

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 28 March 1978, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. S.T. Devare

(India)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. F.J. DÁVILA
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. I. MASTROGIOVANNI
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. G. GAVRILOV Mr. I. PETROV Mr. I. SOTIROV
<u>Burma:</u>	U TINT SO
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. H. JAY Mr. J.T. SIMARD
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. E. ZÁPOTOCKÝ Mr. V. ROHAL-ILKIV
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI Mr. M. OMAR Mr. T. DINANA
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HERDER Mr. M. GRACYNSKI Mr. M. RAKAU
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. J. PÖHLMANN Mr. K. HANNESSCHLÄGER
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. M. DOMOKOS Mr. A. LAKATOS
<u>India:</u>	Mr. S.T. DEVARE Mr. B. BALAKRISHNAN
<u>Iran:</u>	Miss C. TAHMASSEB Mr. D. CHILATY

Italy: Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
Mr. M. MORENO

Japan: Mr. T. SAWAI
Mr. Y. NAKAMURA

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Mr. M. MARIN

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco:

Netherlands: Mr. A.J. MEERBURG
Mr. M.W. VAN BATENBURG

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. S.T. ADAMU

Pakistan: Mr. A.A. HASHMI

Peru:

Poland: Mr. A. OLSZOWKA
Mr. H. PAĆ
Mr. M. KRUCZYK

Romania: Mr. C. ENE
Mr. V. TUDOR

Sweden: Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. U. REINUS

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.I. LIKHATCHEV
Mr. N.V. PESTEREV
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
Mr. L.A. NAOUMOV
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. E.D. ZAITSEV
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV
Mr. G.A. SHEVCHENKO

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.R. ASHE
 Mr. C.L.G. MALLABY
 Mr. I.R. KENYON

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER
 Mr. A.R. TURRENTINE
 Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
 Mr. R. HAGENGRUBER
 Miss B. MURRAY
 Mrs. E. ARENSBURGER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. MULONGANDUSU ESUK

Special Representative of the
 Secretary-General:

Mr. Risto HYVÄRINEN

Alternate Representative of the
 Secretary-General:

Ms. A. SEGARRA

Communiqué of the meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 782nd plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. S.T. Devare, representative of India.

The representative of Canada (H.E. Ambassador R. Harry Jay) recalled that the General Assembly had asked the Conference to give the highest priority to the comprehensive test-ban treaty. He underlined that the importance of the multilateral phase of the negotiations for such a treaty could not be overemphasized. One of the most vexing problems in the negotiations had been to provide for verification measures that would ensure an effective CTB. It had now become widely admitted that teleseismic means and an international seismic data exchange would have an important role to play in a multilateral CTBT. The last report of the Ad Hoc Group on seismic data exchange had indicated that a network for the exchange of seismic data was technically feasible. Since all nations did not have an equal capacity to monitor seismic events, the establishment of such a network and exchange system would make available to all parties to the treaty seismic data on which to base their interpretation of such events at the national level. This co-operative process could help to maintain a higher level of international confidence in the treaty.

Stressing the Canadian Government's long-standing support for the concept of an international seismic data exchange system, Ambassador Jay stated that the fundamental objective was the actual creation of an international network. Thus, a pressing task of the Ad Hoc Group was the development of appropriate guidelines and procedures that would facilitate the necessary broad participation. Canada looked forward to being in a position to play its full part in a seismic data exchange system as early as April 1979.

The representative of Egypt (H.E. Ambassador O. El-Shafei) mentioned that this spring session had convened earlier than usual and in great expectation of the long-awaited results on negotiations concerning the CTB and CW. While the results were not forthcoming, there had nevertheless been assurances on the part of those engaged in negotiation that progress had been made. In the light of those assurances, he welcomed the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on seismic events, particularly when the Group found evidence of prospects for a further reduction of uncertainties and for narrowing the remaining areas of differences.

Ambassador Omran El-Shafei, in formulating his delegation's desire for a positive outcome of the current negotiations, referred to factors which could have a negative effect on the negotiations if the latter were left to drag on indefinitely. In this regard, he invited the major military Powers to increase their co-operation for solving world problems, thus lessening tensions and eliminating armed conflicts. The head of the delegation of Egypt outlined his Government's general policy on disarmament questions, in particular its stand on declaring the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone. He also dealt with his Government's position on the question of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, on the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament and on the question of the structure of the CCD.

