

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 9 February 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mohammad Jafar MAHALLATI

(Iran)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. SALAH-BEY  
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARASALES  
Mr. V. BEAUGE  
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia:

Mr. D.M. SADDLEIR  
Mr. R.W. STEELE  
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX  
Mr. RAEYMAEKERS  
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE  
Miss R. DE CLERCQ

Brazil:

Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV  
Mr. I. SOTIROV  
Mr. K. PRAMOV  
Mr. P. POPCHEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL  
Mr. G. SKINNER

China:

Mr. TIAN JIN  
Mr. YU MENGJIA  
Mr. YU MINGLIANG  
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN  
Mr. LIN CHENG  
Mr. FENG ZHENYAO  
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba:

Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. STRUCKA

Mr. E. ZAPOTOCKY

Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt:

Mr. EL S.A.R. EL REEDY

Mr. I.A. HASSAN

Mr. M.N. FAHY

Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Mr. J. MOPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER

Mr. N. KLINGLER

Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN

Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. CH. ANWAR SANI

Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO

Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

<u>Iran:</u>	Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI Mr. M. NOSTRATI
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. M. ALESSI Mr. B. CABRAS Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. T. OKAWA Mr. M. TAKAHASHI Mr. K. TANAKA Mr. T. ARAI
<u>Kenya:</u>	Mr. C.G. IAINA Mr. D. NANJIRE Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG Mr. S.O. BOLD
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. S.M. RAHHALI Mr. M. HALFAOUI
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. G.O. IJEWERE Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. M. AHMAD Mr. H. AKRAM Mr. T. ALTAF
<u>Peru:</u>	Mr. F. VALDIVIESO Mr. J. BENAVIDES

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA  
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Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITA  
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. T. JAYAKODDY

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON  
Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. G. ANDERSSON  
Mr. S. THEOLIN  
Mr. G. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN  
Mr. V.M. GANJA  
Mr. V.V. LOSHCININ  
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO  
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV  
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV  
Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUCHIN  
Mr. V.A. KROKHA

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES  
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. E.V. ROSTOW  
Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. M. BUSBY  
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. J. LEONARD  
Mr. J. MISKEL  
Mr. R.F. SCOTT  
Miss L.M. SHEA  
Mr. J. GUNDERSEN

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. OSIL GNOK

Mrs. C. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In The Name of God The Most Compassionate, The Most Merciful, I declare open the one hundred and fifty-second plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament and now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Eugene Rostow, who has come to Geneva to address the Committee today.

Mr. ROSTOW (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, being in this beautiful room is always a moving and a chastening experience. The memories of many battles lost and won hover in the air, reminding us that good intentions are not enough. It is an honour for me to be here today and I thank you for your welcome. My delegation looks forward to a constructive and fruitful month in the Committee under your chairmanship. We wish you success in these undertakings and I pledge the support and co-operation of the United States delegation over the coming month. I should also like to add a word of appreciation on behalf of our delegation for the manner in which your predecessor, Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia, carried out his demanding duties during the month of August.

Many of you present today participated in the meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly last fall, at which I presented the position of the United States. I shall try not to repeat here what I said on that occasion. But a certain degree of repetition is inevitable in the interest of continuity and desirable in the interest of emphasis. For that I apologize, Mr. Chairman, and ask you and my other colleagues to forgive me.

Before the First Committee, I noted the abiding support of the United States for the work of the Committee on Disarmament. That Committee has taken one practical step after another to reduce the danger of war, and particularly of nuclear war. We can all draw resolve as well as pride from this record, which has given a powerful impetus to the arms control movement in general and to the role which the Committee, and its predecessors, have played in the diplomacy which led the nations to a series of agreements: the limited test-ban Treaty of 1963; the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty of 1968; the sea-bed arms control Treaty of 1971; the biological weapons Convention of 1972; and the environmental modification Convention of 1977.

The Committee on Disarmament is unusual among multilateral organizations both in its mandate and in its methods of work. Its objective is not only to exhort nations but to develop consensus looking to realistic action on the matters which come before it.

In noting the importance of the Committee's work I do not wish to be misunderstood. The Committee cannot and should not force consensus where none exists. A willingness to compromise on non-essentials is one of the most vital and appealing qualities of democracy; it is the basis for social and political life in democratic societies. It is equally important to the possibility of international co-operation. The United Nations exists, after all, as a centre for harmonizing the actions of the Member States in seeking to attain the purposes of the Charter. But compromise on non-essentials cannot and must not mean submerging fundamental differences. The Charter is founded on the principle of respect for the equal rights of nations large and small. Consensus should never be sought by asking any nation to sacrifice its fundamental and inherent rights.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

While it may seem paradoxical, the way toward consensus can often be eased by a frank and thorough airing of differences. And, where consensus is not possible, a clear understanding of why this is the case can make an important contribution to eventual agreement. For this reason among others, the United States will not hesitate to set forth its views on the controversial issues with which this Committee deals. We expect others to be equally frank. I assure you that in developing our future positions we shall give respectful attention to views which differ from our own.

In the spirit of that precept, I should like now to direct attention to the key relationship between the state of world politics and a number of arms control projects which are, or should be on our agenda. The arms control effort, after all, is an integral part of world politics. It should be a formative influence in the process of world politics and a catalyst for peace. But the converse of that sentence is also true. At any given moment, the state of world politics can all too easily frustrate and overwhelm the potentialities of arms control. That is the challenge faced by all who are working in the cause of peace today.

In my remarks last fall before the First Committee, I made the point that there is a certain unreality in the traditional discussion of many perennial items on the arms control agenda of the General Assembly and of this Committee. The reason for this tone of other-worldliness, I said, is that it has become the habit of the United Nations to ignore the central issue in any objective study of the problem of peace -- the declining influence of Article 2(4) of the Charter on the behaviour of States. This momentous sentence is necessarily the first commandment of the Charter. It forbids the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. Its prohibition is qualified only by the "inherent right" of individual or collective self-defence, protected categorically by Article 51 and by the powers of the Security Council.

Yet the last two decades and especially the last decade have witnessed a rising tide of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and aggressions -- actions which have involved the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of States in every part of the world. From south-east Asia to the Caribbean, State after State is under threat or under actual attack. Unprovoked aggressions occur without even the pretext of the excuse of self-defence. Armed bands and terrorists cross political boundaries with impunity to assault the political independence of States.

The habit of shameful silence or impotent protest in the face of aggression has many consequences, all bad. Perhaps the most insidious in the long run is its impact on international law. Law reflects the pattern of behaviour which a society deems right. Legal norms can survive if they are not perfectly or instantly obeyed, so long as society seeks to enforce them and does so effectively in the end. But when the breach of declared legal norms becomes the rule rather than the exception; when a society gives up any serious efforts to insist that its legal norms be obeyed, those declarations cease to be norms in any meaningful sense, and become no more than pious platitudes. I ask you to look at a globe and count the number of places where war is raging in violation of Article 2(4), and then consider whether our failure to defend that article strictly and impartially is not in fact repealing it as a constitutional principle for the society of nations.



(Mr. Rostow, United States)

In the view of the United States, this question should be the first item on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. If Article 2(4) should become a dead letter, the quest for disarmament would be a quixotic and Utopian activity. These are not words I use in a pejorative sense. The spirit of Cervantes and St. Thomas More are indispensable to civilization. Even so, we want arms control to be more than a dream, more than an aspiration. With the world in a state of anarchy, the effort to negotiate arms control agreements would cease to be a practical way for reinforcing and safeguarding peace. It would be nothing more than a despairing protest of the human spirit, a *cri du coeur*, expressing man's yearning for reason and decency in a world which was becoming more irrational and more menacing every day.

Driven as they are by fear or by the lust for power, large and small nations rush to arm, although they continue to recite the litany of disarmament and arms control. It is no wonder, under such circumstances, that we have achieved no significant arms control agreements or arms reduction agreements for nearly 10 years.

The basic cause of the declining influence of Article 2(4) in world affairs, and the corresponding eclipse of arms control, is the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union and the extraordinary military build-up on which it is based.

Soviet propaganda recognizes that the world lives under threat, but it proclaims that the threat to the peace is caused by a supposed "arms race", which takes the form of a Western effort to attain military superiority over the Soviet Union and then start a nuclear war. There is no arms race. The history of the military balance between the Soviet Union and the United States is clear for all to see. For many years after 1945, the Soviet Union had larger conventionally-armed forces than the United States, and the United States had larger nuclear forces. During the 1970s, the Soviet Union continued to increase both its conventional and its nuclear forces, while the United States remained stable in the nuclear sphere and reduced its conventional forces. The United States did not race. On the contrary, it accepted what it described as an effort by the Soviet Union to attain parity and equality, a place in the sun, recognized status as a great power. Once the Soviet Union reached equality, many people in the West believed it would end its military build-up and settle down to peaceful co-existence under the rules of the Charter.

No one in the West can accept such views now. The Soviet Union has attained military parity with the United States by any measure, yet it continues to build its armed forces and to expand its empire by means of force.

In response, the United States, its allies, and many other nations have reluctantly undertaken the burden of modernizing their armed forces in a belated effort to restore the military balance.

The Soviet Union does not initiate all the turbulence in the world. A great deal occurs without benefit of Soviet intervention. But the Soviet Union does exploit and manipulate regional turbulence in the interest of enlarging its sphere of dominance. And the Soviet example tempts other States to commit aggression also, hoping for the immunity from effective response which the Soviet Union has thus far enjoyed in its imperial adventures.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

Soviet expansion is not a marginal nuisance at the periphery of world politics. It is, on the contrary, one of the dominant elements determining the course of events. Soviet expansionism seeks to destroy the world balance of forces on which the survival of freedom depends. In that quest, the Soviet drive has gone too far. It has produced a wave of fear which will become a wave of panic unless we move promptly and effectively to restore Article 2(4) as part of the living law of international politics.

It is the conviction of the United States that the time has come for the peoples of the world and their Governments to demand that the Soviet Union accept the only possible rule of true détente, that of scrupulous respect for the provisions of the United Nations Charter regarding the international use of force.

When that view is explained to Soviet representatives, they sometimes respond that we are asking them to give up a foreign policy "rooted in their nature as a society and a State". To that claim, the United States replies that we recognize the right of the Soviet Union to preach the creed of Communism at will and in perfect freedom. No democracy could ever consider a different position. What we cannot accept -- what the State system cannot tolerate -- is the thesis that the Soviet Union has a special -- and exclusive -- right to spread its faith by the sword. No United Nations body, no scholar in any country has been able to reconcile this basic Soviet position with the Charter or with the corpus of international customary law which is the context of the Charter. No State can accept a doctrine which would authorize its neighbours to send armies or armed bands across its frontiers or to send arms to those who would challenge its authority. The Soviet doctrine is an attempt to square the circle. This doctrine has failed as a theory. And in practice it stands revealed as incompatible with the necessary conditions for co-operation in the international society of States.

The leaders of the Soviet Union may imagine that they have made great progress in recent years towards their goal of dominion. But that belief is an illusion. At enormous cost, the Soviet Union has made significant gains during the last three decades in its quest for empire. But the Soviet effort has transformed its strategic position. It has called into being a vast coalition of nations determined to retain their freedom. It is clear that the Soviet Union can never achieve its purpose, even through war.

The moral of this tragic chapter in twentieth century history is clear, and we stress it now while there is time to change course, and return to the way of peace.

The highest national interest of the United States in world politics is a system of peace in which all the nations respect the rules of the Charter regarding the international use of force. All our other ambitions in world politics -- economic stability and progress; the vindication of human rights; the advance of literacy, of education and of culture; and the encouragement of progressive peaceful change -- depend in the end on the achievement and maintenance of peace in that sense.

It is our view that the achievement of a system of peace is equally the highest national interest of every other State. Indeed, through the Charter, every State has solemnly promised every other State that peace in this sense is its highest

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

national interest. It should now be obvious -- to recall a phrase once used by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov -- that peace is indivisible. The dynamics of war permit no sanctuaries. As President Reagan has said, the world cannot justify or tolerate a double standard with regard to the international use of force. All must obey the same rules. In the words of Secretary Haig, "the rules of the Charter governing the international use of force will lose all their influence on the behaviour of nations if the Soviet Union continues its aggressive course".

We hope that this session of the Committee on Disarmament will make a powerful contribution to the cause of peace by calling on the members of the United Nations to rededicate themselves to a policy of strict and unwavering respect for the rule of Article 2(4). The discussion of the problem here, and the pursuit of that discussion at the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should help to crystallize a new state of public opinion throughout the world -- a state of public opinion which could compel all nations to accept the vision which dominated the Conference at San Francisco where the Charter was approved in 1945, in the shadow of an appalling war.

The significance of what we propose here is brought out by the pattern of Soviet policy in Poland.

It has been clear for several years that, except for a thin layer of Party and State officials in Poland, the Polish people has been seeking a new order of things in its homeland -- an order characterized by freedom and pluralism in every aspect of the life of the nation. Above all, the Polish people have made it clear that the spirit which sustained the Polish nation between 1792 and 1918 is still unconquerable.

Poland and the other countries of Eastern Europe were promised a free choice by the three victorious allies who met a generation ago at Yalta and Potsdam. President Kennedy said on a famous occasion that "our two peoples, which now live in danger" would not be able to live in peace until the Soviet promise of free choice in Eastern Europe was kept.

