

### THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 15 November 1949, at 3 p.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SARDER (Turkey).*

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)**

1. Sir Carl BERENDSEN (New Zealand) said that the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/996) was the latest in a long series of draft resolutions which that delegation was wont to submit at every session of the General Assembly not with the expectation that they would be acted upon but purely for propaganda purposes. One wondered whether it was useful to discuss them seriously since, quite obviously, anyone who was deceived by them was beyond the reach of logical argument. However, in view of the existing world situation, it did not seem possible to dismiss the Soviet Union proposal without comment.
2. Paragraph 1 proposed that the General Assembly condemn the preparations for a new war being conducted in a number of countries, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom. Sir Carl did not think that there was a single individual who believed that the United States and the United Kingdom were contemplating a war of aggression. Nor did anyone believe that those Governments were encouraging war propaganda. If there was an "armaments race", "inflation of military budgets", or if "military, navy and air bases" were being established, as the authors of the proposal well knew, that was due to the just apprehension of those countries and their associates as to the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union. Those facts were known all the world over and the accusations contained in the Soviet Union proposal were so far from the facts as to merit nothing but ridicule.
3. One had only to consult the record to see that it was the Soviet Union which had deliberately stultified the activities of the United Nations and which was maintaining the most formidable array of forces in the world today. On the other hand, the United States and the United Kingdom, after the war had immediately abandoned their unquestioned military superiority and had reduced their armaments and armed forces to an extent which, if it seemed imprudent, was nevertheless a conclusive indication of their peaceful intentions. The Soviet Union, after the end of the war, had extended its borders by hundreds of thousands of square miles and had forcibly included under its jurisdiction approximately twenty million hitherto free people. Yet, the United States had undertaken no territorial expansion while the British Empire was, by deliberate choice, much smaller than before the war. In Sir Carl's opinion the facts spoke for themselves and demonstrated the ridiculous nature of the assertions in paragraph 1 of the Soviet Union proposal. Nevertheless, he warned the Committee to beware of such nonsense and he recalled how long the world had been deceived by the obvious absurdities that characterized the nazi propaganda during the 1930's. True, no one had believed for a moment that the statement of the nazis could be taken seriously but they had nevertheless dominated Europe and threatened mankind.
4. In paragraph 2 of the draft resolution the Soviet Union, of all the Members of the United Nations, came forth with crocodile tears to condemn atomic weapons as "contrary to the conscience and honour of nations and incompatible with membership in the United Nations", and urged the prompt adoption of practical measures for their unconditional prohibition and for the establishment of strict international control. Sir Carl found that proposal astonishing. He recalled that when the atomic weapon had first been used, the United States, which alone possessed it, had offered to submit it to international control providing that that control was real and not fictitious. It was the USSR and its satellite nations which refused to agree to any practical system of inspection and thus precluded any effective measure of control. In paragraph 2, as in the preceding one, the same propaganda technique was apparent as that which had been used by the nazis: the guilty were attributing to others intentions which they themselves held. Even the words were the same. Sir Carl remembered how often Hitler had deceived the world by accusing his enemies of "war-mongering". However, no one today would be deceived by that propaganda, except those who wished to be deceived, because the world had learned to its bitter regret that the Soviet Union's policy was opportunistic and would change as often as the Government of the USSR believed such a course to be in its interest. Who was there who had not compared the honesty and logic of the statement by the United States representative with the polemics employed by the representative of the Soviet Union? In Sir Carl Berendsen's opinion the statement of the former was in itself evidence of the sincerity and justice of the United States position.
5. Whether the Soviet Union did or did not possess the secret of the atomic bomb it was obvious that there could be no solution to the problem until all the nations of the world were prepared to subject themselves to strict international supervision without which any plan of atomic control would be a farce. There need be no dereliction of national dignity or sovereignty in accepting such supervision. On the contrary, it was Sir Carl's opinion that to accept such an agreement would be an exercise of sovereignty. He stressed that there could be no solution of the problem unless all Member States were prepared to sink some portion of their individual rights for the common good. No one should under-appreciate the seriousness of the problem. It was a matter of life and death not for individuals or groups, but perhaps for mankind as a whole. The United Nations could not afford to take any risk in the matter and there was no solution short of that strict international inspection and control which had been postulated from the outset by the Western Powers and which had repeatedly been rejected by the Soviet Union. If the latter was really sincere in its insistence upon "appropriate strict international control" then the other nations would unhesitatingly accept that proposal with delight. However, they had been disappointed so often in the past that Sir Carl, for one, could not believe that the Soviet Union proposal was

