

GENERAL
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Chairman: Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia).

United action for peace (*continued*)

[Item 68]*

GENERAL DISCUSSION (*continued*)

1. Mr. YOUNGER (United Kingdom) said that a number of delegations, including that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, were under the impression that the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/576) of the seven Powers was contrary to the Charter; those delegations did not realize the necessity of breaking the existing deadlock. He would therefore endeavour to answer those criticisms and to allay the misgivings of other delegations.

2. Mr. Vyshinsky on 9 October (354th meeting) had given grounds for the hope that he would accept some of the principles of the seven-Power draft resolution, despite some difficulties concerning details. Unfortunately, in his statement on the following day (357th meeting) he had employed a battery of legal arguments to accuse the sponsors of the proposal in question of destroying the Charter and had spoken of a *diktat* by the majority.

3. An examination of Articles 10, 11, 12, 43 and 46 showed that in fact there was no threat to the spirit or even to the letter of the Charter, as the United Kingdom delegation would show when the draft resolution came up for consideration section by section. For the time being, the delegation would merely explain the relationship of the proposed resolution with the Charter.

4. It was wrong to speak, in that connexion, of an infringement of the powers which Chapters V, VI, VII, VIII and XII conferred upon the Security Council; on the contrary, it would be a source of gratification if the Council really exercised those powers. To deal with the action of the General Assembly with respect to peace and security in no way prejudiced the pre-

rogatives of the Security Council. He wondered on what grounds Mr. Vyshinsky could have stated that the Council had the exclusive right to fight against aggression. Article 24 spoke of primary responsibility; that implied a secondary responsibility, which under other Articles, such as Articles 10, 11 and 12, was laid upon the General Assembly. Moreover, under international law Member States had always had the right and duty of individual or collective self-defence against aggression. Article 51 of the Charter merely gave expression to those principles. Accordingly, the object of the proposal was, without prejudice to the powers and duties of the Security Council, which there was no thought of transferring to the General Assembly, to give expression and coherent form to the powers and duties in any case vested in the General Assembly; the proposal introduced nothing new but was merely meant to give prominence to the resources available to peace-loving States under the Charter and to serve as a warning to aggressors.

5. Independently of the Charter, a State had the right of self-defence; it could go to the help of another State and enter into defensive agreements for collective self-defence on a bilateral, regional or world-wide basis. The Charter expressly left those rights untouched and at the same time added other provisions for international security. The former defensive alliances between States and the law of the jungle should, however, give way to collective defence measures approved by a truly international organization expressing the will of nations.

6. It would be absurd if the letter of the Charter, which recognized the right of collective self-defence and the pooling of forces, failed to permit the United Nations to approve the effectiveness, morality and constitutionality of action taken by the Member States along those lines. Admittedly, the Security Council, the Military Staff Committee and the agreements provided for in Article 43 played the major part in the maintenance of peace and security, but, as Mr. Dulles

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

had shown (354th meeting), the terms of Article 10 made provision for preserving the residual rights of the Assembly.

7. In creating a system under which the United Nations could resort to armed force against aggression, the authors of the Charter had expected that the unanimity rule—a most important rule, as more than one Power would say in agreement with the USSR—would be employed only in exceptional cases to protect the vital interests of the permanent members of the Security Council which would have to bear the main burden of collective defence.

8. The rule of unanimity had, however, been used to prevent the organization of the security system conceived at San Francisco. Articles 26, 43 and 45 had remained inoperative, and the use of the veto had opened a gap in the system of collective defence. Mr. Vyshinsky, who claimed (357th meeting) that only the minority needed the veto in order to defend itself against the majority, could hardly argue that the United States delegation bribed or bullied the majorities of ten in the Security Council or of fifty-five in the General Assembly which so often opposed the proposals of the USSR. Surely the USSR delegation did not really think that it was the only one which was never wrong.

9. Mr. Vyshinsky, who had emphasized the urgent need to apply Article 43, dealing with making armed forces available to the Security Council, and Article 106, concerning consultation among the permanent members, had submitted the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/579 and A/C.1/580. The delegations, however, which had for five long years endeavoured to put into effect the provisions of Article 43, had met with continuous obstruction from the USSR delegation. The precedents for the consultations between the great Powers recommended by Mr. Vyshinsky had hardly been promising; when the four Powers had examined the German or Austrian question, he had always been a solitary figure.

