

2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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National report of the Russian Federation

The structure of the national report of the Russian Federation to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reflects the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions set out in Part I of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference and includes general categories of issues concerning all three pillars of the Treaty under which the relevant information is reported: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Introduction

The Russian Federation remains committed to achieving common goals in the area of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. We consistently support the strengthening and universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Russia fully complies with its obligations under the Treaty and does not transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons, directly or indirectly.

Russia also in no way assists, encourages or induces any other state that does not possess nuclear weapons to manufacture or acquire in any manner nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or to control such weapons or explosive devices.

Section I: Nuclear disarmament

National security policy, doctrine and actions relating to nuclear weapons

Russia acts responsibly with respect to its international obligations in the area of non-proliferation and nuclear arms control. Strict observance of international treaties and agreements in this sphere is the core principle of Russian foreign policy, reflected in such fundamental documents as the National Security Strategy, the Foreign Policy Concept, and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.



The role of nuclear weapons in ensuring national security is set out in the current Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, dated 25 December 2014. It is strictly defensive in nature and sets rigorous conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. The Doctrine specifies that prevention of a nuclear military conflict as well as of any other military conflict is the basis of the military policy of the Russian Federation. According to the document, the Russian Federation shall reserve the right to use nuclear weapons only in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.

The approaches to nuclear deterrence set out in the Military Doctrine are consistent with the general assessment of the military and political situation in the world, including the list of military risks and military threats to national security.

The approaches to the role of nuclear weapons set out in the Military Doctrine are specified in the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, dated 2 June 2020 (hereinafter – the Basic Principles of State Policy). The document states that our country “takes all necessary efforts to reduce nuclear threat and prevent aggravation of interstate relations, that could trigger military conflicts, including nuclear ones.” It also clearly defines that Russian policy on nuclear deterrence is strictly defensive by nature, and it is aimed at protecting national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.

According to the Russian Military Doctrine, military risk is understood specifically as a state of affairs of the international situation that, under certain conditions, could lead to the emergence of a military threat. The key feature of a military threat, in its turn, is the high degree of readiness of a given state, a group of states or a terrorist organization to resort to military force against Russia and, accordingly, the real possibility of an outbreak of a military conflict.

The external military risks highlighted in the Doctrine include first and foremost:

- The build-up of the power potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), vesting the alliance with global functions carried out in violation of the rules of international law, as well as bringing the military infrastructure of NATO member countries near the Russian borders;
- The undermining of global and regional stability;
- Activities to establish strategic missile defence systems that break the established balance of forces related to nuclear-missile sphere;
- The implementation of the «global strike» concept and the deployment of strategic non-nuclear systems of high-precision weapons;
- The intention of some states to place weapons in outer space.

According to the Doctrine, the destruction of the system of international arms control agreements, together with proliferation in the world of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery means are also factors determining the level of military risk.

The Basic Principles of State Policy enumerates the main military risks that might evolve into military threats (threats of aggression) to the Russian Federation due to changes in the military-political and strategic situation, and that are to be neutralized by implementation of nuclear deterrence. These risks are as follows:

- (a) build-up by a potential adversary of the general purpose forces groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in the territories of the states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies, as well as in adjacent waters;
- (b) deployment by states which consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary, of missile defence systems and means, medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed energy weapons;
- (c) development and deployment of missile defence assets and strike systems in outer space;
- (d) possession by states of nuclear weapons and (or) other types of weapons of mass destruction that can be used against the Russian Federation and/or its allies, as well as means of delivery of such weapons;
- (e) unhindered proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture;
- (f) deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery means in the territories of non-nuclear weapon states.

The main military threats specified in the Doctrine include impediment of the operation of systems of state governance and military command and control of Russia, disruption of the functioning of its strategic nuclear forces, missile attack warning systems and systems of outer space monitoring, nuclear munitions storage facilities, nuclear energy facilities, nuclear and chemical industry facilities, and other potentially hazardous facilities.

Unlike the doctrinal concepts of some countries, the Military Doctrine of Russia and the Basic Principles of State Policy do not designate a specific “enemy” against whom the Russian nuclear capability could be used in the event of aggression by such an enemy. The Russian Federation implements its nuclear deterrence with regard to individual states and military coalitions (blocs, alliances) that consider the Russian Federation as a potential adversary and that possess nuclear weapons and/or other types of weapons of mass destruction, or significant combat potential of general purpose forces.

Under the Doctrine in order to ensure the security of our state and its allies, the basis of the Russian military policy is prevention of nuclear as well as any other military conflict. At the same time the intention is to give priority to the use of political, diplomatic and other non-military means. The use of military force to protect the country’s national interests and the security of its allies is envisaged for only after non-military measures have been exhausted.

