



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 39TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. NAIK (Pakistan)

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DISARMAMENT ITEMS

AGENDA ITEMS 31, 32, 34 TO 37, 39 TO 42 AND 44 TO 49 (continued)

A draft resolution was introduced by:

Mr. Rose (German Democratic Republic) - A/C.1/35/L.36

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The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 31, 32, 34 to 37, 39 to 42 and 44 to 49 (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of the German Democratic Republic to introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/35/L.36.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.36, and I do so also on behalf of the delegations of Angola, Benin, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam.

Let me first make some brief remarks on some items in the text. First, the draft resolution is based on the Final Document of the United Nations tenth special session, as well as on the indisputable fact that the arms race is a growing danger to peace and international security. It refers to the measures relating to arms limitation and disarmament, as adopted at the United Nations tenth special session.

Secondly, the draft resolution is also based on the decisions adopted at the tenth special session, and reaffirms in the preamble that:

"nuclear disarmament is the task of first and highest priority".

At the same time, it is reiterated that:

"progress in the limitation and subsequent reduction of nuclear weapons would be facilitated both by parallel political and international legal measures to strengthen the security of States".

Thirdly, as to the operational part, I should like to emphasize the appeal which is addressed to the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the States that have military agreements with them. This part contains two elements, namely, first, to exercise restraint both in the nuclear and conventional fields and, secondly, not to increase their armed forces and conventional armaments, effective from an agreed date.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

It is our conviction that this would be a first but effective step towards a subsequent reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments of the said States.

We consider this a practical measure which should be acceptable to all States and which, although limited, would give a fresh impetus to the striving for disarmament in all fields.

We had consultations with many delegations, and I may take this opportunity to express our appreciation of their fruitful co-operation. Taking into account the suggestions made by those delegations, we are going to submit a revised text, and we hope that this draft resolution will be adopted by the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to announce the following additional sponsors of draft resolutions: Niger, A/C.1/35/L.3, L.10 and L.16; Mongolia, A/C.1/35/L.7 and L.32/Rev.1; Niger, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, A/C.1/35/L.30 and L.31; Madagascar, A/C.1/35/L.37.

We shall take decisions on the draft resolutions in the following order: A/C.1/35/L.3, L.30, L.31, L.26, L.22, L.25 and L.27. If the financial implications requested from Geneva are available, the following draft resolutions will also be taken up: A/C.1/35/L.10, L.16 and L.19.

We shall now begin the voting procedure with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.3. This draft resolution has two sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Pakistan at the 30th meeting of the First Committee, on 10 November 1980.

I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes before the voting.

Mr. MITTAL (India): The views of my delegation on the proposals contained in draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.3, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia", are already in the record of the First Committee. We intend to vote against the draft resolution for reasons of principle and practice. India has consistently declared that it stands for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons and that it does not intend to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. India's nuclear programme is entirely devoted to peaceful purposes. Our opposition on the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, however, stems from both principle and practical considerations.

India is not opposed to the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones and it has supported the creation of such zones in other regions of the world. However, the setting up of such zones must be the result of the common initiative of the States of the region concerned and, above all, participation must be voluntary. It is inadmissible for any one State in a region to try to impose such a zone on other States within the region.

(Mr. Mittal, India)

It is only when the States belonging to a particular region have evolved common perceptions and share common security concerns that the basis can be laid for the initiative concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It is quite evident that such a situation does not exist in the region of South Asia. Therefore any attempt to force such a concept artificially on the countries of the region can only be regarded as being motivated by concerns other than those professed in the draft resolution.

South Asia is an integral and contiguous part of the region of Asia and the Pacific. It cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the region to which it belongs. The setting up of a nuclear-weapon-free zone must take into account the geopolitical characteristics of the area concerned. Not only are the facts of geography against the concept of such a zone in the region of South Asia but also it entirely ignores the fact that the security environment of the South Asian region is complicated by the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific theatre and the presence of foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean.

India is committed to a policy of good-neighbourliness and co-operation among the States of South Asia. The security environment in that region can improve only if all the States concerned resolve their differences in a spirit of mutual trust and understanding. The continued pursuit of a proposal which in the context of the region is both untenable and impracticable does not contribute to that spirit.

My delegation will therefore be compelled to record a negative vote on the draft resolution.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): My delegation considers that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia - or in any other region, for that matter - would contribute to the over-all objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as to the peace and security of the region in question, and my delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.3.

However, my delegation would like to reiterate its view - which I expressed in detail at last year's session of the General Assembly on the comparable draft resolution on the same subject - that the establishment of such a zone, if it is to strengthen the security of the region, would require the fulfilment of a number of conditions, among them, for example, that it should be agreed upon by all the countries concerned, including the nuclear-weapon States and that it be based on the initiative of the countries in the region.

My delegation considers it also highly desirable for the realization of nuclear-weapon-free zones that all the countries of the region concerned adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

Mr. W. RAHMAN (Bangladesh): In conformity with our position of last year, the Bangladesh delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/35/L.3 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

The Government of Bangladesh believes that effective nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world would contribute to creating conditions that would further strengthen peace and security in the world as a whole. Our continuing support for the concept of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is reflected in our positive reaction to the present draft resolution.

While supporting the draft resolution, my Government believes that the necessary contacts and consultations must take place between the States of the South Asian region in order to ensure unanimity on the question of the establishment of such a zone. We also believe that the limits of the zone should be adequately defined.

While my delegation will vote for this draft resolution, we are fully aware of the complexity of the issue and that is why we believe that adequate and intensive consultations should take place among all the States of the region. In this regard the proposal made by President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh for a regional forum which would provide an opportunity to all the countries of the region to exchange views on matters of mutual interest is of particular relevance.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): The Swedish Government has on many previous occasions had the opportunity to present its position on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. A detailed explanation was made in relation to the comprehensive review of nuclear-weapon-free zones which was carried out in 1975 under the auspices of the then Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). The views of my Government are contained in document A/31/189.

On this occasion, I shall limit my remarks to some aspects of our conception of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In our view, a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be based on a number of basic conditions, the most fundamental being that, in order to create an effective nuclear-weapon-free zone, general agreement thereon must exist among all States concerned. Another is, of course, the non-possession of nuclear weapons by zonal States. A third is the non-development or non-presence of nuclear weapons in the zone and the withdrawal of such nuclear weapons as could only be used against targets in the nuclear-weapon-free zone, thus

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

establishing a safety area or security belt adjacent to the zone. A fourth condition would be the commitment by the nuclear-weapon Powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against targets within the zone.

In explaining our vote on previous draft resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, we have declared that the Swedish Government would welcome the submission of a draft resolution supported by all States of that particular region. The draft resolution submitted this year does not enjoy unanimous regional support.

Although my Government supports in principle the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region in question, the Swedish delegation will for those reasons not vote differently from last year and, consequently, will abstain in this vote. Notwithstanding the fact that the Swedish Government cannot vote in favour of the draft resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, we urge the States concerned to continue to explore all avenues to facilitate the attainment of the objectives contained in the draft. In the meantime, all States should act to reduce tension in the South Asian region through active disarmament and confidence-building measures and refrain from actions that run counter to these objectives.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): The Federal Republic of Germany will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.3, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia". We consider that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones can in the right circumstances make a valid contribution to international non-proliferation efforts and to increasing national and regional security.

