



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-THIRD YEAR

2087th MEETING: 29 SEPTEMBER 1978

NEW YORK

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2087th MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 29 September 1978, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Ilja HULINSKÝ (Czechoslovakia).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Bolivia, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nigeria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2087)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:

Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 431 (1978) (S/12827)

The meeting was called to order at 4.20 p.m.

Statement by the President

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): On behalf of the Council I should like to welcome the presence at the Council table today of His Excellency the Honourable Donald C. Jamieson, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, His Excellency Mr. Louis de Guiringaud, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, His Excellency Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, His Excellency Mr. A. B. Vajpayee, Minister for External Affairs of India, His Excellency Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait, His Excellency Major-General Henry Adefope, Commissioner for External Affairs of Nigeria, His Excellency Mr. David Owen, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, and His Excellency Mr. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State of the United States of America.

Adoption of the agenda.

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:

Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 431 (1978) (S/12827)

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received the letters from the representatives of Benin, Bot-

swana, the Sudan and Zambia, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Houngavou (Benin), Mr. Tlou (Botswana), Mr. Sahloul (Sudan) and Mr. Mwale (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I should like also to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 26 September from the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, which reads as follows:

"It is understood that the Security Council is expected to take up the question of Namibia in the near future.

"I wish to convey to you the desire of the United Nations Council for Namibia to participate in this debate, without the right to vote. For this purpose, the Council will be represented by a delegation headed by myself as President of the Council and including the three Vice-Presidents of the Council: Mr. R. Jaipal (India), Mr. F. Cuevas Cancino (Mexico) and Mr. F. Bouayad-Agha (Algeria)."¹

4. I have also received a letter dated 27 September from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which reads as follows:

"In accordance with the decision taken by the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples at its meeting on 6 September 1978, I have the honour to request the permission of the Security Council to participate, on behalf of the Special Committee, in the Council's consideration of the question of Namibia."¹

5. On previous occasions the Security Council has extended invitations to representatives of other United Nations bodies in connexion with the consideration of matters on its agenda. In accordance with past practice in

¹ Quoted in English by the speaker.

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this matter, I propose that the Council should extend invitations, pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, to the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the delegation of the Council and to the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

At the invitation of the President, Miss Konie (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Salim (Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I wish to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 28 September from the representatives of Gabon, Mauritius and Nigeria, which reads as follows:

"We, the undersigned members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that the Council should extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), during the course of the Council's consideration of 'The situation in Namibia'." ¹ [S/12866.]

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to the request.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nujoma (President of the South West Africa People's Organization) took a place at the Council table.

7. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I have also received a letter dated 28 September from the representatives of Gabon, Mauritius and Nigeria, which reads as follows:

"We, the undersigned members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that the Council should extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Edem Kodjo, Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, during the course of the Council's consideration of 'The situation in Namibia'." ¹ [S/12872.]

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to the request.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Edem Kodjo (Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

8. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I should like to draw the attention of members of the Council to the draft resolution sponsored by Canada, France, Gabon, the Federal Republic of Germany, Mauri-

tius, Nigeria, the United Kingdom and the United States of America which is before the Council in document S/12865. Members also have before them document S/12827, which contains the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 431 (1978) concerning the situation in Namibia. In addition, members will find before them the following other documents S/12836, S/12839, S/12841, S/12853, S/12854 and S/12868.

9. I have been informed that the Secretary-General wishes to make a statement, and I now call on him.

10. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Before proceeding to my statement on Namibia, I wish to express my shock and grief at the unexpected loss which we have sustained in the sudden death of Pope John Paul I. We have lost a spiritual leader of great promise and stature. Even in the short time that Pope John Paul was Pontiff, he made a strong impression upon people everywhere. His directness, his simplicity and his radiant personality gave evidence of his determination to use his great spiritual office for the vital causes of humanity. I wish on this occasion to express my sincere condolences to the Permanent Observer of the Holy See.

11. It is now one month since I submitted to the Security Council my report [S/12827] on the implementation of the proposal of the Five. During that time, exhaustive studies of my report have been undertaken by the parties concerned and I and my staff have conducted intensive consultations with them. These have revealed a number of concerns regarding which I believe it would be useful if I gave an explanation of the way in which the Special Representative would carry out his mandate. My recommendations are based on the tasks which the proposal contained in document S/12636 of 10 April 1978 explicitly mandated the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to perform. Were we to follow any other course, these tasks could not be credibly performed.

12. Concern has been expressed by some members of the Security Council over the cost of this exercise. I recognize that this is a particularly heavy burden for Members to bear and of course I shall try to ensure that the mandate will be carried out in the most economical manner possible. All Members will recognize, however, that the most important consideration is the ability of UNTAG successfully to carry out the tasks assigned to it in the proposal. In the absence of a credible United Nations presence, incidents might take place, intentionally or otherwise, that might lead to a resumption of hostilities. Clearly this would vitiate the whole purpose of UNTAG, which is to ensure that elections will take place freely and fairly in conditions of peace.

13. I should also like to make some observations about the build-up of the military component of UNTAG. When my Special Representative, accompanied by advisers, visited Namibia, his military adviser, Major-General Philipp, was given access to the military installations in the country and he was able to hold detailed discussions with the South African military on the local conditions in relation to the tasks which the UNTAG military component will have to take up in order to fulfil the mandate. The part of my

report on this subject is, of course, an estimate. It is an estimate based upon reliable professional judgement and experience in the light of the tasks to be performed and of previous United Nations experience as well as the rules and regulations governing the deployment of United Nations personnel. The military component of UNTAG will be built up gradually and will be introduced, for practical as well as other reasons, by stages. The figure of 7,500 men—which includes 2,300 for logistics—would be the authorized upper limit of the military component, and it is obvious that its actual size at any given time will depend upon the development of the general situation, which I shall keep under constant review, undertaking such consultations as may be necessary. Such factors as the co-operation extended by the parties, the maintenance of cease-fire and the security situation will obviously be very important in this regard. I am also studying means by which at least some of the logistic functions of the military component can be carried out by civilian agencies.

14. I should also like to make some observations about the procedure by which such United Nations military components are constituted. Although I and my staff have obviously made very informal and preliminary moves to prepare for the task which may be assigned to us by the Security Council, I wish to stress here that no commitments concerning military contingents have been made. Nor could such commitments be made in view of the statement in my report to the Council that "the contingents will be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation" [*ibid.*, para.24]. I wish to emphasize here that in the past this process of consultation has been successfully undertaken, thereby ensuring the co-operation of all parties, without which such an enterprise cannot be successful.

15. The objective of the United Nations under Security Council resolution 431 (1978) is the supervision and control of the entire electoral process. My Special Representative has also to satisfy himself that conditions are established which will allow free and fair elections and an impartial electoral process.

16. But before the electoral process can begin, it is necessary that conditions should be such that they will facilitate it. According to the proposal set out in document S/12636, a general cessation of hostile acts will take place immediately after the Security Council has passed a resolution approving my report. In this connexion, I note that the South West Africa People's Organization and South Africa have each indicated their willingness to observe a cease-fire provided the other does the same. As I have stated in my report, and as is clearly envisaged in paragraphs 4 and 12 of the proposal, the co-operation of all concerned is essential to the success of UNTAG. I welcome the assurances I have received from the neighbouring States, and I intend to instruct my Special Representative, as soon as my report is adopted, to explore with them practical ways to facilitate his task.

17. In paragraphs 29 and 30 of my report I intended to indicate how the Special Representative would fulfil his responsibilities concerning the existing police. According to

document S/12636, primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in Namibia during the transition period shall rest with the existing police. However, the Special Representative is also given explicit responsibilities:

(a) To satisfy himself that the Administrator-General ensures the good conduct of the police force;

(b) To satisfy himself that the Administrator-General takes the necessary action to ensure the suitability of the police for continued employment during the transition period;

(c) To make arrangements when appropriate for United Nations personnel to accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties.

18. It was therefore necessary to have designated personnel at the disposal of the Special Representative to ensure that these monitoring responsibilities would be satisfactorily performed. Moreover, I concluded that, for reasons of safety and effectiveness, these tasks would best be performed by civilian personnel who were professionally qualified. Concern has also been expressed as to whether the number of United Nations personnel to monitor the police is appropriate to the tasks they are expected to perform. I shall of course keep this question under continuous review.

19. A number of considerations have been raised regarding the timing of elections and the date of independence for Namibia. As indicated in my report, a majority of the political parties is of the opinion that it is essential to maintain the orderly phases of the preparatory stages and to allow sufficient time for electoral campaigning in order to ensure free and fair elections. Surely, the objective is not simply the holding of elections by a certain date, but the holding of elections which are manifestly free and fair.

20. It is essential that all aspects of the electoral process should be beyond reproach and, equally important, that this should be apparent. Various parties have expressed concern over the process of registration for elections, and a number of complaints about the existing registration have been brought to my notice. The proposal makes clear that at each stage of the entire electoral process the Special Representative must satisfy himself as to the fairness and appropriateness of all measures affecting the political process at all levels of administration before such measures take effect.

21. Clearly, therefore, the Special Representative, on arrival in the Territory, will look afresh at all the processes and measures, including the registration of voters, in order to satisfy himself that these are fair and appropriate. Accordingly, the Special Representative will review the registration process, and I can assure all parties that no registration process will receive his approval until he is fully satisfied as to its fairness. In accordance with paragraph 10 of document S/12636, the Special Representative will take steps to guarantee against the possibility of intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter.

22. In conclusion, I should like to emphasize once again that the implementation of my report will depend on the co-operation and understanding of all the parties concerned, and of course of all members of the Security Council. In this connexion, I am glad to note that the five Western Governments have given me full assurances of their continued good offices to facilitate the implementation of the report. To this end, my Special Representative will also conduct such further consultations as are deemed necessary. I also trust that the clarifications which I have just given will serve to meet the concerns of all the parties.

23. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I thank the Secretary-General for his statement.

24. It is my understanding that members of the Council are ready to proceed to the vote. I shall therefore put the draft resolution contained in document S/12865 to the vote.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: Bolivia, Canada, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Kuwait, Mauritius, Nigeria, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Czechoslovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The draft resolution was adopted by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.²

One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

25. Mr. GENSCHER (Federal Republic of Germany):³ At this moment we are conscious of an event which has filled us with a deep sense of shock. I speak of the sudden death of His Holiness Pope John Paul I. In the short time of his pontificate, his humanity, rooted in his deep faith, was able to impress the whole world. He gave a sign of hope to all mankind, and in our grief we are also called upon to live up to this hope.

26. In adopting resolution 431 (1978) we took a decisive step towards an internationally acceptable settlement of the Namibia question. Today's decision should initiate the actual process of transition to independence under United Nations supervision. The epoch-making decision by which the Security Council made the settlement proposal set forth in document S/12636 a guideline for the process of transition in Namibia is still valid today. The Federal Republic of Germany continues to adhere to this proposal, which was brought about with its active co-operation.

27. Yet, the former Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa has said no to the much hoped for early implementation of this proposal. If his statement of 20 September 1978 [S/12853, *annex*] were to be put into effect, it would block the implementation of the settlement

proposal until the electoral process had been conducted in Namibia under unilateral South African control, without the participation of the United Nations. Such elections could not gain international recognition. Obviously, there are even forces which are endeavouring to thwart the implementation of the settlement proposal of the United Nations after this intended electoral manoeuvre.

