 9 (a).

<sup>34</sup> See resolution 1718 (2006), paragraph 9 (b).

<sup>35</sup> See resolution 1718 (2006), paragraph 9 (c).

<sup>36</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 32.

<sup>37</sup> See resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 26.

<sup>38</sup> For the purpose of implementing the resolutions, the term "transit" includes but is not limited to the travel of individuals through a State's international airport terminals en route to a destination in another State, regardless of



- Individuals designated by the Security Council or the Committee together with their family members;<sup>39</sup>
- Individuals acting on behalf or at the direction of the designated individuals listed in annex I of resolution 2094 (2013); annex I of resolution 2270 (2016); annex I of resolution 2321 (2016); annex I of resolution 2356 (2017); annex I of resolution 2371 (2017); annex I of resolution 2375 (2017); and annex I of resolution 2397 (2017).<sup>40</sup>
- Members of the Government of the DPRK, officials of that Government, and members of the DPRK armed forces, **if a State determines** that such members or officials are associated with the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by the resolutions.<sup>41</sup>
- Any individual whom **a State determines** is:
  - Acting on behalf or at the direction of a designated individual or entity;
  - Violating the provisions of the resolutions;
  - Assisting the evasion of sanctions;<sup>42</sup>
  - Traveling for the purposes of carrying out activities related to the shipment of prohibited items to or from the DPRK for repair, servicing, refurbishing, testing, reverse-engineering, and marketing.<sup>43</sup>

If such an individual is a DPRK national, then States shall expel the individual from their territories for the purpose of repatriation to the DPRK consistent with applicable national and international law, unless the presence of an individual is required for fulfilment of a judicial process or exclusively for medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, provided that nothing shall impede the transit of representatives of the Government of the DPRK to the United Nations Headquarters to conduct United Nations business.<sup>44</sup>

The travel ban does not apply to designated individuals and entities when the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or the Committee concludes that an exemption would further the objectives of the resolutions.<sup>45</sup> States can submit requests for exemptions from the travel ban for designated individuals and entities following the instructions set out in the Committee Guidelines.

No aspect of the travel ban obliges a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.

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whether such individuals pass through customs or passport control at that airport – see resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 25.

<sup>39</sup> See resolution 1718 (2006), paragraph 8 (c); and resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 11.

<sup>40</sup> See resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 9; resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 10; resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 3, resolution 2356 (2017), paragraph 3, resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 3, resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 3, and resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 3.

<sup>41</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 15.

<sup>42</sup> See resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 10.

<sup>43</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 7.

<sup>44</sup> See resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 10.

<sup>45</sup> See resolution 1718 (2006), paragraph 10.

## IX. **Financial measures**

### a) *Provision of financial services*

States shall prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their territory, of **any financial or other assets or resources, including bulk cash, and the clearing of funds through all Member States' territories, that could contribute to** the DPRK's prohibited programmes or activities, or to the evasion of sanctions, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction, that are associated with such programs or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in accordance with their national authorities and legislation.<sup>46</sup>

The measures apply also to the transfers of cash and gold, including through cash and gold couriers, transiting to and from the DPRK, so as to ensure such transfers of bulk cash and gold do not contribute to the DPRK's prohibited programmes or activities, or to the evasion of sanctions.<sup>47</sup>

States are called upon to exercise enhanced vigilance in this regard, including by monitoring the activities of their nationals, persons in their territories, financial institutions, and other entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad) with or on behalf of financial institutions in the DPRK, or of those that act on behalf or at the direction of DPRK financial institutions, including their branches, representatives, agents and subsidiaries abroad.<sup>48</sup>

### b) *Opening of banking subsidiaries*

States shall prohibit in their territories the opening and operation of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of DPRK banks and are also obliged to prohibit financial institutions within their territories or subject to their jurisdiction from establishing new joint ventures and from taking an ownership interest in or establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with DPRK banks, **unless such transactions have been approved by the Committee in advance**. Furthermore, States shall take the necessary measures to close such existing branches, subsidiaries and representative offices, and also to terminate such joint, ventures, ownership interests and correspondent banking relationships with DPRK banks within ninety days from the adoption of resolution 2270 (2016).<sup>49</sup>

States also shall prohibit financial institutions within their territories or subject to their jurisdiction from opening new representative offices or subsidiaries, branches or banking accounts in the DPRK.<sup>50</sup>

States also shall take the necessary measures to close existing representative offices, subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK within ninety days, **unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis** that such offices, subsidiaries or accounts are required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance or the activities of diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to the Vienna Convention on

<sup>46</sup> See resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 11 and resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 13.

<sup>47</sup> See resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 14; and resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 37.

<sup>48</sup> See resolution 2087 (2013), paragraph 6.

<sup>49</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 33.

<sup>50</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 34.



Diplomatic Relations (see section XIX) or the activities of the United Nations or its specialized agencies or related organizations, or for any other purposes consistent with the resolutions.<sup>51</sup>

*c) Joint ventures*

States shall prohibit, by their nationals or in their territories, the opening, maintenance, and operation of **all joint ventures or cooperative entities, new and existing**, with DPRK entities or individuals, whether or not acting for or on behalf of the government of the DPRK.

