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PETITIONS CONCERNING THE CAMEROONS UNDER FRENCH ADMINISTRATION

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1. Petition from the Cameroonians of the New-Bell Quarter, Douala (T/PET.5/635)

The petition relates to various incidents which occurred in the Mungo and Sanaga-Maritime regions, and also at Douala and Yaoundé, at the end of last May.

The Administering Authority submits herewith a full account of these incidents.

This account is arranged as follows:

In a first section the background of the incidents is set forth; it is preceded by a descriptive and historical report on the Union des Populations du Cameroun;

A second section gives an account of the actual sequence of events;

A concluding section sets forth the measures which the Administering Authority responsible for law and order in the Cameroons was compelled to adopt in the sequence of those events;

A table summarizing the losses sustained by the law-enforcement service, the demonstrators and the public is given in an annex.

* * *

In the Cameroons, the week from 22 to 30 May was a period of serious disturbance marked by many incidents - some of them so serious as to constitute riots in the statutory sense - which necessitated intervention by the law-enforcement agencies.

The Union des Populations du Cameroun, an extreme left-wing revolutionary party of totalitarian type, was behind these disorders, which might have assumed very serious proportions had it not been for the coolness of the local administrative authorities and for the confidence they enjoy among the people.

It seems clear that the party's aim was savagely to create a gulf between the French Administration and the peoples which trust it, and to bring about an irreparable situation, with a view to inflaming international opinion, by artificially creating a Cameroonian problem before the success of the reform programme undertaken since the end of the Second World War rendered any large-scale action too difficult.

Before proceeding with a description of these incidents, it will be helpful to place them in their proper perspective and to stress that the sole purpose of the exaggerated terms of the telegrams from representatives of the UPC, handed in at Tiko, in the British Cameroons, on 28 and 29 May, was to deceive and mislead world opinion. The lie is obvious. The telegrams refer to aerial bombing and to 5,000 dead.

The number of dead did not in fact exceed twenty-six, including the European victims (two) and law-enforcement officers (one), and there was never any bombing from the air.

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The sequence of events, which took place according to a definite timing schedule, proved the existence of an efficient clandestine organization; the events were preceded by well-thought-out psychological preparation the effectiveness of which was demonstrated. It therefore seems necessary, if these occurrences are to be understood, to give an account of the nature of the Union des Populations du Cameroun and to show the trend of its activities in the months preceding the bloody events of May.

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The Union des Populations du Cameroun (abbreviated to UPC) was founded in 1947. It was originally a branch of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), established as a result of an internal crisis in the USCC (Union des Syndicats Confédérés du Cameroun). It did not begin its propaganda activities until 9 June 1948 after a somewhat protracted revision of its constitution. The group, which was a progressive political party at the outset, soon took definite shape as a xenophobic revolutionary movement seeking to unite the masses under the mantle of nationalism. Its cleavage with the RDA, which has existed in practice since 1950, marks the turning point in this movement's history.

Having a strong pyramidal structure modelled on the organization of the totalitarian parties, it succeeded in setting up its own leadership training school, its own press (L'Etoile, a weekly publication, La Voix du Cameroun, a monthly periodical, Lumière, a bi-monthly regional organ and La Vérité, a youth

bulletin), its satellite movements (the Jeunesse Démocratique Camerounaise and the Union des Femmes Camerounaises) and its peace movement (the Comité Camerouanis des partisans de la paix). Immediately before the May incidents it claimed to have about 10,000 active members and about 20,000 card-holding members. While the UPC had not succeeded in winning over the masses, its activities were nevertheless sufficiently effective to disturb the general atmosphere through the anti-foreign sentiment which it sought to arouse, through actually mobilizing suspicion and through the dissemination of carefully-chosen inflammatory slogans.

As a revolutionary movement of a type which has become classic, the UPC gave its active members a practical revolutionary training. Each central committee had its precision camera and its "Skymaster" radio set. In addition to the "theories concerning National Liberation Movements and Anti-Colonial Revolt Movements" ("national revolts in the form of insurrection, localized revolt movements in certain colonies") the syllabus of the training school included "practical courses in the operation of radio and the use of cameras".

The first principle governing the activities of an active member was to inspire fear in his local area in order to assert his influence and inveigle the timid, to adopt officially an attitude of martyrdom designed to disarm the enemy, and to attract sympathy while thus camouflaging his true activities. The second was "to utilize to the utmost the opportunities afforded by the régime against which the fight is directed, in order ostensibly to keep within the law and thereby to accumulate arguments for the future".

Lastly, the instructions given to active members represented the United Nations as a fighting organization, directed against the Administering Power, on which the Party could count to promote its work of subversion.

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The satellite movements likewise took the form, not of political parties with a civic purpose, but of complementary elements in the revolutionary struggle. The Jeunesse Démocratique Camerounaise was designed as a "nursery" for active party members. At Mbalmayo, its committee consisted of the same

active members and held joint meetings with the UPC Committee; only the officers were different. The Union Démocratique des Femmes Camerounaises was born of the desire to associate women with the active work of the party, the women being called upon to take part in demonstrations so as to paralyse the police action by their presence.

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As the party developed, it became more markedly clandestine. On 10 November 1954, the Chairman of the UPC issued instructions on the application of rules of procedure the spirit of which is worth noting. "These rules of procedure," he wrote, "are confidential; that is the desire of the Executive Committee The members present may take a few notes on guiding principles, but no verbatim reference will be permitted, in order to avoid certain indiscretions The Chairman of the Central Committee remains the sole custodian of the Code^{1/} which he will keep locked up in a safe or cupboard. Needless to say, he is pledged to secrecy and must take an oath in writing."

