



Domestic conflict: a proposed index and its implications for Arab States



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Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

Domestic conflict: a proposed index and its implications for Arab States



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Introduction

Conflict is a polymorphous phenomenon that can take various forms. The context, scale and duration of conflicts can vary wildly and they can therefore be studied from various perspectives. The word “conflict” is of Latin origin, meaning “fought or struck together”.¹ It is often associated with conflicting interests between two or more groups as well as hostile and antagonistic feelings and frustrations, especially when involving thwarted interests. If conflicts are left unaddressed, they can lead to or exacerbate violence.

Conflict can arise at the individual or group level, including at the level of organizations or States, and can involve more than two warring parties. For the purpose of this paper, the authors focus on conflicts occurring within a country’s borders and not on its engagement in proxy wars; nonetheless, the authors acknowledge that the involvement in proxy wars also has adverse repercussions on a country’s development outlook and its allocation of resources towards development. Internal conflicts themselves can be local in scope, affecting only a specific territory of the country, or can spread nationwide.

There is no generally accepted definition of conflict among social scientists. Two conceptual limitations explain that lack of consensus. First, given its multifaceted and interdisciplinary nature, by any definition, conflict is an over-determined phenomenon. Second, the interdisciplinary aspects of conflict are highly complex and often difficult to quantify, as they

include struggles over values, and/or claims to scarce status (Coser, 1967) or struggles among parties aspiring towards incompatible or competitive means or ends due to factors inherent to governance systems or societal arrangements (Miller, 2005).

Wallensteen (2002) identifies three general forms of conflict: inter-State, internal, and State-formation conflicts. Inter-State conflicts are disputes between nation States or violations of the inter-State system of alliances. Examples of internal and State-formation conflicts include civil and ethnic wars, anti-colonial struggles, secessionist and autonomous movements, territorial conflicts, and battles over control of government. The rise in frequency and intensity of internal conflicts contributes to the expanding nature, sophistication and complexity of the study of conflict. The increasing number of conflicts in which one or several actors are non-State groups adds another layer of complexity at the conceptual and analytical levels.

In all its forms, conflict matters to the question of development, as articulated in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. As asserted in Draman (2003), “When a conflict turns into open combat with at least 25 battle-related deaths per year, then it is described as armed conflict”, while Ikejiaku emphasizes that armed conflicts often lead to complete economic paralysis, immense social costs and trauma, political quagmires and State disintegration, as well as serious environmental degradation.

¹ For further details regarding the etymology of the term, see: www.lexico.com/en/definition/conflict.

In the past half-decade, the world has witnessed an upsurge in the number of conflicts. Many conflicts have escalated into prolonged and lethal struggles fought on a massive-scale and with a significant detrimental socioeconomic impact. This is particularly the case for conflicts involving external parties. According to the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 52 active conflicts were fought in 2018 in 36 different countries, an increase over 2017 (50 conflicts in 33 countries) and a significant rise compared to 10 years previously. Six of these 52 conflicts were classified as wars (claiming at least 1,000 lives in a year) and were fought in four countries, namely Afghanistan, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. Together, those six wars accounted for some 82 per cent of total recorded conflict-related casualties. Nonetheless, a reduction in conflict casualties was recorded in 2018, which were some 23 per cent lower than in 2017 and some 49 per cent lower than in 2014.). PRIO underscores that numerous low-level armed conflicts, namely conflicts that do not result in annual casualties in excess of 1000 individuals, could potentially escalate and pose a serious threat to development (Strand and others, 2019). Currently, some 163 million people live in countries suffering conflict or occupation in the Middle East and North Africa region. These countries include Iraq, Libya, the State of Palestine, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.²

Conflicts often have a devastating impact on countries' socioeconomic development, including on health, education and living standards, and are likely to exacerbate macroeconomic imbalances, intensify existing challenges such as youth unemployment and gender inequality, worsen threats to social

cohesion, and give rise to new challenges such as illegal migration flows and increased poverty. Indeed, the potential impact of conflict on human development is far more severe than its potential impact on economic growth and physical assets. As of January 2021, 60.8 million people in the seven conflict-affected States in the region, namely Iraq, Libya, the State of Palestine, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, are in need of some form of humanitarian assistance.³ In that regard, it should be underscored that two of the most significant global humanitarian crises are taking place in the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, both of which have witnessed a significant reduction in living standards and reversals in development. (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (OCHA) (2019). Deteriorating health indicators, including a decline in life expectancy and an increase in infant and child mortality rates have been reported. This is due, inter alia, to the large numbers of direct conflict casualties, damaged and destroyed health facilities and insufficient numbers of health personnel, and the indirect repercussions of war on health, such as the spread of disease and extreme food insecurity. Moreover, the risk that the conflicts in the region will affect multiple generations has risen as young people and children continue to be deprived of their basic needs and educational and employment opportunities. Hence the social costs of the conflicts are likely to rise significantly in the coming years, and even once conflict comes to an end. The wars in those countries have also resulted in a sharp contraction in economic activity and mass displacements of civilian populations. In turn, this has led to soaring unemployment and poverty rates. Abu-Ismaïl and Al-Kiswani (2018) suggest that extreme poverty in the Arab region

² Calculations by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) using data contained in Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects*, 2019.

³ Calculations by ESCWA on the basis of data contained in the 2021 Humanitarian Response Plans for the seven countries mentioned.

has been on the rise since 2013, mainly as a result of the increasing numbers and intensity of conflicts in the region.

Against this backdrop, the main objective of the present paper is to fill a measurement gap by proposing a domestic conflict index that can be used by policymakers and other interested parties to assess the most direct and devastating impact of conflict, namely its toll on people. The aim is not to give a comprehensive assessment of all aspects of conflict, which in any case would be a futile endeavour, but rather to offer a simple assessment of the order of magnitude of the human impact of conflict, its intensity and dynamics over time. To minimize the influence of subjective assessments, the index is not informed by any indicators that are

based on expert opinions, such as those that inform the World Bank Worldwide Governance Index. Instead, it assesses a country's level of internal conflict on the basis of simple and easily quantifiable indicators, namely the frequency of domestic conflicts, loss of life and forced displacement.

The remainder of the present paper is divided into four sections. The second section discusses the regional context in Arab countries and reviews ongoing conflicts and their impact on human development. The third section presents the authors' conceptual framework and methodology; the fourth section presents and interprets the empirical results, while the last section of the paper sets out a number of conclusions.

1. The Arab regional context

The Arab region has been seriously affected by numerous longstanding conflicts, including the seven-decade occupation by Israel of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and other Arab territories, the Lebanese civil war and three major wars in the Arabian Gulf.⁴ Since the onset of Arab uprisings in 2011, however, violence in the Arab region has intensified and regional States are increasingly embroiled in domestic and cross-border conflicts spurred on by complex geopolitical conflict drivers, including governance deficits, human rights abuses, and struggles over identity and the control of scarce resources. Conflict has reversed many of the development gains achieved in the early 2000s. Table 1 shows the accumulated reduction in Human

Development Index (HDI) scores relative to a no-conflict scenarios in five Arab countries that have been affected by high-intensity conflicts since 2011.