This provision shall not apply with respect to those joint ventures or cooperative entities, in particular those that are non-commercial, public utility infrastructure projects not generating profit, that have been approved by the Committee in advance on a case-by-case basis.

If such joint venture or cooperative entity has not been approved by the Committee on a case-by-case basis, States shall close any such existing joint venture or cooperative entity within 120 days of 11 September 2017. States shall close any such existing joint venture or cooperative entity within 120 days after the Committee has denied a request for approval.

This provision shall not apply with respect to existing **China-DPRK hydroelectric power infrastructure projects** and the **Russia-DPRK Rajin-Khasan port and rail project solely to export Russia-origin coal** as permitted by paragraph 8 of resolution 2371 (2017).<sup>52</sup>

*d) Provision of public financial support*

States shall prohibit public and private financial support from within their territories or by persons or entities subject to their jurisdiction for trade with the DPRK (including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade), **except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis**.<sup>53</sup>

*e) New commitments for grants, financial assistance or concessional loans*

States and international financial and credit institutions are called upon not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans to the DPRK, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes directly addressing the needs of the civilian population, or the promotion of denuclearization. States are also called upon to exercise vigilance with a view to reducing current commitments.<sup>54</sup>

*f) Companies performing financial services*

Resolution 2371 (2017) clarifies that companies performing financial services commensurate with those provided by banks are considered financial institutions for purpose of implementing paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013), paragraphs 33 and 34 of resolution 2270 (2016), and paragraph 33 of resolution 2321 (2016).<sup>55</sup>

## **X. Luxury goods embargo**

<sup>51</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 31.

<sup>52</sup> See resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 18.

<sup>53</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 32.

<sup>54</sup> See resolution 1874 (2009), paragraph 19.

<sup>55</sup> See resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 13.

States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of **luxury goods**. The term "luxury goods" includes, but is not limited to, the items specified in Annex IV of resolution 2094 (2013), Annex IV of resolution 2270 (2016) and Annex IV of resolution 2321 (2016).<sup>56</sup>

In order to assist States in carrying out this obligation, the Committee has adopted an Implementation Assistance Notice (IAN #3) and has posted it on its website.<sup>57</sup>

## **XI. Sectoral sanctions**

The DPRK shall not supply, sell, or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, **coal, iron, iron ore, gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, rare earth minerals, copper, nickel, silver, zinc, lead and lead ore, food and agricultural products (HS codes 12, 08, 07), machinery (HS code 84), electrical equipment (HS code 85), earth and stone including magnesite and magnesite (HS code 25), wood (HS code 44), and vessels (HS code 89)**. States shall prohibit the procurement of such material from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK.<sup>58</sup>

This provision shall not apply with respect to:

- a) **Coal** procurements that are notified by the exporting State to the Committee in advance and confirmed on the basis of credible information that the **coal has originated outside the DPRK** and was transported through the DPRK solely for export from the Port of Rajin (Rason), and that such transactions are unrelated to generating revenue for the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other prohibited activities;<sup>59</sup>
- b) Sales and transactions of **iron** and **iron ore** for which written contracts had been finalized prior to 5 August 2017 and shipments are imported into States' territories by 4 September 2017, with notification provided to the Committee containing all details on those imports by no later than 19 September 2017.<sup>60</sup>
- c) **Lead** and **lead ore** procurements for which written contracts had been finalized prior to 5 August 2017, with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 19 September 2017.<sup>61</sup>
- d) **Food** and **agricultural products** (HS codes 12, 08, 07), **machinery** (HS code 84), **electrical equipment** (HS code 85), **earth and stone** including **magnesite** and **magnesite** (HS code 25), **wood** (HS code 44), and **vessels** (HS code 89), for which written contracts have been finalized prior to 22 December 2017, all States may only allow those shipments to be imported into

<sup>56</sup> See resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 23, resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 39 and resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 5.

<sup>57</sup> The IAN is available on the webpage of the Committee at:

[https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/implementation\\_assistance\\_notice\\_3\\_3.pdf](https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/implementation_assistance_notice_3_3.pdf).

<sup>58</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 30; resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 28; resolution 2371 (2017), paragraphs 8 and 10; and resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

<sup>59</sup> See resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 8.

<sup>60</sup> See resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 8.

<sup>61</sup> See resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 10.



their territories up to 21 January 2018 with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 5 February 2018.<sup>62</sup>

All Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles and whether or not originating in their territories, of all **industrial machinery** (HS codes 84 and 85), **transportation vehicles** (HS codes 86 through 89), and **iron, steel, and other metals** (HS codes 72 through 83).<sup>63</sup>

This provision shall not apply with respect to the provision of spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft (currently consisting of the following aircraft models and types: An-24R/RV, An-148-100B, Il-18D, Il-62M, Tu-134B-3, Tu-154B, Tu-204-100B, and Tu-204-300).<sup>64</sup>

All Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories of **all condensates and natural gas liquids**. The DPRK shall not procure such materials.<sup>65</sup>

All Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles, and whether or not originating in their territories, of **all refined petroleum products**. The DPRK shall not procure such products.<sup>66</sup>

This provision shall not apply with respect to:

- a) the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles, and whether or not originating in their territories, of **refined petroleum products**, including **diesel and kerosene**, in the aggregate amount of **up to 500,000 barrels** during a period of twelve months beginning on January 1, 2018, and for twelve month periods thereafter, provided that:
  - i. The Member State notify the Committee every 30 days of the amount of such supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of refined petroleum products along with information about all parties to the transaction;
  - ii. The supply, sale or transfer of refined petroleum products involve no individuals or entities that are associated with the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by the relevant resolutions, including designated individuals or entities, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, directly or indirectly, or individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions;
  - iii. The supply, sale or transfer of refined petroleum products are exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals and unrelated to generating revenue for the

<sup>62</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

<sup>63</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 7.

