

nature of that system. On the other hand, there had only been one war with a communist State participating and even then that State had been an ally of capitalistic States. Mr. Vyshinsky did not wish to insinuate that the capitalistic system assumed that there would be war but he contended that it was a system in which there would always be dangers of war.

46. The representative of Lebanon was incorrect even when he stated that all decisive Soviet Union policies were derived from communist philosophy. Mr. Vyshinsky drew attention to the period of "war communism" during which the policies were dictated by the misery and destruction resulting from the first imperialist war and the civil war. Certainly, the NEP (New Economic Policy) period had been dictated by the necessity of educating the peasants in the need for collective farms. Communist philosophy was distinguished from that of the Lebanese representative by the fact that it was derived from real economic and social relations in a State and not from ethereal abstractions.

47. Although the thesis that communism presumed war was without foundation, the Lebanese representative had made it serve as a basis for his contention that communism and capitalism could not co-operate. Mr. Vyshinsky invited a glance into history and at present international relations. The Soviet Union had no desire for war but it would not be frightened. The interview between Generalissimo Stalin and Mr. Roy Howard in 1936 had indicated the Soviet Union policy in foreign relations. At that time Howard had asked whether the USSR would try to impose its ideology by force. Stalin had replied that while the people of the Soviet Union would wish to see socialism established in the neighbouring countries, it would leave it to the peoples concerned to effect the necessary changes. In reply to Howard's question regarding the possibility of world revolution Stalin had stated that the Soviet Union had never had any intention of bringing that about. Mr. Vyshinsky urged avoidance of confusion on two scores: on the one hand, that

world revolution was inevitable, and, on the other, that the Soviet Union was bringing it about. The inevitability of communist revolution had been indicated in the *Communist Manifesto* a hundred years previously. The Lebanese representative had expressed the hope that the people of the Soviet Union would abandon their revolutionary methods without giving up their ideas. Mr. Vyshinsky gave assurances that his people would not give up their ideas and he suggested that others abandon their abstract and idealistic position. Stalin had said that no plans existed to promote a world revolution and that the contrary impression had arisen out of a misunderstanding. He had explained that the Marxist approach was that revolutions would occur in other countries when that would be made possible and necessary by internal conditions in those countries but that revolutions were not for export and that any country wishing to have a revolution would have one, even as the Russian people had had one.

48. In view of the late hour, the CHAIRMAN requested the representative of the USSR to complete his statement at the following meeting.

49. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) proposed that the Committee should not meet the following day since it was the American Thanksgiving. He was prepared to move that formally if a vote was necessary.

50. The CHAIRMAN observed that meetings of the General Assembly and of other Committees were scheduled and he would therefore put the proposal to a vote.

51. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) pointed out that the Assembly had worked on previous "Thanksgivings" and also on previous national holidays. In view of the amount of work before the Committee, he hoped that members would agree to meet on the following day.

The Argentine proposal was rejected by 21 votes to 15, with 10 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.

THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 24 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said the theoretical discussion upon which certain representatives had embarked was incompatible with the tasks of the Committee. If, nevertheless, he had felt obliged to take up the challenge of the representatives of Canada, Chile and Lebanon, the reason was that Marxism and Leninism were being misinterpreted and that it had been falsely concluded that the Soviet Union proposal was insincere and prompted by considerations of tactics and strategy out of keeping with the USSR's real intentions. The purpose of those slanderous statements had been to discredit the peaceful policy that the Soviet State had followed

throughout the thirty-two years of its existence. Nothing could be further from the truth than Mr. Malik's allegation (324th meeting) that each proposal made by the USSR to strengthen peace was just another phase in a general plan for war. On the contrary, those proposals were the logical consequence of the socialist nature of the Soviet Government, which as a matter of principle refused to accept the fact of war, as it refused to accept other factors inherent in the social structure of contemporary capitalist society. The predominant feature of that society was the constant competition that inevitably led to disputes and wars between imperialist States. It was not surprising, therefore, that the primordial task of the Government of the Soviet Union should consist in taking all the necessary measures to prevent, or at least, to localize that danger. Mr. C. Malik could not understand that, since his philosophy was that of