anything more than mere propaganda. Reassuring phrases were valueless unless their authors could be relied upon to carry out their assurances. It was regrettable, however, that there were certain Governments whose past actions did not create confidence as to their willingness to carry out such an undertaking. Consequently, the Soviet Union's proposals were dangerous in the highest degree since they would be accepted and implemented by those nations whose intentions were honourable and give an enormous advantage to those who did not intend to keep their obligations. Promises had proven to be worth nothing in the past and were not made more valuable by the addition of another promise. It was therefore infinitely better to admit a temporary failure than to deceive the world by accepting anything less than the minimum. Nothing less than effective international inspection and control could suffice or should be considered for a minute.

6. Paragraph 3 of the Soviet Union draft resolution called upon all States to settle their differences by peaceful methods and to refrain from resort to force or the threat of force and urged that the five great Powers conclude among themselves a pact for the strengthening of peace. Sir Carl Berendsen asked what would be the purpose of such a pact among the five great Powers alone and whether it would advance the cause of peace in any way. Was not the Charter of the United Nations intended for precisely that purpose? And if the Charter was insufficient, would a five-Power pact be adequate? The New Zealand representative believed that the answer to those questions lay in the negative. The existing world situation was not such as could be resolved by a mere declaration. He urged the Committee to face the fact that a great part of the world was in fear of aggression from the Soviet Union and it was for that reason that nations felt it incumbent upon them to prepare their defence. If their fears were groundless then the delegation of the Soviet Union could easily remove the insecurity from men's minds by agreeing to accept, as an equal in the family of nations, those necessary precautions which were a prerequisite to international confidence. If the Soviet Union was willing to do so, it would find co-operation on all sides. But the world had been given reason to fear that the Soviet Union would not accept the necessary precautions.

7. Sir Carl stated that his delegation would vote against each of the paragraphs of the Soviet Union draft resolution on the ground that not one proposal contained therein was a genuine attempt to remedy the situation which confronted the world. The New Zealand delegation would support the joint draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom.

8. Mr. TSIANG (China) said that under ordinary circumstances when a group of States indulged in controversy, it was inappropriate for a third Power to intervene. However, no delegation could adopt an attitude of neutrality in the present question because the Soviet Union condemnation of a group of States was a serious matter which concerned every Member of the United Nations. Mr. Tsiang therefore proposed to examine the basis of the accusation of war-mongering on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom.

9. Firstly, it was necessary to point out that the United Nations possessed no verified census to enable it to compare the military strength of different nations. Nor was there a common denominator which would enable a comparison to be made between budgetary expenditures on armaments. Such figures of expenditures as were available could not be used for comparison because of wide organizational differences and varying price levels in Member States. Thus, although the estimate of budgetary expenditures might be the same in two given countries, the armaments of one might be two or three times as large as those of the other. Hence, the Committee would be unjust to condemn any State merely on the basis of its armaments programme.

10. In the final analysis the cause of war was imperialism and the imperialist State was the war-mongering State since territorial ambitions lead to aggression and the latter resulted sooner or later in open war. To evaluate the accusations levelled against the United States and the United Kingdom it was therefore desirable to inquire to what extent those nations were or were not imperialistic.

11. Mr. Tsiang considered first the record of the United Kingdom which in his opinion was a good one. In evaluating the real character of a Government's policy deeds were more important than words and, insofar as its action were concerned, the post-war record of the United Kingdom was above reproach. The peoples of Asia had seen one dependent territory after another granted independence. It might be true that the United Kingdom was strengthening its military establishments but certainly no State in the Far East had any fears of the intentions of the United Kingdom. Likewise, as far as Mr. Tsiang was aware, the States of Western Europe had no thought of aggression on the part of the United Kingdom Government or its people.