28. The Federal Republic of Germany, together with the other four Western members of the Security Council—Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States—has assumed the difficult role of mediator between South Africa and the other parties involved. The peaceful settlement of the Namibia conflict is also in South Africa's own interest, for Namibia can become a model for the solution of conflicts by peaceful means. We want to make it a model of peace for southern Africa.

29. Consequently, we ask the Government of the Republic of South Africa: Does not an internationally recognized settlement for Namibia also offer South Africa a chance to improve its position in the world? Is it really in South Africa's interest now to challenge the entire international community? Does South Africa really want to jeopardize at the last minute the efforts of the five Western members of the Security Council to achieve peace? Can South Africa overlook the constructive endeavours of the African Governments concerned and does it want to put at stake the chance of enabling people of all races to live together in lasting peace and on the basis of equality? Does it want to risk a bloody racial war with the endless suffering this would inflict upon the people?

30. We appeal to the new Government of South Africa to face these questions. It is called upon, and it has a chance once again, to bring about a historic change.

31. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany will hold the door open for a solution based on reason. We are ready for any contacts necessary in order to bring about further clarification of the situation.

32. By means of purposeful co-operation with all concerned, we want, together with Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, to complete the settlement proposal. It is our sincere wish that those now entrusted with the leadership of South Africa will see their historic responsibility and not hesitate to take the hand offered to them. We cannot believe that the Government of South Africa will now leave a road on which it has gone a long way with us and thus decide against a peaceful settlement under international control that is within easy reach. No one in the Republic of South Africa should overlook the consequences such a step would be bound to have.

33. The Federal Republic of Germany adheres to the settlement proposal. We therefore also endorse the Secretary-General's report which is before us. On behalf of the Federal Government, I thank the Secretary-General. I express our sincere appreciation of the efficient work which his Special Representative, Mr. Ahtisaari, and his team have accomplished in such a short time. The report, together with the clarifications provided by the Secretary-General, is in line with the settlement proposal. The Federal Govern-

² See resolution 435 (1978).

³ Mr. Genschler spoke in German. The English version of his statement was supplied by the delegation.

ment will contribute to the implementation of the resolution which has just been adopted so that it can become a reality. We shall never accept this resolution being ignored by anyone.

34. We expect the South African Government to judge the necessary size of the military component of UNTAG soberly and objectively. No one can disregard the fact that Namibia is as large as the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Belgium together. Is it really so unreasonable that, in the interest of the security of the people and of secure boundaries, a maximum figure of 7,500 was envisaged? After all, it is a question of avoiding bloodshed.

35. The Secretary-General's comments will undoubtedly make it easier to come to an understanding on this point. Nobody, not even the South African side, denies that the number of personnel obtainable within the authorized framework will be the minimum required by the Special Representative to fulfil his individual tasks. All tasks assigned to UNTAG have been listed individually and in concrete terms in the settlement proposal and therefore also approved by South Africa itself.

36. The determination of the size of the United Nations force has from the very beginning been left to the Secretary-General's discretion. This determination has meanwhile been made by the mission of his Special Representative.

37. What is important is that the tasks set for UNTAG are the determining factor. South Africa has been thoroughly consulted on these tasks and has accepted them. We are quite aware that psychological problems may arise regarding the proportional relationship between the military and civilian components of UNTAG. It is quite compatible with the Secretary-General's report and the tasks of the Secretariat to discuss these questions in a co-operative spirit and to look for agreed ways of easing them.

38. A desire for consultations on the composition of the United Nations force is understandable and justified. Thus, as early as 15 September 1978, the Secretary-General received the representative of South Africa to discuss this point. His promise of consultations will be kept. The South African concerns regarding the police function of UNTAG have also been convincingly dispelled by the Secretary-General's clarification.

39. The essence of the settlement proposal is free elections. To ensure equality of opportunity, we consider an adequate preparatory period for all to be indispensable. This must be taken into account in fixing the election date. In various quarters concern has rightly been voiced about the premature registration of voters—rightly because it is a deviation from the settlement proposal. The Secretary-General's clarification that no voter registration process will receive United Nations approval until the Special Representative is fully satisfied as to its fairness removes all doubt. Therefore, President Nujoma's letter of 8 September 1978 to the Secretary-General [see S/12841] means unqualified acceptance by SWAPO of the settlement proposal and the Secretary-General's report. Consequently, the responsibility for a further delay in reaching an internationally acceptable

solution would now rest exclusively with the Republic of South Africa.

40. As long as free elections under United Nations supervision are not held, the South African Government cannot say it is acting in accordance with the will of the people of Namibia. To discover what this will is, is the essence of the settlement proposal. As members will recall, as recently as 22 September last, representatives of the Catholic, the Evangelical Lutheran and the Anglican Churches in Namibia together declared:

"It is with deep consternation and sadness that we heard the South African decision to hold elections in Namibia in such a way that a participation of the United Nations and several major Namibian parties is extremely unlikely. As we have repeatedly warned in the past, such actions provide no solution, but on the contrary only aggravate existing problems and tensions, and might lead to a rapid escalation of force and violence."

No one should throw such a warning to the winds.

41. The world public is gravely concerned that the success of an international effort to achieve peace, which already seemed within easy reach, might be prejudiced, even after almost all major differences have been overcome. We appeal to all concerned not to gamble away the historic chance of opening up to a people the way to self-determination in peace and freedom. A peaceful settlement must be saved.

42. We take exception to those who accuse the Secretary-General of partiality. He himself reaffirmed before the world on 30 March 1977:

"Throughout its history of involvement in peace-keeping and procedures of transition to independence, the United Nations record of competence, objectivity and impartiality is well proven. Any task assigned to the United Nations in this regard would be performed in full co-operation with all concerned."

43. UNTAG will be under the control of the Security Council. The Special Representative has performed the first part of his mandate in such an impartial way that even the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance in their statement of 15 September 1978 qualified their concern by stating: "we cannot say that the United Nations will exhibit partiality, and the example of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Ahtisaari, during his recent visit points to impartiality".

44. I declare in this forum that the Federal Republic of Germany will be a fair and helpful partner to a free and independent Namibia, a partner whose aim is to contribute with all its energy and on the basis of equality to the development of the country, to the well-being of its people, and to social justice.

45. Before this body I once again appeal to all who bear responsibility: Clear the way for people of all races to live side by side in peace and on the basis of equality in Namibia; create a model for the peaceful settlement of conflicts in the world; open up the path to international

co-operation in Namibia; see to it that a cease-fire becomes effective immediately; prevent racial war; decide in favour of peace.

46. Mr. DE GUIRINGAUD (France) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, I should like first to convey to you my pleasure at seeing the Security Council presided over by the representative of Czechoslovakia. In the difficult circumstances which surround this debate, the Council can only be glad to have the benefit of your experience and talent. Rest assured that the French delegation will not fail to give you its co-operation and support. I should also like to express my appreciation to the representative of China, who so masterfully fulfilled his task for the month of August.

47. I should not wish to enter the debate today without expressing the emotion with which my Government and I received this morning the news of the sudden death of His Holiness Pope John Paul I. All Christians, all peoples devoted to peace and reconciliation among men, will regret the untimely death of this leader of the Catholic Church whose enlightenment and leadership had already favourably impressed the international community as a whole. I request the Observer of the Holy See to accept my very sincere condolences.

48. On 27 July [2082nd meeting], at this same table, I stressed that in adopting the settlement proposal of the five Western countries the Security Council had adopted a decision historic for Namibia and for southern Africa as a whole.

49. In application of resolution 431 (1978), the Secretary-General then appointed his Special Representative, who went to Namibia, where, in co-operation with the local authorities, he was able to study the implementation of a particularly complex endeavour. Today the Security Council is considering the recommendations that resulted from that mission. I wish to thank the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and their assistants for the excellent work they have done.

50. The French delegation, together with its four Western partners, has studied the report of the Secretary-General with the greatest attention. We think the proposals it contains faithfully reflect the spirit of our settlement plan and do not differ from its essential provisions. We have therefore given it our unreserved support. I wish to add that the explanatory statement made to the Council by the Secretary-General in our view provides a satisfactory reply to the various concerns that have been expressed by the interested parties. Further, we deplore the fact that South Africa, having accepted the proposal of the Five shortly after its presentation today refuses to implement it.

51. I wish to make a few remarks here about the arguments advanced by the South African Government. It was with surprise that I noted that some of those arguments seemed to question the key provision of our proposal, that is, the organization in Namibia of free elections under United Nations control.

52. Let us take up the question of the date. Before proceeding to elections, it is imperative, in order to avoid

any possible challenge, for a certain number of conditions to be met guaranteeing the equity and regularity of the electoral process. The timetable provided for in our proposal to bring about the necessary conditions must therefore be followed even if that entails the postponement by a few months of the date initially scheduled for independence.

53. I wish now to refer to the question of contingents. No one doubts that in order to comply with its responsibilities the United Nations must have the necessary means, particularly civilian and military personnel. As provided for in the proposal of the Five, it is the Secretary-General himself who has determined the size of the contingents taking into account the tasks that must be accomplished. We trust his judgement. Furthermore I note that, in his introduction, Mr. Waldheim emphasized that the figure of 7,500 men for the military component of UNTAG constituted the authorized upper limit and that the actual number would depend upon the development of the situation as he himself assessed it through the necessary consultations. I believe these clarifications can allay any doubts there may have been.

54. At a more general level, we know that some fear that the United Nations may not be capable of fulfilling its mandate with objectivity. The history of the Organization proves such apprehensions wrong. In fact, whenever the United Nations has played a role in the accession of a Territory to independence, it has acted with impartiality. In the case of Namibia, this rule of conduct must be strictly observed. The Security Council, which will exercise supreme authority over UNTAG, will see to that most carefully. In view of these various elements, the Republic of South Africa, short of seeking shelter behind a fallacious pretext, can no longer turn its back on an internationally acceptable solution. That solution has been supported by the majority of the Namibian parties, including SWAPO. The front-line States, as well as other African States, have supported it continuously. The international community as a whole yearns for it.

55. The decisions that were adopted in Pretoria on 20 September have opened up a serious crisis that risks the dangerous rekindling of tension in a region of the world where equilibrium is fragile. If the Republic of South Africa maintains its intention unilaterally to organize elections in Namibia, it will find itself in an impasse because the legitimacy of the assembly that would result from such an electoral process would inevitably be challenged from all sides.

56. In the letter he addressed to the Secretary-General on 27 September [see S/12868], the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs affirms that he does not wish to close any doors. We take note of that and enjoin South Africa to abandon without further delay a short-sighted policy that condemns it to a tragic isolation.

57. The Security Council has now adopted the Secretary-General's report, after having heard his additional explanations. South Africa is once again faced with a choice decisive for Namibia's future and also its own future. I formally appeal to the South African Government not to

impose an internal settlement that is doomed in advance and to decide to co-operate with the United Nations in order to enable Namibia to take its place in the community of independent nations. I ask it most formally to refrain from a choice that would disastrously isolate it from the rest of the international community.

58. Mr. VANCE (United States of America): Mr. President, first I should like to congratulate you on the able and effective manner in which you have led the deliberations of the Council during the month of September.

59. When the Council last met to discuss the situation in Namibia, on 27 July [2082nd meeting], my Government and the other four members of the contact group described our satisfaction with the positive turn of events, which seemed to bring us much closer to a peaceful settlement of this long-standing problem. During the intervening period, we have seen these efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in Namibia move through the hopeful stage of the visit of the Secretary-General's survey mission, only to come up against the decision of the Government of South Africa itself to sponsor elections in Namibia. In so deciding, it reversed its earlier willingness to co-operate with the international community in bringing Namibia to independence on the basis of Security Council resolution 385 (1976).