But the Soviet promises of Yalta and Potsdam for Eastern Europe have not been kept. Those promises of themselves transform the crisis in Poland into a matter of deep and legitimate international concern, especially since the other terms of the post-war understanding have also eroded.

There is another and even more basic international dimension to the crisis in Poland. The military coup d'Etat in Poland and the imposition of martial law by the military dictator of Poland were acts done with Soviet complicity and participation, under the compelling threat that, if the Polish armed forces did not act, the Soviet Union would do so itself. This is a threat and use of force in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, a flagrant breach of the peace in one of the most sensitive and important strategic areas of world politics.

Finally, the United States and its NATO allies have stressed that events in Poland violate the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which was signed at Helsinki in 1975. The assurances and the hopes embodied in that document give further ground for the conviction that what is happening in Poland is not a purely domestic problem.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

It has been the objective of the United States in the Polish crisis not only to stress the gravity of what is happening, but to offer the Soviet Union a peaceful and constructive way to reconcile its security concerns with the legitimate demands of the Polish people. The State system as it developed after 1945 must accommodate itself to peaceful change. If it fails to bend, it will surely break. Therefore President Reagan, in his statement of 23 December, offered the co-operation of the United States in large-scale programmes for effective action that would restore the vitality of the Polish economy, without in any way threatening the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. He recalled the American offer of the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s, an offer which Poland first accepted, and then was forced to reject. At the same time, President Reagan warned against steps that could let loose the dogs of war. No man can foresee or control the consequence of such developments.

The United States has high hopes for a fair and reasonable outcome of the crisis in Poland. Such a turn in Soviet policy could make many other agreements possible, and help prepare the way for a genuine improvement in the climate of world politics and the fabric of the international community.

One of the principal means on which we rely to achieve that goal is the negotiation of fair and balanced agreements for the reduction of nuclear arms, and particularly of offensive nuclear arms. Our policy in such talks, as President Reagan made clear in his speech of 18 November 1981, is to propose whatever reductions are necessary to achieve for each side an equal capacity to deter nuclear war. The policy of equal deterrence would deny to either side the capacity to use or to brandish nuclear weapons as an instrument of aggression or political coercion. Measuring deterrence, and distinguishing retaliatory weapons from those capable of use as weapons of aggression, are complex problems. With good will, they can be solved.

The United States policy with respect to nuclear weapons currently includes several different elements. With respect to intermediate range land-based nuclear missiles, negotiations have begun in a constructive atmosphere, and consideration is being given to President Reagan's proposal to abolish all such weapon systems, wherever located. American arms control policy is by no means limited to this aspect of the problem. In his speech of 18 November 1981, President Reagan also proposed the early resumption of Soviet-American negotiations on the reduction of intercontinental range missiles, the revitalization of the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and a vigorous attack on the problem of measures for reducing the risk of surprise attack and the chance of war arising out of uncertainty or miscalculation. All these proposals, the President said, are based "on the same fair minded principles -- substantial, militarily significant reductions in forces, equal ceilings for similar types of forces, and adequate provisions for verification".

This, then, is the policy framework within which the United States is working toward arms control. I can assure you that the United States will play its full part in devising solutions for these problems if the Soviet Union, by adopting policies of restraint, makes it possible for the full range of arms control negotiations and other co-operative activities in this field to continue.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

These basic pillars of United States arms control policy are fundamental to the issues on which this Committee has focused much of its attention since its establishment. Foremost among these has been the question of a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. In the many discussions of this problem here, the ultimate desirability of a test ban has not been at issue, but unanimity has been lacking on questions of approach and timing.

The United States Government has reviewed the question of nuclear testing in the context of its impact not only on arms control efforts but also on the need to maintain the stability of the nuclear balance, bearing in mind in particular the importance of achieving effective verification measures and ensuring compliance with any agreed restrictions.

It is clear that any consideration of a complete cessation of nuclear explosions must be related to the ability of the Western nations to maintain credible deterrent forces. It is equally clear that a test ban cannot of itself end the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Limitations on testing must necessarily be considered within the broad range of nuclear issues. Direct means for achieving progress towards the elimination of the nuclear menace are the restoration of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter as a reality in world politics, the negotiation of significant reductions in nuclear weapons, and the eventual elimination of the weapons themselves. Thus, while a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives, we do not believe that, under present circumstances, a comprehensive test ban could help to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons or to maintain the stability of the nuclear balance. The United States fully shares the keen concern of members of this Committee to move forward rapidly in the effort to remove the burden of nuclear weapons from world politics. The United States will work constructively with the Committee in its efforts to achieve this end.

In the area of chemical weapons, the Committee on Disarmament has already done useful work, and the United States commends the Chairmen of previous chemical weapons working groups and the delegations that have participated so effectively in this effort. President Reagan has now reaffirmed United States support for efforts to achieve a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons and has directed United States representatives to participate actively in this important quest. The United States believes that the Committee on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for work toward a chemical weapons convention. Therefore, it is the United States' intention to concentrate its efforts toward the elaboration of a convention banning chemical weapons in this Committee. We believe the Working Group has successfully completed the bulk of its initial task and, in so doing, has identified important areas of agreement and disagreement. The next step is to see if it is possible to harmonize views on the major elements of an eventual agreement. Such a step is a prerequisite to the achievement of our ultimate objective, and the United States delegation, therefore, will support a revised mandate for the Working Group that will allow it to undertake this essential task.

It is no secret that views diverge widely on the subject of verifying compliance with arms control agreements. The United States believes that the chemical weapons Working Group should devote particular attention to verification and compliance

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

issues, from both a political and a technical standpoint. I urge the members of the Working Group to apply their expertise and imagination to finding ways to overcome the many complex problems which face us in this area. One such problem is that of undeclared stocks and undeclared chemical weapons production, filling and storage facilities. Further, when the chemical weapons experts meet, I urge that, in addition to continuing their work on toxicity standards, they be asked to examine promising technical methods for monitoring the shutdown of chemical weapons production and filling facilities. In this manner the Committee can make use of our collective expertise to try to surmount a major hurdle relating to verification of an eventual agreement. It is the conviction of the United States that in this, as in other areas, the problem of verifying compliance with arms control agreements requires active co-operation among the signatories and not reliance on national technical means alone.

While I am on the subject of expert groups I should dwell for a moment on the work of the Group of Scientific Experts, whose efforts thus far have been pointed toward the international exchange of seismic data. As you are aware, the United States has been an active participant in all the activities of this Group. We want this work to continue for as long as useful results are being produced and we intend fully to support its ongoing efforts. We are aware of the interest which has been expressed by other delegations in an enlarged mandate for the Group, one that would enable it to consider the possibility of exchanging data on nuclear explosions and on certain other unusual events occurring in the atmosphere. We have also examined this possibility and want to share our views informally with other delegations. The idea here is to increase the ability of the Group of Scientific Experts to make a useful contribution to improving our verification capabilities.

At the last session of the General Assembly, the question of controlling arms in outer space was the subject of a lively debate which resulted in the adoption of two resolutions, both of which put the problem on the agenda of this Committee. The United States believes that this was an appropriate step. This is a difficult, complex issue that cannot be separated from broader arms control issues. Because of the magnitude of the problems involved, we must not expect immediate progress in this area. The problem is one that must be approached with extreme care. The ramifications are legion; so are the pitfalls. Too quick a plunge without adequate prior reflection could be fatal to our objective of achieving a stable environment in outer space. At this stage, the United States is prepared to discuss the issue in an informal and general way at informal meetings of the Committee where various points of view and proposals could be thoroughly vetted before any further steps are taken.

I have not yet mentioned three items that have been on the Committee's agenda in the past and which await final action. I refer to the draft radiological weapons treaty, the question of effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear weapons will not be used against them and the development of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The United States would like to see the radiological weapons treaty completed soon. As we have said many times before, it would not be a major step toward putting the nuclear genie back in the bottle, but it would be a step, and anything we can do in this area should surely be done. More delay can only mean more difficulty in achieving ultimate agreement on this treaty.

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

In connection with another issue which has been under active consideration by the Committee during its past three sessions, that of the so-called negative security assurances, I would like to reaffirm the unilateral assurance given by the United States at the time of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978. As we said at that time:

"The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack."

The United States stands by this statement as a reliable and firm assurance. We have nonetheless participated, and are willing to continue to participate in the Working Group which deals with this issue, and would join a consensus to re-establish the group. The United States believes that development of a common assurance, as has been suggested, would be extremely difficult, although of course we are not opposed to this concept.

The Committee's task of developing a comprehensive programme of disarmament, as mandated by the first special session on disarmament, is extremely important. We strongly support this effort and will continue to work constructively toward enunciation of a meaningful programme to be presented to the General Assembly at its second special session. The United States believes that to achieve the necessary consensus, such a programme must be realistic and must reflect the security needs of all States. It should provide guidelines for the actions of States, with an over-all goal of promoting world stability and peace.

Both the increased complexity of modern weapons and the turbulent condition of world politics have highlighted the special importance of compliance with treaties as a factor among the responsibilities of this Committee. Trust is an essential ingredient of the condition of peace. Montesquieu spoke of peace as a state of tranquillity in which no man need fear his neighbour. Alas, that criterion is not satisfied today in many parts of the world. None of the neighbours of the Soviet Union can say that it feels comfortable about the inviolability of its borders. And more generally, the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union radiates anxiety far beyond the States in its immediate neighbourhood, to States which fear the fate of Afghanistan, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the German Democratic Republic, or Bulgaria. Troubling questions have arisen about Soviet compliance with international agreements concerning chemical and biological warfare. Those questions affect every State in the world community. And they cast a shadow over the possibility of verifying Soviet compliance with treaties on the control of other arms, and particularly of nuclear arms.

In 1967, the International Red Cross published disturbing evidence about the use of Soviet chemical weapons in the Yemen. Now, initial circumstantial evidence that lethal chemical weapons have been used in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan has

(Mr. Rostow, United States)

been confirmed by new evidence from south-east Asia — evidence of the use of prohibited lethal mycotoxins, which are particularly cruel and inhumane weapons of war. The production and use of such weapons raises most serious questions about compliance with existing international constraints on such activities, including the biological and toxin weapons Convention of 1972 and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, to which the Soviet Union is a party. This development demonstrates the necessity of further consideration of the adequacy of applicable verification and compliance provisions.

It is vital that all countries concerned co-operate to the fullest extent with the work of the United Nations Group of Experts investigating this matter. It will not suffice simply to call attention to the problems. We deserve answers. The 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk has never been adequately explained. The Soviet Union and its friends and allies have vehemently denied that the Soviet Union is engaged in any way in the use of toxins or other chemical weapons. But it remains altogether unwilling to discuss these matters in detail or to offer the kind of co-operation that might alleviate the legitimate concerns of the world community. Soviet behaviour in the face of such inquiries has simply deepened the suspicions and anxiety of all persons of goodwill. This is a fact of particular importance to the work of this Committee.

It is therefore essential that the verification of compliance with arms control treaties be made a central feature of our work programme here. Until the nations agree on the principle of far-reaching international co-operation in monitoring and enforcing compliance with such agreements, arms control and disarmament cannot begin to achieve their full potential as programmes of peace. The Soviet Union has recently stated that while it continued to rely primarily on national means of verification of compliance with arms control treaties, it was willing to accept co-operative means of verification where circumstances make such procedures necessary and desirable. The United States welcomes this assurance. And it recalls the fact that in 1947 the Soviet Union made a far more comprehensive statement of its readiness to accept inspection and other co-operative means of verification in the interest of arms control during the consideration of the United States' proposal for the international control of nuclear energy, known as the Baruch Plan. The volatility and fragility of the international atmosphere make it essential that the Soviet Union go beyond President Brezhnev's statement of 23 November 1981, to Foreign Minister Gromyko's earlier and more ample offer.

Thus far, I have alluded only in passing to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That is because in many respects its shape and the nature of its contribution to our common endeavours cannot yet be clearly foreseen. In no small part, what happens in New York in June will depend upon what happens here between now and then. The Committee's work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament will be a major input. In that effort, the United States wishes to play an active and energetic role. But, obviously, all does not rest on what we do here. Much will depend on whether the behaviour of States conforms to their professed goals and intentions. The work of the second special session will be particularly sensitive to this factor. Let us hope that, to the extent that we can influence events, this Committee will contribute to a special session which should be marked by a realistic appreciation of the role of arms limitations in the effort to maintain peace and security for all mankind.



Mr. TELIALOV (Bulgaria) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, please accept my sincerest congratulations, on behalf of the Bulgarian delegation, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament at the very beginning of this important and crucial session. You may count on our co-operation in the performance of your task.

Allow me also to extend my warmest thanks to you and to all our colleagues for welcoming me as the new representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and at the same time to state that it is my sincere desire to maintain friendly relations with you all, based on mutual respect, as befits the noble objectives and tasks of this important body for multilateral negotiations on disarmament. Most of you have enormous worldly, political and diplomatic experience, combined with special experience in the disarmament field, and it is therefore an honour for me to join your ranks, in the expectation of and counting on your co-operation.

In this, my first statement in the Disarmament Committee, I propose simply to make some comments on behalf of my delegation, without going into the details of the negotiations on particular issues.