According to the Basic Principles of State Policy, compliance with international arms control commitments is one of the main principles of nuclear deterrence for Russia.

Russia is consistently reducing the place and role of nuclear weapons in its defence policy. The Military Doctrine of Russia gives priority to implementation of a set of diplomatic, military and military-technical measures aimed at preventing aggression through non-nuclear means in the framework of the system of non-nuclear, including strategic, deterrence. This is why, in modernizing the Russian Armed Forces, emphasis is placed on non-nuclear means of conducting armed conflict.

The Military Doctrine and the Basic Principles of State Policy set forth the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons with a necessary degree of specification.

It also ensures the level of transparency and clearness with regard to the parameters of nuclear deterrence that is the maximum possible for our country in the current situation.

The Military Doctrine also defines the procedure for taking decision on the use of nuclear weapons: such decision can be taken only by the President of the Russian Federation. The Basic Principles of State Policy reiterates this rule.

The Doctrine and the Basic Principles of State Policy do not provide for any disclaimers that would establish other rules for the use of nuclear weapons depending on the type of their delivery vehicles, basing modes, nuclear warhead yield or specificity of the possible use. They do not provide for the use of nuclear weapons in order to conduct offensive operations or for the purpose to consolidate their results.

In line with the provisions of the Doctrine, our country's commitment to the principles of inter-state relations enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations remains an immutable element of Russian military planning.

In accordance with its doctrinal positions, Russia consistently and strictly complies with all its international obligations in the area of arms control, including treaty rules on reducing the number of nuclear-weapon-delivery vehicles and of warheads attributed to them.

The Russian Military Doctrine reaffirms readiness for equitable international cooperation in the area of defence and the enhancement of military and political cooperation in the interests of building confidence and reducing global and regional military tensions in the world.

The current situation and the reduction of nuclear forces and stockpiles

Recognizing its special responsibility, both as a nuclear Power and as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to meet its disarmament obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Russian Federation continues to strictly comply with international treaties and agreements in this area, including on reductions of strategic offensive arms.

The Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I Treaty) was signed on 31 July 1991. It entered into force on 5 December 1994. Under this Treaty, the Russian Federation was to reduce the number of its strategic delivery vehicles to no more than 1,600 and the number of warheads attributed to those vehicles to no more than 6,000. These obligations were implemented in full and ahead of schedule. The aggregate number of deployed strategic vehicles – intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers – was reduced to 1,136, and the number of warheads attributed to them was reduced to 5,518.

The Moscow Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Strategic Offensive Reductions, signed in 2002, was a further Russian contribution to nuclear disarmament. Under the Treaty, the parties were to reduce the levels of their strategic nuclear warheads by 31 December 2012 to 1,700–2,200, that is, approximately one third of the limit stipulated by the START I Treaty. These obligations were also fulfilled.

The signing on 8 April 2010 of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) was another milestone in nuclear disarmament. The Treaty provides that each party shall reduce and limit its strategic

offensive arms so that, seven years after its entry into force and thereafter, the aggregate numbers do not exceed: 700 for deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers; 1,550 for warheads on them; and 800 for deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

By 5 February 2018 (the control date under the Treaty), the Russian Federation had fulfilled its obligations with regard to strategic offensive arms reduction in full. As at that date, the total strategic offensive arms capacity of the Russian Federation stood at:

- 527 for deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers;
- 1,444 for warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and also nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;
- 779 for deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

As at 1 September 2020, the Russian Federation possessed 510 deployed strategic offensive means of delivery and 1,447 warheads attributed to them under the the New START Treaty. The aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers as at that date was 764.

The Russian Federation consistently advocated for the extension of the the New START Treaty for a period of five years, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XIV of the Treaty. On 26 January 2021, the Russian Federation and the United States of America concluded an Agreement to extend the New START Treaty until 5 February 2026. This Agreement entered into force on 3 February 2021.

The extension of the New START Treaty for a period of five years ensures the appropriate level of mutual transparency for the parties to the Treaty with regard to the strategic offensive arms that fall within its scope. Furthermore, the Russian Federation proceeds from the assumption that the extension of the New START Treaty provides an opportunity to reverse the negative trend associated with deterioration of the situation in the sphere of strategic stability and intends to make use of the time that was thus bought for comprehensive negotiations with the U.S. on the future nuclear-missile arms control taking into account all factors affecting strategic stability, including offensive and defensive weapons, both nuclear and non-nuclear, capable of accomplishing strategic tasks, as well as the emergence of new technologies and weapons.