<sup>64</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 7.

<sup>65</sup> See resolution 2375 (2017), paragraphs 13.

<sup>66</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 5.



DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by the relevant resolutions.

All Member States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels, aircraft, pipelines, rail lines, or vehicles and whether or not originating in their territories, of **crude oil**

This provision shall not apply with respect to crude oil that for twelve months periods after 22 December 2017, does not exceed **4 million barrels** or **525,000 tons** in the aggregate per twelve-month period, and decides that all Member States providing crude oil shall provide a report to the Committee every 90 days from 22 December 2017 onward of the amount of crude oil provided to the DPRK.<sup>67</sup>

This provision shall further not apply with respect to shipments of crude oil which **the Committee approves in advance on a case-by-case basis** as exclusively for

- a) **livelihood purposes** of DPRK nationals and
- b) **unrelated to the DPRK's nuclear or ballistic missile programmes or other activities prohibited by the relevant resolutions.**<sup>68</sup>

## **XII. Seafood ban**

The DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, **seafood** (including fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms). States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK.<sup>69</sup>

This provision shall not apply with respect to:

- a) Sales and transactions of **seafood** for which written contracts had been finalized prior to 5 August 2017 and shipments are imported into States' territories by 4 September 2017, with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 19 September 2017.

The DPRK is further prohibited from selling or transferring, directly or indirectly, fishing rights.<sup>70</sup>

## **XIII. Textiles ban**

The DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, **textiles** (including but not limited to fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products). All States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK

<sup>67</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 4.

<sup>68</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 4.

<sup>69</sup> See resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 9.

<sup>70</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 6.

by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK.<sup>71</sup> This provision shall not apply with respect to:

- a) The supply, sales or transfer of **textiles** approved by the Committee on a case-by-case basis in advance, and
- b) Sales, supplies, and transfers of **textiles** for which written contracts have been finalized prior to 11 September 2017 and the shipments are imported into States' territories by no later than 90 days from 11 September 2017, with notification provided to the Committee containing details on those imports by no later than 135 days after 11 September 2017.

#### **XIV. Ban on import of statues from the DPRK**

DPRK shall not supply, sell or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft, statues, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK, **unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance.**<sup>72</sup>

#### **XV. Fuel ban**

States shall prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of **aviation fuel, including aviation gasoline, naptha-type jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, and kerosene-type rocket fuel**, whether or not originating in their territory, to the territory of the DPRK, unless the Committee has approved in advance on an exceptional case-by-case basis the transfer to the DPRK of such products for verified essential humanitarian needs, subject to arrangement for effective monitoring of delivery and use.

This provision shall not apply with respect to the sale or supply of aviation fuel to civilian passenger aircraft outside the DPRK exclusively for consumption during its flight to the DPRK and its return flight.<sup>73</sup>

States are called upon to exercise vigilance to ensure that no more fuel is provided to DPRK-flagged civil passenger aircraft than is necessary for the relevant flight, including a standard margin for safety of flight.<sup>74</sup>

#### **XVI. DPRK nationals working abroad**

All Member States shall not provide work authorizations for DPRK nationals in their jurisdictions in connection with admission to their territories **unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis** in advance that employment of DPRK nationals in a member state's jurisdiction is required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, denuclearization or any other purpose consistent with the objectives of the relevant resolutions.

This provision shall not apply with respect to **work authorizations for which written contracts have been finalized prior to 11 September 2017.**<sup>75</sup>

<sup>71</sup> See resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 16.

<sup>72</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 29.

<sup>73</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 31.

<sup>74</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 31.

<sup>75</sup> See resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 17.



Member States shall repatriate to the DPRK all DPRK nationals earning income in that Member State's jurisdiction and all DPRK government safety oversight attachés monitoring DPRK workers abroad immediately but no later than 24 months from 22 December 2017. All Member States shall provide a midterm report by 15 months from 22 December 2017 of all DPRK nationals earning income in that Member State's jurisdiction that were repatriated over the 12 month period starting from 22 December 2017, including an explanation of why less than half of such DPRK nationals were repatriated by the end of that 12 month period if applicable, and all Member States shall provide final reports by 27 months from 22 December 2017.