It is my Government's firm conviction that nuclear-weapon-free zones should include all countries of the region and that their establishment can be successfully undertaken only with the free consent and voluntary participation of all States concerned. This conviction of ours is based on paragraph 60 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which states that nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established

"on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned...". (S-10/2, para. 60)

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic
of Germany)

The text of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.3 in no way prejudices those essential prerequisites. That is why my delegation will be able to vote in favour of it.

Before concluding, I should like to underline my Government's hope that in the meantime all States in the region will refrain from any action that might be regarded as being opposed to the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

Mr. FLOWEREE (United States): The United States will vote in favour of the draft resolution before us, reflecting our continuing support for the principle of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia and other regions of the world, under conditions that would ensure their effectiveness.

We believe that effective nuclear-weapon-free zones negotiated and supported by the appropriate parties can enhance the security of their participants and reinforce non-proliferation goals on a regional basis.

The criteria by which the United States Government judges the effectiveness of any nuclear-weapon-free zone have been elaborated by my delegation many times in the past. It may be useful to mention them briefly again.

First, the initiative for the creation of the zone should come from States in the regions concerned. Second, all States whose participation is deemed important should participate in the zone. Third, the zone arrangement should provide for adequate verification of compliance with the zone's provisions. Fourth, the establishment of the zone should not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security. Fifth, the zone arrangement should effectively prohibit parties from developing any nuclear explosive device for whatever purpose. Sixth, the zone arrangement should not seek to impose restrictions on the exercise by other States of rights recognized under international law, particularly the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas, in

(Mr. Floweree, United States)

international air space and in straits used for international navigation and the right of innocent passage through territorial seas. And finally, the establishment of a zone should not effect the existing right of its parties under international law to grant or deny transit privileges, including port calls and overflights, to other States.

I should like to emphasize that to accomplish its objectives any nuclear-free-zone arrangement must effectively preclude the conducting of any nuclear explosions, whatever their declared purpose. That is not an arbitrary requirement. It is based on the scientific reality that it is simply not possible to distinguish between the technology for making nuclear weapons and the technology for making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes.

While our affirmative vote on the draft resolution reflects continuing United States policy towards nuclear-weapon-free zones, we would not wish to imply by our vote that we regard the creation of such a zone as the only, or even necessarily the most promising, means to avert nuclear arms competition in South Asia. We should like to express our hope that the States of South Asia and other interested States will avoid the creation of a nuclear arms capability.

As we did last year, I should like to take particular note of operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, which contains an admonition urging all States in the region to refrain from any action contrary to the objective of the draft resolution. The United States decision to vote for the draft resolution is based on our expectation that its sponsors and others supporting it will demonstrate that they also take that provision with the utmost seriousness.

Mr. FONSEKA (Sri Lanka): As in previous years, Sri Lanka will be voting in favour of the draft resolution on the Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in South Asia, contained this year in document A/C.1/35/L.3.

Sri Lanka's affirmative vote stems from our basic support for the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world as a contribution towards the strengthening of regional and international peace and security.

(Mr. Fonseka, Sri Lanka)

We believe that a nuclear-weapon-free zone in any given region of the world would, however, be successful only to the extent that it has the acceptance and support of all countries in the designated zone. Intensive consultations among all States in the zone would be required before the precise characteristics of the zone and conditions for its establishment are settled upon. A further consideration is that a nuclear-free zone cannot exist in isolation and requires from States in areas surrounding the zone a commitment against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States in the zone.

We do not underestimate the complexities involved in establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and we are conscious of the need to take full account of the concerns of all States in such a zone. Our support for the principle enunciated in the draft resolution leads us to vote in favour of it despite the difficulties faced in the establishment of such a zone in South Asia.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now vote on the draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.3.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico,

Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Bhutan, India

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malawi, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Sao Tome and Principe, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia

Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.3 was adopted by 89 votes to 2, with 41 abstentions.*

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes.

* Subsequently the delegations of Lebanon and Qatar advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

Mr. NOLAN (Australia): The Australian delegation has just abstained on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.3, on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

The reservation expressed by our vote reflects Australia's belief that the effective implementation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is only possible if the support of all States in the region is forthcoming. The initiative for creating such a zone must therefore come from all the States of the region and thereby avoid any interference with existing security arrangements which States wish to preserve. The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone would of course need to respect accepted principles of international law and be fully verifiable.

Our vote should not therefore be seen as a lack of concern over the need for agreement on appropriate arrangements to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have made clear on a number of occasions our deep concern over that issue. Of particular concern has been the emergence of situations in the Middle East and the South Asian region which suggests that the fragile containments against proliferation in those regions may be shattered. We have, however, been encouraged at this session of the General Assembly by indications that all States in the Middle East region now accept the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

It has long been Australia's contention that a basic step towards the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons would be for all the States of a region to become party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, those States which have decided to stand outside the NPT would reassure the international community by accepting either full-scope safeguards on their nuclear facilities or some other binding or verifiable commitment.

Mr. DORJEE (Bhutan): My delegation believes that the concept of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is an effort by the international community to achieve the final goal of general and complete disarmament. Keeping that objective in mind, my delegation has been able to support draft resolutions in this Committee on establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in cases where they enjoyed the support of all the States concerned.

(Mr. Dorjee, Bhutan)

However, in the case of the draft resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, even after the seven years since the concept was first endorsed, its first prerequisite which we believe is agreement among the countries directly concerned, has not been met. My delegation is convinced that the subject is complex and differences of view still remain unresolved. Therefore my delegation believes that it is unrealistic to rush into a process of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia until the conditions for its creation are established through a process of consultations to bring about an agreement among all the States concerned.

It is for that reason that my delegation has once again cast a negative vote on the draft resolution as contained in document A/C.1/35/L.3.

Mr. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO (Italy): Italy has generally supported the concept of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. We regard the creation of such zones as a positive contribution towards the objectives of general and complete disarmament and thereby of international peace and security.

Accordingly, we endorse and support, whenever possible, draft resolutions concerning the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. As a matter of principle, we favour efforts aiming at the establishment of such a zone in the region of South Asia,

Italy had to abstain, however, on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.3 as we are aware that two States in the South Asian region are not ready to accept such a draft resolution. We believe in fact that the participation of all the States, and particularly of the militarily significant States of a given region, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at and negotiated among themselves is an essential condition for creating a viable and effective nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now begin the voting procedure on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.30. This draft resolution has 28 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Nigeria at the thirty-fifth meeting of the First Committee on 19 November 1980.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Before we take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.30 I shall, on behalf of the sponsors and as a result of the consultations that we have had with some representatives, suggest that the following modifications should be made to that draft resolution.

In the fifth preambular paragraph, which starts "Taking note of the report of the Security Council ...", it has been suggested by the sponsors that that preambular paragraph should stop in line 3 after the words "...more effective...". The paragraph would then read:

"Taking note of the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa on ways and means of making the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa more effective,"

Then in operative paragraph 4, the sponsors have agreed to substitute the word "threat" in line 2 by the word "danger". The paragraph would then read:

"Reaffirms that the racist régime's nuclear plans and capability constitute a very grave danger to international peace and security and jeopardize particularly the security of African States, and increase the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;".

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

As I said, the other sponsors have agreed to introduce those modifications, as a result of consultations both among themselves and with other representatives, in the hope that it will be possible to adopt the draft resolution by consensus in the same manner as the draft resolution on which the study was based was adopted last year.