As shown in table 1, conflict has significantly affected development in countries with large-scale conflicts. Relative to a no-conflict scenario, the accumulated cost of conflict in Syria and Yemen amounts to a near 24 and 17.4 per cent loss in its HDI value, respectively. Had those two countries remained on their pre-conflict development paths, the Syrian Arab Republic may now have been approaching the high human development group while Yemen may have firmly established its position within the medium human development group.

Table 1. Human Development Index (HDI) scores and the accumulated HDI loss compared with a no-conflict scenario in five conflict-affected Arab countries


| | Average HDI growth 2000–2010 | HDI in 2010 | HDI in 2019 | HDI in 2019 in a no-conflict scenario | Accumulated reduction in HDI score relative to a no-conflict scenario (percentage) |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| Libya | 0.23 | 0.798 | 0.724 | 0.815 | 11.12 |
| State of Palestine ^a | 0.83 | 0.684 | 0.708 | 0.737 | 3.89 |
| Sudan | 1.53 | 0.469 | 0.51 | 0.538 | 5.13 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 1.14 | 0.672 | 0.567 | 0.744 | 23.81 |
| Yemen | 1.32 | 0.506 | 0.47 | 0.569 | 17.42 |

Source: Authors' calculations on the basis of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Data Database (1998–2019) (accessed on May 2021).

^a For the State of Palestine average annual growth is computed for the period 2004–2010 due to lack of data prior to 2004. Somalia is not included due to the unavailability of HDI data.

⁴ The Iran-Iraq War, 1980–1988; the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, 1990–1991; and the invasion of Iraq by the United States of America in 2003.

Figure 1. HDI for Arab countries 2000–2019 and extrapolated HDI trends under pre-conflict scenarios for the period 2010–2019



Source: Authors' calculations on the basis of the UNDP Human Development Data Database (1998–2019) (accessed on May 2021). For the State of Palestine, average annual growth is computed for the period 2004–2010 due to lack of data prior to 2004. Somalia is not included due to the unavailability of HDI data. Note: all League of Arab States member countries have been included, with the exception of Somalia due to the unavailability of HDI data. The Arab region average in 2000 also does not include Lebanon or the State of Palestine due to the unavailability of HDI data for that year. Five Arab countries are classified as conflict-affected countries in the post 2011 period, namely Libya, the State of Palestine, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. For each country, a no-conflict scenario was used as a basis for calculating HDI scores to estimate where they would presently rank had they remained on their pre-conflict development trajectories, with HDI scores increasing at the same annual rate as during the 2000–2010 period.

In fact, as shown in figure 1, had these five conflict-affected Arab countries maintained the pre-conflict human development trajectories that they had established between 2000 and 2010, the Arab region might have achieved an HDI score of almost 0.7 in 2019. Instead, the region's HDI score has stagnated at an estimated 0.684. Moreover, those estimates are quite conservative, as current statistics do not capture the full impact of a generation of unschooled children or the real opportunity cost of diverting economic resources from human development to military expenditure. Furthermore, conflicts in Arab countries and their repercussions are not confined to national borders. Multiple spillover effects have been recorded across the region. One such effect is the massive cross-border movement of refugees. In some countries, and especially in Lebanon and Jordan, those

movements not only put enormous pressure on the host country's economic and social infrastructure, but could also trigger political unrest (ESCWA, 2015).

In short, conflict and violence create an unconducive environment for the achievement of development objectives. Quite the contrary, and as illustrated in table 2, conflict erodes institutional capacities, infrastructure and human capital. As such, it is no surprise that the humanitarian outlook for the seven Arab conflicted-affected countries is bleak. Indeed, for those countries, high levels of violence, deficits in governance and development and increased socioeconomic deprivation are significant sources of risk, while the precarious situations of their populations have been further exacerbated by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.⁵

⁵ For further information regarding the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Arab countries, see: ESCWA, *COVID-19, Conflict and Risks in the Arab Region Ending Hostilities and Investing in Peace* (E/ESCWA/CL6.GCP/2020/TP.6) (2020). Available at cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/cic-escwsa-covid-19-conflict-risks-arab-region-english.pdf.

Table 2. Components of the INFORM Index for Risk Management, 2021

| Country | Iraq | Libya | Sudan | Syrian Arab Republic | Yemen | State of Palestine | Somalia |
|---|------|-------|-------|----------------------|-------|--------------------|---------|
| Earthquake | 5.4 | 1.9 | 0.1 | 7.8 | 2.1 | 5.2 | 1.6 |
| Flood | 9.5 | 2.6 | 8 | 5.2 | 4.8 | 1.8 | 7.5 |
| Tsunami | 0 | 7.3 | 0 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 8.1 |
| Tropical cyclone | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Drought | 5.3 | 5 | 6.1 | 7.2 | 4.7 | 0 | 10 |
| Epidemic | 6.9 | 3 | 6.1 | 5.5 | 6.9 | 4.3 | 6.3 |
| Projected conflict risk | 9.9 | 9.8 | 10 | 9.7 | 10 | 5.6 | 10 |
| Current highly-violent conflict intensity | 9 | 10 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 7 | 10 |
| Development and deprivation | 4.9 | 3.5 | 8.6 | 6.3 | 8.8 | 3.2 | 9.7 |
| Inequality | 4.2 | 2.3 | 4.9 | 7.3 | 6.5 | 2.2 | x |
| Economic dependency | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 10 | 5.1 | 8.2 | 8.5 |
| Uprooted people | 9 | 9.1 | 9.6 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Other vulnerable groups | 2.2 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 2.1 | 5.5 | 1.8 | 7.9 |
| Disaster risk reduction | 8.4 | x | 4.9 | 4.6 | 8.5 | 5.8 | x |
| Governance | 7.8 | 8.5 | 8.3 | 8.5 | 9 | 6.5 | 9.3 |
| Communication | 4 | 5.6 | 6.1 | 4.4 | 6.2 | 2.5 | 8 |
| Physical infrastructure | 3.5 | 3.3 | 8.3 | 2.7 | 7.2 | 0.3 | 7.8 |
| Access to health care | 5.6 | 3.5 | 5.9 | 6.3 | 6.9 | 0.2 | 9.6 |

Source: INFORM Index for Risk Management, 2021 Database, accessed on 21 May 2021. Note: Colours denote ascending scale of risk, with green representing a lower level of risk and red the highest level of risk.


Furthermore, ongoing conflicts and growing socioeconomic challenges pose a serious risk for the region's prospects and put it at risk of further conflict in the near future. For example, the human hazard risk,⁶ which is calculated by assessing current conflict intensity and the probability of future conflict, captures the threat posed by the region's high incidence of active violent conflicts. Seven out of the 22 Arab countries fall within the "very high" risk category for current violent conflict intensity, and one (the State of Palestine) within the "high" category, reflecting the ongoing risk posed by the high incidence of violence and

political instability. "Very high" and "high" risk countries are home to roughly 60 per cent of the region's total population. The high probability of future conflict therefore poses a significant risk for the Arab region. A similar grim outlook is depicted when examining the projected conflict risk measured by the Global Conflict Risk Index, which assesses a country's probability of experiencing violent conflict in the subsequent 1–4 years, taking into account a range of relevant political, security, social, economic and geographical/environment-related factors that affect a country's probability of conflict.⁷

⁶ Human made hazards can either stem from technological factors such as industrial accidents or sociological phenomena such as civil war, social unrest, high-intensity crime or terrorism. The infoRM index includes two quantitative variables on human-made disasters that relate to violent conflict and capture the impact of conflict in terms of displacement and the destruction of infrastructure.