10. As Mr. Pearson had observed (358th meeting), the transitional period contemplated in Article 106 of the Charter had become absurdly long. It was reasonable to ask Mr. Vyshinsky to change his attitude and to offer some assurances of the sincerity of his intention to negotiate. It was, therefore, with a mixture of hope, caution and some misgivings that one would look forward to the elaboration of the USSR delegation's proposals; at the same time the USSR should reconsider the seven-Power proposal.

11. In the course of discussion, it should be possible to reach agreement on a number of amendments, to allay some apprehension and to combine the principles of the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/576) with those of the Chilean draft resolution (A/C.1/575).

12. Above all, the Charter should not be merely a paper shield. If it could not be made effective in the precise way originally envisaged, a secondary method must be adopted in order to let it serve its purpose. Concerted action by peace-loving States must replace the former tactics of resisting aggression by scattered isolated actions.

13. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were absorbed in the work of rebuilding their country and relied on the United Nations to take effective steps to dispel the threats of war. That was the spirit in which the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR had given due consideration to the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/576).

14. It was not the first time that the United Nations had been faced with the great problem of strengthening the peace. Thanks to the efforts of the USSR, it had been possible to adopt important decisions aimed at constructing a bastion of peace out of international co-operation. Accordingly, the Ukrainian SSR was always ready to welcome any proposal really designed to strengthen the Organization; such proposals must be based on respect for the Charter and for the political independence and territorial integrity of Member State, whose domestic affairs must remain inviolate.

15. Despite the Charter, Mr. Dulles had set out from the principle that the unanimity rule was an obstacle to international co-operation for the purpose of establishing collective security. To all the hackneyed arguments that had been brought forward in the past in the more or less open attacks on Article 27, Mr. Dulles had added a new argument based on the speedy and unprecedented action taken by the Security Council in Korea in the absence of the USSR. On that shameful episode in the history of the United Nations, which was being used to cover up aggression, had been based the main argument for abolishing or circumventing the rule of unanimity of the five great Powers; that purpose was common to both draft resolutions (A/C.1/575 and A/C.1/576). The delegation of the United States of America, in particular, proposed to extend the prerogatives of the General Assembly in order to give it precedence over the Security Council and usurp the Council's functions in maintaining peace and security.

16. The delegations of France, Brazil and Peru had vainly attempted to justify the attacks on the Security Council's rights by quotations from the Charter (355th and 356th meetings). The representative of Brazil, in particular, had distorted the views of Mr. Kopelmanas, the jurist, who, while admitting that the Charter was not sacrosanct, had always acknowledged that any possible revision must conform to the requirements of Article 109. With experience, no doubt, means would be found of improving the Charter but any such process must follow the rules prescribed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 109.

17. Mr. Younger had tried to dispel the bad impression which had been produced, but his remarks on the nature of a proposal which could only weaken the United Nations had not been reassuring. It was clear from the Australian representative's remarks (356th meeting) that the issue at stake was not merely the amendment of the rules of procedure but the revision of the basic provisions of the Charter. To adopt the seven-Power draft resolution would be to strike at the very foundations of the United Nations.

18. Mr. Dulles had stated (345th meeting) that resistance to aggression was not the exclusive privilege of the great Powers and the Security Council, that the General Assembly more faithfully reflected world pub-

lic opinion and that in the hour of danger two-thirds of the Member States would undoubtedly know how to face their responsibility. The answer to Mr. Dulles' attempt to humour the small Powers could be found in the statement made by Generalissimo Stalin on 7 April 1948, at a dinner in honour of a Finnish delegation. Replying to those who doubted whether it was possible for States, large and small, to base their relations on the principle of absolute equality, Stalin had affirmed that each nation had its own peculiarities, that each brought its own cultural contribution and that in that sense all the nations of the world had an equal dignity.

19. The Charter, too, recognized the principle of the sovereign equality of all Member States but, without being at all inconsistent, attributed the primary responsibility for maintaining international security to the great Powers which had the necessary forces to avert war and whose concerted action was therefore so important. To supplant the Security Council by the General Assembly was therefore to ignore a fundamental principle of the Charter, the rule of the unanimity of the great Powers which had been under constant attack by the United States of America, which was preoccupied only with the world hegemony and did not favour united action. As early as 1946 Mr. Molotov had issued a solemn warning: If the United Nations departed from the rule of unanimity which was its cornerstone, the whole structure would collapse; lasting peace was impossible without unanimity. If one or two great Powers should ever be removed from the Organization, it would lose its international character. Blocs of States with conflicting interests would lead the world onto a path fraught with dangers for international peace and security.