60. We are deeply concerned. Although it is not my purpose to analyse the reasons for South Africa's present position, this latest occurrence is but the most serious in a long series of obstacles we have faced in developing the proposal which is the subject of the Secretary-General's report.

61. I should like to make clear the position of my Government in the light of these developments.

62. First, we give our unreserved support to the Secretary-General's report and his clarifying explanatory statement made this afternoon. They constitute a practical plan which is consistent with the proposal which has been worked out by the five Governments with all of the parties concerned.

63. Secondly, it will be essential that UNTAG, when it is established, should function with efficiency, with impartiality and with fidelity towards the over-all objective of the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections. Assuming all obstacles to implementation of this proposal can quickly be overcome, these elections in Namibia would take place by the end of April 1979.

64. Thirdly, in voting for the resolution and in confirming our support of the Secretary-General, we believe it equally important that he should be accorded flexibility in the implementation of the report to ensure that it will meet the problems and challenges which are certain to be faced once UNTAG is deployed.

65. I urge that all the parties should bear in mind the following points regarding the objectives of this resolution and the deployment of UNTAG.

66. The five Governments, in their efforts, could not have carried matters this far had it not been for the willingness on the part of all concerned to negotiate seriously and to make substantial concessions.

67. Having come this far, the five Governments will persist in their efforts. South Africa must recognize that the international community is committed to seeing that the programme contained in the Secretary-General's report will be implemented.

68. Unilateral action by South Africa, such as its decision to conduct elections in Namibia, cannot be recognized and will not result in a political process which has any international legitimacy.

69. The Government of South Africa and the internal Namibian political parties must be under no illusions. The international community cannot and will not accept the outcome of the election which the South African authorities have now scheduled to begin on 4 December as a free and fair statement of the desires of the Namibian people. The only way in which Namibia can achieve independence in a manner fully acceptable to the international community is on the basis of the full and faithful observance of the proposal endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 431 (1978).

70. It would be tragic indeed if South Africa were to deprive the people of Namibia of this unique opportunity for a peaceful transition to independence. Surely the Government of South Africa and all of the Namibian political parties must realize the troubles which such a course of action would cause for the people of Namibia, of South Africa and of the whole region. We intend to continue our efforts to persuade South Africa to co-operate with the United Nations.

71. It is therefore a time for persistence and vigorous effort in persuading South Africa that its best interests and the best interests of the Namibian people lie in co-operating with the United Nations in the implementation of the resolution we have adopted, and not in permitting a return to the past spiral of violence and isolation. From SWAPO and from the other Namibian political parties we look for continued co-operation and fidelity to the proposal which the Secretary-General's report implements. We call on South Africa to re-think its position.

72. Mr. OWEN (United Kingdom): Mr. President, I would first congratulate you on your conduct of the presidency in our proceedings here in the Security Council during the current month.

73. This is the first opportunity that I have had to express my personal sadness and that of my Government at the news of the death of His Holiness Pope John Paul I. He started his tenure of that very important office with great simplicity, and I think most people in the world felt that he was going to make a major contribution to peace and harmony among nations. We all feel—those of every different religion and faith, and even those without religious faith—that the world has lost a man of great potential.

74. The Secretary-General's Special Representative, accompanied by his military adviser, has now had the most detailed discussions with all the parties in Namibia about how to implement the proposals for a settlement which the Council had before it on the occasion of the previous debate. There has been from all sides well-justified praise for Mr. Ahtisaari and the working relationship which he established with the Administrator-General. It is their ability to work together that will be crucial for the transitional period in Namibia.

75. The figure for the size of UNTAG in the Secretary-General's report has caused concern to some South African politicians, but, apart from the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, there is little real evidence of concern among the people of Namibia. The figure reflects the detailed assessment of the tasks of UNTAG which was made by Major-General Philipp after discussion with all concerned, including the South African military commanders actually in Namibia. There was a technical, professional and military discussion. The Secretary-General has now made it clear that he will conduct such further consultations as may be necessary to the implementation of his report. So the South African Government can be assured that its complaints have been listened to and that the Administrator-General will be consulted as the force builds up.

76. The Secretary-General has made it clear that the figure of 7,500 is an estimate and that it is the maximum authorized upper limit within which he will work. The eventual size and the building up of the military component of UNTAG will depend on the actual security requirement.

77. We all know that the composition of the force is also a serious and sensitive issue. The Secretary-General has made it clear that the composition of UNTAG will be based on consultations with all the parties. He has started this consultation but has made no commitments to anyone, as I know myself. My Government has offered some 80 specialized communications experts from the British Army, but it is for the Secretary-General to decide if he requires them and he has not told us yet whether he does or not. Always in the past an acceptable composition has come out of consultations among the parties in all United Nations peace-keeping operations, and anyone worried about the Secretary-General's ability to square divergent viewpoints should look at the skilful way in which the United Nations has been able to provide effective and acceptable peace-keeping forces in areas as diverse as the Middle East, Cyprus and Lebanon. I have no doubt that the question of composition will be settled satisfactorily.

78. The procedure suggested in regard to the registration of voters is sensible and, I believe, with the explanations we have heard, satisfactory to all parties. We all wish to see Namibia proceed rapidly to independence. That is what the international community has been working for for many years, and when we first presented our proposals from the Five we hoped that it would happen seven months later, which would have been at the end of this year. Unfortunately, as everyone knows, the negotiations took longer than we had hoped, and the timetable has inevitably slipped, as indeed it has done in the case of the negotiations in regard to Rhodesia and independence for Zimbabwe. The

Secretary-General is, in my view, right to maintain the timetable for the procedures set out in the Five's proposal and to recognize that this is the key to a free and fair election, rather than adhering rigidly to a date which was based on the hope that the negotiations would proceed more rapidly than they did. As in the case of Rhodesia, about six months, in my judgement, is the minimum period needed for organizing elections, since the external nationalists have to return to their country and start to campaign. The internal nationalists will always want early elections because they see themselves stealing a march on their opponents. As politicians, we all know that everybody tries to do this, but as politicians who want fair and free elections we know we must devise rules and regulations which are fair to all parties. Fair elections must give everyone an opportunity. Only if all are given a fair chance can the international community accept the transition procedure and endorse the subsequent independent Government. As in Rhodesia, we are seeing some who have resisted majority rule for years eventually forced to recognize its inevitability but even then trying to manipulate the result. Some are trying, under the guise of elections, to so arrange the timing, the supervision and the form of the elections that the party most sympathetic to their cause will win. This is not democracy. For the international community to collude in such an arrangement would be to destroy people's faith in democratic processes.

79. I believe that the people of Namibia recognize that their genuine concerns have been met by the United Nations proposals, which we have now endorsed, and by what the Secretary-General has said this afternoon, and I hope many of them will read the Secretary-General's careful statement with great attention. The five Western Governments have promised their continued help and support to facilitate the implementation of the Secretary-General's report. Our five Governments are ready to talk to the new South African Government and help to persuade it that this arrangement is in everyone's interests—the interests of the people of South Africa and the interests of everyone in southern Africa, the rest of Africa and the world as a whole.

80. We shall approach this task of persuasion over the next few weeks in a constructive spirit, but the South African Government must face up to the question of whether it genuinely wants an internationally acceptable solution for Namibia or is really seeking pretexts for imposing the internal solution. There may be those who over the last 18 months have negotiated in the belief that we would never reach agreement, that the Western Five and the African countries would never persuade SWAPO to forgo the armed struggle and submit its case to the electors of Namibia. It is to its credit that it has accepted this. Some in South Africa may have voiced support for the principle of free and fair elections and independence in the belief that negotiations would break down and that they would never have to carry out the undertakings they had given. If there are such people—and I hope there are not—then I believe that their reaction to the comprehensive clarifications which the Secretary-General has given today will show whether their concerns were genuine or merely excuses to enable them to avoid the unpalatable fact of a free choice for all the people of Namibia.

81. My Government's approach, if the Security Council needs to meet at the end of October, will be governed by the attitude displayed by the new South African Government over the next few weeks. We are issuing no threats, but they should not underestimate the gravity of the situation that could arise if there were no solution in sight and we met here in the Council again. No one in South Africa should mistake the determination that underlies the reasonable and constructive attitude that we have shown for the last 18 months and will show over the next few weeks. The choice is now for South Africa. The rest of Africa and the world, in adopting this resolution, have shown which way they wish to go.

82. Mr. JAMIESON (Canada): Mr. President, I want to join my colleagues in complimenting you on the most efficient and splendid manner in which you have presided over our deliberations in these difficult days.

83. Let me say also that it was with grief and sorrow that we learned today of the passing of His Holiness Pope John Paul I. The world had been unanimous in welcoming the beginning of a pontificate which promised to be characterized by wisdom, openness and humility. Permit me to offer the Permanent Observer of the Holy See our profound and very sincere condolences.

84. As one of the five countries which endeavoured some 18 months ago to find a practical, peaceful solution to the long-standing Namibia problem, Canada was naturally pleased to give its unequivocal support to the resolution that the Security Council has just adopted. As already made clear in my statement before the General Assembly a few days ago,⁴ Canada firmly believes that the Secretary-General's report is fully in line with the proposal submitted to the Council by the five Western members, as are the clarifications given to the Council today. We further consider that the establishment of UNTAG, as called for in the resolution just adopted, should allow a truly peaceful and effective political process to take place in the Territory and the attainment at as early a date as possible of full, internationally recognized independence.

85. I must congratulate the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Mr. Ahtisaari, on their laudable efforts in producing a comprehensive, professionally sound plan of action for the implementation of resolution 431 (1978). My gratitude also goes to the African States which have done so much to make it possible to adopt this momentous decision. I also note with the greatest appreciation the assurances of full co-operation given by SWAPO.

86. If we are not able today to rejoice more at our accomplishments—and none can deny that they have been considerable recalling the situation that existed a year and a half ago—it is, as everyone knows, because we are at this moment uncertain as to whether the co-operation of one major party will be forthcoming. The Government of South Africa has let it be known that it could not agree to the Secretary-General's report in the form in which it was communicated to Pretoria prior to its formal presentation

here today. South Africa also indicated that it would unilaterally organize elections in the Territory for the alleged purpose of ascertaining the views of the local inhabitants. As I made clear in my statement in the General Assembly, to follow such a course of action would be extremely short-sighted, and the consequences of such disregard of the views of the international community could be very serious.

87. Therefore I renew my call upon both the Government of South Africa and those in Namibia who are inclined to support this mistaken course of action to reconsider their decision. My Western colleagues and I have every intention of doing our best to sort out the difficulties which must be overcome. What would be sheer folly would be to put aside the positive results of a long negotiating process and proceed blindly into a renewed period of confrontation. I am confident that there still exists sufficient goodwill on all sides to attain our objectives.

88. My country has long been associated with the efforts of the United Nations to help maintain or bring about peace in the troubled areas of the world. We are proud of our record and of the fact that the performance of United Nations contingents has always been above reproach and has indeed been in all circumstances a factor of stability and impartiality. Canada, as an active partner in the negotiations leading to the adoption of this resolution, is, of course, prepared to consider carefully how we might co-operate most effectively with the Secretary-General in our joint efforts to bring peace and independence to Namibia.