A significant step towards real nuclear disarmament was the implementation by the Russian Federation of the Treaty On The Elimination Of Medium-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), signed on 8 December 1987. The Treaty made it possible to eliminate two classes of nuclear-missile weapons. In accordance with its provisions, 1,846 medium-range (1,000–5,500 km) and shorter-range (500–1,000 km) ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles and 825 associated missile launchers were completely eliminated. An aggregate number of more than 3,000 nuclear warheads with a total yield of more than 500,000 kilotons were deactivated. Russia has fulfilled its obligations under the Treaty in full.

Following the withdrawal of the U.S. from the INF Treaty on 2 August 2019, the international legal constraints under the Treaty were lifted. Against this

background, the Russian Federation made a unilateral commitment not to deploy medium-range or shorter-range ground-launched missiles in the relevant regions unless similar missiles manufactured by the U.S. were deployed in those regions. The Russian Federation calls upon the U.S. and its allies to take similar commitments with a view to preventing a missile race and ensuring additional restraint and predictability with regard to nuclear-missile sphere.

On 26 October, 2020, the Russian Federation took an important additional step in this area. In the “Statement on additional steps to de-escalate the situation in Europe after the termination of the INF Treaty”, the President of the Russian Federation, reiterating the initiative on reciprocal moratoria, invited all parties concerned to consider specific options of reciprocal verification measures to remove existing concerns.

The Russian Federation has significantly, by several times, reduced by the quantity of its non-strategic nuclear weapons. At present, non-strategic nuclear capabilities of Russia is less than 25 per cent of that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) possessed in 1991. All non-strategic nuclear weapons of Russia have been shifted to non-deployed status. They are located exclusively within the national territory and are consolidated at centralized storage facilities where a top-level security regime is assured, ruling out any possibility of theft, as well as accidental or unauthorized use.

Russia has developed and implemented a set of measures to counter terrorist acts; all nuclear- and radiation-hazard facilities regularly undergo comprehensive checks of their security and readiness to prevent terrorist acts.

Russia does not deploy nuclear weapons outside the national territory and does not transfer control over its nuclear weapons, either directly or indirectly, to other states; it does not possess deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons and does not practice employment of nuclear weapons during the exercises and training of general-purpose forces.

The Russian Federation believes that it is necessary to continue to gradually advance the road of verifiable and irreversible reductions of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in the context of general and complete disarmament.

Disarmament does not take place in a vacuum. Progress in this area depends on the international security situation, which is affected today by such factors as the totally unrestricted deployment of a global missile defence system, the development of high-precision non-nuclear offensive arms for the global strike purposes, the possibility of placing strike weapons in outer space, growing quantitative and qualitative imbalances in conventional weapons, changes in military doctrines leading to an increased likelihood of use of nuclear weapons, the destruction and erosion of the arms control architecture and the illegitimate application of sanctions in circumvention of the UN Security Council. The deployment of nuclear weapons outside the national territory of the state that possesses them, and training on handling them with the participation of non-nuclear-weapon states, are also significant factors in diminishing the level of international and regional security and undermining the prospects of nuclear disarmament.

Fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes

Russia stopped the production of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes more than a quarter of a century ago. Weapons-grade uranium has not been produced in our country since 1989. In accordance with the agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America

concerning cooperation regarding plutonium production reactors of 23 September 1997, 13 reactors, that had previously produced weapons-grade plutonium, have been shut down. The last of them was closed in 2010.

We completed the implementation of the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons (the HEU-LEU Agreement, known as the “Megatons to Megawatts” programme), under which we had converted 500 tons of weapons-grade uranium, the equivalent of 20,000 nuclear warheads.

Russia is in favour of negotiating a universal, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT). In 2014–2015 and 2017–2018, the Russian side actively participated in the work of the groups of governmental experts established pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolutions [67/53](#) and [71/259](#) to make recommendations on aspects of such a treaty.

Russia strongly believes that negotiations on such a treaty should be held exclusively in the framework of the comprehensive and balanced programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament and on the basis of the Shannon mandate of 1995, set out in document [CD/1299](#). Moreover, all countries with the capability to produce weapons-grade fissile material should participate in such negotiations.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

In 1990, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declared a moratorium on nuclear tests. The Russian Federation, as the continuing state of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, has not carried out any nuclear explosions since then. We intend to continue to adhere to the moratorium, provided that such a measure is observed by the other nuclear-weapon states.

As a consistent proponent of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, Russia was actively involved in the drafting of the CTBT, ratified it in 2000 and has since been promoting its universalization and swift entry into force.

At the present time, we consider that the main priority with regard to the Treaty is to ensure its entry into force. The fact that it has not entered into force almost a quarter of a century after it was opened for signature poses a serious threat to its existence.