20. The Ukrainian SSR delegation felt, however, that certain proposals in the seven-Power draft resolution were acceptable. It saw no reason why there should not be emergency sessions but, as had already been stated, it would be contrary to the Charter for any seven members of the Security Council to have the power to convene such sessions; moreover, notice of only twenty-four hours would give rise to certain difficulties, especially for the Ukrainian SSR.

21. Referring to section B of the seven-Power draft resolution, he said that a peace observation commission might be established but it must be selected on the basis of equitable geographical distribution. With regard to sections C and D, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR reserved the right to explain its attitude in detail when the various paragraphs were discussed, but wished to state immediately that the clauses relating to armed forces of the United Nations, military experts and a collective measures committee to study the military resources of various States could not be accepted since they were incompatible with the Charter.

22. Mr. COSTA DU RELS (Bolivia) said that his delegation supported the seven-Power draft resolution.

23. He recalled that, when the Interim Committee had been set up (General Assembly resolution 111 (II)), his delegation had submitted a proposal somewhat different from that of the United States. The Interim Committee, as finally constituted, had been unable to fulfil its task both owing to the deliberate absence of certain countries and because it had fallen victim to the

academic spirit. The same concern which had led to the establishment of the Interim Committee had now inspired the United States delegation and other delegations to propose their joint draft resolution (A/C.1/576). It was a constructive proposal which would enable the General Assembly to act with the required promptitude. Certain delegations contended, however, that it would undermine the United Nations. That was reminiscent of Mr. Vyshinsky's defiant attitude regarding the establishment of the Interim Committee,¹ when he had asked that the normal procedure for amending the Charter should be followed, yet had hinted darkly that the conditions of Article 109 could not be fulfilled. The USSR was apparently determined to advance the unanimity rule as an argument for resisting any improvements in the United Nations. Yet, if that rule was to function properly, the great Powers had to cast their votes in good faith and with the object of maintaining the peace. Otherwise they were abusing their power, and in the case of abuse the General Assembly must proclaim the illegality of a vote inconsistent with the principles of the Charter. The Soviet people itself must understand that the negative votes which its delegation was casting constantly, and without justification from the point of view of the United Nations, were preventing the Organization from functioning properly.

24. In those circumstances, the USSR proposed in reply the maintenance of the *status quo*, which would result in paralysing the United Nations. It was meaningless to refer to Article 109, if the USSR was not sincerely disposed to co-operate in a concerted review of the Charter in a spirit of prudence and cordiality.

25. For the moment the situation was that, owing to the position taken by one great Power, the Security Council could not carry out its duties; the Military Staff Committee, composed of the most outstanding military experts, had been unable to give what Aristide Briand called "teeth" to the world Organization; and the Atomic Energy Commission had not been able to come to a single effective decision. All those failures had been the result of the attitude of the USSR.

26. One might wonder what kind of a State it was that was paralysing the action of the international community. Presumably it was a country in which there was freedom of speech, movement and instruction, and which harboured no aggressive intentions against anyone. Stalin himself had told the journalist Roy Howard that his country had never had any intentions of starting a world revolution.

27. Yet history showed that the past actions of the USSR were not so reassuring as that statement might suggest. In 1939, after it had attacked an already weakened Finland in violation of treaty undertakings, the USSR had refused to appear before its peers in the Council of the League of Nations—a dangerous precedent which had recently been followed by Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania when, in violation of the peace treaties, those governments had refused to appear before the International Court of Justice.

28. After Finland, it had been the Baltic States, then the Czechoslovakia of Benes and then Poland which

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second session, Plenary Meetings, Vol. II*, 110th meeting.

had become the victims of a criminal partition. Romania, after having been freed by its young king from the nazi yoke, had been forced to accept a government under a two-hour ultimatum issued by a certain Soviet envoy. True, that envoy in full regalia was now merely a jurist in civilian clothes, whose words were only of respect for the internal affairs of other states. Other times, other customs.

29. Returning from that historical digression—useful for judging the sincerity of Soviet intentions—to deal with the legal aspect of the problem, Mr. Costa du Rels said it became clear that, while the Interim Committee had originally been set up under Article 22 as a subsidiary organ with limited terms of reference, it had now become necessary to keep the General Assembly in a constant state of readiness to carry out its duties under Articles 10 and 11.