12. As to the record of the United States it would be remembered that, before the war, the latter had certain national interests in the Philippines which lay very close to China. Yet, it was a fact that the Philippines had been granted independence. Undoubtedly, there were capitalist interests in Wall Street, but instead of manoeuvring for opportunities of exploitation, those interests had refused to be pushed into large-scale investment in the Far East. With or without the alleged pressure from Wall Street the policy of the United States Government did not constitute a threat to the Far East. Of course, the United States was making some efforts to rearm but that was regarded by most of the peoples of the world as a guarantee against a future world war. Mr. Tsiang said that if the United States had rearmed prior to the First and Second World Wars and had definitely demonstrated its intention to fight against any aggression, the world would have been spared two great disasters.

13. In the estimation of the Chinese representative there was no apparent desire on the part of the United States or the United Kingdom to dominate or exploit other nations. Therefore, if the Committee really desired to condemn those who were preparing for a new war it should not begin by condemning those two States. In Mr. Tsiang's opinion the Soviet Union proposal was intended to hide certain designs of the USSR and was merely another phase in the cold war.

14. Regrettably it could not be said of the Soviet Union that it had no ambitions in Asia. The deeds of the USSR Government were in sharp contrast with its propaganda. In China the policy of the Soviet Union was reminiscent of Tsarist times and was obviously contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. Mr. Tsiang recalled how, after the previous war, the USSR had demanded certain privileges regarding the Manchurian railway and the seaports of Dairen and Port Arthur. China had granted those demands in return for a promise that the Soviet Union would respect China's administrative and territorial integrity in Manchuria. Was is not a strange situation when a State had to make concessions in order to receive a promise that another State would do what was merely its duty as a Member of the United Nations? Yet the Soviet Union had not even fulfilled its promise. It had obstructed the efforts of the Chinese Government to re-establish the administration in Manchuria and it had assisted the insurgence of the Chinese Communists. Mr. Tsiang recalled that before it had withdrawn its troops from Manchuria, the USSR had demanded the right to maintain a close economic connexion with the province which would have included joint operation of over 150 enterprises. If the Chinese Government had accepted that demand then the whole north-eastern part of China would have become a colony of the Soviet Union. Doubtless the communist régime would submit to the Soviet Union's demands. Mr. Tsiang said that there had been similar Soviet aggression and exploitation in the Sinkiang Province which was known to be rich in oil reserves. During the previous year, the Soviet Union had demanded the right to exploit Sinkiang's resources. It was especially noteworthy that the eastern borders of the USSR had been greatly extended since the end of the Second World War; at the present time it controlled more than half the continent of Asia. It was such facts which caused fear and suspicion of the Soviet Union. That country's actions of a similar nature in Europe were already well-known. Therefore, it could be stated clearly that it was the Soviet Union which seriously threatened the peace of the world and not the United States or the United Kingdom.

15. Mr. Tsiang wondered how the USSR delegation, after violating the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 could ask China to participate in another pact. He believed that the Charter of the United Nations was the only guarantee of peace and if it did not command observance, no additional treaty would suffice. Through its acts the Soviet Union had made the United Nations a mere debating society and had frustrated all its efforts by boycotting the various commissions that had been established. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was posing as the champion of peace. Mr. Tsiang considered that the peace of the world was too serious a matter to serve as a diplomatic football. If the 1949 session of the General Assembly was to earn the title of "peace Assembly" given it by General Romulo, it should state clearly to all nations of the world that peace could only be found through the strict observance of the obligations imposed by the Charter and by international treaties. The Chinese delegation would vote against the Soviet Union draft resolution and in favour of the joint draft resolution sub-

mitted by the United States and the United Kingdom.

16. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) said that the accusation of inciting a new war was one of the most serious that could be levelled within the United Nations and was an issue before which no Member could remain indifferent. Under the impact of such an accusation levelled by one great Power against two others, what could befall that co-operation upon which the United Nations was founded and upon which the proper functioning of the system of collective security, created by the Charter, depended? If the United States and the United Kingdom were the authors of a plot against peace then obviously the signatories of the Brussels Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Pact of Rio de Janeiro, a total of some thirty States, would be implicated. True, the Soviet Union proposal named only the United States and the United Kingdom, but it associated with those Powers an indeterminate number of other nations. How could it be imagined that the United Nations could continue to function if it were proven that more than half its Members were preparing armed aggression? Clearly, therefore, the Soviet Union draft resolution challenged the very existence of the United Nations. That was why the Belgian delegation could not remain silent in such a debate.

17. The French representative (326th meeting) and others had already shown how inconsistent and contradictory were the proposals of the Soviet Union. It was therefore unnecessary to speak at all of the five-Power pact which no one, not even the authors of the proposal, had taken seriously. As had been shown, the proposal was merely a propaganda manoeuvre intended for those who did not know any better. Mr. van Langenhove said that he would confine his observations to the accusations of warmongering directed against the United States and the United Kingdom.

18. Coming as it did from the Soviet Union, the accusation was particularly bewildering to public opinion in the countries of Western Europe, conscious as it was of the immense power of the USSR which, together with all its dependent territories contained more than one-third of the world's population and which formed the greatest empire in history.

19. It was to be noted that the States which were accused of plotting against peace were precisely those States where almost everything took place in broad daylight and where the maximum of publicity was accorded to every action of the Government. Military expenditures were discussed at length in the parliaments while the principal components of their military forces were well-known and openly discussed by the Press. On the other hand, the situation was quite different in the countries from which the accusation of warmongering emanated. There, the least attempt to obtain the most innocuous piece of information was considered as a formidable spy plot. A proposal based on the General Assembly's resolution 192 (III) of 19 November 1948 for carrying out a verified census of armaments was opposed by solid opposition. Nor was it only military forces that were clothed in secrecy: all data relating to economic life, such as population censuses and figures of agricultural and industrial production were kept secret. Wide areas of USSR territory were inaccessible to foreigners while liberty of

movement of foreigners was becoming generally more and more restricted throughout the Soviet Union. It was a state of siege which had never been exceeded in any other countries even when they had been at war. Was it, Mr. van Langenhove asked, the best way of fostering international confidence and co-operation as provided by the Charter? He added that, at the same time, tremendous efforts were being made by the Government of the Soviet Union to isolate its people from all outside news. Relations with foreign countries had been reduced to the barest minimum and almost all of the People's Democracies had cut themselves off from international co-operation in the social, economic and cultural fields.

20. At the previous session of the General Assembly the head of the Belgian delegation had explained the reasons for his country's anxiety.<sup>1</sup> The causes had not disappeared. Although the Berlin blockade had been lifted, a growing tension had occurred in Eastern Europe. While it was not Mr. van Langenhove's intention to dwell on the substance of the dispute which caused it, he felt bound to point out that some Members of the United Nations had had recourse to threats and economic and political pressure which were explicitly forbidden by the Charter. The latter formerly stated that international disputes must be solved by peaceful means and, if necessary, be submitted to the Security Council. Nevertheless, the world had witnessed, and was continuing to witness, a flagrant violation of those fundamental rules. The Belgian delegation condemned dictatorship and attempts at domination, whatever form they took. During the previous session of the General Assembly in Paris it had appealed for a new spirit of co-operation between States. Mr. van Langenhove reiterated that appeal, stressing the fact that such collaboration must be in accordance with the Charter.

21. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) said that in the general debate (228th meeting) his delegation had already had the opportunity to welcome the USSR proposal, since it did not only point out in a concrete form the reasons of the existing international tension, but also proposed workable measures for overcoming it.

22. He emphasized that the improvement in the international atmosphere was not due to the withdrawal of the warmongering elements or to a change in their imperialistic policy. It was attributable to the historic events in China, the powerful world-wide peace movement, and the growing strength of the socialist countries. Since the general debate, many events had shown the nature of the present international situation. The Members of the Assembly had once more witnessed the results of the strange mixture of die-hard prestige policy coupled with an attitude of teen-age immaturity. An example was provided by the draft resolution<sup>2</sup> adopted in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on the question of the Admission of new Members.<sup>3</sup> There was no need to underline the fact that in questions in which the military and strategic interests of the United States were especially involved, no endeavour was made towards working out a solution acceptable to all. That was the case in the so-called Korean and Greek questions. Those proceedings and the

attitude of the United States with regard to the election to the Security Council, could only lead to the conclusion that the leaders of the usual majority in the United Nations were determined to pursue their policy of intolerance and dictation, disregarding the world-wide interest in active co-operation among all peace-loving nations.