Following the May incidents, the Administering Authority discovered that the UPC had established a clandestine system of "letter boxes" and of mail relaying between the Cameroons and Gabon. The despatch of telegrams to the United Nations shows the same system of liaison with the Cameroons under British Administration. When Ruben UM NYOBE took flight, just before the incidents, the Administering Authority did not know what route he had taken, and many of the most important UPC leaders subsequently evaded the warrants issued for their arrest.

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This set-up was a logical one for the party in question; it was in keeping with a certain mode of thought and with the totalitarian methods by which its leaders were guided.

^{1/} According to the context, "Code" means "rules of procedure".

The Administering Authority confines itself at this point to stating certain facts, without drawing any conclusions from them for the time being. The UPC, which had the benefit of many training periods: in France and in certain foreign countries for its leaders, maintained a number of full-time workers whose training, propaganda and methods were thus thoroughly permeated with communist education. The UPC, like the CGT, received support on suitable occasions from all the world organizations of communist inspiration - financial support in the case of travel by active Cameroonian members to Europe, to America and even to Asia.

The two men who had animated and guided this movement, UM NYOBE RUBEN and Félix MOUMIE, the Party's Chairman, both of them nourished on revolutionary literature and deceived by the myth that they themselves had created concerning the power of the UPC, believed that the hour of revolution had come and plunged their party into the adventure.

Félix MOUMIE, in particular, bears a large share of the responsibility for these incidents. In addition to his undeniable qualities as a man of intelligence and a hard worker, he has an extremely impressionable imagination and a morbid pride which actually reaches the level of megalomania. The natural bent of his mind, aggravated by continual revolutionary reading, is to inflate, exaggerate and distort. He exerted a decisive influence during the period preceding these events. After the departure of UM NYOBE, his influence was unleashed and culminated in the bloodshed of 22 to 30 May. An impressionable man, more of a visionary than a realist, he precipitated his party into unlawfulness.

I. BACKGROUND OF THE INCIDENTS

It was primarily in the psychological conditioning of people's minds that the UPC demonstrated its methods. That conditioning was carried out in two stages, the first extending from the beginning of March to 17 April and the second from 17 April to 22 May, the date of the serious incidents at Mbanga.

A significant fact dating from 1954 clearly illustrates the methods used by this party to provoke popular reactions by creating a psychosis based upon the exploitation of the old residue of primitive terror and the exaltation of anti-foreign sentiment. During 1954, the UPC attempted to instill into the indigenous population of Douala the belief that European bandits, aided by African accomplices, were driving about in motorcars carrying off indigenous inhabitants in order to decapitate them and use their heads for the practice of witchcraft. This fable rapidly took definite form and spread through various regions of the Cameroons, giving rise to a whole series of incidents. In December, a list of registration numbers of "dangerous" vehicles "possibly belonging to the white bandits" was distributed from Douala to various centres. Active UPC members busily co-operated in spreading it. A UPC pamphlet dated 27 January, referring to an arrest made at Mbalmayo for an entirely different reason, gave the number of a vehicle in which, it was claimed, "a large coffin covered with caked blood, and a loaded revolver" had been found, and the pamphlet explained that the "man-hunters, brought before the authorities, had been sent in the direction of Yaoundé". On that occasion the UPC was able to assess the power of propaganda designed to take advantage of the public's credulity.

The UPC's psychological offensive was conducted in a very spectacular manner, both through meetings and through pamphlets and press communiqués which were widely quoted and discussed in study groups and newspaper articles. The offensive was characterized in its first stage by the systematic use of lies and in its second stage by increasingly violent calls to rebellion.

Everything the Administering Authority did was done for one purpose only: "to promote the exploitation and bondage of the Cameroonian people". For example, "Douala airfield is intended to serve the designs of the warmongers; the bridge over the Wouri will be of service only to the Europeans; their produce will no longer rot at Bonabéri; the Administration builds more prisons than hospitals" (meanwhile, of

course, the public health campaigns carried out by mobile teams were ignored). With regard to the missions, they were accused of "keeping the people in ignorance", of "campaigning against custom" (represented as the golden rule of an idyllic age), of themselves practising racial discrimination, the indigenous clergy being set in opposition to the non-African missionaries.

The Administration, in the person of its representatives, was insulted and slandered. As an example: The High Commissioner himself was taken to task. A pamphlet of 7 March states: "Mr. Roland Pré, the protector of Mr. Aujoulat, had hardly arrived in the Territory when he instituted a retrograde policy. It is quite clear that the aim of the new administration of R. Pré is to support the discredited Aujoulat by every possible means and to revive his prestige through fear, for it is through fear, always through fear, that Governments which hang together only by the slenderest thread seek to survive..."

Could the Administration fight this anonymous propaganda? Every precaution had been taken. It was not without reason that the syllabus of the leadership training school (Ecole des cadres) included theoretical and practical courses on the press, freedom of the press and judicial examination. As was emphasized in a letter dated 2 May from an individual named MPODOL to the Chairman of the UPC which found its way into the examining magistrates' files as a result of searches conducted under a warrant, "the pamphlets published are masterpieces, both from the political and from the judicial point of view".

