

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 20 August 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Ch. A. SANI

(Indonesia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Mr. J.F. COMENSORO
Ms. N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. L. ONKELINX
Mr. J.-M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U HGWE WIN
U THAN HFUN

Canada: Mr. C.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. LI Changhe
Mr. YANG Mingliang
Mr. SA Benwang
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun
Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILL
Mr. P. NÚÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de la GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mrs. H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. F. RUTH
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. RÖHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KÓMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. Ch. A. SANI
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. ACHDIAT
Mr. SOEPRAPTO

Iran:

Mr. A. JALALI

Italy:

Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Morocco:

Mr. M. ARRASSEN
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. BRIMAH
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. J. BENAVIDES

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIAŁOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. O. IONESCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. APLIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. C.-M. HYLTENIUS
Mr. L. NORBERG

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mrs. J. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Mr. W. HECKROTTE

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. O. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Zaire:

Mr. L.B. NDAGA

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary General:

Mr. F. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERMASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In conformity with the programme of work for the present week, the Committee continues today its consideration of the item dealing with reports of subsidiary bodies, as well as the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Before we listen to the statements of members who have put their names down to speak today, I would like to invite the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to introduce the reports of those Working Groups. The reports are contained in document CD/217 for the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, and in document CD/220 for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): In my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, I have the honour of introducing the Group's report to the Committee on Disarmament on its work during the 1981 session.

I shall do this very briefly, both because I am well aware of the need to save as much of the little time remaining to the Committee as possible, and because I feel that the report is -- as is usually said in such cases, although here it is particularly apt -- self-explanatory, especially in view of the fact that the text is supplemented by a full, detailed and well-documented annex which contains the results of the examination of the measures which could form stage I of the programme.

I think that the conclusions appearing in paragraph 17 of the report are balanced and realistic since, although the Working Group has been able to make considerable progress in the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament during the 24 meetings it has held this year, much still remains to be done to resolve certain issues which, as stated in the report, are "important and complex". These issues undoubtedly include those relating to the stages of implementation and the nature of the Programme, to which reference was already made in paragraphs 13 and 15 of last year's report and which, as indicated in paragraph 16 of this year's report, were briefly considered at the first two meetings in 1981.

When the work of the Committee resumes next year -- and the Working Group has recommended that this should take place on 11 January 1982 -- it will be necessary to go into these questions more thoroughly, as would seem to be necessary for the consideration of working papers CD/CPD/WP.36/Add.2 and 3, and CD/CPD/WP.52, which could not be considered during the current session, as the report states, for lack of time.

I should like to mention here that, at the closing session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 17 August, I suggested to the members of the Group that it would be useful if, at the start of the Group's work next year, it could agree on a deadline for the submission of new proposals. Obviously the word "proposals" in this context should be understood to mean only proposals on the comprehensive programme as a whole or any of its substantive chapters as a whole. Thus it would not apply to those proposals for additions, amendments or deletions which will no doubt frequently be made during the consideration of the paragraphs of those chapters, and for which no deadline would be established.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Lastly, I can think of no better way of concluding this brief statement than by saying how much I appreciated the spirit of co-operation shown by all the representatives who took part in the work of the Committee and expressing my sincere gratitude to Miss Aída Luisa Levín of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament for her superlative work as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which culminated in the preparation of the report in document CD/217, to which I have been referring, and of the very detailed and complicated annex to that report. I am also grateful to all the other members of the Secretariat, both visible and invisible, as we usually say, who lent the Group their assistance, and especially the interpreters, who so often showed their goodwill by going on performing their task well beyond normal working hours.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I have the honour to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, as contained in document CD/220.

The work of the Group was carried out under the same mandate as in 1980, which many delegations regretted, since they would have preferred a revised mandate which would have enabled the Group to initiate negotiations on the text of a convention. Nevertheless it was generally agreed that the Group made substantive progress during its 1981 session. During this year's session the Group carried out another substantive and more detailed examination of the issues to be dealt with in the negotiation of a convention on chemical weapons. This work was carried on during the first part of the session on the basis of the outline suggested by the Chairman, and of which I have given a more detailed account in the form of a progress report as contained in document CD/179 of 23 April 1981. I think one can say that the main benefit of this exercise was that all delegations secured a thorough introduction to the various issues and had an extensive exchange of views on them.

This summer the Working Group has considered draft elements which originally were presented by the Chairman. The main part of the report contains those elements, after they have been revised on the basis of statements and other comments by the members of the Group. It was my intention thus to elaborate the initial framework for a future chemical weapons convention, which could facilitate further work. The revised elements do not, however, reflect all the views which emerged on certain issues and they include elements on which delegations' views differed. Some delegations did not deem it advisable at the present stage to enter into discussion on certain elements, in particular some related to the issues of verification. These delegations considered that it was too early to do this until general agreement had been reached on the scope of the prohibitions. Other delegations, however, did express their opinions on these elements, since they considered that they could be examined at the present stage of the work and would contribute to future negotiations. As you will notice, under each element there are comments which contain dissenting views. Sometimes, but not always, there are also comments which record the positions of delegations which opposed these dissenting views. Of course, delegations reserved their right to consider these and other proposals further at the appropriate time.

The report contains a series of recommendations in connection with consultations which the Chairman held on issues relating to toxicity determination. The first of these recommendations is that the Committee should take note of the report of those consultations, as contained in CD/CW/WP.22/Rev.1, of 23 July 1981, and consider it a suitable basis for delegations to prepare further work on methods to be agreed for toxicity determinations for a chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

The second recommendation is that certain specified technical questions on toxicity determination should be discussed at the Committee's 1982 session. It is pointed out in that context that expertise, particularly in toxicology, as well as scientific and technical background material, which may be provided by delegations, will be of value for such discussions.

The third recommendation is that further consultations, similar to those held this year, should take place in the week 1 - 5 March 1982 on the technical issues I have just referred to, unless the Committee decides otherwise at the beginning of its 1982 session.

The fourth and final recommendation is that questions related to possible applications of toxicity criteria in a chemical weapons convention should be taken up in the Committee in the week thereafter.

The conclusions of the report principally reaffirm that the prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction is one of the most urgent measures of disarmament and that the conclusion of such a convention is of the highest priority in multilateral negotiations. The urgency of achieving concrete results to this end was especially recognized in the light of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Group found that after this year's work a convergence of views had emerged on many issues, but that some important divergencies of view still existed on certain elements. The Group expressed its hope that the Committee would take due account of the results of its work, as presented in the report, so that it would contribute to the process of negotiating and elaborating a chemical weapons convention. Finally, the Group has recommended that the Committee should at the beginning of its 1982 session re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an appropriately revised mandate, which will enable the Committee to build upon the areas of convergence and to resolve the differences of views which were identified by the Group during the 1980 and 1981 sessions, so as to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date.

If you permit me, I wish to conclude this presentation of the report by expressing my sincere appreciation of all the important and valuable contributions which delegations have given to our endeavour in the Working Group. I have been deeply convinced of the earnest will of everybody to reach a positive and final result in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention as soon as possible. Our work has sometimes been hard; our endurance may have been tested, but the spirit of co-operation which has prevailed all through our work has been the finest reward I could have received. As I have said on another occasion, the possibility of the survival of the elements which we have elaborated rests entirely on their own strength: I am moderately optimistic in that respect.

My sincere thanks also go to Mrs. Liselotte Waldheim-Natural for her very skilful and experienced assistance as Secretary of the Working Group, as well as to her assistants in the secretariat and to the interpreters for their valuable collaboration.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons for their statements introducing the reports of the Working Groups. I intend to take up the reports of the four Working Groups for consideration and action by the Committee later today, after we conclude our list of speakers and other pending business.

In view of the number of statements to be made at this plenary meeting, we might need to suspend the plenary and continue this afternoon. Immediately after the afternoon meeting I intend to convene an informal meeting of the Committee to consider the concluding paragraphs under various sections of the report of the Committee to the General Assembly of the United Nations, as agreed upon in the drafting group which has been meeting during the last few days.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): As the work of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament draws to a close, our delegation would like to make some general comments on the results of our deliberations -- results which, although not entirely negative, are, as everyone will agree, rather meagre.

Despite the difficulties involved in this exercise of reflection, we finally decided to embark on it because it seemed to us essential, in the present political circumstances, to try to draw the lessons of the recent past in order the better to prepare ourselves for coming events and the future work of our Committee.

Our first comment will concern the meagre concrete results achieved in terms of negotiation, during the 1981 session. It is true that the main reason for this situation, which all of us must regret, is the deterioration in international relations since the end of 1979.

Our 1980 session also concluded without substantial results.

However, if we look back beyond the past two years, we have to admit that the second half of the 1970s was very unproductive in the disarmament sphere, and that for nearly 10 years now real possibilities for negotiation at the multilateral level have ceased to exist.

Thus, although events of a political nature and disturbances of the balance have recently given rise to action -- reaction phenomena which are hardly propitious for achievements in disarmament matters, the international community ought also to try to perceive the more remote and perhaps deeper reasons why our achievements have petered out and most of our efforts have failed.

In the difficult period through which we are passing, the Committee on Disarmament has not been capable of providing the smallest chance of progress, however slight, in an effort to restart a process which has come to a halt.

Rather than trying to identify the categories or groups of countries responsible for this regrettable situation, the Belgian delegation considers it more useful for the future of our efforts to offer some very general comments on our methods of action and the use we make of the remarkable instrument we have in our Committee.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

In the first place, the 1981 session, as compared with the preceding session, will at least have had the merit that we have concentrated our attention more on the programme of work which we ourselves adopted, and that we have avoided engaging in political and procedural discussions which have nothing to do with the negotiating function of this Committee.

And it is undoubtedly this task of negotiation that we ought all to think about more when we are considering our actions and our statements. For although for the most part we have managed to avoid procedural debates in our work, nevertheless it has too often been burdened by rhetorical speeches and academic discussions which have in no way helped us to make progress on the subjects under negotiation in the Committee.

If we want in the future to try to achieve really concrete results in the spheres of negotiation, our delegations ought not, I think, to allow themselves to be distracted by overly theoretical subjects the discussion of which, in our view, falls rather within the competence of such forums as the General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

A stricter adherence to the differentiation in the nature of the various United Nations bodies dealing with disarmament problems would, it seems to me, help prevent the occurrence in the Committee on Disarmament of discussions that are more appropriate to the international deliberative bodies.

However, to revert to the Committee's work at its present session, we may ask ourselves whether we have in fact fulfilled our mandate for negotiation when we have had an opportunity to do so. Unfortunately, it seems to us that real efforts to seek the necessary compromises have been relatively rare. All too frequently, delegations have simply repeated their positions and arguments ad nauseam, without once trying to provide an opening for a possible compromise. The best example is undoubtedly the work on the prohibition of radiological weapons, where each delegation has stuck to its position, although progress appeared possible in the negotiations. When we resume our work in 1982, we shall have to consider propositions other than those that divide us if we want to be able to conclude our work on this matter.

