

22. It should be remembered that the British Empire had entered the war against nazism in 1939, that it had fought almost alone in 1940 and that in 1941, without a moment's hesitation it had announced its intention to fight side by side with the Soviet Union. Nor could Australia forget that the United States had made the major contribution to the defeat of Japan apart from its enormous contribution to the defeat of Hitler and Mussolini. The Soviet Union had fought valiantly and had suffered grievously. Out of that wartime comradeship was born the Charter. Although small nations were also Members of the Organization, they knew that the smooth operation of the Security Council depended upon the unanimity of the great Powers. It was wicked, therefore, to submit a draft resolution which brought baseless charges against two of those great Powers; it was prejudicial to the co-operation of the permanent members of the Security Council.

23. At the end of the war, all nations had been well disposed towards the Soviet Union. As Mr. Austin had recalled (325th meeting) the United States in particular had given great assistance to all the countries of Eastern Europe. American aid, which was extending to all the war-devastated countries of Europe and Asia, was still being given to Eastern Europe through the agency of the United Nations. The much-reviled Marshall Plan had saved the lives or promoted the well-being of millions of people.

24. In spite of its economic difficulties, the United Kingdom, the second greatest contributor

to UNRRA, was doing more than its duty in various international organizations.

25. Mr. Makin could not believe that those actions were those of Powers seeking to dominate the world, destroy humanity and frustrate the development of democracy. The truth was that for four years those two Powers had tried to achieve the purposes of the Charter.

26. No one was seeking to destroy the Soviet Union. To people who attached any value to the liberty of the individual, communism was repugnant, but that ideological difference should not be a cause of war: war was certainly not inevitable. By working through the United Nations, all the nations could live in peace and achieve the conditions, in particular economic conditions, set forth as objectives in the Charter.

27. The Australian delegation would, without hesitation, vote against the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/996) the false insinuations and distorted philosophy of which could not contribute to international understanding and co-operation.

28. The Australian delegation whole-heartedly supported the draft resolution of the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/549) on the "essentials of peace", which was a dignified statement of the obligations undertaken by all Members of the United Nations and a programme of action likely to lead to the attainment of the purposes of the Charter.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 22 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)

1. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/996), submitted to the General Assembly at its plenary meeting of 23 September 1949,¹ had been received most favourably by all the true friends of peace throughout the world. That proposal was, in fact, in perfect accordance with the letter and spirit of the Charter, the preamble of which called upon the United Nations to preserve future generations from the scourge of war.

2. The manoeuvres, quibbles and intrigues of the enemies of peace and international co-operation, who took the nations for greater simpletons than they were, revealed the confusion which the USSR proposal had sown in the ranks of the warmongers. As early as 26 September,² Mr. Bevin had given the signal for the attack, and his emulators had hastened to state that the proposal had only a propaganda purpose. Those who talked thus, however, placed themselves amongst the ene-

mies of peace; for if the warmongers were permitted to escape the punishment and condemnation described in the Soviet Union proposal, whilst the champions of peace were being persecuted in various countries, it would be clearly apparent to all that peace was in danger.

3. The enemies of peace were displaying renewed insolence. In the best hitlerite tradition, the representative of New Zealand (326th meeting) had compared the policy of the USSR, which had beaten nazism and struggled for thirty-two years for the cause of peace, with the policy of hitlerite Germany. What was more serious, a Minister of the United Kingdom had, in his turn, repeated those slanderous attacks in an aggressive speech. If one remembered that the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom were united by a treaty of friendship, one could only regret that the United Kingdom representative had not sufficiently weighed his words and that he had not been more concerned about the effect they would produce in both countries.

4. Such speeches would be sufficient to demonstrate the timeliness of the USSR proposal. But there had been backstage intrigues to sabotage the draft resolution. Firstly, there had been great haste in placing the Greek question or problems relating to supposed violations of human rights on the agenda in order to envenom the atmos-

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 226th plenary meeting.