To sum up, from early March to mid-April, the UPC carried on a vast campaign of denunciation and accusation. This advance was not effected without difficulty and some local setbacks. But the UPC leaders were encouraged by the action taken by the CGT at the same time: from 1 to 4 March there were 420 strikers at the port of Douala; in mid-April there was talk in CGT circles of a strike of indefinite duration by local civil servants, building workers, commercial employees and the like. It is easy to imagine how these events echoed in UPC circles - hence the enthusiasm of the political officers, which local setbacks failed to shake.

From mid-April the campaign was intensified. UM NYOBE said on 17 April at Yaoundé: "I expect to be imprisoned before the end of April.... In that event I shall no longer be here to calm the people's anger. And then we must expect bloodshed in which the colonialist Government will seek to drown our claims." That same day, at Manjo, MOUMIE announced that there was a plot to assassinate UM NYOBE.

The real aim was to justify the leader's flight, which was to take place on 25 April after the publication of a manifesto in which the UPC sought to disclaim in advance any responsibility for the coming events. The manifesto states: "We realize that it is just such a situation that the colonialists would like to develop in the Cameroons. We disclaim responsibility for anything that might be afoot."

The Administration was upbraided in increasingly violent terms, both generally and at the personal level. Here, for example, is what Félix MOUMIE wrote in a pamphlet that was widely disseminated late in April:

"After the notorious incidents of 17 October and 1 November 1954, ... the soil of Ngaoundéré was flooded by the torrential waves of repression. DOMERGUE and ELIAS had wanted to be included in the long list of the martyrology of colonization, and they therefore made the town of Ngaoundéré tremble through their abuses and unlawful acts.... The lives of DOMERGUE and ELIAS are sullied with abuses and illegal acts. September 1945 is the historic date when innocent Cameroonian patriots were killed for no reason by armed soldiers, including priests.... September 1945 is the sinister date on which the bodies of honest citizens were engulfed in wholesale slaughter. Whenever this date is mentioned, certain names come to mind: Nocolas, Georgy, Domergue, names which inspire fear and terror, names the letters of which are soiled with Cameroonian blood" and so forth.

In order to "warm up" active members and over-excite public opinion, public lectures were held at which the same themes invariably recurred: "this year shall not pass without our obtaining our independence - the hour has struck - today we are certain that we shall soon win the fruits of our struggle - we shall obtain our immediate independence, either granted or enforced - that day is near - the time has come - after the victory, the colonialists and their lackeys will be punished - woe betide Africans who are in the service of the police; they will be put to death - the hour has come, victory is near - independence is certain." Pamphlets played variations on the theme: "Blood has flowed" and spoke of "man-hunts, accompanied by pillage". All these accusations were baseless. They were designed to aggravate the tension that was already manifesting itself. On 10 May, the Chairman of the UPC said at Douala: "We must shake off the colonialist yoke. When the horse has had enough, he contrives to throw his rider. One day, the police cars will be overturned. Soon, moreover, the flag of the Democratic Republic of the Cameroons will be unfurled." On 15 May, at Douala, he described the flight of UM NYOBE in

these words: "UM NYOBE, like MAO TSE TUNG and HO CHI MINH, has taken to the maquis. He is now planning the revolution...."

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The reforms put into effect by the High Commissioner were denounced as being "aimed at the consolidation of colonial domination" (pamphlet dated 13 May by Ruben Um Nyobé). In a pamphlet dated 16 May, entitled "Civilisation française made by Roland Pré" ("French civilization, Roland Pré brand"), the High Commissioner and the Minister of Overseas France are accused of the foulest crimes: "blood flowed on the day of Minister Teitgen's arrival, and our compatriot Ngo Yock Sara was the perfect target: today she sleeps her last sleep. During a man-hunt, military lorry number 1794 CA, carrying guards and soldiers searching for the people who had objected to receiving Minister Teitgen as a symbol of protest against the policy of Roland Pré, his representative in the Cameroons, ran over this good citizeness - and for what reason? And this is civilization. People killed to avenge 'white blood'."

In public, to be sure, the UPC spoke of "answering only the blows received." That was ostensibly proclaiming a defensive attitude. Primarily, however, it was an effort to establish an alibi; for the UPC, while completing the mobilization of the Party's troops preparing sedition, was representing itself as a victim of imaginary "colonialist acts of provocation". That attitude was a clever and prudent move. Once the process of mobilization - first the mobilization of minds, and then that of the machetes - had been effected in such an atmosphere, there was no further possibility of retreat. For the UPC the problem was to create the impassioned atmosphere proper to promote the desired events. That is how the incidents originated the course of which the Administering Authority will now describe.

In its reply, the Administering Authority has been careful not to cite any unverified information. All facts and all statements contained in the reply have been established either by documents or by testimony surrounded by every safeguard.

II. ACCOUNTS OF INCIDENTS

For the sake of clarity, we shall consider in succession, while showing their sequence:

1. the incidents in Mungo.
2. the incidents at Douala itself.
3. the incidents at Yaoundé.
4. the incidents in Sanaga Maritime.