Similarly, with regard to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, for which we have a mandate with an absolute time-limit, our efforts, which will undoubtedly be resumed very early in January, will demand clarity of purpose, realism and the will to succeed on the part of all the groups if we wish to avoid presenting the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament with a mosaic of points of view which ultimately prove irreconcilable.

With regard to chemical weapons, we particularly appreciated the fact that the Working Group was able, with the agreement of all participants, to develop the elements of a possible agreement, and that despite the limitations imposed by a rather restrictive mandate. However, if we really wish to make progress towards the conclusion of a treaty, we must reach agreement at the next session on accepted formulas or it will be almost impossible to reconcile the great conceptual differences which still exist.

With regard to security assurances, here too some interesting proposals have been made. And next year the possibilities, for agreeing on arrangements, however small they may be, should not be ignored even if not all the basic concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States which have chosen non-alignment can be fully satisfied from the outset.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

Our Committee has yet to prove its collective capacity for negotiation. Once the areas for negotiation have been defined, each delegation must show flexibility and a will to achieve the goal, without polemics or doctrinaire debates and avoiding those overly theoretical discussions which cannot contribute anything to our work.

The excessive dispersion of our efforts, too, is hardly a guarantee of success. The history of disarmament since the 1960s has shown us that negotiation cannot be undertaken on all subjects at the same time, and that every opportunity of reaching an agreement should be seized.

If, in 1971, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had not agreed to negotiate on chemical weapons and bacteriological weapons separately, the convention prohibiting the latter might not yet have been adopted, even today.

In 1982, the four Working Groups should resume their task very quickly. The formulation of their mandates should not constitute a major obstacle. And we hope that the mandate of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons will go further than the one which has guided our work during the past two sessions. In this connection, my delegation notes with satisfaction that the Ad Hoc Working Group has proposed that its next mandate should enable the Committee to resolve the substantive divergencies of views which were identified during its 1980 and 1981 sessions.

Similarly, at the beginning of the next session, the complete prohibition of nuclear tests could form the subject of an appropriate procedural decision enabling the Committee to deal with the substance of the matter.

On these last two subjects, chemical weapons and the cessation of nuclear tests, my delegation has always considered that the multilateral approach and separate talks among the principal States concerned were complementary, one to another, and likely to ensure the final success of both sets of negotiations. Belgium has not changed its point of view. It therefore earnestly appeals for the rapid resumption of these talks and trusts that international conditions will make them possible in the fairly near future, perhaps before we meet again next February.

On the other hand, we do not think that it would be appropriate to contemplate the setting up of a working group on matters which, however important they may be, do not lend themselves, at the present stage, to negotiations of a multilateral character. We feel that such matters should continue to form the subject of separate talks within the framework of a process which we hope will develop.

The past 10 years of disarmament efforts have, I repeat, hardly been productive. It would be pointless to try to lay the blame for these poor results on a particular category or group of countries. But each State ought to undertake a careful and conscientious examination of its own conduct, of the options it has chosen, and of the views and doctrines it has upheld all through these years.

Some States could perhaps either adopt a more flexible approach to working methods or somewhat modify their positions as regards certain options for negotiations.

Belgium believes that these changes in attitude could take place without any risk to the security conditions of our States. But these modifications and adjustments of attitude, these easings of positions, which are necessary in order to break the deadlock, would help bring about more substantial progress in the future, to the benefit of the entire international community.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, at the closing of this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament, many delegations take the floor to offer their own individual views on our performance. The Brazilian delegation, having associated itself with the document of assessment of the Group of 21, wishes to add a few general remarks.

The third session of the Committee has gone by without significant results in any of its priority items. An optimistic observer might see an exception in the item on chemical weapons. The conclusions of the Working Group on the subject have rekindled the faint hope of achieving a procedural decision on its new mandate, so as to allow the Committee to start negotiating the text of a convention next year. Real progress, however, all of us would agree, has been virtually non-existent, in procedural as well as in substantive questions. We certainly can point to the many pages of reports in which all questions on our agenda are dealt with, sometimes very extensively and in great detail; but we have travelled no further than our predecessors on the road to negotiating disarmament agreements.

Many of us have tried to describe the causes for this immobility, and many of us have painted with dark overtones the dangers inherent in the course taken by those who continue building up on their already excessive arsenals. Yet the response from the two main military alliances, and particularly from the two superpowers, amounts to little more than mere mutual accusations about which one between them is responsible for the massive escalation in their military might. We listen in worried silence as each one of them describes in detail the reasons why its security will be better protected by adding a few more megatons to and improving the accuracy of its delivery systems, or by making those systems undetectable to the rival's radar network, or by "modernizing" the warheads aimed at each other's territory. Their stated positions on security assurances, for instance, stem from the conviction that their own security requirements should prevail over any other considerations. We hear them argue in unison that a treaty dealing with weapons that do not exist must not mention the armaments they already possess, except to exclude those weapons from the scope of the prohibition. We watch with disappointment their reluctance to accept any binding commitment to the implementation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. We listen in bewilderment to them saying that new systems of weapons of mass destruction are simple "conventional nuclear weapons" designed for theatre use, so that we should not really have anything to fear from their appearance.

After all, we are told, something mysterious and apparently unattainable, usually described as "balance", must be maintained at all costs, even at the cost of increasing every nation's insecurity and at the mounting risk of wiping out life on the planet. Each side seems to act constantly under the assumption that the "balance" is always about to be tipped in favour of the opponent, so that neither of the two ever considers that balance has been achieved. Consequently, each superpower, or their military allies, seem to experience the constant need to explain to those not belonging to their alliances, as well as to their own peoples, how important it is to counteract the evil machinations of the other side. Each side perceives the activities of the other as unfailingly resulting in the disturbance of the balance, thus creating the imperative, urgent and justified necessity of its redress.

We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the contention of the distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Issraelyan, last Thursday, when he stated that the maintenance of the existing military and strategic balance between the USSR and the United States of America, and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, objectively serves to safeguard peace on our planet.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

This Committee is not a court of justice that must pass judgement on the intentions of nations, nor was it created to decide whose defence policies are right and whose are wrong. It is a multilateral body established by the free will of every Member of the United Nations, through a consensual document, with the specific and agreed purpose of negotiating disarmament agreements. It would be logical to expect from its members the will to explore all possibilities conducive to the realization of the objectives of this Committee, as they have been expressed in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

It seems to us highly strange, therefore, that delegations to the Committee on Disarmament confine their participation to the utterance of vague indications of their dedication to an ideal world in which armaments, or doctrines of nuclear deterrence, would no longer be necessary. It is even stranger when these indications are coupled with the clear warning that they intend to pursue the armaments race, regardless of what others may think. The international community would expect from the nuclear-weapon Powers, which have recognized their special responsibility, a more active engagement in utilizing the multilateral machinery to further objectives to which they have agreed, instead of merely paying lip-service to the outward aspects or to the over-all purposes of this Committee.

We believe, as the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Flowerree, said last Thursday, that moral rectitude is not the exclusive property of any nation or group of nations. Moral rectitude is, I submit, a part of the common treasure of mankind as a whole. The outcry at the unbridled race towards the illusion of absolute military superiority does not come only from individual delegations around this table, but from every corner of the earth, especially from the peoples that feel more threatened by this state of affairs. No individual delegation claims the monopoly of moral virtue; we do claim, however, the right, and indeed the duty, to point out that to negotiate for disarmament is the only possible course for survival in the nuclear age.

During the present session of the Committee, many delegations pressed this same point again and again. The nuclear arms race feeds on itself and is leading the world inexorably closer to the brink of its own destruction. There is no way out but to face the ultimate reality -- either we negotiate or we perish. Or, to paraphrase the late President Eisenhower, there is no alternative to negotiation. "Negotiation" does not simply mean bilateral accommodation of the rival war machines at higher levels of destructiveness, a process in which each side gets rid of the obsolete and less efficient systems and concentrates on the current turn of the arms spiral. To "negotiate" does not simply mean to "control" nuclear armament, because this notion assumes that the object of such control -- namely, the deadly nuclear arsenals -- is here to stay for ever, as a monopoly of their present possessors. To negotiate, I submit, means to take due account of all aspects of reality, and not simply of the narrow security perceptions of the two rival alliances; it implies an open, frank and forward-looking attitude, coupled with the humble recognition that other nations' security is as important and as worthy of attention and respect as one's own. No individual nation holds a mandate to decide by itself how the security of others is best served; neither is any nation entitled to jeopardize the security of the whole

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

world in attempting to secure its own. My delegation earnestly hopes that the proceedings of the 1981 session, and the interpretation of its lack of results by the Governments concerned, will bring about a change of perception of the role of this Committee that will permit the multilateral negotiating body to fulfil the objectives for which it was established.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): The Mongolian delegation, in its capacity as co-ordinator of a group of socialist countries during the month of August, today has the honour of making a statement on behalf of the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union and Mongolia summing up the results of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament.

The present session of the Committee on Disarmament has taken place in a difficult international situation, in conditions in which there was a marked increase in the activities of the opponents of peace, détente and disarmament, who were endeavouring to impose on the world a qualitatively new round in the armaments race and working in the direction of the exacerbation of international tension.

Even in these circumstances the socialist countries, acting on the basis of their fundamental policy in disarmament matters, have consistently and with initiative adopted in the Committee an approach aimed at constructive negotiations and the achievement of concrete agreements for the curbing of the arms race.

Among the noteworthy events which took place during this session of the Committee on Disarmament were the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the congresses of the fraternal parties of other socialist countries. At these congresses new major initiatives and proposals were put forward aimed at the checking of the arms race and the safeguarding of world peace.

During the Committee's 1981 session the delegations of the socialist countries, as always, played an active part with respect to all the questions on the agenda and put forward a large number of constructive proposals aimed at achieving real progress in the sphere of disarmament.

Those delegations have consistently urged the earliest possible start in the Committee of negotiations on the vitally important question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic, putting forward a proposal which expressed the general position of the socialist countries, presented to the Committee document CD/193, in which it was proposed that consultations should be held within the framework of the Committee in order to prepare concrete negotiations on this question. The socialist countries also continued to strive to bring about the establishment of a working group to conduct negotiations on the question of nuclear disarmament. However, owing to the position adopted by certain nuclear-weapon States it proved impossible again this session to achieve agreement on these proposals.

The socialist countries, like many other States, vigorously condemn the decision of the Government of the United States to begin production of neutron weapons, regarding this decision as a challenge to the cause of peace and disarmament.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In initiating the full-scale production of neutron weapons the United States is taking a step towards putting into practice the doctrine of a "limited nuclear war" and increasing the probability of the escalation of armed conflict to the scale of a general nuclear war.

The socialist countries in document CD/219 which they put before the Committee, called for the urgent establishment of an ad hoc working group for the preparation of an international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons. A draft of such a convention was put before the Committee for its consideration by the socialist countries as long ago as in 1978 (document CCD/559). This time again, too, however, the western Powers blocked the establishment of such a working group.

