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ASSISTANCE TO BOTSWANA

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General transmits herewith the report of the Mission to Botswana, which was appointed in the context of Security Council resolution 403 (1977) to report on the special economic hardship facing Botswana as a result of the imperative need to divert funds from ongoing and planned development projects to hitherto unplanned and unbudgeted for security needs and to assess the assistance needed to allow Botswana to carry out its development projects under the present circumstances.

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(Note: throughout the report the pula has been converted at P 1 = \$US 1.16.)

INTRODUCTION

A. Complaint by the Government of Botswana

1. On 22 December 1976, the Permanent Representative of Botswana to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/12262) registering a complaint against the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia concerning violations of Botswana's territorial sovereignty.
2. The Security Council met on 12, 13 and 14 January 1977 to consider the complaint. In the course of his statement before the Security Council on 12 January, the Foreign Minister of Botswana detailed some 36 violations of Botswana's territorial integrity in recent years. He stated that when these incidents first began they were directed at refugees from Southern Rhodesia, but that they are now directed also at Botswana nationals. He reported that incidents have increased in frequency and seriousness in recent months.
3. The Foreign Minister also stated that Botswana could ill afford to use their limited resources for the development of an army, preferring instead to use their resources for development. The present situation therefore created a serious problem for Botswana in that the incursions by the forces of the illegal régime posed a threat to the security of the country which the Government was not adequately equipped to counter. He reported that in the circumstances, the Government of Botswana had decided to increase substantially the size of its police mobile unit to enable Botswana to put up greater resistance to the activities of the forces of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia.
4. In his statement the Minister pointed out that the Government of Botswana was completely unprepared for this development relating to the security of the country, and that the substantial increase in the paramilitary forces was forced upon Botswana by the rapidly deteriorating security situation along Botswana's border with Southern Rhodesia.
5. The Minister reported that the expansion of the police mobile unit would cost approximately P 25 million (some \$29 million) in a four-year period which would substantially reduce the resources available for their development programme.

B. Security Council resolution 403 (1977)

6. The Security Council adopted resolution 403 (1977) at its 1985th meeting on 14 January 1977. Paragraphs 5 to 8 of that resolution read as follows:

The Security Council,

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5. Takes cognizance of the special economic hardship confronting Botswana as a result of the imperative need to divert funds from ongoing and

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planned development projects to hitherto unplanned and unbudgeted for security needs necessitated by the urgent need to effectively defend itself against attacks and threats by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"6. Accepts the invitation of the Government of Botswana to dispatch a mission to assess the needs of Botswana in carrying out its development projects under the present circumstances, and accordingly requests the Secretary-General, in collaboration with appropriate organizations of the United Nations system, to organize with immediate effect financial and other forms of assistance to Botswana and to report to the Security Council not later than 31 March 1977;

"7. Requests the United Nations and the organizations and programmes concerned, including the Economic and Social Council, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Development Programme, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the International Fund for Agricultural Development, to assist Botswana to carry out the ongoing and planned development projects without interruption as stated in paragraph 5 and envisaged under paragraph 6 of this resolution;

"8. Appeals to all States to respond positively in providing assistance to Botswana, in the light of the report of the mission of the Secretary-General, in order to enable Botswana to carry out its planned development projects;"

C. Statement by the Secretary-General

7. The Secretary-General, in his statement to the Security Council on 14 January 1977, assured the Council that he would organize as soon as possible financial and other forms of assistance to Botswana in close co-operation with the appropriate organizations of the United Nations system. He also announced his intention to dispatch a mission without delay to assess the needs of Botswana and to carry out detailed discussions with the Government in Gaborone. He indicated that as soon as the report of the mission became available, he would be in communication with all States and intergovernmental organizations to enlist their co-operation and support to meet the needs determined by that mission.

D. Appointment of the Mission and terms of reference

8. The Secretary-General, following consultations with the Foreign Minister of Botswana, appointed a Mission composed of the following members:

Mr. Abdulrahim Abby Farah	Chief of Mission
Assistant Secretary-General for Special Political Questions	
Office of the Secretary-General	

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Mr. Gordon K. Goundrey
Director, Technical Assistance Group
Commonwealth Secretariat, London

Mr. James Riby-Williams
Chief, Human Resources Development Division
Economic Commission for Africa

Mr. Robert V. Harris
Senior Economic Affairs Officer
Centre for Natural Resources, Energy and Transport
Department of Economic and Social Affairs

Mr. Kelvin T. Sanderson
Agricultural Economist
FAO Adviser to the Government of Tanzania

Miss Pamela Dowling served as secretary of the Mission.

9. The task of the Mission was to advise the Secretary-General, within the framework of Security Council resolution 403 (1977), on the special economic hardships confronting Botswana as a result of the imperative need to divert funds from ongoing and planned development projects to hitherto unplanned and unbudgeted security needs. The Mission was required to assess the financial and other forms of assistance needed to allow Botswana to carry out its development projects under the present circumstances.

E. Programme of the Mission

10. The Mission arrived in Gaborone on Tuesday, 15 February and spent 14 days in Botswana.

11. The Mission's programme in Botswana began with a full briefing by the President of the Republic of Botswana. Daily meetings were held with ministers and officials concerned with the work of the Mission.

12. In the course of its stay, the Mission visited Francistown. At Francistown the Mission inspected the refugee reception centre and had discussions with government officials. The Mission also drove some 50 kilometres along the border in the area where many of the incidents had occurred and where some of the projects, which have been made necessary by the deteriorating security situation, will be located. (See map.)

13. The Government of Botswana provided documents and material which greatly facilitated the Mission's task and provided all the supplementary information and data which were required. Meetings were characterized by a free and frank exchange of views, with the result that the Mission was satisfactorily briefed on the issues involved. Information provided by the Government was subjected to careful scrutiny and any significant differences were resolved during the Mission's visit.

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14. Before departing from Gaborone, the Chief of Mission met with heads of diplomatic missions in Botswana to provide them with information on the Mission and its work.

15. On his way to New York, the Chief of Mission had meetings to discuss programmes of assistance to Botswana with Commissioner C. Cheysson of the European Economic Community (EEC), with the Rt. Hon. Judith Hart, Minister of Overseas Development of the United Kingdom, and with Mr. S. S. Ramphal, Commonwealth Secretary-General.

F. Acknowledgements

16. The Mission wishes to record its appreciation of the co-operation received from the Government of Botswana throughout its stay in the country. The Mission was received by His Excellency Sir Seretse Khama, President of Botswana, who held an official reception in honour of the Mission which was attended by members of the Cabinet and of the Diplomatic Corps.

17. The Mission wishes to record the contributions made by representatives of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the World Food Programme (WFP) in the preparation of this report.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDED PROJECTS

18. The following is a summary of the conclusions of the Mission and of the projects recommended by the Mission to assist Botswana to carry out its normal development and to cope with the emergency situation that has arisen.

(1) The security situation in the areas bordering with Southern Rhodesia has deteriorated sharply in the past year (paras. 22-25). The unplanned and unbudgeted costs to the Government of Botswana of expanding the Police Mobile Unit in order to reduce the dangers of incursions by the forces of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia and to protect the lives and property of Botswana nationals will amount to some \$16.3 million on capital account and \$3.4 million annually on current account (para. 28).

(2) In addition to the diversion of resources from normal development to meet the costs of the expansion of the Police Mobile Unit, Botswana is facing an additional financial burden as a result of the influx of refugees. The number of refugees seeking asylum in Botswana has increased greatly in recent months (para. 31). Most of the refugees are young single persons from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. At the time of the Mission's visit there were 4,478 refugees in Botswana (table I and para. 32), with more arriving each day. However, the number of refugees passing through Botswana far exceeds this figure. For example, during the first two months of 1977, some 400 refugees have been entering Botswana each week with the majority passing on to other countries. The Mission estimates that it will cost the Government of Botswana at least \$0.25 million annually to protect,

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transport and supervise the present number of refugees (table II and para. 118). These costs will be much higher if the influx of refugees continues to increase, and are in addition to the costs of projects 9, 10 and 11 referred to below.

(3) The Mission found that it will be necessary for Botswana to undertake some 11 projects on an emergency basis to protect its normal development. Nine of these projects were not included in the National Development Plan 1976-1981 and two, while included, will need to be greatly accelerated. In order to safeguard the important livestock industry of Botswana, it will be necessary to carry out a veterinary control programme (paras. 81-83). The veterinary control programme will consist of: a foot-and-mouth disease vaccination campaign (project 1); the construction of two veterinary cordon fences and watering points for livestock and villages (projects 2, 3 and 4), and the construction of access roads and airstrips (project 5) to allow the fences and watering points to be constructed, maintained and patrolled. The veterinary control programme will cost some \$5 million on capital account and will involve recurrent annual expenditures of \$0.38 million (para. 84).

(4) The access roads and airstrips in the border area (project 5) will allow the Police Mobile Unit to patrol the border, to move quickly to trouble spots and to protect the lives and property of citizens threatened by incursions by the forces of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. The roads and airstrips will also be used for the annual foot-and-mouth disease vaccination campaign.

(5) The economy of Botswana is very open and heavily dependent on imports and exports (para. 87). This means that the continued operation of the railway through Botswana now operated by Rhodesia Railways is extremely important as there would be a grave risk to the economy if the services were interrupted or discontinued (paras. 88-91). It will therefore be necessary to develop a capability to operate the railway in an emergency. This will cost some \$16.3 million (para. 96), as well as stand-by credits for meeting operating losses which would be called upon if Rhodesia Railways ceased to operate and the Government of Botswana was forced to operate a skeleton service.

(6) The risk of disruption to production and supplies of food grain makes it necessary to establish a strategic grain reserve which will cost some \$1.6 million on capital account (para. 103). There will also be a need for food grain for famine relief during 1977 which will cost some \$1.7 million (paras. 112-114).

(7) Three projects (projects 9, 10 and 11) will be needed to deal with the situation created by refugees from Southern Rhodesia. These projects involve emergency improvement of the Francistown Transit Centre (para. 121), the establishment of an emergency tent camp (para. 122), and the construction of a new refugee centre (para. 123). Together, these three projects will cost some \$0.99 million.

(8) The Mission estimates that some \$27.98 million will need to be diverted to unplanned and unbudgeted security needs, to provide protection, transport and supervision for refugees, and to meet part of the recurrent costs of emergency projects during the first three years of the 1976-1981 plan period. This will

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amount to 70 per cent of the domestic resources which it was planned to use for normal development (para. 128). In addition, some \$25.6 million will need to be spent on unplanned emergency projects during the next two to three years with corresponding increases in recurrent expenditure.

(9) The diversion of funds will mean that all the projects in the core programme which the Government of Botswana intended to finance from domestic resources and the total cost of core projects for which funding was still to be arranged, as well as the emergency projects recommended in the report, will now need to be financed by external sources if Botswana is to be enabled to carry out its normal development as envisaged in Security Council resolution 403 (1977).

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I. THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION

A. Border incidents

19. Botswana is a land-locked country which is almost completely surrounded by troubled areas. It shares extensive borders with Southern Rhodesia, Namibia including the Caprivi Strip, and South Africa. It has only a limited border with Zambia.

20. At present, the major part of the border with Southern Rhodesia is neither fenced nor adequately patrolled. Because of this, people have been long accustomed to relatively free movement in some of the border areas. People from Botswana have recovered stray livestock from Southern Rhodesia when necessary, and vice versa. People from both sides of the border have used the rivers for domestic water needs.

21. Since the illegal declaration of independence by the régime in Southern Rhodesia there has been a series of border incidents, particularly in the Central, North-East and Chobe Districts. The Mission drove along the border in the Central and North-East Districts where many of the incidents have occurred, and saw evidence of the destruction of houses and the damage from bombs and attacks.

22. The Mission was able to visit a number of villages near the border with Southern Rhodesia, and to interview a number of villagers, farmers and traders who had been affected by acts of provocation and harassment by the forces of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. These interviews with villagers living in the area made it clear that the border incidents and the fears of being shot by the forces of the illegal régime which have established a security zone with a strict curfew in the border area were affecting their ability to carry out their normal activities. They considered it dangerous to water their livestock and cultivate their crops. Indeed, many homes were abandoned and a number of the villagers indicated that it would be difficult to continue to live in the area unless they were provided with increased protection from harassment by the forces of the illegal régime. Furthermore, increased migration of villagers from threatened border areas appeared to have caused strains in places such as Francistown, and there had been a substantial diversion of police forces to the affected areas, in order to provide protection and to deal with social tensions.

23. The Mission was informed by the people they interviewed that "the border violations and attacks on Botswana citizens in border areas have resulted in losses of livestock due to lack of ability to use watering points on the border, ... in addition, the situation on the Rhodesian side of the border could result in increased risks of diseased animals straying into Botswana ... the border violations and attacks have made it mandatory that protection be provided to citizens in border areas".

24. The Government of Botswana provided the Mission with information relating to 53 separate incidents and territorial violations since 1966 by the forces of the illegal régime. In the period from 1966 to 1969 inclusive, only three incidents

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were reported, all involving territorial violations by forces of the illegal régime; from 1970 to 1973 inclusive, nine incidents were reported, of which eight involved the forces of the illegal régime entering Botswana. In 1974 and 1975, seven incidents were reported, of which six involved entry into Botswana by forces of the illegal régime. In 1976, however, the tempo of incidents increased sharply. Altogether, 33 incidents were reported, of which 26 involved the forces of the illegal régime entering Botswana. The information presented to the Mission included details of 19 incidents which involved kidnapping, detention or death, and of six cases which involved destruction of or damage to barns, stores and houses.

25. Even during the Mission's visit a number of incidents were reported. Two incidents on 13 February involved exchanges of fire between the Botswana Police Mobile Unit and the forces of the illegal régime, one at Senyawé in the North-East District and one at Dogwe in the Central District. A further incident was reported on 18 February when the forces of the illegal régime entered Botswana and exchanged fire with members of the Police Mobile Unit at Shoshwe. One member of the forces of the illegal régime was killed and one was wounded; one Botswana national, Mr. Shabalana, was wounded. Also during the Mission's visit, the Government of Botswana issued a statement that a representative of the International Red Cross in Salisbury had reported that four Botswana nationals who had been kidnapped (their kidnapping was referred to in the statement of the Foreign Minister to the Security Council) were to appear before a special court in Salisbury on 21 March charged with "the murder of whites in Rhodesia and with possession of weapons of war".