⁷ Joaquin Salido Marcos, "Understanding the Drivers of Risk in the Arab region: A baseline risk assessment for the Arab region," technical paper, page 11 (forthcoming).

Figure 2. Forcibly displaced persons in selected Arab conflict-affected countries, 2019



Source: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) *Global Trends in Forced Displacement in 2019* (2019) and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Population Division *World Population Prospects 2019* (2019).

Particularly noteworthy is the projected conflict risk, which remains high in those seven conflict- or occupation-afflicted countries. Also noteworthy, and as illustrated in figure 2, is the catastrophic number of forcibly displaced people. Home to 24 million refugees and internally displaced persons, the Arab region is, in fact, at the epicentre of the world's forced displacement crisis. For example, in 2019, there were more than 6 million Syrian refugees, while roughly the same number of Syrians were internally displaced within their country. Needless to say, the high risks of conflict described above will impede the return of many forcibly displaced individuals to their homes.

The massive forced displacement crisis remains a key indicator of the prevalence of conflict and instability. As articulated by Walker and others (2016), when States exhibit a lack of progress in improving living conditions, it can lead to greater political instability and conflict and increase the growing number of refugees and internally displaced persons. Not only does

displacement signify instability but it can also cause instability: In that regard, Walker and others (2016) argue that the displacement of more than a million Syrians internally due to severe droughts prior to the start of the civil war may have contributed to the start of armed conflict in 2011.

The dynamics of conflict in the Arab region are particularly daunting given that the actors involved are unusually fragmented, making peace negotiations or humanitarian development action extremely difficult, if not impossible, in many countries. In addition, many violent non-State actors, including Al-Qaida and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, are driven by "exclusivist" or "eliminationist" ideologies. Reaching an understanding with such groups and their affiliates is often not possible. Furthermore, atrocities and human rights abuses committed by any party to a conflict make an end to violence very difficult. Atrocities and abuses can, in fact, further radicalize armed parties and their followers.

The authoritarian legacy of most Arab countries in conflict has also undermined the development of a vibrant and active civil society that could facilitate reconciliation and the provision of humanitarian and development assistance. More importantly, the collapse, fragmentation or weakness of State institutions has long-term security, humanitarian and development implications; populations in States in conflict have limited access to essential services, including security, while large areas fall outside the control of the State and may become fertile ground for the development of war economies and the trade in illicit goods. Armed groups in those areas often fight among themselves for access to and control over resources and the civilian inhabitants of those areas are often subject to extortion by non-State actors and are at risk of falling victim to acts of terrorism. Finally, geopolitics, and particularly competition among international and regional powers, has historically exacerbated domestic conflict. This is of particular concern as foreign involvement in regional conflicts has, if anything, become more direct and overt over the last decade.

A number of researchers, including Dobbins and others (2013) and Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) recognize the determinative role that

external factors can play in protracted conflict. Civil wars often end quickly once external patrons decide to end their support for local fighters (Connable and Libicki, 2010).⁸ The current conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and Libya are cases in point. Foreign powers have used proxies as tools for their strategic goals, often at the expense of the well-being of local populations. Foreign-backed proxies have fought to promote a range of ideologies or to gain access to strategic rents that can sustain their local power structures. The fragmentation of armed actors, exclusivist ideologies, human rights abuses, geopolitics and the weakness or absence of local peace assets, coupled with weak State institutions mean that the prospects for reconciliation and peaceful transition remain bleak. A likely scenario is that many tensions remain unresolved and there will be sporadic episodes of intense violence. Metrics associated with conflict frequency or battle-related deaths are insufficient to capture the protracted nature of conflict, and hence the number of internally displaced persons and refugees is used as an indicator for the proposed index. Those who have been forcibly displaced are unlikely to return to their homes should tensions or insecurity persist. Sadly, it is likely that violence and conflict will continue and remain a human hazard.

⁸ For further information, see: www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/publications/files/trends-impacts-issue4-protracted-conflict-development-arab-region-english.pdf.

2. Conceptual framework

As explained in the previous section, rallying efforts to resolve conflicts and prevent their escalation is a compelling priority for the Arab region. Such efforts must also lie at the heart of efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly Goal 16, on promoting peaceful and inclusive societies. Assessing and monitoring conflict dynamics is a prerequisite for achieving that objective. In this section, we focus on how to assess domestic conflict levels using the proposed domestic conflict index.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program identifies three types of armed conflict within a country, namely State-based, non-State based and one-sided violence. A State-based armed conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a State, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.” A non-State conflict is defined as “the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a State, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.” One-sided violence is defined as “the deliberate use of armed force by the government of a State or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year.” Extrajudicial killings in custody are excluded”. That distinction captures the different forms of organized and unorganized conflicts and State-versus non-State-based conflicts. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program also defines conflict based on its intensity using battle-related deaths as a proxy, and classifies them into two categories: (a) *minor conflicts*, claiming at least

25 but less than 1,000 battle-related deaths in one calendar year and (ii) *wars*, claiming at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.

Each of the aforementioned types of conflict has its own particular characteristics, yet all forms of conflict have dire consequences: they exacerbate human suffering, severely undermine economic and social infrastructure, and impede inclusive and sustainable development. The proposed index therefore considers conflict more broadly as an expression of the lack of peace and as the epitome of the extreme spectrum of instability. In our investigation of domestic conflict levels, we thus take into consideration any occurrence of the three types of conflict, as defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, while also taking into consideration the magnitude of individual conflicts.

Beyond defining conflict, it is also important to consider how to best measure such a multifaceted concept. A serious challenge is limited data availability and quality in periods of conflict, given the numerous obstacles that impede the collection of statistics. Obstacles include the high risks and costs entailed in data collection, difficulties in covering hard-to-reach and besieged areas, and the impaired functionality of facilities such as hospitals, leading to unreliable documentation and measurement of health outcomes. Systematic record keeping is also hindered by the absence of the rule of law and security concerns that may preclude prevent or impede reporting. Data limitations may also be amplified in poorer countries suffering the effects of conflict.

In the light of those challenges, focusing on direct, quantifiable and observable aspects of conflict provides a more reliable assessment of conflict and its intensity. The authors therefore propose a domestic conflict index that focuses on key manifestations of conflict, while acknowledging that figures should be treated with caution given the aforementioned uncertainties and limitations. The index does not attempt to provide a comprehensive assessment of all aspects of conflict and its related costs; but rather attempts to provide a preliminary assessment of conflict and its intensity and trace its dynamics over time. Moreover, the authors' approach, which relies solely on quantifiable indicators instead of indicators based on expert assessments, eliminates the subjectivity biases that may be introduced by experts and researchers.

In essence the framework for the index centres around the value of human life. It is informed by two indicators. The *conflict score* indicator measures the frequency of internal conflict in a given year, adjusted for its intensity. While various methods can be used to measure the intensity of a conflict, the index takes into account the number of deaths due to conflict and violence as a proxy for the magnitude of conflict, along the lines of the approach adopted by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. The authors acknowledge, however, that death estimates do not capture the full magnitude and scope of conflict and that data on deaths might also have its limitations. Scholars who have examined conflict using a representative variable approach⁹ instead of indices have mostly relied on deaths due to conflict (see, for example, Tanter, 1966; Hibbs 1973).

