



## Security Council

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ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM II)

## INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to paragraph 28 of Security Council resolution 864 (1993) of 15 September 1993, by which the Council requested the Secretary-General to submit to it as soon as the situation warranted, and in any case in good time before 1 November 1993 and again before 15 December 1993, a report on the situation in Angola and the implementation of that resolution. The Security Council further requested the Secretary-General to include in the report his recommendation for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process and, in the meantime, to keep the Council regularly informed of developments. Since the adoption of the resolution, the members of the Council have been kept regularly informed of developments in Angola.

2. The President of the Security Council, at the Council's 3302nd meeting, held on 1 November 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the situation in Angola, made a statement (S/26677) in which he, inter alia, reaffirmed the provisions of resolution 864 (1993). In that statement, the Council noted the communiqué of 6 October by the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), and expressed its concern that not enough progress had yet been made towards the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and relevant resolutions of the Council. The Council also demanded that UNITA take the necessary steps to comply with its previous resolutions, and expressed its readiness to consider the immediate imposition of further measures under the Charter of the United Nations, including, inter alia, trade measures against UNITA and restrictions on the travel of UNITA personnel, at any time that it observed that UNITA was not cooperating in good faith to implement the "Acordos de Paz" and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, or upon a report from the Secretary-General to that effect.

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\* Reissued for technical reasons.

## I. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

3. Since my last report to the Security Council, dated 27 October 1993 (S/26644), my Special Representative, in cooperation with the representatives of the three observer States under the "Acordos de Paz" (the United States of America, the Russian Federation and Portugal) and in contact with the Government of Angola and UNITA, has pursued his efforts to get the peace process in the country moving again along the path of negotiation within the framework of the "Acordos de Paz" and the resolutions of the Security Council.

4. As a result of the efforts of my Special Representative, exploratory contacts were held at Lusaka, from 25 to 31 October 1993, under United Nations auspices, with representatives of the three observer States in attendance. The objectives of the exploratory contacts were:

(a) To obtain from UNITA the clarifications sought by the Government of Angola in order to dispel the "ambiguities and contradictions" referred to by the Government in its note verbale of 8 October 1993;

(b) To ascertain whether appropriate conditions for a resumption of the negotiations existed.

5. During the exploratory talks at Lusaka, my Special Representative had an opportunity to discuss with the UNITA delegation all the specific points raised by the Government of Angola in its note verbale of 8 October 1993, which had been a response to the UNITA communiqué of 6 October 1993.

6. UNITA provided the following clarifications relating to the points covered in its communiqué of 6 October 1993:

(a) According to UNITA, "the updating of the 'Acordos de Paz'" meant that certain provisions of the peace agreements needed to be brought up to date, including those relating to:

- (i) The composition, role and organizational structure of the Joint Political-Military Commission, including the strengthening of the United Nations role;
- (ii) The police;
- (iii) Demobilization and demilitarization;
- (iv) Compliance with the "triple zero" clause;
- (v) The security of UNITA's leaders, members of the Party, its sympathizers, members of other opposition parties and the population in general;
- (vi) The necessity of peaceful coexistence among all Angolans;
- (vii) The formation of a unified national army.

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UNITA specified that the seven points should be the subject of in-depth discussion during the negotiations with the Government of Angola.

(b) On the question of its acceptance of the results of the legislative and presidential elections held on 29 and 30 September 1992, the UNITA delegation stated that the term "fraudulent" did not affect the UNITA position as contained in its statement of 6 October 1993, in which it expressed its acceptance of the results of the elections. In that respect, it reiterated the position that it had already set forth in the letter addressed to my Special Representative on 27 November 1992, in which it recalled its conviction that there had been fraud and said that it had lodged with the Supreme Court an appeal which had not yet been acted upon. As to UNITA's characterization of the results of the elections as "fraudulent", the UNITA delegation explained that the term was political in nature and without legal import. As regards the institutions resulting from the elections, UNITA would like to be properly represented in the executive branch of government and to be in a position to guarantee the security and protection of its leaders, members of the Party, its sympathizers and other members of the opposition;