This provision shall not apply if the Member State determines that a DPRK national is a national of that Member State or a DPRK national whose repatriation is prohibited, subject to applicable national and international law, including international refugee law and international human rights law, and the United Nations Headquarters Agreement and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.<sup>76</sup>

## **XVII. Inspection and transportation**

States are called upon to redouble efforts to implement in full the measures in the resolutions, and to cooperate with each other in doing so, particularly with respect to **inspecting, detecting and seizing** items the transfer of which is prohibited by these resolutions.<sup>77</sup>

All States **shall inspect the cargo within or transiting through their territory, including in their airports, seaports and free trade zones** that has originated in the DPRK, or that is destined for the DPRK, or has been brokered or facilitated by the DPRK or its nationals, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf, or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, or by designated individuals or entities, or that is being transported on DPRK flagged aircraft or maritime vessels, for the purposes of ensuring that no items are transferred in violation of the resolutions.<sup>78</sup> This also includes the **personal luggage and checked baggage of individuals** entering into or departing from the DPRK that may be used to transport items the supply, sale or transfer of which is prohibited by the resolutions.<sup>79</sup>

States are required to inspect **DPRK-flagged aircraft** when they land in or take off from their territory<sup>80</sup> and **cargo transported by rail and road** within or transiting through their territory.<sup>81</sup>

States are called upon to implement such inspections in a manner that minimizes the impact on the transfer of cargo that the State determines is for humanitarian purposes.<sup>82</sup>

States are also authorized **to seize and dispose** (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by the resolutions that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under the resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the

<sup>76</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 8.

<sup>77</sup> See resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 19.

<sup>78</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 18.

<sup>79</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 13.

<sup>80</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 20.

<sup>81</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 21.

<sup>82</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 18.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction of 10 April 1972.<sup>83</sup>

All Member States shall seize, inspect, and freeze (impound) any vessel in their ports, and may seize, inspect, and freeze (impound) any vessel subject to its jurisdiction in its territorial waters, if the Member State has reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel was involved in activities, or the transport of items, prohibited by relevant resolutions. Member States are encouraged to consult with the flag States of relevant vessels once they are seized, inspected, and frozen (impounded).

This provision shall not apply if, after six months from the date such vessels were frozen (impounded), the Committee decides, on a case-by-case basis and upon request of a flag State, that adequate arrangements have been made to prevent the vessel from contributing to future violations of these resolutions.<sup>84</sup>

When a Member State has information to suspect that the DPRK is attempting to supply, sell, transfer or procure, directly or indirectly, illicit cargo, that Member State may request additional maritime and shipping information from other relevant Member States, including to determine whether the item, commodity, or product in question originated from the DPRK.

All Member States receiving such inquiries shall respond as promptly as possible to such requests in an appropriate manner with support from the Committee and the Panel of Experts to facilitate timely coordination of such information requests through an expedited process.<sup>85</sup>

There are several reporting obligations relating to inspections.

a) *Inspections on the high seas*

States are called upon to inspect vessels, with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains prohibited items.<sup>86</sup>

States are called upon to cooperate with the inspections. If the flag State does not consent to inspection on the high seas, the flag State shall direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection by the local authorities. If a flag State neither consents to inspection on the high seas nor directs the vessel to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection, or if the vessels refuses to comply with the flag State direction, then the Committee shall consider designating the vessel for the measures imposed in paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) and paragraph 12 of resolution 2321 (2016) and the flag State shall immediately deregister that vessel provided the designation of the vessel by the Committee.<sup>87</sup>

Resolution 2375 (2017), in paragraph 10, affirms that inspections conducted per paragraph 7 of that resolution should only be carried out by warships and other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect, and underscores that the

<sup>83</sup> See resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 21.

<sup>84</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 9.

<sup>85</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 10.

<sup>86</sup> See resolution 1874 (2009), paragraph 12 and resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 7.

<sup>87</sup> See resolution 1874 (2009), paragraph 13 and resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 8.



inspection authority found in paragraph 7 does not apply with respect to inspection of vessels entitled to sovereign immunity under international law.<sup>88</sup> Resolution 2375 (2017) further affirms that such authorization for inspection on the high seas apply only with respect to the situation in the DPRK and shall not affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, with respect to any other situation and underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be considered as establishing customary international law.<sup>89</sup>

If any vessel has refused to allow an inspection after such an inspection was authorized by the vessel's flag State, or if any DPRK-flagged vessel has refused to be inspected, all States shall deny such a vessel entry to their ports, unless entry is required for the purpose of an inspection, in the case of emergency or in the case of return to its port of origination.<sup>90</sup>

All Member States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction, entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction, and vessels flying their flag, from facilitating or engaging in ship-to-ship transfers to or from DPRK-flagged vessels of any goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from the DPRK.<sup>91</sup>

*b) Ban on all leasing or chartering vessels/aircraft, provision of crew services*

States shall prohibit their nationals and those in their territories from leasing or chartering their flagged vessels or aircraft or providing crew services **to the DPRK**. This prohibition shall also apply with respect to any designated individuals or entities, any other DPRK entities, any other individuals or entities whom the State determines to have assisted in the evasion of sanctions or in violating the provisions of the resolutions, any individuals or entities acting on behalf or at the direction of any of the aforementioned, and any entities owned or controlled by any of the aforementioned. States are called upon to de-register any vessel that is owned, operated or crewed by the DPRK, and not to register any such vessel that is de-registered by another Member State.