² *Ibid.*, 229th meeting.

phere and thus to pave the way for the rejection of the Soviet Union draft resolution. Secondly, a manoeuvre of the United States (which, incidentally, seemed to have miscarried) had attempted to give priority to the Chinese delegation's proposal which was directed against the USSR. To gain time, the Soviet Union delegation had proposed that, when the First Committee was inactive, the Committee should proceed promptly to consider the Soviet Union's draft resolution. That suggestion had been rejected. Finally, now that the USSR proposal was under discussion, the organization of the General Assembly's work, and in particular the fact that the plenary meetings were being held at times when the First Committee was also meeting, tended to place the discussions on that proposal out of focus. Such were the dishonest means to which those pleading a weak case were resorting.

5. With regard to the speeches made by the opponents of the Soviet Union proposal, the United States representative had set the tone: the whole aim was to lead the Committee astray in one way or another. What, in particular, had been the purpose of the silly advice given by the Canadian representative on the subject of the internal régime in the Soviet Union, or of the statements made by Tito's fascist clique?

6. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia), speaking on a point of order, declared that the Yugoslav delegation had been insulted.

7. He recalled that the President of the General Assembly had said¹ that such practices must cease, and accordingly asked the Chairman of the First Committee, who had never before interrupted any delegation, whether he would allow such words to be uttered.

8. The CHAIRMAN said that speakers must scrupulously refrain from all insulting language in referring to delegations or their Governments.

9. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that the group to which he had referred had taken the liberty of hurling insults at a previous meeting, against his country, and that was an incomparably more serious offence than anything that might be said about fascist representatives.

10. The Yugoslav representative had striven to prove that his Government was not the instrument of foreign imperialist forces, although the fact had been proved during the Rajk trial and confirmed by the attitude of the Yugoslav delegation during the current session. In fact, those gentry were making common cause with the delegation of Chile, that of the monarcho-fascist Government of Greece and that of the Kuomintang, whereas the Soviet Union delegation had the people's cause at heart.

11. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile), speaking on a point of order, protested that such insults to delegations and to their countries were intolerable. Their real aim was to destroy the prestige of the United Nations. That was a well-known device which had been used by the nazi deputies under the Weimar régime and by communists in various parliaments.

12. The CHAIRMAN said that any offensive or insulting remarks would be ruled out of order.

13. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said he had not insulted the Chilean representative, although he would have been entitled to protest at the latter's comparison of statements by Soviet representatives with those of nazi deputies.

14. He proceeded to refer to the objections raised against the Soviet Union proposal; the United States representative had drawn an analogy with the attitude of a Soviet ballerina refusing an American invitation. But what treatment was being meted out to Soviet citizens in the United States? A young Soviet engineer on the staff of the United Nations who had been friendly with an American girl, had been arrested, in spite of his diplomatic passport, and accused of some unspecified anti-American activity.

15. Moreover, the Soviet Socialist Republics of Byelorussia and the Ukraine had been compared to Texas and California. The truth was that, like any of the sixteen federated Republics of the Soviet Union, Byelorussia and the Ukraine had a better claim to a seat on the United Nations than certain delegations whose representative capacity had been challenged by the true democratic Governments of their countries. It was impossible, however, to explain such matters to men whose political horizon did not extend beyond Texas and California, or possibly Vermont!

16. Delegations whose cause was just had no reason to be nervous. The Soviet Union proposal affirmed the position of principle taken up by the USSR delegation ever since the establishment of the United Nations: the United Nations, as Marshal Stalin had said, was a serious instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Soviet Union ceaselessly endeavoured to make each session represent a step forward, and all its efforts to that end were links in the chain of thirty-two years of Soviet policy. Ever since the first appearance of the atomic bomb the Soviet Union had been urging the prohibition of that weapon; in 1947 it had submitted a proposal designed to stop warlike propaganda. Subsequently, when the enemies of peace in the United Kingdom and the United States had reached the stage of practical preparations for a new war, the Soviet Union had proposed the reduction of all armaments by one-third.