The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (H.E. Ambassador V.I. Likhatchev) made a statement on the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. He noted that the course of events following the initiative of the Soviet Union concerning the prohibition of the use of achievements of scientific and technological progress for purposes of developing new types of such weapons had most convincingly confirmed the importance and timeliness of the proposal. The urgency of the problem of the comprehensive prohibition, as soon as possible, of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction had not diminished within this period, but, on the contrary, had become greater. The course of modern scientific and technological progress testified to the fact that in view of new successes in the field of fundamental knowledge and a high level of technology the probability of the emergence of the said types and systems of weapons was increasing. The world was becoming ever more concerned with the danger of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

Taking this into account, the United Nations General Assembly, at its thirty-second session, had urged the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, aimed at working out the text of a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of such weapons, and, when necessary, specific agreements on the prohibition of any specific new weapons which might be identified.

Ambassador Likhatchev pointed out further that the Soviet Union exerted and would exert constant efforts in order to put into practice the urgent task -- the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. At the 1977 summer session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the USSR delegation had proposed a supplemented draft of a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction which included provisions resulting from joint discussions of this problem in the Committee. The draft provided for the possibility of concluding, together with a comprehensive agreement, special agreements on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of particular new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the supplemented draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction had an annex with an approximate list of types and systems of such weapons which could be covered by the agreement.

The representative of the Soviet Union stated that in order to make more purposeful the Committee's work on establishing the agreed text of a comprehensive agreement prohibiting new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, in particular on the definition of the scope of the prohibition, it was necessary to establish, under the auspices of the Committee, a group of qualified governmental experts to consider the question of possible areas of development of new types of weapons of mass destruction to be included in the initial list of the types of such weapons to be prohibited under a comprehensive agreement. He introduced a corresponding draft decision of the Committee on this question (CCD/564). In the view of the USSR delegation, the establishment of such a group of experts would ensure a more profound study of the said areas and would contribute to bringing closer together the viewpoints of the members of the Committee on the question of the scope of the prohibition covered by the agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

The delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presented a "Draft decision of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the establishment of an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts to consider the question of possible areas of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction" (CCD/564).

In accordance with its schedule of meetings adopted on 16 February 1978 (CCD/551) and following a proposal by the representative of the Hungarian People's Republic, the Committee decided to hold an informal meeting, with the participation of experts, on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction on Wednesday, 29 March 1978, at 3 p.m.

The Committee held an informal meeting to discuss some aspects of the schedule of meetings adopted on 16 February 1978 (CCD/551).

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 30 March 1978, at 10.30 a.m.

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Mr. JAY (Canada): At the thirty-second session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, I had the honour of delivering the Canadian statement before the First Committee. I recall saying that there was at last some basis for optimism with regard to the long-sought goal of a comprehensive test-ban treaty now that serious, formal negotiations had begun, involving the three original parties to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963.

It is worth reviewing the importance of a CTBT. For many years, and as a reflection of the general concern of the world community, the General Assembly of the United Nations has asked this Conference to give the highest priority to the negotiation of such a measure. And with reason, for it has long been recognized that a multilateral CTBT would serve to limit the development of new weapons systems, buttress the international non-proliferation system and provide an example of the international community's ability to make solid progress in an important field of arms control. Particularly to fulfil these latter two points, the importance of the multilateral phase of the negotiations of the CTBT cannot be overemphasized.

We note with satisfaction the progress achieved so far by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the USSR in their negotiations to remove the areas of disagreement which have blocked progress for so long. The efforts of the CCD have also made an important contribution to this task. One of the most vexing problems has been to provide for verification measures that would ensure an effective CTB. Since the 1960s, when Canada, along with some other members, started exploring the possibility of utilizing teleseismic means and the international seismic data exchange concept, it has become widely recognized that such means have an important role to play in a multilateral CTBT.

Now we have before us the report of the Ad Hoc Group on seismic data exchange. We welcome this report as the fruit of two years of diligent technical work pursued in a spirit of co-operation from all quarters, and we fully support it. The report indicates that a network for the exchange of seismic data is technically feasible.