The socialist countries attach great importance to the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. They are fully resolved to do all in their power to bring about the cessation of nuclear tests in all spheres and by all those who carry them out. The socialist countries have consistently urged the Committee on Disarmament, in which all five nuclear-weapon Powers are represented, to play an active part in this matter. And here they themselves took the initiative by proposing, as did the Group of 21, the setting up of an ad hoc working group on this question. Unfortunately, certain nuclear-weapon States have prevented the Committee on Disarmament from beginning multilateral negotiations on this urgent problem which bears upon the interests of all mankind.

Convinced that the work of the Committee on Disarmament in this connection would be greatly assisted by the successful conclusion of the trilateral negotiations, the socialist countries appealed to the United States and the United Kingdom to resume those negotiations without delay. They also supported the appeal of the Soviet Union to the other participants in the trilateral negotiations to work out together answers to the questions put by the Group of 21 and also by other delegations.

With respect to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the socialist countries endeavoured to secure the consolidation and continuation of the progress achieved at earlier stages of the discussion of this question in the Committee on Disarmament. They are satisfied at the fact that, on a number of substantive aspects of the future convention, a definite degree of mutual understanding has been reached among the majority of the States members of the Committee. This justifies a hope for further progress towards the earliest possible achievement of agreement on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. The socialist countries declare that they will give the Committee their full support towards this end.

The socialist countries continue to consider that the question of the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction is an important element in the work of the Committee, which should concern itself with this question more actively and seriously, using for this purpose whatever means are available to it, including the setting up of an ad hoc group of experts. The past session has confirmed the complexity of the various problems connected with new types of weapons of mass destruction and the need for the competent study of those problems by specialists. The informal meetings of the Committee with the participation of experts which were held in this connection in response to a proposal by the Hungarian People's Republic (CD/174) revealed the necessity and desirability of setting up an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts on this question.

(Mr. Erdenbileg, Mongolia)

The delegations of the socialist countries believe that in 1981 the Committee on Disarmament could have completed the drafting of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons. They note with regret that it did not prove possible to do so. The socialist countries confirm their intention of working actively towards the earliest possible completion of the work on the preparation of such a treaty.

The delegations of the socialist countries attach the importance due to it to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. They have urged that the various stages to be worked out within the framework of the comprehensive programme of disarmament should comprise the maximum possible number of concrete measures leading to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament, and that the entire programme should be oriented towards the achievement of practical agreements in the sphere of the halting of the arms race and disarmament. At the same time they do not consider that it would be advisable to include in the comprehensive programme of disarmament provisions concerning principles, mechanisms and procedures, which are reflected in detail in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It would therefore be sufficient, in their view, merely to include in the comprehensive programme of disarmament references to the relevant provisions of the Final Document.

The socialist countries consider that the solution of the question of strengthening the security guarantees of the non-nuclear-weapon States is an urgent task. They have consistently advocated the preparation and conclusion of an international convention on this subject, and regret that here again it has not been possible up to now for the Committee to proceed to the drafting of the text of such a convention owing to the negative attitude adopted by certain nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies.

In this connection they are convinced that the Committee on Disarmament ought without delay also to undertake negotiations for the purpose of elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present; the conclusion of such an agreement would also help to strengthen the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

In the course of the session the delegations of the socialist countries made suggestions for increasing the effectiveness and improving the organization of the work of the Committee, submitting specific proposals in that connection which were aimed at improving the content of the work of the Committee, increasing the effectiveness of the activities of its subsidiary bodies, increasing the amount of time spent on the discussion of questions of substance, improving the character of the representation of States, and so on (document CD/200).

The delegations of the socialist countries believe that the Committee's rules of procedure have proved their validity during the negotiations in the Committee and contain the requisite reserves for the solution of questions arising in the course of the Committee's work. The basis of the entire activity of the Committee is the principle of consensus, embodied in section VI of the rules of procedure.

The delegations of the socialist countries express their satisfaction at the fact that their suggestions and proposals were supported by many States members of the Committee, and they express their readiness to continue in the future to bend every effort towards the improvement of the Committee's work.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The socialist States are convinced that now as never before it is important to intensify efforts towards the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. A crucial role in this matter devolves upon the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body -- the Committee on Disarmament. The next session of the Committee will be of particular importance in view of the forthcoming second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The socialist countries declare their firm resolve to continue in the future to contribute by every means possible to the success of the work of the Committee.

I request that the above statement should be circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. YU Peiwen (China) (translated from Chinese): At the time when the Committee on Disarmament is drawing to the end of its current session, the Chinese delegation wishes to review the Committee's work in 1981 and look ahead to its task for 1982. In this connection, the secretariat of the Committee has distributed document CD/221 entitled "Some observations of the Chinese delegation on the work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1981". Now I would like to make a brief introduction to the content of this document.

In document CD/221, we have pointed out the achievements made during the current session of the Committee on Disarmament. In a short period of time during the session, the Committee on Disarmament has finished the arrangements for organizational and procedural matters, and the four Ad Hoc Working Groups soon got down to substantive discussion and negotiation. During the discussions and negotiations on some of the important items, the Working Groups further clarified the views expressed by various delegations and enhanced their understanding of each other's positions. This will help future considerations and negotiations. The Committee on Disarmament also put forward some ideas and recommendations on the improvement of its organizational work. We hope that these ideas and recommendations will help raise the efficiency of the Committee.

At the same time, we have also pointed out that, although the Committee on Disarmament has made some achievements in its work during the 1981 session, no substantive results have been achieved on various items of the agenda. This falls short of satisfaction. In our view, the failure to achieve substantive progress is closely related to the worsening of the international situation and the lack of political will on the part of certain countries.

In the document submitted by my delegation, we have also made some specific comments on the considerations and negotiations on nuclear disarmament, a nuclear test ban, the prohibition of chemical weapons, security assurances for non-nuclear States, the comprehensive programme of disarmament and the prohibition of radiological weapons. In order to save time, I will not repeat them here.

Finally, in the name of the Chinese delegation, I wish to take this opportunity to pay tribute and express thanks to Ambassador Sani, the Chairman for the current month, for the objectivity and outstanding skill with which he has led our Committee to the solution of some complex and difficult problems the Committee has encountered. I would also like to express my appreciation to the Chairmen of the Working Groups for the constructive efforts they have made in guiding the Groups' work. I must also sincerely thank Ambassador Jaipal, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Secretary of the Committee, and all the secretariat staff, as well as the interpreters, translators and all the working staff, for their co-operation and assistance in the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to join all the distinguished speakers who preceded me in congratulating you on the excellent manner you are conducting the work of the Committee in this month so crucial for the results of this year's session. My congratulations also go to your predecessor, the distinguished representative of India, Ambassador Venkateswaran, on his able Chairmanship in the month of July and for his successful Chairmanship of the drafting group.

My brief intervention today will be devoted exclusively to one urgent matter introduced in this Committee's document CD/219 by the group of socialist countries, including Poland, in particular calling for urgent consideration by the Committee of the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. The urgency of this problem stems from the conviction, entirely shared by my delegation, that there may still be time to stop a new phase of the nuclear arms race.

The group of socialist countries put forward a draft of an appropriate convention in this respect in 1978 in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, contained in document CCD/559. Perhaps at that time it was the most appropriate moment for elaborating a legally binding document prohibiting the production of nuclear neutron weapons. Unfortunately, as a result of the objection of the delegations of some States which considered our proposal to be "one-sided propaganda", that initiative of ours did not receive a positive response. At that time, in 1978, we also heard the argument that the neutron bomb did not exist and that the decision on its production had not been taken. Today, we are even more conscious of the reasons for such opposition: it was to pave the way for the decision which was taken a fortnight ago.

We have heard up to now the following arguments for the said decision:

First, it is said that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries have been gaining for the last 20 years a military strategic advantage over the NATO countries, so something has to be done to restore the balance. Last Tuesday we even heard that the United States decision on the production of neutron weapons is in this situation the only and maybe the best way out.

Second, we also heard here lectures on the substance of the neutron weapons and its advantages. The weapon itself was unequivocally termed as a new kind of tactical nuclear weapon.

Third, we have been told that the neutron weapon is in essence a defensive and deterrent weapon and, as such, it can only be used against the potential aggressor and mainly against an attack by tanks. Fourth, we have also been told that the decision on the production of nuclear weapons, if not accompanied by a decision to deploy it beyond the frontiers of the producer, is his own internal affair.

These arguments do not stand up under criticism. My delegation would of course be ready to discuss each of the above-mentioned arguments, in a very precise and more detailed way, with reference to facts and data. At the moment, I wish to confine myself only to some remarks of a more general character:

Firstly, on the military strategic balance. The military strategic balance, according to our belief, is a complex of objectively existing real events or facts and not a complex of speculations or mental manipulations, serving for circumstantial justification of any given concept at any given moment. Thus, for the work of our Committee, there is doubtful value in the kind of approach which, in the span of a single year, leads to two different conclusions contradicting each other. We witnessed

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

this kind of approach in 1979; the competent United States authorities announced in June that year the existence of a strategic military balance between East and West, and specifically between the United States and the USSR while several months later and of course without any proved changes in the objectively existing reality, they announced the absence of such a balance. Using this argument, they started their pressure towards an increase of rocket-type armaments in Europe. But even this was not enough. In their mental manipulations, the question of the non-existence of strategic balance has reached such dimensions that, in order to restore it, they thought it necessary to take the decision on the production of a new generation of nuclear weapons. We may rightly ask now; what more will confront us tomorrow from the followers of such an approach to the problem of strategic balance? Regardless of the above, my delegation entirely shares the view, expressed during the plenary meetings over the last days, that the balance between East and West cannot be kept by raising the spiral of armaments but by its gradual lowering. Such is the sense of the proposal contained in document CD/219 and such is the noble purpose of our common endeavours in this Committee.

Secondly, the neutron weapon, as a new kind of tactical nuclear weapon. Precisely here, we see the most dangerous character of this weapon. We are for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, both the "new ones" called tactical and the "old, normal" strategic weapons. Such was the sense of the proposal of the group of socialist countries put forward in document CD/4. When we speak of the particular danger of neutron weapons, we have in mind two main reasons: the decision on its production entails at present unforeseen consequences of the opening of a new phase of the arms race; and its production and stockpiling in the military arsenals will further increase the danger of the eruption of a nuclear conflict, by significantly lowering the nuclear threshold.

Thirdly, the defensive and deterrent character of neutron weapons. May I say that this is merely the declaration of intent of the owner of this weapon and not of its technical characteristics. If, as the distinguished Ambassador of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, has stated, "the only purpose for which the neutron weapon came into existence was to provide an effective counter to the threat of concentrated tank attacks", the question arises whether such escalation of the defensive force against aggression is to be the privilege of one side only, or whether such escalation out of proportion is to become a common rule in armed conflicts. Where can the world be led to by such an approach to "self-defence and deterrence"? Could it be to our committing suicide out of fear of dying?