89. Mr. VAJPAYEE (India): The Security Council is now entering a crucial phase in the implementation of its resolution 385 (1976) which seeks to secure the withdrawal from Namibia of the illegal administration and military presence of South Africa. It also seeks to bring about the genuine independence of Namibia and to establish its territorial integrity and sovereignty on the basis of free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

90. The present historical stage has been set by two main forces. First, the liberation struggle led by SWAPO and supported by the people of Namibia has gone from strength to strength and met with significant success, and that no doubt compelled the Pretoria régime to accept the terms of resolution 385 (1976). Secondly, the group of five Western members of the Security Council used their considerable collective weight to negotiate with South Africa the practical arrangements for its peaceful withdrawal from Namibia on the basis of resolution 385 (1976).

91. The Secretary-General has formulated a comprehensive plan in furtherance of the proposals made by the five Western members and I should like to place on record my Government's appreciation of the work done by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative.

92. It is important to note that SWAPO has accepted the Secretary-General's plan, subject to certain comments, concerning the cease-fire and the control and supervision of elections by the United Nations. My delegation supports

⁴ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings, 9th meeting.

the suggestions of SWAPO which are designed to ensure that elections will be free and fair and held in conditions of peace and security.

93. It is regrettable that South Africa has not yet accepted the Secretary-General's plan and agreed to co-operate with the Security Council. Naturally South African co-operation is essential for the successful and peaceful implementation of the Secretary-General's plan. South Africa's rejection of the plan is bound to provoke the nationalist forces to intensify the armed struggle for liberation, for they will be left with no honourable alternative.

94. In approving the Secretary-General's plan, the Security Council is clearly expecting the group of five Western members to resume its contacts with South Africa with a view to bringing it round to accepting the approved plan. If South Africa fails to do so within the next fortnight, the Council will be obliged to apply such measures as may be necessary under Chapter VII of the Charter to help South Africa to see the wisdom of co-operating with the Council in the implementation of resolution 385 (1976).

95. There is no doubt that we must condemn any unilateral action that may be taken by South Africa in Namibia either to hold elections without United Nations supervision and control or to grant false independence. Namibia has the status of an international Territory, the only one of its kind, and we are all obliged in good conscience and under international law to redeem the pledge of true independence for the people of Namibia.

96. Mr. ADEFOPE (Nigeria): Mr. President, in this my first statement as representative of Nigeria on the Security Council, permit me on behalf of my delegation to join the speakers who have preceded me in extending warmest congratulations to you on your assumption of the high office of the presidency of the Council for this month. There is no doubt in my mind that during your tenure the Council will continue to benefit from your outstanding qualities.

97. It is indeed gratifying to my delegation that you are presiding over this momentous meeting of the Council when the question, and I dare say the problem, of Namibia is on our agenda. The supportive and innovative role of your country and its contributions within the context of the United Nations in promoting the cause of freedom, independence and natural justice are well known. It is therefore my hope and expectation that there will be greater co-operation and collaboration in this area and other related fields between our two Governments and peoples as we jointly continue to strive to attain greater heights and new and rewarding horizons for the benefit of our two Governments and peoples.

98. I also wish to take advantage of this opportunity to thank the Secretary-General for the comprehensive and helpful report submitted pursuant to resolution 432 (1978). That resolution which, *inter alia*, entrusted the Secretary-General with the mandate to dispatch a team to Namibia for the purpose of working out the modalities for the attainment of democratic and early independence in the Territory, was pivoted on the Western plan and was in

accordance with resolution 385 (1976). Considering the nature of his task, the atmosphere of thinly-veiled hostility and unfamiliar surroundings in which his team has had to operate, one cannot but warmly congratulate the Secretary-General for being able to present to us a document so succinct in its mastery of the mandate and so completely tailored to the proposals in its comprehension of the range of problems that are to be solved in Namibia.

99. After years of fruitless rhetoric on the Namibian question, on 27 October 1966 the General Assembly took the historic decision to terminate South Africa's Mandate over Namibia and assume direct responsibility over the Territory [resolution 2145 (XXI)]. In taking that decision, which transformed Namibia into the "ward of the United Nations", the Assembly declared, and correctly too, that South Africa had failed to ensure the moral and material well-being, as well as the security, of the indigenous inhabitants and had, in fact, completely falsified and distorted its trusteeship Mandate.

100. This was the first studied and impartial observation which inspired and propelled the justified concerted international pressure on the Pretoria régime to withdraw from the Territory. It was logical for the United Nations to seek to establish its physical presence there. But we all know how the United Nations mission there was sabotaged.

101. Undaunted, an overwhelming majority of the international community never relented in their demands that pressure should be brought to bear on South Africa to divest itself of the political and administrative control of Namibia. Some States and interests sought to explain away their backsliding in the international endeavour to pressure South Africa into doing what was just and honourable in the matter by questioning the legal authority of the General Assembly's decision regarding withdrawal of South Africa's Mandate. The prevarications in that respect were finally silenced on 21 June 1971. On that day, as representatives will all recall, the International Court of Justice, by 13 votes to 2, handed down the verdict "that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation"—moral obligation—"to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory".⁵

102. While the Security Council, for its part, had adopted a number of resolutions designed barely to keep alive the momentum of pressure against the racist occupying régime, it eventually showed its commitment on Namibia by adopting resolution 385 (1976), to which I referred earlier, from which the Western plan has supposedly drawn its inspiration and which SWAPO, in its magnanimous spirit of compromise and its quest for the peaceful option, was prepared to accept and has accepted.

103. South Africa's response to all this has been intransigence and a contemptuous disregard for the collective will of the entire international community. Of course, the South African Government could show, and has shown,

⁵ *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 58.*

such utter defiance primarily because its friends in the Western bloc have proved their lack of political will to confront the issues at stake in a meaningful manner that would lead to the expected just and final solution.

104. Nigeria eventually accepted the Western plan for Namibian independence, in spite of some obvious flaws, out of pragmatic necessity to bring an early end to the nightmare which South African rule has proved to be for Namibians for decades.

105. During discussions of the Western plan, when we demanded more precise information on several points, some members of the Security Council were even more concerned about South Africa's so-called goodwill in the matter than about any other factor—and this in the face of the unspeakable record of its administration in the Territory and in southern Africa as a whole. But we worked faithfully to harness considerable international support for the plan. We also went out of our way to advise SWAPO to make unprecedented concessions that even, as I said earlier, went beyond the scope of resolution 385 (1976).

106. Consequently, SWAPO agreed that a residual South African force of 1,500 should be allowed to remain in Namibia even though resolution 385 (1976) called for the total withdrawal of all racist troops. SWAPO further bent over backwards to accept a rather innocuous resolution on Walvis Bay. It conceded that Vorster's Fascist security agents, who are notorious for their brutality and callousness, which do not have to be recalled here, should continue to exercise primary responsibility for law and order during the crucial transitional period. On the other hand, although the Pretoria régime announced its apparent acceptance of the peace plan on 25 April 1978, it simultaneously began its equivocation and double-talk in the interpretation of certain provisions in the plan. That served only to reinforce our scepticism concerning the good faith of Pretoria in the matter.

107. The racists were naturally disappointed when SWAPO did not reject the plan. We have learned that some adventurer in the Cabinet, on his own, ordered the launching of that unjustifiable and unprovoked attack on Namibian refugee camps at Kassinga, some 150 miles deep inside Angola. Thus, within a matter of days of South Africa's cunning, hypocritical and so-called qualified acceptance of the plan, while the President of SWAPO, Mr. Sam Nujoma, had stayed behind in New York to attempt to seek further clarifications on some of the hazy—I must emphasize, deliberately hazy—areas of the Western proposals, the South African forces embarked on yet another of their wild adventures, visiting death and destruction on hapless, dispossessed Namibian refugees. Considering the nature and scope of the attack, the large scale use of aerial bombardment and paratroop units, it is patently clear that the genocidal raid on Kassinga was prepared weeks in advance as an alternative line of action in an integrated diabolical plan, the sole purpose of which was completely to destroy the peace plan.

108. When SWAPO refused to take the bait of the treacherous Kassinga raid and thereby allow itself to be provoked into withdrawing support for the plan, cohorts of

the racist administration unleashed the most vicious campaign of harassment, intimidation, calumny, mass arrests and other related atrocities against known sympathizers of SWAPO in a desperate last-ditch attempt to smother the plan.

109. Having exhausted everything in its arsenal of trickery and mischief-making to sabotage the plan, the racist régime perhaps saw in the Secretary-General's report one more chance to create fresh obstacles in the path of the implementation of the plan. It is little wonder, therefore, that some of its spokesmen have stridently suggested that the Secretary-General's report is at variance with the intent, spirit and thrust of the Western plan. In the view of my delegation, such squirming and double-talk serve to portray and underscore anew how degenerate and lacking in honour the South African mind is. To that extent, Vorster's parting snub, in the view of my delegation, constitutes yet another calculated and provocative insult to the Security Council and the most contemptuous defiance to date of the general will of civilized humanity.

110. With the indulgence of members of the Council, I have gone into the background in the hope that as the result of my so doing we shall all place in perspective what Nigeria and other countries with considerable goodwill for Namibia have done within the Council and outside its confines to facilitate the implementation of the Western plan during the past 17 months of painstaking negotiations. My delegation has noted that the Pretoria régime has persistently continued to pretend to ignore the Council in its pronouncements regarding the qualified acceptance of the proposals.

111. However, it will be dangerous for the Council to allow itself to be distracted from its primary objective in Namibia at this time. We must bear in mind at all times that the main task of UNTAG is to ensure effective, orderly and efficient supervision and control by the United Nations Special Representative of the transition process in all its ramifications. These include security measures and a watchful eye on the maintenance of law and order as well as the crucial organization and conduct of the electoral process in the Territory.

112. In this connexion, I wish to place on record my Government's grave concern over the threats and insistence by the racist occupation régime of Pretoria that it will unilaterally continue with the registration of voters in Namibia. This is completely unacceptable to my delegation as it is in flagrant contradiction of the Western plan, as well as resolution 431 (1978). The registration exercise, which has been initiated and carried out by an illegal régime outside the purview of the United Nations Special Representative and which undoubtedly seeks to impose a fait accompli on Namibia and the international community, is, in the circumstances, *ipso facto* null and void and therefore of no legal effect or consequence.

113. Members of the Council will no doubt endorse the view that the electoral process in Namibia can commence only after the United Nations presence in the Territory has been firmly established and not before. And against the background of the record of several instances of breach of

faith on the part of the South African racists, no one can reasonably expect SWAPO, the nationalist movement which South Africa regards as an implacable enemy, to accept a so-called voters' list compiled by agents of the country which is committed to its physical and political liquidation. Saying merely that such a list will not be impartial is an understatement. Indeed, it would be closer to the truth to regard any such voters' list as an unreliable and worthless document filled with fictitious and non-existent voters. It would therefore be political suicide for SWAPO to put any faith in such a list.

114. I should like now to address myself to the question of the cease-fire. My delegation is convinced of the imperative need for the conclusion of a binding cease-fire agreement between the two real parties to the conflict—that is, SWAPO and the South African Government. To avoid any kind of doubt, we should prefer that such an instrument, when concluded, should not only be authenticated by the Secretary-General, but also deposited with him. I emphasize that point because, after having gone this far, we should make that extra little effort to ensure that there will be no unconscionable mistakes to bedevil all our past endeavours, or postpone any further the achievement by the Namibians of their legitimate yearnings and aspirations to live as free peoples in their God-given land.