We all note with regret that the international situation in which our Committee is called upon to work remains complex and tense. Instead of disarmament and the easing of tension, of late we have been hearing more and more frequently about a further upward thrust in the arms race, about the new doctrines of "limited nuclear war", "preventive" and other types of nuclear strikes, and about the increase in military budgets. The United States military budget proposals for 1983 is the latest example of these trends. All of which, of course, also increases the likelihood of the outbreak of conflicts, including nuclear war.

In our view, the reason for this state of affairs in present-day international relations is the policy of increasing confrontation, of achieving military superiority and exerting political and military pressure on a global scale, and of subduing forces fighting for their national and social freedom -- the policy which has been pursued in recent times by the imperialistic circles of a leading Western country.

This policy is unacceptable not only to us and to other socialist countries; it is unacceptable to the billions of inhabitants of our planet; it is disastrous even for its authors themselves. Consequently, we will not cease to repeat and to warn that, in the present difficult international situation, fraught with manifold dangers for peace, we ought all to refrain from following the path which leads to deeper confrontation and instead to take the one which leads to practical actions for the solution of international problems, the path of negotiations towards the conclusion of international agreements and treaties on the limitation, reduction and elimination of arms.

Guided by this basic principle, the socialist countries members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization declared at a meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, held on 1 and 2 December 1981 at Bucharest: "The States represented at the meeting consider that in present-day conditions it is the supreme duty of every State, every responsible statesman, to show restraint, and to match their actions to man's vital requirements, by preserving and strengthening peace,

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

and using material and scientific advances not for purposes of exterminating people and destroying civilization, but in the interests of solving the social and economic problems facing the various nations, enhancing their well-being and permitting the flowering of their culture".

Today, more than at any time in the past, the most urgent task is to achieve an immediate cessation of the arms race and to adopt real and concrete disarmament measures, particularly in the nuclear field.

Convinced of the pressing need for measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war, including the danger of such a war on a regional scale, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, as you know, proposed that the idea of converting the Balkans into a nuclear-free zone should be considered at the practical level. In this connection, Todor Zhivkov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, in his speech on the occasion of the 1300th anniversary of the founding of the Bulgarian State, expressed our country's readiness to organize at Sofia a meeting of leaders of Balkan States on this question. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Balkans and in other parts of Europe would be an important measure for the strengthening of confidence between States on the old continent.

We welcome the resumption of Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, and the USSR position as set forth in the statement by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev at his meeting with the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament. We associate ourselves with his urgent demand for an early resumption, also, of the strategic arms limitation talks, based on strict observance of the principles of equality and equal security of the parties.

The emergence at the Madrid meeting of a decision concerning the convening of a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe would be of particular significance for peace and security on our continent. Such a decision, rather than attempts to turn the Madrid meeting into a forum for attacks and interference in the internal affairs of the socialist countries, would help to strengthen security and co-operation in Europe.

I will not conceal the fact that, as a newcomer to the meetings of this Committee, I was disagreeably surprised to hear in this hall certain statements about entirely different aims and approaches at Madrid and here in Geneva. How can the open attacks and interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State like Poland be explained? Some representatives even went so far as to criticize the ideology and internal systems of the USSR and other socialist countries.

Unfortunately, the same note was struck in today's speech by the head of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Rostov, from whom we expected -- not a long political lecture, full of accusations against the Soviet Union and other countries, including my own -- but more concrete proposals on questions relevant to the Committee on Disarmament.

We disapprove of and protest against such attempts to represent the constitutional measures adopted by one particular Government as a hindrance to our work. For us, that is another example of the usual propaganda campaign, a smokescreen, behind which certain individuals are desirous of concealing the multitude of concrete and dangerous decisions adopted in NATO on the production and deployment of newer and newer types of weapons.

(Mr. Tellelov, Bulgaria)

Do the authors of such actions believe that the campaign against the socialist countries can serve as a cover-up for them and as justification for their lack of political will to achieve real measures for the limitation of the arms race and disarmament?

We associate ourselves with the view expressed here that it would be highly undesirable and a great pity if this Committee -- the only body for multilateral negotiations on disarmament -- were to be converted into a debating club, a place for recriminations and attacks, instead of concentrating on its responsible tasks.

For these reasons, our delegation associates itself with the appeal of the Soviet delegation and a number of other delegations for an intensification of the Committee's work with a view to achieving real results in the negotiations so as to be able to make a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international security and the establishment of a sound basis for the holding of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria sets a high value on the role the Committee on Disarmament could play in the elaboration, in a business-like and responsible manner and on the basis of a sound organization of its work, appropriate agreements on a number of disarmament questions.

The very great importance which States attach to negotiations on disarmament was reflected in the adoption of numerous resolutions at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Many of the previous speakers have rightly emphasized that our Committee is faced with new tasks and new responsibility in the implementation of the will of the overwhelming majority of countries members of the United Nations. The world community and the peoples of the world are demanding this of us.

There can be no doubt that, among the items we are to consider, priority must be given to nuclear disarmament and the entire range of questions concerned with the limitation of the nuclear arms race and the reduction of the danger of nuclear war. In this connection, the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, adopted at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly upon the initiative of the Soviet Union, is particularly relevant.

The group of socialist countries in the Committee has suggested a number of concrete measures, including the establishment of a working group to initiate negotiations on nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session. The proposal for the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and for the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such weapons until they are completely eliminated, has been on the negotiating table for the last three years.

The complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is another extremely important issue. Our delegation shares the concern of the overwhelming majority of delegations in this Committee and associates itself with the demand for the setting up of an ad hoc working group. We have always attached great importance to the tripartite talks between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, but our hopes that the Western partners would at last respond positively to the Soviet Union's constructive steps have also not been realized.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

Our delegation will continue to make its contribution to the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on problems of the seismic monitoring of the observance of the future treaty.

The question of the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is closely linked with that of the development of new types of nuclear weapons. An example of this gloomy prospect is the decision of the present United States administration to start production of nuclear neutron weapons. In endeavouring to resolve this issue, we ought not to be put off by artificial excuses, such as the argument that neutron weapons are not basically a new type of weapon and that there is therefore no need to consider them separately.

It is important that we should embark at once on negotiations for the elaboration of a convention prohibiting this type of weapon, for many specialists categorically affirm that it lowers the "nuclear threshold."

Another question which is closely bound up with the nuclear weapons issue is that of strengthening the security assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Our delegation's interest in this matter is well-known. Together with the delegations of other socialist countries we have been taking an active part in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group concerned. Our aim continues to be the conclusion of an international convention, taking into account, also, other proposals in this direction. In this connection, we believe that it is time to begin negotiations on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

Our delegation is convinced that the Committee should concentrate its attention on and contribute to the elaboration of a treaty for the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. We fully support the proposal made by the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Issraelyan, concerning the setting up of an ad hoc working group to negotiate with the aim of reaching agreement and the text of such a treaty.

The progress of negotiations on chemical weapons is an example of how the Committee's efforts lag behind the development and deployment of new and yet more dangerous types of such weapons. Together with other socialist countries and the vast majority of members of this Committee, we are in favour of the intensification of negotiations within the framework of a mandate which would open the way to the drafting of the actual provisions of the future convention.

We supported the General Assembly's appeal for a speedy resumption of the bilateral negotiations and we consider that the Committee, for its part, ought to pay particular attention to binary and other new types of chemical weapons, and also to the matter of non-stationing of chemical weapons in countries where there are no such weapons at present.

Our delegation attaches great importance to the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. We would urge the setting up of a group of qualified governmental experts, bearing in mind the development of the question at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly. It is our belief that the setting up of such a group would permit an in-depth study to be made of the question within the framework of a permanent and purpose-oriented organizational structure.

(Mr. Tollarov, Bulgaria)

I will not dwell on the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, since the Czechoslovak delegation has explained the common position of the socialist countries. We hope that all delegations will adopt a constructive approach which will allow the Working Group to fulfil its mandate under the guidance of one of the most brilliant statesmen active in multilateral negotiations on disarmament, the distinguished leader of the Mexican delegation, Ambassador Robles.

As I approach the end of my first statement in the Committee, I should like to quote some remarks made by Todor Zhivkov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Chairman of the Council of State of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, which admirably reflect our positions on arms race questions and our efforts towards the adoption of real measures in the sphere of disarmament. In his recent interview with Robert Maxwell, the Chairman of Pergamon Press, Todor Zhivkov said the following:

"Bulgaria is a small country and it is not a matter of indifference to us whether we have to allocate additional funds for our defence in view of the new upward thrust in the arms race or whether we may direct those funds to peaceful construction, thereby bettering the life of our people. We are by no means indifferent to the question whether the new American nuclear 'cruise' and 'pershing-2' missiles are to be stationed in Western Europe, especially as Bulgaria too comes within the range of their action. Our attitude is the same as regards the decision to produce neutron weapons which, in accordance with strategic plans, are also to be stationed on our continent.

It is not a question of whether Bulgaria and other socialist countries are equipped with such types of weapons or facilities for producing them. The point is that the piling up of ever newer types of weapons, each more dangerous than the last, more and more expensive, does not make for a more stable peace. On the contrary, the growing mountain of arms is itself becoming a monstrous threat to mankind".

In conclusion, I should like to state once again that, during this session, and in accordance with the Committee's programme of work, the Bulgarian delegation will present its views in detail on the various questions on our agenda.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. SANI (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, may I join the speakers who have preceded me to extend to you the congratulations of my delegation on your accession to the chairmanship of this Committee. My delegation wishes to pledge to you its fullest co-operation in the discharge of your functions. I should also like to avail myself of this opportunity to thank the distinguished colleagues who, in their statements, have referred with kind words to my chairmanship. For my part, I wish to express once again my deepest gratitude for the co-operation and assistance extended to me by all delegations and by the Secretary of the Committee, Ambassador Jaipal, and his collaborators during my term of office.

(Mr. Sani, Indonesia)

During all the years since the adoption of the Charter of the United Nations, the international community has ceaselessly affirmed the necessity of disarmament. The need to achieve disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, has been expressed again and again. It has not been possible, regrettably, to translate those expressions into concrete actions. Although everybody clamours for disarmament in their statements, in fact the arms race, including that in the nuclear field, has continued unabated. The number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of nuclear-weapon Powers has been growing incessantly, in quantity and in their unimaginable destructive capacity, thus increasing, instead of diminishing -- much less eliminating -- the danger of nuclear war. The impatience of the international community to see concrete disarmament measures speedily taken, particularly by those nuclear-weapon Powers and nations having the largest military arsenals, has been frequently manifested. Especially during the last few years, non-governmental circles and individuals in various parts of the world have organized meetings, adopted resolutions, made statements and issued appeals; popular demonstrations have taken place demanding the cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament. The problem today does not seem to be so much to attract the attention of all peoples, to further mobilize world public opinion and provide a powerful impetus for the cause of disarmament, as formulated in paragraph 99 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, but rather how the States Members of the United Nations, and this Committee, will concretely react to the demand of international public opinion and how they will translate the solemn reaffirmation into concrete and positive acts to work, in the words of paragraph 126 of the Final Document, "for general and complete disarmament and to make further collective efforts aimed at strengthening peace and international security; eliminating the threat of war, particularly nuclear war; implementing practical measures aimed at halting and reversing the arms race; strengthening the procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes; and reducing military expenditures and utilizing the resources thus released in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries". What is necessary today is the translation of those solemn words into concrete acts, not a continued repetition of the same statements without following them up with the sorely-needed political decision to act.

Being a developing country in the process of accelerating its own endeavours to raise the well-being of its people, Indonesia has a vital interest in the success of disarmament efforts. We believe that concrete achievements in the disarmament process will result in the strengthening of peace and security, at the international as well as at the regional level, a condition indispensable for the unhampered process of successful national development. There is, indeed, a close relationship between disarmament on the one hand and international peace and security and development on the other hand. As stated in paragraphs 34 and 35 of the Final Document, progress in any of these spheres would have a beneficial effect on or help greatly in the realization of the other. We have taken note of the two interesting studies relating, respectively, to the relationship between disarmament and development and that between disarmament and international security, prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of groups of experts, which were submitted last year to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session. It is the earnest hope of my delegation that the relaxation of international tension, progress in détente, mutual confidence between nations and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter will again prevail, creating an atmosphere which will enable the Committee on Disarmament to work more successfully and effectively in the discharge of the responsibility entrusted to it by the international community, namely, to exert all efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It is the task of all nations, the most powerful in particular, to create an international political atmosphere which would be conducive to the process of

(Mr. Sani, Indonesia)

disarmament. The holocaust caused by a nuclear war will not be limited to the nuclear Powers alone; it will not stop at their frontiers. It is, therefore, with a feeling of great frustration that we have to watch, practically powerless, the power-game between the nuclear Powers, the stake of which is the very existence of the whole of mankind. We observe with the deepest concern the worsening international political climate marked by continued political confrontation and rivalry between powerful nations armed to the teeth, the aggravation of international tension and the intensification of the arms race. It is in this context that my delegation would like to express the hope that the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union will bring about positive results which will be helpful to the process of disarmament.