The CHAIRMAN: The first modification proposed by the representative of Nigeria pertains to the fifth preambular paragraph and it would mean that the paragraph would end after the words "more effective" in the third line. The second amendment is in operative paragraph 4, where, in the second line, the word "threat" would be replaced by the word "danger".

Since those amendments have been orally proposed now and since they have been accepted by others who have been consulted, the Committee may wish to decide to dispense with the requirements of rule 120 of the rules of procedure.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Before we proceed further with the decision-making procedure, I should like to call on the Secretary of the First Committee, who will make a statement regarding the financial implications of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.30.

Mr. BERASATEGUI (Secretary of the Committee): The following is the statement submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Under the terms of operative paragraph 9 of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.30, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to give maximum publicity to the report on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field and to distribute it to Member States, specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and non-governmental organizations,

(Mr. Berasategui, Secretary
of the Committee)

so that the international community and public opinion may be fully aware of the danger inherent in the programme.

The Secretary-General wishes to state that the publication of the above-mentioned report will have to be carried out externally and will involve \$US 9,900 for printing, reproduction and distribution costs.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on the representative of Ireland, who wishes to explain his vote before the vote.

Mr. MULLOY (Ireland): Ireland will vote for draft resolutions A/C.1/35/L.30 and A/C.1/35/L.31 on the denuclearization of Africa because we wish to give expression to our traditional and long-term support for the fundamental principle of the denuclearization of Africa. At the same time, in casting its positive vote on both draft resolutions, Ireland has reservations on a number of elements in the drafts which we do not feel to be either justified or necessary. Ireland is thinking in particular of the contentious singling out of certain Western States in the fourth preambular paragraph of A/C.1/35/L.30 and in the ninth preambular paragraph of A/C.1/35/L.31, something which we cannot accept, and of the failure, above all, to distinguish in operative paragraph 5 of A/C.1/35/L.30 and operative paragraph 3 of A/C.1/35/L.31 and elsewhere between co-operation for peaceful purposes and co-operation for weapons production.

Finally, we have reservations about the reference to the Security Council's role in operative paragraph 7 of A/C.1/35/L.30 and in operative paragraph 5 of A/C.1/35/L.31.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.30.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.30 was adopted by 104 votes to none, with 13 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes.

Mr. ERSUN (Turkey): We voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.30 because the precise wording of the preambular paragraphs accords with the general principles that guide Turkish foreign policy.

Mr. NONOYAMA (Japan): My delegation is of the view that draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.30 contains assertions which there is no evidence are based on fact. It therefore abstained in the vote on the draft resolution.

Mrs. VARNAI-DRANGER (Israel): At the thirty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Israel voted in favour of resolution 33/63 calling for the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. However, since then Israel has been singled out by name in the resolutions under that item and accused, along with some other unspecified Western countries, of allegedly collaborating with South Africa in the nuclear field.

This year both draft resolutions, A/C.1/35/L.30 and A/C.1/35/L.31, make reference to unfounded and false accusations in that regard. The ultimate absurdity of those allegations is nowhere clearer than in draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.30, which is predicated upon the report of the Secretary-General. That report, on the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, was published on 9 September 1980 and circulated as document A/35/402. Its section entitled "Nuclear co-operation with other countries" reviews the record of official and unofficial co-operation, including the training of scientists and the exchange of sophisticated technologies between South Africa and numerous countries.

(Mrs. Varnai-Dranger, Israel)

In the entire report, only one paragraph, paragraph 37, is reserved for a discussion of the allegations of nuclear co-operation between South Africa and Israel. It describes those charges as mere speculation, and concludes:

"Until specific examples of actual nuclear exchanges or transactions can be cited as clear evidence of such co-operation, this whole question remains in a state of uncertainty."

One wonders by what mysterious process the alchemist sponsors of this draft resolution transmuted these speculations and uncertainties into absolutes and established facts which they included in their draft.

I would add that the reason that no specific examples have been cited in the Secretary-General's report is that none have occurred. The clear and consistent position and practice of Israel was stated in the letter of 4 September 1979 of the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations to the Security Council Committee established under Security Council resolution 421 (1977). In that letter he reported that Israel

"will comply with Security Council resolution 418 (1977), and accordingly Israel will not provide South Africa with arms or related material of all types, including the sale or transfer of weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment". (S/AC.20/17)

Those assurances were reconfirmed as recently as in the Ambassador's letter of 23 June 1980 to the same Committee.

For those reasons Israel abstained on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.30 and will abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): My delegation abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.30. It will also abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31, calling for the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

We continue to favour the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones wherever possible and feasible because we believe that they can contribute to the cause of strengthening the international non-proliferation régime for nuclear weapons and thus lead to more security. My Government will continue

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic
of Germany)

to support initiatives to that end. Therefore we joined last year's consensus on resolution 34/76 B on the nuclear capability of South Africa and endorsed the setting up of an expert group.

As to draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.30, we do not think that it reflects accurately the findings of the Expert Group as submitted in the report to the Secretary-General. Therefore we were not in a position to support it.

Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31 would seem to contain formulations which we feel are not helpful to the attainment of the established end, which we continue to support. In its present form it will not, as we understand it, further the advancement of the cause of the denuclearization of Africa.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now begin the voting procedure on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31, which has 31 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Nigeria at the thirty-fifth meeting of the First Committee, on 19 November 1980.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Before this draft resolution is put to the vote, may I, on behalf of the sponsors, inform the Committee that agreement has been reached on some minor modifications of the text.

In the second line of the fourth preambular paragraph, it has been agreed to substitute the word "danger" for the word "threat", so that it now reads

"Reaffirming that the nuclear programme of the racist régime of South Africa constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and particularly jeopardizes the security of African States".

In operative paragraph 2, the word "danger" is again substituted for the word "threat", so that it reads

"Reaffirms that the nuclear programme of the racist régime of South Africa constitutes a very grave danger to international peace

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

and security, particularly jeopardizes the security of African States, and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons".

The CHAIRMAN: As the representative of Nigeria has indicated, the amendments he has just read out were made after consultations with his co-sponsors and with other delegations, and if I hear no objection I shall take it that the Committee agrees to dispense with the requirement of rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution in document A/C.1/35/L.31, as amended. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand,

Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Abstaining: Belgium, Canada, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31, as amended, was adopted by 123 votes to 2, with 10 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes.

Mr. MITTAL (India): I should like to reiterate here that our affirmative votes on draft resolutions A/C.1/35/L.30 and A/C.1/35/L.31 are without prejudice to the well-known position of the Government of India on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the question of international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities.

Mr. NOLAN (Australia): Because of the importance Australia attaches to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and our growing concern about the negative attitude of some States on this question, the Australian delegation has voted in favour of both draft resolutions on the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

It has been Australia's long-standing view that South Africa should adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or at least accept full-scope safeguards on its nuclear industry. There are, however, some aspects of the draft resolutions which cause the Australian delegation some misgivings. Most importantly, we strongly object to the tendentious naming of States in the draft resolutions. In addition, we consider the wording deficient in that it fails to make the general distinction between the peaceful and the military applications of nuclear energy.

In saying this, however, the Australian delegation wishes to make it perfectly clear that Australia does not permit the transfer of nuclear material between Australia and South Africa or any collaboration whatever in the nuclear field.

