

ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫЕ НАЦИИ

СОВЕТ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ

ОФИЦИАЛЬНЫЙ ОТЧЕТ

ВТОРОЙ ГОД

ДОПОЛНЕНИЕ № 6



Лейк Соксес, Нью Йорк

1947 год

ОБЪЕДИНЕННЫЕ НАЦИИ



СОВЕТ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ

ВТОРОЙ ГОД ДОПОЛНЕНИЕ № 6

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ К ОФИЦИАЛЬНОМУ ОТЧЕТУ О СТО СЕДЬМОМ ЗАСЕДАНИИ, СОСТОЯВШЕМСЯ 18 ФЕВРАЛЯ 1947 ГОДА

ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ 15

Фотоснимки документов, представленных делегацией
Соединенного Королевства на сто седьмом заседании
Совета Безопасности¹ в связи с жалобой Соединенного
Королевства против Албании.

Документы

	Номер
Карта с указанием курса британских военных кораблей 22 октября при прохождении ими через пролив Северный Корфу и их положения в 14 ч. 53½ мин., когда британский эсминец «Сомарез» взорвался на mine	I
Фотоснимки британского военного корабля «Сомарез» после взрыва мины в протраленном фарватере . . . а и b	II
Фотоснимки британских военных кораблей «Сомарез» и «Воледж», взорвавшихся на минах в протраленном фарватере с	II
Соглашение, которым была учреждена Международная организация по тралению мин в европейских водах . .	III
Дипломатическая переписка между британским правительством и албанским правительством в октябре и ноябре 1946 г.	IV
Доклад о тралении мин, составленный французским наблюдателем, капитаном второго ранга Местр (на французском языке с английским переводом)	V
Фотоснимки мин, обнаруженных в протраленном фарватере 13 ноября 1946 г. а до d	VI
Фотоснимки водорослей на минах e	VI
Карта с указанием положения мин	VII
Карта с указанием береговых укреплений в бухте Саранда (Порт Эдда) и курса британских военных кораблей при их проходе 15 мая	VIII
Клятвенное показание капитана судна ЮНРРА, по которому 29 октября 1946 г. был открыт огонь	IX
Фотоснимок судов малого размера, оборудованных для постановки мин	X
Карта с указанием курса самолетов 22 и 23 октября ²	XI

¹ Официальный отчет Совета Безопасности, второй год, № 15.

² Примечание Секретариата: Документ этот, изготовленный в красках, здесь воспроизводится без красок.

EXHIBIT I

Chart showing track of H.M.Ships on 22nd October
on passage through the North Corfu Channel
and their position at 1453½ when H.M.Destroyer
"SAUMAREZ" struck a mine. It will be noted
that all the ships are well inside the route
published internationally as Medri 18/32 and
18/34.

EXHIBIT I




EXHIBIT II (a)


PHOTOGRAPHS OF H.M.S. "SAUMAREZ" AFTER STRIKING

A MINE IN THE SWEPT CHANNEL

EXHIBIT II (a)


PHOTOGRAPHS OF H.M.S. "SAUMAREZ" AFTER STRIKING A MINE IN THE SWEEP CHANNEL

A. 1




H.M.S. "SAUMAREZ" 30 seconds after the explosion, enveloped in smoke and listing to starboard. Time: 1454.

A. 2




"SAUMAREZ" sheers to port into the wind.

3



"SAUMAREZ" comes to rest settling rapidly by the bows.

4



The fire in "SAUMAREZ" is got under control. The fire in fact was not put out until after she reached Corfu at 0300 the next day.


EXHIBIT II (b)

PHOTOGRAPHS OF H.M.S. "SAUMAREZ" AFTER STRIKING
A MINE IN THE SWEPT CHANNEL

EXHIBIT II (b)

PHOTOGRAPHS OF H.M.S. "SAUMAREZ" AFTER STRIKING
A MINE IN THE SWEEP CHANNEL

B.1.




Port side of H.M.S. "SAUMAREZ" on fire. The ship is settling by the bows.

B.2.




Port side of H.M.S. "SAUMAREZ" on fire.

B. 3.



Starboard side of H.M.S. "SAUMAREZ" showing the damage sustained.

B. 4



H.M.S. "SAUMAREZ" settling by the bows. After examination she was written off as a total loss.

EXHIBIT II (c)

PHOTOGRAPHS OF H.M.S. "SAULAREZ" AND H.M.S. "VOLAGE"
AFTER STRIKING MINES IN THE SWEEP CHANNEL

"PHOTOGRAPHS OF H.M.S. "SAUMAREZ" AND H.M.S. "VOLAGE" AFTER STRIKING MINES

IN THE SWEPT CHANNEL

C.1.



H.M.S. "VOLAGE" after taking H.M.S. "SAUMAREZ" in tow strikes a mine at 1616 and her bows are blown off. The photographs show H.M.S. "VOLAGE" proceeding stern first towing H.M.S. "SAUMAREZ" stern first also.

C.2.



A 20 m.p.h. wind is blowing the ships on to the Albanian Coast. However by dint of good seamanship the "VOLAGE", although severely damaged herself, managed to tow the "SAUMAREZ" to Corfu.

EXHIBIT III

The Agreement constituting the International
Organisation for the Clearance of Mines in European Waters.