idealism and imperialism. In that connexion, Mr. Vyshinsky read a passage from Lenin's work *The State and the Revolution* according to which the evolution of the capitalist States (even of those which were allegedly the most liberal) in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was characterized by the development of capitalist monopolies and their transformation into a State capitalism with monopolistic characteristics which, in turn, led to the establishment of a bureaucratic and military State machinery, which was increasingly accentuating its policy of the repression and oppression of the proletariat. That evolution had finally led to the establishment of the Soviet State, isolated amongst capitalist nations which, owing to the internal contradictions of their structure, had been obliged to wage a systematic and persistent struggle against the Soviet Union. The USSR, however, needed peace for its own development. In fact, the history of capitalist States was confined to the history of their wars for the possession of material goods, although all those wars had been camouflaged by ideological pretexts. The country represented by Mr. C. Malik was itself deeply involved in such materialistic conflicts. It was enough to recall the Mosul affair and the fight for the oil-fields. The quest for the domination of sources of power played a preponderant part in the evolution of the capitalist system. Thus, it was capitalism that engendered wars, whereas the fundamental idea of communism was the elimination of war.

2. If Mr. C. Malik understood Marxism and Leninism, he would understand that a socialist State could not be administered in the same way as a capitalist State. The governmental structure of a capitalist State was based upon a system of privileges and inequalities, whereas the principles upon which the governmental structure of the Soviet socialist State was founded suppressed such inequalities, eliminated poverty and hunger and forbade the exploitation of man by man. The Soviet Union had tried to introduce those principles into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by submitting amendments, but Mr. C. Malik and his colleagues had rejected those amendments, by refusing, for instance, to insert a clause providing for equal pay for equal work, without distinction as to sex.

3. The experience of the Paris Commune, which had been repressed with so much bloodshed, had shown Marxists that the proletariat could not free itself by peaceful methods and that it would have to resort to other means. Only those who derived their knowledge from Russian counter-revolutionary books could state that socialism could be achieved without altering the structure of the Government in such a manner as to enable it to apply the principles of socialism. But all that dealt with internal organization or policy, Mr. C. Malik, however, alleged that those factors affected foreign relations. In support of his theory, he had—erroneously—quoted Stalin's *Problems of Leninism*. Whereas that book stated that the proletariat, once it had come into power, should arm itself in order to defend itself from its external enemies, Mr. C. Malik interpreted that passage as an assertion that the socialist State, once in power, should take up arms in order to wage war against the outside world, or, in other words, against the capitalist States. Stalin's statements were correct; that had been proved by the experience of the October Revolution. Three-quarters

of Russia had then been conquered by the White Army which had been equipped by foreign interventionists—France, the United Kingdom and the United States—so as to destroy the young socialist State. The organization of the revolutionary armies had not been an expression of the wish to pursue an aggressive foreign policy but, on the contrary, had been due to the requirements of defence against the aggression of imperialist States, which were then hoping to overthrow the new socialist State. Moreover, history proved that the bourgeoisie of one country always supported the bourgeoisie of other countries in overthrowing a revolutionary Government and that it was impossible to organize a new State until such foreign assistance was overcome.

4. Mr. C. Malik had quoted out of context Stalin's remark that a victorious revolutionary country should regard itself as the instrument of the victory of the proletariat of other countries; in so doing Mr. C. Malik had attached to that passage a meaning that it did not possess. That passage occurred in a chapter dealing with the question whether the victory gained by the proletarian class of one country could be definitive and stating the conditions necessary for the consolidation of such a victory. The fact was that such a victory could not be definitive in one country if the capitalist system persisted in other countries and organized crusades against the socialist State, in the hope of restoring a capitalist régime. Generalissimo Stalin himself had told Mr. Howard in 1936 that the Soviet Union would of course prefer to be surrounded by socialist countries, but that the countries adjacent to the Soviet Union would have to decide their form of government for themselves and that the leaders of the Soviet Union were not proposing to export socialism or revolution. It was also stated in the book *The Problems of Leninism* that even when the bourgeoisie had been overthrown, it would continue for a long time to be more powerful than the proletariat which had come to power. The young socialist State should, therefore, devote its efforts to protecting itself against all danger of foreign intervention.