The severity and the duration of conflict are also reflected in the second indicator used to inform the index, namely the *forcibly displaced population as a share of the total population*, as the majority of those who survive are either displaced internally or seek safety and protection abroad. Challenges related to the return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees remain an ongoing aspect of conflict, particularly in terms of its continuation or resolution. It is noteworthy in that regard that conflict dynamics in the Arab region mean that many wars are protracted or open ended, further obstructing the return of the forcibly displaced.

A score between 1 and 5 is given for each of the two indicators, with lower scores meaning that the phenomenon being measured is less intense and higher scores meaning that they are more intense. Further details regarding the definitions, sources, and band scores for each indicator is provided in Annex 1 to the present report. The overall conflict index score is an equally weighted average of the two indicators. Index scores have been computed for the 95 countries for which sufficient data was available.

The approach adopted in the formulation of the proposed domestic conflict index is very similar to that adopted in the formulation of the Global Peace Index, developed by the Institute for Economics & Peace, a global think tank headquartered in Sydney, Australia. The latter index providing a broad measure of countries' levels of peace using three aspects of peacefulness, namely: ongoing domestic and international conflict; societal safety and security; and militarization. Those aspects inform both qualitative and

⁹ A representative variable means the variable loading the highest on a dimension.

quantitative indicators.¹⁰ As illustrated in figure 3A, the proposed domestic conflict index, though simpler to calculate, is relatively well correlated with the Global Peace Index.

Another indicator with which the proposed domestic conflict index correlates well is the World Bank Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism indicator, as illustrated in figure 3B. That indicator informs the Bank's Worldwide Governance Index, which measure six broad dimensions of governance.¹¹ The proposed domestic conflict index will offer advantages compared to that indicator in that the latter is based on expert opinions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism.

It is also interesting to review the correlation between the proposed domestic conflict index with the Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators (WMO). The WMO variables are again based on experts' perceptions and measure risks stemming from protests and riots, terrorism, inter-State war and civil war, including the risks of property damage, death and injury. As the number of deaths, intensity of conflicts and number of displaced persons are associated

with the risks associated with those non-peaceful activities, the WMO correlates well with the domestic conflict index, as shown in figure 4.


In conclusion, domestic conflict index scores correlate well with the country scores from other conflict-related indices. The proposed domestic conflict index is based solely on quantifiable indicators, however, strengthening its objectivity. The proposed index is, in that respect, similar to the Internal Violence Index, developed by Feindouno, Goujon and Wagner (2016), which relies solely on quantifiable data to assess the levels of fragility and internal violence in a country across four dimensions, namely internal armed conflict, criminality, terrorism, and political violence (i.e., riots, assassinations and purges). Although the Internal Violence Index is a much broader index than the domestic conflict index, which focuses exclusively on direct and quantifiable aspects of conflict, those two indices are closely correlated, as illustrated in figure 5. The relatively high correlation between the domestic conflict index and the other indices mentioned in this section is also expected given that there are informed by many of the same input indicators.

¹⁰ GPI indicators: *Ongoing domestic and international conflict*: Number and duration of internal conflicts; Number of deaths from external organized conflict; Number of deaths from internal organized conflict; Number, duration and role in external conflicts; Intensity of organized internal conflict; Relations with neighbouring countries; *Societal safety and security*: Level of perceived criminality in society; Number of refugees and internally displaced people as a percentage of the population; Political instability; Political Terror Scale; Impact of terrorism; Number of homicides per 100,000 people; Level of violent crime; Likelihood of violent demonstrations; Number of jailed persons per 100,000 people; Number of internal security officers and police per 100,000 people; Militarization: Military expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP); Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people; Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people; Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier (exports) per 100,000 people; Financial contribution to United Nations peacekeeping missions; Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities; Ease of access to small arms and light weapons.


¹¹ Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism variables: *EIU*: Orderly transfers, Armed conflict, Violent demonstrations, Social unrest, International tensions/terrorist threats; *HUM*: Political terror scale; *IJT*: Security risk rating; *IPD*: Intensity of internal conflicts: ethnic, religious or regional, Intensity of violent activities...of underground political organizations, Intensity of social conflicts (excluding conflicts relating to land); *PRS*: Government stability, Internal conflict, External conflict, Ethnic tensions; *WMO*: Protests and riots, Terrorism, Inter-State war, Civil war.

Figure 3. Correlation between the Domestic Conflict Index (DCI) and the Global Peace Index (GPI), and the World Bank Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism indicator (PSI), 2019

A. Correlation with the Global Peace Index




B. Correlation with the Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism indicator




Source: Authors' calculations on the basis of data provided by the Institute for Economics & Peace and contained in the World Bank Worldwide Governance Index database.

Figure 4. Correlation between the proposed domestic conflict index (DCI) and the Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators (WMO), 2019



Source: Authors' calculations. WMO data were retrieved from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Index database.

Figure 5. Domestic Conflict Index (DCI, 2010 data), and Internal Violence Index (IVI, 2012 data)



Source: Authors' calculations. Internal Violence Index data retrieved from Feindouno, Goujon and Wagner (2016).

Finally, to interpret domestic conflict index results effectively, the authors have examined them in parallel with governance and human rights considerations, which are arguably of particular relevance when interpreting index outcomes, especially in the Arab region. While it is important not to underestimate the importance of other factors such as socioeconomic and development conditions, military occupation by a foreign Power or competition for economic and natural resources, such an approach is appropriate given recent literature on the determinants of conflict in the region. The occurrence of political turmoil cannot be predicted solely on the basis of standard economic and development indicators, however. That is particularly evident in the wake of the Arab Spring, in that several countries that underwent a period of significant upheaval, including Egypt, Libya and Tunisia had made appreciable progress in education, health and to a lesser extent gross national income (GNI) per capita by 2010. Nevertheless, those countries suffered from poor governance,

entrenched inequality and limited economic opportunities, all of which were root causes of the unrest that followed but were poorly captured by standard indices (Abu-Ismaïl, Kuncic and Sarangi, 2016). The demonstrations were also a call for increased democracy and freedom, economic opportunities and social justice, as well as accountability and transparency (World Bank, 2015). Good governance, in essence, is associated with reduced inequalities, enhanced social justice and more-inclusive growth, and subsequently lower political unrest (ESCWA, 2015). Accordingly, the authors' examined the correlation between the proposed domestic conflict index with two indices developed by ESCWA in its report entitled Development Challenges (forthcoming), namely the governance index and the human rights and freedom index. The governance index assesses good governance across two key pillars, namely democratic governance and government effectiveness. The democratic governance pillar reflects the quality of the decision-making processes and assesses the

following three elements: rule of law, accountability, and participation. The government effectiveness pillar evaluates the quality and efficiency of public service delivery. The human rights and freedom index complements the governance index and captures elements of political freedoms by considering the following four indicators: harassment of journalists; government

censorship of the media; freedom from political killings; and freedom from torture. Both, the governance index and the human rights and freedom index rely on expert opinion data contained in the Varieties of Democracies database and provide scores between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1 indicating more effective governance and greater freedom.