(c) Concerning the work at Abidjan, the UNITA delegation considered the draft protocol drawn up during the talks at Abidjan to be "a serious basis for negotiations between the Government of Angola and UNITA". The draft protocol represents a substantial and firm basis for future negotiations. It is, however, incomplete and requires further elaboration before the parties can proceed to its signature;

(d) With regard to the position of UNITA on the resolutions of the Security Council, it was emphasized that the expressions "took note of" or "took due note of" were not far from signifying acceptance of the Council resolutions;

(e) As regards the obligations laid down by the Security Council, the UNITA delegation made the following observations:

(i) With respect to the obligation to end the hostilities, the UNITA delegation held that its unilateral declaration represented a step forward and that the Government of Angola must respond to it on a reciprocal basis in order to expedite conclusion of a bilateral cease-fire agreement;

(ii) With regard to the obligation to withdraw its troops from the occupied territories, the UNITA delegation emphasized the need to tackle that issue, which could not be dealt with in isolation and must be considered in the framework of a bilateral cease-fire agreement, including arrangements for on-site verification and monitoring and for full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz".

7. With regard to the Government, my Special Representative, with the support of the representatives of the observer States, called on the Government delegation to reaffirm its willingness to observe a unilateral cessation of hostilities, so that negotiations could begin in a climate enhanced by the observance of a de facto cease-fire.

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8. With the support of the representatives of the three observer States, my Special Representative called on UNITA to provide notification, in writing and unequivocally, and by 31 October 1993 at the latest, of its acceptance of the principle of withdrawal, in accordance with paragraph 8 of resolution 864 (1993) in which the Council demanded that UNITA should immediately withdraw its troops to United Nations-monitored areas as a transitional measure pending full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz".

9. In a letter dated 30 October 1993, UNITA informed me that it accepted the principle contained in paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 864 (1993). In the same letter, it stated that the modalities for the implementation of the principle would be considered during the negotiations with the Angolan Government and that in the interest of a peace that would guarantee security for and coexistence among all Angolans in the same country, the above-mentioned principle should be applied within the framework of a bilateral cease-fire throughout the national territory. On 3 November, my Special Representative officially transmitted to the Angolan Government the document conveyed to me by UNITA.

10. With regard to the request made to the Government to observe a unilateral cessation of hostilities once UNITA agreed in writing to comply with paragraph 7 of resolution 864 (1993), the Government explained to my Special Representative that it had not been able to make such a commitment, for the following reasons:

(a) Once the exploratory contacts at Lusaka had ended, UNITA had launched military offensives in a number of locations in the country, despite its declaration of a unilateral cessation of hostilities;

(b) Although the Government had been satisfied by the first paragraph of the UNITA letter of 30 October 1993 in which UNITA agreed to withdraw its troops, the third paragraph of the letter had given rise to problems for the Government because it considered the principle of withdrawal of UNITA troops only within the framework of a bilateral cease-fire. Thus, UNITA had itself shown its preference for a bilateral act;

(c) Lastly, given the discreet nature of the forthcoming negotiations, the Government would not feel comfortable about justifying a cessation of hostilities to its troops. My Special Representative nevertheless emphasized that, in the absence of a unilateral declaration of cessation of hostilities, the Government should ensure that a pause in military operations is observed for the duration of the talks at Lusaka.

11. Following the exploratory contacts at Lusaka, my Special Representative, in consultation with the representatives of the three observer States under the "Acordos de Paz", set the date and venue for the talks. He pursued his contacts with the Angolan Government and, by telephone and fax, with UNITA. He also met with a number of Heads of State of the region, particularly President Miguel Trovoadá of São Tomé and Príncipe and President Sam Nujoma of Namibia, whose actions contributed to the effective resumption of negotiations between the Angolan Government and UNITA.