5. By using contrived examples and quotations out of context, Mr. C. Malik had misrepresented the Government of the Soviet Union's real attitude towards its neighbours. It was untrue that the Soviet Union wished to promote revolution in other countries. Although the USSR was surrounded by capitalist States, which certainly constituted a threat to it, it did not wish to attack those States and to pursue an irresponsible policy of adventures. The Soviet Union was not in any way dreaming of imposing socialism upon other countries by armed force. Mr. C. Malik had not understood that point and, furthermore, had absolutely ignored the danger of foreign interference with a view to restoring the former régimes in countries where socialism had triumphed.

6. Mr. C. Malik had stated that the Soviet Union peace proposals bore the stamp of pure cynicism. But surely it was not cynical to try to put an end to preparations for war and to the organization of aggressive and military blocs. Surely it was not cynical to propose a peace pact between the great Powers. In its draft resolution (A/996), the Soviet Union had merely expressed its wish for peace.

7. It had been alleged that it was illogical for the Soviet Union to accuse the United States and the United Kingdom of preparing for a new war and of organizing military blocs against the Soviet Union, while at the same time proposing the conclusion of a peace pact with those States; to argue thus was to misunderstand the manner in which the problem appeared. Indeed, it would have been illogical to propose such a pact if the activities of the United Kingdom and the United States had been inspired by peace. It was precisely because those States were preparing for war against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies that it was essential to sign a peace pact in which they would declare that they had no warlike intentions. If the Soviet Union had taken the problem to the General Assembly and had not approached the United States and the United Kingdom direct, the reason was that the United States had not expressed the intention of settling the outstanding disputes between the two countries, even after the conversations held between Mr. Molotov and General Bedell Smith and those held between Mr. Stalin and Mr. Kingsbury Smith and in spite of the assurances given by the USSR.

8. The Soviet Union considered that, in spite of the division of the modern world into two camps, the forces of humanity, if applied unanimously in the right direction, would succeed in eliminating the danger of war or at least in limiting them and keeping them in check. All the arguments and objections that had been brought forward against the Soviet Union proposal seemed hardly important. It was alleged that the proposed pact would be redundant in view of the existence of the United Nations Charter, but the Charter had not prevented the conclusion of other pacts allegedly intended to strengthen peace. If the Brussels Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty and the Inter-American Treaty could coexist with the Charter, surely so could the five-Power pact. Such a pact would serve as a concrete reaffirmation of the high principles of the Charter. Not only could such a pact be concluded but, in the existing circumstances, it had to be, though of course, it would have been unnecessary if the two Powers concerned had not been preparing for war.

9. Mr. C. Malik's proposal was that of the "third force", oscillating between good and evil, but always attracted towards evil, while having good words on his tongue. The doctrines of the Fathers of the Christian Church, of whom he had spoken, were certainly closer to communist theory than to capitalist theory, since the Church Fathers had wished to put an end to the exploitation of man by man. Mr. C. Malik had also spoken of human rights and had alleged that the Soviet State denied those rights. That was obviously untrue. The Soviet Union had asked that the right to work should be guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but the majority had objected to that proposal. What the Soviet Union did deny was the capitalist conception of human rights. For the communists there was no freedom of the Press if the people had no printing presses and paper at their disposal. It was true that the Soviet Union gave no rights to the enemies of socialism. On the basis of that principle, the Soviet Union had liquidated the "fifth column" instigated in 1938 by France, the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany. There was no room in the Soviet Union for the enemies of

socialism and for fascists. The Soviet Union would never tolerate fascist propaganda or a repetition of the history of the ten years between 1920 and 1930, when thousands of millions of American dollars had been placed at the disposal of Hitlerism and German militarism. It had been said then, as it was still being said, that the danger of war lay only in Soviet propaganda, but the war had come, provoked by American and other monopolies, which had armed Hitler in the hope that he would attack some other country; but he had first attacked France and the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union would never admit that kind of freedom of action within its frontiers.