Fourthly, the production of the neutron bomb is an internal affair of the producer himself. Here again the Ambassador of the United Kingdom tried to reassure. Europe when he stated that "now, in fact, we know from the United States statement that no deployment is being considered at the present time". This, certainly, is an outright implication that the decision on the production of the neutron bomb is an "internal matter". It may be wondered, however, as a matter of fact, against whose tanks this weapon might be used if it is not to be deployed outside United States territory; but that is not so important, since even in the most daring, or perhaps most naive, assumption one cannot believe that the United States neutron weapon will not be deployed outside the United States.

The argument that the production of the neutron weapon is the United States internal affair cannot stand up under criticism, mainly because of the simple fact that never in the history of international relations has the appearance of a new type or a new generation of weapons been considered an internal affair of any producer State, nation or tribe.

(Mr. Suika, Poland)

We were told during our informal meeting yesterday that the ban on neutron weapons cannot be singled out from the whole complex of nuclear weapons under our agenda item 2. Well, generally, we could agree with this approach. But what can the Committee do when one has been trying to persuade us that the problems under agenda item 2 are not yet ripe for negotiation? Does it mean that some delegations believe that the ban on neutron weapons is not ripe for negotiation either? What kind of logic is this? Instead of trying to answer this very question, I can only say that the world community is frequently, and has been frequently, confronted with the results of such logic -- that is, with an uncontrollable escalation of the arms race. I leave it to the Committee to judge to what extent these words are "one-sided propaganda".

My delegation belongs -- and I quote again from the statement of my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Summerhayes -- my delegation belongs to "those who wished to present an exaggerated picture of the character and potential of these weapons". I would like to state that I do "exaggerate" and I will always be "exaggerating" whenever and wherever there appears a threat of new escalation of armaments, consuming not only the creative forces of nations but also ever larger resources for purposes contrary to the interests of security and endangering the world peace. These are the main reasons why my delegation fully supports the proposal to elaborate in this Committee a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. We hope that it is maybe not yet too late now. But this might be the last chance that the Committee will have.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind reference he has made to the Chair.

Mr. TERREFFE (Ethiopia): As we are about to conclude this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament, I would like to take this opportunity to extend to you my delegation's sincere appreciation for the competent way in which you are guiding the work of the Committee as its Chairman during the difficult month of August. My delegation's warm gratitude also goes to Ambassador Venkateswaran for the most efficient and amiable leadership which he provided to us as Chairman of the Committee during the month of July.

In my brief statement today I would like to make some general comments and observations concerning our work during this year's session of the Committee.

First of all, my delegation cannot but express a feeling of great disappointment that, despite repeated calls by many delegations -- including that of a major nuclear-weapon State -- for the initiation of negotiations on the items concerning a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, two nuclear-weapon States remained opposed to the proposal and to the establishment of ad hoc working groups for this purpose. I would like once again to reaffirm my delegation's belief and that of the Group of 21 that working groups provide the best means for conducting effectively the work of the Committee on Disarmament. In this respect, my delegation recognizes and welcomes the useful work done by the four Ad hoc Working Groups and is appreciative of the leadership provided by their respective Chairmen. We trust that the various degrees of the results achieved in each Working Group, and the conclusions and recommendations that we are about to adopt today will facilitate our future work and result in concrete disarmament measures next session. The establishment of a working group on a nuclear test ban with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States should remain a priority task for the Committee on Disarmament. Furthermore, the need for an urgent resumption of the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban cannot be overemphasized.

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

In view of the foregoing, my delegation reaffirms the position taken by the Group of 21 with respect to the future work of the Committee in relation to the Ad hoc Working Groups. In view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, our attention needs, it seems to me, to be focused on the following points:

- (a) Ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda should be established at the beginning of 1982 session;
- (b) The Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons should be given a broader mandate to continue its work with a view to elaborating a draft text for a CW convention;
- (c) A comprehensive programme of disarmament should be prepared before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, and to this end the early commencement of the work of the Ad hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament in 1982 is essential; and
- (d) In parenthesis, I should like to state that the trilateral negotiations on a nuclear test ban should resume as soon as possible and should also respond to the questions posed by the Group of 21 and other members of this Committee;
- (e) My delegation believes, as do other members of the Group of 21, that an agreement could be reached on a radiological weapons convention if genuine efforts were made by all concerned to advance negotiations. To this end, the early resumption of the work of the Ad hoc Working Group on this question will be productive;
- (f) Finally, we share the view that the most effective assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In this respect, the nuclear-weapon States have to provide, in the form of an international agreement of a legally binding nature; assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In the second part of my intervention, I would like to refer to the recent disturbing development which in my delegation's view has undermined the disarmament process and runs counter to the ultimate goals of general and complete disarmament and also frustrates our immediate objective of the relaxation of international tension. Naturally, I am referring here to the recent decision by the United States Government to manufacture and stockpile the neutron weapon. Possibly, deployment of this weapon may be yet another surprise in the making. I cannot but register my delegation's strong opposition to this decision and its consequences, about which many delegations have already expressed concern.

We have listened with great interest and anxiety to the views expressed in this connection by a number of delegations in the course of recent meetings in the Committee. The generally negative reaction to the decision taken by this nuclear-weapon Power has also been featured prominently in the international news media. The world has clearly observed a case where United Nations resolutions and decisions, as well as the genuine aspirations of the international community to live in relative peace and security, have been completely ignored.

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

In sharp contrast to the views held by the advocates of the neutron bomb, world public opinion is generally opposed to the decision on the manufacture, stockpiling and deployment of this weapon. We identify ourselves with this sentiment of genuine concern and the legitimate apprehension about this development. We have no doubt in our minds that the production of the neutron weapon would further provoke and intensify the spiralling of the nuclear arms race. Its full implication is yet to be known. There is no need to downplay the impact of this decision on the deterioration of international tension; nor is it wise to sidetrack the issue or to ignore the views and genuine feelings shared by an overwhelming international public opinion and a good number of delegations in the Committee on Disarmament representing by and large the non-nuclear-weapon States. We cannot hide the fact that the neutron bomb introduces new nuclear phenomena with far more dangerous neutron radiation effects to human beings. The decision of the United States on the production and stockpiling of these weapons will no doubt lead to a further lowering of the so-called nuclear threshold, thus increasing the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

The Ethiopian delegation has made repeated calls for the halting of the development and manufacture of the neutron weapons. We now realize more than before the need for a concrete step, preferably in the form of agreements, banning the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of the neutron weapons. Taking into account paragraph 50 of the Final Document, the Committee on Disarmament could play an active and constructive role in the preparation and concluding of such agreements. The draft convention in document CCD/559 submitted by a group of socialist countries as early as March 1978 could also serve as a basis for such agreements. In this connection, the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons, as proposed in document CD/219, has our general support.

I would like to conclude my brief intervention by pointing out again my delegation's concern about the recent development, the origin of which seems to be the "doctrine of nuclear deterrence" and the misleading belief that a limited nuclear war can be waged and won. Consciously or unconsciously, the proponents of such a philosophy are contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, thus threatening international peace and security; and by their provocative actions they are repeatedly violating the principles of the United Nations Charter and United Nations decisions and frustrating the aspirations of the world community for the promotion of peace and international understanding. We earnestly hope that the Committee on Disarmament will be able to work in a more propitious international climate next year and to achieve more by way of concrete results so it can contribute substantially to the success of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Ethiopia for his statement and for the kind reference he has made to the Chair.

Mr. SAW HLAING (Burma): At the 146th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, the Group of 21 had the opportunity to present to the Committee a working paper on the principles of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Today, on behalf of the Group of 21 and as its co-ordinator, I would like to present to the Committee the working paper of the Group on the chapter entitled "Measures" in the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The Group of 21 has already presented a set of Working Papers (CD/CPD/WP.36 and Add 1, 2 and 3) to the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The paper which I am going to submit will constitute an explanatory note to these working papers. I am given to understand that this paper, together with the aforementioned working papers of the Group, will be circulated as an official document of the Committee bearing the symbol CCD/223. The explanatory note reads as follows:

"During the course of the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the delegations belonging to the Group of 21 have submitted a document containing in detail specific measures which should be included in a comprehensive programme of disarmament during four stages of implementation (CD/CPD/WP.36 and Add.1, Add.2 and Add.3). The formulations in respect to these specific measures are provisional in nature representing the highest common denominator achieved within the Group of 21 at the present stage. Revisions, amendments or additional formulations to the contents of this Chapter may be proposed by any delegation, whenever deemed necessary. In spite of its provisional character, the present document is sufficiently illustrative of what should essentially be the contents of the Chapter under 'Measures'. For this reason the Group of 21 has concluded that it would be useful to submit this document to the Committee before the end of its 1981 session."

The second part of my intervention relates to the statement of the Group of 21 on the conclusion of the third annual session of the Committee on Disarmament. The text of the Group's statement reads as follows:

"The Group of 21 regrets that the adverse trends in the international situation which it had noted at the end of the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament continued to prevail during the third annual session of the Committee. The Committee has not been able to make any significant progress in negotiations on most of the items on its agenda, especially the items to which the United Nations General Assembly has accorded the highest priority, namely, a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, owing to the absence of political will on the part of certain major Powers. The Group of 21 is deeply disturbed over this trend which seriously undermines the effectiveness of the Committee as the single multilateral negotiating organ in the field of disarmament.

"The Group of 21 reaffirms its belief and confidence in the multilateral approach to all disarmament questions and considers that ad hoc working groups have proved to be the best available machinery for the effective conduct of all substantive disarmament negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Saw Hlaing, Burma)

"The Group of 21 expresses deep regret that during the 1981 session the Committee was once again prevented from setting up an ad hoc working group to undertake multilateral negotiations on the scope, arrangements for verification and final clauses of a nuclear test ban treaty as proposed by the Group. In view of the fact that the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament will be held next year, the Group reaffirms the political significance of initiating negotiations on a nuclear test ban in the Committee on Disarmament at the beginning of its next session.

"It is also regrettable that the parties which had been engaged in trilateral negotiations on this subject did not respond, either jointly or individually, to the questions posed to them by the members of the Group of 21, as contained in document CD/181, seeking clarifications on issues which are of vital concern to both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. The Group calls upon the States concerned to respond urgently to these questions.

"During the third annual session, members of the Group of 21 emphasized the dangers of the continuing arms race and the need for urgent measures to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. The Group of 21 is convinced that the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear arms directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the vital security interests of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. Convinced, therefore, that the issues of nuclear disarmament have a bearing on the security of the whole world, the Group of 21 has recommended in document CD/180 the establishment of an ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament to initiate without delay negotiations on certain concrete issues of nuclear disarmament, particularly the elaboration of the stages of nuclear disarmament contained in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. It is a matter of regret that no consensus could be reached on this proposal during the 1981 session of the Committee, thus precluding the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament from undertaking concrete negotiations on an item of the highest priority on its agenda.

"The Group of 21 deplores the fact that no consensus could be achieved to give the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons a mandate to negotiate on a multilateral convention. The Group of 21 welcomes the intensive and business-like work carried out by the Ad Hoc Working Group. It considers of particular importance the fact that in the Working Group all relevant issues involved have been presented and thoroughly examined and that the Committee is now provided with a solid basis for negotiation on the text of a convention for the total prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. It is indispensable that the Committee at the beginning of its 1982 session gives the Working Group a clear mandate to urgently negotiate the text of such a convention.