Allow me now to refer briefly to the question of the agenda and programme of work of the current session of our Committee. This first part of the 1982 session is of a special nature because we are meeting just before the convening of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Our work should therefore be geared towards contributing as much as possible to the success of that session. It is only logical that the Committee on Disarmament, being the machinery established at the first special session should submit to the General Assembly at its second special session an assessment of its contribution to the implementation of the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of the first session. As is called for by resolution 36/92 F, the Committee on Disarmament is required in particular to submit to the second special session a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which will be a valuable contribution to the work of that session. The Committee is also requested, in that resolution, to intensify its negotiations on priority questions of disarmament, so that it may be in a position to contribute, through concrete accomplishments, to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and to submit to that session a special report on the state of negotiations on the various questions that are under consideration by it. In organizing our work we have therefore to keep in mind the contribution we are expected to make to the second special session. The approximately twelve weeks at our disposal should therefore be utilized in the most efficient manner. In view of the special nature of the second special session, the report to be drawn up by the Committee for submission to that session should have a special character, in terms of its format as well as its contents, which we will have to discuss in detail as soon as possible. In the view of my delegation, the report should also contain an assessment of the performance of the Committee since its restructuring by the General Assembly at its first special session, nearly four years ago.

As to the agenda, my delegation has no problems with the draft as proposed by the secretariat. We agree with the inclusion of further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space as a new item on the agenda. We feel, however, that, in view of the limited time available, the Committee should determine carefully the order of priority and the time to be allotted to the discussion of each of the agenda items, in order that the Committee will indeed be able to make a worthwhile contribution to the second special session. Accordingly, the programme of work should be drawn up in such a way that the maximum amount of time is allotted to negotiations on items which, in the opinion of the Committee, have the best chance of producing concrete results to be submitted subsequently to the General Assembly at its second special session for consideration and, hopefully, for adoption, such as, for example, the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

(Mr. Sani, Indonesia)

As regards the establishment of ad hoc working groups on items relating to the nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the position of my delegation is well known. My delegation continues to believe that, since an ad hoc working group has proved to be the best forum for the conduct of serious negotiations, ad hoc working groups on those two items, which have been accorded the highest priority by the Final Document, should be established, as requested repeatedly by the Group of 21 since the commencement of the work of this Committee three years ago and urged most recently by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session in resolution 36/92 F. The establishment of a working group on a nuclear test ban has become the more urgent because apparently we cannot expect the trilateral negotiations on a nuclear test ban to be reopened in the near future. My delegation also agrees with the reconstitution of the ad hoc working groups on negative security assurances, chemical weapons and radiological weapons, and their immediate resumption of work. We are glad that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has been enabled to continue its work without interruption under the able and competent chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico. We hope that the Committee will also be able to submit the results of negotiations on the last three subjects I have mentioned to the second special session, as called for by resolutions 36/96 A, paragraph 4, 36/97 B, paragraph 1, and 36/92 F, paragraph 2. My delegation is of the view, however, that, as I stated earlier, the allotment of time for these working groups should be determined in a realistic manner in accordance with the degree of priority accorded by the Committee to the items concerned on the basis of a realistic evaluation of its possible contribution to the work of the second special session. My delegation hopes that it will be possible to give the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons a more extended mandate, entrusting it with the actual elaboration of a draft international instrument on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as urged by resolution 36/96 A, paragraph 3, and 36/96 B, paragraph 3. It will be a valuable contribution to the second special session if we succeed in doing so even partially. My delegation attaches great importance to the comprehensive programme of disarmament that the Committee on Disarmament is expected to submit to the second special session. With regard to the CPD, may I make some brief observations on two questions, namely, "Priorities", and the so-called "time-frame" for the implementation of the programme. The CPD is, of course, not an end in itself. What is decisive for disarmament is its concrete implementation. The implementation of the programme would, as stated in paragraphs 9 and 109 of the Final Document, lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the ultimate objective of the disarmament process.

As to the priorities in negotiations to achieve the ultimate objective of the disarmament process, they should correspond:

Firstly, to the immediate goal of the disarmament efforts, that is, as stated in paragraph 8 of the Final Document, "the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace";

Secondly, to the types of weapons and disarmament measures which are referred to by the Final Document as priorities. May I quote in this connection paragraph 45 of the Final Document, which states: "Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons;



(Mr. Sani, Indonesia)

conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces".

The proposal made by the Group of 21, to which my delegation belongs, contained in document CD/230 reflects the relevant provisions contained in the Final Document, such as paragraphs 8 and 45.

With respect to the implementation of the programme, if a specific period of time is not set for the CPD as a whole as well as for every stage of the programme, it will lose its value as a programme. The political commitment made by States to implement the CPD will then not have much practical significance, and the CPD will constitute merely a document containing a list of recommendations without any indication as to when their implementation should be completed. This is certainly not what the international community expects. Declarations, statements, pledges and other forms of expression of intentions to make serious disarmament efforts have been made during the last three and a half decades. The international community is certainly expecting more; it expects concrete action on the basis of an agreed programme. It certainly wants to see that concrete results in the disarmament process could be expected to materialize in a specific period. It also expects that, after a certain period of time, if not the present generation at least the coming generation will be living in a world where lasting peace prevails. The setting of a specific time-frame for the implementation of the CPD is therefore essential. The stages would imply the necessity of having a review system, where the international community can take stock of the state of the implementation of the measures envisaged in every stage of the programme. In the light of such a review, a decision could be taken to prolong the implementation of certain unfinished measures into the subsequent stage. In the event that certain measures were completed before the end of the period of the stage concerned, decisions would have to be taken as to which measures relevant to the next stage could begin being implemented immediately. Of course, a certain flexibility will have to be observed in the actual implementation of the stages of the programme.

It has been our hope that it would be possible for us to look forward to the next millenium as an age of peace and prosperity for all the peoples of the world, when the threat of nuclear war to the survival of mankind would have been eliminated because we would have achieved general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the ultimate objective of the disarmament process, and when the immense possibilities of technological progress and the availability of funds can be put exclusively to the service of increasing the welfare of mankind. However, in view of present realities, I doubt very much whether it will be possible to realize that hope by the year 2000. But in any case we have to do our utmost to ensure that it will be achieved as early as possible in the first years of the new millenium. Whether we will be able to do so does not depend so much on countries like Indonesia, but rather on the nuclear-weapon Powers, and especially the two superpowers, and the militarily significant nations with their immense arsenals of nuclear weapons and sophisticated conventional arms. It has become a cliché to say that for each individual man, woman or child, there is the equivalent of three tons of TNT available ready to blow him or her up. According to the

(Mr. Sani, Indonesia)

"Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons", document A/35/392, more than \$500 billion a year are spent for military purposes which, according to the "Study on the relationship between disarmament and development", document A/36/356, represents some 19 times the official assistance provided by the OECD countries in 1980 to meet the needs of the developing countries where two-thirds of mankind live, amongst whom, 570 millions suffer from malnutrition, 800 millions are illiterate, one and a half billion have little or no access to medical services and 250 million children do not go to school. My delegation notes with deep concern the Secretary-General's remarks in his message to the Committee of 2 February which state, inter alia, that "the amount required to provide the basic necessities of the entire human race for one year is estimated to be less than the cost of the arms race for one month". But perhaps we must hammer again and again upon these facts to make those with the primary responsibility for disarmament aware that it is indeed already extremely late in the day to reverse the arms race and to work seriously towards disarmament and peace.

As to the closing date of the current session, in view of the fact that the Preparatory Committee for the second special session will start its meeting on 26 April, and that the second special session itself will begin on 7 June 1982, my delegation would prefer that this first part of our 1982 session should be concluded on Friday, 16 April 1982, with the possibility, however, that it could be extended by a couple of days, if by adding those few days we shall indeed be able to produce a more positive and a more worthwhile contribution to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

We shall be working under pressure of time if we want to submit a meaningful contribution to the second special session as this is the last session of our Committee before the special session of the General Assembly. The Committee will have to prove not only its usefulness but also its effectiveness as the sole multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament. It will have to submit a factual report on its success or lack of it, and to justify its existence to a very critical and most impatient world forum. That we have not yet been able to produce concrete results cannot, in all fairness, be blamed on the Committee. As we all know, the Committee has worked hard, but the international political climate has prevented it from achieving the results we all want. It is perhaps necessary to look into our working methods to see whether improvements cannot be made. The distinguished representative of the Netherlands referred at length to this aspect in his intervention at our first plenary meeting.

I shall conclude my statement by expressing the hope of my delegation, under the circumstances perhaps unrealistically, that the international political atmosphere will improve in the near future and will thus be conducive to the success of the efforts exerted by this Committee to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as the ultimate objective of the disarmament process. I am in no way suggesting, however, that we should wait for that improvement in the international political climate to take place. On the contrary, the deteriorating international political atmosphere should strengthen our determination to attain as many concrete results as possible in our negotiations. We have to persist in our efforts to achieve disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. There is no other choice: the alternative is the destruction of mankind.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, it is a matter of deep satisfaction to my delegation to see the representative of friendly Iran guiding the deliberations of our Committee during the current month. Iran and India share a long history of intimate bonds that encompass culture, tradition and language. It is in the spirit of our common heritage that my delegation pledges to you its full co-operation and support in your difficult task.

I would also like to express our appreciation to Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia, who so skilfully presided over the closing stages of our Committee's work during its 1981 session.

The untimely passing away of our distinguished colleague from Italy, Ambassador Montezemolo, has deprived us all of a seasoned diplomat with rich experience. May I convey to the delegation of Italy our deep and sincere condolences.

May I also take this opportunity to bid farewell to Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands, who has often enlivened this Committee with his incisive statements and earned the respect of all those who have worked with him. I wish him every success and personal happiness in his new assignment and, since he is not present today, I would request the representative of the Netherlands to convey my delegation's sentiments to him.

On behalf of the Indian delegation, I would also like to welcome in our midst our colleagues from Australia, Bulgaria, Burma, Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Nigeria and the United States of America, who have joined us for the first time this session. I am sure that the work of our Committee will be considerably enriched and enhanced by their contributions.

The first half of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament has acquired special significance and importance in view of the convening of the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament to be held in June this year. Within a few months' time, our Committee and its work will be the focus of intense scrutiny and evaluation by the international community. If the results of the recently concluded thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly are any indication, we may expect some searching questions as to the practical relevance and usefulness of our body as the sole multilateral negotiating organ in the field of disarmament.

In his thought-provoking statement of 2 February, Ambassador Fein referred to certain disquieting trends in the work of the First Committee in New York as well as in our Committee here. If the First Committee does at times seem to be unproductive in terms of concrete results, the responsibility surely lies with those who have, over the years, not paid any heed whatsoever to the solemn resolutions of the General Assembly. Ambassador García Robles of Mexico has reminded us, for example, of the many resolutions of the General Assembly, adopted by overwhelming majorities or even by consensus, calling for a complete cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. It certainly does not add to the prestige and authority of the General Assembly if certain nuclear-weapon States continue brazenly and contemptuously to disregard those very resolutions to which they themselves have been a party.

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

The Committee on Disarmament finds itself in a similar quandary. Over the past two years we have been treated to the sorry spectacle of a determined minority preventing this body from fulfilling its solemn negotiating mandate. Despite the fact that a nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament are items of the highest priority on our agenda, multilateral negotiations on specific and concrete issues under these items have yet to commence. If other members of this Committee have resisted the attempt to turn this body into what Mrs. Thorsson of Sweden has aptly called a "mailbox" for draft treaties of low priority, such as the radiological weapons convention, prepared by the major Powers, then their attitude should not be taken merely as tactical moves to prevent progress.

I would like to add a note of caution here. It is all too easy to dismiss the concerns of other States as "foolish" or "ill-intentioned", while reserving the glory of "sincerity" and "realism" to one's own initiatives. Let us not fall prey to that kind of myopia which preaches that the gun in one's own hand is for peace while that in another's hand is for war.

In the same context, while proposals to improve the efficiency and working methods of this Committee deserve serious consideration, the fundamental question still remains a political one -- are the major Powers ready to accept, without reservations, the principle of multilateral negotiations on disarmament? As long as only lip service is paid to this principle, I am afraid that no reform of working methods would yield the concrete results we all desire.

In the several statements we have heard so far, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament has justifiably been a major theme. However, whether in their approach to the programme or to the question of disarmament itself, some of our colleagues have once again underlined the need for so-called "realism". Ambassador Weyoner of the Federal Republic of Germany in his statement of 4 February, said:

"Realism is also the key word for the second special session itself. Lofty objectives must be measured against reality; review and appraisal of achievements in the past period must lead to careful planning for the next few years. Reasonable prospects for concrete results within this period will have to take precedence over the promulgation of over-ambitious ideas."

The Ambassador of Japan, too, spoke in the same vein in his statement of 4 February. He too thought it would be "wiser to avoid too over-ambitious an approach and to try to draft a programme that would be verifiable and workable".