EXHIBIT III

POST WAR MINE CLEARANCE

IN

EUROPEAN WATERS

The attached document has been agreed between us as the basis of an international organisation for the clearance of mines in European Waters. The representatives of the United States, France and Great Britain have already been authorised to accept this document on behalf of their respective Governments.

SIGNED

S. LRYKE.
Engineer Rear Admiral
Soviet Navy.

R. PRICE.
Captain
United States Navy

A. SALA.
Rear Admiral
French Navy.

L. L. S. KING. 22nd November, 1945.
Vice Admiral
Royal Navy

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION FOR THE
CLEARANCE OF MINES IN EUROPEAN WATERS.

The following organisation for the clearance of mines in European waters after the defeat of Germany has been drawn up with a view to meeting the needs of all interested maritime Powers by providing an international machinery for the direction of policy and general control of mine clearance operations. It is hoped that by these measures mines will be cleared with equal thoroughness and expedition in all European Waters.

Division of European waters into zones

2. The European waters to be cleared shall be divided into four zones:-

- (i) An East Atlantic zone
- (ii) A Mediterranean zone
- (iii) A Barents, Baltic and Black Sea zone
- (iv) A Kattegat, Baltic Straits and their Approaches zone

These zones shall be divided into areas and sub-areas, the clearance of which shall be allocated to the interested littoral and other naval powers under the direction of Boards set up in accordance with paragraph 7 below. The recommended limits of these zones are given at Appendix A.

International Central Mine Clearance Board

3. Mine clearance in European waters shall be controlled and co-ordinated by an International Central Mine Clearance Board, under the presidency of a British Naval Officer and consisting of representatives of France, U.S.S.R., U.K. and U.S.A.

4. Each member of the Central Board shall be responsible for consulting his Government as he may deem necessary and shall have the right to insist that the confirmation of his Government is required before any particular action contemplated by the Central Board affecting its interests is taken.

5. At all stages during the preparation of plans for mine clearance, and until completion of the task, the Central Board shall refer to the Allied Naval Authorities as deemed necessary and shall in particular consult the Supreme Allied Commanders and the Allied Commission of Control on their special requirements. In their dealings with capitulated powers, the Central Board, and the zone Boards referred to below, shall communicate with them through the appropriate Supreme Allied Commander or Allied Commission of Control.

6. The functions of the Central Board shall be:-

- (a) to draw up a general plan of mine clearance in the European waters taking into account ships, manpower and minesweeping equipment (minesweeping forces) required, and to ascertain for this purpose available resources of both the Allied and neutral countries concerned and the defeated powers.
- (b) to lay down the precise limits of the zones in European waters and to adjust these limits only if at any time this should be necessary.
- (c) to set up and direct the Zone Mine Clearance Boards referred to in paragraph 7.
- (d) to set up the Central Mine Clearance Intelligence Office referred to in paragraph 13.
- (e) to direct, through the Zone Clearance Boards, the general policy of mine clearance in European waters.
- (f) to apportion, in the light of the mine clearance commitment of each zone, the available minesweeping forces between the zones at the beginning of mine clearance, and to re-allocate minesweeping forces from one zone to another should it at any time appear desirable, provided that such re-allocation would be without detriment to the first zone.
- (g) /

(g) to give guidance to the Zone Boards in determining the areas of specified responsibility referred to in paragraph 7 (a).

(h) to specify the acceptable scale of mine clearance, essential for safe navigation.

(i) to promulgate reports on experience gained in the course of operations.

NOTE. It is assumed that, under the terms of the instruments of surrender, all enemy minesweeping forces will be taken over and held at the disposal of the United Nations.

Zone Mine Clearance Boards

7. There shall be set up within each zone a Zone Mine Clearance Board, responsible to the Central Board, with the following functions:-

(a) to divide the zone into sub-areas and to assign the responsibility for the clearance of sub-areas among the Powers involved; to re-adjust the limits of these sub-areas only if at any time this adjustment should be necessary.

(b) to direct the general policy of mine clearance within the zone, while leaving the executive control of minesweeping forces in the hands of the individual Power responsible for each sub-area. But the direct control in the clearance of sub-areas for which surrendered countries are responsible shall be exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander or the Allied Commission of Control.

(c) to determine the responsibility of the capitulated Powers in the clearance of waters within the zone.

(d) to allocate minesweeping forces assigned to the zone by the Central Board to Powers represented on the Zone Board who have not sufficient minesweeping forces with which to clear the sub-area /

sub-area for which they are responsible.

(e) at the outset of mine clearance to collect full intelligence of all mines laid within the zone and throughout the work of clearance to collect and collate reports on the progress and operations; and to transmit this intelligence without delay to the Central Mine Clearance Intelligence Office.

(f) to co-ordinate the mine clearance plans of the Powers responsible for clearance within the zone and to ensure that priorities of common interest, such as the fairways of navigation are observed.

(g) to ensure that the standard of mine clearance specified by the Central Board is observed.

(h) to transmit to the Central Board and to promulgate within the zone reports on the experience gained in the course of operations.

NOTE: For the purpose of the preceding paragraphs, the term "minesweeping forces" should be taken to include minesweeping vessels, aircraft used in the search for mines, minesweeping equipment, ancillary vessels and gear, maintenance facilities and other resources used in minesweeping, together with the personnel to man or operate them.