B. Need to expand the police forces

26. In a preambular paragraph of resolution 403 (1977), the Security Council realized "the need for Botswana to strengthen its security in order to safeguard its sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence". The Government of Botswana informed the Mission that the increasing tension in the Central and North-East districts made it imperative that the Government reconsider its plans regarding the resources to be devoted to the police. Botswana has no army; indeed, it has only a skeleton police force for a country of 582,000 square kilometres and a population of over 680,000. In 1976 the approved establishment for the police, including the Police Mobile Unit, was only 1,800 all ranks (including secretaries, clerks, drivers and messengers).

27. In drawing up the National Development Plan 1976-1981, only a minor expansion of the Police Mobile Unit was envisaged - provision was made for some \$1.5 million (P1.3 million) on capital account, mainly for stations and equipment, and for some \$232,000 (P200,000) additional in annual recurrent costs. This planned provision would have allowed the Police Mobile Unit to be expanded by about 84 all ranks over the five years of the plan.

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28. As a first step towards dealing with the deteriorating security situation, the Government of Botswana has decided to expand the Police Mobile Unit. The capital costs of the expansion - police stations, vehicles, arms and equipment - will amount to some \$17.8 million (P15.3 million) and the associated annual recurrent costs to some \$3.6 million (P3.1 million). The total cost of the expansion over four years will therefore amount to \$32.1 million (P27.7 million). Of this, some \$2.4 million (P2.1 million) was included in the National Development Plan 1976-1981. The Mission therefore estimates that the "hitherto unplanned and unbudgeted for security needs" will require \$29.7 million (P25.6 million) of resources to be diverted from the normal planned development of Botswana. (This compares with the rough estimate of \$29 million or P25 million given by the Foreign Minister in his statement to the Security Council on 12 January 1977.)

II. THE REFUGEE SITUATION

A. General refugee situation

29. It is a tradition of the people of Botswana to accept into their midst people who come seeking refuge. Since the attainment of independence in 1966, the Government of Botswana has maintained an open-door policy of providing refuge to persons fleeing neighbouring countries in fear of victimization for political reasons. Thus, Botswana has in the past 10 years extended assistance as a country of first asylum for a regular flow of refugees from South Africa, Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and some other countries in southern Africa.

30. In spite of this open-door policy, however, Botswana rarely faced a major refugee problem, with the exception of one period some 10 years ago when some 4,000 Angolan refugees were granted asylum. (These have now been accorded Botswana citizenship and are settled mainly in the Ngamiland District, where they account for about 7 per cent of the population of the district.) The past two years, however, have seen a significant change.

31. Table I shows the distribution, entry and exit of refugees into Botswana from the beginning of 1975 until 25 February 1977.

32. It will be noted from table I that some 12,072 refugees entered Botswana from 1 January 1975 to 25 February 1977. Of these, 1,146 were from South Africa and 10,131 from Southern Rhodesia. Since the date of the Mission's departure from Botswana, information has been received from the Government that 1,167 more refugees have entered Botswana and that 871 have left. These figures suggest that the number entering Botswana is still increasing. Many of the refugees stop over in Botswana for relatively short periods - from a few weeks to a few months - depending on the availability of transport and other opportunities to move elsewhere, and for them only transit arrangements and facilities are normally required. Some refugees, however, find no opportunities to move on and some others wish to remain in Botswana. These last two categories constitute a continuing economic and social burden for Botswana.

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Table I
Refugees in Botswana

Arrivals in 1975

South Africans	168
Namibians	286
Zimbabweans	1 038
Others	<u>79</u>
Total	<u>1 571</u>

Departures in 1975

South Africans	28
Namibians	6
Zimbabweans	800
Others	<u>1</u>
Total	<u>835</u>

Arrivals in 1976

South Africans	880
Namibians	187
Zimbabweans	5 712
Others	<u>213</u>
Total	<u>6 992</u>

Departures in 1976

South Africans	309
Namibians	57
Zimbabweans	5 099
Others	<u>1</u>
Total	<u>5 466</u>

Arrivals up to 12 February 1977

South Africans	86
Namibians	21
Zimbabweans	2 339
Others	<u>2</u>
Total	<u>2 448</u>

Departures up to 12 February 1977

South Africans	17
Namibians	1
Zimbabweans	1 550
Others	<u>-</u>
Total	<u>1 568</u>

Arrivals from 12 to 25 February 1977

South Africans	12
Namibians	Nil
Zimbabweans	1 042
Others	<u>7</u>
Total	<u>1 061</u>

Departures from 12 to 25 February 1977

South Africans	Nil
Namibians	Nil
Zimbabweans	295
Others	<u>Nil</u>
Total	<u>295</u>

Total number of refugees in Botswana on 25 February 1977

		<u>Net arrivals</u> <u>1 January 1975 to</u> <u>25 February 1977</u>
South Africans	861	792
Namibians	575	430
Zimbabweans	2 638	2 387
Others	<u>404</u>	<u>299</u>
Total	<u>4 478</u>	<u>3 908</u>

B. Strain on the economy of Botswana

33. The Mission found that the strain being inflicted on Botswana as a result of the open-door refugee policy is very serious in relation to the size of the country and its resources. Further, there is a strong evidence that the situation will become even worse. Some of the refugees from South Africa came in the wake of the Soweto riots. Those arriving from Southern Rhodesia are expected to increase as the fighting escalates. Increased provision will have to be made for the security of the refugees and for various forms of support including food, accommodation, medical care, administration and management. Transit arrangements are needed for those proceeding elsewhere, and the provision of places in educational and training institutions, already stretched by local demands, are required for those wishing to remain in Botswana or unable to proceed elsewhere. To date, most of the refugees are young single persons. This may change as the situation in Southern Rhodesia develops, and Botswana may find significant numbers of women, children or whole families arriving. Indeed, the Government of Botswana has informed the Mission that in the first two weeks of March a number of women with young children have been among the refugees. This marks a major change and, should the situation continue, major modifications will be required in the assistance programme. Educational facilities will need to be provided, and more permanent arrangements made. The situation is too fluid at this time to make firm recommendations, but it will have to be watched carefully and the needs of the refugees reviewed when more information becomes available. The reception centre recommended below (project 11) will facilitate the collection of necessary information so that adequate plans can be made for refugees remaining for longer periods in Botswana.

34. In addition to direct outlays for security, support and services, a serious concern must be felt about the impact on the refugees in the country's unemployment situation. As the National Development Plan 1976-1981 makes clear, "Botswana already finds it impossible to provide jobs in the formal sector for all of its labour force entrants. The refugee situation compounds this problem". Furthermore, the influx of large numbers of refugees into small communities and towns like Gaborone, Francistown and Lobatse can only lead to social problems unless adequate accommodation and other facilities are provided.

C. South African student refugees

35. It was not possible for the Mission to prepare estimates of the cost borne by the Government of Botswana as a result of the influx of all the refugees. The two major groups, however, are from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. A report has been prepared on the problems faced by Botswana as a result of the influx of South African student refugees, following the riots in Soweto and elsewhere, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 31/126, and the report includes proposals for providing Botswana with assistance to deal with those refugees. In summary, the report recommends the construction of a senior secondary school, a junior secondary school and a reception/transit centre, at a total cost of \$4.4 million. The proposal envisages the newly constructed schools forming

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an integral part of the educational system of Botswana and the Government of Botswana guaranteeing 960 places in secondary boarding schools and 50 places in the university for refugees.

D. Influx of refugees from Southern Rhodesia

36. Since the illegal declaration of independence by the régime in Southern Rhodesia, the Government of Botswana has pledged its support to those attempting to put an early end to illegal minority rule in Southern Rhodesia. As part of this policy of support, the Government has provided asylum for refugees from Southern Rhodesia. In 1975, the number of these refugees entering Botswana increased to a level which necessitated the construction of a transit camp at Francistown in August of that year. The camp consisted of four dormitories, toilet and lavatories. Partly because of a shortage of resources, and partly because the need was for emergency transit facilities, no special provisions were made for kitchen, dining hall, reception and registration, study or recreation. The transit centre was designed to provide short-term accommodation for about 240 persons.

37. When the Mission visited the transit centre on 18 February 1977, there were 719 persons accommodated there, and five days later more than 100 more were to have been admitted. The dramatic increase in the number of refugees from Southern Rhodesia created a situation for which the transit centre had not been planned. The Mission found living conditions to be hopelessly inadequate, with sanitation and hygiene facilities totally unsatisfactory. The centre was overcrowded, with no provision for food storage or preparation, no organized recreation or study, and an inadequate administrative structure. The Mission also noted that many of the refugees accommodated at the transit centre had been there for several months and could not be considered as being "in transit". Of particular concern was the welfare and protection of 51 young girls, ranging in age from 10 to 24, who were accommodated at the centre. (The Mission has been informed that since its visit to the centre, the Government of Botswana has been able to make other arrangements for those girls, but the basic problem will remain so long as alternative accommodation is not available and young women continue to enter Botswana.)

38. Table II gives the Government's estimate of expenses incurred on refugees from Southern Rhodesia (part A). It also includes an estimate of the funds expended on refugee support by the Botswana Council for Refugees during 1976 (part B). Throughout its examination of the refugee situation in Botswana, the Mission was accompanied by a representative of UNHCR whose presence was of great assistance to the Mission.

39. It is apparent from table II that the influx of refugees from Southern Rhodesia has imposed a heavy burden on the Government of Botswana in spite of the assistance being provided through the Botswana Council for Refugees.

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Table II

A. EXPENSES ON REFUGEES FROM SOUTHERN RHODESIA
INCURRED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF BOTSWANA

	\$	P
(i) Construction of temporary camp at Francistown	31 320	(27 000)
(ii) <u>Food (1975)</u>		
954 refugees stayed an average of 30 days (954 x 30 x P 1.25)	41 500	(35 775)
<u>1976</u>		
5,573 refugees stayed an average of 30 days (5,573 x 30 x P 1.25)	80 810	(69 663)
<u>1977 (up to 11 January 1977)</u>		
400 refugees for 11 days (400 x 11 x P 1.25)	6 380	(5 500)
(iii) <u>Transport</u>		
(a) From September 1975 to February 1976	72 615	(62 600)
(b) From March 1976 to February 1977	145 232	(125 200)
(iv) <u>Security and supervision</u>		
(a) From September 1975 to March 1976	24 708	(21 300)
(b) From April 1976 to February 1977	56 608	(48 800)
(v) <u>Sanitation</u>		
The refugee camp is not connected to main sewers and vacuum tankers have to be used to empty septic tanks. On an average, 10 trips were necessary per week and each trip cost P 30.		
<u>September 1975 to March 1976</u>		
P 30 x 10 x 26 weeks	9 048	(7 800)
<u>April 1976 to February 1977</u>		
P 30 x 10 x 48 weeks	16 704	(14 400)
(vi) <u>Maintenance of camp</u>		
From April 1976 to February 1977 (5 per cent of capital cost)	1 450	(1 350)
Total	486 480	(419 380)

B. FUNDS EXPENDED ON REFUGEE SUPPORT BY THE BOTSWANA
COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES DURING 1976

UNHCR \$94 545 (P 81 503); All African Conference of Churches (AACC)
\$24 700 (P 21 295); International University Exchange Fund (IUEF)
\$1 119.5 (P 965), as listed below:

	\$	P
Cash allowances	94 280	(81 274)
Education allowances	282	(243)
Education programme	1 120	(965)
Emergency relief	6 970	(6 009)
Loans granted	835	(720)
Medical allowances	1 565	(1 348)
Settlement scheme	6 522	(5 622)
Travel allowances	2 005	(1 728)
Other allowances	6 790	(5 854)
Total	120 365	(103 763)

III. RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR NORMAL DEVELOPMENT

A. Background

40. The situation in Bechuanaland (and in Basutoland and Swaziland) had been under consideration by the United Nations General Assembly as early as 1962, and concern had often been expressed at the economic plight of the Protectorate. In 1965, for example, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2063 (XX) which "established a Fund for the Economic Development of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, to be made up of voluntary contributions and to be administered by the Secretary-General ...". In 1966, the Secretary-General reported that, as the contributions pledged so far were insufficient, it had not been possible to bring the fund into operation. The General Assembly, in resolution 2134 (XXI), appealed "to all States which have not done so to contribute to the Fund established by the General Assembly in paragraph 7 of its resolution 2063 (XX)". In the event, however, the fund never materialized and, on 30 December 1966, Bechuanaland became the independent Republic of Botswana after more than 80 years as a British Protectorate.

41. Independence came at the end of a very severe drought cycle which had lasted for more than five years. The situation at independence was described in the Transitional Plan of Social and Economic Development issued on Independence Day in the following terms:

"Botswana is now experiencing the most calamitous drought in living memory. Its end is not in sight. No one yet knows how many cattle have died, but it is reliably estimated that the national herd has been reduced by over one third and that the losses in some areas have exceeded 50 per cent. More particularly, a whole year's crop of calves has been lost, and it is calculated that it will need some five years for full recovery to take place. The present drought has brought with it famine, making one fifth of the population dependent on international famine relief assistance."

42. The Government's total recurrent budget at independence was approximately \$11.5 million (P 10 million), of which slightly over half was covered by internally generated revenue. The Government therefore had to depend on outside assistance for a substantial amount of its recurrent budget and all of its development expenditures. The population was small, estimated at 526,000, of which only 74,000 were attending any type of school. The gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated at \$43 million (P 37 million), or less than \$80 per capita. About half of the GDP originated in the agricultural sector. The economy was extremely open, with imports amounting to just over 50 per cent of the GDP and exports to 20 per cent of the GDP.

43. The first 10 years of independence saw a virtual transformation of the economy. The population increased to nearly 680,000, the GDP grew to over \$230 million, so that the per capita GDP exceeded \$300. The share of the agricultural sector in the GDP fell to less than 30 per cent with significant increases in the share produced in the mining, manufacturing and construction sectors. Central

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Government recurrent revenues increased from \$7 million in 1966/67 to \$85 million in 1975/76. Developmental expenditure increased from some \$4.4 million in 1966/67 to \$65 million in 1976/77. However, the economy had become more open with the development, with imports and exports both increasing as a proportion of GDP.