In the past, our delegation has questioned this seemingly practical and reasonable emphasis on "realism". What this brand of realism, in effect, implies is an indefinite perpetuation of the present status quo; worse, it implies an even further worsening of the security climate for the developing and non-aligned nations of the world. In the name of this realism we are asked to accept the

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notion of a pernicious balance of nuclear terror and to live indefinitely under the threat of a thermo-nuclear war. When non-aligned and non-nuclear-weapon States voice their legitimate security concerns and seek to safeguard the survival of their peoples, they are dismissed as starry-eyed idealists, who are asking for the moon. I would like to emphasize that this is not so. We are not moralists who are pushing "lofty objectives" or peddling "over-ambitious ideas". We are simply seeking our survival in a world which technology has compressed into one small neighbourhood, a world in which the security of each nation lies in collective security for all. No longer can one's security be defined solely in terms of one's region or neighbourhood. Any neighbourhood today is global in scope and one's adversaries, real or potential, may as often lie beyond the oceans as across one's own borders. As Dr. Eugene Rostow, speaking this morning on behalf of the United States has conceded, in the present-day context, "the dynamics of war permit no sanctuaries". The realists among us have still not answered a question that has been posed to them repeatedly: is it permissible for any State or group of States to pursue its security interests in a manner that jeopardizes the security of all other States and threatens the survival of the human species itself? In the Final Document of the first special session, it was acknowledged by consensus that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for belligerents and non-belligerents alike. How are we expected to live with the reality of the growing threat of a nuclear disaster? Is it just a "lofty" objective to seek to eliminate this danger? Is it "over-ambitious" to seek even one's survival? One would have thought that this was a matter of plain common sense, and that all acknowledge that the right to live is the first and most fundamental of human rights.

Another aspect of this peculiar brand of "realism" that is being foisted upon us concerns the relationship among various measures of disarmament. It has long been acknowledged, universally, I might add, that the highest priority in disarmament negotiations must be accorded to the elimination of nuclear weapons. This is clearly and unambiguously endorsed in the Final Document. However, during negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, some delegations have sought to overturn this order of priorities and to argue that it is unrealistic to expect that nuclear disarmament can take place without an integral linkage with conventional disarmament. We are told that the reality of nuclear deterrence and the disposition of nuclear and conventional forces in Europe, for example, makes it impossible to conceive of nuclear disarmament without a concomitant and so-called balance reduction in conventional forces.

There is another aspect of the "reality" of nuclear deterrence which some of our colleagues may have missed. I can quote no better authority on this score than Mr. Iklé, formerly Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the United States and now United States Under-Secretary for Defense. Addressing a Joint Harvard-MIT Seminar on 26 February 1974, Director Iklé said:

"The seemingly rigorous models of nuclear deterrence are built on the rule, 'what you can't calculate you leave out'. For example, the 'missile duels' usually ignore fallout. And the calculations are unable to cope with critical details regarding unreliability."

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

Mr. Iklé added:

"Our entire structure of thinking about deterrence lacks empiricism. Like no other field of human endeavour, nuclear deterrence is unique in demanding -- absolutely compellingly -- that we work out successful solutions without directly relevant experience, without experimentation. There can be no trial and error here, no real learning."

We have been told that nuclear deterrence has, in fact, prevented a nuclear war, that were it not to exist the very disaster we all seek to avoid may befall us. Is this a valid argument? Here is what Mr. Iklé had to say:

"Our efforts to prevent nuclear war could fail, as all of you know, not only because of an inadequate retaliatory capability to deter a deliberate attack, but for other reasons, such as an accident, an unintended process of escalation, or a combination of failures and causes we could not have anticipated or even imagined. Put in such terms, no one even disagrees with the proposition that a situation of mutual deterrence does not by itself guarantee the prevention of nuclear war."

The non-aligned non-nuclear-weapon States have taken the lead in recommending several measures for the prevention of nuclear war, taking into account precisely the reality which many of our colleagues refuse to acknowledge. We have suggested a total prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons pending nuclear disarmament. We have called for negotiations on urgent measures of nuclear disarmament. These unfortunately have been met with stone-walling tactics. In resolution 36/81 B the General Assembly has asked nuclear-weapon States to come forward with their own ideas on this vital issue at the second special session devoted to disarmament. This resolution, of which India was a co-sponsor, was adopted by consensus. We hope that the second special session will not have to listen to the same old theory that nuclear deterrence will prevent nuclear war. Enough has been said on the subject to underline the need for other more genuinely realistic measures and we trust that the nuclear-weapon Powers will come forward with their constructive proposals on this vital issue.

Our delegation looks upon the comprehensive programme of disarmament as embodying an international strategy for disarmament. If this strategy is to be meaningful, then it must map out not only the starting point and the destination, but the route to be followed as well. To map out the route as we go along, as some of our colleagues suggest, would hardly amount to a strategy. It is true that the route we now chart for ourselves may require some detours and deviations in the light of the actual terrain we must traverse. However, to embark on a journey with no idea of the route, except merely to follow our noses, is what should be called over-ambitious and adventurous. And this latter course is exactly what CD/205, presented on behalf of a group of Western countries, has asked us to do.

The Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany has objected to the fact that the Group of 21 has, in document CD/223, which contains a list of measures for a draft CPD, gone beyond indicating the main thrust of negotiations, and anticipated detailed results. The essence of strategy lies in anticipation.

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

If the measures included in a CPD were broad and general in character, there would be no strategic plan, no chart to guide our progress. And I am sure that members will recall that during the 1981 session of this Committee, the Group of 21 recommended certain broad, though concrete and substantive, issues for negotiations on nuclear disarmament in an ad hoc working group of the Committee. The reaction of several of our colleagues was that these issues were too broad in character, that negotiations could not take place until we identified specific measures. Well, this point has been taken into account, gentlemen, and the Group of 21 has identified specific items for negotiations. If States themselves have to decide what they are going to negotiate, and when they are going to negotiate, why have a CPD?

Reference has been made to the fact that progress in disarmament requires painstaking, step-by-step negotiations, that negotiators must not operate under any time-pressure. This would have been valid if decisions concerning the development and deployment of armaments were also being taken in a similar painstaking, step-by-step manner, with small increments over long periods of time. But to fight a flood, which is what the arms race is, by planting a slow procession of faggots is what bespeaks of an idealism and ambition, which members of the Group of 21 are certainly not guilty of!

The Group of 21 envisages a CPD divided into four phases, whose implementation must take place within an agreed and negotiated time-frame. However, this time-frame will be flexible in character. The sponsors of document CD/223 do not believe in a mechanical time-frame nor in the "magic and automatism of a calendar which future events could render useless and futile" as has been claimed by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is a measure of the communication gap which seems to separate us that despite repeated clarifications and explanations from members of the Group of 21, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany can still continue to make such observations. We in the Group of 21 do not conceive of a rigid or automatic calendar for the completion of the CPD. However, we do believe that if the programme is to have any meaning, if it is to be a politically operational document, it must have at the very minimum at least an indicative time-frame for the completion of the various measures. The priorities set forth in the programme can only be conceived of and given practical meaning in terms of time-sequences for the implementation of categories of measures. The interrelationship among the various measures also can only be elaborated in terms of time-frames for their implementation. This ought to be self-evident.

Above all, we must bear in mind the purpose of adopting a CPD. If the adoption of the CPD will have no impact whatsoever on the decisions of States concerning armaments; if States cannot anticipate with any degree of confidence that the global security environment would improve as a result of the gradual but planned implementation of the CPD, then would it not be like one of those unproductive resolutions of the General Assembly that Ambassador Fein spoke of? All States plan their armaments and defence posture years in advance. This is realism. Would it be realistic to expect that an open-ended CPD with not even an indicative time-frame for implementation would have any impact on the armament plans of States?

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany seems to have again misunderstood another aspect of the approach adopted by the Group of 21 towards the CPD. He alleged that document CD/225 provides for a tightly planned negotiation calendar with detailed prescriptions as to what is to be negotiated and achieved in later stages, quite independently from the outcome of preceding stages. This is simply not correct. What is contained in each state of the programme, as conceived of by the Group of 21, is on the assumption that measures contained in the previous stage have been implemented. All plans necessarily follow such a practice. However, the sponsors of CD/225 have never suggested that what should be negotiated and implemented in later stages would be quite independent of the outcome of preceding stages. I am surprised that this charge has been made in spite of the fact that in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, my delegation and a number of others in the Group of 21 have repeatedly explained that the review mechanism would provide for readjustment and modifications in the programme in the light of the progress made in the implementation of the previous stages. The details of the review mechanism remain to be spelt out, but the principle is quite clear and unambiguous.

I trust that my statement today will have cleared up once for all the various misconceptions which seem to exist regarding the approach of the Group of 21 to the elaboration of the CPD. The disarmament philosophy of the non-aligned, non-nuclear-weapon States rests on firm and realistic foundations. It is oriented towards practical results and is rooted in a sober appraisal of the dangers which confront us. Those who so readily charge us with lack of realism and lofty ambition would do well to carry out a searching examination of the assumptions on which they themselves have based their approach.

Before concluding, I would like to say that we have taken note of the detailed statement made by the representative of Czechoslovakia on 2 February in which the views of a group of socialist countries on a draft CPD were set forth. We are in the process of examining the specific proposals made in that statement, and will offer our considered comments at a later date. At the same time, we hope that the sponsors of document CD/205 will reconsider their positions in the light of the clarifications given by us today.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to me and for the kind reference you made to my country.



Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, allow me to join other delegations which have congratulated you on your assumption of the Chairmanship of the Committee for the first month in the 1982 session. My delegation pledges its full co-operation with you, a representative of a fellow non-aligned country, in the accomplishment of your onerous task. Your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia, also deserves our appreciation for the very able manner in which he concluded the work of the Committee in the last part of the 1981 session. Also, I wish to associate myself with the deep condolences already conveyed to the delegation of Italy on the death of our friend and colleague, Ambassador Montezemolo. May his soul rest in peace.

At this juncture, I would like to express my warm gratitude to you and to all those who have welcomed me to the Committee, and I look forward to working closely with members.

It is now a truism to state that we are living in times of grave international tension. Man's vision of right and wrong is blurred; his concept of the noble idea of human rights has been prostituted in a cold war atmosphere. Nowadays, whether or not one is guilty of the violation of human rights depends upon one's ideological label. There is very little honesty about human rights. If there was sufficient objectivity about it, the racists in South Africa would have been the first to qualify for economic sanction.

From the standpoint of a developing country like Nigeria, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that we believe that its continuation runs counter to the attainment of meaningful economic co-operation among the different nations of the world. Indeed, if the arms race continues at the present pace it will reach a point at which it generates so much suspicion and tension among nations that all reasonable forms of interaction will cease. My delegation agrees with the conclusions voiced by Ambassador de la Gorce of France in his statement last Tuesday, that "disarmament could also serve the two important objectives of international co-operation, namely, security, and economic and social progress, particularly for the benefit of the less favoured countries."

We are living in a world where there is a real danger of a nuclear war, and my delegation shares the concern of those who have expressed the view that such a nuclear war will produce "no winners but only losers". The threat of mankind's self-extinction owing to the colossal accumulation of nuclear weapons by a few States has never been so pronounced.

During the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, my delegation took the initiative on the declaration of the 1980s as the second disarmament decade. Our concern then, as it is today, was to see by the end of the 1980s a world more secure through effective disarmament measures and much more economically equitable. Present trends clearly indicate that this objective is in danger of not being realized. This would be a disaster for mankind, and as my President, His Excellency Alhaji Shehu Shagari stated at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly in October 1980:

"The armaments race has assumed a new and dangerous momentum, at a time when the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has failed. The North-South dialogue on the economic problems of the world is stalemated, as a consequence of a most regrettable inability to agree even on procedures to begin negotiations. The present stalemate in the climate of negotiations between the developing and the developed countries holds terrifying prospects for all. Perhaps, more than is realized, the world is poised delicately on the brink, that critical margin, between survival and disaster."

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

My delegation has always argued against nations basing their security on doctrines of nuclear deterrence because we, the nuclear-have-nots, also desire to survive. We will continue to hold the view that doctrines of deterrence, strategic balance and parity are all based on the narrow security interests of the nuclear-weapon States which stubbornly refuse to take into consideration the vital security interests of third States. As my delegation has stated on several occasions, it is a fact that the greater the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons, the greater is the risk of nuclear war.

In Africa, the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons are increasing because of South Africa's nuclear capability, and in spite of the fact that the Organization of African Unity as far back as 1964 took a decision on the denuclearization of Africa, these developments can only place a serious obstacle in the path of peace on the continent. Paragraph 12 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament states:

"Indeed, the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm."

My country is only too aware of the dangers posed to the African continent by South Africa's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Also, through the report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, document A/35/402, the world community has a clear picture of the dangers posed by the racist régime in Pretoria. Indeed, as is stated in paragraph 89 of the report:

"The diplomatic and political costs of South African acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons would be high, and quite possibly disastrous, if those weapons were ever used. Nevertheless, desperate to preserve the apartheid system, South Africa's leaders may eschew a rational weighing of costs and gains."

My country has always taken the opportunity in different forums to deplore the collusion between South Africa and her Western allies, and we seize the opportunity to do so in this Committee.

Allow me now to dwell briefly upon some of the substantive items that my delegation feels should preoccupy the Committee's attention this session, particularly as we approach the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

A nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament constitute the two most central and priority items which the Committee should urgently address itself to. It is almost a cliché to state that everything that can be said in favour of a test ban treaty has already been stated. The numerous

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resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly testify to the continuing interest of the international community in the matter. The latest United Nations resolution, 36/85, entitled, "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 35/145 B", in its operative paragraphs, not only reiterates the indispensable role of this Committee in the negotiation of a nuclear test ban, but also in its paragraph 6, requests

"the Committee on Disarmament to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority at the beginning of its session to be held in 1982."