10. The representative of Lebanon felt sorry for the educated classes in the Soviet Union, although thousands of facts could be adduced to prove that the position of Soviet intellectuals was unequalled in other countries.

11. In alleging that in the Soviet Union the State was all-important, whereas the family, the Church and the individual should be superior to the State, Mr. C. Malik was forgetting that the Soviet Constitution of 1936 prescribed respect for religious beliefs and he also forgot that it stated that the individual could not exist without the State, just as the State could not exist without the individual, since they were mutually complementary.

12. Mr. C. Malik had tried to prove that the Soviet Union proposed was based solely on tactical considerations, that the philosophy of communism was war-like and aggressive and that communists tended to export their doctrine to other countries. On the contrary, the history of communism proved that the purpose of the communist philosophy was to eliminate war. The purpose of communism was to eliminate the causes of war that were inherent in the capitalist system, since capitalism was founded upon the principle of the exploitation of man by man.

13. Mr. McNEIL (United Kingdom) said that, when Mr. Manuïlsky had reminded him (332nd meeting) of the existence of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, he had probably lost sight of the fact that, on 14 October 1947, Marshal Stalin had remarked to Mr. Zilliacus, the British M.P., that the establishment of the United Nations had made the treaty practically useless.

14. Mr. McNeil added that, if, as Mr. Eban had asserted, the tone of the language used in the Committee was indicative of the political tension of the time, it was not true that the language increased that tension. In fact, as far as some delegations were concerned, propaganda had replaced diplomatic conversations. It was inevitable when, in some countries, all the means of information were in the hands of the State, that diplomatic language should become more forthright, and the democracies must reply to the manoeuvres of Soviet propaganda.

15. The figures given by Mr. Vyshinsky on the percentage of military expenditure in relation to the budgets of various countries could not be taken seriously. In point of fact, different countries had very different methods of compiling their budgets and no comparison was possible. Thus, the USSR budget included the expenditure for the industrial organization of the country, whereas that expenditure did not appear in the United Kingdom budgets or those of the United

States and other countries. Municipal expenditure was not shown in the United Kingdom's budget either. Thus the figures quoted were misleading and could not usefully be compared.

16. A fairer method, however, would be to study the ratio between the military budget of the various States and their national income. Such a comparison would show that, in 1948, the military expenditure of the USSR represented 15 per cent of the national income of the Soviet Union, whereas that of the United Kingdom represented only 8 per cent, that of France, the Netherlands and the United States, 6 per cent, and that of Belgium, 2 per cent.

17. It would also be desirable that every State should give statistics of the strength of its armed forces. The United Kingdom published such figures annually. By contrast, Mr. Vyshinsky had been unwilling to reveal the total strength of the USSR armed forces. Mr. McNeil reminded the meeting that, the previous year, he had estimated the figure at approximately 4 million and the figure had not been denied. If the representative of the USSR wished to dispel anxiety, he should himself supply data and, if an international commission were allowed to check the information submitted, all suspicion would be ended. Unfortunately, Mr. Vyshinsky had persisted in his refusal and had submitted only those figures which could neither be compared nor checked. The only possible conclusion to be drawn from his attitude was that he was not seeking to enlighten the Committee, but to confuse the situation. The discussion would, in any case, have shown the Soviet Union why impartial and objective people dreaded the Soviet Union and its adherents, but did not dread the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. Mr. Vyshinsky had failed to convince the Committee of his good intentions and thus no progress had been achieved.