Mr. BALETA (Albania) (interpretation from French): My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31 for the same reasons for which it voted in favour of the previous draft resolution, A/C.1/35/L.30, that is, to reaffirm once more its condemnation of the activities of the régime of South Africa in the field of nuclear weapon capability.

We also condemn Israel's collaboration, or that of any other State, with South Africa in the nuclear field.

But as regards draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31, entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa", my delegation would also like to state the following. Repeatedly in the past, the delegation of Albania has expressed its views and its reservations regarding the idea of the declaration of various zones throughout the world as nuclear-weapon-free zones. My delegation has not participated in the vote when draft resolutions on this subject have been adopted. One of the reasons for this is that we cannot accept this idea. We do not believe that it is possible to avert danger by declaring certain parts of the world to be nuclear-weapon-free zones while the nuclear Powers, particularly the two super-Powers, continue to stockpile and to improve their nuclear weapons and to increase nuclear blackmail.

We believe that countries which belong to so-called nuclear-weapon-free zones would not be sheltered from the nuclear danger as long as nuclear weapons exist and are kept as a means of blackmail, and less still if those weapons were used.

Those are the reservations which we have in regard to draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31, which has just been adopted. In order to avoid taking the floor repeatedly, we should like to underscore the fact that we have the same reservations in respect of all the other draft resolutions which deal with the question of the creation of so-called nuclear-weapon-free zones or denuclearized zones.

Mr. MARTIN (New Zealand): New Zealand voted in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/35/L.30 and A/C.1/35/L.31, although there are several aspects of both texts about which we have misgivings. In particular, as we are not opposed to all co-operation in the civil nuclear field under adequate safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), we have difficulty with the formulation of some of the paragraphs in both draft resolutions which bear upon that question. In relation to operative paragraph 7 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.30 and operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31, New Zealand regards it as the prerogative of the Security Council to decide on enforcement action.

Nevertheless, our support for the concept of the denuclearization of Africa as a regional arms control arrangement that would strengthen the non-proliferation régime and our concern over South Africa's attitude to safeguards outweigh the difficulties that we have with those and some other aspects of the texts.

Mr. de LA GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): The delegation of France wishes to explain its position on the two draft resolutions on which we have just voted, that is, our abstention on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.30 and our negative vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31.

The French delegation wishes to recall on this occasion the support given by its Government to efforts aimed at the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. France, in fact, voted in favour of resolution 32/81 which proposed the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

My Government also shares the view and conviction according to which all States should refrain from any action which might promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

Furthermore, we consider it necessary that South Africa submit all its nuclear installations to International Atomic Energy Agency controls. On this point, therefore, the French Government is fully in agreement with the authors of draft resolutions A/C.1/35/L.30 and A/C.1/35/L.31.

However, the French delegation notes that in those two texts no distinction whatsoever is made between the peaceful use of nuclear energy and its use for military purposes. In other words, the sponsors of these two draft resolutions presuppose that all co-operation between industrialized countries and countries that import technology in the field of nuclear energy, even that which is under the control of the IAEA, will inevitably lead to military uses. What consequences should the industrialized countries draw from this kind of logic?

In this connexion, I should like to point out that the two texts are in contradiction to the report of the Group of Experts set up in implementation of resolution 34/76 B, adopted by consensus in 1979. That report, which was drawn up by highly qualified experts representing the different regions of the world, draws a quite clear distinction between the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under IAEA guarantees and the uses of nuclear energy that escape control. As regards more specifically the Koeberg nuclear power reactor that is being built at present by French industry in the Cape province, I should like to quote an extract from the report of the group of experts:

"... the Koeberg nuclear plant /is/ covered by IAEA safeguards.

These include materials accounting and reporting procedures; containment of materials, e.g., of cooling spent fuel, to specified areas with continuous automated surveillance and monitoring; and periodic inspections by the IAEA. (In addition, cooled spent fuel from the Koeberg reactors is to be returned to France.)" (A/35/402, annex, para. 41)

We are surprised that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31, who declare that they were inspired by that report, did not mention one of its main aspects.

To these objections, we must add others that are of great importance and relate to the compatibility between these texts and the Charter of the United Nations. The draft resolutions provide that the General Assembly should address requests and recommendations to the Security Council, whereas the Council is already seized of various aspects of the situation in South Africa. We do not think that this is in keeping with Article 12 of the Charter.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

We note, furthermore, in connexion with the language of documents A/C.1/35/L.30 and A/C.1/35/L.31, that the Security Council would be requested to take coercive action against South Africa. We realize that the formulation introduced before the vote no longer refers, implicitly at least, to the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, but we believe that it is for the Security Council to judge in what circumstances to take such action.

We note moreover that draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31 mentions the recommendations of that Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 421 (1977). We wish to recall that the Committee's report, adopted by consensus, clearly states the opposition or reservations of the French delegation to some of the proposals put forward by delegations that are members of that Committee.

Mr. FRELLESVIG (Denmark): The Danish delegation voted in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/35/L.30 and A/C.1/35/L.31 because we agree with the objectives concerning the prevention of the spreading of nuclear arms to Africa and because we share the concern about all forms of nuclear co-operation with South Africa. We have, however, serious reservations about certain points in the draft resolutions, such as the ninth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.30 and the seventh preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31, referring to unverified information, and the inappropriate singling out of certain countries in the text.

Mr. TAVARES NUNES (Portugal) (interpretation from French): My delegation would like to explain the vote it has just cast on draft resolutions A/C.1/35/L.30 and A/C.1/35/L.31 on the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

My delegation's vote reflects the support given by my Government to the principle of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. We think that the creation of these zones can make a positive contribution to the achievement of the final goal of disarmament. Hence, we support all efforts by the international community aimed at the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, including those designed to safeguard that continent from those weapons.

(Mr. Tavares Nunes, Portugal)

However, we think that the comprehensive condemnation of any collaboration in the nuclear field with South Africa is a little excessive. To our mind, co-operation for peaceful purposes should not be included in this condemnation, but only the military kind, because a comprehensive condemnation that includes co-operation for medical purposes, for example, might be detrimental to the interests of the peoples of Africa.

Furthermore, we have some misgivings regarding the merit of operative paragraphs 5 and 7 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.30 and operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31.

Mr. NONOYAMA (Japan): My delegation wishes to put on record that our vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31 should not be construed as meaning that we are in agreement with the assertions contained in some of the paragraphs of the draft resolutions, which lack conclusive evidence.

Mr. FLOWEREE (United States of America): My comments will be directed to both the draft resolution on the nuclear capability of South Africa (A/C.1/35/L.30) and the draft resolution on the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa (A/C.1/35/L.31).

The abstention of the United States on these draft resolutions should not be interpreted as any lessening of our support in principle for the creation of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone, consistent with the well-known United States position on the principles for establishing such zones.

(Mr. Floweree, United States)

The Organization of Africa Unity deserves great credit for its early recognition of the importance of denuclearizing the African continent. The United States also welcomes the substantial support for non-proliferation among African States, as reflected by almost 30 of those States having become party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The United States abstention on these draft resolutions also does not reflect any lessening of our concern about South Africa's nuclear programme. Its operation of an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility in the absence of a treaty obligation not to develop or acquire nuclear explosives are of serious concern to the United States. The United States Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 provides as a minimum condition for the licensing of nuclear exports to any country after March 1980 that it have all its nuclear activities under international safeguards. As a practical matter, however, the United States ceased exports of nuclear materials or equipment to South Africa four years ago.