1. The incidents in Mungo: provocative acts by UPC members in Mungo

On 7 and 8 April 1955, in the Bamiléké region, in which for various reasons it takes an especial interest, the Union des Populations du Cameroun suffered a complete, spectacular and painful setback. At Mbouda and at Bafoussam the UPC delegation from Douala had been ridiculed by the members of a rival party, the RPC (Rassemblement du Peuple Camerounais). No meeting had been held, and it had not been possible to hoist the UPC flag. That setback was particularly keenly felt because it involved Ruben UM NYOBE and Abel KINGUE, the Party's most conspicuous leaders. On 23 April, at Bangangté, the UPC sent a new delegation led by Abel KINGUE, which was shut up in a hut by the people and freed only through the intervention of the Chief Subdivisional Officer. On 24 April, at Bafoussam, when the same delegation again sought to raise the UPC flag in the centre of the town, it was upbraided in violent terms by active members of the RPC and by peasants attending the market. These incidents were not without repercussions in Mungo, where more than one-third of the population is of Bamiléké origin. It was up to the UPC to avenge its failure and to select the Mungo region as the scene of the first of the incidents which it desired to provoke.

On 15 May an unauthorized meeting was held on the public highway at Mbanga, and had to be dispersed. Law-enforcement officers were jostled and struck. Nevertheless, with a view to restoring calm, no arrests were made.

First incidents at Mbanga: UPC victory bulletin

A second meeting, arranged to be held at the same place on the following Sunday, 22 May, was forbidden lest law and order might again be disturbed. It was, however, started notwithstanding the prohibition. This persistence clearly shows the provocative intent of the UPC members, who hoped to secure their hoped-for revenge

in that way. In the morning many UPC groups had arrived from Douala and the surrounding localities. The Chief Subdivisional Officer, accompanied by the commandant of the brigade and several guards, began to disperse the gathering. The demonstrators, numbering between 100 and 150, recoiled and allowed themselves to be pushed back to a predetermined position, where hundreds of individuals, armed with cudgels, empty bottles and the like, rushed out of the neighbouring huts and surrounded the police, who were thus cut off from their vehicles. During this clash a gendarme and some guards were seriously wounded by the demonstrators who attacked them. The three police vehicles were set on fire. A regional guard who was very seriously wounded died in hospital. When police reinforcements arrived, at about 3.30 p.m., the disturbances ceased entirely and the demonstrators scattered into the bush.

The "UPC victory" was announced that evening from Nkongsamba to Douala. It encouraged the active members and prompted chain reactions. As the police had not wished to use their weapons, the UPC spread the rumour that "the guards have no right to fire because the Cameroons is a Trust Territory" or, alternatively, that "the guards have only blank cartridges".

The next day, Monday, 23 May, the Chief Regional Officer came to the scene of the incident, accompanied by the examining magistrate and the magistrate. Some of the leaders were arrested. At Penja, the chief officer of the Loum administrative station was attacked and seriously wounded while making one of these arrests, and had to be taken to hospital.

Nkongsamba

On the same day a group of about forty UPC members, most of them armed with cudgels and iron bars, arrived at Nkongsamba by train. These people came from the area where the incidents of the previous day had occurred.

During the afternoon the demonstrators, reinforced by local UPC members, went to the regional administrative offices. When the Assistant Regional Officer appealed for calm the group withdrew without incident.

A second group of demonstrators arrived by lorry in the early afternoon of Tuesday, 24 May. Accompanied by women members of the UDEFEC, they went to the Chief Regional Officer's office at about 3.30 p.m. They were requested to leave, but did not withdraw until the police arrived, and then they reassembled in the African town.

The crowd then moved towards the prison, destroying several vehicles on its way. When the police intervened they were immediately surrounded and attacked. A non-commissioned officer who was in danger of his life was obliged to use his weapon. Two demonstrators were wounded and one of them died in hospital. The demonstrators dispersed, but in addition to the three victims already referred to, other persons were wounded, two of them being stabbed with knives. All of them were members of the police.

Further demonstrators were to arrive by train on 25 May. A guard was set at the station, and it was discovered that about forty passengers were carrying cudgels, tyre-wrenches, daggers or clasp-knives. These people were apprehended for an identity check and were put on a lorry to be taken to the police station. At that moment they blinded a law-enforcement officer with pepper, jumped from the vehicle and attacked the police. The police, being outnumbered, were obliged to use their weapons. Nine demonstrators were wounded.

Loum

On Wednesday, 25 May, serious incidents occurred at the village of Loum. Without any warning, between 200 and 250 demonstrators gathered at dawn, stormed the prison and then besieged the administrative station.

The Chief Subdivisional Officer was notified and proceeded to the spot with thirty Cameroonian guards; he was stopped at the entrance to the village by a barricade of stone blocks and boulders. The demonstrators, armed with cudgels, bottles and stones, were gathered behind this barricade and the huts bordering the road.

The Chief Subdivisional Officer gave the statutory warnings, calling upon the crowd to move on. Instead of dispersing, the demonstrators attacked the police, who, several of them being wounded, were compelled to fall back, throwing a few "shock grenades".^{1/} As the attack became more violent, the police used their weapons. Unfortunately, six of the demonstrators were killed and five wounded.

The administrative station was cleared without further use of force.

The demonstrators scattered into the bush, where they tried to reassemble their

^{1/} The French "shock grenade" (grenade offensive) consists of a light charge of explosive contained in a very thin casing. Its effect is in fact psychological, and it presents little physical danger; although such grenades were used on several occasions during the incidents, nobody was injured by them.

forces. Accordingly, a second barricade, similar to the first, was cleared in the village of Manjo on the following day, 26 May. This action by the police was not marked by any serious incident.