We must now address ourselves to what useful further work might be pursued by the Ad Hoc Group in coming months. While we would not wish to prejudge the multilateral negotiations, we are confident in this connexion that those concerned will agree that teleseismic means will be a basic monitoring tool. We, therefore, see an important role that an international exchange of seismic data can play, and we see the need to create and develop a network for such an

(Mr. Jay, Canada)

exchange under the treaty. The CTBT is meant to be a multilateral treaty, but it is quite evident that not all nations have an equal capacity to monitor seismic events by teleseismic means. There is a role for such a network and exchange system in putting all parties to the treaty on an equivalent footing, in terms of the availability of seismic data to interpret such events at the national level. Through this co-operative process, a higher level of international confidence could be maintained in the treaty.

Therefore, it seems to my delegation that the Ad Hoc Group's most pressing task must be to make broad participation in an eventual network possible by preparing the ground in advance. This task can best be accomplished by having the Ad Hoc Group develop the technical guidelines and procedures required for participating seismic nations, so as to make the resulting data of a uniformly high standard. A second task which in our view the Ad Hoc Group can immediately address, is delineation of the operational procedures for the international data centre or centres, identified in the Ad Hoc Group's report as essential to the successful operation of the network.

The Ad Hoc Group's report points out what further work is required up to the actual creation and operation of a network in the context of the successful negotiation of a CTB. We see merit in the CCD recognizing these requirements, including the conducting of experimental exercise and tests and assigning the Ad Hoc Group, at this stage, the initial tasks I have outlined above.

In keeping with its long-standing support for the concept of an international-seismic-data-exchange system, I am happy to indicate that, now that such an enterprise seems to be a likely possibility, perhaps by next year, we shall be seeking budgetary authorization for the necessary resources to be in a position, subject to financial approval, to play our full part in a seismic-data-exchange system starting as early as 1 April 1979.

Mr. EL-SHAPEI (Egypt): As I am taking the floor for the first time at this spring session of the CCD, allow me to add my voice of welcome to our colleagues who have joined us for the first time: Ambassador Adeniji of Nigeria, Ambassador Tadesse Terrefe of Ethiopia, Ambassador Pfeiffer of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands and Ambassador Voutov of Bulgaria. My delegation welcomes their participation and wishes to assure them of our full co-operation, and would like to ask them kindly to convey our best wishes to their predecessors.

This spring session started earlier than usual with the tacit agreement of all delegations and in great expectation, for two reasons: the first, that the negotiations taking place outside the CCD, bilaterally on chemical weapons and trilaterally on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, were expected to produce the results waited for; the second, that this session is the last one of the CCD immediately before the special session on disarmament of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Both occasions could have been considered as strong reasons for enhancing the work of this session. We are now almost at the end of our session, and many of us, and indeed the majority of the States Members of the United Nations which will shortly be deliberating the various issues of disarmament at the special session, will be looking at this negotiating body, questioning its achievements.

Meanwhile, my delegation, among others, was assured at the beginning of this session by the leaders of both the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Likhatchev, and the United States delegation, Ambassador Fisher, that the tripartite negotiations with respect to a comprehensive test ban have made progress. As of recently, the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Ambassador Ashe, assured us that substantial progress has been made towards agreement on the provisions of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, and that a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would be an integral part of such a treaty.

We were further assured by Ambassador Ashe, speaking on behalf of the parties to the tripartite negotiations, that they consider that all parties to the treaty, whether or not they contribute seismic stations to the global network, should have the right to participate and to receive seismic data provided by the international exchange, and that procedural arrangements for implementing the international exchange should be worked out after the entry into force of the treaty.

(Mr. El-Shafei, Egypt)

In the light of these statements and assurances, my delegation welcomes the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic Events, and finds it most helpful regarding the possibility of realizing a verifiable test ban. The history of national research programmes as well as multinational undertakings in the field of detecting and identifying seismic events is such that in scrutinizing its results, the Ad Hoc Group finds evidence of prospects for further reduction of the uncertainties and of narrowing the remaining areas of disagreement.