My delegation supported this resolution and we hope that the establishment of a working group on a comprehensive test ban treaty will be possible this session.

We are in agreement with those who state that all technical barriers to the conclusion of the treaty have been fully explored and that what remains lacking is the political will of the nuclear-weapon States to negotiate. The nuclear test ban has a central importance in the urgent task of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of such weapons, and of preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. This fact is clearly embodied in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament.

Bearing in mind that the second special session is only a few months from us, it would be very useful if the Committee on Disarmament could, without further delay, agree on the establishment of a working group on a CTBT. This achievement would be an indication of a positive contribution that this Committee could make towards the implementation of the negotiating responsibility conferred upon it by the international community. In this context, my delegation calls upon those nuclear-weapon States that have so far withheld their consent, to join in the consensus otherwise existing in the Committee on the subject.

As one of the sponsors of working paper CD/204, my delegation also feels that the rule of consensus in the Committee should not be interpreted in such a way as to impede the progress of the work of the Committee, especially in such a crucial and vital area as that of a nuclear test-ban treaty.

For those of us who were trusting enough to sign the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, the fact that the provisions of its article VI have become a dead letter is a matter of great concern.

I have already highlighted the dangers of a nuclear war. My delegation cannot support the view that nuclear weapons should be used as a means to offset perceived asymmetries in conventional armaments. This view is untenable, since for one thing nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction and cannot be compared with conventional armaments.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

My delegation welcomed the structured informal meetings held last session on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and believes that at this session further meetings should be held to keep alive the momentum generated by these meetings. In this context, the working paper of the Group of 21, document CD/180, should provide a firm basis for structured discussions that should lead to the establishment of a working group.

My delegation believes that the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be the beginning of a new concept of special sessions, and this is why my delegation continues to attach great importance to the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The special sessions should not be a mere periodic get-together but should have an organic link to the review of the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. We are confident that under the guidance of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, the Working Group on this subject will make the necessary progress. However, my delegation is all too well aware that it is the political will to negotiate that will determine the outcome of the ongoing negotiations. In this connection, my delegation associates itself with the views expressed by the representative of Mexico in his opening statement, that any deviation from the letter and spirit of the Final Document of the first special session in the elaboration of the CPD will be a step backwards in the cause of disarmament.

The intensive negotiations carried out in January produced some useful results. My delegation noted with interest a growing convergence of views between the different groups and we believe that this trend, if continued, will augur well for the successful elaboration of the CPD.

A crucial aspect that my delegation feels that the CPD should take account of is the relationship between disarmament and development. The recently concluded United Nations study on the subject stated, inter alia, in paragraph 391 of the conclusions:

"This investigation suggests very strongly that the world can either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigour or move consciously and with deliberate speed towards a more stable and balanced social and economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both."

During the last three years it has become evident that the nuclear-weapon States are more concerned with their narrow security interests than in giving credible assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be threatened with or have nuclear weapons used against them. The present attitude of the nuclear-weapon States can only lead to a perilous increase in the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and all the inherent dangers that such an escalation would contain.

I will refrain from going into great detail in my intervention today as to why the present declaratory statements made by the nuclear-weapon States do not suffice as credible guarantees. My delegation holds the view that Article 51 of the

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United Nations Charter is of limited application, not only in the context of conventional warfare but also as to those it covers, since it appears to cover only allies of the respective nuclear-weapon States. Security Council resolution 255 is also not meaningful, since problems again arise if the threat to use nuclear weapons is made by or directed against one of the allies of the nuclear-weapon States.

My delegation believes that the Ad hoc Working Group on Security Assurances should continue to try to find a "common formula" of universal application. The alternative approaches considered in the Working Group at the last session should in our view be further explored. Alliance relationships, troop deployments and dissemination of nuclear weapons give very limited assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. However, a concrete international convention on negative security assurances will ensure that the non-nuclear-weapon States will not be the victims of nuclear blackmail. In resolution 36/95 of the General Assembly entitled, "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", an appeal is made

"to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character."

My delegation hopes that the much required political will will be evident during the work of the Working Group.

With respect to the other existing working groups, my delegation believes that during this session it will clearly be necessary to advance the mandate of the Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to cover something more than mere "consideration". An appropriately revised mandate in our view will steer the Working Group on the right course towards elaborating the text of a convention. In this connection, we welcome the United States offer made this morning by Mr. Rostow to support a revised mandate on chemical weapons. Further elaboration is still required, however, on the role of the consultative committee, the complaints procedures, the scope of the convention, and verification. This is also true of the Ad hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. The present state of the negotiations calls for greater efforts on the part of various delegations to narrow down their differences on the question of scope and definition, and move progressively forward to the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

Permit me now to offer some few comments on the inclusion of new items on our annual agenda. My country is one of those that has expressed deep concern about the increased militarization of outer space. The increase in the use of anti-satellite weapons, high-energy lasers and particle-beam weapons make outer space a battlefield of the future. In view of the fact that this development runs counter to the spirit and the letter of the outer space Treaty of 1967, which seeks to promote its peaceful

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uses for the benefit of mankind, my delegation believes that the subject needs to be given the status of consideration within the context of the priority items listed for examination in the Committee.

My delegation also attaches considerable importance to the special report that would emanate from the Committee to the General Assembly at its second special session. In the view of my delegation, the report should be an evaluation of the contribution of the Committee on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body, to disarmament negotiations. An early consideration of this subject in the Committee would be necessary to enable a decision to be taken on the format of the special report.

There is very little time left between now and the second special session. The task before this Committee is monumental, and the expectations are high. Therefore we cannot afford to waste any of this precious time on procedural discussions. My delegation hopes that the Committee will this week adopt the draft provisional agenda and the work programme, and proceed immediately to substantive negotiations on the items on the agenda.

Finally, permit me to conclude by quoting once more from the address of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the General Assembly in 1980. On that occasion, he said:

"The present uncertain international situation challenges all those entrusted with the responsibility of safeguarding the destiny of mankind to pause and think. Times have changed. Conditions have changed. The concepts and structure which precipitated some of the current international crises cannot remain unchanged. Any organic institution without the means to adjust to change is without the means of survival. The sum of over 500 billion dollars, which the developed countries have spent on military research and development since 1960, far exceeds what two-thirds of mankind require to banish poverty and degradation. There must be disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, to save mankind from untold anxiety and indeed a holocaust. There must be disarmament to release resources for development."

This is a view that my delegation intends to pursue. I wonder if those countries that have built their economic policies around the battle against inflation have ever given thought to the view that such a battle cannot be won as long as the arms race continues at the present level.

The CHAIRMAN: We have practically exhausted the time available to us for the morning. If the Committee agrees, I would suggest that we suspend the plenary meeting now and resume it this afternoon at 3.15 p.m. If there are no objections, we will proceed accordingly.

The meeting was suspended at 1.15 p.m. and resumed at 3.15 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 152nd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed. The Committee will now listen to the remaining speakers inscribed to take the floor today.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, in its statement of 2 February the Soviet delegation presented its position on the basic questions on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. We deemed it necessary to do so on the opening day of the current session as we seek, from the very beginning, to participate in the work of the Committee in a constructive spirit. If the Committee on Disarmament manages to make progress on specific aspects of the curbing of the arms race and disarmament, it will make a not insignificant contribution to the solution of the basic global problem now facing mankind: the removal of the danger of war. This danger has, unfortunately, not diminished in recent times but increased, which imposes an even greater responsibility on the Committee.

In view of the present international situation, the task facing the Committee is already rather complex. We therefore vigorously condemn the actions of those delegations which seek to render the negotiations in the Committee even more difficult by introducing into them problems totally unrelated to the content of the negotiations and mixing up questions of completely divergent character into a single tangled skein. We are deeply convinced that the Committee's task is to concentrate all its attention on questions relating to the limitation of the arms race, objectively analysing the real difficulties arising in disarmament negotiations, and together to work towards overcoming them.

Who will deny that the fundamental danger to the cause of peace at the present time is the reckless acceleration of the arms race and the development of ever newer systems of weapons designed primarily for first strike capability, which is accompanied by the promotion of doctrines based on the waging and winning of nuclear war?

It is true that -- improbably -- the American delegation in its statement today claimed that there is no arms race. This claim would imply that the United States is not engaging in an arms build-up, is not expanding its arsenals, is not inflating its military budget to gigantic proportions. All this, apparently, is simply an illusion. Let us now turn to the facts as they stand today.

In recent days we have heard about the submission to the legislative bodies of the United States of its draft budget for fiscal year 1983, which clearly reflects a policy of escalating the arms race. It has already become rather a tradition in the United States, as well as in the NATO countries, to greet special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament with sudden increases in military budgets. This was the case in 1978 when, during the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the NATO countries adopted a decision systematically to increase the military budgets of the member countries of that military-political alliance in the succeeding years. This time, too, there is a decision to increase military expenditures -- even more. On the eve of the second special session the United States is preparing to adopt a military budget that sets a record for all of the post-war years. According to the budgetary message of the President of the United States, in fiscal year 1983 expenditures on United States strategic nuclear forces alone are to increase from \$16 to \$23 billion and expenditures for so-called general purpose forces from \$88 to \$106 billion.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The naval and rapid deployment forces will also receive multi-million-dollar increases. Some \$6.8 billion are to be spent merely on the construction of aircraft carriers. A total of \$258 billion has been requested for military appropriations for the coming year. Clearly, President Reagan's decision to begin producing new types of chemical weapons on a large scale, with an allocation for that purpose of \$700 million, can only be seen as some kind of "surprise present" for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Mr. Rostow's statement that the United States agrees to negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the banning of chemical weapons can hardly sweeten this bitter pill. The result of all this is that the United States' total military expenditures for a period of five years will amount to the truly unbelievable sum of more than \$1.6 trillion.

On what, precisely, will these billions be spent?

In early October 1981, President Reagan of the United States announced his "strategic programme" for the 1980s, which not only strengthens and expands previously confirmed plans but also envisages the development and deployment of new weapon systems. The American strategic programme has assigned a special place to the deployment of MX inter-continental ballistic missiles, each of which will be armed with 10 warheads of extremely high accuracy, which will make it possible to destroy heavily-defended targets, i.e. to use these rockets for a "disarming" strike.

The ballistic missiles aboard Trident-2 submarines, the construction and emplacement of which has been approved by the American leadership, will have practically the same military capabilities as the MX missiles. It is also planned to produce, in the 1980s, a qualitatively new strategic bomber, the "B-1B", and to equip the B-52 bomber fleet with strategic cruise missiles of various types. At the same time, intensive activity is under way towards the development of effective anti-missile defence equipment, the creation of the means for waging war in space, the significant expansion and renewal of the chemical warfare potential of the United States and the re-equipment of its land forces at a qualitatively higher level.

An important part in the United States' plans to achieve military superiority is undoubtedly played by the decision to deploy nearly 600 American medium-range missiles in western Europe, which will give the NATO bloc a 3-2 superiority in delivery vehicles of this category and a 2-1 superiority in the corresponding nuclear payload.

All in all, it would seem that the American leaders have great hopes of achieving "victory" in the arms race through qualitative superiority. No less than two-thirds of all federal government expenditures in the United States on scientific research and experimental design work in the coming years will be devoted to the laying of the scientific and technical foundations for the development of new and ever more destructive types of weapons. The production of new weapons systems is also being actively pursued. A clear example of this are the plans relating to cruise missiles. The possible results of such calculations based on technological leadership in armaments was quite correctly pointed out in the statement made here by Mrs. I. Thorsson, the head of the Swedish delegation, on 2 February. It is difficult not to agree with her warnings.



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We may legitimately ask, why does the United States need such a gigantic military budget? Why has it adopted numerous programmes for the development of new generations of weapons, including weapons of mass destruction? This question is often answered by a claim that the United States, and in fact the entire NATO bloc, has fallen behind the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries. This claim is entirely false and it can easily be refuted by consulting the facts.

Despite the fact that after the Second World War the world had already witnessed a number of very dangerous upsurges of the arms race, initiated in each case by the United States and its allies -- we have several times already provided examples confirming this -- in recent years an approximate military balance has nevertheless been reached and it still exists, both between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Treaty countries and those of NATO. This equilibrium exists both in the field of strategic nuclear forces and in the sphere of conventional armaments and armed forces, on a global scale as well as at the regional level.

When the SALT-II Treaty was signed, the USSR and the United States exchanged detailed data on the quantities of their strategic arms. These figures are familiar to the members of the Committee. The Soviet Union had approximately 2,500 strategic delivery vehicles and the United States 2,300. However, in terms of numbers of strategic warheads, the United States had considerable superiority over the USSR -- by more than one third. Over-all, however, there was an approximate balance in this field, which was to be further strengthened through the implementation of the Treaty. The situation of approximate equality in this field was, moreover, recognized both in 1979 and later by the most authoritative American leaders.

What has happened since the signing of the SALT-II Treaty? Is it possible to imagine that within the space of one or two years the Soviet Union has been able to achieve superiority, and even more, substantial superiority, in strategic weapons, the development of which requires many many years? The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, was forced to admit, at a meeting with American newspaper editors in Washington on 5 June 1981, that the alleged superiority of the Soviet Union in this field was a deliberate invention. "In strategic nuclear forces", he said, "approximate parity continues to prevail between our two countries".