23. Furthermore, there seemed to be a prevailing opinion, even in those countries subjected to anti-Soviet propaganda, that the end of the United States monopoly of atomic weapons did not increase, but rather decreased the danger of war. That fact, in itself, destroyed the picture of the USSR as an aggressor because, even when living under the illusion of a monopoly, nobody had denied that atomic weapons were not only weapons of mass destruction and genocide, but typical weapons of aggression. That was made clear by the statement of General Vandenberg to the effect that atom bombs would "be valuable in achieving the initial advantage".

24. In the light of that situation, Mr. Clementis wished to draw attention to the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union as contained in the speech of Mr. Malenkov, delivered on the eve of the 32nd anniversary of the Soviet Revolution. The Press in the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies was concerned with the building of a socialist society and in contrast with the Press of the United States, which was sensational and full of articles on the theme of a third war.

25. In paragraph 1 of its draft resolution, the Soviet Union pointed out those dangers and in paragraphs 2 and 3, invited the Assembly to take decisions with a view to eliminating those dangers.

26. There was no doubt that the so-called post-war differences between the great Allies were partly due to the fact that the Soviet Union had emerged from the Second World War not only victoriously, but stronger than ever before. A very high United States personality had stated during the war: "If we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and that way, let them kill as many as possible". A similar statement had been made by a member of the Churchill cabinet.

27. The preparations for a new war, especially in the United States, were both ideological and material. It was, on the one hand, being maintained that the Soviet Union was the cause of all the troubles in the world and, on the other hand, it was said that the United States, the mightiest, wisest and richest nation on earth, was predestined to save the world for an American way of life and for the blessings of an everlasting capitalism.

28. It was hardly necessary to give the First Committee illustrations of the first line being pursued. As regards the second, however, Mr. Clementis wished to quote the declaration made by General Eisenhower before the House Armed Services Committee on 20 October 1949 to the effect that a unified United States could "whip the world". That was only a translation into military language of all the doctrines and theories dealing with the leading role and direct responsibility of the United States in world affairs. Those theories might lead to the conclusion that whenever that

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I*, 147th plenary meeting.

<sup>2</sup> See document A/AC.31/L.25.

<sup>3</sup> See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee*, 29th meeting.

so-called responsibility was offended, the United States would be entitled to act, thereby serving as a justification for unleashing a preventive war. Furthermore, the responsibilities of the United States had extended over such an area that the very existence of the Soviet Union and of the People's Democracies ran counter to that responsibility and constituted an excuse for a preventive war.

29. Mr. Clementis quoted from a letter of Mr. Lewis Mumford, dated 26 June 1949 and published in the *New York Herald Tribune* which referred to the well-known article by Rear Admiral D. W. Gallery published in *The Saturday Evening Post*. In that letter, Mr. Mumford contended that the American people had been committed by their elected officers and their military leaders to a doctrine of war which was utterly repulsive to American principles, to the decent opinions of mankind and to the traditions of civilization. The causes of that situation, the letter explained, were mainly due to the illusions of power and pride. With regard to the illusion of power, the United States leaders had treated the atomic bomb as a magic weapon which could inflict maximum damage to the enemy with the least possible loss of life to the American people. As to the illusion of pride, it was mainly due to the false belief that scientific and technological knowledge was mainly an American monopoly. Mr. Mumford had not realized that those phenomena were only by-products of the theory of the inevitability of a third world war and the material and ideological preparations for it. That was plainly illustrated by many statements of United States military officials. According to the *United States News and World Report* of 7 October 1949, General Bradley had said that, once Franco was armed, Western Germany could be permitted an army that might give the West equality, or even superiority on land. On 2 November 1949 the *Agence France Presse* had reported General Eichelberger of having praised the help which the Japanese would render to the United States in case of war against the Soviet Union. Those statements could only lead to the conclusion that German and Japanese soldiers would make up for the loss of the monopoly of the atomic bomb. Mr. Clementis then quoted from an article by Mr. Bruce Catton in the *Nation* of 12 November 1949, which explained that the competition among the three armed services had unleashed a propaganda contest, in every line and overtone, that the Soviet Union was the enemy of the United States and that war was inevitable.