Operative paragraph 8 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.30 and operative paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31 recognized the importance of the application of full scope safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency, a principle which the United States strongly supports and is pressing the South African Government and other Governments to adopt. South African acceptance of such safeguards and adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be important in reassuring the international community that its nuclear programme is peaceful.

The United States believes that nuclear co-operation for appropriate peaceful uses under suitable international safeguards and controls need not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear explosives.

It is the judgement of the United States that implementation of the actions called for by operative paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31 and paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.30 could prevent co-operation of a kind that offers the best prospect for encouraging South Africa to accept appropriate non-proliferation controls. Hence it is our view that these paragraphs would not effectively serve the purpose of non-proliferation.

(Mr. Floweree, United States)

Since 1977 the United States has engaged in discussions with South Africa on the question of our nuclear relationship. Specifically we have sought its agreement to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to accept safeguards on all nuclear facilities, and have indicated to South Africa that resumption of peaceful nuclear relations with us would depend on their co-operation in this area. The United States Government has not provided nuclear fuel to South Africa, nor has the United States ever supplied nuclear materials or technology to South Africa which have not been and remain under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

It is for the reasons which I have put forward in the paragraphs above that the United States had to abstain on both of the draft resolutions before us on this issue.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): I should like to make an explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31, dealing with the denuclearization of Africa, and my remarks should also be taken to refer to the very similar draft resolution on the nuclear capability of South Africa, contained in document A/C.1/35/L.30.

We are grateful to the sponsors of these draft resolutions for the changes which they have made to both draft resolutions. Nevertheless, my delegation found it necessary to abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.30, and to vote against draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31.

In those draft resolutions the sponsors expressed their deep concern about the possibility of South Africa acquiring a nuclear-weapon capability. If evidence were to emerge that South Africa has acquired such a capability, it would be a matter which my country would view very seriously indeed. But we note that the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability, having looked into the question very thoroughly, does not come to any definite conclusion on this matter. It is nevertheless implied in both draft resolutions by those who have already concluded that South Africa has acquired a nuclear-weapon capability, that Western Governments have in some way contributed to this. We categorically reject any such

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

implication. It is unthinkable that the United Kingdom, as one of the depository Powers of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, should assist South Africa in manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and we have not done so.

Instead, while emphasizing the right of all States to apply and develop programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which is an internationally recognized principle enshrined in a number of international instruments, my Government has repeatedly encouraged South Africa to become a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, so as to reassure its neighbours and the world about its nuclear intentions.

Mr. ERSUN (Turkey): We voted, as we did last year in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.31, because we fully share the concerns of the sponsors and the objectives laid down in this text.

However, what I have said in explaining the vote of my delegation on the previous draft resolution, A/C.1/35/L.30, also applies to this draft resolution, namely, A/C.1/35/L.31.

Mr. de LAIGLESIA (Spain) (interpretation from Spanish):

The Spanish delegation voted in favour of the two draft resolutions, A/C.1/35/L.30 and A/C.1/35/L.31, concerning the nuclear capability of South Africa and the implementation of the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa, because we are fully in agreement with the objectives and substance of both draft resolutions.

However, in our view, certain terms used in those draft resolutions appear to us to be extremely polemical and not entirely accurate. We would have preferred there to be no such references in the texts with which we have associated ourselves.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Draft resolutions A/C.1/35/L.30 and A/C.1/35/L.31, on which we have just finished voting, are both dated 18 November 1980. They came to the knowledge of my delegation the following day, 19 November. They both deal with matters which my delegation regards as of considerable importance. Those texts were submitted the same day by my delegation to our Government for due consideration. Today, 21 November, that is, only two days later, we are required to vote on those draft resolutions.

There were no prior consultations, virtually no debate on those texts. There was hardly any opportunity for an exchange of views. We were presented with these texts more or less on a "take it or leave it" basis.

We understand the mood of the sponsors, and to a certain extent we share that mood, but my delegation and my Government believe that the matters dealt with in these draft resolutions must be treated with deliberation and great care. The possibility of nuclear-weapon activity in Africa, and especially in South Africa, is one which should induce us to weigh our words carefully and to plan our actions with a cool head. If, however, we are required to take snap decisions on far-reaching proposals which appear to be non-negotiable, then of course our freedom of choice in voting is also seriously restricted.

Thus it happens that last year the Netherlands could vote in favour of the resolutions on the denuclearization of Africa and on South Africa's nuclear capability, but this year, since we take seriously what is said in a draft resolution, especially of this nature, we were left with no choice but to abstain.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

Allow me now to state in brief and simple terms, as one should in an explanation of vote, what are, in our opinion, some of the principal elements in this matter and where we could agree with the texts and where we had difficulties.

We consider the continued denuclearization of Africa desirable. We are also worried, as are the sponsors of the draft resolutions, that there does in fact exist in Africa a potential danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We agree with the demands for the application of full-scope safeguards in the Republic of South Africa. We should have liked to see in the draft resolutions a clear call upon the Government of South Africa to undertake unequivocal non-proliferation commitments. We share the concern of the sponsors with regard to the ambiguity of the Government of South Africa in respect of its nuclear policy. We are also worried about the reports of certain possibly nuclear events in or near South Africa which still remain without satisfactory explanation.

However, some of the wording of the draft resolutions appears to us to be insufficiently considered or somewhat extravagant: for instance, in document A/C.1/35/L.30, in the third preambular paragraph, the words "as nuclear-weapon fuel" and, in the fourth preambular paragraph the words "has been enhanced by the co-operation of certain Western States". Operative paragraphs 5 and 7 are somewhat peremptory and precipitate. . We have similar difficulties with the choice of words, not of sentiments, in document A/C.1/35/L.31. Here, for instance, in the eighth preambular paragraph, the words "gravely concerned" do not go well with the qualified presumption expressed by the word "might". In the ninth preambular paragraph, the word "indignation" strikes a somewhat exaggerated note. Similarly, the word "condemns" in operative paragraph 3 is language that is somewhat too strong for our taste, and the wording of operative paragraphs 4 and 5 is, again, somewhat too peremptory.

Mr. RAJAKOSKI (Finland): The Finnish delegation voted in favour of both draft resolutions, A/C.1/35/L.30 and L.31, which have just been adopted. My delegation has consistently supported the efforts to strengthen the security of States on a regional basis, in particular the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Equally consistently, it has tried to combat the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons by assuming an active role in promoting the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We have done so because we believe that the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States runs counter to the security of all States both in the region concerned and outside it.

Together with the delegations of other Nordic States, the delegation of Finland has expressed its concern at the developments affecting non-proliferation in document A/C.1/35/10, which has been circulated in this Committee. The reports that the Government of South Africa may have tested a nuclear weapon serve to underline the danger and the mere suspicion of the danger of nuclear proliferation whenever and wherever it may occur.

My delegation supported the draft resolution with some misgivings concerning its language. In particular, some of the paragraphs do not, in our view, accurately reflect the respective areas of competence of the General Assembly and the Security Council as provided for in the Charter.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now take up draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.26. This draft resolution has 15 sponsors, including Yemen, which recently signified its intention to become a sponsor. It was introduced by the representative of Sweden at the 34th meeting of the First Committee, on 18 November 1980. Before we proceed any further, I shall call on the Secretary of the Committee to make a statement regarding the financial implications of this draft resolution.