In addition, a large assembly of armed individuals was dispersed in similar circumstances at the village of Mombo on 29 May.

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To sum up, a series of demonstrations took place in Mungo, from 22 to 26 May, which were fostered by emotional excitement, by an early success at Mbanga and by a feeling of confidence that the police, inadequate in numbers, would not use their weapons. These reactions were provoked by the well-known local leaders. Nevertheless, thanks to very prompt action by the law-enforcement agencies, the UPC shock troops did not succeed in intimidating the public as a whole.

2. Douala

The incidents of which an account is given below took place only in the "foreign quarter" of Douala, the rest of the town remaining absolutely calm.

The first serious incident at Douala took place on Sunday, 22 May, the same day as at Mbanga.

The 22, 23 and 24 May were marked by offensive acts by UPC members against anti-UPC Africans. In particular, on the evening of Sunday, 22 May, a group of demonstrators attacked with bottles and stones persons attending the first meeting of a "National Front" the purpose of which was the constitution of a federation of the parties refusing to follow the UPC.

The police, who had been forbidden to use their weapons, nevertheless succeeded in carrying out their mission, although they were subject to rough treatment on several occasions.

During the evening of 23 May, members of the UPC collected nail-studded cudgels, clubs, machetes, asségais, empty bottles and the like. During the night they marched into the area in armed groups, singing, clad in shorts and with their bodies oiled. The UPC organized patrols and posted look-outs. Armed combat units were concealed near the communication routes.

A police patrol heard its own approach signalled from point to point by gong beats and whistles. It fell into an ambush, from which it extricated itself only by

using shock grenades, after giving due warning. As has already been stated, nobody was injured by these grenades.

A number of Africans, some of whom had been caught and molested by the UPC troops, came at dawn to place themselves under police protection.

On the morning of Tuesday, 24 May, the leaders of the Party harangued their troops. According to testimony subsequently obtained from several sources, the order of the day was as follows: "Attack non-UPC Africans, then the Whites... kill all guards who intervene".

The representative of the High Commissioner made a last attempt to restore calm. The Chairman of the UPC was notified that the Administration wished to get in touch with him. He was asked to call upon the Party's troops to disperse. The Party's Chairman sent word that he would not meet the Representative unless a request was made to him in writing and unless he was able to have a large delegation from his Party with him.

The High Commissioner proceeded to Douala in the afternoon and again ordered the police, who were ready to intervene, not to use their weapons.

During the night of 24 to 25 May the UPC again mobilized in the same way as it had done the previous night.

The incidents took on the aspect of a riot from noon on Wednesday, 25 May. About twenty blazing or destroyed vehicles were arranged as an obstacle so as to channel traffic and cause motor-cars to move towards the groups of rioters, while cordons of demonstrators compelled vehicles - whose approach was signalled by whistles - to proceed to points where they would be attacked. Two Europeans who fell into this trap were killed; a third was left for dead by the demonstrators. Some fifteen other persons, including both Africans and Europeans, were seriously wounded.

Other UPC troops attacked the prison. The firemen who were called in as reinforcements held back for a short time the armed rioters who were attacking the gate, but were then forced to fall back into the building.

The UPC troops then turned their attention to the offices in the administrative section of New-Bell, situated opposite the prison.

At about 2.45 p.m. the High Commissioner authorized the police to use their weapons, but only if they were unable to prevent the demonstrators from forcing their way into the prison.

At about 3.15 p.m. the UPC shock troops prepared for a new attack. The statutory warnings were given, but in vain. Shock grenades were thrown, but had no effect, as the leaders had told their troops that the grenades were harmless. The Chief of Police was wounded by two shots from a shotgun. Nevertheless, he did not give his men the order to use their firearms until the last moment, when they were almost overwhelmed by the demonstrators. The latter dispersed at once and, unfortunately, seven persons were killed and a number were wounded.

The UPC bands then spread through the quarter in several groups. They attacked many passers-by, particularly Europeans, and destroyed and burned the vehicles they found on their way. They attacked the central radio station. A radio technician was wounded in the shoulder by a bullet.

The police were again obliged to intervene to protect the firemen and remove the wounded. The army was called upon to provide reinforcements. Order was restored by about 6 p.m., with no further use of firearms by the police.

At dawn on Thursday, 26 May, the headquarters of the UPC were searched; a fireman who had been taken prisoner by the demonstrators and had escaped during the night had stated that he had seen the bodies of two Europeans there.

The search resulted in the discovery and seizure of a whole arsenal of freshly-sharpened machetes, nail-studded cudgels, spears, axes, iron bars etc. Sixteen individuals who tried to resist the search were arrested carrying weapons.

No incidents took place during the day, and on Friday, 27 May, the "foreign quarter" of Douala was calm again. At about 9.30 p.m., however, a fire broke out: the headquarters of the Union des Populations du Cameroun and the neighbouring huts were in flames. The inquiry at once revealed the criminal origin of the fire, which was attributable to the UPC itself. It is noteworthy that the adjacent huts, which belonged to Party sympathizers, had been vacated and cleared of their contents by their occupants. The latter had been forewarned of the fire by UPC members, while the non-UPC Africans had remained in their homes.

To sum up, the riot at Douala did not cover the whole town. The disturbance was confined to New-Bell, the foreign quarter, the area of which is about one-third of that of the town, but in which the UPC was able to assemble only 3,000 demonstrators out of a population of 60,000. The failure of the riot of 25 May at Douala unquestionably played a part in putting a stop to the activities of UPC members in Mungo. However, the launching of the "war on the Whites" at Douala promoted the Yaoundé incidents.