30. Turning to the material preparations, Mr. Clementis recalled that he had already pointed out, in the First Committee during the first part of the third session, that the United States had retained, and even in some cases extended, some of the institutions set up during the Second World War, and that the American Army was being reorganized with a view to building an offensive force. Moreover, both civilian and military research work in the United States was directed towards the solution of the problem of an offensive war. The Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty constituted not only military projects but an actual interference in the domestic affairs of the countries concerned. He quoted General Marshall as saying, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives, that there had been criticism of the sixteen nations

benefiting from the Marshall Plan "for not arriving at agreements in six weeks that affected their national sovereignty and that involved making concessions never made before by any independent nation in the history of the world". Mr. Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, had declared before the joint hearings conducted by the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Armed Services of the United States Senate that essential military aid should be added to the Marshall Plan and to the North Atlantic [military] Treaty. Obviously, that so-called unselfish economic help was designed to attain the economic and military objectives of the United States and not those of the European countries.

31. The representative of Denmark, who had so convincingly condemned (326th meeting) the waging of the cold war, had unfortunately not endeavoured to inquire as to the causes and purposes for starting such a cold war. In that connexion, Mr. Clementis wished to recall the reference made by Mr. Vyshinsky to Professor Sumner H. Schlichter's article published in the *New York Herald Tribune* of 20 October 1949, admitting that the building up of a new war machine and the rearmament race was hailed by United States capitalist circles.

32. The Marshall Plan was not sufficient to prevent the recession in the United States from developing into a depression. Moreover, what was good for the United States economy might prove very harmful for the economies of the European countries since their rearmament programmes were being carried out at the expense of the already low standard of living of the working classes. Such warlike preparations had caused a very dangerous psychosis, and paragraph 1 of the USSR proposal was a timely and justified challenge to all the Members of the Organization.

33. As to paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, various Members had objected that the question had already been discussed, and even decided upon, during the debates of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. However, even before that decision had been taken, an article in the *Daily Compass* had stated that it was taken for granted that the United States would be able to muster sufficient votes for passage of a resolution continuing the present international deadlock and that many of the votes would be half-heartedly cast in concession to United States world wide economic and political might, rather than out of conviction that the United States atomic programme was the best available.

34. In discussing the USSR draft resolution, and especially the paragraph 2 thereof, the First Committee would still have the opportunity to try once more to reach a complete agreement on that very serious and dangerous problem. It was well-known that the representatives of the Soviet Union had made very substantial steps to meet the point of view of the United States, but the answer of the latter had always been in the negative.

35. The opponents of the USSR draft resolution and, in particular, the representative of the United States, had so far concentrated most of their efforts against paragraph 2 on the ground that the proposed conclusion of the five-Power pact would merely duplicate the relevant provisions of the Charter. If that was the case, the represen-

tative of Czechoslovakia was at a loss to understand the need for the North Atlantic Treaty. He said that it was quite natural that the representative from Belgrade as well as the representative of the Kuomintang Government had tried to beat even their masters in anti-Soviet propaganda.

36. The joint draft resolution presented by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom was a very poor substitute for the USSR draft resolution for which the Czechoslovak delegation would vote.

37. Mr. PIPINELIS (Greece) said that his delegation had carefully studied the two draft resolutions on the strengthening of peace which had been submitted to the Committee in view of the importance of the problem raised therein.

38. Paragraph 3 of the USSR draft resolution gave the impression of being intended to inaugurate an era of peace among the great Powers, but only after those great Powers had exchanged the kind compliments included in paragraphs 1 and 2. Those rhetorical exercises could hardly be made consistent with any constructive elements. Nevertheless, the Greek delegation had attempted to extract those constructive elements with a view to utilizing them.