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12. Accordingly, the Angolan peace talks began at Lusaka on 15 November 1993. An initial plenary session made possible a direct meeting between the two delegations, which each put forward a draft agenda. Divergences between the positions of the two delegations necessitated a series of consultations, which led to the adoption on 19 November 1993 of the following agenda:

1. Reaffirmation of the acceptance by the Government and by UNITA of the relevant legal instruments:
  - (a) The "Acordos de Paz";
  - (b) Security Council resolutions.
2. Further implementation of the "Acordos de Paz" and completion of the Abidjan work:
  - (a) Military questions: re-establishment of the cease-fire; withdrawal, quartering and demilitarization of all UNITA military forces; disarming of all civilian populations; completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces, including demobilization;
  - (b) Police;
  - (c) Mandate of the United Nations and role of observers in respect of the "Acordos de Paz";
  - (d) National reconciliation;
  - (e) Conclusion of the electoral process and other pending questions.
3. Other matters: date and venue for the signing of the Lusaka Protocol.

13. It was agreed that the two delegations would, in advance, submit their position on each agenda item in writing. Consideration of the agenda was the occasion for the Government solemnly to reaffirm its acceptance of the validity of the "Acordos de Paz" and its unconditional acceptance of all Security Council resolutions. The UNITA delegation also reaffirmed its acceptance of the validity of the "Acordos de Paz", while reiterating its desire to update certain provisions. With regard to the Security Council resolutions, UNITA stated that it took "due note" of them. However, like the Government, UNITA formally indicated that it accepted the conclusions drawn by my Special Representative at the close of the consideration of those two agenda items, namely that the "Acordos de Paz" could be amended if, during the peace talks at Lusaka, the Government and UNITA decided to do so, and that the fact of taking "note" or "due note" of the Security Council resolutions was not significant, since those resolutions were enforceable and since the parties concerned were required to implement them.

14. In order to facilitate discussion of the technical aspects of military issues, an ad hoc military committee was established. The committee, which is headed by the chief of the military contingent of UNAVEM II, consists of military attachés of the observer States, Government and UNITA officers and

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military elements of UNAVEM II. The committee held several meetings during which general and specific principles relating to the military issues on the agenda were considered.

15. On 10 December 1993, the negotiations culminated in the formal adoption of general and specific principles on the re-establishment of the cease-fire and the practical arrangements, including a timetable for the implementation of those principles. The general and specific principles on completing the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces were also adopted.

## II. ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST UNITA

16. In resolution 864 (1993) the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, decided that, starting on 26 September 1993, all States should adopt the measures set forth in paragraphs 19 to 25 of the resolution "unless the Secretary-General notifies the Council that an effective cease-fire has been established and that agreement has been reached on implementation of the 'Acordos de Paz' and relevant resolutions of the Security Council".

17. The arms embargo imposed against UNITA by resolution 864 (1993) came into force at 0001 hours Eastern Standard Time on 26 September 1993.

## III. MILITARY SITUATION

18. In Angola, on the military front, although reports received from the UNAVEM II teams deployed in five Angolan towns confirm that the fighting has become much less intense since 21 September 1993, troop movements and build-ups by both the Government and UNITA continue to be noted.

19. The reports given by the Government and the UNITA-controlled media have been contradictory. According to Government sources, there have been UNITA troop and logistic build-up and movements around the towns of Kuito/Bié, Andulo, Malange, Luena, Cabinda and Saurimo. The same sources have reported UNITA attacks, ambushes and mine-laying in several parts of the country and UNITA shelling of Menongue, the capital of Kuando-Kubango province.

20. The Government media have also stated that the oil and arms embargo imposed against UNITA by Security Council resolution 864 (1993) has been violated and that UNITA has continued to receive substantial shipments of military matériel and other assistance through a number of air and sea ports in the country.