18. Mr. Vyshinsky might also say that he had no confidence in the good intentions of the democracies. It was difficult, however, to see how he could take such an attitude since history, and the history of the United Kingdom in particular, showed that that country had never nourished aggressive intentions and that its policy was controlled by public opinion. The representatives of Burma, Colombia, and India had pointed out that the statements made in the USSR draft resolution on the aggressive intentions of the United Kingdom and the United States were groundless. Moreover, the representative of the USSR could certainly not complain that the United Kingdom and the United States had never made concessions. Mr. McNeil recalled the concessions made to the USSR, both in Europe and in Asia immediately after the Second World War, in the hope of gaining the friendship of that country. Those efforts had, however, proved vain; nor had the vehement language in which Mr. Vyshinsky addressed the Committee helped to put their minds at rest. It was difficult to see how Mr. Vyshinsky could reproach the United Kingdom of not having made concessions, while his own attitude remained altogether inflexible. Had he not replied on the previous day to the representative of Lebanon that the standpoint of the USSR would not change and had he not appeared to boast that his views were beyond criticism? Had he not also declared, a year previously, that the USSR would never accept the plan for the control

of atomic energy proposed by the majority? In the circumstances, it was difficult to see how he dared pose as the champion of progress, when he did not budge an inch in his ideas. It was an old British tradition to believe in discussion as a means of solving problems. Where there were mutual concessions, it was always possible to reach a solution without yielding on principles. If Mr. Vyshinsky was resolved to refuse in advance to consider even the possibility of concession, no progress would be made in any direction; yet, if the two halves of the world wished to survive without having recourse to war, they had to make a joint endeavour to restore the broken lines of communication.

19. The representative of the United Kingdom read a telegram from Prague stating that the *United Nations Bulletin* of 16 November had been confiscated by the Czech Authorities because it gave the complete text of the joint draft resolution put forward by the United States and the United Kingdom calling upon every nation to promote full freedom for the peaceful expression of political opposition. Thus Mr. McNeil wondered whether any useful purpose could really be served by putting forward and considering draft resolutions that the populations of the People's Democracies were not even allowed to read textually. Such methods, just as the "jamming" of BBC broadcasts, were unlikely to make for mutual understanding.

20. At a previous meeting (335th meeting), Mr. Vyshinsky had said that ideological intervention might lead to war. On the one hand, that statement might prove accurate if there was any tampering with facts to mislead the peoples. From another point of view, however, the statement was not true since it was essential that peoples should have access to facts, that they should be able to absorb them and test them in the light of their own experiences. The free exchange of information was thus one of the essential conditions if international relations were to remain possible and if ideological intervention were to be avoided.

21. The representative of the USSR also considered that it was inevitable that changes would be brought about by revolution. That being so, he might legitimately be asked whether he was more concerned for the maintenance of peace in the world or for furthering the relentless march of world revolution. Did not the troubles fomented by communist agents in Greece, Korea and other parts of the world constitute ideological interventions which were endangering peace?

22. A new era of peace might dawn if the communists would realize that the maintenance of world peace was more important than their local attempts at disturbance. Similarly, if the representatives of the USSR were to tell members of the Communist Party to disassociate themselves from violence, by that act alone, they would be making a real contribution to the preparation of world peace and would make it possible to break down the barrier separating East and West.

23. Mr. JORDAAN (Union of South Africa) recalled that, if it was true that peace was an absence of armed conflict, then peace did exist at the present time. But was that a fact? The very fact that it was possible to ask that question showed that the USSR had been right in sub-

mitting a draft resolution on that subject. The United Nations must study it closely if they were to fulfil their main obligation: the maintenance of peace and international security.

24. The small States did not provide grounds for fear. They had really hoped that peace could in fact be assured by collective security. Unfortunately, the great Powers had failed to achieve that collective security and it was they who possessed the most deadly weapons. To satisfy the demands of the USSR, the other four great Powers had doubtless made concessions which, alas, had been of no avail.