Mr. BERASATEGUI (Secretary of the Committee): The following is a statement presented by the Secretary-General in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly:

"Under the terms of operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.26, the General Assembly would request the

(Mr. Berasategui, Secretary
of the Committee)

Secretary-General to arrange for the reproduction of the full report on a comprehensive study on nuclear weapons as a United Nations publication and, making full use of all the facilities of the United Nations Department of Public Information, to publicize the report in as many languages as is considered desirable and practicable. The Secretary-General wishes to state that the publication of the above-mentioned report will have to be carried out externally and will involve US\$ 17,300 for printing, reproduction and distribution costs."

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes before the vote.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet Union has constantly advocated that the nuclear Powers should contact one another so as to embark on negotiations, with the participation of a certain number of non-nuclear States, to cease production of all types of nuclear weapons and to destroy the stockpiles thereof until they are completely eliminated.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Thus we are geared to practical actions in the field of nuclear disarmament, and the position which has been voiced by the Soviet Union regarding nuclear disarmament remains constant.

As for the study on nuclear weapons, back in 1978, when we voted on resolution 33/91 D, the Soviet Union expressed misgivings about exactly what a study on, for example, the doctrines of "restraint", existing nuclear arsenals, trends in the development of nuclear weapons and so on might yield in so far as practical disarmament is concerned. Now that the General Assembly has before it the study on nuclear weapons prepared by a Group of Experts, the justification for the misgivings we voiced earlier becomes particularly obvious. I hope that everyone will agree with me that it is unlikely that the completion of this work could in any meaningful way bring us any nearer to a practical solution of the question of nuclear disarmament, for example, in the Committee on Disarmament. This once more reaffirms the truth of the view that independent studies should be carried out only - I repeat only - in cases where they are genuinely justified. Otherwise the United Nations would be diverted from practical discussions about and solutions of disarmament issues.

In this respect operative paragraph 4 is particularly relevant. It recommends that

"the Committee on Disarmament should take the report and its conclusions into account in its efforts towards general and complete disarmament... in particular in the field of nuclear disarmament."

In connexion with this recommendation I should merely like to note that States entering into negotiations on this matter will naturally take as a basis their own positions and are not likely to take as a basis the provisions of this study, many of which are nothing if not controversial.

On that basis, the Soviet delegation will abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.26.

The CHAIRMAN: I now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.26.

Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.26 was adopted by 116 votes to none, with 20 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: We now turn to draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.22.

It is sponsored by 24 delegations and was introduced by the representative of India at the Committee's 35th meeting on 19 November 1980.

I shall now call on those representatives wishing to explain their votes before the voting.

Mr. MULLOY (Ireland): I should like to explain Ireland's vote on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war as set out in draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.22, which was introduced by India, calling once again on the General Assembly to declare the use of nuclear weapons to be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity.

We are opposed to the use of nuclear weapons; we consider that their use would indeed be disastrous. I wish to quote the statement made by the Irish delegation earlier, in the general debate:

"We do not ever want to see such weapons used. We believe that it would be madness, the ultimate madness... We want to see an end to the further development of these weapons; a reduction in the stockpiles; and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as soon as possible."

(A/C.1/35/PV.28, p. 5)

We deeply regret, therefore, that we should be obliged to vote against a draft resolution under the title "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war" and, to avoid any misunderstanding of our position on this very issue, we want to put it quite clearly on record.

Already in 1961 Ireland voted against resolution 1653 (XVI) on 24 November 1961, which declared

"the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons /to be/ contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations."

The 1961 resolution further declared that the use of such weapons was

"contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity."

In explaining our position on that issue the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Frank Aiken, in a letter to the Secretary-General dated 29 June 1962 indicated that Ireland was not convinced that a simple declaration would be an

(Mr. Mulloy, Ireland)

effective method of preventing the use of nuclear weapons or that such a declaration would add anything to the clear terms of the Charter, by which all Members are obliged to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against...any State".

(Mr. Mulloy, Ireland)

In Ireland's view, said Mr. Aiken, the declaration might even be positively dangerous, in so far as it would tend to encourage a false sense of security and lead States to reduce their endeavours to prevent the further spread of these terrible weapons and to establish a world security system which would be effective in preventing war and would ensure the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons in the hands of individual Powers.

That was the position in 1962, three years after Ireland's first introduction to this Assembly of a draft resolution to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and six years before the culmination of the efforts initiated by Ireland in 1958 which resulted in the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

While I would not wish at this point to enter into the merits of the system of controls and safeguards established as the result of the NPT, is it realistic to imply that a single declaration is an adequate substitute for patient negotiations involving the nuclear Powers to restrict the production, transfer and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and fissionable materials for weapons purposes. However, the draft resolution on which we are to vote is not simply a general statement with which all can agree. It declares specifically that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter and a crime against humanity and that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should therefore be prohibited pending nuclear disarmament.

I regret to have to say that we do not agree that this particular approach is a good one. The nuclear Powers which claim to hold nuclear weapons as a deterrent have developed those weapons over many years as a matter of military policy and they always emphasize that they are ready to retaliate if attacked. Granted that position, we see little prospect that the nuclear Powers will now put into practice a declaration here that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter, especially since the Charter itself makes no mention of any weapons and does provide for the right of self-defence.

(Mr. Mulloy, Ireland)

Nor will the nuclear Powers accept a declaration by the Assembly that the use of nuclear weapons is a crime against humanity. They may agree, as we do, that it would be the supreme folly. But they attach a particular legal significance to the term "crime against humanity", which was given a specific definition by the international community following the Second World War, and they will not concede in response to a simple declaration by the Assembly that the military policies of deterrence to which they are at present committed are in effect crimes in international law which merit international punishment.

Furthermore, we consider it unrealistic and indeed dangerously misleading to the world at large to suggest that pending nuclear disarmament the nuclear Powers could be willing to accept a prohibition on the threat of use of nuclear weapons when that is central to the logic of their strategic doctrines, however much we regret those doctrines.

Given the huge arsenals that exist, it is, rather, only through nuclear disarmament that the immense risk to mankind can be reduced and eventually removed. We question seriously the value of sweeping declarations of this kind because we fear that they may distract attention from the very serious need to negotiate the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, to which we are strongly committed, and devalue the currency of United Nations resolutions and their authority.

We know that a simple declaration by the Assembly will change nothing in practice, however emotionally satisfying it may seem. Even if the nuclear Powers were to accept such a declaration now, they would, we believe, still retain their weapons, and we see no prospect that they would really abide by the declaration in time of war.

As evidence of the ineffectiveness of such declarations in achieving real nuclear disarmament, I would point to the fact that the 1961 resolution declared the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons a violation of the Charter and a crime against humanity. That was 19 years ago, and the only change since then has been a great increase in the arsenals of nuclear weapons held by the nuclear Powers.

(Mr. Mulloy, Ireland)

In voting against the draft resolution already in 1961, Ireland's delegation explained its position as follows:

"Each nuclear Power may declare now that to use its nuclear weapons would be contrary to international law, but if its very survival were at stake, it would not hesitate to use the most potent weapons available to it, regardless of what declarations it subscribed to ... My delegation yields to none in our horror at the prospect of the use of nuclear weapons ... but we strongly feel that this declaration" - the 1961 draft declaration - "although well intended, would be of very little real value. Indeed, in so far as a convention of the kind proposed would give a false sense of security, it may even be positively dangerous - as it would lead States to reduce their search for the construction of a world security system which would be effective in preventing war and would permit the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons in the hands of individual Powers." (A/C.1/PV.1193, p. 38)

Those were the views of my delegation in 1961, as expressed in this Committee on a somewhat similar resolution. I believe that those views have been fully borne out in the 19 years which have passed since then and it is essentially for similar reasons that to our regret we must vote against the present draft resolution.