"The Group of 21 attaches considerable importance to the adoption of the comprehensive programme of disarmament at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. To be meaningful, the programme must contain concrete disarmament measures in defined stages leading to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament

(Mr. Saw Hlaing, Burma)

within an agreed time frame. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 30 of the Final Document which refers, inter alia, to the negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, a comprehensive programme of disarmament should create obligations on the part of all States to implement the measures included in the programme.

"The Group of 21 has submitted a working paper containing specific disarmament measures to be included in the various stages of a comprehensive programme of disarmament as well as a working paper on the principles underlying such a programme. The Group of 21 calls upon all delegations to be forthcoming and submit such proposals as would be conducive to the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament as conceived of in the relevant provisions of the Final Document.

"The Group of 21 recommends that more intensive negotiations should be conducted from the beginning of 1982 in the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to ensure the adoption of a programme at the second special session.

"The Group's position on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been outlined on previous occasions (documents CD/50 and CD/134). The Group believes that the most effective assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The Group reiterates its view that the nuclear-weapon States have an obligation categorically to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

"Members of the Group of 21 have supported and played an active role in the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group to evolve an agreement on a common approach or formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. The Group recommends that negotiations on this question should be actively pursued at the next session of the Committee. It is of the view that an agreement on this question is possible before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament provided certain nuclear-weapon States revise their positions based on their nuclear strategic doctrines which so far have prevented progress towards a common approach acceptable to all.

"In the negotiations on a radiological weapons convention, the Group of 21 has recommended that the definition of such a weapon must be precise and complete, and that it should not include an exclusion clause with respect to nuclear weapons.

"The Group of 21 considers that there exists a very real risk of mass destruction from the dissemination of radioactive substance through attacks on nuclear facilities. In this context the Group suggested in the relevant Working Group that serious consideration should be given to the inclusion of an undertaking never to attack or deliberately damage any such facilities, and to the prohibition of radiological warfare.

(Mr. Saw Hlaing, Burma)

"The Group of 21 has recommended that the proposed convention must contain an explicit commitment for the urgent pursuit of measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. The Group of 21 reaffirms the inalienable right of all States to develop and apply their programmes for the peaceful use of radioactive materials and sources of radiation, including nuclear energy, and their right of access to and acquisition of related materials, equipment, information and technology. In this regard, the need to strengthen international co-operation was also emphasized. These and other issues still remain to be resolved. In the opinion of the Group of 21, agreement on a radiological weapons convention can be reached if a sincere effort is made in the negotiations to take into account the positions and views of all the members of the Committee on Disarmament.

"The Group of 21 considers it imperative that concrete negotiations should be initiated on effective measures to reduce current international tensions and to halt and reverse the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and avert the growing danger of the outbreak of war, in particular nuclear war.

"If the Committee on Disarmament is unable to undertake concrete negotiations and conclude specific agreements on priority items on its agenda before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, consideration would have to be given at that session to the situation arising therefrom'.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. The last sentence of the seventh paragraph in the statement of the Group of 21 (CD/222), which its Co-ordinator has just read out, was the result of intensive discussions in the Group. As often happens in such cases it does not in my delegation's opinion have the desired clarity. Therefore, my delegation would like to refer, in the following brief statement, to the significance and scope it attaches to it.

My delegation interprets the obligations referred to in the last sentence of the seventh paragraph as an obligation to undertake, as soon as the comprehensive programme of disarmament has been adopted, intensive negotiations for the joint elaboration of legally binding agreements guaranteeing effective implementation of the measures included in the programme. When I requested the floor, Mr. Chairman, that was my only intention in doing so.

Subsequently, however, my distinguished colleague on my left, the representative of Mongolia, referred in his speech to one aspect of the Group's work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament which also, in our opinion, deserves a brief explanation.

I understood him correctly, his statement was to the effect that with regard to mechanisms and procedure, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should not include provisions but only references to the provisions of the Final Document.

This question has already been raised in the Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme. Nevertheless, since, as we all know, the Group did not have records, I would like to repeat what I have said in the Group many times, namely, that the Committee on Disarmament last year adopted the decision of the Group contained in paragraph 10 of its report to the effect -- and I quote -- that "the comprehensive programme will have to be self-contained". Accordingly, that decision is still fully in force and will remain so unless the Committee decides to change it.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor at this point to state for the record that my delegation deeply regrets the fact that the Committee on Disarmament, owing to the opposition of certain States, has been prevented from taking a decision in favour of establishing a working group on the neutron bomb.

It is also regrettable that attempts have been made to link this question with other aspects that have nothing to do with the neutron bomb. The particularly inhumane features of these weapons and also their very nature, which reduce the so-called nuclear threshold, are more than sufficient reasons why the Committee on Disarmament should have decided to establish a working group on this question as a matter of urgency.

It is a fact that the decision to begin production and stockpiling of the neutron bomb, in addition to initiating a new spiralling of the arms race, represents an attempt to put into practice the doctrine of limited nuclear war and creates serious obstacles to disarmament negotiations. Accordingly, my delegation constantly supports the proposal that the Committee should begin considering this item as soon as possible, through concrete negotiations in a working group.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to read out the statements issued yesterday by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba on this question.

"On 8 August last, international cable agencies published the news that, according to information provided by White House spokesmen, the United States President, Ronald Reagan, had at a meeting of the National Security Council decided to authorize the production of the neutron bomb or the so-called enhanced radiation weapon, according to the technical language of its inventors.

"Barely 24 hours after the announcement, the same news agencies, including those based in the United States, undertook to shed new light on the question.

"The decision to manufacture neutron bombs had not in fact been taken on 8 August but on 6 August, the date of the thirtieth anniversary of the criminal bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which directly or indirectly cost more than 200,000 victims -- the date when the 1981 World Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs was being held at Nagasaki, and also the date of the March for Peace 1981 through several western European cities, from Copenhagen to Paris, in which demonstrators expressed their opposition to nuclear weapons.

"As will be recalled, the Administration of ex-President Carter had decided to produce the neutron bomb which, as we know, destroys all human beings but leaves installations intact; but the international outcry which this decision provoked led to the suspension of the decision in April 1978.

"Now Mr. Reagan is not only making again the decision which Carter was obliged to suspend; he is going further. He is publicly and cynically ridiculing the international community by taking the reprehensible decision to produce these mass-extinction weapons on the same date on which, thirty-six years ago, the Administration of President Truman ordered a nuclear attack against Japanese cities.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

"This is the true nature of the country which has claimed to set itself up as the champion of human rights throughout the world and which is saying today that it wishes to combat international terrorism.

"There is no better example of international terrorism than the current policy of the United States Government. Its acts clearly prove this.

"The decision to manufacture and stockpile neutron bombs in United States territory is an affront to international public opinion and to all Governments, but at the same time, and above all, it is a major affront to the United States people and the peoples of western Europe. The former already have -- and the latter will soon have -- on their soil this diabolical scientific monstrosity which has been placed in the service of bellicose interests and is intended for the annihilation of human beings.

"The United States people and the peoples of western Europe, who love and desire peace and are in favor of international détente, and who do not want to be pushed into a nuclear war which would claim the whole of mankind as its victim, must now say what they think.

"Memories are still fresh of the furtive attack by the Israeli Air Force on 7 June last against nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes in Iraq -- an attack for which the Israelis used ultramodern and sophisticated F-15 and F-16 aircraft provided by the United States.

"Who can say for sure that in addition to being designed for a European scenario -- for the purpose of neutralizing a mass attack by tanks as we are told -- these weapons will not be used tomorrow by the Zionist friends of the United States against the Arab countries and the Palestinian people, or that the capital of apartheid, protected by the United States, will not use them against progressive African countries?

"The question of President Reagan's decision to produce the neutron bomb is clearly not only a matter of concern for the United States people and the peoples of Europe. It is an affront to all the peoples of the world, and it should be condemned from all corners of the planet.

"The United States decision is being made after the NATO countries have been pressured to increase their military budgets to astronomical levels and have been forced to agree to the deployment of 572 medium-range nuclear missiles from 1983 onwards. At the same time steps are still being taken for the establishment of a large rapid deployment force to operate wherever its interests may be in danger, and it is essential not to overlook the fact that its military presence in the Indian Ocean and its network of military bases and installations are growing at an uncontrolled pace, causing great concern for every country in the world.

"As if the aforementioned were not enough, it should be recalled that in line with the approval of the manufacture of a neutron bomb, they began the military manoeuvres entitled 'Ocean Venture 81', which are the most extensive war exercises to be undertaken since the Second World War by the United States and the NATO countries, and which are being conducted in the north and south Atlantic and the North and Baltic Seas, and also in the Caribbean, including the territory illegally occupied by the Guantanamo naval base. In the last-mentioned case, the exercises coincide with the war games of the United States and certain Latin American countries known as Unitas XXII.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

"The decision to manufacture the neutron bomb is one more step in the arms escalation provoked by the United States; and it is endangering international peace and security.

"Thus the United States Government is sabotaging United Nations agreements and resolutions; and the decision -- to which it formally subscribed itself -- that the 1980s should be declared as the Second Disarmament Decade with the objective of curbing and reversing the arms race and of taking measures conducive to general and complete disarmament under international control; and it is doing this at the very time when the United Nations is preparing to hold the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and when it is hoped that important decisions will be taken leading to the adoption of genuine disarmament measures.

"There are some who with uncontrolled hotheadedness try to fan the flames of war and are ready to make foolish statements. Thus barely twenty-four hours after the Yankee decision became known, the governing clique in China, through its press, expressed its satisfaction that production of the neutron bomb was now beginning in the United States and said it would like to see such bombs deployed in Europe.

"Some still believe in the mistaken theory of limited nuclear war and, what is worse, they think that, in the event of a nuclear conflagration, they could remain outside any conflict that might break out.

"Such attitudes are conceivable only by those who are bereft even of a minimum of respect not only for their own peoples but also for the very existence of mankind.

"The Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Cuba expresses its most vigorous condemnation of the United States Government's decision to manufacture the neutron bomb, and wishes to point out that full responsibility for the effect that this decision will have on international peace and security rests entirely with the Government of the United States and those who support it in its plans".

The CHAIRMAN: Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? As I anticipated earlier, we will have to resume the plenary meeting this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. We shall then adopt the reports of the Working Groups and also take up discussion of document CD/219 for decision. During the afternoon's plenary meeting, we hope to circulate the results of the work of the drafting group. We shall then adjourn the plenary and meet in informal meeting this evening to consider the remaining parts of the annual report. I am planning our final plenary meeting for 6.00 p.m. tomorrow by which time all documents will be ready. The meeting is suspended until 3.30 p.m. this afternoon.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The one hundred and forty-eighth plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is called to order. You will recall that, at our last plenary meeting the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Erdembileg, introduced document CD/219 entitled "Statement of a group of socialist countries on the need for the urgent establishment in the Committee on Disarmament of an ad hoc working group on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron nuclear weapons". In that document the sponsors requested that their proposal should be considered and a decision should be taken on it by the Committee at this plenary meeting. Is there any objection to the proposal contained in document CD/219?