East Atlantic Zone Board

8. The East Atlantic Zone Board shall consist of members representing Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Holland, Norway, U.S.S.R., and the U.K. under the Presidency of a British Naval Officer. A representative of Germany shall be summoned to attend as required by the Board to give information and to receive directions. Eire, Iceland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, shall be invited to send observers to the Board.

Mediterranean Zone Board

9. The /

9. The Mediterranean Zone Board shall consist of members representing France, Greece, U.S.S.R., the U.K., U.S.A., and Yugoslavia under the Presidency of a British Naval Officer. Representatives of Germany and Italy shall be summoned to attend as required by the Board to give information and receive directions. Egypt, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey shall be invited to send observers to the Board.

Barents, Baltic and Black Seas Zone Board

10. The Barents, Baltic and Black Seas Zone Board shall consist of members representing Denmark, Norway, Poland, U.S.S.R. and U.K., under the Presidency of a Soviet Naval Officer. Representatives of Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Italy and Roumania shall be summoned to attend as required by the Board, to give information and to receive directions. Sweden and Turkey shall be invited to send observers to the Board. The Soviet Government considers the Danube to belong to the Zone of the Barents, Baltic and Black Seas and it has already carried out a considerable amount of minesweeping of the river.

Kattegat, Baltic Straits and their Approaches Zone Board

11. The Kattegat, Baltic Straits and their Approaches Zone Board shall consist of members representing Denmark, Norway, Poland, the U.S.S.R., and the U.K. The Presidency of this Board shall be held for alternate periods by a British and Soviet Naval Officer. A representative of Germany shall be summoned to attend as required by the Board to give information and to receive instructions. Sweden shall be invited to send an observer to the Board.

Allocation of Responsibility within the Zones

12. The allocation of responsibility within the Zones is a matter for the decision of the respective Zone Boards. Each Power will undertake the clearance of its own coastal waters and, in addition, an adjoining area in the open sea in proportion to the minesweeping forces available or made available to it.

The Intelligence Office of the Central Board

13. The Central Mine Clearance Board shall establish a Central International Intelligence Office for the evaluation and promulgation of mine clearance intelligence. It shall consist of an Executive Committee and an Administrative Section. The Executive Committee will consist of representatives of members of the Central Board. The organisation of the Administrative Section will be undertaken by the British Admiralty. To secure close liaison between the Executive Committee and the Administrative Section, the Senior Officer of the Administrative Section will also be a member of the Executive Committee.
14. Mine clearance intelligence from the zones, after collation by the Zone Boards will be received by the Central International Intelligence Office in the name of the Central Board. Information so received will be plotted by the Administrative Section for examination and evaluation by the Executive Committee, and will be promulgated by the Administrative Section in accordance with the Executive Committee's decisions.
15. The maritime Powers shall be invited to appoint representatives in London, who might normally be officers at their Embassies, Legations, Consulates or High Commissioners' Offices, with whom the Intelligence Office may have direct contact. On receipt of intelligence from the Zone Boards the Office shall, with as little delay as possible, distribute "Mine Warnings to Mariners" to these representatives for onward transmission to their respective Governments.
16. The Office shall be responsible for its work to the Central Board.

/Appendix "A"

APPENDIX "A"

Limits of Zones in European Waters

The limits of the zones shall be as follows:-

- East Atlantic Zone (i) The Eastern boundaries of the East Atlantic Zone shall be a line running approximately along the meridian of North Cape (Nordkapp) ($25^{\circ} 47'$ East approximately) to the coast of Norway; the Scandinavian coast to the Norwegian-Swedish frontier; a line joining the Norwegian-Swedish frontier to tip of the Skaw; the Western shores of Europe to Cape St. Vincent; and a line joining Cape St. Vincent and Cape Blanco (North) ($33^{\circ} 09'$ North) ($8^{\circ} 38'$ West). The Western boundary of the East Atlantic Zone shall be the dividing line between the British and American strategic areas.
- Mediterranean Zone (ii) The Western boundary of the Mediterranean Zone shall be a line joining Cape St. Vincent and Cape Blanco; at its Eastern end the Zone shall exclude the territorial waters of Turkey.
- Barents, Baltic and Black Seas Zone (iii) The Western boundary of the Barents Sea area shall coincide with the Eastern boundary of the East Atlantic Zone North at approximately the meridian of North Cape (Nordkapp).
- (iv) /

(iv) The boundary between the Baltic Sea area and the Kattegat and Baltic Approaches Zone shall be a line drawn from Ystad (Sweden) to the vicinity of Lubeck.

(v) The Black Sea area shall exclude the Bosphorus and the territorial waters of Turkey.

Kattegat, Baltic Straits
and their Approaches Zone

(vi) The Western boundary of the Kattegat, Baltic Straits and their Approaches Zone shall be a line joining the Northern tip of the Skaw to the frontier of Norway and Sweden. The Eastern boundary shall coincide with the Western boundary of the Baltic Sea area.

EXHIBIT IV.

Diplomatic Correspondence between H.M. Government
and Albanian Government, October and November 1946.

Note conveyed to Albanian Government through the Legation in Belgrade, 26th October 1946. This note stated that in view of the serious accidents which occurred recently to two of His Majesty's warships passing through the Corfu channel, and of which the Albanian authorities were no doubt aware, British minesweeping authorities would shortly sweep the channel.