44. One of the major national targets at independence was to build an economically viable sovereign State which, among other things, meant freedom from reliance on recurrent budget grants-in-aid. As a result of the expansion of the beef industry, new mineral discoveries, the new customs arrangements and general economic growth, the Vice-President and Minister of Finance was able to report that self-sufficiency for the recurrent budget would occur during 1972/73.

45. Particularly important was the rapid increase in the contribution which domestic resources were able to make to development expenditure. In 1974/75 and 1975/76 domestic resources for development amounted to \$14.5 million annually, or some 40 per cent of the total development expenditures.

B. Projected development

46. Fortunately for the work of the Mission, the National Development Plan 1976-1981 had been approved by the Government of Botswana and was made available to the Mission. The plan spells out the Government's objectives, the policies for each sector and the details for financing the planned development.

47. The GDP is projected to increase by 9.6 per cent per annum, reaching \$500 million in 1980/81 (at 1976 prices). Employment in the formal sector is projected to grow by about 5 per cent per annum (from 66,000 in 1976/77 to 81,000 in 1980/81). Even this rate of growth would not absorb all of the available labour and, according to the plan, only 19 per cent of the available labour force will be in formal employment at the end of the plan period. Over the period of the plan, gross fixed capital formation is projected at \$102 million per annum. The balance-of-payments projection suggests that, for the period as a whole, a deficit on current account will be matched by capital inflows, particularly in the last three years of the plan, so that foreign exchange reserves will be maintained at a high level. (The level of foreign exchange reserves is an important consideration as Botswana has just introduced its national currency and, as a land-locked country with an open economy, prudence requires foreign exchange reserves to be at a relatively high level in terms of imports.)

48. Although the projections show a significant domestic contribution to the development budget, the vulnerability of the economy, and therefore the financial plan, should be noted. Botswana depends on three exports for its foreign exchange earnings - diamonds, copper/nickel matte and beef. But two factors need emphasizing. First, both copper/nickel matte and meat exports depend on the continuing operation of the railway and are vulnerable to any disruption of rail services. Second, earnings from beef exports depend on the continuation of the EEC quota and the arrangements for rebating the beef levy. If the beef levy rebate is not continued, Botswana's foreign exchange earnings could fall by nearly 15 per cent. Continuation of the quota and the rebate of the levy are essential to Botswana's planned development.

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C. Financing the development plan

49. Table III, drawn from the development plan, shows the projected recurrent revenues and expenditures over the plan period and the projected current surplus.

Table III

BUDGET PROJECTIONS - 1976/77 TO 1980/81
(million dollars - 1976 prices)

Recurrent revenue	83.0	109.0	124.0	125.0	140.0	580.2
Recurrent expenditure <u>a/</u>	71.0	76.4	84.8	95.1	103.6	430.8
Current surplus	12.0	32.6	39.2	29.9	36.4	149.4

a/ Including debt servicing.

50. The projected development budget for the plan period, showing the method of financing the development plan, is given in table IV.

Table IV

FINANCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT BUDGET
(million dollars - 1976 prices)

	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>Total</u>
Core development programme	52.2	61.5	63.8	58.0	54.5	290
Interplan projects	-	-	-	11.6	17.4	29
Total expenditure	52.2	61.5	63.8	69.6	71.9	319

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Table IV (continued)

	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Financed by:</u>						
Domestic Development Fund	9.3	13.9	16.2	23.2	29.0	91.6
Donor funds approved or under negotiation	42.9	47.6	44.1	25.5	15.1	175.2
	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total funds available	52.2	61.5	60.3	48.7	44.1	266.8
Funds to be negotiated	-	-	3.5	20.9	27.8	52.2

51. The methods used by the Government of Botswana in preparing the development plan should be noted. Projects for inclusion in the plan are divided into those which the Government is determined to proceed with - called a core programme - and those which will be proceeded with if funding becomes available - called the supplementary programme. The information in table IV covers only the core development programme with a small allowance for interplan projects. The core projects for the first three years are given, but flexibility is provided by allowing for interplan projects to be approved for implementation in the final two years of the plan period. These may be projects which were insufficiently studied at the time the plan was prepared, new urgent projects which emerge during the plan period, or projects which, although forming part of the supplementary plan, are found to have a higher priority than was envisaged when the plan was prepared.

52. In terms of financing development, two major domestic funds have been created which are financed by the current surplus - the Domestic Development Fund and the Public Debt Service Fund. The former fund is used to finance development projects, the latter is used to provide finance for the parastatal sector. Of the projected current surplus of \$150 million (P 128.8 million) for the plan period, \$47 million has been earmarked for the Public Debt Service Fund for onlending to parastatal organizations. Some \$92 million has been earmarked for the Domestic Development Fund to be used to finance development projects in the plan (the small balance of the projected surplus has been allocated to contingencies and revenue stabilization)

53. The costs of projects with a high priority, for which no external source of funding is available, are met from the Domestic Development Fund. The Domestic Development Fund also meets the local cost contribution to projects being partly funded from abroad.

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54. There are three features of table IV which should be noted. First, almost all of the donor funding in the first three years of the plan has been approved or is under negotiation. To the extent that those projects involve local cost contributions or only include part of the cost of a project, the availability of the foreign funding depends on the ability of the Domestic Development Fund to meet the local costs. The magnitude of this consideration can be judged from the 1977/78 estimates of expenditure in which for 30 development projects for which external financing has been negotiated, the local contribution amounts to some \$4.3 million.

55. Some \$40 million, or about 22 per cent of the finance for projects for the first three years of the plan period, are expected to be provided from domestic resources. Well over half of the domestic resources available for development is projected to be available only in the last two years of the plan period.

56. The projections in table IV do not include any of the costs of dealing with the situation that has emerged as a result of the deteriorating security situation. Both the projections of revenue and of recurrent costs assume the continuation of trends that were observed before the critical border situation with Southern Rhodesia was appreciated. The budget for 1977/78 involves lower revenue estimates than those projected in the plan and slightly higher recurrent expenditures.

57. There is already some evidence of falling private investment (e.g. in tourist facilities in the border areas) and reductions in tourism receipts. Even foreign-funded development projects in the border area are being disrupted or delayed by the security situation. In other words, not only will it be necessary to undertake projects and programmes which were not envisaged when the plan was drawn up and for which no funding was provided, but the amount of domestic resources available for development projects, depending as it does on the current surplus, is being significantly reduced by the present situation.

58. This diversion of resources to security needs will be at the expense of the contributions which the Domestic Development Fund, financed by current surpluses, was expected to make to the development budget. It is extremely difficult to identify at this time which particular programmes and projects will suffer as a result of the diversion, in view of the way in which projects in the development plan are financed. For this reason, the most useful type of assistance from the international community would be general programme assistance to the Government of Botswana.

59. Although general programme assistance would be the most useful in that it would allow Botswana to proceed with its planned development without going through a major reprogramming exercise so soon after the National Development Plan 1976-1981 was prepared and approved, it is possible for the international community to provide assistance on a project basis. Botswana would be enabled to carry on its normal development if projects which were to be financed from the Domestic Development Fund and projects for which funding was still to be arranged were to be financed by foreign assistance.

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60. A selection of projects included in the draft estimates of expenditures for 1977/78 which were to be financed from the Domestic Development Fund or for which financing is still to be arranged is given in annex II. In the absence of programme assistance, external financing would be needed for some one third of these projects if Botswana is to be in a position to carry out its planned development projects notwithstanding the diversion of funds to urgent security needs.

61. Although the question of the diversion of funds from normal development was the major concern expressed by Botswana before the Security Council, the Mission believes that the development programme will be seriously jeopardized unless a number of emergency projects are undertaken. Some of these projects were not included in the National Development Plan 1976-1981, others were included but need to be modified and accelerated.

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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDED PROJECTS

62. In the view of the Mission, the present situation involves five groups of projects which were either not included in the normal development plan or, if included, will need to be modified or accelerated.

63. These five groups of projects are:

(1) The expansion of the Police Mobile Unit.

(2) Projects to safeguard Botswana's beef industry, to reduce tension along the border, and to allow the Government to patrol the area to protect citizens and their property.

(3) Projects to safeguard Botswana against deterioration or collapse of the railway.

(4) Projects to meet emergency food requirements and to provide a strategic food reserve.

(5) Projects to allow Botswana to deal with the refugee situation.

64. Those projects will entail additional claims on Botswana's limited resources unless foreign assistance is made available. If Botswana has to meet the costs of these emergency projects, this will force postponement of many projects with high priority in the development plan and eliminate Botswana's capacity to meet the local cost component of already negotiated development assistance.

65. Those projects are summarized in each of the subsequent sections, and individual project descriptions and background data are given in annex I. Their locations are shown on the map at the end of the report.

66. It should be noted that not only are the groups of projects interrelated, but many of the individual projects are related to those in other groups of projects. The service roads and air strips (project 5) are important to the effective use of the expanded police mobile unit. The railway (project 6) is critically important to the viability of Botswana's beef industry, in that a substantial part of the rail traffic involves carrying animals to the abattoir and meat products to export markets. The strategic grain reserves and emergency food assistance are both related to the danger of disruption of rail services.

67. Nor are these emergency projects unimportant in terms of Botswana's continued ability to carry out her normal development programme. The continued prosperity of the livestock industry and the operation of the railroad are both necessary if the projected revenues and foreign exchange earnings are to materialize during the plan period.

A. Expansion of the Police Mobile Unit

68. In paragraph 28 above the costs of expanding the Police Mobile Unit were

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estimated at \$17.8 million (P15.3 million) on capital account, with associated annual recurrent costs of some \$3.6 million (P3.1 million). Of this total, however, some \$2.4 million (P2.1 million) was included in the National Development Plan 1976-1981. The Mission therefore estimated that costs of "the hitherto unplanned and unbudgeted for security needs" would amount to some \$16.3 million (P14 million) on capital account and \$3.4 million (P2.9 million) annually on recurrent account.

69. The costs of the expansion of the Police Mobile Unit will have to be met from the resources of the Government of Botswana. It will be recalled from table IV that Botswana had planned to provide \$39.5 million (P34 million) for the normal development budget from domestic resources during the first three years of the plan. However, during the first three years of the plan, \$27.8 million (P24 million) out of the \$39.5 million (P34 million) which was to have been provided from local resources for normal development will now be required for the expansion of the Police Mobile Unit and for the recurrent costs of emergency projects. This is a measure of the extent to which resources will have to be diverted from normal development to strengthening the security of Botswana in order to safeguard its sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. The situation, however, is very fluid, and it may well prove necessary for the Government to divert even more resources to security needs.

70. In order that the Police Mobile Unit be able to patrol the border area and move quickly to protect the lives and property of citizens threatened by the forces of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, it will be necessary to construct all-weather access roads in the border area. The necessary roads and supporting landing strips are included in project 5 (para. 84).

B. Group of projects to safeguard Botswana's beef industry and to reduce incidents along the border

71. Meat constitutes one of the major exports of Botswana and its meat producing, processing and export industry is efficient and is expanding. At present the industry contributes nearly one third of the value of Botswana's exports, and it is estimated that 80 per cent of the people in Botswana derive income directly from this industry. Further, substantial expansion and improvement of livestock production is under way and a number of projects for improving the industry are included in the National Development Plan 1976-1981.

72. Although there have been a number of factors which have contributed to the growth and development of the industry, strict measures for the prevention and control of disease, especially of foot-and-mouth disease, have been important in that they ensured access to higher priced markets. In 1976 the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) slaughtered some 212,000 cattle and 8,000 sheep and goats, from which they produced 6,000 tons of carcass meat and 27,000 tons of boneless beef. The gross value of this production was some \$62 million, of which over \$58 million of meat and animal products were exported.

73. At present Botswana has a quota to supply a maximum of 18,000 tonnes of

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boneless beef to EEC. The future contribution of that industry to the economy of Botswana and a continuation of the present high level of returns depend upon continued access to EEC for those high valued exports. Access to world markets would be temporarily denied should foot-and-mouth disease infect part of the Botswana herd. Continued exports also depend on the operations of the railway.

Risk of imported disease

74. Botswana has developed an efficient system of prevention and control of foot-and-mouth disease. The last outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in Botswana was in the north, on the Zambian border, in 1968. Then, in 1974, an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease was identified in the Caprivi Strip adjoining Botswana. The Government of Botswana instituted an immediate vaccination campaign, with the result that there was no outbreak in Botswana and export markets were not threatened.

75. Over the past five years there have been a number of foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks in the West Nicholson area of Southern Rhodesia, about 90 kilometres from the north-east border of Botswana. Indeed, it now seems likely that foot-and-mouth disease is endemic in that part of Southern Rhodesia. Although the reported outbreaks are some distance from the Botswana border and have therefore not been a threat to Botswana's exports to date, action is necessary to ensure that foot-and-mouth disease infection does not become such a threat.

76. It is reported that disease control and veterinary services have been declining with the increasing military and political pressures within Southern Rhodesia. This decline in control measures in Southern Rhodesia means a high risk of foot-and-mouth disease being spread through the tribal cattle in Southern Rhodesia to the Shashe and Ramokgwebana rivers which form the border between Southern Rhodesia and Botswana.

77. There is considerable random mixing of livestock across this sandy river border during the watering of stock and as a result of livestock straying across the border. A foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in Southern Rhodesia could therefore cross the border into Botswana unless measures are taken to prevent it. The effect of a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in the North-East District of Botswana, as a result of infection spreading from Southern Rhodesia, would be disastrous for the livestock industry in Botswana.

78. Botswana has a system of veterinary cordon fences which could be picketed and used to isolate any foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in one area of the country. This is particularly important because the import regulations of EEC are such that in the event of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, the export of meat can continue only if there is a controlled buffer zone between the zone containing the outbreak and the zone supplying or processing cattle for export.