17. An essential characteristic of the policy of the USSR was that it had not altered an inch when, in 1947, Soviet science, in the course of its work on the problem of the peaceful utilization of a great discovery, had, in addition, discovered the secret of the atomic weapon. On the contrary, the Soviet Union had thought it its duty to pursue with renewed energy the fight against preparation for another war and the utilization of atomic energy for military purposes. The Soviet Union had replied to the aggressive attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom by proposing a pact aimed at strengthening the peace. Such an answer was all the more praiseworthy since the North Atlantic Treaty, which was being described as peaceful, defensive and regional, had in fact aggressive purposes, as had the alliance of Western Europe, which was its complement. Although no State was threatening the United States or the United Kingdom with war, American industry was on a war-footing. Reserves of strategic materials and arms were being built up and at the same time the armaments of the West-

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 246th plenary meeting.

ern Allies were being standardized. The United States was becoming a gigantic arsenal for the alliance, while the American, British and French war budgets were laying a heavy burden on the populations. Moreover, while it was being contemplated to bring Western Germany into an alliance in which one ex-enemy country, Italy, already participated, the Soviet Union which for its part, had fought against the Axis was the only great Power excluded from the Treaty. The fact was that the North Atlantic Treaty, which was being represented as a complement of the Charter, was directed against the Soviet Union and constituted a violation of Articles 52, 53 and 54 of the Charter. Moreover, Senator Taft himself had said in the United States Congress that the North Atlantic Treaty would bring war, not peace, and that it was in conflict with the obligations assumed by the United States under the Charter. It was, in fact, significant that after the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty, Congress had granted credits to the other participating nations to enable them to re-equip their armies. The previous summer, a tour of inspection by the American Chiefs of Staff in Europe had aroused serious apprehensions on the part of the population.

18. No impartial observer could fail to realize the full significance of the USSR draft resolution, at a time when the North Atlantic Treaty and the Western Union were involving certain States in American-inspired adventures which had no connexion with international peace and co-operation. By contrast, a five-Power pact would create a more favourable atmosphere both in the United Nations and throughout the world. It would be the best possible guarantee of general peace, would ensure the security of the small States, and enhance the prestige of the United Nations. As to the argument that the conclusion of such a pact would be anti-democratic in that it would result in the creation of an omnipotent directorate which would replace the Security Council, that was an allegation devoid of any foundation. It was an indisputable fact that it was not the relations between small Powers that could threaten world peace: the small countries themselves had expressed the anxiety they felt as a result of the state of relations between the great Powers, particularly the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Precisely because the great Powers in fact controlled raw materials, industrial resources and powerful weapons, the Charter had entrusted them with special responsibilities and, as permanent members of the Security Council, it was for them to see that the peace was kept and, if conflicts arose, to settle them.

19. Hence, the Soviet Union had deliberately refrained from including the small States in the new contractual system which it wished to see established. The small States could thus benefit from the advantages of the system without risking incorporation in such blocs as those created by the United States. That, however, in no way precluded States, including small States, from subscribing or acceding to a pact, the provisions of which might be taken for granted as being those of a peace treaty: the parties to the pact would pledge themselves not to attack one another, to settle all their problems by peaceful means, to call a halt to the armaments race and to ban the atomic bomb.

20. It had also been said that the pact would be concluded without reference to the Security Coun-

cil, which was composed of eleven and not of five members. It had been forgotten that, on the initiative of the United States and the United Kingdom, the question of the atomic weapon had been withdrawn from the competence of the Security Council and referred to the five Powers and Canada; that procedure had not met with any objection.

21. It had also been argued that the fact that the Soviet Union maintained diplomatic relations with the Chinese People's Republic would stand in the way of the conclusion of a five-Power pact. It might, however, be asked since when the fact of maintaining diplomatic relations with a democracy constituted an obstacle to peace. The United Kingdom itself was proposing shortly to follow the example given by the Soviet Union with as much foresight as magnanimity. It only remained for the United States to decide whether it would take like action or would place itself beyond good and evil, content to publish white books on the failure of the Kuomintang. Whatever the case might be, conduct which was considered laudable in the case of the United Kingdom could not be condemned in the case of the Soviet Union and if the conclusion of a five-Power pact were made absolutely dependent on the absence of diplomatic relations with the new China, that would merely create confusion.