(A similar communication was made to the Greek Government).

.. B -

Albanian Note of 31st October, 1946.

NOTE-VERBALE.

La Légation d'Albanie, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de l'Ambassade de Grande Bretagne ce qui suit:

"EN relation avec votre dernière Note en date du 26 Octobre 1946 adressée à la Légation d'Albanie à Belgrade, le Gouvernement Albanais a l'honneur d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement Britannique du fait que pour la deuxième fois des bateaux de guerre de la Grande Bretagne ont violé les eaux territoriales albanaises, sans avoir aucune autorisation du Gouvernement Albanais et de cette manière ont porté atteinte à l'intégrité de notre Pays. Il n'est pas longtemps du premier incident de Saranda, lorsque des navires de guerre britanniques sont entrés dans les eaux territoriales albanaises, qu'il se répète pour la deuxième fois et dans une échelle plus large encore, ce geste non amical qui pourrait en avoir des conséquences tristes.

Exactement le 22 Octobre 1946 quatre bâtiments de guerre de la flotte britannique sont entrés dans les eaux territoriales albanaises. Le premier de ceux-ci, qui portait le Nr. R.62 suivi d'un second bâtiment qui portait le Nr. R.41 sont entrés dans la baie de Sarando et dans les

/eaux albanaises ...

aux Albanaises ou dans une distance de 1.5 kilomètres loin du Port.

Les deux autres bâtiments naviguaient aussi dans nos eaux vis à vis de Kakome et de Borshi. Les quatre bâtiments en question étaient des bateaux de guerre et d'après l'Agence Reuter en date du 26 Octobre 1946 ils étaient enclins d'ouvrir le feu. A la vedette de la Marine Albanaise qui s'est rendue immédiatement à la direction des navires de guerre britanniques, pour demander des explications de la violation des eaux territoriales albanaises et pour leur prêter l'aide nécessaire, étant donné qu'il a été observé de la fumée et du feu sortants d'un des bâtiments, l'équipage britannique d'une façon non amicale n'a pas daigné de donner aux marins albanais la moindre réponse explicative.

Le Gouvernement Albanais proteste énergiquement contre pareilles incursions de bateaux de guerre britanniques dans ses eaux territoriales sans son autorisation et il les considère comme des actes non amicaux et en contradiction de toute loi internationale.

De pareils actes ne servent absolument pas dans le but de renforcer les relations amicales entre nos deux peuples, par conséquent le Gouvernement Albanais ajoute que dans l'intérêt de l'amitié de nos deux pays et dans l'intérêt commun de la Paix et de la prospérité entre les peuples du monde, de telles actions doivent prendre fin et ne doivent pas se répéter plus, pour éviter ainsi des incidents regrettables.

En ce qui concerne le nettoyage du canal de Corfou mentionné dans la Note en date du 26 Octobre 1946, le Gouvernement Albanais a l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que en dehors de la zone des eaux territoriales de l'Albanie, Il n'a pas aucune objection pour votre entreprise et souligne aussi que vos navires qui vont entreprendre cette opération ne doivent pas entrer en aucune façon dans ses eaux territoriales, soit dans la zone du canal soit en dehors de la zone du canal.

Le Gouvernement Albanais ne prend pas aucune responsabilité au cas que cette opération aura lieu dans ses eaux territoriales et Il la considérera de nouveau comme une violation flagrante de l'intégrité de son Pays, pour la sauvegarde duquel celui-ci il a été et il est toujours vigilant."

La Légation d'Albanie saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à l'Ambassade de Grande Bretagne les assurances de sa haute considération.

Belgrade, 13 31 Octobre. 1946.

Note to Albanian Government dated 10th November 1946.

This note, referring to the previous notes of 26th and 31st October, informed the Albanian Government that sweeping of the Corfu channel would take place on 12th November.

It made clear that this was being done in accordance with the unanimous decision of the Central Mine Clearance Board on 1st November that the channel should be reswep. It explained that the area to be swept would be Medri areas 18/32 and 18/34, as defined in the charts of the Central Board, which were in the possession of the Albanian Government. It added that no ships would be stationed in Albanian waters and that the operation would be carried out in exactly the same way as the original sweeping done in October 1944 and February 1945, to which the Albanian Government raised no objections.

Albanian Note of 11th November.

(English Translation).

The Albanian Government is obliged to protest against unilateral decision of His Majesty's Government concerning the sweeping of the Straits of Corfu i.e. for Albanian territorial waters within the Straits. They cannot agree that a sovereign country should be faced in this way with a fait accompli.

The Albanian Government as stated in its note of October 31st does not consider it inconvenient that the British fleet should undertake the sweeping of waters of channel of navigation to ensure passage of its ships. In these circumstances and before the sweeping is carried out, the Albanian Government consider it indispensable to decide what area of the sea should be considered to constitute the channel of navigation. To this

/end Albanian

and Albanian Government propose the establishment of a mixed Commission competent to submit to the two Governments an actual solution. Albanian Government at the same time request His Majesty's Government to draw the attention of all subordinate authorities, when they undertake the sweeping of the channel, to the necessity of confining themselves strictly to the sweeping of determined passage in strict accordance with contents of His Majesty's Government's note of October 10th. (a)

Any sweeping undertaken without the consent of the Albanian Government outside the determined passage, i.e. inside Albanian territorial waters where foreign war ships have no reason to sail, can only be considered as a deliberate violation of Albanian territory and sovereignty.