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, if your request was for a decision on the document CD/219, as I understand it, which proposes the urgent establishment of an ad hoc working group on the prohibition, production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons, I will, of course, have to take exception to that proposal. I will confine my remarks to that question, and will not attempt to rebut some of the tendentious statements that have been made today about my country's policies in that regard and on some other subjects, particularly the statement made by the Cuban representative, which contained so many outrageous assertions as to be undeserving of a response that would dignify its contents. I take this restraint in my own intervention out of respect for the need of the Committee to make the best use of the precious few hours remaining to us. Now, as the title of the proposal contained in CD/219 suggests, we are dealing here with a question concerning the prohibition of nuclear weapons. But, as a number of speakers have noted in our informal meetings, why deal with only one type of nuclear weapon while leaving others aside?

In fact, the most lethal and damaging weapons, those that have actually been deployed, would not be considered under this proposal.

The so-called nuclear neutron weapon, which is more properly designated "enhanced radiation weapon" (ERW), is one possible variant in the broad range of nuclear weapons. Every one of them, including the ERW, produces blast, thermal effects, prompt radiation and residual radiation. These effects vary according to the design, yield and even such things as the height of the explosion. Thus, all sorts of distinctions can be made among nuclear weapons. But the fact remains that all can kill and wreak varying degrees of damage, ranging up to the catastrophic for the larger warheads carried by medium-range and intercontinental missiles. Therefore, there would seem to be no reason connected with an approach to nuclear disarmament for selectively concentrating on one particular variant of nuclear weapons, particularly since it is one of the least damaging of nuclear weapons and is designed to be placed in artillery shells and short range rockets.

The question of the reason for the selective approach in CD/219 then remains. As the United States has pointed out on many occasions, the ERW weapon is defensive in character and is intended, if ever deployed, to maintain deterrence of attack. It would be considered for use only in extreme circumstances, which we pray will never occur, in responding to a mass armoured attack. A look at the disposition of forces in Europe might suggest the answer to the question of why this proposal is being pressed by the sponsors of CD/219, nearly all of whom are members of the Warsaw Pact. There are over 40,000 Warsaw Pact tanks ranged against some 11,000 NATO tanks in Europe.

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

The argument has also been made that the danger of nuclear war has been heightened by the beginning of production of the ERW because the temptation to use it would be greater -- that somehow its existence would make it easier to cross the threshold into nuclear war. I dealt with this question in my intervention on 13 August. I noted that the ERW is still a nuclear weapon, and that the decision to use it would be no less difficult to make than the decision to use any other nuclear weapon. The possibility of indiscriminately destructive responses from the other side would be high, increasing the potential for escalation.

For these and other reasons my delegation does not believe that a case has been made for the urgent creation of a working group to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of so-called nuclear neutron weapons. The introduction of this proposal at this late date in our session, and under the prevailing circumstances, leads to the conclusion that it is not a serious disarmament proposal.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): My delegation has listened carefully to the arguments put forward both yesterday and today on the proposal to establish immediately a working group on nuclear neutron weapons. I have already introduced some views of my own into the debate. I believe that there are three main issues that have to be considered:

- (i) Is there some exceptional urgency for setting up such a working group?
- (ii) Is it appropriate that neutron weapons be singled out for independent treatment in this Committee?
- (iii) Do neutron weapons constitute some new and immediate threat to peace, as some delegations try to allege?

My delegation's views on these three questions are as follows:

On the question of "exceptional urgency", we do not consider that a decision by the United States Government to manufacture and stockpile in the United States a weapon which is designed to meet the potential -- but I am sure not immediate -- threat of armoured warfare in Europe justifies some almost emergency step on our part. As I have made clear, the United States decision was taken as a matter of precaution and involves no deployment of enhanced radiation weapons.

On the second question, which is that of appropriateness of singling out neutron weapons and negotiating a convention on them, I believe that neutron weapons fall within the definition of nuclear weapons. My delegation has consistently pointed out that the only secure route to effective nuclear arms control lies through negotiation between the nuclear Powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. It seems obvious to us that the negotiations have to take place between the States which have to accept the obligation to control and to reduce their nuclear armouries. For this reason, my Government has never seen how the negotiation of nuclear arms control agreements can initially be conducted by this Committee as a whole.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

On my third question which was whether neutron weapons, and the deterrence purpose for which these could be used, constitute a possible threat to peace, I would repeat here what I said in plenary on 18 August. It is alleged that, because enhanced radiation weapons are designed as short-range and tactical weapons, this somehow indicates an intention within the NATO Alliance to prepare for what is called "limited nuclear war". It is suggested that Alliance thinking is making a dangerous shift, and that NATO is somehow moving away from the concept of deterrence. These allegations, which imply that NATO intends to give up its purely defensive role and posture, are completely unfounded. Indeed, arguments of this kind are so patently false as to be merely malicious and seem to be designed to create fear and anxiety where this is unjustified.

In all, my conclusion -- for the reasons I have just stated -- is that there is no case for establishing immediately a CD working group to deal with the question of neutron weapons.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the French delegation has made known its gratitude to the proposal which was submitted to us at the private meeting we had yesterday. Today, it confirms this position. For the reasons expressed at an earlier plenary meeting, we consider that the enhanced radiation weapon is part of the over-all problem posed by the arms race and nuclear disarmament; in our opinion, it is not therefore necessary to give it special treatment or to prepare any specific conventional provisions relating to it. The establishment of a working group to negotiate on that subject does not therefore seem to us to be justified. Such discussions as might be desirable on the subject of this weapon will find their normal place at our next session in the informal meetings which the Committee will no doubt, as we would hope, devote to the consideration of questions relating to the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: In the light of the discussion, are you going to speak in objection to the proposal, Mr. Ambassador? I saw the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Is this to speak against, in objection to, the proposal?

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation wishes to express its profound dissatisfaction at the lack of consensus ...

The CHAIRMAN: I asked whether there are any objections to the proposal contained in document CD/219. If I may, I would like to conclude this debate as to the decision of the Committee with regard to the proposal. Afterwards, if I may and if you agree, I will give the floor to allow arguments against those which have been put forward against the proposal. Would that be agreeable?

In the light of the discussion held on this question, there is no consensus on the proposal contained in document CD/219, and therefore it is not adopted.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation wishes to express its profound dissatisfaction at the lack of consensus on the document submitted by a group of socialist countries, containing a proposal for the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Committee on the preparation of a draft international convention on the prohibition of neutron weapons and for the establishment of an ad hoc working group for that purpose. Today we should like once again to stress that this is an exceptionally important and urgent matter directly connected with international security and disarmament and affecting the destinies of peoples, since the emergence of neutron weapons considerably increases the threat of a nuclear war.

We therefore consider that the efforts made by individual delegations to minimize the danger of such weapons and to conceal a number of negative aspects of the decision taken by the Administration of the United States of America are unsound. The Soviet delegation will certainly continue its efforts aimed at solving the problem of the prohibition of neutron weapons, in order to outlaw them.

We should like once again to recall the statement by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, Head of the Soviet State in which he said -- and I quote -- that: "We for our part confirm that we shall not begin to produce them -- that is, neutron weapons -- unless they appear in other States; and we are prepared to conclude an agreement prohibiting such weapons once and for all". As we have already emphasized, in the situation which is developing, the Soviet Union cannot and will not remain a passive onlooker.

I should now like to say a few words concerning our discussions, including the statements made today. We have not heard anything new today either. We have been asked why we raised this issue. We have answered that question: we did so because President Reagan had taken the decision a little more than ten days earlier to produce neutron weapons. Clearly, we would not have raised this question now if President Reagan had not taken that decision on 6 August. Secondly, why do we consider this question urgent? We have explained that it is an urgent question because the development of neutron weapons increases the threat of the outbreak of a nuclear war. I think this is clear and simple. We have been asked why we are proposing that this issue should be considered separately. We have replied that we are prepared to examine this issue in an ad hoc working group. We are prepared to consider it in the context of a ban on nuclear weapons -- a subject on which the same States have blocked the establishment of a working group. We have also said that we are prepared to listen to any serious counter-proposal. We heard none yesterday, and we have heard none today.

Finally, we have been told that we are creating fear with our proposal. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman; but this is something that can be said only by people who do not even read the newspapers. It is not we who are creating fear, it is the neutron bomb that creates fear. In this connection, one has only to go one floor down from this room and take any newspaper in any language, in order to see that it is not the statement of the Soviet delegation or the proposal for the establishment of a working group that is creating fear, and that the peoples are not protesting against the establishment of a working group but against the production of neutron weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Lastly, we are accustomed to listening with attention and respect to the discussion in the Committee. We have just been told that essentially only the countries of the Warsaw Pact are advocating the prohibition of neutron weapons, and that their delegations are responsible for raising this issue. For the information of the United States delegation, in the last days of the 1981 session, at least 21 States have spoken on the question of neutron weapons, and representatives of a group of socialist countries and representatives of the non-aligned States have voiced a vigorous condemnation. Consequently, to endeavour to distort the essence and the nature of this discussion is, to say the least, unworthy of a responsible delegation.

In conclusion, I should also like to draw attention to one more point. Some delegations, and in particular the delegation of Pakistan, have referred to their anxiety not only in regard to the production of neutron weapons but also in regard to the deployment of certain types of weapons with nuclear warheads, particularly medium-range weapons. In this connection I should like to quote from a speech made by President L.I. Brezhnev at a dinner in honour of Mr. Willy Brandt on 30 June 1981. He said that:

"The Soviet Union is prepared to stop the deployment of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country on the day when negotiations begin on the substance of the matter -- but it will do this of course only if the United States tells us that during the negotiations it will not increase the number of its medium-range nuclear devices in Europe either."

The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared that it is prepared to limit and prohibit any type of weapon but, of course, on the basis of reciprocity and without impairing the security of any of the parties.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): On behalf of the sponsors of document CD/219, permit me, Mr. Chairman, to express our gratitude to you for the efforts you have made in connection with the consideration in the Committee, both at the informal meeting and at the plenary meeting today, of the proposal by the socialist countries on the need for the urgent establishment in the Committee on Disarmament of an ad hoc working group to elaborate an international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

I should like to place particular emphasis on the fact that this important and timely initiative of the socialist countries was given much attention in the Committee and received the support of many delegations.

We note with regret, however, that owing to the well-known position of a number of Western countries, the Committee was today unable to take a positive decision on this important matter. The representatives of these Western countries, having earlier prevented the Committee from adopting a decision to establish ad hoc working groups to start negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, once again showed their negative attitude, this time in regard to the important question which brooks no further delay and which is raised in document CD/219.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Having listened to the statements of certain representatives of Western countries at today's plenary meeting, I should like to say the following: I did not quite understand yesterday's statement by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Flowerree. After the statement by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, he said that Ambassador Issraelyan's statement fully confirmed his own statement; but I should like to note that in his statement today the distinguished representative of the United States alleged that the discussion here is about the least destructive type of nuclear weapon. It is precisely this statement which bears out our concern. The statement that the neutron nuclear weapon is a "clean", "defensive", "humane" weapon is totally inadmissible. The distinguished representatives of Western countries have also alleged that the proposal by the countries of the socialist community is not serious. I leave that to the conscience of the representatives of the Western countries; but I would like to ask the members of the Committee the following question. Were the Western countries taking a serious step when they blocked the proposal to establish working groups on the problem of nuclear disarmament and on the problem of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests?