22. In view of the existence of the Charter, the pact had also been described as superfluous. It might then be asked of what use the draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/549) would be, since it was a mere collection of phrases culled from the Charter or other declarations. Those "essentials of peace" were neither essential nor pertinent—they were not of a nature as to constitute a bulwark of peace. Moreover, some provisions of that draft resolution would constitute a violation of the rights of Member States of the United Nations. That was true of the clauses which provided that foreigners claiming to act in the name of the United Nations should have free access to the territory of all States, regardless of any national interest which might exist. Similar objections arose in connexion with the free exchange of information to be supplied to other States to the detriment of national security, the limits they wished to set to the sovereignty of States, the paragraphs relating to human rights which might lead to the resurgence of fascist organizations and yet other paragraphs which violated the Charter—and particularly Article 27, paragraph 3—or concerned the international control of armaments, an idea intended to take the place of the limitation of armaments. The sole object of some other paragraphs, embodying certain declarations torn from their contexts, was to secure the passage of provisions contrary to the Charter.

23. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would therefore vote against the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States, since it was irrelevant to the question raised by the Soviet Union and was also harmful in itself.

24. It was not true to say that the provisions of the Soviet Union resolution was already embodied in the Charter. Moreover, ruling circles in the United States and the United Kingdom were daily violating the Charter, as shown by the destruction of Indonesian liberties, the help granted to

the monarcho-fascist Government in Greece, the establishment of a puppet regime in South Korea and the bloody oppression in Viet-Nam. The right of colonial peoples to self-determination had been violated. The intensive manufacture of armaments, the establishment of military bases, the Marshall Plan (which led to the enslavement of nations), were all violations of the Charter. The Soviet Union request that the Marshall Plan should be placed under the aegis of the United Nations had been rejected by the United States which was turning the Organization itself into an instrument of American policy and sought to reduce the status of the Security Council to that of the secular arm of the State Department, whereas it was intended to be one of the pillars of the Charter.

25. Thus, when the principles of the Charter proved a hindrance, ruling circles in the United States, with the backing of those in the United Kingdom, did not hesitate to violate them openly. When the Soviet Union thereupon endeavoured to take up the defence of the Charter and to make concerted action possible on a basis of mutual understanding, those same ruling circles in the United States described the attitude of the Soviet Union as an unfriendly act. The conclusion of a peace treaty would enable the nations freely to express their friendship for the Soviet Union and would re-create the atmosphere which had prevailed during the war.

26. The Soviet Union had, in any case, the support of an immense peace movement which was growing in all countries. The representative of France, with aristocratic arrogance, had characterized the Soviet Union proposal as an appeal to "the man in the street". But surely "the man in the street" meant the people which had captured the Bastille, had saved the world from fascism and was striving for peace. The representative of France could not have spoken as he did, had he not disdained the people—and the people knew the suffering that another war would bring.

27. By comparison with the forces for peace, there was only a handful of warmongers. The representative of the United Kingdom had sought to juggle with recent election figures. But the peace movement was spreading far beyond the Communist Parties which had originally launched it. From day to day, the balance was swinging towards democracy and away from war, hence the nervousness shown by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States.

28. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR, in supporting the USSR draft resolution, wished to express its conviction that the masses would bring about its success, with or without or even against a majority of the delegations.

29. The CHAIRMAN stated that, in the General Assembly, there were no representatives of any cliques or various political groups, or even representatives of the "man in the street"; there were only representatives of States, who should be referred to as such. Any other designation would be considered irrelevant and out of order.

30. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) recalled that, on 4 February 1919, when the Soviet Government had made peace proposals to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan, President Wilson had pointed

out that the Bolsheviks had agreed to negotiate, but that their acceptance had been couched in deliberately insulting terms. Thirty years later, Mr. Vyshinsky was submitting a document purporting to be a peace proposal, but equally unacceptable in its wording. The object was the same: it was intended that it should be rejected. It was not by rhetorical jousting that the representative of the Soviet Union would succeed in breaking the unanimous opposition to his proposal; indeed, more than fifty nations had decided not to let themselves be deceived by that blatant endeavour to weaken the home front of the countries of the democratic world.

31. Some representatives had said that the attitude of the Soviet Union in international affairs could be explained by its Government's inability to reach agreement with the rest of the world, since the USSR leaders, in accordance with Marxist ideology as interpreted by Lenin, thought that war was inevitable and that any understanding between the capitalist and socialist camps was an impossibility. In that connexion, it was interesting to quote a passage from Stalin's book *The Problems of Leninism* where the author declared that it was possible for socialism to triumph at the outset in one single capitalist country. The victorious proletariat in such a land, having organized a régime of socialist production within its borders, would rise against the remainder of the capitalist world, winning over to its cause the oppressed classes in other lands, inciting them to revolt against the capitalists, and even, when needs must, having recourse to armed intervention against the exploiting classes and their States. It was thus obvious that, if the leaders of the USSR were Marxists and Leninists, they could not believe in peace.

32. The delegation of Chile believed, however, that, far from being a socialist State, Russia was a super-capitalist, totalitarian and police State. Marxism had been revised and distorted to fit the ends of Soviet bureaucracy and its expansionist plans. Marxist slogans and tactics were still in fashion, but the aim followed was not the establishment of a world socialist régime, but the weakening of the internal order of other States for the strengthening of Russian imperialism.

33. In the circumstances, there was no need to know what the Soviet Union delegation thought of the Marxist theory that war was inevitable. The important thing was to know whether that super-capitalist State was ready to find a permanent basis for peaceful understanding with the rest of the world. The representatives of the Soviet Union would also need to be convinced that the entire world was determined to prevent the fulfilment of their expansionist plans. It was the duty of the democracies to foster democratic principles, solve the problems created by the needs of the peoples, combat "fifth columns" and strengthen the democratic unity of free peoples; only thus could an enduring foundation for peace be ensured.

34. It was unnecessary to dwell on the fact that nearly all the undertakings of the USSR had aims incompatible with the realization of lasting peace and mutual comprehension. But there was one salient feature in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union which constituted a source of trouble and a threat to peace; the Soviet Union's foreign policy was not governed by normal diplo-

matic procedure, but by the Communist Parties of the whole world, acting on the orders of the Kremlin.

35. The leaders of the USSR were of course claiming that the *Comintern* or *Cominform* were bodies separate and distinct from the Government of the USSR, the Communist Party of the USSR being merely one of the partners. That argument could easily be refuted if it were noted that Mr. Manuilsky's policy as Foreign Minister of the Ukrainian SSR exactly coincided with the directives which he used to prescribe for the communist parties as Secretary-General of the Third International. In the same way, in 1947, Mr. Zhdanov had worked out for the *Cominform* an analysis of the world situation precisely similar to that which he had given a few months later as spokesman of the Government of the Soviet Union. Finally, the international policy fixed in Moscow on 7 November 1949 by Mr. Malenkov was identical with the one he had laid down as head of the *Cominform*. The policy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that of the Stalinist international organization were one and the same. Truth only came from Moscow and Marxism could not be interpreted either by Marshal Tito, or by Mr. Browder in the United States, or by Mr. Gomulka in Poland, and still less, by Mr. Duclos or Mr. Togliatti.