3. Results

Figure 6 shows that, when looking at all countries, there is a very clear negative correlation between the proposed domestic conflict index and the ESCWA governance index. Negative correlation is also observed for Arab countries, although that correlation is weaker. Interestingly, in both figures the group of countries with relatively low to medium conflict incidence (domestic conflict index scores of between 1.5 and 3) is relatively widely distributed across very low to high governance levels (governance index scores of between 0.2 and 0.8). The same is not true for conflict-free countries (a domestic conflict index score of 1 in figure 6A), which

are clustered in the high to very high governance category.


The same observations broadly apply to the relationship between the proposed domestic conflict index and the ESCWA human rights and freedom index, as illustrated in figure 7. It should be noted, however, that the degree of correlation between those two indices is slightly weaker than the correlation between the proposed domestic conflict index and the governance index for the full dataset, but notably stronger for Arab countries. This suggests that good governance and respect for human rights and freedoms is a prerequisite for the successful eradication of domestic conflict.

Figure 6. Correlation between the proposed domestic conflict index (DCI) and the ESCWA governance index (GI), 2019



Source: Authors' calculations.

Figure 7. Correlation between the proposed domestic conflict index (DCI) and the ESCWA human rights and freedom index (HRFI), 2019



Source: Authors' calculations.

Table 3 sets out the domestic conflict index scores for Arab countries between 2010 and 2019, together with their equivalent scores on the ESCWA governance and human rights and freedom indices. The domestic conflict scores show that, in 2019, three countries, namely Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen reached the maximum score of five and that five countries experienced an increase in conflict. The full list of countries with medium or higher conflict scores is shown in figure 8. Arab region countries constitute one quarter of that group of countries (7 out of 28 countries). Furthermore, numerous studies have shown that governance in the majority of Arab countries remains weak. Indeed, governance has improved in very few Arab countries and has deteriorated in many others, and especially in countries that have been affected by domestic and cross-border conflict since 2010. Along with their poor governance records, the human rights situation

in many Arab countries is worse than in many non-Arab countries with similar levels of income and human capital.

In the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, the two countries that have been most affected by conflict over the past decade, a vicious cycle of deteriorating governance, worsening human rights and intensifying conflict is apparent. Not surprisingly, there was a significant deterioration in the conflict index scores for both countries between 2010 and 2019. Also noteworthy is the fact that out of the fourteen countries in our dataset with deteriorating domestic conflict index scores, two are other Arab countries (Egypt and Libya), and two are non-Arab States in the Middle East and North Africa (Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran). On the other hand, three of the eight countries with improving domestic conflict index scores are Arab countries (Algeria, Iraq and the Sudan).


Table 3. Arab region countries' scores according to the ESCWA governance and human rights and freedom indices, and the proposed domestic conflict index, 2010 and 2019

| | Governance index | | Human rights and freedoms index | | Domestic conflict index | |
|----------------------|------------------|-------|---------------------------------|-------|-------------------------|------|
| | 2010 | 2019 | 2010 | 2019 | 2010 | 2019 |
| Algeria | 0.409 | 0.392 | 0.587 | 0.51 | 3 | 1.5 |
| Djibouti | 0.407 | 0.444 | 0.364 | 0.392 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Egypt | 0.427 | 0.405 | 0.385 | 0.274 | 1.5 | 2.5 |
| Iraq | 0.374 | 0.386 | 0.416 | 0.36 | 5 | 3.5 |
| Lebanon | 0.491 | 0.451 | 0.552 | 0.542 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Libya | 0.269 | 0.264 | 0.242 | 0.426 | 1.5 | 4 |
| Mauritania | 0.439 | 0.445 | 0.689 | 0.644 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Saudi Arabia | 0.436 | 0.476 | 0.292 | 0.273 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Sudan | 0.298 | 0.32 | 0.315 | 0.454 | 5 | 4 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 0.317 | 0.191 | 0.235 | 0.143 | 1.5 | 5 |
| Tunisia | 0.507 | 0.636 | 0.364 | 0.693 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| United Arab Emirates | 0.601 | 0.651 | 0.452 | 0.426 | 1.5 | 1.5 |
| Yemen | 0.309 | 0.158 | 0.424 | 0.243 | 2.5 | 5 |
| Somalia | 0.192 | 0.188 | 0.397 | 0.383 | 5 | 5 |

Source: Authors' calculations. It should be noted that the domestic conflict index figures for 2019 refer to 2019 for all countries with the exception of Djibouti and Lebanon, for which figures for 2018 have been used.


Note: Values marked in red font are imputed based on authors' expert opinion.

Figure 8. Countries with domestic conflict index scores of 2.5 and above (2019)



Source: Authors' calculations.

Figure 9. Changes in domestic conflict index scores (2019 score minus 2010 score)



Source: Authors' calculations.

4. Conclusion

In this paper, the authors propose a domestic conflict index that can be used by policy makers and other relevant stakeholders to assess a country's level of internal conflict. The proposed index is informed by objective and quantifiable data. The index should not be viewed as a means to assess all aspects conflict, including associated costs or root causes. Instead it can be used to conduct a simple assessment of conflict and its intensity on the basis of two indicators, namely a *conflict score*, which assesses the incidence and human toll of conflict, and *forcibly displaced population as a share of the total population*.

The paper first argues the case for these indicators and argues that despite its many limitations, the proposed index is a significant improvement over other indices on conflict, with which there is a significant degree of correlation. Importantly, the proposed index is not informed by subjective expert opinion, which often undermines the credibility in many countries of indices on conflict.

A number of key findings emerge from the domestic conflict index scores for the various countries. Firstly, conflict is strongly associated with governance systems and human rights. Countries with weak governance and human rights protection mechanisms are at increased risk of conflict. Indeed, it may be argued that good governance and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is a necessary precondition for the eradication of domestic conflict. Secondly, despite the aforementioned assertion, not all Arab countries with poor human rights and governance deficits have experienced conflict. Indeed, as was

the case in the Syrian Arab Republic and Libya prior to the start of the domestic conflicts in those countries, many Arab countries continue to enjoy relative stability despite significant governance and human rights deficits. Thirdly, a significant increase in levels of conflict has occurred in the region since 2010. In 2019, three countries, namely Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen reached the maximum score of five on the domestic conflict index while five countries experienced an increase in conflict.

An important observation is the apparent paradox of relative stability of many Arab countries despite their poor governance and human rights records. Studies on the political economy of the region have drawn a number of conclusions to explain that paradox, including that an authoritarian bargain has been struck in many Arab countries, which, in essence, entails the trading of freedoms and democratic governance in exchange for rents and other benefits.

Arab rentier States are ill-equipped to address the multiple challenges they face, including the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources, low levels of decent employment, rising levels of poverty and inequality and several large scale and long-standing conflicts. Policy responses since 2010 have been either to offer additional rents and/or less space for effective dialogue, accountability and governance reforms.¹² Those responses are an extension of the same policies that led to the 2010 uprisings. To address the challenges they face, Arab countries must move beyond short-term fixes to address the root causes of conflict.

¹² United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and Economic Research Forum (2019), Rethinking Inequality in Arab Countries. E/ESCWA/EDID/2019/2.

Annex

Domestic conflict index indicators, methodology and data sources

1. Forcibly displaced population as a share of the total population

Definition: The total number of internally displaced persons and refugees who have been displaced as a result of conflict and violence as a percentage of the total population of their country or territory of origin. The values for a given year are then banded to establish a final country score for this indicator. The approach adopted in the formulation of this indicator is very similar to that adopted in the formulation of the Global Peace Index indicator on forced displacement and similar score bands are used.