3. Yaoundé

On 22 May, the day when the serious incidents at Mbanga and Douala began, MOUMIE Félix held a public meeting. Excitement reached fever pitch when he declared: "I bring you fraternal greetings from UM NYOBE, who is now in hiding and who will not return without a well-conceived plan for the Revolution in the Cameroons.... On 6 June, our national day, people will come from all quarters. If UM NYOBE is killed on that day, we shall erect a monument in honour of the first national martyr...."

This statement was intended both to prepare people's minds and to enable him to throw off the responsibility for the incidents which had begun that same day at Mbanga and Douala.

The announcement on the next day but one of the events at Mbanga and Douala excited emotions to the utmost and enhanced the feeling of restlessness. It was in that atmosphere that the most dynamic and fanatical contingent of the UPC at Yaoundé, that of the "market boys", held a meeting on 25 May at which the UPC representative TCHOAGANG urged his listeners to stop paying the market pitch dues and not to obey any administrative summons. He stated: "War has been declared at Douala between the UPC and the Government. Two guards have already been killed; 350 have already left Yaoundé. Let us arm and prepare ourselves."

The High Commissioner's departure for Douala strengthened their determination. This timing of the action was a skilful manoeuvre. Through waiting a few days, the UPC leaders were able to exploit at the psychological level the news of the Mbanga and Douala "victories" and at the tactical level the departure for Douala of the High Commissioner and of a part of the police strength.

On Thursday, 26 May, Pierre TAYOU, a delegate of the "Force Ouvrière" trade union, was attacked and beaten up in the market-place by a group of UPC members. The police had to intervene. Nine of the demonstrators were arrested and taken to the Central Police Station, after several policemen had been wounded. As the crowd did not disperse, the Chief Regional Officer proceeded to the scene. His appeal for calm held the demonstrators in check for a short time, but it was not long before he was insulted and struck. The Chief of Police was wounded and had to be taken to hospital.

The group of UPC members, numbering about 300, then moved toward the Central Police Station with the intention of freeing those of their number who had been

arrested; they destroyed several vehicles, including the fire engine, on their way. The police station was stormed. A few shots were fired in the air by the police to impress the demonstrators, but without any effect. The doors were broken in and the leaders were freed.

At that juncture an onlooker was killed by a bullet, the origin of which is being investigated.

The crowd took charge of the body, which they carried into the meeting-hall of the Territorial Assembly, situated a few yards from the police station. A Councillor narrowly escaped a knife-thrust. Order was restored by the concerted efforts of the Secretary-General and several African members of the Territorial Assembly. No further incident occurred during the day. A curfew was imposed.

As at Douala, the UPC officer responsible for the central zone was summoned by the Secretary-General, who drew his attention to the responsibilities of a leader in times of disorder and requested him to take steps to promote calm. A UPC meeting arranged for noon dispersed with no speeches and no disorder. It seemed that calm had returned.

However, a curfew having been provisionally imposed as a precaution, a few armed groups which attacked vehicles during the night were dispersed without incident and with no casualties after being intimidated by the use of a few shock grenades.

On the morning of Friday, 27 May, a barricade was set up on the Douala road by demonstrators who were attacking vehicles.

The police proceeded to the spot and tried to disperse them. They reformed their ranks and proceeded in an armed group towards the hospital and then towards the centre of the town, where they soon clashed with the police who had been called up to stop them. On being warned to disperse, the demonstrators advanced against the police. After having given the statutory warning as many as five times, the Chief Regional Officer, who was in danger of being attacked and overwhelmed, was compelled to give the Cameroonian guards the order to use their arms.

The demonstrators then dispersed at once, leaving two dead and half a score of wounded, who were immediately taken to hospital. There were no further breaches of the peace at Yaoundé.

On Saturday 28 May, a UPC meeting at Obala broke up without incident on the arrival of the police.

To sum up, the incidents which occurred at Yaoundé on 26 May cannot be described as "spontaneous". A note-book found on a demonstrator giving the membership of a group of seventeen rioters and specifying the weapon with which each member was to equip himself, betrays premeditation. However, as some local committees had been left waiting, the disturbance did not develop to the same extent as at Douala.

4. Sanaga Maritime Region

The incidents occurred mainly in the Babimbi subdivision, where the ESOCAM, a party opposed to the UPC, has a number of supporters. The UPC wished to wipe out this opposition. The action of Abel KINGUE, the Vice-Chairman of the UPC, was decisive in the organization of the disorders.

Ngambé

On Thursday 26 May, at Ngambé, the chief town of the subdivision, about 150 members of the UPC, led by Abel KINGUE, the Vice-Chairman, marched to the subdivisional offices, which they succeeded in entering. They took away with them a man named Michel NDJAH, whose tax position was being examined by the Chief Subdivisional Officer. The chairman of the local ESOCAM office had previously been held up and beaten by the UPC members.