Economic effects of disease on beef exports

79. At the present time there is only one cordon fence between the north-east

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border of Botswana and the sole abattoir in Lobatse in the south. In the event that foot-and-mouth disease crosses the border from Southern Rhodesia, causing an outbreak in the North-East District, the direct effects would be as follows:

(a) Slaughtering at Lobatse would be halted immediately as the foot-and-mouth disease would be in an adjacent zone;

(b) Slaughtering and export to some other markets could only be resumed after the outbreak had demonstrably been eliminated, which usually takes two to three months;

(c) Exports to EEC would be banned for a further six months.

80. The economic effects of such an occurrence on Botswana would be very great. A minimum estimate of damage would be the diversion for six months of the normal export to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to other markets. At 1976 levels of prices and exports the loss of revenue from the United Kingdom market would be over \$17 million. If those exports were sold in other world markets as frozen manufacturing beef, Botswana could expect to realize no more than \$7.7 million at today's prices. In other words, the minimum loss to Botswana would be nearly \$10 million. It is possible too that this disruption in the flow of exports to the United Kingdom could lead to some prejudice against Botswana for some period after the outbreak. This would mean a very substantial long-term loss to Botswana - a drop of something approaching 15 per cent in export earnings.

Means of eliminating the risk to Botswana's meat industry

81. Although there are a number of factors which could seriously affect Botswana's exports of meat products, the only major preventive action which Botswana can take on its own is to eliminate the threat of foot-and-mouth disease infection spreading from Southern Rhodesia. At the present time, Botswana, with external assistance, is doubling and extending existing cordon fences. But further action is required to safeguard the industry.

82. The necessary actions are as follows:

(a) To embark immediately on regular foot-and-mouth disease inoculation programmes in the North-East District which is at risk;

(b) To construct a new double cordon fence along the rivers bordering Southern Rhodesia to prevent contact between Botswana cattle and cattle from Southern Rhodesia;

(c) To provide watering points for cattle at intervals inside the fence, as a substitute for the river bed which was previously used for watering cattle;

(d) To provide water supplies for the population of the villages where those are needed, to prevent the fence being damaged by people going to the river for water;

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(e) To construct another new cordon fence to complete the triangular delimitation of the north-eastern zone. In the event of a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak, this zone could immediately be closed, along with the existing east/west cordon fence at Dibete, some 140 kilometres to the south.

83. Such action would not only eliminate much of the risk to the export of meat, but would also allow the abattoir at Lobatse to continue in operation should there be an outbreak on the border by allowing one controlled buffer zone to be created between the outbreak zone and the abattoir.

Summary of the group of necessary projects

84. The costs of those five projects, which together constitute a package of measures to safeguard Botswana's meat industry, are as follows:

<u>Capital costs</u>	
Project 2 - Vakaranga-Tuli Circle fence	\$ 986,000
Project 3 - Vakaranga-Tuli Circle water supplies	\$ 657,260
Project 4 - Palapye-Tuli Block fence	\$ 324,800
Project 5 - Service roads and airstrips	\$2,958,000
Total capital cost	<u>\$4,926,000</u>
<u>Recurrent costs - per annum</u>	
Project 1 - Foot-and-mouth disease vaccination	\$ 208,800
Projects 2, 3, 4, 5 - Fence, water and roads	\$ 162,400
Total	<u>\$ 371,200</u>

85. Details of those projects are given in annex I.

C. Project to provide a skeleton rail operation to safeguard against disruption or discontinuance of the service provided by Rhodesia Railways

86. The only railroad operating in Botswana runs from Ramatlabama in the south to near Vakaranga on the border with Southern Rhodesia. Rhodesia Railways owns and operates the line within Botswana as a result of rights which were granted in 1895 when the United Kingdom was responsible for the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The trains are manned by Rhodesia Railways, and all maintenance and repair of the rolling stock is done in Southern Rhodesia. Equipment and trained personnel for track maintenance are also provided by Rhodesia Railways.

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87. The economy of Botswana is completely dependent upon the railway. Indeed, only in recent years has an all-weather road been constructed parallel to the railway from the south to the north. Only part of the road is paved. The completion of the paving and its continuation to Kazungula making connexion with Zambia is included in the National Development Plan 1976-1981. Although the road does not have the capacity to handle the volume and types of traffic at present carried on the railroad, its completion and improvement to Zambia is important in safeguarding Botswana export industries and in providing "a life line" to and through Zambia in the event of disruption of the existing transport system.

88. The reliance of the meat industry in Botswana on the railroad has been noted above. But the livestock industry in Botswana also depends on the railway for diesel oil. Throughout Botswana, water for the national herd of cattle is provided by deep wells with diesel pumps. Botswana's two other major exports - copper/nickel matte and diamonds - also depend on the continued operation of the railway.

89. The copper/nickel matte is produced at Selebi/Phikwe, near Francistown, and shipped by rail to export markets. The mine relies on the railroad for coal, mining equipment and supplies, and petroleum products. Disruption of the operations of the railway would undoubtedly lead to the closure of the copper/nickel mine.

90. The other major export product, diamonds, is produced at Orapa and Letlhakane west of Francistown. Mining equipment and supplies of petroleum products - particularly diesel - are all taken to the mine from the railhead at Francistown. Any disruption of rail services would have serious effects on the cost structure of the diamond mines, which would in turn have serious implications for government revenues.

91. The development of Botswana over the next two decades will depend heavily on new mining ventures. Those large projects, with gestation periods of four years or more, involve large amounts of foreign investment. The Government of Botswana informed the Mission that the risk of disruption or discontinuance of the railway is already being seen as a serious disincentive to investment in such projects. This could have serious consequences for the longer-term development of Botswana.

Dangers of disruption or discontinuance of the railway

92. Although Rhodesia Railways continues to operate and maintain the line through Botswana, the Government of Botswana is gravely concerned about possible disruption or discontinuation of the service.

93. There is always a danger that fighting inside Southern Rhodesia may close the line or cause so much disruption that the railway will cease to operate. Another reason for concern arises from the extent to which Rhodesia Railways will be willing and able to continue maintenance and repair of the rolling stock and right-of-way in Botswana. The growing armed struggle in Southern Rhodesia and the increasingly heavy demands of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia for manpower for its armed forces may well reduce the capacity of Rhodesia Railways to continue the railway operation inside Botswana. The higher priority being given to the

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efficient operation of the line to Beit Bridge may also affect the level of efficiency and operations inside Botswana. Indeed, there is already some evidence - for example an increase in the number of derailments - that the demands being made on professional and technical manpower for military service by the illegal régime is affecting operations.

94. Even in the event of a settlement of the Rhodesian issue, there may be a period in which it would be difficult for the new Government in Zimbabwe to continue to operate and maintain the railway and the rolling stock if there was an exodus of skilled personnel.

95. In view of the justified concern over the railway's future, and particularly over possible disruption or interruption of services on the section of the line within Botswana, the Government of Botswana has decided to proceed with a gradual takeover, in an orderly fashion, of the operation of Rhodesia Railways within Botswana. However, in view of the shortage of professional and technical personnel within Botswana, the financial burden involved in taking over the railway and the related assets, and the absence of repair and maintenance facilities within Botswana, this cannot be done at once. But the risk to the economy of Botswana is so great that it is imperative to begin to establish a capability for the operation of at least a skeleton railway.

Programme to develop a capability to operate a skeleton railway

96. A phased programme for developing a capability to operate a skeleton railway in the event of interruption of services is set out in project 6. The project involves procuring rolling stock and maintenance equipment, developing maintenance facilities, recruiting advisers and entering into stand-by arrangements in the event of an emergency. The total costs (excluding stand-by credits) would amount to some \$16.36 million in the period from 1977 to 1980. Further details of the project are given in annex I.

D. Strategic grain reserve and emergency food requirements

97. Another grave risk to the economy of Botswana from the disruption of transport arises from the low stocks of materials and supplies held in Botswana. It has never been the custom to hold large stocks and, in recent years, there is some evidence from the national accounts that investment in inventories in general has fallen. Two major areas of concern are the stocks of petroleum products and the stocks of grain. The Mission was informed that, at most, four weeks' supply of petroleum products was available - far too little in view of the risks of disruption of the transport system. The Mission was not in a position to study the situation regarding petroleum products in depth. The Government of Botswana considers that three months' supply is the minimum stock necessary and is preparing a project costing some \$8 million for detailed discussions with possible donors.

98. The Mission was able to explore the situation regarding food grains. In 1975, a report entitled "A Policy and Action Plan for Strengthening National Food Security in Botswana" was prepared by FAO/WFP. The report recommended the

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establishment of a strategic grain reserve made up of 4,000 tons of grain sorghum and 2,000 tons of whole maize. In the light of continuing uncertainty about domestic grain production, the deteriorating security situation in the area and the danger of disruption or discontinuance of rail operations, those recommendations should be implemented as soon as possible.

99. Arable agriculture in Botswana shows huge variations in both yields per hectare and in hectareage planted. Those variations are related in large measure to the erratic quantity and distribution of rainfall, e.g. in 1970/71, some 120,000 tons of sorghum and maize grain were produced, whereas in 1972/73 the total production of those crops reached only 8,100 tons. As grain is the staple diet, the country has to depend on purchases of grain from external sources to meet shortfalls in domestic production. On balance Botswana needs to import food grains in two years out of three.

100. In recent years the Government has introduced major measures to improve food production and to provide regular supplies. The establishment of the Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board (BAMB) in 1975 was a major step towards increasing production and regularizing supply through price stabilization and a more rational approach to pricing policy. The establishment of BAMB now makes it feasible to introduce a strategic grain reserve as part of the Board's normal operations.

Need for a strategic grain reserve

101. In the FAO/WFP report the need for a strategic grain reserve over and above the normal operating stock of about 4,000 tons held by BAMB was based on the following factors:

(a) There should be on hand in Botswana at least one month's grain requirements to meet the possibility of interruption of imports.

(b) The Board should control about 20 per cent of the food grain supply to enable it to counteract widespread and excessive price rises in times of shortage. The proposed strategic grain reserve, coupled with the Board's operational stock, would put the Board in possession of approximately 20 per cent of the annual food grain requirements.

(c) The recent trend towards maize consumption is not helpful to food security in Botswana even though maize is less expansive than sorghum at present. Sorghum can be produced over a much wider area of the country than maize, and is slightly less vulnerable to erratic rainfall. Sorghum should be available to prevent a further shift towards maize consumption.

(d) Stocks of grain could be replenished through commercial or Board sources within six weeks. The strategic grain reserve, coupled with the Board's operational stock, would exceed six weeks' requirements and therefore be sufficient for all reasonable contingencies.

102. In addition to the arguments for the strategic grain reserve in the FAO/WFP

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report, the Government believes there are compelling reasons to create the reserve at this time. The deteriorating security situation in the region makes it increasingly probable that the country's land communications will be disrupted. For a country so dependent on the import of food-stuffs, the reserve would provide critical breathing space in the event of loss or disruption of the transport system. The dependence on imports has been accentuated by the poor rains and poor hectarages planted in the 1976/77 season.

Establishment of a strategic grain reserve

103. The establishment of a strategic grain reserve is outlined in project 7. The strategic grain reserve will be located to take account of the pattern of production and consumption of grains in Botswana. The maize will be stored at Lobatse or Pitsane, or at Selibe Phikwe or Palapye, in order to be within easy reach of a mill. The sorghum will be stored at the same sites and at Maun, Francistown, Gaborone or Mahalapye. The existing storage capacity is already being used for the normal commercial operations of the Board. It is therefore necessary not only to obtain the grains to constitute the reserve but also to provide additional storage. If the grain reserve is imported immediately, initial storage will be under poles and tarpaulins. In the longer term, metal and steel frame-type warehouses will be erected at the various locations. At today's prices, the cost of erecting the necessary warehouses will be \$174,000 (P 150,000).

104. The cost of the grain for the strategic reserve, if bought on the world market, would be some \$485,400 for 2,000 tons of maize and \$950,100 for 4,000 tons of sorghum. In addition, the cost of transport to the various stores would add \$28,800 to the cost.

105. The total capital cost of the project would therefore be \$1,638,300. There would also be an annual recurring cost of \$80,000 for fumigating and handling the grain and for the repair and maintenance of the storage sheds.

Management and operation of the reserve

106. Management and control of the strategic grain reserve will be the responsibility of BAMB.

107. The reserve is designed to be used in a situation of national food shortage to allow time for arrangements to be made to import extra supplies of food grain. One indication of a food shortage would be the running down of the BAMB operating stock, which normally amounts to 4,000 tons, and which constitutes the first line of defence in the event of shortage. The Government proposes that the strategic reserve be tapped when the operating level is down to 25 per cent, i.e. 1,000 tons, but subject to government approval.

108. Revenue from the sales of emergency stocks through commercial channels would finance replenishment. If a more serious shortage situation was identified, e.g. crop failure with a subsequent large increase in destitution, the reserve would be used as food aid and would be distributed by existing food aid programmes,

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e.g. WFP. In this case, BAMB stocks would be replenished through food assistance or by the Government.

109. The details of project 7 on the establishment of a strategic grain reserve are given in annex I.

Emergency food requirements

110. Even with the creation of the strategic grain reserve (project 7), Botswana is likely to face severe food grain shortages in 1977/78 as a result of erratic rains and drought.

111. The Ministry of Agriculture, based on monthly reports of its extension services, is predicting a grain harvest in the neighbourhood of 45,000 tons in 1977. Past estimates of subsistence production of maize and sorghum have been of the order of 90,000 tons per annum and per capita consumption estimates also imply consumption of the same order. The surplus grain left over from the last crop season is estimated at 20,000 tons.

112. The Government of Botswana has concluded that there will be a shortfall of at least 20,000 tons of grain before the 1977/78 harvest. The Government is therefore requesting 7,000 tons of sorghum and maize, for delivery from August onwards for selective famine relief for those sections of the population who have experienced crop failure and cannot afford to buy imported grains. This request constitutes project 8.

113. The request for 7,000 tons of food aid will only meet part of the expected shortfall. However, it will provide, along with the strategic grain reserve, sufficient food to meet shortages until further deliveries can be arranged after actual grain harvests become known and the situation is reviewed.