The Albanian Government attaches particular importance to this statement because the two British warships which were shipwrecked were sailing as competent British authorities have themselves admitted, outside the Straits and within Albanian territorial waters.

(a) Presumably November 10th is intended.

EXHIBIT V.

REPORT ON MINESWEEPING BY
FRENCH OBSERVER CAPITAINE DE FREGATE MESTRE
(IN FRENCH WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION)

Pendant un certain temps j'ai pu suivre à la jumelle une embarcation naviguant assez près de terre portant un pavillon rouge avec quelques signes dans le rouge (je crois que c'était le pavillon albanais) . Cette embarcation a croisé assez loin des dragueurs sans jamais ~~se~~ approcher à moins de 3.000 ou 4.000 mètres . Aucun signal à ma connaissance n'a été fait par elle .

La deuxième mine ramenée à terre n'a pu en raison de la ne être examinée que le 14 Novembre . Il y a tout lieu de croire que son aspect ne différerait pas beaucoup de celle examinée le 13 Novembre .

CONCLUSION-

Le chenal de Corfou peut dorénavant être considéré comme ouvert à la navigation de surface . Cette opération de sécurité permettra de raccourcir notablement les communications maritimes entre le Nord de la Grèce et l'Adriatique et intéresse particulièrement les bâtiments de l'U.N.R.R.A. chargés du ravitaillement des pays de l'Europe Centrale et Méridionale .

Pour terminer je tiens à remercier les Autorités Britanniques de l'excellent accueil que j'ai trouvé sur les divers bâtiments et avions qui m'ont transporté . Cet accueil ainsi que les facilités de transport qui m'ont été données m'ont rendu particulièrement agréable ma mission d'observateur .

Le Capitaine de Frégate MESTRE

Rufin



DE : Commander MESTRE, French Navy
French Representative to the MEDMINTON Board

DATE : 23rd November, 1946

ADDRESSEE : Captain BLACKBURN, Royal Navy,
President of the MEDMINTON Board.

SUBJECT : Minesweeping Operations in Corfu Channel.

OBJET : Operation de dragage dans le chenal de Corfu.

Sir,

Dans le rapport que je vous ai remis à Rome le 16 novembre dernier, au sujet de l'opération de dragage des mines du chenal de Corfu, je vous ai rendu compte que j'avais examiné les mines lorsqu'elles étaient à l'eau et que je les avais identifiées comme étant du type allemand G.R.

Pas suite de difficulté pour me conduire à terre avant la nuit, je n'avais pu les observer moi-même sur le rivage.

Les mines ont été ultérieurement transportées à Malte où je les ai examinées en détail le 23 novembre. Sans aucun doute possible ces mines sont du type allemand G.Y. et non pas G.R. Plusieurs caractéristiques que je n'avais pu contrôler à flot rendent la confusion impossible entre ces deux types de mine.

- (a) Diamètre beaucoup plus grand du flotteur de la mine G.Y.
- (b) Ceinture à laquelle sont soudés les deux hémisphères constituant le flotteur.
- (c) Deux antennes de forme particulière montée sur une pièce coudée et qui ne sont pas visibles lorsque la mine est dans l'eau, étant fixée à l'hémisphère inférieur. La mine G.Y. est la plus grosse mine à crapaud (moored mine), que j'aie jamais vue (600 livres d'explosif).

J'ai profité de cette visite approfondie pour contrôler que les marques peintes sur les mines étaient encore très visibles.

Royce

CAPITAINE DE FREGATE. R. MESTRE

Copies en français :

- 1 pour President MEDMINTON Board
- 1 pour Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
- 1 pour Ministère de la Marine
- 1 pour Admiral Mediterranean, Algiers.

ROME, le 16 Novembre 1946

ORIGINE : Capitaine de Frégate MESTRE Délégué Français au Bureau International des dragages pour la zone méditerranéenne .

ADRESSEE au Capitaine BLACKBURN R.N. Président du Bureau International des dragages pour la zone méditerranéenne.

OBJET : Mission auprès du Contre-Amiral Commandant l'opération RETAIL les 12 & 13 Novembre 1946

SIR.

J'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte de ma mission auprès du Contre-Amiral KANAHAN R.N. Commandant la CSI, chargé de l'exécution de l'opération RETAIL.

Grace aux mesures qui furent prises pour assurer mon transport rapide, après avoir apponté sur H.M.S. OCEAN, je fus transbordé en mer sur H.M.S. MAURITIUS bâtiment amiral.

L'opération prévue pour le jour D fut exécutée normalement ; le dragage de la zone prévue pour les évolutions du Support Group le jour suivant était terminé à la tombée de la nuit. A 20 heures je fus transbordé sur le dragueur B.Y.M.S. n° 2075 qui devait participer le lendemain à une partie du dragage et devait être utilisé pour le transport du M.D. Officer et de moi-même. A 7 heures 30 le 13 Novembre l'opération de dragage du chenal de CORFOU commença avec 4 dragueurs B.Y.M.S. 5 Fleet Minesweepers et 3 Danlayers .