My delegation has noticed the need for an experimental exercise felt by the Ad Hoc Group, and would like to see this work done. In this regard, we noted also with appreciation the invitation extended by the Government of Japan to help realize such an experimental exercise. We would like to support as well the draft submitted by the Swedish delegation on terms of reference for the continued work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts (CCD/562).

While we support every effort tending to narrow the differences between the positions of the participants in the current negotiations for achieving a comprehensive test ban, we remain confident that all efforts will be made to expedite these negotiations, for, we believe, however important agreement is in the field of detecting and identifying seismic events for achieving progress in the negotiations, other factors outside the negotiations can affect it negatively if the negotiations are allowed to drag on indefinitely.

Recent developments in the field of producing new weapons of mass destruction have already clouded the atmosphere, not only of the present session of the CCD, but also the atmosphere of arms control negotiations taking place outside the CCD. In this connexion, we cannot ignore the fact that a draft convention has already been submitted to the CCD at this spring session by a number of delegations on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, development and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

We have also listened to the counter-arguments against raising this subject in the CCD. Some of them reveal the horrifying aspect of the race to produce weapons of a much greater destructive capacity.

(Mr. El-Shafei, Egypt)

My delegation would be failing in its duty if we did not denounce, in a most categorical way, the production of new weapons of mass destruction. This aspect is especially alarming after this negotiating body has made serious efforts to reach an agreement on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling and deployment of weapons of mass destruction.

We believe that science and technology should serve the progress and prosperity of mankind and should not be used for its destruction. The General Assembly, by its resolution 32/84, requested once again the CCD to continue negotiations with the participation of experts to work out the text of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and, when necessary, prepare specific agreements on this subject, and to submit a report on the results achieved for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session. We look forward to a meaningful discussion of this question, in the light of which we might request the establishment of a working group with the task of elaborating an agreement or agreements in this regard.

I referred briefly to factors in the field of armament which can affect negatively the current negotiations on arms control. My reference would be insufficient if we do not take into consideration other factors which have a bearing on negotiations undertaken by the major military Powers. We know that reduction and arms control cannot be effected in a political vacuum. Recent developments in world political events confirm the responsibilities of the major nuclear Powers, and we believe that efforts to solve world political problems must go parallel, and with no less determination, with efforts to reduce the dangers resulting from the increasing arms race.

Greater attention must be directed towards the underlying causes responsible for the continuation of armed conflicts threatening international peace and security. We believe that the major Powers are under the obligation to contribute positively to the solution of these problems.

Egypt has constantly shown deep commitment to the cause of disarmament. We have always encouraged and supported initiatives tending to strengthen international peace and security. Together with many non-aligned countries, we initiated the idea that led to the adoption by consensus of General Assembly resolution 31/189, which provided for the convening of the special session

(Mr. El-Shafei, Egypt)

devoted to disarmament and for holding a world disarmament conference. My delegation is fully confident of the important role the special session has to play. We presented to the Preparatory Committee, together with other non-aligned countries, a working document containing a draft declaration and programme of action on disarmament which was submitted to our Committee as well (CCD/550). As we look forward to a greater success of the special session in the field of disarmament, we emphasize the need for sincere and effective international co-operation in trying to eliminate the causes and sources of tensions, wherever they are.

It is not my intention to dwell in depth on the continuous and sincere efforts exerted by my Government to help achieve a just and lasting peace in our region, the only effective way to halt the arms race in the area, nor do I intend to speak about the courageous peace initiative launched by President Sadat, an initiative which was met with great admiration and approval. The recent developments in the area convince us, once more, that all should be done to pave the way for resolving the conflict and not complicating it. Among the efforts I referred to, and relevant to the work of this Committee, is our demand for the denuclearization of the region. Together with the delegation of Iran, we inscribed this item on the agenda of the General Assembly four years ago, and requested that all necessary measures should be undertaken to declare the Middle East a denuclearized zone. We will continue to insist in this direction, so that the population of our region may be spared the dangers of annihilation.

This Committee has been requested once more by the General Assembly in its resolution 32/80 to continue its work on the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. We note with satisfaction that a number of proposals are already submitted to this effect. My delegation, along with the delegations of Argentina, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia and Zaire, has submitted to the CCD document CCD/550, containing a programme of action on disarmament. We believe that this programme of action can form a good basis for negotiation.