30. Mr. Vyshinsky had maintained (357th meeting), of course, that under Article 11, paragraph 2, questions calling for action could only be sent to the Security Council. If however, through the fault of one of its members, the Security Council was prevented from carrying its decisions into effect, and if it did not follow the recommendations of the General Assembly, what was the General Assembly to do? The word "recommendation" must be understood, not in the sense of friendly advice but as an order, in accordance with its Latin origin. If, therefore, the wishes of three-fourths of the General Assembly were disregarded by the Security Council, which was the agent of the General Assembly, the latter could resume its prerogatives for the sake of public welfare and in order to safeguard peace. That seemed to be the best justification for the seven-Power draft resolution.

31. The Chilean draft resolution had the great advantage of taking into account all economic and social factors and, as the Lebanese representative had suggested (359th meeting), it might therefore be well for the seven Powers and the Chilean delegation to consult together with a view to arriving at a single generally acceptable text in keeping with the Charter.

32. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) said that he unreservedly supported the objectives set forth in the seven-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/576). The primary purpose of the draft resolution was to ensure that, if the Security Council failed to discharge its responsibilities, the General Assembly should be able to make use of the functions and powers for maintaining peace which it had been recognized as having ever since San Francisco. The objectives were those for which Mexico had fought at San Francisco when it had urged the granting of the widest possible powers to the General Assembly. Mexico had opposed the privilege of the right of veto at San Francisco because the Mexican delegation had felt that that privilege was a source of discord and a potential danger to the United Nations, and not because it had not desired understanding among the five great Powers. That had in fact always been the desire of Mexico, as it had proved by submitting its appeal to the great Powers to compose their differences (General Assembly resolution 190 (III)). The competence of the General Assembly with regard to the maintenance of peace was limited only by the domestic jurisdiction of Member States over their internal affairs (Article 2, paragraph 7).

33. The governments of the American Republics would, he was sure, be in favour of any measures taken to strengthen, within the United Nations, the principles of the equality of rights of States, of solidarity in the face of aggression and non-intervention in their domestic affairs.

34. The measures proposed by the seven-Power draft resolution were in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Charter. Moreover, they had the additional advantage of relying for their efficacy not on the binding nature of decisions of the Security Council but on the moral force represented by the will of States as expressed in a recommendation of the General Assembly.

35. In accepting Chapter I of the Charter, Members had committed themselves to take measures of collective security for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace. Further, Article 10 conferred upon the General Assembly very broad powers of discussion and recommendation, subject only to the limitation contained in Article 12, under which the General Assembly could not make any recommendation with regard to a dispute or situation while the Security Council was dealing with the matter. That limitation, however, affected not the competence of the Assembly but the time when that competence could be exercised. The provision was intended to regulate the work of the Organization in such a way as to avoid the possibility of two of its organs discussing the same question simultaneously and attempting to settle it by conflicting decisions. The fact that the Security Council did not discharge its responsibilities did not relieve the Members or the Organization of the duty to fulfil their obligations.

36. The seven-Power draft resolution recognized, in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter, that the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security had been conferred on the Security Council in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations. If, for reasons which could not have been foreseen at San Francisco, the Security Council could not act promptly or effectively, the United Nations did not thereby lose its freedom of action and was not relieved of its responsibility to take collective measures for the maintenance of peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression. Naturally, the Assembly would recommend the adoption of collective measures of defence only if the Security Council failed to fulfil its functions. That was unexceptionable, since the first right was the right to survival.

37. It had been said that it was wrong to talk of the failure of the Council when it could not act due to the lack of unanimity among the five great Powers since the right of veto was recognized by the Charter. That argument did not hold water. Modern jurisprudence and doctrine did not accept the notion of the absolute and unlimited exercise of a juridical power. It was recognized that rights were only accorded as a social function and for the fulfilment of the duties they implied towards national or international society. The exercise of the right of veto could therefore be regarded as legitimate only to the extent that it did not run counter to the mission of the Security Council, the maintenance of international peace and security. If it was used otherwise, it was an abuse of power.