We endeavour to promote the Treaty in multilateral forums and bilateral meetings, calling upon the states that have not joined the Treaty, in particular the eight remaining Annex 2 States, to sign and/or ratify it immediately and without any preconditions. Over the years, our country has been a consistent co-sponsor of General Assembly resolutions in support of the Treaty. We attend the “Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty” meetings of Ministers for Foreign Affairs that take place biennially and the Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We actively participate in the implementation of the final declarations of the Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty, the latest of which was adopted in 2019.

Russia fully supports the gradual and balanced establishment of a mechanism for the verification of compliance with the Treaty. We are actively engaged in the work of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization involving the discussion of relevant issues, including the on-site inspection regime (OSI).

The second largest segment of the International Monitoring System (IMS) is being developed on the territory of Russia. The total number of certified facilities in the Russian Federation is 29 (91 per cent of the total number of facilities in the Russian segment of the System). At its own expense, the Russian Federation is developing forward-looking technical models for IMS stations, in particular a high-performance noble gas detection system. The Russian Federation, with the participation of representatives of the CTBT Organization, organizes training courses every year at the National Nuclear Test Data Centre for staff of the IMS stations.

We believe that, until the Treaty enters into force, the IMS is operating in test mode, and any changes to its configuration, as set out in the Treaty, are currently not possible.

Development of verification, transparency and confidence-building measures

In 2018 and 2019, Russia actively participated in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 71/67 to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament. The principled approach of the Russian Federation, based on the experience gained in the process of applying the control mechanisms set out in the arms control treaties to which it is a party, is that verification procedures should be considered in the context of specific agreements on arms reduction and limitation and they should be aligned with the subject and scope of the restrictions set out therein.

In accordance with generally acknowledged principles and rules of international law, the parties to an agreement, or bodies specially designated by them, may participate in the verification of the agreement's implementation. Potential proliferation risks must also be taken into account. It would be unacceptable for verification measures to damage the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including through leaks of the relevant knowledge and technologies.

Specific topics relating to transparency among the nuclear Powers are considered in the context of the relevant dialogue formats, on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and comprehensive consideration of the interests and concerns of the parties.

Nuclear risk reduction as an inter-state confidence-building measure is viewed by the Russian Federation in the general context of making progress towards nuclear disarmament while strengthening international security and stability, taking into account current strategic realities. With a view to preventing both nuclear conflict as well as any other military conflict, the Russian Federation acts in such a manner as to avert situations that could lead to dangerous aggravation of relations at the international and regional levels and to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war, and is also taking the necessary steps to reduce the nuclear threat.

Our principled approach is based on the understanding that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We consistently advocate for the reaffirmation by all nuclear Powers of this tenet, known as the Gorbachev-Reagan formula.

On 2 June, 2020, "Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence" were released. The publication of this document was carried out in the framework of Russia's overall efforts aimed at increasing transparency in nuclear sphere and removing erroneous or deliberate misinterpretation of our relevant concepts.

In the context of attempts to reduce nuclear risks, the Russian Federation has accumulated considerable experience of interaction on these issues with other nuclear Powers. Hotlines have been established and are in operation, necessary information exchange is conducted, including notifications of missile launches. Bilateral

intergovernmental agreements on the prevention of nuclear conflicts have been concluded with the United States (1973), France (1976) and the United Kingdom (1977). These agreements set out the obligations of the parties to enhance organizational and technical measures for the prevention of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. In order to communicate urgent information, notifications and inquiries in situations requiring swift clarification, direct intergovernmental communication lines have been established.

The Russian Federation has concluded agreements with the United States on notifications of missile launches and major strategic exercises, which represent an important risk reduction measure. The agreement on notifications of missile launches has also been concluded with China. The bilateral intergovernmental agreements with the United States (1989) and China (1994) on the prevention of dangerous military activities constitute additional conflict prevention measures.

Russia participates in the discussion of issues pertaining to transparency, confidence and nuclear risk reduction in the P5 format. Within this format, opinions are exchanged in particular on best practices in this area. P5 also holds discussions of the problem of nuclear doctrines, a special working group has been established. This gives the nuclear-weapon states the opportunity to express their concerns to one another directly and to examine existing doctrinal misperceptions. Such activities contribute to increasing transparency and reducing risks in the nuclear sphere. They complement relevant efforts at the bilateral level.

Currently, due to the New START Treaty between Russia and the United States, a high level of mutual transparency in relation to strategic offensive arms – intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, heavy bombers, intercontinental ballistic missile launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers – is provided. Notifications are exchanged, displays of new arms are carried out and inspections are conducted.