Mr. NONOYAMA (Japan): Against the background of increased international tension in various regions, notably in Afghanistan, my Government considers a stabilized system of nuclear deterrence to be of ever-increasing importance as a factor to contain the further spreading of such tension. That is the reason why this year my delegation has been instructed to vote against the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.22.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now put to the vote draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.22.

Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.22 was adopted by 101 votes to 19, with 15 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes.

Mr. ZHARKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): With respect to the vote that has just been taken on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.22, on the non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war, the delegation of the USSR would like to state the following.

The Soviet Union considers that a solution to the question of the non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war can be achieved by a cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the cessation of the production of those weapons, the reduction and elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and, parallel with that, by all States refraining from the use of force in international relations. The position of the USSR on this matter has been repeatedly stated in the United Nations, including in a letter sent by the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the question of the non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war, dated 2 October 1979, which was circulated as document A/34/456 Add.1. The Soviet Union sees the solution of this matter first and foremost through a cessation of the nuclear-arms race; secondly, and in parallel with that, through strengthening the political and international legal guarantees for the security of States, including a ban on the use of nuclear and other types of weapons and banning the use of force in general in international relations; and thirdly, through the adoption of measures aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation régime and preventing the danger of conflicts arising where nuclear weapons might be used.

We believe that it is inadmissible artificially to divorce the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons from the prohibition of the use of force in international relations. We are convinced that the advantage of resolving the question of the non-use of nuclear weapons in the context of the prohibition of the use of all types of weapons lies in the fact that all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, would be placed on an equal footing. Unfortunately, in the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.22, the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is once more artificially divorced from the question of the adoption of international political and legal measures to strengthen the security of all States and from the question of the renunciation by States of the use of force in international relations. Because of that the Soviet Union was compelled to abstain in the vote on that draft resolution.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): The Swedish Government attaches the greatest importance to measures aimed at preventing the use of nuclear weapons. It is in fact a matter of the very survival of mankind that such weapons should not be used. There is also a logical link between non-use and non-proliferation which must be kept in mind.

I wish to recall what was said in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on the question of the non-use of nuclear weapons. Negotiations on the matter during that session reminded us of all the practical difficulties involved. It is all too evident that effective measures in the field of non-use cannot be achieved without fully taking into account the problems inherent in the nuclear arsenals and their related military doctrines. It is in fact necessary to grapple with the concrete reality of nuclear forces and of the doctrines for their possible use which go deeply into the general military dispositions of the leading military Powers and concern their conventional forces as well.

It is our firm belief that more resolute efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament are urgently needed. That should take place through gradual and balanced reductions of nuclear-weapons stockpiles with the aim of their total abolition. Measures of non-use have their natural place in such a process, although unfortunately it does not seem realistic to expect that a prohibition of nuclear weapons can start such a process.

Sweden entirely shares, however, the objectives of this draft resolution. We also share the opinion of the representative of India in his introductory statement that a nuclear war most probably would have such effects that it would constitute a crime against humanity.

As operative paragraph 1 is worded, making a precise interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations, we think it has to be carefully scrutinized from a legal standpoint as well. In that light we have, much to our regret, not found it possible to vote in favour of this draft resolution, since we do not think that a declaration of this kind will fulfil its purpose.

Mr. RAJAKOSKI (Finland): The Finnish delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.22 that has just been adopted. We believe that efforts to eliminate the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and to halt and reverse the arms race should include a variety of approaches, including measures aimed at the prevention of nuclear war. We consider that to be the overriding goal of that draft resolution.

However, in the view of my delegation, operative paragraph 1 is not in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. That is a serious shortcoming in the draft resolution just adopted. Taking into account, however, the ultimate objective expressed in the draft resolution, namely the prevention of nuclear war, my delegation cast a positive vote.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now begin the voting procedure with regard to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.25. This draft resolution has 28 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Iraq at our meeting this morning. I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes before the vote.

Mr. MULLOY (Ireland): I should like in the name of Ireland to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.25 entitled "Israeli nuclear armament", introduced by Iraq and 27 other sponsors.

Though the draft resolution has been presented as a purely procedural one, its intent, as expressed in the second preambular paragraph, implies that in adopting it the General Assembly would put itself in a position of reaffirming resolutions 33/71 A of 1978 and 34/89 of 1979, both of which were unacceptable to Ireland.

(Mr. Mulloy, Ireland)

In effect, Ireland, in common with the nine member States of the European Community, voted against resolution 33/71 A of 1978 because the terms of that draft resolution were, in our opinion, incompatible with the achievement of a just, comprehensive and durable peace in the Middle East, along lines repeatedly indicated by the Nine.

Ireland abstained in the vote on resolution 34/89 of 1979 because we did not consider it prudent, productive or just to single out as a special case the problem of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Israel, while other related regional aspects of the proliferation problem were not treated in that resolution. Ireland accordingly felt that resolution 34/89 served to introduce an imbalance into the international debate on this question and thereby complicated efforts to bring global proliferation under control.

Ireland regrets, therefore, that it cannot accept the reaffirmation of those resolutions and will abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.25.

Mr. HEPEURU (Bahamas): The reason for the affirmative vote which the Bahamas delegation will cast on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.25 is my Government's strong belief that support should be given to every effort geared towards curbing the development of nuclear arms and establishing regional nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Similarly, my delegation wishes to reiterate the position it held when this item was discussed in 1978 and 1979; that is that our affirmative vote does not mean agreement with the imbalanced expressions contained in several parts of this resolution, particularly in preambular paragraph 2.

Further, my delegation welcomes the signs of willingness shown by the Israeli delegation recently to work towards finding a solution to the conflicts which threaten peace in the Middle East.

Finally, taking into consideration the reservations it has on this draft resolution, my Government sincerely hopes that this affirmative vote will be seen, in addition to the foregoing, as an appeal to all States in the

(Mr. Hepburn, Bahamas)

region to combine these positive measures that have been expressed, which, in my delegation's opinion, cannot help but enhance the process of reducing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, not only regionally but globally as well.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.25.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Netherlands, Norway,
United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia,
Burma, Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Federal
Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland,
Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi, Nepal,
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Saint Lucia,
Singapore, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.25 was adopted by 96 votes to 6, with
34 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those members who wish to
explain their votes at this stage.

Mr. de SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): The Brazilian delegation voted in
favour of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.25, but had a separate vote been
taken on the second preambular paragraph it would have abstained. That
paragraph reaffirms the terms of resolution 33/71 A, in the voting on which
the Brazilian delegation deliberately did not participate.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): I should like to
explain why my delegation has abstained on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.25
entitled "Israeli nuclear armament". The second preambular paragraph of
the draft resolution would, in effect, reaffirm resolution 33/71 A of
14 December 1978. That resolution was and remains unacceptable to my
delegation.

Furthermore, the subject of nuclear non-proliferation in the Middle
East has taken on another dimension by the decision of Israel to support the
Egyptian draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.6. As a result of that support, the
draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.6 could yesterday be adopted by consensus. My
delegation sincerely hopes that the consensus draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.6

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic
of Germany)

will contribute to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

With that aim in mind, we have carefully studied draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.25 and we have not found it to be a helpful contribution.