21. For its part, UNITA's Radio, "Vorgan", has not broadcast many military reports during the period under review, but it has announced that the Government has bombed areas occupied by UNITA in the areas of Ambriz, Namibe, Benguela and Sumbe. Radio Vorgan has also reported that the Government would continue its troop build-up in preparation for a large-scale military offensive in various parts of the country.

22. UNAVEM II military and police observers continue to be engaged in patrolling, maintaining extensive contacts with the respective local

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authorities, rendering support to humanitarian operations, and conducting investigations. These and other relevant activities continue to be an essential factor in efforts aimed at establishing peace in Angola.

23. The ability of UNAVEM II to evaluate the military situation objectively is very limited, for the current observer contingent consists of only 47 military, 18 police officers and 11 paramedics, stationed at Luanda, Lubango, Namibe, Benguela and Sumbe. Recently, in pursuance of the statement of the President of the Security Council of 1 November 1993 (S/26677), UNAVEM II, in coordination with the Secretariat, initiated contingency planning for the possible augmentation of the existing strength of the Mission for deployment in the event of significant progress in the Lusaka talks. Some potential troop-contributing countries have been contacted, having in mind the need to respond rapidly to any such progress. Moreover, I have decided to send to Lusaka a small military/logistic team to assist my Special Representative and the two parties in drawing up projections for the involvement of the United Nations in the implementation of the agreements under discussion.

24. Nevertheless, the military observers have been able to note that during the period covered by this report the Government steadily enlarged the area of the country under its control. Thus, the following localities were apparently retaken by the Government's forces: Quilengues, Cacula, Dongo, Cainga, Cuvelai and Cassongue.

#### IV. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

25. Since my last report to the Council (S/26644), humanitarian activities have continued to make appreciable progress, in particular because of the relative calm which reigns on the military front. Areas which until recently were unreachable because of the hostilities are now open to evacuation and assistance missions by the United Nations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Despite the marked increase in World Food Programme (WFP) deliveries, by airlift and road convoys, totalling a thousand tons of food and non-food products each week, human suffering continues on a scale exceeding that described in detail in the United Nations Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola launched on 3 June 1993. It is widely recognized that 3 million people, one third of the country's population, are in desperate need of humanitarian assistance, without which their survival is in jeopardy.

26. The humanitarian situation in Angola has three aspects: the situation in coastal areas, the situation in non-intensive conflict areas and the situation in areas which, until the very recent past, could be called intensive conflict areas.

27. In the coastal areas, where the military situation is less dramatic, serious malnutrition persists and has been aggravated by the arrival of masses of displaced persons fleeing the combat areas. The serious economic difficulties in the main coastal towns, such as Luanda, Benguela and Lobito, have been accompanied by galloping inflation, which prevents the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants from obtaining essential products, including food. This difficult situation is one of the main causes of the malnutrition and the

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increase in diseases of all kinds. The United Nations system, in particular the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and WFP, together with the NGOs, have managed to stem the constant increase in suffering in this part of Angola by a number of coordinated activities, such as food distribution, vaccination campaigns, the provision of primary health care and relief and survival assistance and, more recently, the distribution of seeds and tools for the next agricultural season.

28. The non-intensive conflict areas encompass a large part of the provinces in the north, east and south of the country and are now being supplied by road and air by the United Nations and the NGOs. During the period covered by this report, thanks to the efforts of my Special Representative, supported by the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat, these provinces became more accessible, enabling United Nations bodies such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF and WFP, together with the NGOs, to step up emergency operations in these areas. That said, human suffering in these areas remains extreme: acute malnutrition, diarrhoea and measles are widespread, and this is the main reason why Angola currently has the highest infant mortality rate in the world. Every effort is being made to prevent this tragic situation from becoming worse.