La première passe fut exécutée par les 4 B.Y.M.S. dragues à babord qui parcoururent du Nord vers le Sud la limite Ouest du chenal, suivi à une certaine distance par les 5 Fleet Minesweepers . Au cours de cette passe, 2 mines vinrent en surface, l'une fut ramenée sur la cote Nord de Corfou, l'autre explosa dans la drague. La deuxième passe fut faite du Sud au Nord par les 5 Flette Minesweepers suivis par 3 B.Y.M.S. dragues à tribord . Dans cette zone qui était plus rapprochée que la précédente des eaux albanaises, 7 mines vinrent en surface. Une troisième passe fut faite du Nord vers le Sud, dragues à babord, au cours de laquelle 13 mines vinrent en surface .

A la fin de cette passe le dragage du chenal de Corfou pouvait être considéré comme terminé avec le résultat suivant:

21 mines venues en surface

1 mine explosée dans une drague .

Des 21 mines venues en surface, 2 furent remorquées à terre sur la cote Nord de Corfou, une fut coulée à coups de fusil. Les autres ne purent être coulées le jour même en raison de la difficulté de perforer leurs coques avec des balles ordinaires .

... ..

Mes observations au sujet des mines venues en surface sont les suivantes :

1.- Les 22 mines draguées étaient dans l'ancien chenal dragué ou dans son voisinage immédiat.

2.- Les 8 mines que j'ai vues personnellement étaient celles draguées à la première et à la deuxième passe . Toutes les 8 étaient du même modèle que j'ai pu identifier comme le type allemand G.R. sans antenne flottante, avec 5 antennes (HORNS) et 90 livres d'explosif . Je ne puis rien dire des 13 mines draguées à la troisième passe, n'ayant pas pu me rendre sur place avant la nuit, mais j'ai tout lieu de supposer qu'elles étaient du même type .

3.- Les 8 mines que j'ai vues moi-même étaient apparemment à l'eau depuis un temps que j'estime de l'ordre de 6 mois au maximum et probablement moins . En effet aucune trace d'oxydation ni de coquillages ni d'herbes n'apparaissaient sur elles .

J'ai eu entre les mains plusieurs pièces provenant de la première mine qui a été désarmée par le M.D.Officer : le détonateur la charge primaire , les antennes avaient toute l'apparence de pièces neuves et il semble que le démontage des antennes ~~était très facile~~ ait été très facile, les antennes en plomb n'ayant pas été abîmées par les clés de démontage.

4.- La densité des mines draguées augmentait au fur et à mesure que les dragueurs passaient plus près de la côte : 2 mines à la première passe, 7 mines à la deuxième , 13 mines à la troisième .

5.- Les mesures les plus rigoureuses ont été prises pour que l'opération ne puisse à aucun moment être considérée comme une provocation aux yeux de la population albanaise .

a) Jamais les canons des dragueurs n'ont été pointés vers la terre

b) Interdiction avait été faite aux dragueurs d'utiliser leurs canons légers pour détruire les mines .

c) Seul le tir des armes légères (fusils) était autorisé pour la destruction des mines .

d) Les embarcations chargées de la destruction des mines avaient la consigne de tirer sur les mines vers l'Ouest donc vers le large.

e) Ces consignes ont été rigoureusement exécutées pendant la période au cours de laquelle je suis resté sur les lieux où étaient les mines en surface.

.../..

Translation of Reports on Minesweeping from Capitaine de Frigate Mestre (the French member of the Mediterranean Mine Clearance Zone Board), forwarded to the President of the Mediterranean Zone Board. -

1.

16th November, 1946.

Sir,

I have the honour to make the following report of my mission with Admiral Kinahan, 1st Cruiser Squadron, in charge of "Operation Retail".

Thanks to the measures taken to expedite my transport after having landed on H.M.S. OCEAN, I was transferred at sea to H.M.S. MAURITIUS, the Flag ship.

The operation, which was intended for D-Day was carried out normally. The sweep of the zone in which the Support Group would be cruising, was finished by the same evening. At 2000 hours, I was transferred to the Minesweeper BYMS 2075, which was going to take part the following day in part of the sweep, and which would also carry the Mine Disposal Officer as well as myself. At 7.30 am, on the 13th November, the operation of clearing the Corfu Channel began with four BYMS Minesweepers and five Fleet Minesweepers and three danlayars.

The first lap was carried out by four BYMS with their sweeps to port working from North to South on the western limit of the Channel, followed at a certain distance by the five Fleet Minesweepers. During this lap two mines came to the surface, one was towed to the North Coast of Corfu, and the other exploded in the sweep. The second lap was made from South to North by the five Fleet Minesweepers followed by three BYMS with sweeps to starboard. In this zone, which was closer than the preceding one to the Albanian shore, seven mines came to the surface. The third lap was made from North to South with sweeps to port during which thirteen mines came to the surface.

At the end of this lap the sweep of the Corfu Channel could be considered as completed with the following results:

Twenty one mines came to the surface. One mine exploded in the sweep. Of the twenty-one mines which came to the surface two were towed to the North Coast of Corfu, and one mine was sunk by rifle fire, but the others could not be sunk that day because of the difficulty of penetrating their shells with ordinary ammunition.