36. In whatever country, to the mystification of the workers and the peasants in their aspirations, communist parties were the instruments of the Soviet Union's foreign policy—they echoed the *Cominform's* slogans and imitated the violent phraseology used by the USSR. In 1947, the Soviet Union and the communist parties had aimed all their attacks at President Truman, in 1948 at Mr. Marshall and, 1949, at Marshal Tito. Whether in France, Burma or Chile, communist parties used the same language and concentrated their propaganda on the same ends and in so doing followed in parallel line the tactics employed by the Soviet Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

37. Twenty years previously, the Soviet Union, obsessed by the fear that the United Kingdom and France were preparing for war, had entered into closer relationship with Germany and had thus enabled the German Communist Party to strengthen its position in exploiting the idea of revenge on the victors of the First World War. At the same time, the *Comintern* was asserting that, in spite of their dissensions, the capitalist States, led by the United Kingdom, were preparing for war on the USSR. In the circumstances, it urged the workers of the world to defend the USSR against the attacks of capitalist Powers by all available means. That appeal showed that, in pursuit of its aggressive ends, the USSR was already then attempting to mobilize national groups against their own countries by maintaining that their Governments were seeking to encircle the USSR but keeping silent on the fact that the USSR was isolating itself from the rest of the world.

38. The history of the German Communist Party showed that it had obeyed the orders of the Soviet Union to the last, even to the extent of agreeing to its own destruction and refusing, on the orders of the International, to establish a common front with the Socialist Party against the growth of nazism. As it happened, the first victims of

nazism had been the German communists themselves.

39. For the first two years of the Second World War, the communists had taken the view that it was a conflict between two imperialist Powers and that the peoples themselves were not concerned with the defence of their native lands. The desertion of Maurice Thorez, in France, was a good illustration of that attitude. It was difficult to forget that, ten years previously, communist parties had served the propaganda of the German armies and that it was not until 1941, after the nazi invasion of the USSR, that they had taken part in the resistance.

40. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that the Chilean representative had no right to say that the communist parties had served the propaganda of the German armies. He reserved the right to reply to all those slanders.

41. The CHAIRMAN said the Chilean representative's statement was within the scope of the discussion and that the USSR representative could reply to it in due course.

42. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile), continuing his speech, stated that if Mr. Vyshinsky wished to use that pretext in order to insult him, he would be quite able to reply to him as well.

43. He remarked that all those facts proved that the policy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that of the Third International were identical. Reading the newspaper *L'Humanité* or any other communist newspaper of any country would prove that from 1939 to 1941 the communist parties had waited to receive their orders from Moscow before engaging themselves in the struggle.

44. After the war, the communist parties and the USSR had simultaneously launched their offensive against the democracies, by endeavouring to sabotage the Marshall Plan and by accusing the leaders of the resistance or of the allied offensive of being fascists. The communists were more than obsessed by the fear of a war against the USSR. In every country they had declared that in no case and for no reason would they fight against the USSR, but they had never indicated that they would in no circumstances fight against their own countries. The intention was to accustom the population to the idea that aggression by the USSR should be regarded a liberation. The various peace congresses which had taken place recently had also served as branch offices for the communist propaganda machine, which enabled the USSR representatives to maintain that those congresses represented the majority of the peoples.

45. At the present time, all the communist parties were heaping abuse upon Marshal Tito, on whom they had showered praises a few years beforehand, but who, since then, had refused to be automatically obedient to orders from Moscow. It was probable that communist propaganda would also attack Gomulka, who was already accused of wishing to remain a Pole. The propaganda machine of Goebbels could not rival that of the Soviets, which relied on whatever national sections of the *Cominform* were ready to betray their own countries.

46. In Latin America, the communist parties could have helped to solve the problems due to

economic under-development. But communist parties were not influenced by national considerations and not guided by the desires of the people. In Chile, the communist party had limited its action exclusively to the international policy advocated by the *Comintern* and the *Cominform*. It had sabotaged production, tried to prevent exports towards the democratic States and obstruct industrial development. In Argentina, the Communist Party had started a violent campaign against the Government of that country at the same time as the Soviet newspaper *New Times* of Moscow. In the previous twenty years, the Third International had sent a large number of instructors to all Latin-American countries.

47. Peace could only be safeguarded if the principle of the sovereignty of States was respected and if there was no intervention in the domestic affairs of States. The existence of anti-national groups in the service of an imperialist nation must be prevented. If the Soviet Union desired peace, it must dissolve its "fifth columns". Until it had given the guarantee that it would change its international policy and abandon the policy followed by its diplomatic service, by the *Comintern* and the *Cominform*, no one would believe in Mr. Vyshinsky's peace proposals.