29. In the areas that until recently were known as intensive conflict areas, such as those in which the besieged towns of Kuito/Bié, Malange, Menangue and Huambo are located, emergency humanitarian assistance operations have become wider in scope during the period covered by this report. As I informed the Security Council, towards mid-October the United Nations succeeded in supplying humanitarian assistance to the towns of Huambo and Kuito/Bié and in increasing flights to Malange and Menangue. There are starving women and children everywhere in these towns, where a number of NGOs are working with United Nations bodies. The WFP logistics operations continue to support all the humanitarian organizations working in Angola. The emergency activities of UNICEF, such as the intensive vaccination campaigns at Huambo and Kuito/Bié, complement the work of these NGOs.

30. The United Nations and the NGOs, have joined forces to tackle the severe malnutrition and critical health situation that continue to exist in Angola. The United Nations bodies and the NGOs have drawn up a number of strategies to reduce suffering in the country. They have conducted joint evaluation missions in areas which have recently become accessible and have set up programmes to palliate the disastrous humanitarian situation in Angola. Thanks to the unceasing efforts of the personnel providing humanitarian assistance, countless Angolan lives have been saved.

31. Since my last report to the Council (S/26644), the Government of Angola and UNITA have played a significant role in facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance in the country. The two parties have greatly assisted the humanitarian organizations by giving them access to all the provinces of the country and supporting their work in the field. The response of donors to the emergency humanitarian situation in Angola, and in particular to the United Nations Inter-Agency Appeal, is still somewhat reticent. These agencies, especially UNICEF, are facing serious financial difficulties which may

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jeopardize the emergency programmes which are so desperately needed. In a letter dated 4 November 1993, my Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs reminded donors of the need to allocate the necessary resources to emergency humanitarian programmes in Angola. It is to be noted that the necessary action for the preparation of a revised Inter-Agency Appeal, covering the priority needs of severely affected populations for 1994 is already being taken in Luanda. This appeal should cover both the continuing humanitarian relief requirements and the initial rehabilitation action designed to bring back normal conditions for these populations. My Special Representative, supported by the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs has taken measures designed to ensure the effective participation of all the parties concerned in the preparation of the Appeal.

32. The humanitarian challenge in Angola remains critical. In the coming months, there will be a pressing need for food, medicine, water and sanitation equipment. The Government of Angola and UNITA must continue to guarantee access and security so that emergency assistance can be transported throughout the country. My Special Representative will pursue his efforts to ensure that the necessary security conditions prevail so that the personnel providing humanitarian assistance can continue their work. Only through the concerted efforts of the Government, UNITA, the United Nations, the donor countries, the NGOs and above all the Angolan people as a whole will the country be able to overcome its current tragic situation.

#### V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

33. The General Assembly, by its decision 47/450 C of 14 September 1993, authorized the Secretary-General to enter into a commitment in an amount not exceeding \$1,942,000 gross (\$1,871,900 net) per month for the maintenance of UNAVEM II for the period from 16 September to 15 December 1993, subject to the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Mission beyond 15 September 1993. The Security Council, by its resolution 864 (1993) of 15 September 1993, extended the mandate of UNAVEM II for a period of three months from 16 September to 15 December 1993. Subsequently, the Advisory Committee concurred in an amount not exceeding \$5.5 million gross for the continued maintenance of UNAVEM II for the three-month mandate period ending 15 December 1993.

34. Should the Security Council decide to continue the mandate of UNAVEM II beyond 15 December 1993, appropriate financial provision will need to be made by the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session.

35. The cash flow situation of the special account of UNAVEM II continues to be very critical. As of 30 November 1993, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account amounted to some \$38.2 million. This represents approximately 23 per cent of the total amount assessed on Member States since the inception of the Mission up to 15 December 1993.

36. In order to provide UNAVEM II with the necessary cash-flow requirements, loans in a total amount of \$37 million have been borrowed from the Peace-keeping

Reserve Fund and other peace-keeping accounts. These amounts have not been repaid.