My observations on the subject of the mines which came to the surface are as follows:

- 1) The twenty-two mines which were swept were in the channel previously swept, or in the immediate neighborhood.
- 2) The eight mines which I saw myself were those swept during the first and second laps. All the eight were of the same kind, which I identified as German GR type without snag lines with five horns and 90lbs of explosive. I cannot say anything about the thirteen mines cut during the third lap, as I could not get to the position before nightfall, but I have every reason to suppose they were

the same type.

- 3) The eight mines which I saw myself had apparently been in the water for a length of time which I should estimate at the maximum of six months and probably less. There was no trace of rust or marine growth or barnacles apparent. I had in my hand several pieces of the first mine which was rendered safe by the Mine Disposal Officer. The detonator and the primer and the horns all had the appearance of being new, and the unscrewing of the horns appeared to be very easy as the lead of the horns was not even marked by the spanner.
- 4) The density of the mines cut increased as the sweepers got closer to the shore: two mines in the first lap, seven in the second, and thirteen in the third.
- 5) The most rigorous precautions were taken to prevent the operation at any time appearing provocative in the eyes of the Albanian population:
 - a) The guns of the minesweepers were never pointed towards the shore.
 - b) The sweepers had been ordered not to use their light guns to destroy the mines.
 - c) Only fire by small arms (rifles) was authorised for the destruction of floating mines.
 - d) The boats which had the duty of destroying mines had orders to fire at the mines to the westward i.e., towards the open sea.
 - e) These orders were rigorously carried out during the period I was on the spot where mines had come to the surface.

During part of the time, I could follow with my binoculars a boat cruising fairly close to the shore carrying a red flag with some design (I think it was the Albanian flag). This boat cruised a fair distance from the sweepers and never came closer than 3000 to 4000 metres. As far as I know no signal was made by her

The second mine brought ashore could not be examined until the 14th November owing to the darkness. There is every reason to believe that it did not differ in any respect from the mine examined on the 13th November.

CONCLUSION. The Corfu Channel can from now onwards be considered open to surface navigation. This operation will allow for a considerable shortening of the sea communication between North Greece and the Adriatic, and interest particularly the craft of UNRRAs which are engaged in bringing relief for countries of Central and Southern Europe.

To conclude I wish to thank the British Authorities for the excellent welcome which was given me on board the various ships and aircraft on which I travelled. This welcome and the facilities for transport which were afforded me made my mission as observer a particularly agreeable one."

(Sgd) Le Capitaine de Fregate MESTRE

23rd November, 1946.

Sir,

In the report I presented at Rome on the 16th November last, concerning the minesweeping operations in the Corfu Channel, I reported that I had examined the mines while they were in the water and that I had identified them as being of the German G.R. type.

Owing to the difficulty of getting ashore before nightfall I was not able to examine them personally on shore.

The mines were subsequently taken to Malta, where I examined them in detail on the 23rd November. Without any possible doubt these mines are of the German GY type and not GR. Several characteristics, which I had not been able to check while the mines were afloat make it impossible to confuse these types of mine.

- a) The much greater diameter of the shell of the GY mine
- b) A ring to which the two hemispheres of the shell are welded.
- c) Two horns of a peculiar shape, mounted on a bracket (elbow piece), which are not visible when the mine is in the water, being fixed to the lower hemisphere. The GY mine is the largest moored mine I have ever seen (six hundred pounds of explosive).

I took the opportunity of this close examination to note that the marks painted on the mines are still easily readable.

(Sgd) Le Capitaine de Fregate
Mestre

EXHIBIT VI (a)

PHOTOGRAPHS OF MINES FOUND IN THE SWEEP CHANNEL

ON 13TH NOVEMBER, 1946

EXHIBIT VI (a)


PHOTOGRAPHS OF MINES FOUND IN THE SWEEP CHANNEL ON 13TH NOVEMBER, 1946

A. 1




Warrant Officer Powning securing a tow rope to mine No. 2 swept by H.M.S. "SKIPJACK" at 1124 on 13th November off Saranda. Mine No.1 had exploded. The Albanian coast is seen in the background.


A. 2



Mine No.2 being brought ashore on the rugged coast of Corfu.



A detailed examination by Lieutenant Phillips reveals that it is a German moored mine Type "Y". The fresh paint on the mine and the grease on the mooring wire showed that it had been recently laid.



The detonator is removed by Lieutenant Phillips in order to render the mine safe.


EXHIBIT VI (a)

PHOTOGRAPHS OF MINES FOUND IN THE SWEPT CHANNEL


ON 13TH NOVEMBER, 1946

EXHIBIT VI (a)

PHOTOGRAPHS OF MINES FOUND IN THE SWEPT CHANNEL ON 13TH NOVEMBER, 1946



All mines swept were identified as German "Y" type. The two mines which were dismantled had all seven horns in place, and the fresh paint on the casing and the grease on the mooring wire showed that the mines had only been a short time in the water.




Type C. Mechanism plate of the German "Y" type mine. The photograph shows the firing mechanism and electric leads which connect to the contact horns on the outer casing of the mine.

EXHIBIT VI (b)

PHOTOGRAPHS OF MINES FOUND IN THE SWEPT CHANNEL


ON 13TH NOVEMBER, 1946


B. 1



A tow rope being secured to one of the mines. This mine was subsequently dismantled. See photograph B. 3.