115. My delegation is pleased to note that the Western Five have been firm in accepting unequivocally that the Secretary-General's report is not only in conformity with but, more important, a correct reflection of the proposals they earlier advanced and diligently shaped. We are also more than gratified to learn that the Secretary-General has been given the assurance by the five Western members that they will not, after the adoption of today's resolution, wash their hands of this matter, but will continue to employ their best endeavours, individually and collectively, to ensure that, if necessary, continual pressure will be brought to bear on South Africa not only to accept the Council's decisions in this matter but also to facilitate the work of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and other staff in the collective pursuit of the sacred obligations of the United Nations towards the birth of a free, independent State of Namibia. My delegation both hopes and expects that in the coming weeks, between this series of meetings and the next one, scheduled for late October, we shall collectively be on our guard and not allow or encourage any attitudes or actions that might lead to purposeless drift or steer us into the doldrums. I should like to emphasize further that the quintessential honour, prestige and power of the United States and its allies in the context of their combined diplomatic and political leverage must not lead to a situation whose results could only negate the efforts of 18 months of negotiations. The presence of the Foreign Ministers of the five Western Powers affords us some hope.

116. In conclusion, I wish to reiterate that Nigeria has single-mindedly worked in good faith and in close concert with SWAPO, our sister African front-line States and the five Western member States of the Security Council to bring to fruition the common noble and inevitable objective: the attainment of genuine independence for Namibia, and peace, freedom and dignity for its people. We hope and trust that this good faith is well placed.

117. Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber AL-SABAH (Kuwait):⁶ I should like to express my deep sorrow and offer my condolences to the world as a whole and the Christian world in particular on the passing of His Holiness Pope John Paul I.

118. I take this opportunity, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council and on the excellent manner in which you are conducting our proceedings.

119. The Council has just adopted a historic resolution which constitutes an epoch-making event. The world has the right to heave a sigh of relief. This event marks the end of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and heralds a new phase for the indigenous people of Namibia, who have suffered for years from the most oppressive form of foreign rule and from its concomitant consequences of privation and *apartheid* and from indescribable tribulations. With the adoption of this resolution, we are inclined to forget the past, with all the darkness of evil, and concentrate on the new process of transition and change which it is hoped will restore to the people of Namibia their fundamental political, civil and human rights.

120. My country has always supported SWAPO in its struggle for the attainment of the independence of the Territory and recognized it as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people. Namibia is close to independence primarily because of the sacrifice of its people in their tenacious fight for the achievement of self-determination. We praise their indomitable spirit as well as appreciating their sacrifice. We should also like to praise the people and the Governments of the front-line States which have displayed a plausible degree of resilience, patience, stoicism and statesmanship throughout these years in which they have suffered immensely. But their commitment to the principle of an independent Namibia has submerged their grievances. My delegation would like to place on record its appreciation of the role of the five Western members of the Security Council, which never lost hope in the face of unexpected challenges. Their determination and perseverance against eccentric odds may bring about the long-cherished results.

121. My delegation has studied very carefully the explanatory statement of the Secretary-General. We find it satisfactory. It answers almost all the questions raised in the course of consultations over this issue. We are happy with the role of the United Nations presence in Namibia. The objective of the United Nations under resolution 431 (1978) is the supervision and control of the entire electoral process. This is a fundamental point and my delegation attaches maximum importance to the role of the United Nations in the election process. My delegation also notes with satisfaction the role of the Special Representative as defined in the Secretary-General's explanatory statement [*para. 21 above*]. We are against any attempt to subordinate the Special Representative to the Administrator-General, who is bound to follow the line of South Africa. We are also happy with the Secretary-General's

⁶ Sheikh Al-Sabah spoke in Arabic. The English version of his statement was supplied by the delegation.

explanation about the registration of voters. This was an issue that had touched off justified apprehension. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to express its sincere admiration and thanks to the Secretary-General and his staff for the efforts they have been making for the purpose of implementing resolution 431 (1978). The Secretary-General's report contained in document S/12827 meets with our approval. It is our fervent hope that the Secretary-General will proceed with his proposed plan of action without further delay.

122. The behaviour of the Government of South Africa is at best discouraging and at worst destructive. We know that the approval of the report of the Secretary-General is not sufficient to enable him to go ahead with the plan of action just adopted. South Africa, which is illegally in Namibia, has the physical power to prevent UNTAG from reaching the Territory or, even if UNTAG is admitted, has the same power to prevent freedom of movement necessary for the discharge of its functions. It is therefore important for the success of the plan of action to compel South Africa to co-operate in the present undertaking.

123. But this co-operation is as yet not secured, and our fear of South Africa's defection is reinforced by the recent letters of its Foreign Minister, who claimed that his Government had a continuing responsibility in regard to the security of the people of Namibia and would leave only at their request. He also claimed [*S/12853, annex*] that the people of Namibia were confronted, in the Secretary-General's report, with a military component which, in his own words, "virtually amounts to an operational peace-keeping force or an occupation force". He was not content merely to describe the United Nations military component as an occupation force. He went even further and openly defied the Secretary-General by saying "it is not for the Secretary-General or the United Nations or any other entity to delay the process leading to self-determination and independence".

124. We cannot rule out the possibility of unilateral declaration of independence of Namibia by South Africa under circumstances that make Namibia anything but a genuinely independent State. Any reluctance to confront the endeavours of South Africa in creating another Transkei amounts to a betrayal of United Nations resolutions, the Charter and the Security Council commitment to strive for the implementation of its resolution 385 (1976). The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Owen, drew the attention of the General Assembly to this possibility in his statement on Wednesday.⁷ We admit that this possibility is not ruled out. However, we believe that, if South Africa persists in its defiance of the Security Council, one course remains open to the Council, namely, to take action under Chapter VII of the Charter. Such action has long been overdue, considering South Africa's long record of defiance and inhuman behaviour, which has placed it beyond the pale of the law. The credibility of the Security Council is at stake, and failure to take action to implement the proposed plan based on the Secretary-General's report can only stultify the

Council and suppress hopes that are raised for a genuinely independent Namibia.

125. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): The next speaker is Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO.

126. Mr. NUJOMA: Mr. President, I should like, on behalf of my delegation and in the name of the Namibian people, to join the Security Council and millions the world over in expressing our grief and sorrow at the untimely death of His Holiness Pope John Paul I. We express our heartfelt condolences and sympathy to the Catholic community of the world, to the Government and the people of Italy and to the Vatican.

127. It is for the second time in about three months that I address the Council on the question of Namibia.

128. On 27 July, the Council adopted two important resolutions on Namibia. In resolution 432 (1978), it upheld the principle of the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia by reaffirming that Walvis Bay was an integral part of Namibia and decided to remain seized of the question until Walvis Bay was completely reintegrated into Namibia. In resolution 431 (1978), the Council, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General to submit at the earliest possible date a report containing his recommendations with regard to the implementation of the Western proposal in accordance with its resolution 385 (1976).

129. It is general knowledge that the Secretary-General has, on the basis of the recommendations of his Special Representative, fulfilled this mandate. Consequently, he submitted his report, contained in document S/12827.

130. The members of the Council will have noticed that I addressed a letter to the Secretary-General, dated 8 September, contained in document S/12841. In that letter we expressed our views on various aspects of the report which presented some difficulties for us. At the same time, we also noted those aspects which concurred with our position. Having weighed all these aspects of the report, and on the basis of our trust and confidence in the Secretary-General, we accepted the report, while leaving it to the Secretary-General to ensure that our difficulties would be overcome.

131. We have taken note of the statement of the Secretary-General made at the beginning of this meeting, and we are assured that our concerns and preoccupations will be duly attended to during the transition period.

132. In accepting the report, SWAPO further pledged its full co-operation with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative as well as with the entire United Nations staff in the decolonization process of Namibia now being authorized by the Security Council.

133. I wish to reiterate without any hesitation that throughout the last 18 months of diplomatic exercise it has been SWAPO's demonstrated flexibility and a spirit of compromise which have made it possible for progress to be made. We believe that it has been because of this statesmanship and willingness to make necessary concessions that we have reached the present stage.

⁷ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Plenary Meetings, 10th meeting.

134. However, the same cannot be said about the attitude and actions of the illegal Fascist occupation régime. This racist régime, which continues to occupy Namibia illegally with a military force of about 60,000 men, armed extensively with sophisticated weapons of NATO production, not only has remained intransigent and belligerent but has stepped up repressive measures and acts of aggression against the people of Namibia and the neighbouring States of Angola and Zambia. The latest aggression is the ground and air bombardment of the Zambian town of Sesheke, which resulted in the killing or wounding more than 30 innocent Zambian civilians.

135. SWAPO and many of our friends pointed out and cautioned that the Pretoria régime was neither sincere nor prepared to negotiate seriously on a genuine settlement in Namibia. It has deployed throughout a two-track strategy of political character assassination, manipulation of mass media, false pretensions and public relations gimmicks, all aimed at presenting racist South Africa in a positive light and suggesting that it has gone a long way in making so-called concessions. But actually, inside Namibia, the régime remains uncompromising and intransigent. This attitude and these actions on the part of South Africa have proved contrary to the letter and spirit even of the Western proposal which they claim to have accepted, and they are certainly destructive of the efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement.

136. During the last Security Council debate on the situation in Namibia, I pointed out that:

"Even at this late stage, the régime is threatening to withdraw from the whole exercise and put into operation the second track of its strategy, the so-called internal settlement. We wish to bring these points out in order to caution that there is still much that remains to be done. . . . It is misleading to say at this stage, when we are just starting the serious business, that the diplomatic process has already succeeded in Namibia." [2082nd meeting, para. 85.]

I further stated on that occasion:

"The situation is still pregnant with many uncertainties, imponderables and dangers." [Ibid., para. 86.]

137. Now, where are we? For all practical purposes, the diplomatic exercise which started about 18 months ago has failed, as we predicted. In rejecting the report of the Secretary-General, the Pretoria régime has turned its back on a negotiated settlement under the aegis of the United Nations and has thus opted for its long envisaged internal settlement, which, in effect, will be a unilateral declaration of independence.

138. While efforts towards a negotiated settlement were going on, racist South Africa deployed a stream of repressive measures and illegal acts, such as the unilateral appointment of a so-called Administrator-General in August 1977, and the enactment and re-enactment of numerous repressive measures and emergency regulations, for example, AG 26 of April 1978 under which SWAPO leaders, members and sympathizers have been arbitrarily arrested, detained and imprisoned.

139. Another serious element is the fact that the so-called Administrator-General went ahead with the unilateral proclamation of the so-called registration of voters in preparation for the so-called elections in December this year.

140. We have evidence that South African police and soldiers and so-called field workers and organizers of the so-called Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, who are supplied with arms by the Pretoria régime, are being used to force people to register.

141. In our letter to the Secretary-General we stated our views with regard to the question of the registration of voters. We concluded by stating:

"We would therefore insist that this question of registration should be looked at afresh and we should prefer that a new registration"—I emphasize "a new registration"—"of voters be undertaken immediately upon the beginning of the transition process." [See S/12841.]

142. Reports from SWAPO sources and from recent visitors to Namibia indicate clearly that massive legislative, administrative and military preparations are being undertaken in Namibia aimed at setting the stage for a unilateral declaration of independence or internal settlement. There should be no doubt in anybody's mind that racist South Africa's rejection of the Secretary-General's report has created a new situation of confrontation between the people of Namibia and South Africa on the one hand and between South Africa and the United Nations on the other.