Approximate equality also exists as regards medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, i.e. the basic rocket-borne and airborne nuclear weapons of the NATO countries that can reach targets in the Soviet Union from the territories of western European countries and the waters adjoining Europe, that is, weapons with a range of 1,000 kilometres and more, and the corresponding Soviet weapons of similar range deployed in the European portion of the USSR. The NATO countries have 986 such delivery vehicles for use on the European continent. This includes 723 American planes, 64 ballistic missiles and 55 British bombers, as well as 98 rockets and 46 bombers belonging to France. The Soviet Union has 975 similar military units, including 461 planes and 514 rockets.

As regards the negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe now under way in Geneva, to which Mr. Rostow referred in his statement, an exhaustive evaluation of the situation with regard to those negotiations was given by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in

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his talk with representatives of the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament, which took place recently in Moscow. In view of the importance of what Mr. Brezhnev said on that occasion, the Soviet delegation intends to circulate the text of his remarks as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

No less revealing, too, are the facts about the numbers of the armed forces and conventional weapons of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries. It is, of course, more difficult to make a comparison in this sphere because of its varied and diverse nature, and the differences in the structure and organization of these forces. But a look at the basic components shows a picture of approximate equality. For example, there are 4.9 million men serving in the armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc countries, while the number serving in the countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization is rather less than 4.8 million. As far as the number of tanks goes, NATO has 24,000 units while the Warsaw Treaty countries have scarcely more -- 25,000 units. As regards air forces, despite the somewhat larger number of military aircraft in the forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries (by a 1.2 to 1 ratio), NATO has superiority in air support capacity (by a 3 to 1 ratio) and in the number of helicopters (by a 1.8 to 1 ratio). The exchange of numerical data at the Vienna talks, the last of which related to the situation as of 1 January 1980, confirms that there is approximate equality in the numbers of land and air forces of the two sides in Central Europe, where the NATO countries have 991,000 men and the Warsaw Treaty countries 979,000.

We could continue this comparison of numerical data confirming that there is an equilibrium. Detailed comparative data on the various types of weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States and the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO can be found in a book prepared by the Soviet Ministry of Defence entitled, "Where does the threat to peace come from?". This book was published in Moscow in January 1982 and we can acquaint interested delegations with it. The information given in the book convincingly demonstrates that the balance exists not only on paper but also in fact. Thus, there is no need for the United States to catch up in weaponry as it has not fallen behind the Soviet Union.

Do Western strategic planners know all this? Of course they do. Nevertheless their plans for the building up of armaments of all kinds that are being prepared and adopted today are without parallel in the entire post-war period. And why is all of this necessary? For the very purpose of destroying the balance that has been created and securing military superiority for the United States and the NATO countries over the Soviet Union and its allies. President Reagan stated this goal of the United States rather clearly during his meeting with editors of provincial American newspapers on 17 October 1981, in which he said quite frankly that "the Russians will not be able to keep up with us". Many comments in the same vein have been made by the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger, most recently during his current trip to the Middle East region.

The United States' plans to achieve military superiority are matched by actual American policy with regard to the negotiations on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. The United States broke off negotiations with the Soviet Union on such important problems as the limitation of strategic weapons, the prohibition of chemical weapons, the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, the limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean, and so forth. In the

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Committee on Disarmament the initiation of serious negotiations on many key aspects of arms limitation and disarmament has been blocked for as much as a year now.

Any initiative, any step in the sphere of the limitation of armaments that might in some way affect the American programmes relating to the arms race are declared inappropriate. Today we heard that the same applies to the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests -- a measure which the overwhelming majority of States have long sought to bring about but which, apparently, "must be related to the ability of the Western nations to maintain credible deterrent forces." This, it should be noted, was to apply only to Western States. As soon, it seems, as it is decided in Washington that the establishment of a working group on the prohibition of tests would destroy the entire theory and practice of deterrence, the group cannot be established.

Arthur Cox, writing in today's issue of the International Herald Tribune, says the following about the reasons for the United States' negative attitude vis-à-vis disarmament negotiations: "But the more fundamental reason for not moving towards serious negotiations is an unresolved policy debate in the Reagan administration. The majority position is still held by the hawks, who are opposed to genuine arms control and reductions. They prefer to seek the chimera of nuclear superiority. Instead of reducing nuclear weapons, they want to build and deploy the MX, the Trident-2 and the Pershing-2, which some of them claim would enable the United States to fight and win a nuclear war. They are struggling to make the use of nuclear weapons a rational means of warfare. The effort is not only extraordinarily dangerous, it is insane."

The NATO countries are trying to cover up their unconstructive approach to disarmament negotiations by making references to events in various regions of the world. In connection with the references to Poland made by Mr. Rostow in his statement today, I should like to state the following.

Attempting in some manner to justify their interference in Polish affairs, the NATO countries vary their story in various ways, claiming that martial law was imposed in Poland under pressure from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and that the Soviet Union is generally involved in the current development of the situation in Poland. This is a fabrication from beginning to end.

The measures introduced by the highest authorities in Poland are the result of a national Polish decision; it is the business of the Poles, and only theirs. What could be more authoritative on this subject than the statements made by the Polish leadership?

It should, at the same time, be clear that the fate of neighbouring socialist Poland is not a matter of indifference to the Soviet Union. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet people gave their lives to liberate Poland from fascist slavery and this cannot be erased from the memory of either the Soviet or the Polish peoples.

Of course, if one's purpose is to disrupt negotiations and to use every means of dragging out the solution of urgent problems in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race, then of course, any device will do, including references to the situation in one country or another.

The statement we heard today from the representative of the United States, Mr. Rostow, is typical in this respect. Like many of his predecessors in the days of the "cold war", he sees the root of the evil only in "the hand of Moscow".

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How many such statements have we heard in our time! His statement would also lead one to believe that there are only two States in the world, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, and that all other States and peoples have no particular influence on the world situation.

In essence, Mr. Rostow's statement assembled all the basic themes of current American propaganda by means of which that country attempts to justify the United States policy of a gigantic build-up of arms for the purpose of achieving military superiority.

We do not intend to enter into polemics with Mr. Rostow, for that would only distract the attention of the Committee from the vital issues it should be dealing with. I would like, however, to draw attention to the following facts.

Under the smokescreen of completely false statements about an alleged Soviet military threat, the United States is attempting to achieve a military superiority which would be a threat not to the Soviet Union alone. Any country might be or could become the victim of American military might, if the system in that country did not please American ruling circles. We do not wish to follow Mr. Rostow's example by going into a discussion of the situation in various countries where American interference in their internal affairs is now taking place. These countries and regions that are now the sites of crisis situations brought on by the actions of the United States are well known. We would also draw attention to the fact that the proponents of linkages in studying the international situation did not feel it necessary to mention the annexation by Israel of the Golan Heights -- an act of aggression that was decisively condemned by the United Nations General Assembly a few days ago, or the continued occupation of Namibia by the South African aggressors, or the bloody crimes of the military junta in El Salvador, or the bloodshed in Ulster that has been going on for years now, and many many other Gordian knots in international life that truly demand immediate solution. We do not, however, think that the Committee on Disarmament is the appropriate place for discussing these problems, burning issues though they may be, because they are not directly related to the question of the limitation of the arms race. It would not be a realistic approach.

A genuinely realistic approach would be to solve the most acute international problems at the negotiating table, on the basis of equality and equal security, with regard for the legitimate interests of each side. This is the method the Soviet Union advocates, and it was once more authoritatively stated by L.I. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, on the occasion of his meeting with representatives of the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament last week. As L.I. Brezhnev stated, the Soviet leadership is firmly convinced that "for any State to base its policy on an assumption of a nuclear war and of victory in such a war is madness, irresponsibility and adventurist gambling with the fate of mankind. Diplomacy demands not entanglements but disentanglements. The Gordian knot of conflict situations and controversial issues in today's world cannot be cut by any sword. The only course is one of patient, constructive negotiations, negotiations ensuring a real limitation and destruction of arms."

This is the approach called for by the Soviet Union.

Mr. DE GUEIROZ DUARTE (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to congratulate you on your accession to the Chair of our Committee and to pledge to you on behalf of my delegation, and also on behalf of Ambassador Souza e Silva, the full co-operation of my delegation during your chairmanship.

My delegation's statement today will be devoted to some of the procedural aspects of the 1982 session of our Committee, in particular those related to the agenda and programme of work and to the organization of the activities of the Committee itself.

My delegation believes it is very important for the Committee to arrive at an early decision on these procedural aspects. This does not mean, however, that such decisions should be taken lightly or that their implications and the reasoning behind the several proposals should not be thoroughly examined. Procedural discussions should not be viewed as somehow belonging to a lesser category of questions, which could be treated in a hasty and superficial manner. All of us know that the structured organization of work, particularly in multilateral bodies such as the Committee on Disarmament, is a fundamental step toward the completion of the substantive task involved. Therefore, procedural discussions should not be regarded as a mere waste of time. Not without reason, incidentally, are we engaged in the exercise of trying to put together a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which will function as the necessary framework for the substantive work of disarmament itself.

Accordingly, my delegation considers the discussion of the agenda and programme of work as a serious and important issue, because it affects the very substance of our work. My delegation does not, for that reason, agree with those who have urged the Committee to do away quickly with the discussion on procedure, on the grounds that the Committee should concentrate on elaborating its report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as if the presentation of such a report would constitute an end in itself. In our view, the most important business here is to ensure substantive progress in the priority issues under consideration in this Committee, so that the results achieved in this forum on such priority issues themselves constitute a positive contribution to the second special session, to be then incorporated in our report to that session.

My delegation thus regards the discussions that took place last week at informal meetings of the Committee as very relevant to the swift completion of our task. We would hope that the insight on the different positions, as provided by those discussions, will soon produce satisfactory results that will enable the Committee to attend more efficiently, and in an orderly fashion, to its substantive business.

With these thoughts in mind, let me proceed by discussing briefly some of the points that were made in those meetings. Many delegations, particularly those belonging to the western group, have supported the secretariat's suggestion for the inclusion of a new item, dealing with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Incidentally, may I suggest that for the future the secretariat confines itself to drawing up a proposed agenda consisting of those items carried over from the preceding session of the Committee on Disarmament, together with a comprehensive list of General Assembly resolutions that call for specific

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action by the Committee, unless expressly instructed otherwise by the Committee itself. This would help to avoid misunderstandings and would allow the Committee to give precise directions as to what the draft agenda should look like. I do not intend to dwell here on suggestions to improve the effectiveness of the Committee but maybe a few simple measures might help a lot in the achievement of that objective, such as, for instance, taking the necessary administrative steps to provide a faster processing and circulation of documents and verbatim records, particularly when statements are not previously prepared.

In the present stage of the debate on the agenda, the supporters of the secretariat's draft have stated, as the basis for proposing the inclusion of the item on outer space, the fact that two resolutions of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly have requested that the Committee on Disarmament be seized of this question. Although the two resolutions differ slightly in their treatment of the subject, thus originating divergent views last Friday, it seems possible to arrive at a compromise on the formulation of the proposed new item. The stand of the Brazilian delegation, however, is based on other, and to our mind very fundamental, considerations. We have no quarrel with the request made by the General Assembly to this Committee, and indeed we did not object to the substance of either resolution at the time of their discussion and vote at the Assembly. Brazil has always considered that the decisions of the General Assembly must be complied with by this Committee, and that delegations represented here have an obligation to abide by such decisions. I would only like to recall that during the last session of the General Assembly, the representative of Brazil in the First Committee, Ambassador Souza e Silva, had the following to say with regard to the two draft resolutions on outer space, tabled respectively by some socialist and by some western delegations: "Brazil, together with other Member States, has advocated for many years now the need for prompt action in assuring the demilitarization of outer space. It is high time for responsible multilateral efforts to ensure that outer space is preserved for peaceful uses alone". In the same statement, Ambassador Souza e Silva discussed the request to the Committee on Disarmament to take up the question with the following words: "We would only argue that the Committee on Disarmament is currently seized with six substantive questions on its annual agenda, including two subjects to which the General Assembly has repeatedly assigned the highest priority: the nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". The Brazilian delegation to the First Committee even considered proposing amendments to the two draft resolutions suggesting that the question of outer space be entrusted to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, rather than to the Committee on Disarmament. In our exploratory contacts on the idea of such an amendment we met with sympathy from the group of sponsors of one resolution, but with resolute objection from the group of sponsors of the other. We finally decided not to move any amendment, and voted in favour of both resolutions with an explanation of vote that set forth our thoughts about the best available forum to ensure effective and speedy negotiation on the substance of this issue.

I felt compelled to recount those events because unfortunately the apprehensions and misgivings we expressed last fall in New York seem to have now become a reality. Here we are confronted with a suggestion, advocated by delegations of both East and West, to include a new item on our agenda on the grounds that a

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specific decision of the General Assembly has requested the Committee on Disarmament to do so; but what has happened to those items already included in our agenda to which so many decisions of the General Assembly have assigned the highest priority and urgency and on which they have repeatedly and poignantly requested both this Committee and three of its members individually to take speedy and concrete multilateral action?