Source: Data for internally displaced persons is taken in 2020 from the database compiled by the International Displacement Monitoring Centre. The data is available at www.internal-displacement.org/. Data for refugees by country or territory of origin is taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators database and UNHCR Refugee Data Finder statistics, available at <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/>.

Scoring bands according to share of total population (per cent)

| 1/5 | 2/5 | 3/5 | 4/5 | 5/5 |
|---------|-------------|------------|--------------|---------|
| 0–3.034 | 3.035–6.069 | 6.07–9.104 | 9.105–12.139 | >=12.14 |

2. Conflict score

Definition: The conflict score measures the frequency and the magnitude of conflict in a country in a given year. The indicator accounts for three conflict types: State-based, non-State based and one-sided violence, as defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.

Each individual conflict event/entry in a given year is first scored between 0 and 1 based on the number of direct deaths due to conflict, including both military and civilian fatalities. The preliminary intensity score band at this initial stage is calculated on the basis of guidelines formulated by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program: a conflict is categorized as a war if it claims at least 1,000 lives in a year and is categorized as a minor conflict if it claims at least 25 lives but less than 1,000 lives in a year.

In a second stage, the individual entries in a given year are added and then banded to establish a final country score for this indicator. The approach adopted in the formulation of this indicator is very similar to that adopted in the formulation of the Global Peace Index indicator on the number and duration of internal conflicts, although slight adjustments are made.

Source: The Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset Global Version 20.1. The Dataset is available at ucdp.uu.se/. For death tolls in a given event, use is made of the deaths variable labelled as *best*, defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program as “best estimate, containing the most reliable estimate of deaths identified in the source material”.

Intensity scoring bands according to death toll due to conflict (stage 1)

| 0 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1 |
|-------------|------|--------|------------|-------------|----------|
| No conflict | 0–24 | 25–999 | 1000–4,999 | 5,000–9,999 | >=10,000 |

Scoring bands based on the aggregated score for all individual conflict entries in a given year (stage 2)

| 1/5 | 2/5 | 3/5 | 4/5 | 5/5 |
|-------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------|--------|
| No conflict | > 0 and <=4.75 | >4.75 and <=9.5 | <9.5 and <=14.25 | >14.25 |

Table A.1 Domestic conflict index and the banded scores for its subcomponents, 2010–2019

| Country | Domestic conflict index | | | Banded conflict score indicator | | | Banded forcibly displaced population indicator | | |
|--------------|-------------------------|------|------|---------------------------------|------|------|--|------|------|
| | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 |
| Afghanistan | 4.5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| Algeria | 3 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Angola | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Armenia | .. | 1.5 | 1.5 | .. | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Australia | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Azerbaijan | 2.5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Bangladesh | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Belgium | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Benin | .. | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Brazil | 1.5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Burkina Faso | .. | 2.5 | 3 | .. | 4 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Burundi | .. | 2.5 | 2.5 | .. | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 |

| Country | Domestic conflict index | | | Banded conflict score indicator | | | Banded forcibly displaced population indicator | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------|------|------|---------------------------------|------|------|--|------|------|
| | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 |
| Cameroon | .. | 3 | 3.5 | .. | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Central African Republic | 3 | 5 | 4.5 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 5 |
| Chad | 1.5 | 1.5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Colombia | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 |
| Congo | .. | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Djibouti | 1.5 | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Ecuador | .. | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Egypt | 1.5 | 3 | 2.5 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Ethiopia | 3 | 2.5 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| France | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Georgia | 2.5 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Ghana | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Guinea | 1.5 | .. | 1.5 | 2 | .. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Haiti | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Honduras | 1.5 | .. | 1.5 | 2 | .. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| India | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Indonesia | .. | 1.5 | 1.5 | .. | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Iran (Islamic Republic of) | 1.5 | 1.5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Iraq | 5 | 4 | 3.5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 2 |
| Israel | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Kenya | 2 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 2 | .. | .. | 3 | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Lebanon | 1.5 | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Liberia | .. | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Libya | 1.5 | 3.5 | 4 | .. | 5 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Madagascar | .. | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mali | 1.5 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mauritania | 1.5 | .. | 1.5 | 2 | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 |

| Country | Domestic conflict index | | | Banded conflict score indicator | | | Banded forcibly displaced population indicator | | |
|--|-------------------------|------|------|---------------------------------|------|------|--|------|------|
| | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 |
| Mexico | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Mozambique | .. | 2 | 3 | .. | 3 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Myanmar | 2.5 | 2.5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Nepal | .. | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Niger | .. | 2 | 3 | .. | 3 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Nigeria | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Pakistan | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Papua New Guinea | .. | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Peru | 1.5 | .. | 1.5 | 2 | .. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Philippines | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Russian Federation | 3 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Rwanda | .. | 1.5 | 1.5 | .. | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Saudi Arabia | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | .. | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Senegal | 1.5 | 1.5 | .. | 2 | 2 | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Somalia | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| South Africa | 1.5 | .. | 1.5 | 2 | .. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| South Sudan | .. | 5 | 5 | .. | 5 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 5 |
| Sri Lanka | .. | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Sudan | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 3 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 1.5 | 5 | 5 | .. | 5 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 5 |
| Tajikistan | 1.5 | 1.5 | .. | 2 | 2 | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Tanzania (United Republic of) | .. | 1.5 | 1.5 | .. | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Thailand | 3 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Togo | .. | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Tunisia | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | .. | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Turkey | 2.5 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Uganda | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Ukraine | .. | 3 | 3 | .. | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| United Arab Emirates | 1.5 | .. | 1.5 | 2 | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland | .. | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

| Country | Domestic conflict index | | | Banded conflict score indicator | | | Banded forcibly displaced population indicator | | |
|--|-------------------------|------|------|---------------------------------|------|------|--|------|------|
| | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 |
| Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) | .. | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Yemen | 2.5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 5 |
| Zimbabwe | .. | 1.5 | 1.5 | .. | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Other countries (conflict free) ^a | | | | | | | | | |
| Denmark | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Finland | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Iceland | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Norway | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Sweden | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Switzerland | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Czechia | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Canada | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Netherlands | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Luxembourg | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Germany | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Iceland | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Belgium | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Austria | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Portugal | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| New Zealand | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Japan | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Slovenia | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Singapore | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Australia | 1 | 1 | 1 | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |

Source: Authors' calculations.

^a The 20 countries listed as conflict free are regarded as the most peaceful countries so a value of 1 is assigned for their domestic conflict index. Those 20 countries are also among the top performers on similar indices, including the Global Peace Index.

For Arab countries with missing data, domestic conflict index scores are in red and are imputed based on the authors' expert opinion.