143. Now more than ever before we have a new situation. This situation poses a fundamental challenge to the integrity and viability of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, which is charged with the responsibility for peace and security in the world. Let the world body, in particular members of the Council, face up to the reality and seriousness of the situation which is in the making now in Namibia.

144. South Africa's refusal to co-operate with the Secretary-General and the Security Council in the implementation of the resolutions and decisions which are meant to bring about the early independence of Namibia through elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations now clearly constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security in terms of Chapter VII of the Charter.

145. What is important at this point is the responsibility of Member States to honour the decisions and carry out the commitments which they have pledged themselves to fulfil by supporting and voting for the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations.

146. In this context I should like to address special words to the five Western Governments represented on this occasion by their honourable Ministers for Foreign Affairs. I would tell them that we have participated in the diplomatic exercise they initiated on Namibia conscious of our historic responsibility to represent and speak for our oppressed people in order to hasten the achievement of

genuine independence in Namibia. We did so in the conviction that the process of negotiation is an integral part of the struggle. We did so also in the belief that, as the major trading partners and as countries with special relations with racist South Africa, they are best placed to exert pressure on that country to co-operate at last with the United Nations on the question of Namibia. But, instead, SWAPO rather than racist South Africa has been subjected to massive pressure and blackmail. This has not only been sinister and unfair, but it has provided the Pretoria régime with support and encouragement to continue to defy and rebuff the United Nations and to frustrate and suppress the political aspirations of the Namibian people.

147. Let it be recorded that we have reached this dead end clearly and solely because of racist South Africa's intransigence and non-compliance. Racist South Africa remains committed to its own neo-colonialist designs on Namibia and is therefore not prepared to co-operate with the United Nations for a genuine transition in Namibia supervised and controlled by the United Nations.

148. We believe it is worth pointing out that, even at this late hour, SWAPO has once again demonstrated its flexibility in giving yet another change to efforts towards a negotiated settlement. However, we have serious doubts as to how the Secretary-General will be able to implement his report in the face of South Africa's expressed rejection of that report. But, according to the reasoning of some, there may still be a chance to rescue what to us appears to be a lost cause.

149. I would fail in my duty if I did not, on behalf of the Central Committee of SWAPO and, indeed, the oppressed people of Namibia, express our appreciation and gratitude to you personally, Mr. President. SWAPO is indeed grateful for the concrete material assistance and political and diplomatic support your country has rendered to the Namibian people. It is grateful also to the members of the Council as well as to members of the African Group who, through the current African members of the Council, made it possible for us to appear here once again to give more ample information on the interests and political aspirations of the Namibian people, the fulfilment of whose yearning for freedom and genuine independence is the single objective of our struggle. I would also say that, as we continue to pursue this objective, whether on this front or the other fronts, we renew the assurance of our readiness to continue to co-operate with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in our common endeavours to find a basis for accelerating the total liberation of Namibia. In this connexion, SWAPO remains committed to free, fair and democratic elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

150. In conclusion, I should like to state honestly and frankly that the business of the liberation struggle in Namibia is to us a matter of life and death. The people of Namibia will continue to resist foreign domination and oppression and will with the same determination oppose any neo-colonial solution imposed on them. We expect the Security Council, and in particular the Western permanent members, to contemplate and to reflect on the other options which must be considered in the event of racist

South Africa's once again, and especially at this juncture, refusing to comply and co-operate with the United Nations. In this connexion, we listened carefully to the statements just made by the honourable Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the five Western Powers, and we shall study them fully.

151. We have been patient for too long. We are patient, but we cannot and we will not for ever remain patient to the point of committing national suicide. *A luta continua.*

152. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Russian*): I am most grateful for the words of appreciation addressed through me to my country for its role in supporting the just struggle of SWAPO.

153. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): Please allow me, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the office of President of the Council for this month. I know that this is not just an honour for you but also a most exacting burden. You have already shown your qualities of leadership since the very beginning of this month and in the difficult period of intensive and extensive consultations preceding today's meeting. Please be assured, of my full co-operation in the remaining days, or perhaps I should say hours, of your term.

154. I should also like to thank the representative of the People's Republic of China for his patience and wise counsel during the month of August, when he was President of the Council. It was through his efforts that we were able to thread our way through considerable difficulties with success.

155. I must also add a word of particular thanks to our esteemed Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, and his staff, who worked so hard to prepare the way for a settlement in Namibia. This is an occasion of historic importance. It has been an arduous task even to reach the present stage. If we have been successful in bringing Namibia to the brink of independence, it is to an important extent because we have had the help of the Secretary-General. Today we have a settlement before us which can, if implemented in the spirit of previous General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, lead to true independence for Namibia. We owe a debt of thanks to the Secretary-General for his efforts.

156. I should also like to pay a tribute to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, who carried out the recent mission to Namibia with great skill, tact and integrity. He was able to overcome many, if not all, of the difficult problems encountered on his mission and has made a significant contribution to the preparation of a settlement.

157. I salute today the presence among us of the Foreign Ministers of Nigeria, Kuwait, India, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as my comrade and beloved brother Mr. Sam Nujoma of SWAPO.

158. This morning we heard the sad news regarding the sudden demise of His Holiness Pope John Paul I. To all my Catholic colleagues involved in the work of the Security

Council and to the Observer Mission of the Holy See I extend my country's heartfelt sympathy and condolences. With the passing of Pope John Paul I the world has lost a dynamic, democratic and progressive man of peace.

159. We are not here today to engage again in the debates of the past. Our task, rather, is to examine the possibilities for independence in Namibia in the light of the recent report of the Secretary-General. At the beginning of August, the Secretary-General's Special Representative went to Namibia with a large staff to conduct a preliminary survey of the situation there. The Secretary-General was charged by the Council with the task of submitting a report containing his recommendations for the implementation of proposals designed to secure Namibian independence, and for their implementation in accordance with the provisions of resolution 385 (1976). On his return from Namibia, the Special Representative reported to the Secretary-General on the situation there.

160. The Secretary-General's report is to an important extent a reflection of the assessment resulting from the August mission to Namibia. In my view, that assessment suggests that the way may be open for moving ahead with plans for ensuring Namibian independence. However, it is also clear from the report that, if we do so, we must proceed with extreme caution.

161. When the Secretary-General's report was presented on 29 August, some members were suggesting that we should immediately authorize the Secretary-General to proceed with the implementation of the plan before us. This seemed to many of us too hasty, for the report indicated that there were questions which still needed clarification and obstacles which needed to be cleared. I am happy to say that the more cautious view prevailed and that we were able to undertake a series of consultations for the purpose of examining problems which needed discussion. The Secretary-General has been very active in these various consultations, and I should like to thank him for his patience in discussing with us our doubts and concerns. I warmly welcome and fully accept his explanatory statement.

162. We are now in a position to see more clearly what, in the present circumstances, needs to be done in order to ensure independence in Namibia through free elections under United Nations supervision and control. Against the background of the assessment provided in the report, the recommendations of the Secretary-General should move us in the right direction. However, it is also clear that the proposals now in hand for a settlement of the Namibian question will work only if certain conditions are met.

163. First of all, we can see that the plan for holding elections in Namibia can be set in motion only if the parties undertake to cease hostilities. The cessation of hostilities at the moment appears to be something of a stumbling-block. Both South African and SWAPO forces are still engaged in military activities. A few days ago, the South African Foreign Minister dispatched a long letter to the Secretary-General complaining of hostile acts on the part of SWAPO [S/12835]. And it has been suggested that SWAPO should show some sign that it is willing to end its military actions.

164. It should be observed, of course, that the continuing illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa is what gives rise to such acts; for actions by SWAPO are nothing more than resistance to the repression and brutality which will be the normal order of things as long as South Africa continues to occupy Namibia.

165. None the less, SWAPO has shown that it is willing to give a public undertaking to cease hostilities on the condition that such an undertaking is reciprocated. It has offered, and is offering now, to sign a cease-fire agreement with South Africa and to deposit that agreement with the Secretary-General. Whatever may prove to be the best modalities for arranging such an agreement, this is certainly the best suggestion which has been put forward so far. I strongly support the proposal that South Africa and SWAPO sign a cease-fire agreement immediately. That appears to me to provide the best basis for launching the United Nations operations described in the report of the Secretary-General.

166. Secondly, the whole operation must proceed according to the schedule originally established. The mechanics of arranging elections in so vast a country require a great deal of time. Independence can come only after proper procedures have been observed. Therefore the elections must be prepared, and the date of independence set accordingly. It cannot be the other way around. Thus the date originally set for the independence of Namibia, 31 December of this year, cannot be met. As the Secretary-General observed in his report:

"The delay in reaching agreement among the parties now makes completion by this date impossible."
[S/12827, para. 17.]

Consequently, elections for the Constituent Assembly will have to be held in the spring of next year at the earliest. The Constituent Assembly should then itself set the date for independence.

167. Thirdly, we now come to the difficult question of registration. Namibia is moving towards its first national elections. Registration, the establishment of electoral rolls, is the key to any election; the process of registration defines who may and who may not vote.

168. The elections projected for Namibia are to be held under United Nations supervision and control. I interpret that to mean, as do almost all members, that the United Nations must control all stages of the electoral process. This would necessarily include the establishment of the electoral rolls. However, in the spring of this year the Administrator-General of Namibia, so-called, who was appointed by the South African Government, launched a registration process in Namibia in anticipation of the scheduled elections. This was an act which took out of the hands of the United Nations, without any consultation, a key part of the electoral process for which it is responsible. The electoral rolls which have been prepared by the South African administration in Namibia may or may not be accurate. I myself cannot know, although reports which we had in July of intimidation and irregularity in registration were confirmed upon the return of the recent United Nations

mission. What is clear, however, is that it must be for the Special Representative to examine the rolls and to decide whether he is or is not satisfied that they have been properly drawn up. If he is not satisfied, then there is no question of using them. The registration procedure must begin again under United Nations supervision and control.

169. It is also important to note that all exiles who return to the country must be allowed to register, regardless of the length of their residence, that the rolls must be open to effective challenge and that they must be published at least two months before elections.

170. I would also add that I believe the proposals with respect to the size of UNTAG must stand. There is no question of reducing the size of the military component or of the police units assigned to the civilian component. These figures are for the United Nations to decide in the light of its needs. Major-General Philipp has carried out a careful survey of deployments in Namibia and has decided that 7,500 men are necessary to carry out United Nations functions in the transition period.

171. There may, of course, be some question about logistic support troops. If I understood the Secretary-General's statement correctly, that figure—7,500—includes the 2,500 men for logistic support. In my civilian view, that is quite a small number. It would necessitate, as indicated in the report of the Secretary-General, contracting with civilian agencies in Namibia for logistics and other functions. This may be undesirable. Who are the civilian contractors to be? How many non-United Nations personnel would be involved? Would not such contracting make the military component of UNTAG dangerously dependent on organizations which may in the final analysis be influenced by the South African Government? I am confident, however, that the Special Representative and Major-General Philipp will know how to deal with these delicate matters.

172. I welcome the decision of the Secretary-General to appoint Major-General Philipp commander of the military component of UNTAG. However, as Namibia is an African issue, I should like to express the hope that his deputy will be an African. UNTAG will, of course, be equitably balanced. In the nature of things, however, Africans will have to play a major role in the military component. It is only large numbers of African troops that will convince Namibians that the dangers of South African occupation have passed.