## VI. OBSERVATIONS

37. The current and ongoing negotiations covered in some detail in the present report are crucial for the process of resolving the situation in Angola. The positive outcome of the exploratory talks held in October 1993 is reflected in the acceptance by UNITA of the validity of the "Acordos de Paz", the validity of the results of the legislative and presidential elections of 29 and 30 September 1992 and, above all, the content of paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 864 (1993), by which the Council demanded that UNITA withdraw its troops immediately from the locations which it had occupied since the resumption of the hostilities, and demanded that UNITA agree without delay to return its troops to United Nations-monitored areas as a transitional measure pending full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz".

38. The exploratory talks in Lusaka have made possible the resumed negotiations under way since 15 November 1993. The many consultations, discussions and plenary meetings have led to the formal adoption of the general and specific principles which are to govern the cease-fire and the practical arrangements, including the timetable for the implementation of those principles. The general and specific principles on the completion of the Angolan Armed Forces have also been adopted.

39. It is important to underline that the formal adoption by the Government and UNITA of the principles governing the re-establishment of the cease-fire, including the withdrawal of UNITA forces from the areas they have occupied since the resumption of hostilities and their disarmament and the cantonment of their weapons under United Nations supervision constitutes a significant accomplishment of the peace process. However, in order to facilitate a final settlement, much more effort would need to be deployed.

40. It will be recalled that, in my last report, I recommended that action to impose further measures against UNITA under Chapter VII of the Charter be postponed for a period of one month in view of the talks that had then started in Lusaka under the auspices of the United Nations. Having reviewed the progress that has so far been achieved in the talks in Lusaka, I would recommend that action to impose additional measures against UNITA be further postponed; I would inform the Council at any time if circumstances warrant any further review by me of this recommendation. In this regard, I urge the Government and UNITA to make renewed efforts to ensure that the talks succeed in moving the peace process forward.

41. In view of the encouraging results achieved at Lusaka and to enable the United Nations to pursue its mediation and good offices role and facilitate the conclusion of a comprehensive settlement of the Angolan conflict, I recommend that the mandate of UNAVEM II be extended for three months. In case the cease-fire in Angola is agreed upon or established, I will immediately update the Council and submit to it my recommendations for the expanded mandate for UNAVEM II and the time-frame for the extension.

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42. Should the present negotiations result in an effective and sustainable cease-fire, the United Nations would be called upon immediately to deploy an additional contingent of military and police observers as well as some formed units. Moreover, the expanded tasks that the Organization might be asked to perform would eventually require a substantial presence of United Nations troop contingents in Angola. I intend to proceed with the necessary contingency planning to enable the Organization to contribute in an effective manner to the implementation of a comprehensive settlement. However, in the final analysis, there is no substitute for the genuine commitment of the Angolans themselves to peace and national reconciliation.

43. During the negotiations, the Government and UNITA insisted that the mandate of the United Nations should be reviewed with a view to strengthening its role. The Government and UNITA propose a substantial increase in the involvement of the United Nations, for the purpose of:

(a) Verifying and monitoring the withdrawal and quartering of the UNITA military forces;

(b) Collecting, storing and guarding the military armaments of UNITA at the time of quartering;

(c) Overseeing the disarming of the civilian population;

(d) Verifying the formation of the Angolan armed forces and the police;

It is likewise proposed that the United Nations should participate in and verify the process of extending the State administration throughout the territory of Angola.

44. While the political negotiations proceed at Lusaka, it remains important to continue and even intensify humanitarian activities throughout the territory of Angola. These activities can contribute not only to the well-being of a population overwhelmed by the effects of the war, but also to the maintenance of a climate favourable to a peaceful settlement. It is in this spirit that I appeal once again to all parties concerned to create the conditions of security that will permit the provision of sufficient and effective humanitarian assistance in Angola.

45. The personnel of UNAVEM II continue to serve with exemplary dedication in difficult circumstances. I should like to pay tribute in particular to my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, and to Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba, for the determination with which they have performed their very difficult tasks.

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