I shall only dwell on three main aspects of this question:

1. Concluding a comprehensive programme for disarmament is a matter of urgency. We should bear in mind that the accumulation of armaments, and

(Mr. El-Shafei, Egypt)

in particular nuclear arms and arms of mass destruction, constitutes an immediate threat to mankind, particularly in the absence of instruments banning the production, stockpiling and use of such weapons.

2. Priority should be given to nuclear, chemical, incendiary weapons and other weapons of mass-destruction, respectively. Putting an end to conflict in hotbed regions by eliminating its roots will bring about an effective limitation and gradual reduction of conventional arms on both a regional and a global basis.

3. Measures to build confidence should be carefully observed by all States. The principle of the non-use of force or of the threat of force in any form against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States would contribute to creating a climate of confidence among States if observed strictly.

In establishing the Ad Hoc Working Group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament to elaborate such a programme, we believe that our Committee has taken the right course of action.

While we view the General Assembly as the main political decision-making organ in the field of disarmament, the CCD remains the main competent negotiating body. In the light of this fact, this body bears a great responsibility. Efforts should be exerted to further its ability and to enhance its activities. The Group of Fifteen -- to which Egypt belongs -- has presented to the CCD for its consideration some concrete proposals relating to the question of structure and procedures. These proposals are reflected in document CCD/550.

The necessary conditions for the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in the activities of the CCD should be created. The system of chairmanship of the CCD should be amended in such a way as to satisfy the need which the CCD members feel for the change. Monthly rotation might be a solution for such a change. An organic link between the General Assembly and the CCD should be established. Many proposals have been presented to that effect. We believe that all proposals should be dealt with objectively and in a spirit of goodwill for the purpose of making our negotiating body more effective.

Mr. LIKHACHEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Since the Soviet Union came forward with its initiative concerning the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the course of events has most convincingly confirmed the importance and timeliness of that proposal. The arms race is becoming ever more dangerous, and new, barbarous means of warfare are emerging. One of the most dangerous types of weapons of mass destruction -- the nuclear weapon -- is being perfected. The world has been threatened with the production and deployment of a qualitatively new variety of those weapons -- nuclear neutron weapons. The danger of scientific achievements being used for the purposes of developing new types of weapons of mass destruction remains and is growing greater.

The delegation of the Soviet Union considers that until agreement on the strict prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction is reached, there will remain the possibility of, and even scope for, the use of the achievements of scientific and technological progress for purposes exactly opposite to the constructive ones -- for the development of weapons of mass destruction in areas that are basically new. Without achieving an agreement, it will obviously be impossible to halt the dangerous process of releasing the spring of the arms race; in the modern world, one cannot expect that the deployment of any new type of weapons by one side will not lead to its appearance on the other side also.

Is there a real possibility of saving the world from such a dangerous course of events, and can a reliable barrier be erected to the development of new types and systems of weapons? In connexion with this task, we sometimes hear assertions to the effect that to reach agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction is difficult because the possible areas of the development of such types of weapons cannot easily be discovered in advance. We do not accept this view, for the idea is precisely to reach an agreement in principle -- in the form of an international instrument -- not to develop or manufacture any new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and, in cases where it is considered necessary, to conclude additional special agreements on the prohibition of particular specific types and systems.

(Mr. Likhatchev, USSR)

Today no one presumes to call in question the existence of the danger of new and even more devastating types and systems of weapons of mass destruction being developed, the consequences of whose emergence it is now even difficult to foresee, or the resultant urgency of the problem of the prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of new types and systems of such weapons.

At its recent, thirty-second session, the United Nations General Assembly bore witness to the ever-growing concern in the world over the real danger of scientific and technological progress being used for purposes of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. This problem was widely discussed both in the plenary meetings of the Assembly and in the First Committee. The Assembly adopted two special resolutions on this question. One of them -- 32/84 A -- contains a direct request to the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, aimed at working out the text of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and, when necessary, specific agreements on this subject. At the same time, the General Assembly urged all States to refrain from any action which would impede international talks aimed at working out an agreement or agreements to prevent the use of scientific and technological progress for the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. It is clear that all States should give due attention to this call to continue negotiations, to facilitate their conduct and not to impede them.