114. Detailed methods of distribution of the requested food aid still have to be worked out. However, it is likely that the Institutional Food Programme, which currently administers the World Food Programme in Botswana, would supervise the distribution of selective famine relief. In the last period of shortage (1975/76), the Institutional Food Programme reached 237,000 people in Botswana. However, it should be emphasized that the ability of the Institutional Food Programme to handle and distribute the larger programme envisaged, depends on further assistance being provided. Two project memoranda were submitted in 1976 to the United Nations Capital Development Fund and to FAO/WFP requesting assistance for improving the operations of the Institutional Food Programme. Unless that assistance is forthcoming, the Institutional Food Programme is unlikely to have the capacity to distribute further food aid later this year.

115. Details of this project (project 8) and supporting background data are provided in annex I. The cost of the grain delivered to stores in Botswana would be approximately \$1.74 million.

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E. Projects to allow Botswana to deal with the refugee situation

116. The number of refugees in Botswana is large, and is increasing every month. Paragraphs 29-32 above provided basic information on the number of refugees in Botswana, their countries of origin, and gave some indication of the numbers currently arriving and leaving Botswana. Briefly, there were 861 refugees from South Africa and 2,638 refugees from Southern Rhodesia out of a total of 4,478 refugees in Botswana at 25 February 1977.

117. In the period from 1 January 1977 to 25 February 1977 3,381 refugees arrived from Southern Rhodesia and 98 from South Africa. Although many of those refugees leave Botswana, the numbers are very large and the cost of transporting, protecting, feeding and providing shelter are significant. The data in table 2 show that the cost to Botswana from September 1975 until February 1977 amounted to \$486,480 for accommodating the refugees from Southern Rhodesia alone. In addition, some \$120,365 was expended by the Botswana Council for Refugees in 1976 to assist refugees in Botswana.

118. The group of projects to deal with refugees (projects 9, 10 and 11) recommended by the Mission will still leave Botswana to meet many of the costs. Transport, security and supervision, which in the past were responsible for nearly two thirds of the costs, will continue to be needed. The Mission's rough estimate of the annual costs to Botswana for transport, security and supervision of refugee movements at present levels is \$250,000. The projected recurrent costs of the Government in the National Development Plan 1976-1981 do not make provision for those costs at the levels now being experienced. If the number of refugees entering Botswana continues to increase, those costs will be correspondingly higher. It should be noted that the information provided by the Government of Botswana since the visit of the Mission suggests that the number of refugees is still increasing and that the number of women with young children is becoming significant. The group of recommended projects (9, 10 and 11) only deals with the emergency that has arisen, and there will have to be a review of the needs of refugees, especially families and school children.

Projects to deal with the refugee problem

119. It was noted in paragraph 35 above that a separate report has been prepared in accordance with General Assembly resolution 31/126 on the problems posed for Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana by the influx of South African refugee students following the riots in Soweto and elsewhere. That report recommends a reception centre and educational facilities in Botswana costing some \$4.4 million. It is sufficient to note here that if external assistance is not provided to help Botswana deal with the influx of refugees from South Africa, Botswana's ability to finance normal development will be correspondingly reduced.

120. The influx of large numbers of refugees from Southern Rhodesia presents a much greater economic and financial burden. The conditions in the existing transit centre in Francistown are described in paragraphs 36 and 37 above. The situation is now critical, and three emergency projects are recommended to alleviate the worst problems of congestion and overcrowding.

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Improvements to the transit centre in Francistown

121. First, a small amount should be spent on the existing transit centre to improve facilities (project 9). The project involves providing lighting for the existing dormitories, the construction of a dining area, the construction and improvement of sewerage, drainage and toilets. The estimated cost of these emergency improvements is \$17,290. The Mission was informed that UNHCR had funds available for these improvements and that work could begin immediately. The estimate of costs for improvements does not include an additional vacuum tanker to empty the septic tanks at the camp. At the present time, Francistown has only one such tanker, and it is unable to deal with the normal needs of the town and the septic tanks at the transit centre. When additional facilities have been provided for the refugees, it will be necessary to reconsider the role of the transit centre in Francistown, and, depending on the situation at that time, to determine a programme for improvement and rehabilitation if the centre continues to be needed.

Temporary tent camp

122. There is also a need for a temporary tent camp, at least until the new refugee centre (project 11) is constructed, to house the large number of refugees who cannot be accommodated at the existing transit centre. Tents, blankets, furniture and equipment for a temporary tent camp are urgently required. The Government of Botswana is prepared to move immediately to clear the site, provide hard standing for the tents and to construct toilets and kitchens. The estimated cost of such a project would be \$122,000.

Reception centre at Selebi/Phikwe

123. Projects 9 and 10 are purely emergency measures required as a result of the dramatic increase in the number of refugees in Botswana. There is an urgent need to provide a new reception centre. The accommodation would consist of six hostel blocks, six toilet/ablution blocks, a dining hall and kitchen block, three classrooms, an office block, other service blocks, housing for staff, and site works and services. The total cost of the new reception centre is estimated at some \$851,440. The details of this project and a summary of projects 9 and 10 are given in annex I.

124. In the past it had been assumed that refugees from Southern Rhodesia would be in transit through Botswana, awaiting only an opportunity to travel elsewhere, and that most of the refugees from Southern Rhodesia would be single young persons. In recent months, however, a growing number of refugees from Southern Rhodesia have decided to remain in Botswana. The Mission was informed that women and children were among the latest groups entering Botswana. The facilities recommended above (projects 9, 10 and 11) are mainly for reception and transit facilities and do not make any organized provision for education or training of refugees from Southern Rhodesia. It may, therefore, be necessary to provide more appropriate facilities. But the situation is very fluid and there is insufficient information about the age composition of the refugees, their educational attainments or their preferences to make any specific longer-term plans for education and training. The proposed reception centre and the associated services will make it possible to collect the necessary information to review the situation.

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F. Summary of financial implications

125. The Mission's estimates of the financial implications of the recommended programmes and projects and its estimates of the extent of the diversion of resources from normal development are given in the following paragraphs.

126. Summary of financial implications of recommended emergency programmes and projects

<u>Project title</u>	<u>Capital costs</u>	<u>Recurrent costs</u>
1. Foot-and-mouth disease vaccination	-	\$209,000
2. Vakaranga-Tuli Link fence	\$ 986,000)	
3. Watering points	657,300)	(93,400
4. Palapye-Tuli Link fence	325,000)	(69,600
5. Surface roads and airstrips	2,970,000)	
6. Skeleton railway	16,310,000	(Stand-by credit) <u>a/</u>
7. Strategic grain reserve	1,638,300	80,000
8. Famine relief	1,740,000 <u>b/</u>	
9. Francistown transit centre	17,290 <u>c/</u>	
10. Emergency refugee tent camp	121,800	
11. Refugee reception centre	851,440	
Total	<u>\$25,617,130</u>	<u>\$452,000</u>

a/ Most of the recurrent costs until the skeleton railway needs to be operated would be met by foreign technical assistance. What is required is a stand-by credit so that, in an emergency, Botswana can operate the railway and meet any operational losses.

b/ This does not include the costs of the requests to the United Nations Capital Development Fund and FAO/WFP for improving the operations of the Institutional Food Programme.

c/ These funds are already available from UNHCR. The amount shown does not include the costs of a vacuum tanker to serve the transit centre.

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127. Mission estimate of the diversion of resources from normal development

	<u>Capital</u>	<u>Annual recurrent</u>
Expansion of the Police Mobile Unit	\$16,300,000	\$ 3,400,000
Security, protection and transport of refugees	-	250,000
Annual recurrent costs of emergency projects		243,000 <u>a/</u>
	<u>\$16,300,000</u>	<u>\$ 3,893,000</u>
Total costs to Botswana during the first three years of the plan period <u>a/</u>		\$27,979,000
Domestic resources available for normal development for the first three years of the plan period <u>a/</u>		\$39,440,000

a/ Excludes costs of project 1 (foot-and-mouth disease vaccination campaign) which it is assumed will be covered by external assistance.

(Of course the effects of the diversion will extend beyond the first three years. However, as the situation will need to be reviewed, the Mission has concentrated only on the first three years.)

128. In other words, some 70 per cent of the domestic resources which Botswana intended to use for its planned development during the first three years of the plan will need to be diverted to other purposes. The balance of the domestic resources available for the first three years of the plan is already committed as counterpart funds for foreign assistance which has already been arranged or is under negotiation. In addition, the emergency projects, costing some \$25.0 million on capital account alone, need to be financed. Those figures suggest that all the projects in the core programme which the Government of Botswana intended to finance from the Domestic Development Fund and the total costs of projects in the core programme for which funding was still to be arranged, as well as the emergency projects recommended in this report, will need to be financed by external sources if Botswana is to be enabled to carry out its normal development as envisaged in Security Council resolution 403 (1977). The situation will be even more serious if recurrent resources fall short of the projections in the plan, as they are apt to do in the present circumstances.

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CONCLUDING REMARK

129. The Mission believes that there are four major ways in which the international community could assist Botswana to carry out its normal development projects in the new circumstances:

(a) General programme assistance to match the diversion of funds from normal development;

(b) Project assistance for projects included in the National Development Plan 1976-1981 for which financing has not yet been arranged;

(c) Assistance in carrying out the emergency projects;

(d) Financing agencies agreeing to reduce or waive local cost contributions to development projects and programmes. In view of the magnitude of the local contribution to projects and programmes financed by external sources, that approach could make a significant contribution at this time.

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Annex I

SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND DATA FOR INDIVIDUAL EMERGENCY PROJECTS

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Summary of projects for the North-east Veterinary Control
Zone to safeguard Botswana's beef industry

Scope: The establishment of a veterinary control zone mainly for prevention and control of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in north-east Botswana requires the following complete package of projects:

- (a) Project 1: FMD vaccination campaign (annual);
- (b) Project 2: Vakaranga-Tuli Circle veterinary closed cordon fence;
- (c) Project 3: Vakaranga-Tuli Circle water supplies;
- (d) Project 4: Palapye-Tuli Block veterinary open cordon fence;
- (e) Project 5: Service roads and airstrips.

Justification: There have been a number of outbreaks of FMD over the last 3-5 years in the West Nicholson area of Southern Rhodesia, about 90 km from the north-east border of Botswana. Samples of all three southern African strains of the virus (SAT 1, SAT 2, and SAT 3) are being submitted frequently to the international FMD centre from the West Nicholson area. Tribal grazing lands extend from this area to the Botswana border. There appears to have been some decline in veterinary measures in Southern Rhodesia already, and with further social disruption and military activity in Southern Rhodesia, a further decline is to be expected. (Even in the event of an early settlement of the Southern Rhodesian situation, there will be a continued need for stringent veterinary control measures.) The risk of an FMD outbreak crossing the border into Botswana is very high. The FMD vaccination campaign would ensure that should FMD cross the border the severity of outbreak in Botswana would be less than without vaccination, and the disease would be eliminated more quickly. The Vakaranga-Tuli Circle veterinary closed cordon fence will prevent Botswana livestock from watering in the riverbeds of the Ramokgwebana and Shashe rivers and thus prevent contact with livestock which may be infected. The cattle water points are necessary if access to the river is denied, and village water points are needed to ensure that damage to the fence by people going to the river is avoided, as well as saving people from the danger of harassment or aggression by border patrols by the forces of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. The Palapye-Tuli Block veterinary open cordon fence will complete a continuous cordon around the north-east zone. There would then be a buffer zone between the border and the abattoir at Lobatse, so that if there was an FMD outbreak at the border, the abattoir could continue operations, drawing cattle from the south and west once the FMD had been contained. If this fence were not built, the abattoir would be closed for a further six months. The economic justification for this package is that it will greatly reduce the risk of FMD crossing the border, and that if FMD does cross the border, it will reduce the heavy loss on export beef which would otherwise occur. If there was an FMD

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outbreak at the border at the present time, meat exports would cease for two or three months while the disease was being eliminated. In favourable conditions, these cattle could be slaughtered later at little loss. However, for another six months, Botswana chilled meat would be denied access to EEC markets and would have to be sold as frozen meat in any markets available. The minimum loss in export revenue would be \$9.4 million over this period. The cost to Botswana of a sustained period of loss of markets could be some 15 per cent of export earnings. There is also justification for the border fence and water supplies from a personal security point of view. At present, people and cattle who go down to the riverbed for water and people who cross the river to retrieve cattle run the risk of harassment, kidnapping or even death from border patrols of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. This package will ensure that people no longer have to go to the river and will also provide improved access and communications, primarily for veterinary purposes but also for the security forces.

Institutional framework: Responsibility for construction of the various elements will be vested with the Department of Veterinary Services, Ministry of Agriculture; Water Affairs Department, Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs; and the Roads Department of the Ministry of Works and Communications. Prime responsibility for operation of the control zone will rest with the Department of Veterinary Services, Ministry of Agriculture.

<u>Timing:</u>	<u>Major activities</u>	<u>Date</u>
	Vakaranga-Tuli Circle fence	June 1977-March 1978
	Palapye-Tuli Block fence	April 1978-August 1978
	Water supplies	June 1977-June 1978
	Service roads and airstrip construction	January 1978-July 1979

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1. FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE VACCINATION CAMPAIGN

PROJECT SUMMARY

Sector: Agriculture

Project priority: Emergency

Objective: Carry out FMD vaccination, using bivalent or trivalent vaccines on approximately 300,000 cattle in the north-east veterinary control zone.

Justification: As outlined in the Summary of Projects for the North-east Veterinary Control Zone. This specific project will reduce the chances of any FMD occurrence in the zone and ensure more rapid elimination of the disease following an outbreak coming from Southern Rhodesia.

Institutional framework: Carried out annually by staff of the Department of Veterinary Services, Ministry of Agriculture.

Timing: June 1977 and annually thereafter.

Costs:	FMD vaccine	P 165,000
	Casual labour	5,000
	Vehicle operation	10,000
		<hr/>
		P 180,000
	or	<hr/>
		\$ 209,000
		<hr/>

2. VAKARANGA-TULI CIRCLE VETERINARY CLOSED CORDON FENCE

PROJECT SUMMARY

Sector: Agriculture

Project priority: Emergency

Objective: Construction of approximately 320 kms of double 1.4 m high fence, including small stock-proofing. Bush clearance where necessary (50 ha) from Vakaranga Junction to Tuli Circle along the Ramokgwebana and Shashe rivers.

