



## Security Council

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### Letter dated 10 August 2021 from the Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to our letter dated 18 February 2021 (S/2021/163), France, Germany and the United Kingdom wish to bring to the attention of the Security Council recent actions undertaken by Iran that are inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), regarding Iran's ballistic missile programme.

As the Security Council is aware, paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) states:

Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology, until the date eight years after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action adoption day or until the date on which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submits a report confirming the Broader Conclusion, whichever is earlier.

In forming an assessment of what constitutes a "ballistic missile designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons", we have applied the performance characteristics of the Missile Technology Control Regime category-1 systems. These comprise rocket systems capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km, the recognized minima for the mass of a nuclear warhead and the distance required to ensure self-preservation after delivery. Missile Technology Control Regime category-1 systems are recognized through long-standing international consensus as being the systems of most concern with respect to the delivery capability for a nuclear payload. These criteria have been widely used among members and non-members of the Missile Technology Control Regime, including with respect to implementing obligations under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). "Designed to be capable" in this context means having the capabilities by virtue of technical design, regardless of claimed intent.

According to media reports, on 12 June 2021 Iran once again conducted a flight test of a satellite launch vehicle; this was not made public by Iranian authorities.

In its final report, dated 4 June 2012 (S/2012/395, para. 87), the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1929 (2010) noted that "the Panel reached a consensus that both ballistic missile and space launch programmes shared a great deal of similar materials and technology, including systems for propulsion, control and navigation". The technologies and trials necessary for the conception, fabrication and launch of a satellite launch vehicle are closely related to those required for the development of a long-range ballistic missile or an intercontinental ballistic



missile, which correspond to Missile Technology Control Regime category-1 systems. Actual launches of satellite launch vehicles provide Iran with empirical results that can be used to optimize capabilities related to the development of such missile systems. It is therefore our assessment that launches of satellite launch vehicles amount to launches “using such ballistic missile technology” under paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

In the light of these elements, France, Germany and the United Kingdom assert once again our firm conviction that the above-mentioned activities are inconsistent with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). We are particularly concerned that these launches, which follow activities outlined in our letters of November and December 2018, February, March and November 2019, June 2020 and February 2021, constitute an enduring trend of Iran continuing to advance its ballistic missile capabilities despite the provisions in Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). We further request that the Secretary-General once again report fully and thoroughly in his next report on this resolution.

We would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Barbara **Woodward**  
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom

*(Signed)* Nathalie **Broadhurst**  
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of France

*(Signed)* Günter **Sautter**  
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany

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