Table A.2 Raw values for domestic conflict index indicators, 2010–2019

| Country | Conflict frequency | | | Conflict-related deaths (best estimate) | | | Internally displaced persons due to conflict | | | Refugees by country of origin | | | Forcibly displaced population (internally displaced persons and refugees) | | |
|----------------------------------|--------------------|-------|-------|--|--------|--------|---|-----------|-----------|-------------------------------|-----------|-----------|---|-----------|-----------|
| | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 | 2010 | 2018 | 2019 |
| Afghanistan | 1 806 | 3 723 | 4 682 | 7 151 | 26 889 | 30 434 | 352 000 | 2 598 000 | 2 993 000 | 3 054 699 | 2 681 267 | 2 727 556 | 3 406 699 | 5 279 267 | 5 720 556 |
| Algeria | 92 | 10 | 9 | 252 | 35 | 15 | | | | 6 665 | 4 186 | 4 519 | 6 665 | 4 186 | 4 519 |
| Angola | 4 | 6 | 11 | 10 | 24 | 26 | | | | 134 851 | 8 243 | 8 176 | 134 851 | 8 243 | 8 176 |
| Armenia | | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 2 | 8 400 | | | 17 554 | 11 040 | 10 962 | 25 954 | 11 040 | 10 962 |
| Australia | | 2 | | | 2 | | | | | 38 | 10 | 20 | 38 | 10 | 20 |
| Azerbaijan | 14 | 17 | 10 | 20 | 16 | 9 | 593 000 | 344 000 | 351 000 | 16 756 | 11 246 | 11 626 | 609 756 | 355 246 | 362 626 |
| Bangladesh | 8 | 20 | 2 | 5 | 28 | 3 | 426 000 | 426 000 | 427 000 | 10 044 | 21 023 | 22 766 | 436 044 | 447 023 | 449 766 |
| Belgium | | 2 | | | 4 | | | | | 81 | 50 | 34 | 81 | 50 | 34 |
| Benin | | | 1 | | | 1 | | 3 500 | 3 700 | 438 | 659 | 721 | 438 | 4 159 | 4 421 |
| Brazil | 2 | 90 | 263 | 4 | 2 349 | 1 296 | | | | 992 | 1 038 | 1 399 | 992 | 1 038 | 1 399 |
| Burkina Faso | | 65 | 221 | | 195 | 1 240 | | 47 000 | 560 000 | 1 141 | 11 447 | 11 733 | 1 141 | 58 447 | 571 733 |
| Burundi | | 38 | 34 | | 94 | 62 | 100 000 | 49 000 | 23 000 | 84 053 | 387 850 | 380 900 | 184 053 | 436 850 | 403 900 |
| Cameroon | | 234 | 239 | | 984 | 858 | | 668 000 | 969 000 | 14 953 | 45 118 | 66 241 | 14 953 | 713 118 | 1 035 241 |
| Central African Republic | 43 | 77 | 58 | 148 | 585 | 476 | 192 000 | 641 000 | 592 000 | 164 902 | 590 858 | 610 152 | 356 902 | 1 231 858 | 1 202 152 |
| Chad | 1 | 12 | 25 | 4 | 168 | 293 | 171 000 | 90 000 | 176 000 | 53 713 | 10 895 | 11 163 | 224 713 | 100 895 | 187 163 |
| Colombia | 88 | 57 | 52 | 442 | 149 | 126 | 5 196 000 | 5 761 000 | 5 576 000 | 395 579 | 138 583 | 189 254 | 5 591 579 | 5 899 583 | 5 765 254 |
| Congo | | | 2 | | | 0 | 7 800 | 107 000 | 134 000 | 20 682 | 13 354 | 12 743 | 28 482 | 120 354 | 146 743 |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 90 | 431 | 416 | 806 | 3029 | 2 393 | 1 700 000 | 3 081 000 | 5 512 000 | 476 691 | 720 302 | 802 974 | 2 176 691 | 3 801 302 | 6 314 974 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 21 | | | 80 | | | 522 000 | 302 000 | 303 000 | 41 748 | 38 316 | 39 351 | 563 748 | 340 316 | 342 351 |

| Country | Conflict frequency | | | Conflict-related deaths (best estimate) | | | Internally displaced persons due to conflict | | | Refugees by country of origin | | | Forcibly displaced population (internally displaced persons and refugees) | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------|-----|-----|---|-------|-------|--|-----------|-----------|-------------------------------|---------|---------|---|-----------|-----------|
| Djibouti | | 1 | | | 6 | | | | | 556 | 2 124 | 2 351 | 556 | 2 124 | 2 351 |
| Ecuador | | | 1 | | | 2 | | | | 859 | 1 424 | 1 644 | 859 | 1 424 | 1 644 |
| Egypt | 1 | 85 | 68 | 1 | 690 | 458 | | 65 000 | 65 000 | 6 906 | 24 850 | 27 416 | 6 906 | 89 850 | 92 416 |
| Ethiopia | 98 | 57 | 33 | 152 | 474 | 256 | 300 000 | 2 137 000 | 1 414 000 | 68 838 | 92 232 | 93 467 | 368 838 | 2 229 232 | 1 507 467 |
| France | | 8 | | | 13 | | | | | 90 | 59 | 50 | 90 | 59 | 50 |
| Georgia | 4 | | | 3 | | | 257 000 | 293 000 | 301 000 | 10 636 | 6 983 | 7 519 | 267 636 | 299 983 | 308 519 |
| Ghana | 1 | | | | | | | 5000 | 230 | 20 176 | 18 071 | 18 432 | 20 176 | 23 071 | 18 662 |
| Guinea | 1 | | 2 | | | 2 | | | | 11 978 | 23 493 | 26 857 | 11 978 | 23 493 | 26 857 |
| Haiti | | 1 | | | | | | | 2 100 | 25 886 | 27 517 | 26 734 | 25 886 | 27 517 | 28 834 |
| Honduras | 6 | | 1 | | | 4 | | 190 000 | 247 000 | 1 301 | 18 857 | 26 351 | 1 301 | 208 857 | 273 351 |
| India | 784 | 476 | 352 | 1 641 | 946 | 1 | | 479 000 | 470 000 | 17 767 | 9 586 | 11 787 | 667 767 | 488 586 | 481 787 |
| Indonesia | | 7 | 9 | | 32 | 1 | | 16 000 | 40 000 | 16 883 | 12 148 | 12 039 | 216 883 | 28 148 | 52 039 |
| Iran (Islamic Republic of) | 12 | 18 | 27 | 101 | 92 | | 0 | | | 68 786 | 129 941 | 128 998 | 68 786 | 129 941 | 128 998 |
| Iraq | 366 | 254 | 246 | 1 851 | 1 430 | 58 | | 1 962 000 | 1 555 000 | 1 683 576 | 372 332 | 336 274 | 4 483 576 | 2 334 332 | 1 891 274 |
| Israel | 36 | 33 | 43 | 64 | 70 | 82 | | | | 1 290 | 492 | 452 | 1 290 | 492 | 452 |
| Kenya | 28 | 68 | 51 | 87 | 163 | 188 | 250 000 | 162 000 | 162 000 | 8 586 | 7 480 | 7 705 | 258 586 | 169 480 | 169 705 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 25 | | | 44 | | | 75 000 | | | 2 748 | 2 934 | 2 963 | 77 748 | 2 934 | 2 963 |
| Lebanon | | 1 | | | 2 | | 75 000 | 11 000 | 7 000 | 15 864 | 5 621 | 5 647 | 90 864 | 16 621 | 12 647 |
| Liberia | | | 1 | | | 1 | 23 000 | | | 70 134 | 5 508 | 5 365 | 93 134 | 5 508 | 5 365 |
| Libya | | 123 | 190 | | 670 | 1 850 | | 221 000 | 451 000 | 2 298 | 13 868 | 16 033 | 2 298 | 234 868 | 467 033 |
| Madagascar | | | 3 | | | 3 | | 2 000 | | 266 | 298 | 298 | 266 | 2 298 | 298 |
| Mali | 2 | 235 | 196 | 28 | 1 281 | 1 210 | | 120 000 | 208 000 | 3 659 | 158 267 | 164 466 | 3 659 | 278 267 | 372 466 |