An unprecedented step that provided real “added value” with regard to transparency was our demonstration in January 2019 of the newest Russian tactical missile, 9M729, which prompted an absolutely groundless but extremely destructive propaganda campaign, culminating in the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Russia, although it was under no obligation to do so, demonstrated the missile, having invited to the exhibition representatives of countries, including those that officially designate us as their adversaries, and moreover explained its construction features and disclosed its tactical and technical specifications.

In October 2019, Russia voluntarily informed its foreign partners in advance of the preparations for and conduct of the Grom-2019 strategic command and staff exercise, and also informed them what forces and resources would be involved in the exercise and where and at which test sites the ballistic and cruise missiles would be launched.

The actions of the Russian Federation confirm its continued commitment to the goal of ridding the world of the nuclear threat and to consistent progress towards real nuclear disarmament, as required under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Section II: National non-proliferation measures

International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards

The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is essential for ensuring the stability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The comprehensive safeguards system, which was developed after the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed, has become a reliable tool for verifying compliance by states with their Treaty obligations. A Comprehensive

Safeguards Agreement, as well as an Additional Protocol that was first introduced in the mid-1990s, allow to guarantee detection of undeclared nuclear programmes. Safeguards implementation by states is an important prerequisite for realizing their right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and fosters trust among the parties to the Treaty.

We strongly believe that the IAEA safeguards system must continue to be based on the following principles: objectivity, technical validity and consistency with the safeguards agreements concluded between states and IAEA. Safeguards implementation should be guided by the presumption of innocence and respect for sovereignty, which remain the legitimate rights of all states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In drawing its conclusions, the Agency should rely only on information the accuracy of which the IAEA Secretariat is prepared to defend in an open debate in a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors and to support with objective data. There should be no place for subjective factors, political bias or unsubstantiated assumptions in the conduct of inspections and the drafting of safeguards conclusions. Any departures in this regard would inevitably undermine the confidence of states parties to the Treaty in the IAEA safeguards system and erode the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole.

Any changes to the IAEA safeguards system must be made in such a way that application of the new methods is understood by all states members of the Agency and have their unanimous support. Any such changes must be approved by the Agency's policymaking organs.

Russia recognizes the crucial importance of additional protocols to safeguards agreements. Having an additional protocol in place allows the Agency to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in states, which is the highest standard of verification of compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We encourage countries that have not yet signed an additional protocol to do so as soon as possible. At the same time, we emphasize that this measure is strictly voluntary, and any coercion as to the signing an additional protocol is completely inappropriate. We view the additional protocol as a mandatory condition for the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies (relating to enrichment and chemical reprocessing) and equipment.

We call upon all countries that have signed a small quantities protocol but have not yet adopted the modified text to do so as soon as possible. Any states in which nuclear facilities are being built must rescind the small quantities protocol in a timely manner and switch to normal safeguards implementation.

The Russian Federation supports the Agency's efforts to ensure the reliability and improve the effectiveness of its verification mechanism. To that end, we have been contributing material and expert support, including through the national safeguards support programme. In the course of the programme's existence, spanning more than 35 years, extensive work has been carried out to reinforce the conceptual and technical framework used by the Agency's Department of Safeguards. One way in which Russia has assisted the Agency through this programme is by examining in its analytical laboratories environmental samples collected by the Agency during inspections. New technologies are being developed to detect undeclared nuclear materials and activities. We place great emphasis on the training of the Agency's inspectors, including in the use of non-destructive techniques for testing nuclear material and in the conduct of inspections at uranium enrichment facilities. Specialized Russian institutions continue to provide training in nuclear material accounting and control to IAEA Secretariat staff and experts from IAEA member states. Russia supports the Agency's efforts to develop innovative measurement equipment that would allow for more accurate control of irradiated nuclear fuel and

its efforts to establish uniform non-discriminatory methods for implementing safeguards at facilities that are being decommissioned. Russia has also worked with the Agency to develop verification methods to be used at new types of facilities, such as mobile nuclear power plants with small modular reactors, and to study ways of taking potential safeguards implementation into account in nuclear facility design.

In 2019, Russia added one more nuclear installation to the list of facilities to which IAEA safeguards could be applied under the Agreement of 21 February 1985 between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The list now includes more than 40 nuclear installations at more than 20 facilities.

IAEA safeguards continue to be applied at the International Uranium Enrichment Centre in strict compliance with the comprehensive safeguards agreement between Russia and IAEA and its additional protocol. Every year the IAEA Secretariat has confirmed that nuclear material subject to safeguards in Russia remains in peaceful activities.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) is a valuable mechanism for strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole. By establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, thereby implementing article VII of the Treaty, states help to strengthen regional and international stability and security and build mutual trust. Russia has always been supportive of such efforts and has assisted states in establishing and formalizing such zones.