These measures shall apply without exception, **unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis in advance**.<sup>92</sup>

States shall prohibit their nationals from procuring vessel and aircraft crewing services **from the DPRK**.<sup>93</sup>

*c) Registering, insuring, operating DPRK-flagged vessels*

States shall **prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction** from registering vessels in the DPRK, obtaining authorization for a vessel to use the DPRK flag, and from owning, leasing, operating, providing any vessel classification, certification or associated service, insuring or chartering any vessel

<sup>88</sup> See resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 10.

<sup>89</sup> See resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 12.

<sup>90</sup> See resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 17.

<sup>91</sup> See resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 11.

<sup>92</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 8.

<sup>93</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 23.



flagged by the DPRK. These measures shall apply without exception, **unless the Committee approves on a case-by-case basis accompanied in advance.**<sup>94</sup>

d) *Insurance or re-insurance services to vessels*

States shall prohibit their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction from providing insurance or re-insurance services to vessels it has reasonable grounds to believe were involved in activities, or the transport of items, prohibited by the relevant resolutions or owned, controlled, or operated, including through illicit means, by the DPRK **unless the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis** that the vessel is engaged in activities exclusively for livelihood purposes which will not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate revenue or exclusively for humanitarian purposes.<sup>95</sup>

e) *Vessels' de-registration*

States shall de-register any vessel it has reasonable grounds to believe was involved in activities, or the transport of items, prohibited by the relevant resolutions or that is owned, controlled, or operated by the DPRK, and shall not register any such vessel that has been de-registered by another Member State pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 2321 (2016).

Member States are required to prohibit its nationals, persons subject to its jurisdiction and entities incorporated in its territory or subject to its jurisdiction from thereafter providing classification services to such a vessel **except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis.**<sup>96</sup>

States shall not register any such vessel that has been de-registered by another Member State pursuant to this paragraph **except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis.**<sup>97</sup>

f) *Ban on port calls*

States shall **prohibit the entry into their ports of any vessel** if the Member State has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a designated individual or entity, or contains cargo the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by the resolutions, unless entry is required in the case of emergency or in the case of return to its port of origination, or for inspection, or unless the Committee determines in advance that such entry is required for humanitarian purposes or any other purposes consistent with the objectives of this resolution.<sup>98</sup>

All Member States shall **prohibit the entry into their ports of vessels designated by the Committee** for which it has information indicating they are, or have been, related to activities prohibited by the relevant resolutions, unless entry is required in the case of emergency or in the case of return to its port of origination, or **unless the Committee determines in advance** that such entry is required for

<sup>94</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 9 and resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 7.

<sup>95</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 22 and resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 11.

<sup>96</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 12.

<sup>97</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 12.

<sup>98</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 21.

**humanitarian purposes** or any other purposes consistent with the objectives of the relevant resolutions.<sup>99</sup>

g) *Ban on the provision of bunkering services*

States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or from their territory of bunkering services, such as the provision of fuel or supplies, or other servicing of vessels, to DPRK vessels if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe they are carrying prohibited items.

Such bunkering services can be provided when necessary for humanitarian purposes or until such time as the cargo has been inspected, and seized and disposed if necessary.

The ban on the provision of bunkering services is not intended to affect legal economic activities.<sup>100</sup>

h) *Flight denials*

States shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, unless under the condition of landing for inspection, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains prohibited items, except in the case of an emergency landing. States are called upon when considering whether to grant overflight permission to flights to assess known risk factors.<sup>101</sup>

i) *Ban on new helicopters and vessels*

States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of new helicopters, new and used vessels, **except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis.**<sup>102</sup>

### **XVIII. Seizure and disposal**

States are authorized to, and shall, seize and dispose (such as through the destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a state other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of prohibited items that are identified in inspections. This must be done in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 29 April 1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972. All States shall cooperate in such efforts.<sup>103</sup>

<sup>99</sup> See resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 6.

<sup>100</sup> See resolution 1874 (2009), paragraph 17.

<sup>101</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 21.

<sup>102</sup> See resolution 2321, paragraph 30 and resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 14.

<sup>103</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 20.



Methods for States to dispose prohibited items include, but are not limited to, destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to another State other than the originating or destination States for disposal.<sup>104</sup>

There are several reporting obligations relating to seizure and disposal (see section XXV for details).

#### **XIX. Liability limitations**

Resolutions 2087(2013), 2094(2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017) emphasize the importance of all States, including the DPRK, taking the necessary steps to ensure that no claim lie at the instance of the DPRK, or of any person or entity in the DPRK, or of persons or entities designated for measures in the resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures in the resolutions.<sup>105</sup>

#### **XX. Humanitarian consequences**

Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017) repeatedly underlined that the imposed measures **are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian assistance, that are not prohibited by the resolutions and the work of international organizations and non-governmental organization carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK** for the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK.<sup>106</sup>

Resolution 2397 (2017) further stresses the DPRK's primary responsibility and need to fully provide for the livelihood needs of people in the DPRK. The Committee may, on a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions if the committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of these resolutions.<sup>107</sup>

#### **XXI. DPRK Diplomatic missions/consular posts**

States shall take steps to limit the number of bank accounts to one per DPRK diplomatic mission and consular post, and one per accredited DPRK diplomat and consular officer, at banks in their territory;<sup>108</sup>

The Council recalled that, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, a diplomatic agent shall not in the receiving State practice for personal profit any professional or commercial

<sup>104</sup> See resolution 2087 (2013), paragraph 8.