48. The Chilean representative quoted extracts from Vladimir Potemkin's book *History of Diplomacy*, which indicated that at the Conference of Genoa in 1922, the Soviet Union delegation had adopted its policy by taking into account the influence of pacifists, without, however, sharing their bourgeois illusions. Lenin had written on that subject, on 14 March 1922, that proposals must be formulated just as if the negotiations were dealing with a business matter. It must be stated clearly before breaking off negotiations, that the Soviet Union had a complete programme, pointing out, however, that it had its own communist programme, but that as a good "businessman" it was its duty to support the pacifists in the bourgeois camp. Lenin had added that venomous and simple tactic would make it possible to divide the opposing bloc. Mr. Santa Cruz added that in view of the attitude of the Soviet Union and the communist parties throughout the world, the USSR proposal also appeared to be inspired by that venomous tactic.

49. Mr. Santa Cruz, analysing the essential conditions for a permanent peace, pointed out that since the Second World War, favourable conditions had developed likely to ensure peace, prosperity and happiness in the world. International peace was only possible if human rights were respected in a system of social peace. All the discriminations forbidden by the Charter should also be fought against, all parts of society should share in the benefits of an expanding economy and workers should be granted a legitimate right to a fair share in the products of society. In short, equal treatment and a system of freedom were the uniform conditions which all democratic nations would have to accept in order to continue the fight against totalitarian aggression. For that purpose, anti-democratic habits in each country must be eliminated. In fact, social snobbery and racial and religious discrimination were the most certain allies of a totalitarian Power, which needed a base from which it could spread despair and discouragement among free peoples. In one

word, the democracies must become still more democratic.

50. From the point of view of propaganda, the Soviet Union had a great advantage over the democracies: the latter were open to information, while the USSR only offered the world "official versions" of events taking place within the USSR. To counteract that disadvantage, it was above all important to understand that the Communists who were conspiring in Moscow, as well as those who persisted in maintaining conditions of life unacceptable to a civilized people, were the enemies of democracy.

51. It could be emphasized with satisfaction that, despite the prophecies of the representatives of the Soviet Union and despite the treason of the communist parties, great progress had been achieved in the sphere of international co-operation, especially in the economic field. In those circumstances, two conclusions could be drawn: (a) no threat of war existed among the democratic nations, since all their problems could be solved by peaceful means; no democratic nation represented a threat of war for anybody; (b) international collaboration must continue so as to assure the economic development of all peoples. When an honourable standard of life was attained in each country, the words of Mr. Vyshinsky would find no echo and peace would be maintained for a long time to come.

52. For all those reasons, the Chilean delegation would vote in favour of the joint draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/549).

53. Sir Benegal N. RAU (India) said that he would have been able to support the proposals contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution submitted by the USSR, if they had not been coloured by the comments of paragraph 1. Recalling the recent statement made by the Bishop of Birmingham and the point of view expressed by Mr. Jessup in his book on modern international law, the Indian representative observed that many people thought that the atomic bomb should be outlawed. If the prohibition envisaged in paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution could be implemented effectively, then the draft resolution could be supported.

54. It was also true that nobody could object to the text of paragraph 3 of the USSR proposal, although an atmosphere of sincere friendship between the great Powers was preferable to a mere pact of friendship. However, paragraph 1 contained an accusation against the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom that those Governments had aggressive intents. Such an accusation did not seem justified; the fact was that the United Kingdom, though it had been victorious, had been terribly weakened. It was regrettable that defence measures taken in an atmosphere of mistrust could be mistaken for measures of aggression, but it could hardly be said that the United Kingdom or any other country was really preparing for a war of aggression.

55. The allegations that new preparations for aggression were proceeding in various countries were due to the suspicion prevailing in international relations. One of the reasons for such an atmosphere of mistrust was probably that the representatives of the USSR over-estimated the ex-

tent to which the Press of the United Kingdom or the United States reflected the opinion of the Governments of those countries. Such an attitude was not surprising on the part of a country where the Government controlled all media of information.