Justification: Over-all justification outlined in the Summary of Projects for the North-east Veterinary Control Zone. This specific project will physically prevent contact between potentially FMD-infected livestock from Southern Rhodesia and Botswana livestock. It will also prevent cattle from going down to the river where they and their owners risk harassment and aggression from Southern Rhodesia.

Work done to date: Consulting engineers have traversed the route of the fence, drawn up specifications and designs and prepared tender documents in consultation with the Department of Veterinary Services. The Central Tender Board has called for tenders.

Institutional framework: Responsibility for the project is vested in the Department of Veterinary Services, Ministry of Agriculture.

Timing:	<u>Major activities</u>	<u>Dates</u>		
	Acceptance of tender	May 1977		
	Construction	June 1977-March 1978		
Costs:	<u>Item</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>Total</u>
		(thousands of Pulas)		
	Bush clearance etc.	35	-	35
	Fence - supply and erect	573	165	738
	Erect maintenance			
	Compounds and supply vehicles	77	-	77
	TOTAL	P 685	P 165	P 850,000
		or		\$ 986,000

Post-project activities: Patrol and maintenance of fence and minor road maintenance by Veterinary Services Division will cost about \$93,400 (P 80,000) per year.

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3. VAKARANGA-TULI CIRCLE WATER SUPPLIES

PROJECT SUMMARY

Sector: Agriculture

Project priority: Emergency

Objective: Erect and install 24 water points on the Ramokgwebana and Shashe rivers. Each point to include well points, electric-powered pumps with standby, remote diesel generator, storage tanks, cattle troughs, simple water treatment and standpipe for village water supply.

Justification: Over-all justification is mainly related to cattle disease control as outlined in the Summary of Projects for the North-east Veterinary Control Zone. This specific project will allow cattle to be watered at or near existing veterinary crushes and will provide a basic water supply to villages and small settlements when the fence has stopped access to the riverbeds. The storage tanks, cattle troughs, water treatment and standpipe taps will be situated up to 1 km from the riverbed. This is desirable to reduce overgrazing around the water points and will also reduce the risk of harassment or injury by the border patrols of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia.

Work done to date: Consulting engineers have recommended a general design, the Department of Veterinary Services has investigated siting of points, and tenders have been called (along with the closed cordon fence - project 2); the Department of Water Affairs has drawn up a final design to provide a standby pump and more complete supply to settlements. Most additional elements in this design can be provided within the present tender document by increasing the quantities of given items as specified and costed in the existing tender.

Institutional framework: Operation of the pumps will be controlled by the Department of Veterinary Services, which will supply a full-time pumper at each site and integrate general servicing with the fence-patrolling function. Periodic maintenance of watering points will be carried out under the existing programme of the Department of Water Affairs.

Timing:	<u>Major activities</u>	<u>Dates</u>
	Acceptance of tender	May 1977
	Construction	June 1977-December 1977

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Costs:	<u>Item</u>	<u>Costs</u> <u>1977 (Total)</u>
	24 x Pumps, generators, well points, fittings	P 180,480
	24 x Pipes, tanks, troughs	85,920
	24 x Installation and trenches	181,200
	24 x Water treatment etc.	48,000
	Extensions for village supplies	55,000
	4 x equipment for boreholes	16,000
		<u>P 566,600</u>
	or	<u>\$ 657,300</u>

Post-project activities: Supply of fuel, supervision, minor repairs by Department of Veterinary Services and periodic maintenance by Department of Water Affairs are estimated to cost \$69,600 (P60,000) annually from 1978 onwards.

Background data

Project coverage: Main cattle-based water points (north to south)

Cattle crush:

<u>Watering point</u>	<u>Approximate number of cattle</u>	<u>Approximate distance from preceding water point (km)</u>
Jakalasi I	1,300	—
Butale	650	7.5
Senyawé	2,000	18
Jakalasi II	1,100	20
Matshelagabeui	850	20
Gongwa	400	4
Mhatane	400	5
Tshilo Hill	650	5
Pobe Pobe	650	8

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Cattle crush (continued):

<u>Watering point</u>	<u>Approximate number of cattle</u>	<u>Approximate distance from preceding water point (km)</u>
Bareng Mahupela	700	2
Rooj Kop	700	2
Matsiloje	700	5
Lephaneng	700	5
Maroking	1,500	7
Metopi	1,200	10
Molomololapudi	(N/A)	13
Mmadikgaka I	3,050	12
Mmadikgaka II	1,900	7
Mushambe	2,700	18
Lenyetse I	2,100	15
Lenyetse II	3,500	14
Mabolwe	3,000	25
	<u>Total</u>	
	29,750	

Two additional points will be sited in the heavily settled north.

Eight southern points are cattle posts with settlements remote from the border.

Equipment per water point:

	<u>Number</u>
Reciprocating pump (Mono CD70 type)	2
Electric motor, 5HP weatherproof	2
Well points 2" x 750 mm	10
Diesel generator 9 kw	1
3 core cable 300 m	1
Pump house	1
Pipe OVC 75 mm Cl.6	1,000 m
Tank 45 m ³	2

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Equipment per water point:

	<u>Number</u>
Trough with ball valve	4
Topstand	1
Plus fittings, belts, pulleys	

Approximate cost per water point: P 20,000
or \$ 23,200

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4. PALAPYE-TULI BLOCK VETERINARY OPEN CORDON FENCE

PROJECT SUMMARY

Sector: Agriculture

Objective: Construction of approximately 90 kms of double 1.4 m high fence, including small stock-proofing, but with regular openings to enable free movement of livestock in normal times. From Palapye to Sherwood Ranch in the Tuli Block. Bush clearance along length of fence (80 ha).

Justification: Over-all justification outlined in the Summary of Projects for the North-east Veterinary Control Zone. This specific project will allow the creation of a triangular veterinary controlled zone bordered by the Vakaranga-Tuli Circle fence in the north and east, the railway fences in the west and the subject fence and Tuli Block fence in the south. In the event of disease outbreak on the border this fence would be closed and picketed, as would the north-west to south-east fence through Dibete, 140 km to the south. The zone between Palapye and Dibete would be the quarantine buffer zone, so that the meat plant at Lobatse would be able to recommence operation, being in the zone south of Dibete, immediately the disease was controlled in the north-east zone.

Work done to date: As with project 2 (Vakaranga-Tuli Circle veterinary closed cordon fence). Tenders have been called.

Institutional framework: Responsibility for the project is vested in the Department of Veterinary Services, Ministry of Agriculture.

Timing:	<u>Major activities</u>	<u>Dates</u>
	Acceptance of tender	May 1977
	Construction	April 1978-August 1978 (following completion of project 2)
Costs:	<u>Item</u>	<u>1978 Total</u>
	Bush clearance	P 54,000
	Fence supply and erection with 20 gates	200,000
	Contingency 10 per cent	26,000
	Total	P 280,000
		or \$ 325,000

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Post project activities: Patrol and maintenance of fence by the units attached also to Vakaranga-Tuli Circle fence. Access by existing all-weather road Palapye to Sherwood Ranch. Recurrent costs included in project 2.

5. SERVICE ROADS AND AIRSTRIPS

PROJECT SUMMARY

Sector: Transport

Project priority: Emergency

Scope: Construction of 600 km of low-cost roads and three airstrips for servicing of veterinary cordon fence and related watering points in the Francistown area.

Implementation by force account.

Justification: The deterioration of veterinary controls in Southern Rhodesia threatens cattle in Botswana's north-east with foot-and-mouth disease infection. It places the country's entire meat industry in jeopardy. Major preventive programme includes the construction of a cordon fence extending along the Southern Rhodesian border from Vakaranga to the Tuli Circle, so as to prevent stray animals from crossing the Ramokgwebana and Shashe rivers. Closure of access to the rivers will make it necessary to establish frequent watering points within the fence, using pumps to draw river water into storage tanks. The construction of low-cost roads and airstrips is required to provide access to the fence area for construction and maintenance, to enable sanitary patrolling and to ensure adequate servicing of the fence and of related watering points. Low-cost roads and airstrips are also required for patrolling of the border by police units. It will be recalled, in this connexion, that forces of the illegal régime have recently been operating as much as 10 and 15 kilometres inside Botswana territory. Patrolling is expected to act as a deterrent to such incursions, reduce the dangers to life and property and improve the security of persons in villages in the border areas.

Institutional framework: Responsibility for the project will be vested with the Roads Department of the Ministry of Works and Communications, whose staff and facilities will be strengthened to this effect under the project.

Timing:	<u>Major activities</u>	<u>Dates</u>
	Procurement and delivery of equipment and spares, mobilization of personnel	July 1977-December 1977
	Construction	January 1978-July 1979
	Project completion	July 1979

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Costs:	Item	Costs (million)			
		1977	1978	1979	Total
	Equipment and spares	P .72	--	--	.72
	Equivalent	\$.84			.84
	Expatriate staff	P .01	.31	.16	.48
	Equivalent	\$.01	.36	.19	.56
	Operation costs	P --	.90	.45	1.35
	Equivalent	\$ --	1.05	.52	1.57
	Total	P .73	1.21	.61	2.55
	Equivalent	\$.85	1.41	.71	2.97

Post-project activities: Project equipment will revert to the Ministry of Works and Communications upon completion of construction. It shall remain available for purposes of maintenance.

Background data
(22 February 1977)

Project coverage

<u>Roads</u>	<u>Present condition</u>	<u>Length (km)</u>
Sefhophe-Bobonong	Poor gravel	65
Bobonong-Kobojango-Semolale	Track	60
Francistown-Selkirk turnoff	Fair gravel	31
Selkirk turnoff-Matsiloje	Track	14
Francistown-Matshelagabedi	Track	23
Tsamaya-Siviya-Rhodesian border	Track	9
Nkange-Maitengwe	Track	30
Survey beacon 113 to Tuli Circle	Track	<u>368</u>
	Total	600

Airstrips

Bobonong
Semolale
Maitengwe

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Road criteria

Clearing and grubbing width: 20 m. Formation width: 6 m. Construction at grade or slightly above (feasible since terrain is flat). Crowned cross section. Ditches as required. Spot-graveling where in-place soils are unsuitable (estimated 30 per cent of total length). Irish crossings at streams (estimated length: 2.5 m per km of road). Desired travel speed: 50 km/h average.

Airstrip criteria

Clearing and grubbing: 80 m x 2.000 m. Grading: 25 m x 1.200 m, including limited earthworks and gravel surfacing.

Project timing

Mobilization: 6 months (1977). Construction: 18 months (1978-1979).

Construction rate

Estimated 0.75 km of road daily. Use two construction units.

Equipment

Requirements for two units:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Unit cost (P)</u>	<u>Total cost (P)</u>
Bulldozer (D-6)	2	72,000	144,000
Front-end loader (2.5 cy)	2	40,000	80,000
Grader	2	47,000	94,000
Vibratory roller	2	12,000	24,000
Tipper	10	18,000	180,000
Bowser	2	18,000	36,000
Concrete mixer (0.5 cy)	2	3,000	6,000
Mobile shop	1	40,000	40,000
Land rover	4	6,000	24,000
			628,000

Spares

10 per cent of equipment cost yearly.

Total for project: 628,000 x .1 x 1.5

P 95,000

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Expatriate staff

One site engineer to arrive in 1977 for mobilization and organization. Full complement of personnel required for 18 months, starting January 1978. All personnel costed at P51,600 per man year.

	<u>No. required</u>	<u>Cost (million P)</u>			
		<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>Total</u>
Site engineer	2				
Master mechanic-operator	1				
Assistant mechanic-operator	1				
Administrative assistant	<u>2</u>				
Total	6	0.01	0.31	0.16	0.48

Irish crossings

Estimated 3 cubic metres of masonry or concrete per linear metre, at a cost of P65.0 per cubic metre.

Total requirement 600 x 2.5 x 3 x 65 300,000

Petrol, oil, lubricants

Estimated at 33 per cent of equipment cost yearly.

Total requirements 628,000 x .33 x 1.5 310,000

Local staff and labour

Estimated at P1,200 daily, on the basis of 420 days. 505,000

Overhead and contingencies

Estimated at 9 per cent of total project cost. 232,000

Total for project

P2,550,000

Approximate cost per kilometre or (\$2,958,000)
(disregarding airstrips) P4,250 or \$4,930.

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Implementation strategy

As scheduled herein, the project's roads and airstrips would be completed under force account by July 1979. It is recognized that completion of at least a track at a much earlier date is highly desirable. Use of contractors to speed up the project would probably increase costs by nearly 200 per cent and would not increase the capacity of the Roads Department for either maintenance or construction.

Recommended programme

(a) Immediate launching of spot improvements programme (Irish crossings, repair of most critical sections), using the existing resources of the Roads Department.

(b) Assurance of reliable four-wheel-drive traffic: June 1977.

(c) Mobilization of funds from external sources, procurement of equipment, construction under force account.

(d) Completion of work: July 1979.

6. SKELETON RAILWAY OPERATION

PROJECT SUMMARY

Sector: Transport

Project priority: Emergency

Scope: Procurement of engines, waggons and track maintenance equipment; development of rolling stock maintenance facilities; recruitment of advisers; and provision of miscellaneous items for railway operation in case of emergency and as initial steps towards ultimate railway takeover.

Justification: The bulk of Botswana's trade, both external and internal, is carried by Rhodesia Railways whose line runs through the country, along its eastern border. Botswana is highly dependent on Rhodesia Railways' services. Their interruption would bring most economic activity to a standstill, with great loss and human suffering. It is significant, however, that Botswana's ability to control the continuity of the railway's services is virtually nil, since it has no share in its ownership or in its management. In view of its justified concern over the railway's future and particularly over possible disruption or interruption of services on the Botswana line, the Government announced its intent to proceed with gradual takeover through an orderly process, as well as with the immediate development of a capability for operation of the line in the event of an emergency. The project's purpose is to begin the buildup of a capability for both emergency operation and eventual takeover.