Russia has completed the domestic procedures necessary to sign the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and is ready for joint consultations between the group of five nuclear-weapon states (P5) and the states parties to the Treaty with a view to settling all remaining issues.

A very important event was the first Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery, held in New York in November 2019, in accordance with the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Russia participated in that Conference as an observer and contributed to its convening and success.

The Conference was the first practical step in many years towards the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The Conference stated in its final declaration the intent to pursue with all invited states the elaboration of a treaty establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by consensus by the states of the region.

Addressing regional challenges to the non-proliferation regime

The Russian Federation has always insisted that regional challenges to nuclear non-proliferation can and should be addressed using exclusively political and diplomatic means on the basis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the inviolability of its provisions, in strict compliance with the rules of international law and in accordance with the legitimate security and development interests of all states.

It is unjustified and unacceptable that some countries insist on inflating the Iranian threat and using it as a pretext to scrap the essential international arrangements concluded in 2015, which are exemplars of effective diplomacy and the competent settlement of emerging disagreements in the area of nuclear non-proliferation. The

assault on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for the settlement of the situation relating to the Iranian nuclear programme (JCPOA) had nothing to do with the actions of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

With the implementation of the JCPOA, the crisis brewing over Iran and its nuclear programme was defused. IAEA quickly obtained answers to all of its questions, with Iran becoming the most frequently verified state among the Agency's members.

We believe it to be unacceptable for any country to manipulate the mechanisms and requirements of the non-proliferation regime in order to settle political scores with countries that have fallen out of its favour, in this case Iran, and call upon all responsible states to support us in this regard. Every effort should also be made to preserve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and achieve its ambitious goals. There is no alternative to these arrangements. Russia remains fully committed to the JCPOA and is counting on a similarly responsible approach from its Western partners and the support of the international community as a whole, as called for in Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

The Russian Federation has taken an active part in finding a political and diplomatic settlement of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue. It remains in contact with all interested parties.

The process of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be phased and should be guided by mutual interests. A solution to such a complex challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime requires maximum restraint from all interested states without exception.

If any arrangements are reached concerning the dismantlement of the military nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, this work would need to be carried out under the supervision of experts from nuclear-weapon states.

In our view, the role of IAEA is to verify the implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Export controls

Russia attaches great importance to the implementation of Article III (2) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The efforts of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, originally established as an exporters' committee in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have proved in practice that it is possible to agree on a non-discriminatory nuclear export control regime.

Russia has founded its national export control system on the principles of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee and the export rules and control lists produced by them. Russia implements the recorded decisions of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in its national laws in a timely manner and without delay.

The guiding principle of our work in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee is that any rules or restrictions introduced by them should help to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime without affecting the rights of states to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their technological development.

International non-proliferation efforts should not lead to unfounded restrictions on legitimate trade in dual-use goods and technologies or on civilian scientific and technological cooperation.

As an active participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Russia stresses the need for the Group's activities to reflect current realities in international development and for the Group to respond effectively, as far as its technical mandate allows, to the latest challenges and threats to the international non-proliferation regime.

We do not see the Nuclear Suppliers Group as an exclusive and closed club. Our consistent position has been that the Group should include states that have significant industrial and export potential and are capable of making a tangible contribution to the achievement of its statutory objectives.

Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

Russia believes that all countries need to implement in full Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) aimed at keeping weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials and technologies out of the hands of non-state actors, including terrorists. Russia plays an active role in the work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to monitor the implementation of the resolution and to coordinate technical assistance to countries in need.

In the provision of technical assistance, Russia continues to give priority to the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In order to share its experience with implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), it has organized training courses for national contact points of states members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, including in Kaliningrad (June 2016) and in Rostov-on-Don (September 2018).

Nuclear security and combating nuclear terrorism

Russia attaches great importance to strengthening nuclear security worldwide. We firmly believe in the fundamental principle of the responsibility of the state for ensuring nuclear security in its territory. All nuclear material, storage locations and related facilities in Russia, as well as the transportation of nuclear material and radioactive substances, are subject to the necessary security measures.

No significant changes have been made since 2015 to the laws governing nuclear material accounting, control and physical protection, export controls and control lists of nuclear-related goods. However, some optimization has been made in the light of industry-specific programmes and plans developed by individual organizations. At the same time, measures have been taken to enhance nuclear security culture.

The Russian Federation is a party to all key international legal instruments in this area, in particular the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 Amendment thereto, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. We advocate universal adherence to these instruments.

IAEA plays a central role in international cooperation in the area of nuclear security.