The other resolution -- 32/84 B, whose co-sponsors were Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Italy, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Japan -- also contains, together with an appeal to States "to refrain from developing new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles" and "to apply scientific discovery for the benefit of mankind", a request to the Committee on Disarmament to keep under review the question of the development of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and to consider the desirability of formulating agreements on the prohibition of any specific new weapons which may be identified.

These two resolutions show that although some divergencies of opinion remain in connexion with the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction, those divergencies relate not to whether a barrier to the emergence of such types of weapons should be erected, but rather to the question of the methods which should be used to achieve such a prohibition. The first resolution,

(Mr. Likhatchev, USSR)

which was co-sponsored by the socialist countries, represents a more active approach to the solution of the tasks before us, and in our opinion this approach is the more effective one. But this does not mean that intensive study and constant observation of developments in the field of the emergence of new types and systems of weapons are thereby excluded. Such study and observation would be useful in themselves, and I intend to dwell on this aspect in greater detail somewhat later. At the same time, it is hardly possible to accept the view that all that is needed is to confine ourselves to keeping the development and manufacture of new types of weapons under observation, and to studying the possibility of their emergence, so that an appropriate agreement can be prepared, but only after the danger of the emergence of such a weapon becomes obvious and tangible. If the question is put in this way, the elaboration of a much-needed agreement might be delayed, and this could have far-reaching disastrous consequences.

As everyone knows, the Soviet Union is making great efforts to ensure that the idea of prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction is given practical effect. More than two years ago, the USSR submitted to the United Nations General Assembly a specific document -- a draft international legal agreement on this question. The members of the Committee on Disarmament will remember that at the last summer session of the Committee the USSR delegation, acting on the instructions of its Government, introduced a supplemented draft agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction (CCD/511/Rev.1) which included provisions resulting from joint discussions of this problem here, in the Committee on Disarmament. In particular, we took into account the ideas of a number of members of the Committee concerning the definition of the notion of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The definition of the object of the prohibition which had previously been included in the Soviet draft agreement was brought as closely as possible into line with the well-known formulation of 1948, on which there is already a broad area of agreement. The Soviet Union actively supported the views -- quite reasonable, in our opinion -- of those members of the Committee on Disarmament who spoke in favour of the prohibition of particular new types of weapons of mass destruction on the basis of specific agreements; and in its supplemented draft it provided for the possibility of concluding, together, i.e. parallel, with a comprehensive agreement, special agreements on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of particular new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction (article I, paragraph 3, of the draft).

(Mr. Likhatchev, USSR)

We believe that the main thing is to achieve a comprehensive solution of this problem. And here all ways are good if they lead to this goal. In this connexion I would like to remind the distinguished members of the Committee that the Soviet Union has not only stated the possibility of using various methods to achieve the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, but is taking practical steps in this direction. As everyone knows, the Soviet Union has now been conducting bilateral negotiations for more than a year with the United States on the question of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and in this context on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

An important initiative in the field of the prohibition of the development of a new weapon of mass destruction was the submission on 9 March 1978 by eight socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, of a draft convention, for consideration by the Committee on Disarmament, on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. We are convinced that the implementation of this proposal by the socialist countries, which is in the spirit of our times and meets the interests of strengthening peace and the security of the peoples, would not only be an important factor in curbing the nuclear arms race, but would also make a considerable contribution to preventing the danger of the use of scientific and technological progress for purposes of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

A positive exchange of views has already taken place in the Committee on Disarmament, both at its official meetings and at informal meetings with the participation of governmental experts, on the question of preparing a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. A number of delegations, including the representatives of the socialist countries as well as those of India, Pakistan and Egypt, actively supported the proposal on the conclusion of such an agreement.