<sup>105</sup> See resolution 2087 (2013), paragraph 13; resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 30; resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 47; resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 41; resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 22; resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 23; and resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 21.

<sup>106</sup> See resolution 2087 (2013), paragraph 18; resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 31; resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 48; resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 46; resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 26; resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 26; and resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 25.

<sup>107</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 25.

<sup>108</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 16.

activity, and emphasized accordingly that DPRK diplomatic agents are prohibited in the receiving State from such practice of professional or commercial activity;<sup>109</sup>

States shall prohibit the DPRK from using real property that it owns or leases in their territory for any purpose other than diplomatic or consular activities.<sup>110</sup>

## **XXII. Diplomatic missions in the DPRK**

The Council emphasised that States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8(a) (iii) and 8(d) of resolution 1718 (2006) **without prejudice to the activities of diplomatic missions in the DPRK** pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;<sup>111</sup>

The Council also demanded that the DPRK fully comply with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations;<sup>112</sup>

States are called upon to reduce the number of staff at DPRK diplomatic missions and consular posts.<sup>113</sup>

## **XXIII. International agencies**

**International agencies** are encouraged to take necessary steps **to ensure that all their activities with respect to the DPRK are consistent with the provisions of the resolutions.** International agencies are also encouraged to engage with the Committee regarding their activities with respect to the DPRK that may relate to provisions of the resolutions.<sup>114</sup>

States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties are urged to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures imposed by the resolutions.<sup>115</sup>

## **XXIV. Reporting and notification obligations**

### *a) Related to the overall implementation of resolutions*

States are called upon to submit a report to the Security Council on the "steps" or "concrete measures" they have taken in order to implement effectively the provisions of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017) within a

<sup>109</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 17.

<sup>110</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 18.

<sup>111</sup> See resolution 1874 (2009), paragraph 21; resolution 2087 (2013), paragraph 17; and resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 32.

<sup>112</sup> See resolution 2371 (2017), paragraph 16.

<sup>113</sup> See resolution 2321 (2016), paragraph 14.

<sup>114</sup> See resolution 2087 (2013), paragraph 11.

<sup>115</sup> See resolution 1874 (2009), paragraph 27.



specified period of time.<sup>116</sup> States are also encouraged to provide, if any, additional information related to the implementation of the resolutions.<sup>117</sup>

b) *Related to inspection, seizure and disposal*

- States that **inspect** cargo in their territory or vessels on the high sea with the consent of the flag State **or seize and dispose** of prohibited items must submit promptly reports containing relevant details to the Committee on the inspection, seizure and disposal;<sup>118</sup>
- States that do not receive the cooperation of a flag State are required to submit promptly to the Committee a report containing relevant details;<sup>119</sup>

Any State that has been refused by a vessel to allow an inspection shall promptly report the incident to the Committee.<sup>120</sup>

c) *Related to non-compliance with the measures*

States are called upon to supply information at their disposal regarding non-compliance with the measures imposed in resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) or 2270 (2016).<sup>121</sup>

d) *Related to transfers, re-naming or re-registering of DPRK aircraft, vessels or ships*

States are requested to communicate to the Committee any information available on transfers of DPRK aircraft, vessels or ships to other companies that may have been undertaken in order to evade the sanctions or in violating the provisions of resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), or 2094 (2013), **including renaming or re-registering** of aircraft, vessels or ships. The Committee is requested to make that information widely available.<sup>122</sup>

e) *Related to designated vessels*

If a Member State has information regarding the number, name, and registry of vessels encountered in its territory or on the high seas that are designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as subject to the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006), the various measures imposed by paragraph 12 of resolution 2321 (2016), the port entry ban imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 2371 (2017), or relevant measures in this resolution, then the Member State shall notify the Committee of this information and what measures were taken to carry out an inspection, an asset

<sup>116</sup> Reports pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) must be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution (see paragraph 11 of that resolution); reports pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), within 45 days (see paragraph 22 of that resolution); reports pursuant to resolution 2094 (2013), within 90 days (see paragraph 25 of that resolution); reports pursuant to resolution 2270 (2016), within 90 days (see paragraph 40 of that resolution); reports pursuant to resolution 2321 (2016), within 90 days (see paragraph 36 of that resolution); reports pursuant to resolution 2371 (2017), within 90 days (see paragraph 18 of that resolution); reports pursuant to resolution 2375 (2017), within 90 days (see paragraph 19 of that resolution); reports pursuant to resolution 2397 (2017), within 90 days (see paragraph 17 of that resolution).

<sup>117</sup> See resolution 2087 (2013), paragraph 10.

<sup>118</sup> See resolution 1874 (2009), paragraph 15.

<sup>119</sup> See resolution 1874 (2009), paragraph 16 and resolution 2375 (2017), paragraph 9.

<sup>120</sup> See resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 17.

<sup>121</sup> See resolution 2270 (2016), paragraph 41.