B. 2





The second mine recovered after being dismantled ashore. The mine like the first one, was found to be in new condition and with fresh paint on the case and grease on the mooring wire. The mechanism plate from this mine is shown in Photograph A. 6.

EXHIBIT VI (c)


PHOTOGRAPHS OF MINES FOUND IN THE SWEEP CHANNEL


ON 13TH NOVEMBER, 1946

PHOTOGRAPHS OF MINES FOUND IN THE SWEEP CHANNEL ON 13TH NOVEMBER, 1946



Two of the mines swept between 1338 and 1401 on 13th November off Saranda. The coast of Albania can be seen in the background.





B.Y.M.S. Minesweeper 2075 on board which the French observer, Captain de Fregate Mestre witnessed the Minesweeping. One of the mines swept is shown in the foreground. The fresh paint and lack of seaweed indicates that the mine can only recently have been laid. The Albanian Coast is seen in the background.


EXHIBIT VI (c)

PHOTOGRAPHS OF MINES FOUND IN THE SWEEP CHANNEL

ON 13TH NOVEMBER, 1946


EXHIBIT VI (c)

PHOTOGRAPHS OF MINES FOUND IN THE SWEEP CHANNEL ON 13TH NOVEMBER, 1946




C. 4

One of the mines swept off Saranda. The newness of the paint and lack of seaweed and barnacles show that it can only have been recently laid.



C. 5

6



One of the mines swept off Saranda. The coast of Albania is in the background.

7




EXHIBIT VI (d)

PHOTOGRAPHS OF MINES FOUND IN THE SWEPT CHANNEL

ON 13TH NOVEMBER, 1946

"FROM: THE SUPERINTENDENT, ADMIRALTY MINING ESTABLISHMENT, LEIGH PARK HOUSE, NR. HAVANT, HANTS.

EXAMINATION OF GERMAN MINE TYPE G.Y FROM MALTA
(EX. CORFU)


The mine was in good condition externally and internally, much paint remaining on the spherical shell and only slight traces of marine growth on the mechanism plate. A serial number D.S.161 was visible on the shell upper hemisphere. Originally in red paint, the number had been recently painted over in white. Each of the seven lead horns carried a red paint ring near the tip.

The mine is identified as a German G.Y of the "EMC.II" class (German title) which was designed in 1942/43 for use with 6 metres (20 ft.) 2 inch chain mooring, and 100 metres (50 fathom) 1.9/16 inch stranded steel mooring rope. This class of mine was put into service by the Germans largely in 1944, in the North Sea and the Mediterranean."

EXHIBIT VI (d)

PHOTOGRAPHS OF MINES FOUND IN THE SWEEP CHANNEL ON 13TH NOVEMBER, 1946

D. 1



D. 2




EXHIBIT VI (e)

MARINE GROWTH ON MINES

THE AMOUNT OF MARINE GROWTH FOUND ON A MINE IS AN
INDICATION OF THE LENGTH OF TIME THE MINE HAS BEEN
IN THE WATER

EXHIBIT VI (e)

From experience of minesweeping and minelaying it has been ascertained that Marine Growth will accumulate on mines laid at depths down to twenty feet below the surface at the rate of three inches in thickness in three to six months.

The photographs shown here are of mines being recovered two to three years after laying and should be compared with photographs of mines found off the Albanian coast shown in Exhibits VI (a) to (d).






EXHIBIT VI (e)

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EXHIBIT VI (c)

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


EXHIBIT VII

Chart showing position of mines

EXHIBIT VII




EXHIBIT VIII.

CHART SHOWING DEFENCES OVERLOOKING THE
BAY OF SARANDA (PORTA EDDA) AND THE TRACK OF H.M. SHIPS
ON PASSAGE ON 15TH MAY

EXHIBIT VIII




EXHIBIT IX

Affidavit sworn by Captain of U.N.N.R.A. vessel
which was fired on on October 29th, 1946.

A F F I D A V I T

I . . . *Enrico Bargellini*
 of *Via Oberdan 4, Viareggio*

Master Mariner, make Oath and say as follows:-

I was Master of the TANAC tug F/CT 12, and at about 2100 hours on 29th October, 1946 I was proceeding with three U.N.R.R.A. barges in tow, Southwards in the North Corfu Channel when I was fired on from the Albanian shore. The position of my vessel was approximately halfway down the channel and less than $\frac{1}{2}$ mile from the Albanian coast. The night was moonless and the sky overcast. Vessel was burning all navigation lights. The fire was well directed and most of the shots fell across the vessel's bow although some straddled her. They appeared to have been fired in three bursts from a heavy automatic gun although rifle fire was also heard. On realising my danger, I headed the vessel towards the Corfu coast and was shortly joined by a Greek motor launch which had been attracted to the scene by the sound of firing. We exchanged messages as to identity, and the motor launch escorted us to Corfu where we arrived at 0100 hours next day. On examination in daylight, neither tug nor barges were found to have been hit.

Witness my hand this *thirty-first* . . . day of
December, . . . , 19*46*.

Enrico Bargellini

SWORN at Viareggio, a place within the Consular District of Florence, before me:


Federigo Lelli

 BRITISH Pro Consul



EXHIBIT X.

Photograph of small craft
prepared for minelaying.



H.M.S. NIGHTINGALE

EXHIBIT XI.

Chart showing routes of
Aircraft on Oct. 22nd and 23rd.