39. In spite of the radically different conceptions prevailing in the world, the United Nations should welcome the possibility even of a limited *rapprochement*. Moreover, in spite of the picturesque and metaphoric characteristics of the USSR draft resolution, there would be no reason to reject such a proposal just because it came from the delegation of the Soviet Union, provided it were designed to serve the welfare of mankind.

40. In view of the fact that Greece was in a region upon which the attention of a number of Powers had been focused, his delegation was particularly interested in obtaining a relief of international tension. However, paragraph 3 of the USSR proposal appeared extraordinarily incomplete, since the strengthening of peace might be viewed as a result of the settlement of the existing world problems. But, much to the regret of the Greek delegation, such a settlement was far from being a reality. Therefore, that proposal might be viewed only as an attempt to establish new machinery for the settlement of international disputes. If so, the First Committee was entitled to expect, from its authors, more clarification on the way in which the machinery was expected to function and decisions would be arrived at. Otherwise, such machinery would merely overlap with existing organs such as the Council of Foreign Ministers and the United Nations. If the decisions were to be taken unanimously, a similar impasse to that existing in the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Security Council would result. If the decisions were to be taken by a majority vote, there would be a complete change in the political situation of the world which would have serious drawbacks for the small nations but which would, nevertheless, constitute a new approach to the settlement of conflicts and the restoration of international order.

41. Moreover, the role of the small countries within that new machinery should be defined. Would they be mere spectators of the actions of

that new international board of directors, or could they, perhaps, be called upon to participate in the work of such a machinery?

42. Settlement of the difficulties confronting the world would require much more than the signature of a pact, or a pious statement that Members should solve their differences without the use or threat of force. The real political problems would have to be conciliated, some premises for an equitable settlement would have to be accepted unanimously, or, failing that, a precise and workable procedure would have to be elaborated. His delegation endorsed the joint draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom because it stated the standards of duty and law which, if implemented, would remove the principal causes of international friction.

43. Mr. Pipinelis said that the principal threat to peace arose from the forcible extension of the spheres of influence of the great Powers. Following the Second World War the Soviet positions had advanced into the very heart of Europe and in the wake of occupation armies the USSR had installed puppet Governments in Bucharest, Budapest, Sofia and Warsaw. It was often claimed that that was to some extent justified by the defence requirements of the Soviet Union. However, he must point out that each new bastion created further security problems and called for a further advance for its own protection. The policy of border defence and the establishment of friendly neighbouring Governments had degenerated into a policy of penetration and war. Of course that was not the complete explanation of the problem and it was also necessary to take into account the communist theory of universal revolution. In that connexion, he quoted Stalin's speech of 30 March 1925 on the national question of Yugoslavia. Stalin had emphasized that the Bolsheviks had always considered the national question as inseparably linked with the prospect of revolution. History had showed the stupidity of such expansionist political theories, because no people could resign itself to assuming the role of a satellite. National heresies arose and the indomitable energy of the oppressed masses was released. Purges were then in order to forestall palace revolutions and if all the purges failed stronger measures were called for. History showed that, after reaching the limits of expansion, all empires had fallen apart under the impact of local reactions of national dignity and independence. Already the signs of a reversal were beginning to appear and the propitious moment had come to make an appeal to the great Soviet empire to put an end to the nefarious and useless policy of penetration by which it sought to set up everywhere in the world Governments in its own image. It was for that reason that the joint proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom was an appeal of historic scope. If it met with some response on the part of the leaders of the Soviet Union the fourth session of the General Assembly would be the most fruitful international gathering of our times. He recalled his recent appeal to the Soviet Union representative (304th meeting) that occupation forces be withdrawn from Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. Now he endorsed the new appeal that, in common with other countries, the USSR should declare that it would do nothing, by the use or threat of force, or otherwise, to jeopardize the independence and freedom of any nation.