For our part, we state frankly that those delegations which have prevented the adoption by the Committee of a positive decision on such an urgent and extremely important problem are assuming a serious responsibility.

With regard to the position of the socialist countries, their position of principle has been and is clearly set forth in their statements, in document CD/219, and in other documents which have been officially submitted to the Committee on Disarmament.

The socialist States members of the Committee on Disarmament are prepared to examine, this very day if you like, any other constructive proposals aimed at the prohibition as soon as possible of this most barbarous type of weapon of mass destruction, namely the neutron weapon.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, permit me to bring to your attention, and to that of the members of the Committee, the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Mongolian People's Republic a few days ago issued a statement clearly and precisely reasserting the position of principle of the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic regarding this monstrous type of weapon of mass destruction and severely condemning the foolhardy step taken by the United States Administration in escalating the armaments race by introducing the new neutron spiral which constitutes a serious threat to the cause of peace, disarmament and détente. My delegation intends to have this statement circulated without delay as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. YU Peiwen (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, at the recent meetings of the Committee on Disarmament, there have been debates around the decision of the United States Administration to produce neutron bombs. The Soviet delegation has distributed in the Committee working paper CD/216, which contains a TASS statement of 13 August. In this statement, the TASS made groundless attacks on China. I am compelled, in the name of the Chinese delegation, to reject categorically such wanton attacks by the Soviet Union.

The facts are that: China's press organs, among others, our official newspaper The People's Daily, have responsibly and objectively reported the views of some countries on the United States decision to produce neutron bombs, including the contents of press release issued by TASS.

(Mr. Yu Peiwen, China)

Then what is the motive of the Soviet attacks on China? Why did Moscow fly into a rage when China's newspapers have reported views and reactions of some countries on the production of neutron bombs by the United States? What is behind all this? These are questions worth pondering.

Evidently, the production of neutron bombs by the United States will affect the balance of nuclear forces between the Soviet Union and the United States. In recent years, the Soviet Union has stepped up its development of nuclear weapons in order to gain nuclear superiority. By deploying a large number of SS-20 missiles and Back-fire bombers in Europe, the Soviet Union has gained nuclear superiority in the European theatre. Now, with the production of neutron bombs by the United States, the nuclear balance between the two sides is bound to be affected.

The production of neutron bombs by the United States will offset the "tank advantage" enjoyed by the Soviet Union in the European theatre. It is reported that the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty States have deployed as many as 47,000 tanks in Europe, whereas the Western counterpart has but 12,000. As we all know, the neutron bomb is an effective anti-tank weapon.

The United States decision to produce neutron bombs was made at a time when the United States is preparing to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1981 on theatre nuclear weapons. This shows that the United States is trying to strengthen its military capabilities so that it may stand in a relatively favourable position in future disarmament negotiations, i.e. from a position of strength.

It seems that the above points are precisely the reasons why Moscow is so disturbed and panic-stricken by the production of neutron bombs by the United States, and so furious about the objective reporting in the Chinese newspapers. In the final analysis, the production of neutron bombs is in fact a product of the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. China has all along been against the nuclear arms race and holds that the two superpowers should take the lead in carrying out nuclear disarmament. The Soviet vilification against China's clearcut position on disarmament is utterly futile.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): I just wanted to clear up one point of fact. During his remarks a moment ago, the representative of the Soviet Union suggested that I had not acted like the representative of a responsible delegation in saying that only the members of the Warsaw Pact supported the proposal or had certain views on the desirability or the undesirability of the neutron weapon. I will give the Soviet representative the benefit of the doubt. I would like to read what I actually said, and that is that "the answer to the question of why this proposal is being pressed by the sponsors of CD/219, nearly all of whom are members of the Warsaw Pact ..." I did not say that other delegations had not spoken out against the neutron weapon, as they call it. I had simply said the sponsors of CD/219 were nearly all members of the Warsaw Pact. I did not appreciate being misquoted on that point.

If it is not true that nearly all the sponsors of CD/219 are members of the Warsaw Pact, I would appreciate that information.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):
Mr. Chairman, forgive me for taking the floor a second time, but I should like to reply to some comments that have been made here including some comments about my country.

I must say that speculation about tanks is one of the favourite hobby-horses of Western propaganda. Various figures are quoted in an attempt to create an impression of some kind of nightmarish and terrible superiority of Soviet tanks; and the figures quoted vary considerably. It is typical, Mr. Chairman, that today, even with the increasing military co-operation between the United States and China, the United States mentioned one set of figures -- saying, I believe, that we have 40,000 tanks while NATO has, I think he said, 11,000 tanks -- but the representative of China decided, so to speak, to arouse some emotion and said that we have 47,000 tanks while NATO has 13,000 tanks. This is an altogether unfortunate fact because, I repeat, in view of their growing military co-operation it should certainly be possible for them to share their information more systematically and more accurately.

With regard to superiority in tanks, we do indeed have a superiority in tanks and we have repeatedly said so. Indeed, I even mentioned in the Committee on Disarmament, in my statement on 26 March, that in order to counterbalance this tank advantage, NATO has -- in addition to other types of weapons, including such redoubtable weapons as aircraft carriers -- NATO has a great superiority in anti-tank weapons, with which the NATO countries seek to offset or counterbalance the difference in types of weapons between the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO countries. Thus, this excuse that neutron weapons are being developed to counter Soviet tanks is without foundation. I am bound to recall today's statement by Ambassador Sujka who quite rightly asked how the United States would combat Soviet tanks with neutron weapons if it did not intend to bring such weapons to Europe. But that is another question.

With regard to the statement by the representative of China, in the beginning I found it rather pleasing. It seemed to me that he really wanted to base himself on an objective appraisal of the situation; but where is the objectivity, when everything which the representative of China said concerning military balance was word for word the same as what our NATO colleagues have been telling us? Consequently, we heard nothing new or objective. We heard the NATO interpretation in the statement by the representative of China. Thank you; and I think that with these remarks I have finished the discussion of this matter.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, my delegation -- as, I am sure, the majority of the members of this Committee -- has listened with great interest and, I am sure, with no small measure of concern to the exchange of views which has taken place both this afternoon and earlier, in our Committee. In response to the question that has been raised here about the enhanced radiation weapon, I think Mr. Chairman, that this occasion may be an appropriate one for my delegation to express its own views and suggestions on this situation which presents itself to the Committee.

I would like to recall, and I believe that the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union mentioned this point earlier on, the remarks which were made by the head of the Pakistan delegation in his intervention yesterday, when he stated, and I quote, "that the current climate of confrontation" -- and we have seen evidence of this this afternoon -- "that the current climate of confrontation should not be allowed to lead to an unbridled escalation in the arms race, especially in nuclear weapons. Our concern is aroused whether such escalation in the arms race is quantitative or qualitative in nature, whether it involves the deployment of the SS-20 mobile missile, or the production of the enhanced radiation weapon". The head of my delegation added that "the present was not the time for self-serving postures or proposals, it was time for resolute and wide statesmanship".

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the exchange of views which we have had on the proposal contained in document CD/219 has, at least for my delegation -- and I believe this to be true of other members of the Group of 21 also -- reinforced our view that the Committee on Disarmament should be enabled, at a very early date, to establish an ad hoc working group which can deal with the whole question of nuclear disarmament and in the first instance with measures to halt the qualitative and quantitative escalation in the nuclear arms race. We hope that a positive decision on this proposal of the Group of 21, which is still on the table, will become possible in the near future, perhaps as soon as we resume our work next year. At the same time Mr. Chairman, my delegation believes that the Committee ought not to remain completely silent about the present situation. I think we must note the current and prospective escalation in the nuclear arms race, in both its quantitative and qualitative aspects, and the fact that this escalation is taking place mainly between the United States and the Soviet Union. I believe, Sir, that it would be in keeping with the high responsibilities of this Committee and with its important mandate if we could at least issue an appeal -- phrased in very objective language -- to the United States and the Soviet Union to open early negotiations with a view to halting and diverting the present and potential escalation in the nuclear arms race between the two Powers in its quantitative and qualitative aspects. I believe Sir, that this is something that we could do, and that we could, I hope, reach agreement on; and I believe that this is something that would bring credit to this Committee and to the 40 members who have sat around this table during this year, watching with some consternation the developments taking place in the world around us.

The CHAIRMAN: May I now go on to the next item on this afternoon's agenda. In accordance with the practice followed by the Committee in previous years, I would like now to put before the Committee for adoption the reports of the four Working Groups, re-established during the present session. Those reports are contained in documents CD/215, CD/217 and Corr.1, CD/218 and CD/220.

(The Chairman)

If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to adopt the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons (CD/215).

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: May I now turn to document CD/217 and Corr. 1 containing the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. In particular, may I draw the attention to the recommendation contained in paragraph 17 of the report which recommends to the Committee that the Group should resume its work on 11 January 1982. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to adopt the report of the Working Group.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I put now before the Committee for adoption document CD/218 containing the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. In paragraph 23 of its report the Working Group agreed to recommend to the Committee that it consider whether the Group should resume its work on 18 January 1982. In connection with this report, may I also draw attention to paragraph 11 of the report of the Working Group and to the communication addressed to me by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons dated 10 August 1981 by which I am informed that, subject to the Committee's agreement, it would be appreciated if I could invite the Director-General of the IAEA to provide the information described in that letter. Before we adopt the report, I wish to ask the Committee, firstly, whether there is any objection to the proposal that the Chairman invite the Director-General of the IAEA to provide the information concerning the draft convention which has been requested by the Chairman of the Working Group. Is there any objection?

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, during the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, my delegation had already expressed some serious reservations concerning a reference to the Director-General of the IAEA. However, we did not stand in the way of Ambassador Kómives, Chairman of the Working Group, holding further consultations on this matter with members of the Committee.

In the meantime, we have reflected further on this, and have had an opportunity also to consult our authorities. We have come to the conclusion that, at a time when neither the definition of radiological weapons nor the scope of application of the future treaty has been settled, a reference to the Director-General of the IAEA would be premature. We therefore request that the proposal be dropped for the present.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, it will be noted that in paragraph 11 of document CD/218 it is stated that some delegations had expressed their reservations on the proposal to invite the Director-General of the IAEA to express some views on the question referred to in that paragraph. My delegation was one of those. We, like the Indian delegation, have had an opportunity to reflect further on this matter, and we do believe, Sir, that at the present time it is somewhat premature to address this invitation to the Director-General of the IAEA.