38. Adoption of the seven-Power draft resolution could not fail to restore confidence in the principle of collective security, since it would make it possible to erect an effective barrier against any possible aggressor.
39. The Mexican delegation felt that section C, paragraph 8 of the seven-Power draft resolution did no more than confirm and repeat the provisions of Article 43 of the Charter. Consequently, any agreement regarding the establishment of international armed forces in the service of the United Nations would have to be made in accordance with the constitutional processes of the contracting States. That reservation might with advantage be included in the text of paragraph 8.
40. The draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Chile (A/C.1/575) also deserved the attention of the Committee, in particular the proposal relating to the co-ordination of the efforts and resources of Member States with a view to a joint economic programme and the proposals regarding respect for individual liberties and human rights.
41. With regard to the two draft resolutions submitted by the USSR (A/C.1/579 and A/C.1/580) the delegation of Mexico reserved its position until they had been further explained.
42. Mr. KISELEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the experience of the United Nations showed that from the beginning there had been a conflict between the partisans of two opposed political ideologies. On 29 October 1946,² Mr. Molotov, speaking before the General Assembly on the right of veto, said that two international tendencies were struggling within the United Nations, one based on respect for the ideas and principles of the Charter and the other aiming to undermine the very foundations of the United Nations. Mr. Molotov's predictions had proved to be correct. How persistent and determined the Soviet Union and the people's democracies had been in their endeavours to promote the observance of the principles of the Charter was obvious to any impartial and objective observer. The USSR representatives had repeatedly made concrete proposals to put an end to the armaments race, to prohibit atomic weapons and to bring about peaceful co-operation between nations. They had also proposed that the five great Powers should sign a peace pact.
43. The current discussion of the so-called right of veto revealed the extremely serious divergences existing between two political groups, one of which upheld the principle of co-operation between great and small nations while the other, led by small influential groups, wanted to have a free hand for unlimited expansion.
44. On 9 October 1950 (354th meeting) Mr. Foster Dulles had energetically advocated the adoption of the seven-Power draft resolution; he had previously outlined its main principles in an interview broadcast from Lake Success on 7 October. The Committee was now witnessing a fresh assault, led by Mr. Acheson and Mr. Foster Dulles, in the five-year-old struggle against the principle of the unanimity of the five great Powers.
45. As long ago as 15 November 1946³ Mr. Vyshinsky had told the First Committee that the aim of those

who were then criticizing the right of veto while hypocritically pretending that they did not ask for its abolition, had been to strengthen their following in order to "liquidate" the right of veto as soon as a favourable opportunity arose. Events were now confirming that prophecy. The United States of America probably believed that its position had become sufficiently strong and that it had enough supporters to achieve its plan.

46. There was a strong current of opinion in the United States against the right of veto. Speaking in a sub-committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate in February 1950, Senators Thomas and Douglas had suggested that the United States delegation to the General Assembly should propose a revision of the Charter to enable a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly, including the concurring vote of three permanent members of the Security Council, to override the veto of any permanent member of the Security Council. For the purpose of giving effect to such an amendment, they had suggested the conclusion of a pact the signatories to which would undertake to regard as binding any decision taken by the General Assembly in the circumstances described. The aim of those proposals was to make it possible for any question on which the Security Council reached a deadlock to be brought before the Assembly within twenty-four hours after the question had been removed from the Council's agenda.

47. The same meeting of that sub-committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had also discussed the creation of an international force to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations. It had been made clear during that particular discussion that the right of veto would not apply to decisions of the Council concerning the utilization of that armed force; such decisions would be taken by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. The reactionary aims of those proposals were too obvious to deserve further comment.

48. On 27 April 1950, Mr. Herbert Hoover, former president of the United States, had said that the United Nations should be "reorganized without the communist nations in it", and that, if such a reorganization should not prove feasible, a new united front should be created.

49. Although the only aim of those proposals was to try to abolish the right of veto, in other words to weaken the Council in its role as the principal guardian of peace, they were represented to the world as designed to strengthen the authority and prestige of the United Nations.

50. The Peruvian representative (356th meeting) had asserted that in accordance with the letter of the Charter and the spirit in which it had been drafted at San Francisco, the General Assembly could make recommendations whenever the Security Council was unable to take any action. Clearly, Mr. Belaúnde believed that the time had come openly to replace the Security Council by the General Assembly.

51. Mr. Spender (356th meeting) had also attacked the right of veto and had alleged that the principle of unanimity had only been adopted under pressure from the great Powers. In fact, however, it was not by accident that the right of veto had been stipulated in the Charter. That right had been discussed at great length;

² *Ibid.*, Second part of first session, Plenary Meetings, 42nd meeting.