44. Mr. Pipinelis recalled that, within the framework of peaceful agreements of neutrality, Greece had been able to maintain friendly and close relations with its friends of the West and with the Empire of the Tsars. There had been a peaceful interplay of political and intellectual forces without detriment to Greece's relations with any Power. Once the respect for the independence of small countries was established, their relations with the great Powers could not cause offence to anybody. Sooner or later that concept would have to be accepted as the inevitable basis of normal international relations. The grandeur of the democratic system was to be found in the confidence with which the western nations accepted the free interplay and competition of forces all over the world. He asked whether a great country like the USSR could accept as final an attitude of mistrust toward the free interplay of forces which made it compete with most of the other peoples and which at the same time was a lamentable confession of weakness and failure. After all that had happened since the First World War, it was necessary to make a new start and to sum up in a few clear principles the needs and yearnings of millions of human beings, and first of all the hopes of those who were suffering under a foreign yoke or under the threat of invasion. That was why he welcomed the proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom as a move of great vision.

45. Mr. CARÍAS (Honduras) acknowledged that the great Powers carried a major historical re-

sponsibility. Considering the grave international problems confronting the world, he regretted and wondered at the lack of confidence and good-will. He could not believe that the tragedies and lessons of the war had been forgotten. The small nations had a great moral duty to discharge and they must play their part. Since all the people of the world would suffer in any future war, the Members of the United Nations must try to eliminate psychological barriers and conceptions of racial superiority. The participants in the work of United Nations were no longer simple observers and must take upon themselves the duty of deciding the future of humanity. It was necessary to close all doors to hatred and to look for a new living interpretation of justice. He believed that it was possible for man to recover faith and to create a new atmosphere of hope instead of despondency. The delegation of Honduras would give its enthusiastic support to the joint draft resolution of the United States and United Kingdom, which was based on the Charter and established the fundamental principles for a permanent peace. Failure to respect those principles would certainly lead to the continuation of international tension. It was absolutely essential that all Members should act in accordance with those principles, in the spirit of co-operation in which the United Nations had been founded.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.

### THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-NINTH MEETING

*Held at Lake Success, New York, on Wednesday, 16 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.*

*Chairman: Mr. Selim SARPEN (Turkey).*

#### **Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)**

1. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) stated that, while it was easy enough to reply to Mr. Vyshinsky's arguments (325th meeting), he could feel no enthusiasm at taking part in a debate which would serve no useful purpose. Although discussion to reach and eventually carry out an agreement was the very basis of the political life and the strength of the United Kingdom, that was unfortunately not the case in the Assembly, where agreement was impossible unless the views of the USSR were adopted.

2. The case made by Mr. Vyshinsky was not a new one. He had asserted that the United Kingdom, the United States and certain other countries were preparing a new war of aggression, and gave as proof of his thesis the facts that their military budgets were being increased; that they were extending their network of strategic bases; that a campaign of slander had been launched against the Soviet Union; and that those States were blocking all progress towards international control of atomic energy and of atomic weapons.

3. It would be interesting to know whether Mr. Vyshinsky in fact believed that the democracies were preparing for an aggressive war. If that were so, he would have been deceiving himself

with his own propaganda, and in that case other methods of discussion should be used. Nevertheless, Mr. Vyshinsky's work and intellectual capacity, and even his arguments, showed that he was not allowing himself to be deceived by his own propaganda and that he must therefore be aware of the gulf that separated the facts as they were from the facts as he presented them.

4. No one could deny that the people of the Soviet Union wished for peace. In that connexion, the people of the USSR did not differ from any other people in the world. As a matter of fact, Mr. Vyshinsky admitted that fact when it suited him. Was not the basis of his propaganda in the United Nations and the propaganda to which he gave free rein at so-called peace congresses that the peoples normally and passionately wished for peace? Nevertheless, it had to be said that the closer a Government was to the people, the more a people could apply pressure on the Government and the less likely was the danger of aggressive war. Thus, if Mr. Vyshinsky wished to persuade the First Committee that the United Kingdom was preparing for a new war, he would have to prove that the Government of the United Kingdom was in a more authoritarian position in relation to its people than the Government of the USSR was in relation to the Soviet people.

5. It was well-known that elections in the United Kingdom took place by secret ballot, that opposition was not only permitted, but encouraged, and that newspapers could publish any information