56. Nor could the existence of an "iron curtain" fail to foster suspicions between the two blocs. While it was natural for the Soviet Union to surround itself with protective machinery in the early days of its existence, the time had perhaps come to dispense with that troublesome protection and to allow the USSR to enjoy greater freedom in its relations with the outside world.

57. A third source of mistrust was the fact that the same words were often used in different meanings: the word "sovereignty" was one such word. In India, law was considered "the king of kings", in other words, every State was subject to the law and no difficulty was experienced in accepting that every State, in exercising its sovereignty, had

to honour certain paramount obligations. Accordingly, so far as atomic energy was concerned, for example, India found no difficulty in applying the principle. But certain other countries regarded sovereignty as something sacred, and to those who thought thus, any plan providing for the control of atomic energy caused serious misgivings.

58. Without wishing to insist upon those three specific causes, the representative of India hoped that others would make their own analysis with a view to dispelling the current atmosphere of mistrust. India would support the joint draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom which, while condemning no one, sought the co-operation of all for the maintenance of peace. For the reasons already indicated, the Indian delegation could not support the draft resolution of the USSR.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 22 November 1949, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (*continued*)

1. Mr. THORS (Iceland) said that the problem under discussion was the paramount question in the minds of international society. His country being utterly defenceless and one of the smallest nations represented in the Organization, was obviously interested in peace even more than any other nation, since it had everything to lose in case of war. All nations had become practically within reach of each other and Iceland's geographical isolation was no longer a protection.

2. During the two world wars, Iceland had depended upon the United States for food and supplies, and particularly during the last war, when the commercial, economic and political ties between the two countries had become closer than ever. Mr. Thors recalled that in 1939 a German delegation had visited Iceland seeking the consent of the Icelandic Government for the establishment of an airfield. The solemn assurance had been given that an airfield would be used for commercial purposes only. Despite the fact that Iceland had extremely important commercial ties with Germany, his country did not hesitate to decline such an offer, being prepared to bear any future consequences. On 10 May 1940, British forces landed in Iceland with a view to protecting the country. It was true that his Government had not asked for such help, but the United Kingdom Government had known, as had later been proved, that the nazis had intended to occupy Iceland. The relations of the British forces with the Icelandic people had been most friendly and the solid and old friendship existing between the two countries had made his Government feel assured that the British forces would withdraw as soon as circumstances allowed. However, those forces had been compelled to leave sooner than had been ex-

pected, and, following a special agreement, freely negotiated with the President of the United States, American forces had landed in Iceland in July 1941 to assume the protection of the country. It did not take long before the American soldiers were welcomed by practically the whole Icelandic population. They had taken the greatest care not to interfere in the country's internal affairs. In October 1946, the American forces had withdrawn, in accordance with a freely negotiated supplementary agreement duly ratified by the Icelandic Parliament. It would have been a beautiful dream, had the people of the world been able to believe that there would never again be the slightest danger of war. Unfortunately, the present world was divided into two camps and, at the present time, any attempt at mediation on the part of the small nations seemed utterly futile. His delegation hoped that that sense of insecurity would not last and that friendship and free relations between the great Powers would replace mistrust and isolation.

3. In the meantime, however, Iceland had had to think of its own defence in case of another emergency. Since the United Nations had lacked the strength and efficiency to intervene in such an emergency or to avert it, his country could not but avail itself of the experiences gained during the war and join its friends and neighbours whom it could fully trust. Knowing that those neighbours would never resort to aggression, and would do their utmost to hinder any threat to the peace, and believing in the defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty, Iceland had deemed it its duty to adhere to such a Treaty. Obviously, therefore, no one could accuse Iceland of warmongering on that account. Besides, his country possessed no army, navy or air force and had been unarmed since the dawn of its history. By signing the North Atlantic Treaty, it wanted to make clear its desire to belong to the free community of democratic nations. He sometimes wondered if his country would have enjoyed its present complete freedom,