173. My delegation co-sponsored and voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/12865, in which it is proposed to initiate United Nations operations in Namibia. It has done so, however, only on the understanding that the conditions we have just set out will be met. These conditions are indispensable for the successful conclusion of the elections envisaged by the Security Council in resolution 385 (1976). If they are not met, we cannot be sure that the United Nations will have proper control over the process of transition and the preparations for elections.

174. I should like to call attention, in conclusion, to two matters which deserve our attention at this stage. The first

is a matter of caution. In my view, it would be best if, in starting UNTAG on its way, we recognized at the same time that the road ahead was a difficult one. Many things could go wrong. Therefore I should like to suggest—this is only a suggestion and not a formal proposal—a means by which we may ensure that we shall examine our progress at a crucial stage. In my view, we must provide for a review of the situation by the Security Council after the completion of the registration process in order to ensure that things will go smoothly. I would suggest, then, that the Secretary-General should report back to the Council on the progress towards elections immediately after the conclusion of the registration process. This will ensure that Council members will be kept fully abreast of events in Namibia and will be able to draw their own conclusions about the success of our efforts.

175. I should also like to draw attention to the fact that Namibia will still lack a government after the elections for the Constituent Assembly. The drawing up and acceptance of a constitution could well consume much time. We should, therefore, be prepared to extend United Nations operations in Namibia to considerably more than a year if necessary; there should be no question of abandoning Namibia after these elections, just because a year has elapsed. There are clearly many problems which still need consideration. It is best that we should be prepared for them now.

176. Lastly, I should like to thank and congratulate the five Western members of the Council for their initiative and their constructive efforts over the past 18 months. I should like to thank and congratulate also the Secretary-General and his staff for their skill and patience. I have no doubt that, in return, the Western Powers in the Council appreciate the spirit of co-operation extended to them at all times, not only by the African members, including Mauritius, and other non-aligned members but also by my comrade and beloved brother, Mr. Sam Nujoma of SWAPO, who, I pray, will soon be the President of an independent, sovereign Namibia. *A luta continua*. Africa will not be divided.

177. Mr. CHEN Chu (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): On 27 July last when the Security Council was considering the question of Namibia [2082nd meeting], the Chinese delegation stated in a comprehensive way our basic position on the settlement of the Namibian question. In a nutshell, the Chinese Government and people have always firmly supported the Namibian people in their efforts to achieve genuine national independence free from any outside interference and on the basis of territorial integrity and unity. We have consistently held that the South African racist régime must immediately, totally and unconditionally withdraw all its military and police forces as well as its administration from Namibia and terminate forthwith its illegal occupation there. Walvis Bay is an integral part of the Territory of Namibia and should be returned immediately to Namibia.

178. Under heavy blows from the Namibian people engaged in valiant struggle, the South African racist régime is now heading for its doom, yet it is still putting up a last-ditch fight. Recently, going back on its own words, it

perfidiously withdrew its earlier verbal promises and obdurately insists on going ahead with the gimmick of an "internal settlement" in Namibia in an attempt to foster a puppet régime through the phoney "elections" under its single-handed manipulation, so as to maintain its illegal occupation and colonial rule of Namibia. Furthermore, it has stepped up its armed repression of the Namibian people coupled with incessant incursion into the neighbouring African States. At the same time, the super-Powers, particularly that super-Power which flaunts the banner of "supporting the national liberation movements", casting a covetous eye, is making active preparations for infiltration and intervention. This shows that there do exist no small obstacles on the road of the Namibian people's struggle for genuine national independence. In order to win complete victory in their struggle, the Namibian people have to heighten their vigilance, strengthen their unity and persist in struggle, and thus foil the repeated sabotage and trouble-making on the part of the South African racist authorities and firmly guard against and exclude all forms of super-Power meddling and interference.

179. While voting in favour of resolution 431 (1978), the Chinese delegation made it clear that this did not signify our approval or total endorsement of the "proposal" of the Western Five "for a settlement of the Namibian situation"; we also pointed out the serious deficiencies of the proposal. We also made it clear that we had always held a different position in principle with respect to the dispatch of United Nations forces and that we had serious reservations on the proposal of the Western Five concerning the dispatch of a United Nations transition assistance group. In view of the fact that the draft resolution contained in document S/12865 mainly concerns the approval of the Secretary-General's report and a decision to dispatch the group to Namibia, we did not participate in the vote on the said draft and will not be held responsible for the expenses involved.

180. Mr. N'DONG (Gabon) (*interpretation from French*): Before taking up the question on the agenda I should like to say that the delegation of Gabon learned with great consternation of the demise of His Holiness Pope John Paul I. This tragic event leads my delegation to address its sincere condolences to the Permanent Observer of the Holy See.

181. The international community still recalls that, on 27 October 1966, the General Assembly decided that henceforth Namibia would become the direct responsibility of the United Nations [*resolution 2145 (XXI)*]. That decision, like all those that followed or preceded it, has remained a dead letter, that is to say, it was simply a pious wish, because of the disregard, the arrogance, the contempt and the indifference flaunted by Pretoria as regards the instructions of the Organization. That shows us that is not by threatening resolutions, platonic decisions, non-violence or innocuous sanctions that the international community will be able to prevail over that hated Pretoria régime which does no credit to our century, to the Organization, to the Council, to human rights—the hobby horse of certain States—nor to the Christian civilization to which the South African leaders constantly refer. In any event, we have to say that once again the Security Council, despite its earlier

resolutions, has been obliged today to reopen the Namibian file of tragedy, and that at a time when regional uncertainty, threats and dangers loom over us.

182. It was on the very eve of our attainment of our common noble objective of leading Namibia to independence by peaceful means that South Africa saw fit to renounce its former commitments. In other words, the process which started after the adoption of resolutions 385 (1976) and 431 (1978) has been ruthlessly interrupted and the hope which developed in the hearts of many has been dissipated. Once again South Africa has contemptuously rejected the path which would normally lead to a peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem, and has thus brought to nil all the efforts made by the five Western countries of the Security Council and many other States, as well as by the Secretary-General and his colleagues, to do everything possible to ensure a peaceful and just solution which would enable the Namibian people at last to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence in keeping with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

183. This brutally sudden *volte-face* by the authorities at Pretoria is extremely disconcerting, as are also the unjustified criticisms of the report of the Secretary-General which is simply an outline of the various stages which are necessary in order to establish a favourable climate for holding genuine elections and it is not in any way contrary to the Western proposal, as the authors have themselves acknowledged. The use of unjustified criticism to rid oneself of one's responsibilities is a pretext which can deceive only those who are willing to be deceived.

184. My delegation feels that South Africa's rejection of the report of the Secretary-General is a repetition of the permanent challenge which that country presents to the Security Council and international public opinion. It is a stinging rebuff to the five Western members of the Council, sponsors of the plan which the Council endorsed. It is also a result of the morbid fear from which the white racist minority régimes of Pretoria and Salisbury have suffered since the accession to independence of the two progressive African States of Mozambique and Angola. That fear has led them to intensify their efforts to perpetuate indefinitely their deplorable designs, which go against the course of history.

185. But what is really disturbing the South African racists is that, in his report, the Secretary-General does not try to move too quickly but provides for everything needed to ensure that the electoral campaign will proceed in suitable conditions of security, tranquillity, objectivity and equality for all Namibians without exception, under the supervision and control of the United Nations. There is no doubt that, in such conditions, equal opportunities would be given to all sectors of Namibian opinion.

186. We can understand why the advocates of *apartheid* switch positions so often and create so many obstacles on the path to peaceful negotiation in a simple attempt to sabotage the Western plan. They could thus speed up the so-called internal settlement, as has been done in Zimbabwe. Unmistakable signs—the intensification recently

of the South African military presence in Namibia, the frequent violations of the air space of neighbouring independent African countries, provocative manoeuvres, arbitrary arrests and the massacre of African nationalists, the unilateral establishment of electoral rolls, and so on—prove this and show clearly that Pretoria has chosen the path of an internal settlement in order to prevent SWAPO from participating in the elections and impose on Namibia the leaders of its choice. Thus Pretoria is blocking the possibilities for an internationally acceptable peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem as provided for in the plan of the five Western members of the Council and causing the situation in that part of Africa to become dangerously complicated.

187. The international community in general and the Security Council in particular must oppose the delaying tactics of Pretoria and react by specific action to show quite clearly that they are no longer willing to accept such humiliations from Pretoria because they are clearly challenges which we must take up.

188. Any decision taken by South Africa outside the context described in the report of the Secretary-General must therefore be regarded as unacceptable by the entire international community. My delegation supported the Western plan at the time and voted in favour of the report of the Secretary-General, which it supports entirely, together with his explanatory statement. That is because we feel that this is the key to any internationally acceptable solution in Namibia.

189. Of course, the adoption of the Secretary-General's report implies that it will be implemented. In this connexion, my delegation would like to make a last appeal to the leaders at Pretoria that they should no longer stubbornly persist in their mistaken ways, that they should no longer follow the path of confrontation that they have always chosen, and that at last they should face facts and once again join in the efforts of the international community to find a just and acceptable solution to the thorny Namibian problem.

190. My delegation would also appeal to the Western countries to take more effective action vis-à-vis Pretoria, applying the many different pressures that they can bring to bear to try to make it follow the path of reason, which is to have a free dialogue with the African nationalists who have accepted the Secretary-General's report in spite of its inadequacies, which they have none the less not failed to point out. In this regard, SWAPO has shown a high sense of responsibility and moderation and proved that, in spite of its implacable struggle against the white racists at Pretoria, it is willing to explore all avenues likely to bring Namibia to independence.

191. The Western countries are in a position to bring Pretoria back to the path of reason, and they are under even more of an obligation to do so because they developed the plan whose implementation is now eluding us. The failure of that plan will be a severe blow to the credibility not only of the Council but also of the sponsors of the plan. We hope nevertheless that South Africa will at last understand that there is no alternative for it but to come to

terms with the sons of Africa if it wants them to consider it a reliable country and a responsible negotiating partner. For that, it must accept dialogue within the context of the Western plan.

192. In conclusion, I would congratulate the Secretary-General and his colleagues on the excellent report they have submitted to us and welcome the President of SWAPO and the distinguished Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Kuwait, Nigeria, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, whose presence in the Security Council bears the most eloquent testimony to the importance that their respective countries attach to the search for a peaceful solution to the distressing problem of Namibia.

193. Mr. KHARLAMOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Before I state the position of our delegation on the substance of the matter before us, I should like to say that we join with all those who have expressed here their sincere condolences on the demise of the head of State of the Vatican, Pope John Paul I, who did a great deal to help co-operation and peace in Europe and beyond Europe.

194. I should also like to say at the beginning of my statement, Mr. President, that I share the view of representatives that have spoken before me that you have shown your great diplomatic abilities in your exercise of the responsibilities of President of the Security Council during the month of September, during which we have dealt with some extremely serious and complicated matters.

195. I turn now to the matter before us. The position of the Soviet Union on the question of Namibia is determined by our position of principle which advocates the complete elimination of all remnants of the system of colonial oppression and infringement of the equality and independence of peoples, of all remnants of colonialism and racism.