Mr. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO (Italy) (interpretation from French):
Italy abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.25.

My delegation could not go along with the second preambular paragraph of that draft resolution, although we recognize that it is of a procedural nature. That paragraph in effect reaffirms the validity of resolution 33/71 A of 14 December 1978 on military and nuclear collaboration with Israel and Italy voted against that resolution.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now take action on the draft resolution contained in A/C.1/35/L.27.

That draft resolution was introduced by the representative of Hungary at the 35th meeting of the First Committee on 19 November 1980. Members of the Committee will also recall that at our meeting this morning the representative of India proposed an amendment to operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, which was acceptable to the delegation of Hungary.

The revised and modified operative paragraph 1 reads:

"Calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons and to report on the results to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session."

(The Chairman)

The sponsors of this draft resolution have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection I shall take it that the Committee adopts draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.27 without a vote.

It was so decided.

Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.27 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: I call upon the representative of Venezuela, who wishes to explain his vote.

Mr. ARTEAGA (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Venezuela did not fail to join the consensus achieved in respect of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.27 even though we have certain reservations on a number of aspects. In the discussions in the Ad Hoc Working Group that was set up by the Committee on Disarmament this year to consider the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, the Venezuelan delegation proposed a change of approach to the consideration of the question.

In our view the convention to be produced by the Working Group should not refer to "radiological weapons", since there is no such specific type of weapon, but rather to prohibition of the use of radioactive material for military purposes, the prohibition of radiological means of warfare or of means of radiological warfare. In this connexion, Venezuela seeks only to help achieve a genuine disarmament measure on the subject.

In that constructive spirit my delegation will continue to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament in the hope that the different views on this question may be reconciled and that the best possible results may thus be achieved for the benefit of international peace and security.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has concluded its consideration of and action on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.27.

The representative of Nigeria wishes to exercise his right of reply. I now call on him.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): My delegation wishes to exercise its right of reply concerning some of the statements we have heard this afternoon in explanation of vote on the draft resolutions in document A/C.1/35/L.30 and A/C.1/35/L.31, on the implementation of the demuclearization of Africa.

It is necessary to exercise our right of reply because some of those statements contained assertions that we consider to be rather unfortunate in the sense that it has never been characteristic of my own delegation or of the other sponsors of the two draft resolutions to which I have referred to refuse to discuss any suggestions for modifications or improvements in order to make them more acceptable to delegations or groups of delegations. I was therefore certainly surprised to hear a representative here this afternoon - though out of respect for my friendship with him I shall not name him - say that the sponsors of the draft resolution had thrust it forward on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. That is far from the truth, as can be seen from the fact that the proposals made to us only this morning by some representatives, notably the representative of France, were considered by the sponsors.

You, Mr. Chairman, were kind enough to give us some time to reflect on those proposals, and some modifications were made to our original draft resolutions as a result of suggestions that were made to us. The sponsors were grateful, and I too was grateful of course, for the sympathy shown by various representatives who referred to the potential danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Africa. Of course, it is one thing to speak of that potential danger, but when we come to making proposals as to how that potential danger can be stemmed it becomes rather curious that those proposals are not supported. We are told that we ought to call on South Africa to assume non-proliferation commitments. I am sure that those who make that point would be the first to realize that if those who have leverage with South Africa are in no position to force South Africa to adhere

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to submit all its nuclear programmes to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, neither the African countries themselves individually nor the Organization of African Unity as an organization is in any position to do so. In fact, that is the whole essence of the draft resolution before the Assembly namely that in consideration of the danger to non-proliferation posed by South Africa, a danger that everyone has recognized, the General Assembly should be able to do something about it directly or at least to call on the Security Council to take action in exercise of its own authority.

Of course, my delegation for one is quite aware that the verbal encouragement that certain Member States that have leverage with South Africa have been giving has not yielded any results.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

We are also aware that as a result of the fact that South Africa had not yielded, the United States in particular took the decision that more than verbal urgings would be required and decided to suspend for some time the shipments of highly enriched uranium fuel destined for the South African Safari 1. While my delegation appreciates this, we see it as merely a small step along the path leading to what measures ought to be effected in getting the result which we all desire. That result is to ensure that South Africa does not acquire nuclear weapons and thereby endanger peace and security in particular of the African continent.

Indeed, it was our information that when, in 1977, the Soviet Union first indicated that South Africa was preparing to test a nuclear explosive device in the Kalahari Desert, the United States made representations to South Africa. Not only the United States did this: the United Kingdom also, we understand, made an approach in Pretoria to the South African Government calling its attention to the danger which its insistence on conducting such a test would involve.

Unless the representations of the United Kingdom at that time were based only on imaginary South African preparations - and I have in mind here what we heard here this afternoon from the representative of the United Kingdom - and the British Government was not convinced that South African preparations were really taking place, and unless also the preparations were supposed to be for peaceful purposes, in which case, I am sure, the Government of the United Kingdom would probably not have taken the trouble to make its representations, then it cannot be concluded, as it has been this afternoon, that the idea that South Africa could in fact have been presumed to have possessed some nuclear weapons by 1979, as indicated in the report of the Secretary-General, was far-fetched.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

I refer to paragraph 88 of the report of the Secretary-General (A/35/402). Nothing, therefore, that we had inserted in the draft resolution came out of our own imagination. These are facts which are borne out by the evidence which we have all been witnessing since 1977. Another piece of concrete evidence, of course, was what happened last year on 22 September.

I should like finally to say to the representative of France that it is not the intention of the sponsors of the two draft resolutions to prohibit sales by industrialized countries to developing countries. We are all aware that many of us developing countries do require the products of technology and industrial products from developed countries. But certainly we have the right to expect that industrialized countries, particularly nuclear-weapon States and suppliers of nuclear materials and technology, have a duty not to place commercial interests before their international responsibilities. This is the main thrust of our draft resolutions. We have no quarrel with the sales from one country to another, but when the kinds of materials and equipment sold by one country to another are such as to jeopardize the security of the whole region I think we have the right to call attention to such a development.

Again, I should like to stress that this is not something which we have picked out of a hat. I think the representative of France quoted part of the report of the Secretary-General on the nuclear capability of South Africa. He indicated that whatever sales France had contracted with South Africa were under IAEA safeguards. What, of course, he did not quote was the fact that of all the industrialized countries or suppliers of nuclear materials and technology, the report has clearly indicated that France is the only one whose continuing assistance in training staff to operate the reactors which it has contracted to sell to the South African Government constitutes a significant exception to the changing pattern of official external ties with South Africa in the nuclear field. Again, I am quoting from the report of the Group of Experts, and not imagining.

(Mr. Adeniji Nigeria)

Indeed, I should congratulate some of my co-sponsors of the draft resolution for the fact that they have been very restrained in the mentioning of names in the text.

Mrs. LEEK (United Kingdom): I should simply like to reserve the right of my delegation to reply to the remarks just made by the representative of Nigeria.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): I for my part wish to indicate that my delegation reserves the right to respond to the statement of our colleague from Nigeria at a subsequent meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to make the following announcement with regard to the co-sponsorship of draft resolutions. Yemen has become a co-sponsor of draft resolutions A/C.1/35/L.35 and A/C.1/35/L.38; Viet Nam has become a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.32/Rev.1.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.