Institutional framework: Responsibility for the project will be vested with the Ministry of Works and Communications, whose staff will be reinforced to this effect under the project through the provision of advisers.

Timing:	<u>Major activities</u>	<u>Dates</u>
	Procurement and delivery of equipment and spares	July 1977--July 1978
	Recruitment and arrival of advisers	July 1977--December 1977
	Design of maintenance facilities	July 1977--December 1977
	Construction and equipping of maintenance facilities	January 1978--December 1978
	Arrival of staff for operation of maintenance facilities	January 1979

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Costs:

<u>Item</u>		<u>Costs (million)</u>				<u>Total</u>
		<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>	<u>1980</u>	
Equipment and spares	P 2.76	6.44	-	-	-	9.20
Equivalent	\$ 3.21	7.49	-	-	-	10.70
Expatriate personnel	P 0.10	0.12	0.24	0.22	0.22	0.68
Equivalent	\$ 0.12	0.14	0.28	0.26	0.26	0.80
Maintenance facilities	P 0.02	0.98	-	-	-	1.0
Equivalent	\$ 0.02	1.14	-	-	-	1.16
Miscellaneous items	P 0.20	1.20	1.78	-	-	3.18
Equivalent	\$ 0.23	1.40	2.07	-	-	3.70
Total	P 3.08	8.74	2.02	0.22	0.22	14.06
Equivalent	\$ 3.58	10.17	2.35	0.26	0.26	16.36

Post-project activities: Assistance under the project will satisfy priority needs for emergency operation of the railway, and it will constitute a first step toward a buildup of capability for orderly takeover of the railway at a future date. It is stressed that further assistance will undoubtedly be needed, both during and after project completion, depending on progress and on the findings of the Government. Stand-by credits to deal with the operating losses of a skeleton railway are needed and could be substantiated. The amounts, however, will depend upon a number of factors (e.g., amount and type of assistance with rolling stock and staff) which cannot be quantified at this time. In addition, substantial investment in road transport may become necessary at any time.

Background data

(23 February 1977)

Project purpose

Development of a skeleton capacity for emergency operation of Botswana's portion of Rhodesia Railways in the event of interruption of services on the part of Rhodesia Railways. Simultaneously, initial steps toward ultimate takeover of Botswana's portion of the railway by the Government of Botswana.

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Timing criteria

Target: readiness for emergency operation of a railway within Botswana on notice of two months or less. Allowing for mobilization, this should be possible starting in mid-1978.

Major elements of the plan

<u>Item</u>	<u>Required action</u>	
	<u>Immediately</u>	<u>Upon interruption of service</u>
Staffing:	Personnel training at all levels. Stand-by arrangements, preferably on a Government-to-Government level, for emergency recruitment of expatriate personnel as required for emergency operations.	Recruitment of expatriate personnel.
Motive power:	Procurement of engines. Assignment thereof upon delivery to Mahalapye-Mafeking section of the line.	Operation of engines on all lines within Botswana by newly recruited expatriate personnel.
Petrol, oil, lubricants:	Use of South African Railways waggons under standing interchange agreement, as per current practice.	Continued use of South African Railways waggons.
Other merchandise:	Procurement of waggons. Assignment thereof upon delivery for use on all lines within Botswana on lease to railways or major shippers.	Continued use of waggons on all lines within Botswana, with newly acquired engines and newly recruited personnel.
Rolling stock maintenance:	Staged development of maintenance facilities within Botswana. Corresponding phase-out of current maintenance practices. Stand-by arrangements for use of additional facilities in South Africa.	Use of newly developed facilities within Botswana and additional facilities in South Africa.

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<u>Item</u>	<u>Immediately</u>	<u>Upon interruption of service</u>
Track maintenance:	Staged procurement and introduction of track maintenance equipment. Corresponding phase-out of current practices. Stand-by arrangements for handling of balance of maintenance requirements under contract.	Launching of track maintenance contract, with allowance for use of newly introduced track-maintenance equipment.
Operating capital:	Stand-by arrangements for credits as required for emergency operation.	Use of pre-arranged credits.
Co-ordination:	Immediate assignment of advisers to maintain state of readiness in managerial, technical, and financial matters.	Launching of emergency procedures developed by advisers.

Immediate assistance requirements

- (a) Procurement of engines;
- (b) Procurement of waggons;
- (c) Development of rolling stock maintenance facilities (stage I);
- (d) Procurement of track maintenance equipment (stage I);
- (e) Miscellaneous items (equipment, buildings, stores, vehicles etc.);
- (f) Recruitment of advisers.

Recorded Botswana traffic (transit traffic excluded)

	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>	<u>Traffic</u> (thousands of tons)	
			<u>Internal</u>	<u>Total</u>
1972-1973	448.7	40.9	96.6	586.2
1973-1974	516.7	64.0	229.6	810.3
1974-1975	447.1	74.7	212.5	734.3
1975-1976	488.5	95.0	300.4	883.9
				/...

Train and engine requirements for Botswana traffic

<u>Run (round trip)</u>	<u>Distance (km)</u>	<u>Trip time (hrs)</u>	<u>Trains daily</u>	<u>Engines required</u>
Mafeking-Vakaranga	1,332	54	2	4.5
Morupule-Selebi Pikwe	298	30	1	1.25
Lobatse-Vakaranga	1,178	48	15	3
			Subtotal	8.75
			Spare allowance	1.25
			Total	10.

It is estimated that the emergency operations will provide for 60 per cent of normal Botswana traffic. Engine requirements for emergency operation: 6 units.

Waggon requirements for Botswana traffic

<u>Traffic</u>	<u>Daily loading (no. of waggons)</u>	<u>Turn-around time (days)</u>	<u>Waggons required</u>
Coal: Morupule to Selebi Pikwe	15	5	75
Coal: Morupule to Gabcrone power plant	5	6	30
Livestock: various stations to Lobatse	36	5	180
Meat: Lobatse to South Africa	6	10	60
General merchandise: scattered break-bulk	13	8	104
Copper-nickel matte	3	12	36
Explosives			2
Cabooses			6
		Subtotal	493
		Spare allowance	49
		Total	542

It is estimated that the emergency operation will provide for 60 per cent of normal and nearly all essential Botswana traffic. Waggon requirements for emergency operation: 325 units. Financing assured for 55 units. Balance to be procured: 270 units.

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Rolling stock maintenance facilities (stage I)

Location of facilities: Palapye, Mahalapye, or Serule. Scope: trackage, buildings and equipment for engine maintenance shop (1 bay) and waggon maintenance shop (3 bays), including parts storage and administration. Expatriate staff for on-the-job training of local personnel and operation of facilities (10 specialists).

Track maintenance facilities (stage I)

Procurement of one mechanized track maintenance unit. Expatriate staff for on-the-job training of local personnel and operation of unit (3 specialists).

Miscellaneous items

- (a) Procurement of breakdown equipment;
- (b) Procurement of road vehicles;
- (c) Procurement of basic stores (tarpaulins, chains, spare parts);
- (d) Construction of buildings (offices, storage sheds, essential housing, etc.);
- (e) Contingencies.

Recruitment of additional advisers

Advisers in operations, civil engineering, mechanical engineering, finance and signalling and telecommunications, for a period of two years.

Costing of immediate assistance requirements

<u>Item</u>	<u>Cost (million P)</u>
Engines and five-year supply of spare parts, 6 x 460,000	2.76
Waggons and five-year supply of spare parts, 270 x 22,000	5.94
Rolling stock maintenance facilities (stage I)	
Buildings and trackage	0.50
Equipment	0.50
Expatriate staff for two-year period 10 x 20,000 x 2	0.40

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Costing of immediate assistance requirements (continued)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Cost (million P)</u>
Track-maintenance facilities (stage I)	
Equipment	0.50
Expatriate staff for two-year period 2 x 20,000 x 2	0.08
Advisers	
5 x 20,000 x 2	0.20
Miscellaneous items	
Breakdown equipment	0.20
Road vehicles	0.20
Basic stores	0.50
Buildings	1.00
Contingencies (10 per cent of total project costs)	1.28
Total	<u>P 14.06</u>
or	<u>\$ 16.31 (million)</u>

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7. STRATEGIC GRAIN RESERVE

PROJECT SUMMARY

Sector: Agriculture

Project priority: Emergency

Scope: To provide a strategic reserve of 4,000 tonnes sorghum grain and 2,000 tonnes maize grain. To supply and erect storage sheds capable of storing 6,000 tonnes of bagged grain.

Justification: The establishment of a strategic reserve of 6,000 tonnes is based on the following:

(a) the possibility of disruption of grain supply at a time of the year when consumption was being met by imports. This could happen if the railway service was interrupted, or if there were other interruptions to supply as a result of strikes or political upheavals.

(b) In order to counteract excessive seasonal price fluctuations the Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board (BAMB) needs larger stocks than it has at present.

(c) Botswana has extreme variations in seasonal rainfall and other climatic conditions resulting in recent production ranging from about 120,000 tonnes of maize and sorghum in 1970/71 and 1975/76 to only 8,100 tonnes in 1972/73. At present, there is no co-ordinated drought-monitoring system, and so a strategic grain reserve is urgently needed to allow quick remedy if shortages emerge in the country.

Work done to date: Government requested preparation of "A policy and action plan for strengthening national food security in Botswana", which was completed by FAO and WFP in 1975.

Donor aid was not forthcoming at that time and in view of the better-than-normal growing seasons in 1974, 1975 and 1976, the Government felt that other projects had a higher claim on domestic development funds. A study dealing with drought in relationship to the livestock industry has been recently completed, and a study on drought in relation to crops is to be undertaken shortly.

Institutional framework: Responsibility for operation of the stores and maintenance of the reserve in good quality would be vested in BAMB. This project would be integrated into their existing storage capacity, and the stock would be turned over as part of their trading operation.

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Decisions relating to draw-down of the stock would be made by Government in consultation with WFP.

Eventually, it would be integrated into the drought monitoring mechanism.

Timing:	<u>Major activities</u>	<u>Dates</u>
	Construction of stores to hold 6,000 tonnes grain.	June-Sept. 1977
	Importation 6,000 tonnes grain	Aug.-Sept. 1977
Costs:	<u>Item</u>	
	Stores for 6,000 tonnes	P 0.15 million
	4,000 tonnes sorghum and 2,000 tonnes maize delivered could cost up to	<u>1.23 million</u>
		P 1.38 million
		or \$ <u>1.60 million</u>

Post-project activities: The recurrent costs of maintaining the reserve in good quality would be about \$80,000 (P 68,760), including fumigation, depreciation and repairs and maintenance of the stores, and 5 per cent storage loss.

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8. GRAIN REQUIREMENTS FOR FAMINE RELIEF

PROJECT SUMMARY

Sector: Agriculture

Project priority: Emergency

Scope: To provide 5,000 tonnes sorghum and 2,000 tonnes maize grain to Botswana.

Justification: The rains in Botswana have come very late this year, and there is little likelihood of a normal grain crop. The north of the country is particularly hard hit, and the south is also affected. The normal level of production and consumption is approximately 80,000-90,000 tonnes of sorghum and maize per year in the subsistence sector. Some maize is exported but is thought to roughly balance the approximately 20,000 tonnes of maize meal and maize reimported from South Africa (this operation is likely to continue as long as the subsidy system in South Africa continues to operate). Production this year is forecast to be 45,000 tonnes, and there is, in addition, approximately 20,000 tonnes carry-over in farmers' stores from the good crop in 1975/76. A shortfall in food grain of 20,000 tonnes is expected before the next harvest. Seven thousand tonnes is assessed as necessary to overcome famine in the worst-affected groups, particularly poorer farming families whose crops fail this year. The 6,000 tonnes strategic reserve (project 7) will provide some flexibility and can be drawn-down, if necessary, while further supplies are being obtained.

Work done to date: In the past (late 1960s), in times of drought, food was distributed in "Food for Work" and "Food for Fallow" programmes. In recent good seasons, this was discontinued.

Institutional framework: The Government has yet to finalize the institutional arrangements for distributing famine-relief grain, but it is anticipated that distribution will be co-ordinated with existing WFP distributions to schools and to vulnerable groups of the population. The WFP distribution is administered by the Institutional Food Programme, which, in 1975/76, reached 237,000 people. The IFP has storage for 5,000 tonnes throughout the country. Improvements to this storage and vehicles to support the programme have been requested from the United Nations Capital Development Fund and the United Nations/FAO World Food Programme.

Timing: The grain should be shipped to arrive in Botswana in August 1977.

Costs: The costs of this grain, delivered to store in Botswana could be as much as \$1.74m. (P 1.5m.).

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Post-project activities: Monitoring of food situation by the Government and WFP to determine possible need for further supplies of grain on the basis of better estimates of the shortfall for the year.

Background data

Average rainfall figures for Botswana range from 250 to 500 mm per year. This rainfall occurs during the summer months from the end of September to April or May. However, amounts are very variable both annually and regionally, and distribution through the season is unpredictable. Correspondingly, crop production is extremely variable, with yields fluctuating widely to the extreme of total crop failure. Ploughing and planting begin after substantial rains and optimum yields are obtained through planting in October and November; but, depending on the date of the last rains, planting can be delayed until early February. Harvesting takes place any time between February and June.

Crop yields over the last four years have been estimated at:

	<u>Sorghum tonnes</u>	<u>Maize tonnes</u>	<u>Total tonnes</u>
1972/73	10,000	4,000	14,000
1973/74	73,000	33,000	106,000
1974/75	34,000	29,000	63,000
1975/76	55,000	60,000	115,000

It is deduced that subsistence production is of the order of 90,000 tonnes per year, if replenishment of stores is taken into account. Per capita consumption estimates also imply a consumption of 80,000-90,000 tonnes per year. Production of beans tends to increase in a year of low rainfall because of their short growing season, but production figures are not available.