Beginning in 2010, Russia has made annual voluntary contributions of \$1 million to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund. The funds have been used to implement activities that include more than 40 international, regional and national projects. IAEA courses and seminars have been organized, research projects have been conducted, and targeted assistance has been provided to interested states members of the Agency, as well as financial support to enable foreign experts to take part in the Agency's events. Between 2016 and 2019, more than 600 specialists from some 70 countries attended IAEA courses and seminars on nuclear security organized

in the Russian Federation by the State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom, the Federal Customs Service of Russia and the Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision (Rostekhnadzor).

Under bilateral agreements and contracts, the Russian Federation has provided assistance to all interested countries in the assessment and development of national nuclear infrastructure, the establishment of physical protection systems for nuclear material and facilities and the training of foreign experts, among others.

In 2006, Russia and the United States launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

The Initiative, which currently brings together 89 partner states and 6 international organizations participating as observers, is now well established as a representative forum of like-minded states that fosters a common understanding of the challenges posed by the threat of nuclear terrorism, encourages the search for effective solutions and supports exchanges of best practices in combating nuclear terrorism and strengthening nuclear security.

Russia and the United States were endorsed as co-chairs of the Initiative for an additional four-year period at the plenary meeting held in Buenos Aires in June 2019. Russia has organized a number of events relating to the Initiative since its launch and has organized and conducted regional seminars on nuclear forensics for Russian-speaking experts from the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Eastern Europe.

Section III: National measures relating to peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Russia advocates broad access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy for states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, in line with action 47 of the action plan adopted in 2010, respects each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.

The strategy of the Russian Federation for the development of civilian nuclear energy around the world

In 2019 Russia celebrated 65 years since the world's first nuclear power plant became operational in Obninsk. This event marked the beginning of an era of peaceful use of nuclear energy as a new source of energy that could meet the needs of humankind.

By early 2020, there were 447 nuclear power units in operation worldwide with a total capacity of 395.69 GW. Another 52 units are now under construction.

Russia has 10 land-based nuclear power plants and 1 floating nuclear power station with a total of 38 units and an approximate capacity of 30 GW. Electricity produced by nuclear power plants accounts for about 18 per cent of all electric power generated in Russia.

There are currently 36 nuclear power units under construction in 12 countries, at various stages of completion.

The launch in 2016 of Unit 1 at Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Plant 2, the world's first «Generation III+» head unit, was a milestone event in the field of energy production in Russia and around the world. Work is under way on the construction of similar units at other Russian nuclear power plants. The «Generation III+» modified reactor design, which meets all post-Fukushima safety requirements, is now the only

design used when upgrading WWER reactors in Russia. Russia has extensive experience in operating small-sized nuclear power plants.

Russia has dedicated considerable effort to the continued development of floating nuclear power stations. The Akademik Lomonosov floating nuclear power station was towed to Chukotka in the autumn of 2019 and began producing its first kilowatts of electricity in December. Floating nuclear power stations will be built using the new integrated RITM-200 reactors and its serial production has been launched. A total of six reactors of this type have been manufactured for the Russian icebreaker fleet. There are also plans to use the RITM-200 design for stationary land-based nuclear power plants.

Russia is pursuing a two-pronged strategy for the development of nuclear energy. First, it is taking a traditional approach that involves the continued development of thermal reactors. Second, it is focusing on the development of fast neutron reactors. This approach makes it possible to achieve a closed nuclear fuel cycle, which will substantially expand the range of fuels that can be used for nuclear power generation and significantly reduce the amount of radioactive waste.

Fast neutron reactors have been in operation in Russia for over 40 years. In 2015, a new 800 MW reactor based on this technology was put into operation near Ekaterinburg. In early 2020 the first batch of mixed uranium-plutonium (MOX) fuel was loaded in there, which will become the main type of fuel used in the transition to a two-component nuclear power system with a closed nuclear fuel cycle. There are also promising projects under way to build fast neutron research reactors.

Bilateral cooperation and projects

At present, nuclear power plants are being built using Russian technologies and with the active support of Russian experts in Bangladesh, Belarus, China, India and Turkey. Preparations are under way for the construction of nuclear power plants at sites in Egypt, Hungary and Finland. A project for construction of a nuclear power plant is also underway in Uzbekistan.

Russia supports states seeking to use peaceful nuclear technologies in industry, science, medicine and agriculture. The President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, in his message to the international ATOMEXPO-2019 forum, noted that nuclear technologies have made fundamentally new developments possible in medicine, new material design, space exploration and Arctic development and are helping to strengthen the energy sector, which drives the economy. To that end, Russia is supporting a number of countries in the establishment of national nuclear science and technology centres, namely, Bolivia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Serbia, Vietnam and Zambia.