Songmbengué

On Friday, 27 May, three "companies" armed with axes, machetes, clubs and the like, organized by Abel KINGUE, were gathered at the village of Song-Nkam, 23 kilometres from Ngambé. Before he disappeared, the Vice-Chairman of the UPC decided to keep one "company" in reserve, and he sent the second along the Ngambé road with instructions to cut the bridges; eight were destroyed. The third "company" proceeded to Songmbengué, at the Sanaga ferry. This company brought all the ferry-boats to the right bank of the river, thereby making it impossible to cross; it seized the boatmen and molested several ESOCAM members. It then attacked the home of Mr. BASSAMA, an active member of ESOCAM, and his life was threatened. A shed, a shop and a pharmaceutical warehouse belonging to him were burned and looted. The Chairman of the UPC's Central Committee at Edea fired

through the window of the room where Mr. BASSAMA had taken shelter with his family, and the demonstrators invaded his property. In order to get clear, this man himself fired several shots. As a result, there were two fatalities and several persons slightly wounded, who fled.

The man was freed a few hours later, on the arrival of the Chief Subdivisional Officer accompanied by police.

The police, whose approach had been impeded by the bridges destroyed along the road, had also clashed with one of the UPC "companies", which had tried to stop them by force. The police succeeded, however, in overcoming the UPC band and reaching Songmbengué.

On Saturday, 28 May, at Ngambé, a further assembly of UPC members had to be dispersed by force. Eight demonstrators were wounded.

Tomel

On Monday, 30 May, the UPC reassembled its troops in the village of Tomel. About 300 individuals thus occupied the village. The Chief Subdivisional Officer proceeded to the spot accompanied by the police; the police were at once attacked by the demonstrators, who were armed with machetes and assegais. The UPC members fired six shots at the police, who, being outnumbered and having unavailingly given the customary warnings, were compelled to return the fire. Two demonstrators were killed and two wounded. The UPC troops fled. A stock of cartridges, a stolen shotgun, machetes, assegais and the like were found in the Party's hut. An ESOCAM member held as a prisoner by the UPC was killed. The circumstances in which this African was fatally injured are the subject of an enquiry.

There were no further breaches of the peace in the subdivision of Babimbi. In the remainder of the region, only Edéa was the scene of some minor disturbances.

In the night of 26 May, some sixty UPC members armed with clubs, machetes and the like occupied the verges of the Yaoundé-Douala road. The group dispersed two hours later without having attempted any action.

The same manoeuvre was repeated during the evening of Friday, 27 May. A general strike order issued by the CGT to take effect on 27 May was obeyed by only about fifty labourers, who stopped work for twenty-four hours.

On 25 May, at Mom, in the Eséka subdivision, the officer in command of the post at Makak, trying to break up an unauthorized meeting being held by the UPC on the public highway, was violently abused by active Party-members and had to withdraw.

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The UPC also tried to stir up disorders in the Bamiléké and Bamoun regions. The attempt was, however, a complete failure.

At Bafoussam, in the Bamiléké region, hostile demonstrations by UPC troops against members of the Rassemblement du peuple camerounais - a party which does not follow the UPC line - and against the traditional chiefs occurred at daybreak on 28 May. Even before the police arrived, the public opposed these demonstrations and destroyed the local headquarters of the UPC, the hut of one Daniel NDENO.

A large gathering had been organized by the UPC at Bafang for 29 May. A few barricades were set up on the roads. In this case also, however, the public speedily scattered the demonstrators and destroyed the UPC's Bafang headquarters before the police could intervene. In the Bamoun region only a certain amount of tension was reported; it was due to the people's hostility to UPC supporters, of whom, incidentally, there were only about thirty. At Foubot, five agitators who had come from Douala were arrested. They stated that their instructions were to assassinate the Sultan of the Bamouns, who was a member of the Territorial Assembly.

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III. CONCLUSION

Everything brings out the falseness of the accusations made against the Administering Authority by the UPC in denouncing the local authorities' "policy of bloody oppression".

On every occasion the instructions given to the law-enforcement agencies have been to make every effort to avoid bloodshed. Accordingly, contrary to the calculation and to the repeated affirmations made by the UPC, the number of dead did not exceed twenty-six. The Party bears the sole and entire responsibility for these deaths.

It is true, as the petitioners assert, that wherever incidents occurred, a curfew was ordered the same evening. All publicity media were used in announcing the order requiring the public to keep off the streets at night, and the regulation authorizing security patrols to fire on any gathering without warning was given wide publicity. Nevertheless, these patrols in fact had orders not to fire in any circumstances, and despite the night-time assemblies which were observed at Douala and Yaoundé, for example, not a shot was fired and not a demonstrator was wounded.

In conclusion, the Administering Authority wishes to stress that it was faced with a revolutionary undertaking the avowed purpose of which was to change the lawful régime by force. The UPC, a minority party, organized shock units and spread a psychosis of disorder the partial success of which was due to the respect for the political liberties by which the Administration was bound and of which, incidentally, the UPC claimed that it was deprived.

As a minority party, the UPC had to confine its activities to the few regions where it had some influence. That is why the incidents were restricted to a very small part of the Territory and, in that part, to a very small minority of the urban and rural population.

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The dissolution of the UPC and its associated organizations

The campaign of subversion in which the UPC engaged with the assistance of its subsidiaries, the UDEFEC and the JDC, placed the Administering Authority before two alternatives: either to continue to tolerate the existence of a seditious movement, at the risk of a recurrence of the abortive attempt of May, or to proclaim its dissolution, an extreme step which a democratic Government always hesitates to take.