196. At present, southern Africa is one of the main areas of the struggle of the peoples for the final elimination of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, in his message to the International Conference of Solidarity with the Struggle of the African and Arab Peoples against Imperialism and Reaction, recently held at Addis Ababa, said the following:

"The Soviet people consistently support the elimination of the last remnants of racism and colonialism in southern Africa and call for the transfer of all power to the people of Zimbabwe as represented by the Patriotic Front, for the withdrawal of the armed forces of South Africa from Namibia and the granting to that country of true independence, and for the elimination of the system of *apartheid* from the Republic of South Africa."

197. For several decades, the racist rulers of Pretoria have been illegally occupying the Territory of Namibia, flagrantly flouting international legal norms and standards and challenging the many decisions of the United Nations on

the immediate granting of independence to that country. The Pretoria circles have imposed and are pursuing in Namibia a loathsome racist policy and are subjecting the indigenous population to mass repression. They maintain in Namibia a large occupying army, and now they are trying to set up a puppet régime in order to keep that country in chains, subject to their colonial domination.

198. However, South Africa would not have been able to persist for so long in failing to meet the demands of the United Nations to withdraw from Namibia had it not been encouraged in that policy by certain influential circles in Western countries that are interested in continuing to exploit the natural wealth of Namibia and to maintain there a military bridgehead of South Africa against the independent African States. The mining corporations in Namibia which are controlled by Western monopolies obtain billions of dollars in income as a result of their plundering of the natural resources of the country and the brutal exploitation of the African population. The lion's share of those profits ends up in the Western countries—that is, those that are directly interested in maintaining and strengthening the colonial system in Namibia.

199. The policy followed in Namibia by the racist régime of South Africa creates, as has frequently been stressed in United Nations decisions, a serious threat to peace and security in that part of Africa and beyond it.

200. The colonial policy of the South African racists is being firmly rebuffed by the people of Namibia, who do not want to accept their enslaved position. Over the years, through the persistent national liberation struggle, the leader of that struggle, SWAPO has won the trust and broad support of the population of the country and beyond it, and has become the recognized leader of the Namibian people. The international authority of SWAPO has gained ground. It is now recognized by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity as the one legitimate and genuine representative of the Namibian people.

201. We feel that there is no doubt that SWAPO now has sufficient experience and sufficient qualified and trained personnel to shoulder responsibility for resolving any problems relating to the attainment of independence and the government of the country. If the question of granting Namibia self-determination and independence can brook no further delay—and this is now recognized—that is the result of the growing success of the national liberation struggle of the Namibian people, headed by SWAPO.

202. We must immediately solve the problem of how to ensure Namibia's independence. The only reliable way to do so is indicated in many United Nations resolutions providing for a complete end to the occupation of Namibia by the Pretoria régime, with immediate withdrawal of the administration, police and troops of South Africa. Unswerving compliance with the sanctions introduced against South Africa and the Security Council's adoption of further effective measures to ensure the complete international isolation and boycott of the racist régime of South Africa should ensure that the United Nations decisions will be carried out.

203. Considering the recommendations in the Secretary-General's report from that point of view, the Soviet delegation believes that they are far from being the best way of ensuring Namibia's transition to national independence. We are convinced that keeping the administrative machinery and some South African troops in Namibia for the transitional period runs counter to former decisions of the United Nations and is completely unjustified. On the one hand, this creates artificial obstacles on the path to independence for the Namibian people and, on the other, it involves sending to Namibia a considerable number of military contingents and civilian personnel of the United Nations to help overcome these obstacles. There is no doubt but that Namibia would be able to attain its independence in a much more effective manner if the South African administration and armed forces were from the very outset completely removed from the country. The responsibility for the fact that, instead of being allowed to take this direct path, the people of Namibia are now being invited to take another path—a path strewn with obstacles—lies with those States that have an opportunity to exert the necessary pressure on the Pretoria régime but are reluctant to do so and are thus delaying a solution to the Namibian problem.

204. The Soviet delegation welcomes the participation of the President of SWAPO, Comrade Nujoma, in the work of the Security Council. The organization which he heads has for many years now been leading the heroic struggle of the Namibian people to reaffirm their inalienable right to freedom and independence.

205. We should like to say that we understand SWAPO's position, which has just been very clearly and convincingly stated by its President. In the present circumstances SWAPO, guided by the interests of ensuring the liberation of the people as quickly as possible, has said that it is willing to accept the Secretary-General's recommendations, as contained in his report and his additional explanatory statement.

206. Taking into account SWAPO's position and the position of other African States, the Soviet delegation did not oppose the adoption by the Security Council of the resolution providing for the establishment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, involving military contingents of Member States and civilian personnel. We proceeded from the premise that the purpose of sending the Group to Namibia was to ensure the immediate and complete withdrawal of all South African troops and the South African administration from Namibia and to grant the people of Namibia real independence on the basis of the preservation of the country's unity and territorial integrity.

207. The Soviet delegation feels that it must also stress that this United Nations operation involving the use of armed forces should be carried out in strict conformity with the Charter—that is, all matters relating to the establishment, composition, command and function of the Group and to the amount of time that it will be in Namibia should be settled directly by the Security Council and should be constantly under the Council's strict control. There should be no personnel in the United Nations contingents from States having close contacts with South

Africa. The Secretary-General and his Special Representative in Namibia should be fully answerable to the Security Council, which is the only organ with the authority to take decisions and control and direct these operations. The Soviet delegation confirms also the position of principle already stated by it in the Council on the question of the method of financing United Nations operations in Namibia.

208. In its view, the resolution adopted by the Council should have contained provisions condemning the Pretoria régime for its continued refusal to comply with Council resolutions. It should also have contained provisions for the Council to take appropriate measures to put pressure on South Africa if it continues to disregard the will of the United Nations and its resolutions in the future. Furthermore, we feel that some parts of the resolution are not sufficiently clear. We feel for instance that the resolution should have stated more specifically exactly what the mandate of the Group will be and should have indicated that the actions of the South African Administrator-General should be under the strict control of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

209. The defiant position taken by the Pretoria régime on the Namibian settlement, and also the whole course of the consideration of the Namibian question in the Security Council, only increases our doubts and fears regarding future developments in Namibia and the possible role to be played by the United Nations in that connexion. The Soviet delegation thinks that it is particularly important not to allow the measures provided for in the resolution and in the Secretary-General's report to be used against the interests of the Namibian people. The Soviet Union intends to follow closely the developments in Namibia and to defend consistently the interests of the Namibian people. It will support the generally recognized role of SWAPO in ensuring the independence of Namibia.

210. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Gromyko, said in his statement to the General Assembly on 26 September this year:

"Colonialism and racism must be fully and irrevocably eliminated from the African continent too. Those who want to preserve the racist régimes, which are so odious to the peoples of Africa, must realize that their cause has been lost, and lost irretrievably.

"...

"The objective, inexorable laws of historical development will prevail. The day is not far off when the hour of independence will strike for the peoples of southern Africa, too, and when the entire African continent to the last inch will become free."⁸

211. Mr. ROLON ANAYA (Bolivia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Bolivia, a Catholic country, mourns the unexpected death of His Holiness Pope John Paul I. My delegation is grateful for the statements of condolences that we have heard and we express our deep sorrow to His Reverence the representative of the Holy See.

212. The delegation of Bolivia extends a warm welcome to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and heads of State who are with us today.

213. Bolivia has always expressed its firm support for Namibia's independence and sovereignty, and since the last Council meeting on the situation in the Territory, we were the first country to propose—a month ago—the adoption of the Secretary-General's report, not only because all his initiatives have been impartial and coherent, but also because of the practical objectivity of the procedures suggested. In our opinion, the explanatory statement we have heard today makes even more viable the proposal to which we are solemnly committed: the transfer of power to the people of Namibia, with the assistance of the United Nations and in conformity with resolution 385 (1976) and the resolution adopted today, by means of free and fair elections.

214. I am pleased that I was able to vote in favour of the adoption of a resolution that has facilitated the expression of the constructive and reasonable attitude of the Namibian people, through SWAPO, the sole great and heroic representative of the people, recognized by the United Nations because of its national authenticity and to avoid a situation in which democratization may be confused with dispersal. In contrast with the obstructionist positions of South Africa, SWAPO has shown understanding and political responsibility which has definitely won our solidarity.

215. I wish to express again my appreciation to the Secretary-General and his colleagues for the guidance that his reports constantly provide. I am deeply grateful to you, Mr. President, for everything you have done in connexion with this disturbing and long-standing problem of Namibia's independence.

216. For Bolivia, only a democratic government elected by the people in elections free of any intimidation or partial treatment can in full sovereignty exercise its right to self-determination in a nation like Namibia—a nation that we wish to be genuinely free right from the start. This genuine democracy has two aspects. There is the internal aspect—there cannot be true democracy without true freedom; and there is the external aspect—there cannot be and must not be any interference in the expression of the people's will by means of external pressures or, even less, by means of moral or economic intervention like that which Bolivia experienced in its efforts at establishing people's institutions. Those efforts were frustrated on 9 July last by external actions but were renewed by the people in the conclusion of a pact among all the political parties, under the auspices of the present Government, in order to achieve soon what the Minister for External Relations of my country spoke of a few days ago in his statement to the General Assembly:⁹ elections by Bolivians for Bolivians.

217. With regard to the resolution which has just been adopted, my delegation wishes to place on record that Bolivia welcomed from the start the hard work undertaken in an effort at conciliation by the five Western members of

⁸ *Ibid.*, 8th meeting, paras. 53 and 56.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 11th meeting.

the Council, whose participation we have appreciated in good faith and considered of great value. In considering the resolution itself, my delegation would point out that paragraph 5 calls on South Africa to co-operate. The implementation of this resolution in all its aspects, in particular this aspect, must be energetically pursued.

218. Finally, the text does not mention the problem of Walvis Bay. As a country which has been subject to territorial encroachments and whose people continues to suffer greatly as a result of its loss of its coastline, Bolivia attaches great importance to that problem. My delegation presumes that this omission does not indicate a weakening of the Security Council's determination to maintain the criterion of the territorial integrity of Namibia, including of necessity Walvis Bay.

219. Mr. CARPIO CASTILLO (Venezuela) (*interpretation from Spanish*): My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution which was submitted earlier in an effort to join in a co-operative undertaking to bring about a peaceful settlement of the problem of the independence of Namibia, a Territory illegally occupied, oppressed and exploited by the racist régime of Pretoria and the transnational corporations.

220. We are deeply concerned over the attempts of the South African Government to flout the agreement reached with the five Western Powers and contained in document S/12636, an agreement aimed at providing the necessary institutions, instruments and guarantees for the accession to independence of Namibia by peaceful and orderly means.

221. The Council today has made a serious and deep commitment. The adoption of the Secretary-General's report and, consequently, the establishment under his authority of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group place upon the members of the Council, to the extent of their responsibilities, and upon the Organization itself the obligation to support any efforts being made to implement the measures proposed in the report which has been adopted.

222. SWAPO has amply demonstrated its goodwill and determination to co-operate in the implementation of the Secretary-General's report, and we are pleased at that. But the other side, the racist Government of South Africa, has not responded in like manner, quite the contrary. In the circumstances, we urge South Africa to demonstrate that it is prepared to co-operate in carrying out a process leading to Namibia's independence, in accordance with the will of the people expressed under the auspices and protection of the international community.

223. My delegation wishes once again to place on record its fervent hope for the rapid emergence of an independent, prosperous, free and sovereign Namibia and, consequently, my Government pledges its co-operation, to the extent of its ability, in the carrying out of the operations planned for the transition period and set forth in the very comprehensive and excellent report submitted by the Secretary-General.

The meeting rose at 7.40 p.m.