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

Inter alia, we have studied the scope of the Vienna Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and it would appear from that Convention that the activities which are of concern to the IAEA under that Convention relating to the protection of special fissionable material, under certain particular situations, are considerably narrower than the responsibilities that would arise in relation to the proposed action to prevent diversion of radioactive substances under the proposed convention on radiological weapons. We would think that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons would need to examine, first of all, what precisely it wishes to do in terms of safeguard activities with relation to this action before it could invite any views either from the Director-General of the IAEA or from some other technical body about the methods for preventing the diversion that is referred to in the proposed RW convention.

For these reasons, Sir, we believe that this decision should be postponed to our session in 1982 when we would like to study this matter further and then seek very clear and precise guidance from the Director-General of the IAEA, or from any other agency, on this and any other relevant question.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): At the time the Netherlands delegation welcomed the spirit of accommodation that led the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons to agree that it would benefit the work of the Group if, in conformity with rule 41 of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament, the Director-General of IAEA could be invited to provide information on the possible relationship between a draft convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of RW on the one hand and the Vienna Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material as well as the Guidelines for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material on the other hand. We are grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for the consultations you have initiated on this request.

The Netherlands delegation regrets that a request was made that this proposal be dropped.

It does not augur well that no consensus could be reached, Mr. Chairman, on your sending a letter to the Director-General of IAEA inviting him to provide the information indicated above. We are perturbed by this lack of consensus since it had been clearly understood that the information sought would be technical and in the nature of providing relevant facts to delegations. It would have no bearing on the process of negotiation. In this context let me quote from the Netherlands Statement in the plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament held on 14 July 1981:

"Our sole aim is to try to establish maximum congruence between the work done in various fora, in casu located in Geneva and Vienna respectively, where new instruments of international law are being created. It goes without saying that the possible future advice of the Director-General of IAEA will in no way prejudice the decision the Ad Hoc Working Group will finally take as regards the wording of the article IV of the consolidated text. The Ad Hoc Working Group works under the mandate given to it by the Committee on Disarmament, and this Committee is of course the only instance which de jure is empowered to draw up the radiological weapons convention. All the same, we deem it the duty of all States to see to it that agreements dealing with the handling of radio-active materials -- be these texts drawn up in Geneva or in Vienna -- form, between them, a formidable and coherent obstacle to unauthorized or illegal use of these dangerous materials".

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

In this light, the inability of the Committee on Disarmament to empower you to send the letter under reference does not augur well for our future negotiations. If facts are going to be barred from being provided, what is to come of the much vaunted "business-like" negotiations? It seems that six precious months for bringing factual information together will be lost.

We deplore this failure.

The CHAIRMAN: As there is no consensus, the proposal that the Chairman invite the Director-General of the IAEA is dropped. Secondly, I would like to know whether there is any objection to the Working Group resuming its work on 18 January 1982.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I have a comment rather than an objection. My delegation is one of those which took the view that we should postpone taking a decision about the date until we had considered the matter further at this meeting.

The essential point, as we see it, is that we have to establish whether we would be able to embark on the next round of discussions in January, with a genuine hope of making early progress. In the view of my delegation, there would not be any virtue in calling a special early meeting of the RW Group unless the prospect of substantive progress was well demonstrated; and so perhaps we all need to go back and think about our negotiating positions. If by the beginning of next year, it does become apparent that a meeting on 18 January would be fruitful and justified, then we would be very much in favour of it. But we suggest that it might be appropriate for the Chairman to consult, perhaps among a few delegations who are particularly concerned on the central points, to make certain that the way forward has been unblocked before we actually get down to that new round of meetings at an early date in January.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, my delegation unfortunately has some difficulties with endorsing the view that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons should resume on 18 January next year. Our difficulties are both constitutional, and substantive in nature.

As far as the procedural questions are concerned, there is, as you know, Mr. Chairman, a distinction between the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme and the other three Working Groups which we have set up. The Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme has been established up to the time when it would submit the programme for adoption at the second special session devoted to disarmament, whereas the other three Working Groups are set up on an annual basis with annual mandates. Therefore, Sir, the problem of reconvening the Radiological Weapons Group before the fourth annual session of the Committee on Disarmament resumes would be one of constitutionality because that Working Group, as far as the procedural question is concerned, ceases to exist with the completion of the present session of the Committee; and we would have to re-establish that Group, by deciding anew on its mandate, appointing its Chairman, and so forth, when we resume our work in 1982. That is, Sir, the constitutional position.

With regard to the substance, we see that there are considerable difficulties within the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, on the questions of definition scope, peaceful uses, the question of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities and other questions. What is required basically is not more time for negotiations, but substantive political decisions on the part of the negotiating

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

parties with a view to reaching an agreement. We hope, Sir, that these political decisions will be taken and that once they are taken, we think that the Ad Hoc Working Group could, within the time available after the resumption of the 1982 session, achieve agreement on an RW convention. Therefore, Sir, we believe that the work of the Working Group should be resumed when the Committee itself meets in 1982.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, with regard to this question my delegation just wishes to say that the decision whether the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons should meet on 18 January or not is a decision exclusively for this Committee. I am making this explanation because I do not know whether I correctly understood the remarks of the representative of the United Kingdom, who mentioned the possibility that there might be consultations between the Chairman and a group of delegations particularly concerned with this matter on the question whether or not this Group would meet on the date envisaged.

If that was the meaning of his remarks, my delegation would like to say that it cannot agree that decisions of this type should be taken between the Chairman and a certain group of delegations particularly concerned, because the interest of all the members of the Committee in this matter is the same and has the same value. Thus I repeat that any decision taken on this matter, either one way or the other, should be taken exclusively within this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: In view of the statements which have been made, I conclude that there is at present no consensus on the question of convening the Working Group on Radiological Weapons on 18 January 1982. In the absence of objections, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to adopt the report of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall proceed now to take up document CD/220 containing the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee wishes to adopt the report of the Working Group.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: That concludes our business in the plenary meeting for today. Papers on the concluding paragraphs under certain sections of the annual report have been circulated to the members under the symbol Working Paper No. 44/Add.1/Rev.2 in all languages. Members need some time to read these papers and so the informal meeting will convene at 8 p.m. this evening.

Mr. HASSAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, my country's delegation has no objection to the approval of the reports that have just been adopted. However, we would like to state that we have some comments on the Arabic translation of those reports. Since this may not be the appropriate time to raise such questions, we reserve the right to transmit these comments to the secretariat at a future time in order to ensure that the Arabic version is in conformity with the English text of the reports. Thank you.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): I understood that you suggested ending our deliberations now and reconvening at eight o'clock. Is that correct? As we have very little time left for our future deliberations, I wonder if there is nothing we can take up right now as there is still one hour until six o'clock, which I think it would be a pity to lose. I have no specific proposals. There are others who have participated more assiduously than I have in the informal negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN: The drafting group could actually convene now to draft a paragraph on the issue of neutron bombs. So, I hope that the members of this open-ended drafting group will be available for a meeting immediately after this meeting adjourns.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): I should like in my turn to express the thanks of my delegation to our colleague, Ambassador Issraelyan, who has described very clearly the organizational problems to which we must certainly give particular attention this year, since we are approaching the end of this third session and the experience we have accumulated makes it possible for us to reflect on the conclusions which we can derive from it.

We too are in agreement with much of what has been said by our distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union. We consider that it would be highly desirable to be able to work for long periods, and that it would also be highly desirable for delegations to have the necessary resources and the autonomy to be able to devote themselves entirely to the work of our Committee. We also agree, of course, on the fundamental nature of the work which is performed in the subsidiary bodies, basically the working groups. With regard to the practical solutions which can be arrived at, we are, of course, bound to recognize certain limits.

First of all, with regard to the status and the size of delegations, on which nearly everything depends. We ourselves consider that the means available to delegations -- and I include in this comment, the case of my own delegation -- are inadequate in the light of the mass of work with which we have to deal. We would be happy if a larger number of the participant countries were able to establish separate missions headed by ambassadors responsible exclusively for disarmament matters. In expressing this wish we are of course aware of the difficulties which this transformation might raise for a number of participants in the Committee. We are therefore being rather guarded in our opinions on this matter, though we very much hope that a great deal of attention will be given by all to these requirements with respect to the resources available to delegations.

I am referring, of course, both to permanent staff and to the experts required for some of the work conducted here. With regard to the length of our sessions, our Soviet colleague has very properly distinguished -- and our colleagues from Mexico and the Federal Republic of Germany have done the same -- between sessions of the Committee itself and the work of the Working Groups which could possibly be extended beyond the time when the Committee is in formal session. We believe that this is a useful distinction. My delegation entirely shares the opinion expressed by Ambassador Garcia-Robles and Ambassador Pfeiffer that it is very useful, and indeed necessary, for heads of delegations whose Governments so wish to participate in the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly and also in the work of the Disarmament Commission. There is a unity in all the multilateral disarmament endeavours conducted within the international community as a whole, even if this Committee is not very formally part of the United Nations system for many of those

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

here present. We consider that the advantages we derive from our personal participation in the work of the First Committee are invaluable and the link thus established between the negotiating body and the deliberative bodies is an extremely valuable one at the political level both for the Committee on Disarmament and for the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission.

It should be possible both to take into account the constraints thus imposed with regard to the calendar of meetings and at the same time to schedule a session for the Committee which might be a little longer. We would have no objection to a reconsideration of the provision in our rules of procedure which states that the session shall begin on the first Tuesday in February of each year; and we think that it might be possible to gain two or three weeks by convening the Committee, for example, on 10 or 15 January. This is an idea I am expressing; I do not know how it may be received, but I observe that our Soviet colleague has already proposed a formula of this kind for next year if, as is probable, the constraints relating to the preparation of the second special session oblige us to conclude our spring session next year earlier than usual.

Ambassador Garcia-Robles has made a very useful calculation which enables us to conclude that there are in fact 30 working weeks between the beginning of February and the beginning of September; and this would, I think, be sufficient for the Working Groups. The Groups could perhaps be left to continue their meetings during the four weeks of the Disarmament Commission's session if heads of delegations wished to go to New York on that occasion. It would no doubt be desirable for the work to be completed at latest by early September unless the groups went on until early October, i.e. after the approval of the report on the session. It would be perfectly possible to arrange for the report on the session to review the state of the work of the groups, for example up to 15 August; they could then continue their work, after devoting about a week -- as they do now -- to the preparation of their reports for the over-all report by the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly, which must be ready by the end of August.

These are the comments which I wish to submit at this stage. It is obvious that the requirements we are referring to, and which will certainly call for a major effort, depend substantially on the possibilities for negotiation open to us. We hope that these will be as extensive as possible. There is a political factor in the practical prospects for negotiation, and then of course there is the international situation; and we are among those who believe that this situation has inevitable effects. But we also think that this is not a reason for relaxing our efforts in continuing the negotiations on disarmament.

These are the thoughts which I wished to submit at the present stage on the matter with which we are concerned.

The CHAIRMAN: I think it is necessary for the drafting group at least to spend some time looking into the draft for a paragraph on our discussion about the neutron bomb.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.