³ *Ibid.*, First Committee, 20th meeting.

it safeguarded the principle that the five great Powers should act in a concerted manner. Before the Second World War, the great Powers had entertained no such desire for united action in the defence of international peace and security. That lack of unity had brought untold sorrow to mankind. The United Nations had recognized the principle of unanimity of the great Powers because they wanted to safeguard more adequately the interests of all States, whether large or small.

52. The Bolivian representative's slanderous remarks about the USSR were too hackneyed to deserve any comment.

53. The true aim of the seven-Power draft resolution was to replace the Security Council by the General Assembly, to paralyse the activities of the Security Council and to transform the United Nations into a mere tool of the foreign policy of the United States of America. Without interfering formally with the Council's existence, that draft resolution proposed to abolish the veto indirectly by giving the Assembly powers which, under the Charter, belonged exclusively to the Council. Under the cover of grandiloquent phrases about peace, the authors of the draft resolution sought to interpret the various articles of the Charter in their own favour. They interpreted Article 11, for example, as authorizing the General Assembly to study and decide any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, whereas the same Article stated clearly that any such question on which action was necessary had to be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly, either before or after discussion. The authors of the seven-Power draft resolution wished to ignore that very clear provision because it ran counter to their interests.

54. Section A of the seven-Power draft resolution provided for the calling of emergency sessions of the General Assembly at the request of any seven members of the Security Council, whereas under the Charter a decision of that nature required a majority which included the five permanent members. The Byelorussian delegation was categorically opposed to the calling of emergency sessions in the manner, and within the time-limit of twenty-four hours proposed by the seven Powers.

55. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR would agree to the establishment of a peace observation committee provided that it were really representative of the United Nations and not the tool of a group of States.

56. His delegation could not agree to the proposal to set up armed forces of the United Nations together with a panel of military experts. Such a proposal was contrary to the Charter, particularly to Chapter VII thereof, which provided that the armed forces of the United Nations should be placed at the disposal of the Military Staff Committee, which was itself subordinate to the Security Council.

57. The establishment of a collective measures committee was also in conflict with the Charter since the responsibilities which the Committee was to be given

were already vested in the Security Council. Moreover, as the representative of Australia had pointed out, the Committee's powers were very vaguely defined.

58. In fact, the seven-Power draft resolution was calculated to transform the United Nations into an instrument of aggression and interference in the internal affairs of peaceful States. The Byelorussian SSR delegation would therefore vigorously oppose it. By contrast, it warmly supported the draft resolutions submitted by the USSR delegation (A/C.1/579 and A/C.1/580).

59. Mr. GONZALEZ (Venezuela) said that it was the duty of Member States to strengthen the efficacy of the United Nations; in his government's view, the resolutions of the General Assembly, provided that they were validly adopted, should guide the work of the other organs of the United Nations.

60. The object of the seven-Power draft resolution was precisely to strengthen the authority of the United Nations. There were some, however, who argued that it would violate both the spirit and the letter of the Charter by infringing the powers of the Security Council. There were others, on the contrary, who maintained that the restrictive provisions of Article 12 would cease to be operative in cases where the Council was unable to act owing to the lack of unanimity among its permanent members.

61. While unwilling to enter into considerations of a juridical nature, the representative of Venezuela wished to state that he supported any proposal designed to improve the machinery of the United Nations and to achieve a stricter application of the principles upon which the Organization was based. The provisions of the Charter would certainly have to be amended in due course so as to bring them into line with facts and events, but it would not be desirable to do so until the United Nations had gained wider experience.

62. As a party to the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, Venezuela supported any plan to organize collective world defence against aggression and, consequently, supported the seven-Power draft resolution. The establishment and training of United Nations armed forces constituted, in the present circumstances, the best means to achieve that aim. The capacity of each State and the provisions of its constitution would, of course, have to be taken into account when those contingents were established. Venezuela, for its part, had not reached a level of industrial development which would enable it to co-operate as effectively as it would wish in the creation of international armed forces. It would progressively increase its participation *pari passu* with the increase in its resources.

63. The Venezuelan delegation proposed that the information concerning the measures taken by Member States to give effect to paragraph 8 of the draft resolution should, in view of its nature, be communicated, not to the Secretary-General as proposed in the Greek amendment (A/C.1/577), but to the collective measures committee, for that information came within the committee's competence.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.