<sup>122</sup> See resolution 2094 (2013), paragraph 19.



freeze and impoundment or other appropriate action as authorized by the relevant provisions of the relevant resolutions.<sup>123</sup>

f) *Related to sectoral sanctions*

All Member States providing crude oil shall provide a report to the Committee every 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution of the amount of crude oil provided to the DPRK.<sup>124</sup>

g) *Related to DPRK nationals working abroad*

All Member States shall provide a midterm report to the Committee by 15 months from 22 December 2017 of all DPRK nationals earning income in that Member State's jurisdiction that were repatriated over the 12-month period starting from 22 December 2017, including an explanation of why less than half of such DPRK nationals were repatriated by the end of that 12 month period if applicable, and all Member States shall provide final reports by 27 months from 22 December 2017.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 15.

<sup>124</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 4.

<sup>125</sup> See resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 8.

**Annex 94: Preliminary assessment of responses to the Panel's implementation questionnaire**

1. The Panel sent its questionnaire (see annex 92) to UN Member States at the end of November 2022; by mid-January, it had received 23 responses from the following States:

Australia, Benin, Bulgaria, Colombia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Japan, Kiribati, Luxembourg, Moldova, Monaco, Morocco, Palau, Poland, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Seychelles, Singapore, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, United Kingdom and United States.

2. Very few of the reporting Member States had taken executive action on the basis of the Security Council resolutions; the Panel was already aware of almost all of the actions taken by those that reported them (Republic of Korea, Palau, Singapore and the United States). The large majority reported no opportunity to take executive action against sanctions-evading individuals or entities, but also provided detail regarding their legislative preparedness to do so should any sanctions evasion in their territories be detected. All of the responding Member States were up-to-date in notification obligations (question 3a in the questionnaire) and the majority had responded to the Panel's requests for information in a timely and constructive way. Most responding Member States were polite about the value of the Panel's recommendations in its 2022 reports in informing their implementation of sanctions; recommendations on maritime issues, cyber, finance and the updating of export control lists had been implemented according to some reporting Member States.

3. Regarding problems in implementation, two Member States noted a lack of training for officials involved in the implementation of sanctions, as well as the complexity of the DPRK sanctions regime. The difficulty of gathering evidence of sanctions evasion to the standards required by law was noted by another. One Member State noted difficulties with coding and customs issues. These comments are likely to inform the recommendations in future Panel reports.

4. The Panel is extremely grateful to those Member States which have already responded to the 2022 implementation questionnaire. The Panel requires much more data in order fully to assess the global state of implementation and looks forward to further responses.

## Annex 95: Consolidated list of recommendations

### Maritime

#### 1. The Panel recommends that the various parties engaging in vessel sales adhere to the following best practice:

- (i) **Prior to contract signing:**
  - Ensure transactions occur through accredited domestic ship brokers;
  - Verify the vessel's final/end destination and the identity of the contracting party (e.g. shipping company and ship charterer);
  - Verify the identity of the transacting partner's broker as well as information of the party's past transaction records;
  - Keep proper records of all documentation and due diligence verification processes throughout the transaction.
- (ii) **Upon entering a contract:**
  - Validate all information, contact details and identity of the vessel's consignee (vessel recipient);
  - Seek a statement of confirmation affirming the compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions (Statement(s) and clause(s) could be entered as additional clauses to the contract);
  - Exercise a risk-based approach and refrain from transactions with counterparties that cannot be expected to fulfil such a contractual obligation.
- (iii) **Following hand-over of vessel:**
  - Commit buyer to update the relevant authorities and the IMO of its purchase / ownership;
  - Submit to the IMO updated information on the vessel sale and ownership change, and verify it on the IMO GISIS website;
  - Alert the relevant national authorities where there could be potential cause for sanctions evasion including turning off the AIS signal.

#### 2. The Panel recommends that the Committee designate the following DPRK vessels pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 2397 (2017) that prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of all new and used vessels:

- (i) **RAK WON 1 (IMO: 8355786)**
- (ii) **SA HYANG SAN 1 (IMO: 9054779)**
- (iii) **SO BAEK SU (IMO: 9054767)**
- (iv) **MO RAN BONG 2 (IMO: 8357112)**
- (v) **SONGRIM (IMO: 8594540)**
- (vi) **RAK NANG 2 (IMO: 8594552)**
- (vii) **CHOL BONG SAN 1 (IMO: 9125308)**
- (viii) **TAE DONG MUN 2 (IMO: 8356120)**
- (ix) **SIN PHYONG 5 (IMO: 8865121)**
- (x) **SU RYONG SAN (IMO: 9016430)**
- (xi) **TAE PHYONG 2 (IMO: 8602763)**
- (xii) **MU PHO (IMO: 8651178)**
- (xiii) **UN HUNG (IMO: 9045962)**
- (xiv) **KANG HUNG (IMO: 9340257)**

- (xv) RA SON 6 (IMO: 9340271)
- (xvi) XIN HAI (IMO: 7636638)
- (xvii) TAE DONG MUN (IMO: 9011399)
- (xviii) TO MYONG (IMO: 9162318)
- (xix) TAE PHYONG (IMO: 9018751)
- (xx) PUK DAE BONG (IMO: 9020003)
- (xxi) SF BLOOM aka PU YANG 2 (IMO: 8891297)