I would like now to touch upon a question to which I referred earlier. Current discussions in the Committee show that the main subject we are talking about is the scope of the prohibition, i.e. which new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction could be subject to prohibition. The distinguished members of the Committee are well aware of the fact that the Soviet Union has spoken and speaks now in favour of the proposition that the prohibition of potentially dangerous areas of the development of such weapons should have as

(Mr. Likhatchev, USSR)

broad a scope as possible. At the same time, we have indicated precisely which such areas may now already be regarded as probable and could therefore be prohibited. For this purpose we annexed to our supplemented draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction an approximate list of types and systems of such weapons which could be covered by the agreement. Of course, this list makes no claim to be exhaustive, and is open for any future additions, as the need arises. Several delegations, in particular at informal meetings of the Committee, have already made some valuable suggestions regarding possible additions to this list, particularly of areas which are at the junction between different sciences.

It seems to us that in order to make more purposeful the Committee's work on establishing the agreed text of a future agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction -- and we take it that the need for a scientific study of every aspect of this question is generally recognized -- some measures of an organizational nature must be adopted.

The USSR delegation considers that a group of governmental experts should be established under the auspices of the Committee to consider the question of possible areas of development of new types of weapons of mass destruction to be included in the initial list of the types of such weapons to be prohibited under a comprehensive agreement. In this way we could identify the potentially dangerous areas more fully, and, by forestalling the possible development on their basis of new weapons of mass destruction, make the necessary efforts to secure the prohibition of such types of weapons.

In this connexion the delegation of the Soviet Union submits for consideration by the members of the Committee a draft decision on the establishment of an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts to consider the question of possible areas of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction (CCD/564). We urge the distinguished members of the Committee to approve this draft decision of the Committee on Disarmament.

We believe that the establishment of such a group of experts would meet the wishes expressed by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-second session, when it requested that negotiations and the study of the question should be continued, with a view to the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction. We would thus ensure a still deeper study of potentially dangerous possible areas of development of new types of weapons of mass

(Mr. Likhatchev, USSR)

destruction, and no doubt succeed in bringing closer together the points of view of the members of the Committee on questions connected with a precise definition of the object of the prohibition.

In submitting for the consideration of the members of the Committee its proposal concerning the establishment of the above-mentioned group of experts on new types of weapons of mass destruction for consideration by the members of the Committee, the Soviet delegation also proceeds from its awareness that the Committee on Disarmament has already acquired good and useful experience of the work of similar ad hoc groups. Take, for example, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic Events. This Ad Hoc Group has done some useful work, as may be gathered from its final report, submitted recently to the Committee.

We understand, of course, that, apart from the object of the prohibition, the preparation of an agreement on the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction involves also other important questions requiring careful study and solution. This means that, side by side with the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, active efforts can and must be continued in the Committee on Disarmament to find solutions for other questions, too, connected with this agreement.

The CHAIRMAN: There are no more speakers on my list. According to the spring schedule of the Committee, this week has been earmarked for informal meetings with the participation of experts on the question of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. I would therefore like to enquire if there are any suggestions which distinguished representatives would like to make regarding the holding of meetings on this subject during the week.

Mr. DOMOKOS (Hungary): I would like to propose to the Committee that we hold a second informal meeting on the subject of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction at 3 p.m. tomorrow afternoon.

The Hungarian expert would like to make a statement on that occasion.

Mr. LIKHATCHEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I assume that you are aware of the decision of the Committee, which we took at the last plenary meeting, to hold the first informal meeting on this subject, with the participation of experts, at 3 p.m. today.

The CHAIRMAN: The first informal meeting on this subject will be held at 3 p.m. this afternoon.

I have been given to understand that the Co-Chairmen recommend that an informal meeting be held this morning to discuss some aspects of the CCD schedule. It is recommended by them that the plenary meeting be recessed and reconvened to take action on the schedule if a consensus develops as a result of the discussion at the informal meeting.

If this is agreeable, we will then hold an informal meeting after recessing the plenary meeting.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): As I understand, there is no proposal by the Co-Chairmen to have a recess of the session of the CCD. There is a proposal to have a discussion on this subject during a recess of this plenary meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: If I could just clarify, the statement I read out refers to a recess of this plenary, so that a discussion can be held to see if there is a developing consensus on the question of the CCD schedule. That is the proposal so far, and if there is no objection we can go ahead and hold an informal meeting to discuss this question.

The meeting was suspended at 11.40 a.m. and resumed at 1 p.m.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.