With regard to such priority items, which as we all know refer to the ban on nuclear-weapon testing and to the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, we have seen the efforts deployed mainly by the Group of 21 to initiate concrete negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament systematically thwarted by the staunch objection of two of its members. Neither of those two members has so far made any specific proposals on how to deal effectively with such questions in this multilateral body, despite the repeated requests by the General Assembly I have mentioned above, among which, of course, we must also count the Final Document itself. What we heard this morning from the distinguished representative of the United States, Mr. Rostow, does not point to any change in this posture.

During Friday's discussion on the agenda and programme of work, a suggestion was put forward by the distinguished delegate of the United States, Ambassador Fields, to the effect that items 1 and 2 be combined in a single formulation. If I recall his words correctly, Ambassador Fields said that this could elicit "creative proposals" on both issues. I do not intend to elaborate here on the reasons why his suggestion is unacceptable to my delegation, and I believe to a large majority of other delegations as well. I would only recall that we have been repeatedly told, in this and in many other forums, that nuclear matters are highly complex. The merging of items 1 and 2 would only add to the complexity of the issues. Thus, a "composite" item made up of the present items 1 and 2 hardly seems the most adequate way to deal with the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, an issue to which the world community has devoted many years of attention and study and which awaits only the political will of two nuclear-weapon States to be the subject of multilateral negotiation in this forum. But I am indeed looking forward to hearing what creative and concrete proposals the delegation of the United States has to present on this item.

I will close these remarks by stating again my delegation's belief that the procedural discussions in which we are engaged are of the utmost importance to the success of our endeavours. On our part, we intend to continue to participate in them in the same constructive spirit that has been shown so many times in this Committee by our delegation and by many other delegations. But at the same time we will exert our best efforts to see to it that the agenda and the programme of work we finally approve are in keeping with the responsibilities and the duties that the General Assembly has entrusted to this Committee and with the priorities defined by its resolutions. In so doing, we are confident that the Committee on Disarmament will be able to offer the best possible contribution to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, namely, the initiation of substantive negotiations on the priority issues that are before it.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, I wish to begin my statement by congratulating you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the first month of its 1982 session. It is my sincere hope that under your able guidance the Committee will make a good beginning in its work. I wish also to express my thanks to your predecessor, His Excellency Ambassador Sani, for his contribution to the work of the Committee. I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to extend our welcome to the new representatives who have come to participate in this year's work of the Committee. The Chinese delegation expresses its deep condolences on the passing away of Ambassador Vittorio Cordero de Montezemolo of Italy.

During this spring session of the Committee, which comprises the last round of meetings before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Chinese delegation is ready to co-operate with other delegations in a common endeavour to fulfil the important tasks entrusted to the Committee.

Three years have elapsed since the first special session on disarmament, held in 1978. During this period, a number of grave events have taken place in the world, and the international situation is becoming more tense and turbulent. Particularly over the past couple of years, the situation has been extremely volatile. The danger of war is growing, and international peace and security are under greater threats. All these have caused concern and anxiety among the peoples of the world. It is disappointing that in spite of the great efforts made by many of the delegations, no substantive progress has been made at the past three sessions of the Committee. The two superpowers, far from slowing down their arms race, have now entered into a new round of the arms race. One superpower, while making a fanfare about its "peace programme for the 1980s", has been drastically increasing its military strength, striving to achieve complete military supremacy. After achieving a rough nuclear parity, it has spared no effort to develop and improve MIRVs, to continue to deploy mobile medium-range missiles and to build new types of missile-carrying submarines, with the intention of outstripping its rival in military technology. In the field of conventional armaments, while maintaining its quantitative supremacy, it is vigorously improving their quality. The other superpower, in fear of being outdone, has been increasing its military expenditures, developing new types of strategic missiles and missile-carrying submarines and strengthening the combat capabilities of its conventional forces. All this clearly indicates that the root cause for the lack of real progress in disarmament lies in the failure of the superpowers to substantiate their avowed intention for disarmament with concrete actions, in total disregard of the world people's ardent desire and reasonable demand for disarmament.

Furthermore, parallel to the intensifying arms expansion of the two superpowers is their increasing rivalry all over the world. In Asia, one superpower is forcefully pushing its strategy of a southward drive. It continues its military occupation of Afghanistan and reinforces its troops there to suppress and massacre the Afghan people. Meanwhile, it supports regional hegemonism in its continued occupation of Kampuchea. It has obstinately refused to implement the



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several solemn resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly demanding its unconditional withdrawal from Afghanistan and Kampuchea. Thus it has come under strong condemnation from justice-upholding countries and peoples. In Europe, both superpowers are updating their armaments, strengthening their military deployments and frequently staging large-scale military manoeuvres. Recent developments show that the situation in central Europe has become more tense and complicated than before. Even North Europe, a relatively peaceful region in the past, saw the grave incident in which the territorial water of a neutral State was encroached upon by a foreign submarine. It should also be noted that in the Middle East, Israel, following the bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor, has recently flagrantly annexed the Syrian Golan Heights, causing new tensions in this region, in total disregard of the strong opposition of world public opinion. The deterioration of the world situation has inevitably damaged the international atmosphere needed for disarmament negotiations.

Numerous small and medium-sized countries are deeply concerned about and dissatisfied with the worsening world situation, the intensifying arms race and the growing danger of war. They staunchly oppose the hegemonist aggression and expansion which are menacing world peace, demand a halt to the arms race and work actively for disarmament. We believe that to achieve progress in disarmament it is imperative to establish suitable principles and effective approaches to disarmament in the light of the international situation, including the actual state of the arms race. The present situation of world armaments is that the two superpowers possess the highest levels of armaments in the world. According to the United Nations Secretary General's report in 1980 to the General Assembly entitled, "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons", and the statistics of internationally reputed research institutions, the two superpowers possess 48,000 nuclear warheads of all types, comprising 97 per cent of the total number of nuclear warheads in the world today. Their military expenditures account for four-fifths of the annual total of about \$500 billion spent in the world for military purposes, far exceeding the total of the military expenses of over one hundred other countries. And the destructive and lethal power of their nuclear and conventional weapons is even more stupendous, not to be matched by that of all the other countries combined. The seriousness of all this lies not merely in their military strength, but in particular in the grave threat they pose to world peace and to the security of various nations. In this connection, that superpower which is noisily advocating détente and disarmament has in fact committed acts of aggression, expansion and hegemonism which are particularly glaring. Therefore, in order to safeguard world peace and diminish the danger of war, it is imperative to oppose hegemonism and demand that the two superpowers take the lead in carrying out disarmament.

During our discussion on the question of disarmament, reference has also been made to the imbalance existing between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States. In the world today, there are only a few countries which possess nuclear weapons, while the great majority of nations have no such weapons. It is only reasonable, therefore, that the non-nuclear-weapon States should demand that the nuclear-weapon States carry out disarmament so as to cut down and eliminate such an imbalance. We agree to the idea that all nuclear-weapon States should assume their respective responsibilities for nuclear disarmament.

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We have all along favoured and supported the efforts made by the people of the world towards the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. As to the specific steps to be taken, bearing in mind the real and grave threat to international peace and security posed by the two superpowers, we believe that only after they have actually and substantially reduced and destroyed their armaments will favourable conditions be created for the other nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States to reduce their armaments. When the huge armaments gap between the two superpowers and other States has been narrowed, other nuclear-weapon States should join them in reducing their armaments according to rational ratios until the total destruction of nuclear weapons is realized. During this process, as the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons is halted, and the nuclear threat faced by the numerous small and medium-sized countries reduced, favourable conditions will be created for the prevention of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It should be pointed out that any indiscriminate demand for simultaneous disarmament by all the nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States, regardless of the huge imbalance in armaments between States and regardless of the source of the threat to international peace and security, would only help serve the purpose of the superpowers to perpetuate their military superiority and maintain their capability for aggression, expansion, threat and blackmail. The superpowers are precisely playing this trick of clamouring for simultaneous disarmament with other countries and using it as an excuse for their refusal to reduce armaments.. That is why the representatives of many countries emphasized at various relevant conferences of the United Nations that the superpowers should undertake primary responsibility for disarmament. The proposals on disarmament measures submitted by the Group of 21 also reflect the idea that the superpowers should take the lead in disarmament. The Chinese delegation endorses these reasonable demands. We hold that the two superpowers with the largest arsenals taking the lead in disarmament should constitute a basic principle for disarmament and is an important criterion of judging whether disarmament is genuinely carried out.

I now wish to turn to some other items on the agenda of the current session of the Committee on Disarmament. The comprehensive programme of disarmament will be an important item at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. At its current session the Committee is to elaborate a draft CPD and to submit it to the special session for consideration and adoption. The experience of the last two years shows that great efforts are still needed for the elaboration of a satisfactory programme. The Group of 21, with the aim of accelerating the process of disarmament, has actively initiated the elaboration of a programme and advanced reasonable suggestions and proposals, of which we express our appreciation.

It is our view that in order to accelerate the process of disarmament, the elaboration of the programme should proceed in the light of the international situation and actual state of the arms race, and it should fully reflect the fundamental principle that the two superpowers should be the first to reduce armaments. The programme should be carried out in stages so as to ensure its

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effective implementation. For each stage, an indicative time-frame should be provided. And the verification machinery and procedures necessary for reviewing its implementation should be established. Since the programme is to be worked out through serious negotiations, States should undertake obligations and responsibilities arising therefrom and implement the programme in earnest.

The prohibition of chemical weapons has always been an important issue at the sessions of the Committee on Disarmament. The continued use of such weapons of mass destruction in massacring people has aroused grave concern on the part of the world public opinion. Over the past year, there have again been many reports on the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, Kampuchea and other places. It is disturbing to note that the superpowers which possess large arsenals of chemical weapons are stepping up the production, development and deployment of these weapons. All this commands greater urgency in the task of formulating an international convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons. We agree with the proposal of many countries that the mandate of the Working Group be extended.

We maintain that the scope of the prohibition in the future convention should cover the use of chemical weapons. To emphasize anew the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons would supplement and strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In order to ensure implementation of the future convention, we maintain that stringent and effective measures for international verification be provided for, including on-site inspections on the use of chemical weapons, the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons and the dismantling of facilities for their production.

Let me turn now to the question of security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States. In the face of the grave nuclear threat, the numerous non-nuclear-weapon States demand that, pending nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon States unconditionally undertake the obligation not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and that on this basis, negotiations be started as soon as possible to conclude an international convention in this regard. The Chinese delegation supports this demand. We are ready to give positive consideration to proposals made or to be made on this item, provided they are truly conducive to the strengthening of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. In our view, the nuclear-weapon States should consider the reasonable demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States for the guaranteeing of their security. Basing themselves on their own narrow interests, the major nuclear-weapon powers are putting various conditions to non-nuclear-weapon States, and demanding that non-nuclear-weapon States ensure the security of the major nuclear Powers first. Such a practice of putting the cart before the horse is bound to prevent the Committee on Disarmament from making progress on this item.

The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session call upon the Committee to consider at its current session the question of preventing an arms race in outer space. In recent years, the two superpowers have been energetically developing military technology used in outer space. They have in their hands some outer space weapons which are near the operational stage. The fact that the arms race between them has already extended into outer space is another salient feature in the new round of their arms race.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

The development of outer space weapons poses an additional threat to world peace and security and has aroused anxiety and vigilance in the international community. It is appropriate for the Committee on Disarmament to consider the issue of preventing the militarization of outer space. We hold that outer space, the common heritage of mankind, should be used for peaceful purposes in the interest of humanity. We are opposed to any military activities in outer space which jeopardize peace and security. At the same time, we are opposed to the practice of paying lip service to the prevention of the militarization of outer space while actually working hard to develop various types of outer space weapons.

Before concluding my statement, I wish to point out that there is not much time left before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is the hope of the Chinese delegation that the second special session will achieve practical results, thus giving a new impetus to the cause of disarmament. At its current session the Committee should expedite its work so as to make its due contribution to the second special session. The Chinese delegation is ready to make its efforts for the success of the current session of the Committee as well as the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair.

That completes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to speak?

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): I have asked for the floor only in order to make one brief comment, Mr. Chairman. In the statement he made a little while ago, our distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union gave some figures designed to prove that in the nuclear sphere there is an approximate equality between the number of devices in the possession of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries, and the number possessed by the United States and the NATO countries. My delegation heard Ambassador Issraelyan include France's nuclear forces in this evaluation. In this connection, my delegation wishes to repeat that France's nuclear forces cannot be counted together with those of other States. The French nuclear forces are not under the control of any outside authority but are responsible solely to the Government of France. That is all I have to say on this point.

The CHAIRMAN: I have been asked by the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 to inform members that a meeting of the Group will be held tomorrow at 10.30 a.m. in this room.

I wish to inform the Committee that we have a long list of speakers for our plenary meeting on Thursday. I do not think that all members listed for that day could complete their statements during the morning meeting. At the same time, we should bear in mind that the Committee has already agreed that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet on Thursday afternoon. Therefore, I believe that we should hold a third plenary meeting this week, on Friday morning. On Friday morning we can conclude the statements pending from Thursday, and if there is time we could still hold our

(The Chairman)

informal meeting immediately after adjournment of the plenary meeting. If necessary, on Friday afternoon we could continue the informal meeting. If there are no objections, we will proceed accordingly.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Thursday, 11 February, at 10.30 a.m. As agreed by the Committee, an informal meeting will be held tomorrow afternoon at 3 p.m.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.