| Country | Conflict frequency | | | Conflict-related deaths (best estimate) | | | Internally displaced persons due to conflict | | | Refugees by country of origin | | | Forcibly displaced population (internally displaced persons and refugees) | | |
|----------------------|--------------------|-------|-------|---|--------|--------|--|-----------|-----------|-------------------------------|-----------|-----------|---|------------|------------|
| Mauritania | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | 37 721 | 37 050 | 37 423 | 37 721 | 37 050 | 37 423 |
| Mexico | 275 | 598 | 786 | 3 313 | 8 386 | 11 789 | 123 000 | 338 000 | 345 000 | 6 810 | 12 870 | 14 621 | 129 810 | 350 870 | 359 621 |
| Mozambique | | 47 | 121 | | 172 | 575 | | 14 000 | 110 000 | 120 | 57 | 77 | 120 | 1 4057 | 110 077 |
| Myanmar | 50 | 71 | 147 | 185 | 122 | 587 | 446 000 | 401 000 | 457 000 | 415 662 | 1 145 149 | 1 076 825 | 861 662 | 1 546 149 | 1 533 825 |
| Nepal | | | 2 | | | 6 | 50 000 | | | 5 883 | 8 589 | 8 033 | 55 883 | 8 589 | 8 033 |
| Niger | | 24 | 70 | | 179 | 447 | 11 000 | 156 000 | 195 000 | 794 | 2 715 | 3 063 | 11 794 | 158 715 | 198 063 |
| Nigeria | 92 | 525 | 509 | 980 | 3 202 | 2 437 | | 2 216 000 | 2 5830 00 | 15 645 | 276 834 | 295 578 | 15 645 | 2 492 834 | 2 878 578 |
| Pakistan | 962 | 77 | 81 | 7 226 | 464 | 257 | 980 000 | 119 000 | 106 000 | 39 980 | 132 249 | 136 902 | 1 019 980 | 251 249 | 242 902 |
| Papua New Guinea | | | 3 | | | 28 | | 12 000 | 14 000 | 87 | 424 | 475 | 87 | 12 424 | 14 475 |
| Peru | 13 | | 1 | 29 | | 2 | 150 000 | 59 000 | 60 000 | 5 834 | 2 579 | 2 765 | 155 834 | 61 579 | 62 765 |
| Philippines | 119 | 123 | 130 | 372 | 436 | 364 | 15 000 | 301 000 | 182 000 | 965 | 520 | 552 | 15 965 | 301 520 | 182 552 |
| Russian Federation | 245 | 21 | 12 | 481 | 37 | 26 | 78 000 | 2 300 | 1 800 | 111 944 | 61 457 | 62 353 | 189 944 | 63 757 | 64 153 |
| Rwanda | | 3 | 1 | | 11 | 19 | | | | 115 519 | 247 469 | 246 407 | 115 519 | 247 469 | 246 407 |
| Saudi Arabia | | 8 | 3 | | 11 | 3 | | | | 659 | 1 492 | 1 721 | 659 | 1 492 | 1 721 |
| Senegal | 9 | 1 | | 19 | 1 | | 24 000 | 18 000 | 8 400 | 16 255 | 18 208 | 17208 | 40 255 | 36 208 | 25 608 |
| Somalia | 313 | 507 | 426 | 2 722 | 2 500 | 2 221 | 1 500 000 | 2 648 000 | 2 648 000 | 770 143 | 949 637 | 901 596 | 2 270 143 | 3 597 637 | 3 549 596 |
| South Africa | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | | 250 | 374 | 482 | 441 | 374 | 482 | 691 |
| South Sudan | | 155 | 66 | | 1 208 | 639 | | 1 869 000 | 1 352 000 | | 2 285 301 | 2 234 805 | 0 | 4 154 301 | 3 586 805 |
| Sri Lanka | | | 4 | | | 255 | 327 000 | 37 000 | 27 000 | 141 066 | 113 955 | 110 341 | 468 066 | 150 955 | 137 341 |
| Sudan | 94 | 97 | 89 | 1 790 | 461 | 333 | 4 800 000 | 2 072 000 | 2 134 000 | 387 266 | 724 787 | 734 780 | 5 187 266 | 2 796 787 | 2 868 780 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | | 2 717 | 2 242 | | 20 109 | 10 931 | 433 000 | 6 119 000 | 6 495 000 | 18 451 | 6 654 374 | 6 615 249 | 451 451 | 12 773 374 | 13 110 249 |

| Country | Conflict frequency | | | Conflict-related deaths (best estimate) | | | Internally displaced persons due to conflict | | | Refugees by country of origin | | | Forcibly displaced population (internally displaced persons and refugees) | | |
|--|--------------------|-----|-----|---|-------|-------|--|-----------|-----------|-------------------------------|--------|--------|---|-----------|-----------|
| Tajikistan | 21 | 1 | | 98 | 4 | | | | | 574 | 1 695 | 1 987 | 574 | 1 695 | 1 987 |
| Tanzania (United Republic of) | | 1 | 1 | | 1 | 6 | | | | 1135 | 723 | 695 | 1 135 | 723 | 695 |
| Thailand | 155 | 40 | 27 | 218 | 61 | 60 | | 41 000 | 41 000 | 352 | 183 | 171 | 352 | 41 183 | 41 171 |
| Togo | | | 1 | | | 1 | 10 000 | | 2 000 | 18 308 | 8 029 | 8 034 | 28 308 | 8 029 | 10 034 |
| Tunisia | | 6 | 5 | | 7 | 12 | | | 4 | 2 161 | 1 985 | 2 068 | 2 161 | 1 985 | 2 072 |
| Turkey | 64 | 167 | 137 | 204 | 441 | 313 | 1 000 000 | 1 097 000 | 1 099 000 | 146 786 | 68 900 | 83 239 | 1146 786 | 1 165 900 | 1 182 239 |
| Uganda | 1 | 2 | 2 | 74 | 2 | 2 | 166 000 | 32 000 | 32 000 | 6 421 | 7 034 | 7 301 | 172 421 | 39 034 | 39 301 |
| Ukraine | | 153 | 172 | | 243 | 234 | | 800 000 | 730 000 | 25 102 | 93 248 | 59 844 | 25 102 | 893 248 | 789 844 |
| United Arab Emirates | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | 418 | 169 | 155 | 418 | 169 | 155 |
| United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland | | | 3 | | | 4 | | | | 152 | 84 | 69 | 152 | 84 | 69 |
| Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) | | | 8 | | | 11 | | | | 6 697 | 21 047 | 93 239 | 6697 | 21 047 | 93 239 |
| Yemen | 63 | 334 | 176 | 201 | 4 837 | 1 927 | 226 000 | 2 324 000 | 3 635 000 | 2 071 | 31 145 | 36 522 | 228 071 | 2 355 145 | 3 671 522 |
| Zimbabwe | | 2 | 8 | | 4 | 8 | | | | 24 081 | 15 618 | 10 045 | 24 081 | 15 618 | 10 045 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Source: Authors' calculations.

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