Under French law the Government of the Republic was entitled to dissolve a party which had taken the form of a seditious alliance composed of armed bands and had provoked riots. Its duties as an Administering Power made that right an obligation. Under the United Nations Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement it is responsible not only for ensuring law and order, but also for safeguarding respect for and the development of democratic freedoms. Through its revolutionary action and its violent methods, the UPC showed itself to be a permanent danger to internal order in the Cameroons. Through its false news campaigns and its acts of intimidation and terrorism against the members of parties opposed to its activities the UPC also proved itself to be a movement with dictatorial and totalitarian aspirations.

A decree issued by the Council of Ministers on 13 July 1955 accordingly proclaimed the dissolution of the UPC, the JDC and the UDEFEC in the Cameroons under French Administration.

A N N E X

TABLE

Summarizing the losses sustained by the law-enforcement service,
the demonstrators and the public

PLACE	DATE	LAW-ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES		CIVILIAN POPULATION		DEMONSTRATORS	
		KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED	KILLED	WOUNDED
MBANGA	15/5/55	1	10				5
MBANGA	22/5/55		19				
PENJA	23/5/55		4				
NKONGSAMBA	24/5/55		3		3 Europeans	1	1
LOUM	25/5/55		9			6	5
DOUALA	25/5/55		13	2 Europeans	8 Europeans	7	60
YAOUNDE	26/5/55		4	1 African			
YAOUNDE	27/5/55					3	30
SONGBENGUE	27/5/55					2	3
NGAMBE	26(28)/5/55					(attack on Mr. BASSAMA)	
NGAMBE	26(28)/5/55				1 African		8
TOMEL	30/5/55			1 African	1 African	2	2
		1	62	4	13	21	114

2. Petition from Mr. Etienne Masso (T/PET.5/599)

Petition from the Union des Populations du Cameroun (T/PET.5/600 and Add.1 and 2)

Petition from Mr. Samuel Dumbe (T/PET.5/602)

Petition from Chief Martin Abega and others (T/PET.5/610)

Petition from the traditional chiefs of Eséka (T/PET.5/611)

Petition from the Executive Committee of the Médiation Franco-Camerounaise (T/PET.5/614 and Add.1)

Petition from Mr. Daniel Njene (T/PET.5/615)

Petition from the Association of Cameroonian Students (T/PET.5/616)

Petition from Mr. Louis Ebonji (T/PET.5/619)

Petition from the Paris Local Committee of the Union des Populations du Cameroun (T/PET.5/620)

Petition from the 24 October Local Committee of the Union des Populations du Cameroun (T/PET.5/621 and Add.1)

Petition from Mr. Ernest Edimo Ebanda and others (T/PET.5/623)

Petition from the Special General Assembly of the African People of the Mungo Region (T/PET.5/624)

Petition from the Association of Cameroonian Students, Montpellier branch (T/PET.5/625)

Petition from various local committees of the Union des Populations du Cameroun, (T/PET.5/627)

Petition from the Local Committee of the Union des Populations du Cameroun, Yaoundé (T/PET.5/628)

Petition from the Executive Committee of the Coordination des Indépendants Camerounais (INDECAM) (T/PET.5/630 and Add.1)

Petition from the Central Committee of the Union des Populations du Cameroun, Mombo Gare (T/PET.5/632)

Petition from the Local Committee of the Union des Populations du Cameroun, New-Bell Bas-Fond (T/PET.5/633)

Petition from the Union des Populations du Cameroun (T/PET.5/636)

Petition from the Central Committee of the Union des Populations du Cameroun, Koumassi (T/PET.5/637)

Petition from the Ndog-Bat II Local Committee of the Union des Populations du Cameroun (T/PET.5/639)

Petition from the Local Committee of the Union des Populations du Cameroun, of New-Bell Bas-Fond (T/PET.5/641 and Add.1)

Petition from the Delegation of the Ecole des Cadres de l'Union des Populations du Cameroun (T/PET.5/642)

Petition from the advisers of Loum-Chantiers village (T/PET.5/643)

Petition from the Local Committee of the Union des Populations du Cameroun, Nkongsamba Ville (T/PET.5/644)

Petition from various local committees of the Union des Populations du Cameroun (T/PET.5/647)

Petition from the Chief of the Bamoun Group and notables (T/PET.5/648)

Petition from 355 Cameroonians (T/PET.5/649)

Petition from the Local Committee of the Union des Populations du Cameroun, Nkololoun (T/PET.5/655)

Petition from the Félix Moumié Local Committee of the Union des Populations du Cameroun (T/PET.5/659 and Add.1 and 2)

Petition from Mr. Silas Tchuen-Tamou (T/PET.5/660)

Petition from Mr. Jean Batoum (T/PET.5/661)

Petition from a group of African workers (T/PET.5/662)

Petition from the Etude de la Région de N'kam (T/PET.5/663)

Petition from Mr. Jacques Mbock Batoum (T/PET.5/664)

Petition from Mr. Jean Baouti (T/PET.5/666)

Petition from the Union des Populations du Cameroun, branch in the Cameroons under British Administration (T/PET.5/670)

Petition from the Nyoum Village Local Committee of the Union des Populations du Cameroun (T/PET.5/672)

Petition from members of the Committee of the Village of Penja (T/PET.5/676)

Petition from the Njimoffira U.P.C. Refugee Committee (T/PET.5/677)

The facts referred to in these petitions relate to the incidents which occurred in the Territory at the end of May 1955.

The Administering Authority has already submitted its relevant observations in reply to petition T/PET.5/635.^{1/}

^{1/} Note by the Secretariat: See section 1 of this document.