A prerequisite for the successful development of peaceful nuclear technologies is the existence of a reliable human resource capacity. Russia is making a significant contribution to the training of highly qualified nuclear specialists from many countries through its various educational programmes that take into account, among other things, the relevant IAEA requirements. So far, more than 1,500 foreign students from some 30 countries are studying nuclear specialties in Russia.

Russia attaches great importance to the development of cooperation relating to peaceful uses of nuclear energy with states members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. This helps to build the necessary basis for targeted bilateral projects.

Russia ratified an agreement on cooperation between states members of the Commonwealth of Independent States to ensure preparedness in the event of a nuclear accident or a radiological emergency and to facilitate mutual assistance during operations on elimination, which entered into force on 1 January 2020. The agreement

will simplify procedures for the cross-border movement of specialists, specialized equipment and machinery in the event of an emergency situation, thus reducing the response time to any incident involving the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The draft framework programme for cooperation among the states members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy up to 2030 has been approved and an action plan for the implementation of the first phase of the programme for the period 2021–2025 is being finalized. These documents reflect the terms of the draft economic development strategy of the Commonwealth of Independent States up to 2030 and the key provisions of national energy and industrial development strategies.

Progress has been made in the implementation of the inter-state target programme of the Commonwealth of Independent States to reclaim territories affected by uranium mining operations. The project to reclaim the sites of the Kadzhi-Say tailings piles in the Kyrgyz Republic has been completed. The facility has been made radiologically safe and put into operation.

Cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency

The Russian Federation fully supports IAEA activities in all major areas of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Since 2017, the Agency has been successfully implementing our assistance in infrastructure development to countries embarking on nuclear power programmes. In the first stage of this effort, spanning from 2017 to 2019, 550 foreign experts took part in 41 training events. The project was extended for an additional four years in 2019 and provided with funding in the amount of some 4 million euros.

Russia is not only the initiator but also the leading sponsor of the Agency's International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). This project has become a fully operational mechanism and a centre of excellence in the comprehensive analysis of a host of factors relating to proposed and planned nuclear power systems, including infrastructure, safety, minimization of radioactive waste and environmental protection.

Some of the important projects undertaken jointly with the Agency in recent years include the establishment of infrastructure to ensure nuclear safety at WWER installations and the reclamation of areas affected by uranium mining operations.

Our priorities in working with IAEA include scientific research into and development of radiation technologies and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in medicine, agriculture, industry and other key economic sectors. With Russian assistance, the Agency has been paying increased attention to these activities. In 2019, Russia made a supplementary contribution to the Agency's ReNuAL+ project to modernize its research laboratories in Seibersdorf.

In 2016, Russia joined the Agency's Programme of Action for Cancer Treatment (PACT). Over the past four years, 18 training events organized by PACT have been held in Russia, funded from Russian contributions and attended by more than 350 experts from 19 states members of the Agency.

Russia regularly hosts major international IAEA events. In 2017, the Agency held its International Conference on Fast Reactors and Related Fuel Cycles in Ekaterinburg. The Agency's International Conference on Nuclear Knowledge Management and Human Resources was scheduled to be held in Moscow in 2022.

Russia continues to be a leading partner in developing, together with the Agency, a vision for providing assurances of nuclear fuel supply and multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle services aimed at promoting development goals and

expanding access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy around the world while strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

A number of projects now under way in Russia, such as the establishment of the International Uranium Enrichment Centre and a guaranteed low-enriched uranium reserve in Angarsk, support this vision. In 2019, Russia supplied the first and second batches of low-enriched uranium to the IAEA Low-Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan.

Nuclear safety and civil liability for nuclear damage

Russia advocates the strengthening of nuclear safety around the world and is a party to all major international legal instruments in this area.

It has welcomed visits by the Agency's Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) to Russian nuclear power plants in accordance with the medium-term schedule agreed with the Agency's Secretariat. In 2018, this long-established practice was complemented by a corporate OSART mission to the headquarters of Rosenergoatom Group. The assessment confirmed the Russian operator's commitment to ensuring a high level of safety.

We continue to work with the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. More than 50 Russian organizations are currently working with this Agency. We are actively involved in the implementation of 13 international projects and programmes under the auspices of the Nuclear Energy Agency, including its Multinational Design Evaluation Programme and «Generation IV» International Forum. The Agency's main task is to assist participating states with scientific and technical development and with harmonization of national regulatory and legal instruments for the safe, economical and environmentally friendly use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The Russian Federation believes that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is one of the most important elements of the modern world order and ensures peace and security. Strengthening it is one of our foreign policy priorities. Ensuring the proper functioning of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is a top priority for advancing the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