The Institutional Food Programme is currently distributing food to 237,000 people in Botswana. This food is received by two groups: primary school children and vulnerable groups. The breakdown is as follows:

Primary school children	120,000
Pre-school children	89,000
Pregnant women	24,000
TB outpatients	4,000
Total	<u>237,000</u>

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Grain crop outlook: The Agricultural Field Services Division of the Ministry of Agriculture produces monthly summaries of the information they receive from District Agricultural Officers. Included in these summaries are statements of the state of ploughing and planting, yield forecasts and an estimate of the amount of grain held in storage. The situation reports produced at the end of December indicated that the 1977 harvest is likely to be very low. The reports at the end of January noted sufficient rainfall for ploughing and planting, but yield forecasts were described as fair to poor. The Ministry of Agriculture is now predicting yields of 50 per cent in the south and 30 per cent in the north, where many areas had very little early rain. On this basis, a harvest of 45,000 tonnes of grain is estimated.

The surplus stock carry-over is currently estimated at three months or 20,000 tonnes. Some increase in bean production and consumption is expected. However, an over-all shortfall of about 20,000 tonnes is predicted. Therefore, selective famine relief is likely to be needed by people who will experience partial or total crop failure and cannot afford to buy maize.

While all estimates are subject to wide margins of error and crop yields will depend on the amount of rainfall in the next two months, a request is made for the delivery of 7,000 tonnes of sorghum and maize from August 1977. If food for work programmes are going to be used, then some other food would need to be substituted for part of this total. Unmilled maize has to be processed at Lobatse or through a new mill at Selebi-Pikwe. There is some evidence of consumer resistance to yellow maize.

Administration and distribution: Government has still to make decisions on the machinery for distributing this food aid. It is likely to be administered by the Institutional Food Programme, but the distribution of food to destitutes is somewhat different from their existing programme, which provides 5,000 tonnes of food to primary school children and vulnerable groups. Proposals for food for work programmes, free hand-outs or selling at subsidized prices still have to be drawn up. The Institutional Food Programme has over 5,000 tonnes storage capacity throughout the country and can handle the increased volume, if the supply is staggered. In 1972/73 12,000 tonnes were handled. If delivery of the whole 7,000 tonnes occurs at one time, emergency storage would be required. However, the present IFP vehicle fleet is three to four years old, and the storage facilities need renovation. Proposals for improvements were included in the project memoranda submitted to the United Nations Capital Development Fund and to the United Nations/FAO World Food Programme in 1976. Without the new vehicles and renovation to buildings, IFP would not have the capacity for this increased operation.

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IFP Stores

<u>Location</u>	<u>Number of store buildings</u>	<u>Maximum capacity</u>	<u>Distribution</u>
Sebele	2	2 200	South east and Gaborone
Francistown	3	480	North east and North central
Palapye	4	500	Eastern central
Mahalapye	1	230	Southern central
Lobatse	2	350	Southern District
Molepolole	1	200	Kweneng District
Kanye	1	150	Eastern Ngwaketse
Mochudi	1	200	Kgatlang District
Maun	1	160	Ngamiland
Serowe	1	200	Serowe area of Central District
Kasane	2	60	Chobe
Pitsane	1	200	Reserve store for Lobatse
Tshabong	1	150	Reserve store for Lobatse (Kgalagadi District)
Ghanzi	1	150	Reserve store for Lobatse (Ghanzi District)
		<u>5 230</u>	

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9. EMERGENCY IMPROVEMENTS TO FRANCISTOWN REFUGEE CENTRE

PROJECT SUMMARY

Sector: Humanitarian relief

Objective: To improve on an emergency basis the existing Refugee Transit Centre at Francistown.

Justification: The present facilities are grossly inadequate for the refugees who are currently being accommodated there. The Centre was originally constructed for 240 persons. At present, there are some 900 persons of both sexes being housed in the Centre, with more waiting to be admitted. Arrangements and facilities for proper administration, record-keeping and recreational facilities are non-existent. Additionally, there are no kitchen or dining facilities, and sanitary and toilet facilities are completely inadequate.

Costs involved: The following improvements should be made immediately:

Lighting for existing dormitories	\$ 750
Construction of dining area	3,900
Construction and improvement of kitchen facilities	2,768
Improvement of sewerage, drainage and toilets	4,672
Reserve	5,200
Total	<u>\$17,290</u>

The mission was informed that UNHCR had funds available within the country for these improvements and that work could begin immediately.

Follow-up: When projects 10 and 11 are completed, it will be necessary to reconsider the role of the Centre in Francistown and to decide on a programme for improvements and rehabilitation if the Centre is still needed.

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10. EMERGENCY ACCOMMODATION FOR REFUGEES

PROJECT SUMMARY

Sector: Humanitarian relief

Project priority: Emergency

Objective: To establish a temporary tent camp to house the large number of refugees who cannot be accommodated at the existing transit centre until a new refugee reception centre is constructed (see project 11). Thereafter, the tent camp will be held as back-up facilities to serve any sudden influx of refugees and to provide shelter for the overflow from the existing camp while it is being reconditioned and improved (see project 9).

Justification: Existing refugee transit facilities are designed for 240 persons. At the present time, some 900 persons of both sexes are being housed in the Centre, with more waiting to be admitted. The movement of refugees from Southern Rhodesia to Botswana has increased sharply in recent months, and more are arriving each week. Emergency provision is required until better facilities can be provided.

Timing: The Government of Botswana has already approached a number of Governments and organizations to provide the tents, blankets, furniture and equipment. The Government is prepared to move immediately to clear the site, provide hard-standing for the tents, and construct toilets and kitchens.

Costs: Site preparation, including toilet and kitchen blocks	\$ 63,800
Tents*	\$ 58,000
Total cost	\$ 121,800

Post-project activities: The above estimates do not include the recurrent costs of operating the camp. UNHCR has indicated that funds would be available to cover these recurrent costs.

* It may prove more economical to construct simple block-wall hostels. This alternative is being actively explored. The additional cost of constructing 50 such units, each housing 10 persons, is estimated at from \$16,000 to \$20,000.

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11. REFUGEE CENTRE: SELEBI-PIKWE

PROJECT SUMMARY

Sector: Humanitarian relief

Objective: To provide a centre for the large numbers of refugees from Southern Rhodesia

Justification: There has been a dramatic increase in the number of Zimbabwean refugees who pass through Botswana. The existing Transit Centre at Francistown can only accommodate a small proportion of these refugees. A Francistown doctor has declared that the Centre will soon become a health hazard if the number of inmates is not reduced to 240. Another refugee centre is therefore required.

Institutional framework: The Office of the President of the Republic is responsible for refugees and co-operates closely with UNHCR and the Botswana Council for Refugees.

Timing: The centre is urgently needed, and construction can begin immediately.

Costs: Preliminary estimate of construction costs

- Notes:
1. Camp to accommodate 600 persons.
 2. Construction of single-storey conventional pattern; cement-paved floors; plastered brick/block walls, pitched steel-sheet roofs; softboard ceilings.
 3. No furniture, furnishing included.
 4. Electric lighting installations included.
 5. Costs are at current day rates.

A. Buildings

i.	96-place hostel block ($474m^2$) P38 200 x 4	P152 800
ii.	108-place hostel block ($523m^2$) P42 200 x 2	84 400
iii.	Toilet/ablution blocks, each with No. 8 VCs, No. 8 basins, No. 8 showers, No. 4 sinks ($98m^2$) P15 600 x 4	62 400

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iv.	Toilet/ablution blocks, each with No. 9 WCs, No. 9 basins, No. 9 showers, No. 4 sinks (104m ²) P16 700 x 2	33 400
v.	Dining hall and kitchen block (507m ²) (allowance for solid-fuel cooking pots) P59 300 x 1	59 300
vi.	Class-rooms (102m ²) P7 000 x 3	21 000
vii.	Fuel compound (fencing and gates only)	400
viii.	Office block (7 offices), with toilet facilities (90m ²) P9 700 x 1	9 700
ix.	Generator housing P500 x 1	500
x.	Library (102m ²), with wall shelves P8 000 x 1	8 000
xi.	Health post (65m ²) P8 000 x 1	8 000
xii.	Toilet blocks to class-rooms P9 000 x 1	9 300
		<hr/> P 448 900

B. Housing

i.	Refugee counsellor/centre director type II P18 000 x 2	36 000
ii.	Assistant centre director type M2 P9 500 x 1	9 500
iii.	Staff housing P4 000 x 4	16 000

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C. Site works and services

i.	Site clearance recreation ground, roads and paths	10 000
ii.	Security fencing	11 000
iii.	Site water supply with tank, main supply and distribution	16 000
iv.	Electrical supply and site reticulation (generator)	40 000
v.	Stormwater and soil drainage	35 000
vi.	Solar heating	45 000
		<hr/> 667 400
	Contingency	66 600
	Total	<hr/> P 734 000
	or	<hr/> \$ 851 440

Note: The estimates for site works and services are provisional.

Post-project activities: After the camp is constructed, these will be recurrent costs of operation and maintenance. UNHCR has indicated that funds would be available to cover these recurrent costs.

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Annex II

SELECTED PROJECTS FROM DRAFT ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURES FOR
1977/78

<u>Head and subhead</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Funds needed</u>	
		<u>1977/78</u> (Pulas)	<u>1978/81</u> (Pulas)
71.7	Bulk stores-animal health	60 754	175 500
71.17	Veterinary laboratory	50 000	307 500
71.20	Co-operative bank equity	100 000	410 000
71.29	Livestock auction yards	26 000	2 000
71.32	Salvinia control	59 700	55 300
71.55	Field staff housing	50 000	405 000
71.62	Livestock development	1 100 000	12 141 100
72.1	Wildlife conservation and development	168 625	591 420
72.3	Wildlife conservation education	4 944	15 300
72.7	Gaborone Dam Park	17 000	23 100
72.8	Trade fair ground	30 300	40
72.13	Wildlife and range management	242 300	12 640
72.14	Maun Wildlife Training Centre	231 000	-
72.21	Industrial building scheme	100 000	810 000
73.4	Water supply scheme	460 500	3 373 500
73.9	Underground water development	66 000	-
73.13	Air pollution control	24 600	-
73.15	Geological survey buildings	34 500	122 450
73.25	Electrical department development	200 000	237 800
73.27	Village water supplies	200 000	770 000

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<u>Head and subhead</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Funds needed</u>	
		<u>1977/78</u> (Pulas)	<u>1978/81</u> (Pulas)
74.7	Customs and immigration control	136 100	715 800
74.9	Tax administration development	110 000	-
74.12	Bank of Botswana	240 000	575 000
77.24	District housing	164 000	630 000
77.31	Francistown development	330 000	4 631 000
77.35	Nalehi upgrading	433 500	1 400 500
77.37	Gaborone growth study	25 000	-
78.4	Road depots	66 000	86 400
78.5	Aerodrome improvements, Gaborone	20 000	5 200
78.9	Government buildings	467 000	835 000
78.10	Meteorological development	171 400	318 890
78.11	Botswana-Zambia road	5 520 000	7 185 000
78.12	Ghanzi-Kanye road	300 000	8 535 500
78.15	Road maintenance equipment	500 000	135 000
78.19	Maun and Kasane aerodromes	250 010	1 143 090
78.21	Secondary road improvements	235 000	3 108 950
78.27	Radio communications equipment	409 000	138 600
78.28	Underground and overhead cables	291 000	958 400
78.31	CTO fleet development	500 000	2 772 200
78.32	Aviation fire and rescue	149 010	426 790
78.34	Buildings department depots	99 000	194 000
78.35	Improvements to government railway lines	30 030	147 970

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<u>Head and subhead</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Funds needed</u>	
		<u>1977/78</u> (Pulas)	<u>1978/81</u> (Pulas)
78.37	Mahalapye-Serule road	4 300 000	10 820 800
78.40	Vehicle-testing stations	86 000	40 300
78.49	Aerodrome improvements, Francistown	350 000	95 500
80.18	Bobonong health centre	14 500	76 300
80.19	Ghanzi health centre	200 000	165 200
74.14	Central stores	300 000	1 430 000
74.15	National Development Bank	750 000	750 000
74.16	Migration study	230 000	176 200
74.17	Manpower survey	5 000	70 650
75.1	Mater Spei College	225 000	589 000
75.3	Moeheng College	63 000	200 600
75.7	Teachers Training College, Francistown	260 000	331 220
75.8	Teachers Training College, Lobatse	370 000	488 550
75.12	Lobatse secondary school	94 000	299 250
75.14	Moeng College	123 000	-
75.15	Maun secondary school	330 000	-
75.17	Tutume Community College	92 850	47 900
75.18	Teacher Training College, Serowe	350 000	408 900
76.20	National archives	70 000	261 100
77.2	Botswana Housing Corp.	110 000	400 000
77.3	Local authority development grants	223 800	178 200
77.13	Primary school equipment	600 000	4 373 000

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<u>Head and subhead</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Funds needed</u>	
		<u>1977/78</u> (Pulas)	<u>1978/81</u> (Pulas)
77.14	Primary schools	2 400 000	10 010 000
77.15	Surveys and roads	220 600	440 900
77.16	Development of Land Ecards	490 000	656 900
77.20	Primary school stores	40 000	311 500
77.21	Rural industry grants	125 000	520 500
77.22	Rural administration centres	220 020	2 679 180
77.23	Lobatse development	200 000	5 220 000
80.22	Kasane Health Centre	100 000	258 600
80.25	Dental health services	50 000	286 130
80.29	Control of communicable disease	50 000	192 500
80.30	Lady Leisching Health Centre	7 000	172 000
80.32	Tsabong Health Centre	60 000	285 400
		<u>P27 230 000</u>	<u>P95 635 000</u>
	or	\$31 587 000	\$110 937 000

Note: This list includes core projects, plus projects from the supplemental programme. In the budget speech delivered to the National Assembly on 7 March 1977, the Vice-President and Minister of Finance stated: "For the total number of projects included in the National Development Plan, P65.8 million (\$76.3 million) is required to be appropriated in 1977/78. This figure will exceed the likely expenditure for a number of reasons, and I expect the outturn to be in the region of P54 million (\$62.6 million)."

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REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA

LOCATION OF EMERGENCY PROJECTS



FM D vaccination campaign (Project 1)



Vakaranga - Tuli Circle fence (Project 2),
and associated water supplies (Project 3)



Palapye - Tuli Circle fence (Project 4)



Service roads and airstrips (Project 5)



Railway (Project 6)



Strategic grain reserve (Project 7)



IFP stores (Project 8)



Project 9



Projects 10 and 11