**3. The Panel recommends the Committee designate the following vessels pursuant to the following relevant Security Council resolutions:**

- (xxii) HENG XING (IMO: 8669589), pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 2397 (2017) and to paragraph 5 of resolution 2397 (2017) that prohibits the illicit unreported transfer of refined petroleum to the DPRK
- (xxiii) ANNI aka KYONG SONG 3 (IMO: 8356584), pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 2397 (2017) and to paragraph 11 of resolution 2375 (2017) that prohibits any facilitation or engagement in ship-to-ship transfer with DPRK vessels of any goods or items that are supplied, sold or transferred to or from the DPRK

**4. The Panel reiterates its recommendations for designation of the following “direct delivery” vessels:**

- (xxiv) NEW KONK (IMO: 9036387), pursuant to paragraphs 5 of resolution 2397 (2017) and 11 of resolution 2375 (2017)
- (xxv) UNICA (IMO: 8514306), pursuant to paragraphs 5 of resolution 2397 (2017) and 11 of resolution 2375 (2017)

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## Trade and Customs

5. **The Panel reiterates its recommendation that appropriate measures be taken by the International Organization for Standardization and Member States, including outreach activities to respective customs authorities, to prevent erroneous usage of country codes.**
6. **The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States streamline their export and import control lists, using as supporting material the informal list of prohibited commodities.**
7. **The Panel reiterates its recommendation that customs authorities of Member States use the above-mentioned list to inform trading agents in their jurisdictions for due diligence purposes, in particular when dealing with such commodities in the vicinity of sanctioned jurisdictions such as the DPRK.**
8. **The Panel reiterates its recommendation, with regards to the Member States requiring assistance with the issue of the sectoral ban, that the Committee consider information outreach.**

## Implementation of Luxury Goods Ban

9. **The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States consider updating their export control lists to reflect their lists of prohibited luxury goods in a manner consistent with the objectives of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016) and 2321 (2016), avoiding unnecessary broadening of their scope in order not to restrict the supply of unprohibited goods to the civilian population or have a negative humanitarian impact once trade resumes.**
10. **The Panel reiterates its recommendation that Member States encourage their business entities and nationals exporting luxury goods to include a contractual provision to prevent trans-shipment to the DPRK.**



## Finance

11. The Panel recommends the designation of the following individual for his role in and support for the prohibited weapons programme in accordance with paragraph 27 of resolution 2094 (2013) and paragraph 43 of resolution 2270 (2016) : General Ri Chang Ho (리창호), the Director of the RGB, an organization whose cyber units (known as Lazarus Group, Kimsuky, Andariel etc.) are continuously engaged in the illicit generation of revenue and acquisition of sensitive information. The RGB was designated in March 2016.
12. The Panel emphasises its previous recommendations:
  - that Member State agencies, as well as financial institutions, businesses and virtual asset service providers, devote appropriate attention to increased cyberhygiene by requiring all cryptocurrency users attempting access to a cryptocurrency exchange to set a higher default threshold, such as a two-factor authentication of transaction;
  - that Member States implement as soon as possible the Financial Action Task Force guidance on virtual assets, which seeks to prevent financing of weapons of mass destruction proliferation by placing anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism financing requirements on these assets and virtual asset service providers;
  - that any entity suffering a cyberattack report this to and engage with the proper legal authorities as soon as possible, issue a public announcement of the incident and engage with agencies relevant to the event, including blockchain analysis firms, to increase the prospects for recovery of some stolen assets.
13. The Panel recommends that Member States consider national legislation that establishes directives for cyber security that enforce “know your customer” protocols and tighten procedures for virtual asset service provider registration.
14. The Panel recommends that Member States strengthen cooperation, facilitate dialogue, and enhance information-sharing especially in their geographic region, to address the growing intelligence and financial threat of cybercrime. This would include:
  - information-sharing on threats with other financial institutions through organisations such as the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (<https://www.fsisac.com>);
  - cybersecurity training for financial institutions conducted by a number of organisations such as UNODC, FATF, and various cyber firms.

## Unintended Humanitarian Effects of Sanctions

15. The Panel recommends that the Committee consider renewable and standing exemptions for humanitarian aid actors and humanitarian-related commodities.
  16. The Panel emphasises the urgency of re-establishing a durable banking channel to allow the sustainable resumption of humanitarian operations in DPRK.
  17. The Panel values the biannual briefings by the relevant United Nations agencies on the unintended impact of sanctions and recommends that the Committee continue this practice.
  18. The Panel reiterates its recommendations that the Security Council continues to address issues and processes that mitigate the potential unintended adverse impact of sanctions on the civilian population of the DPRK and on humanitarian aid operations.
  19. The Panel recommends that the Committee and other relevant stakeholders practically consider the idea of exempting selected exports currently under sanctions, the proceeds of which might be used to finance humanitarian supplies.
  20. The Panel recommends that the Committee consider more active outreach with civil society providing humanitarian assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to help implement resolution 2664 (2022), including providing input to the preparation of the Secretary General's report.
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