25. Recalling that Mr. Vyshinsky had complained of the automatic majority in the Committee, Mr. Jordaan pointed out that the USSR and its associates had cut themselves off from the rest of the world by a barrier of fear. Had it not been for that fear, nations desirous to co-operate with other States would not have been obliged to sign the North Atlantic Treaty.

26. It was for the USSR to take the initiative in dispelling that fear, since no one could seriously believe that the United Kingdom and the United States were preparing for a war of aggression against the USSR. It was good to notice the readiness of the United Kingdom and the United States to establish friendly relations with the USSR and to note that Mr. Vyshinsky had in fact stated that widely differing ideologies could live side by side.

27. In the light of those considerations, it was strange that the USSR draft resolution should begin with a condemnation of the States to which it was holding out the olive branch. Furthermore, there seemed to be no need for a new pact, since the Charter laid down the principles governing peace. Hence, it would be advisable rather to respect engagements already entered into than to conclude others.

28. The joint draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/549) seemed unnecessary, since it added nothing to the principles of the Charter. Nevertheless, with some reservation on drafting amendments, particularly with regard to atomic energy, the delegation of the Union of South Africa would support the draft resolution so as not to oppose the general tendency to reaffirm the principles of the Charter.

29. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) thought that the discussion with the representatives of the majority was reminiscent of a conversation with the deaf. In fact, those representatives had merely repeated outworn arguments, without replying to the arguments which had been submitted in the discussion. Mr. Santa Cruz had stated, in particular (332nd meeting), that in the democratic countries there were no questions which could not be solved by peaceful methods. If that was the case, should one conclude that Chile was not a democracy, since concentration camps existed in that country and since the police fired on demonstrators? As to the representative of Bolivia, he had maintained (333rd meeting) that the USSR did not wish to accept any control over atomic energy. Had he then forgotten Mr. Vyshinsky's statement, to the effect that the USSR was ready to accept such a control, without, however, surrendering the ownership of atomic plants to American super-trusts?

30. The representative of India had referred to freedom of the Press (332nd meeting). But that was a notion which lent itself to many interpretations. In the countries of the People's Democracies, freedom of the Press signified that it was free from the control of trusts and cartels.

31. Mr. McNeil had maintained that the Czech authorities had seized a United Nations news bulletin. Without giving an opinion as to the exactitude of that information, the representative of Poland pointed out that the United Kingdom and the United States Embassies in Poland also published bulletins reproducing official documents from their Governments, as well as records of United Nations meetings. The question was not that those bulletins published United Nations resolutions, but rather that they accompanied such reproductions with comments which were, at times, insulting. Thus, in one of those bulletins, Poland had been called a satellite State. Poland could not tolerate such insults, and would confiscate every injurious publication of that nature. It was highly probable that the confiscation of the *United Nations Bulletin* at Prague had been due to similar reasons which Mr. McNeil had omitted to indicate.

32. The representative of Poland agreed with the representative of India that the same word could have different meanings. Thus, the word "sovereignty" could have several meanings. It was surprising, however, that the representative of India did not recall that the USSR representatives had stated that their country was ready to renounce part of its sovereignty and that it had, in fact, already done so voluntarily by submitting to international obligations, such as the Charter, for instance. However, such renunciation of sovereignty should be made for the benefit of all mankind, and not for that of one State thirsting for power, such as the United States, which, in the field of atomic energy, wished to gain world control. The maxim "Law is the king of kings", which had been referred to by the representative of India, should be taught rather in the United States or in the United Kingdom, which for centuries had been guided by the principle "Might is right" in its relations with India.

33. Mr. McNeil had emphasized (329th meeting) that no one could possibly say that Denmark had aggressive designs, yet he himself had accused Albania of aggressive designs against Greece. Doubtless, Denmark was a small State. The accusation was not that that State was itself aggressive, but that it was used for purposes of aggression by the great Powers.

34. The representative of Poland wondered why Iceland had signed the North Atlantic Treaty, when that country was not threatened on the part of the USSR, and when the free community of democratic peoples, to which that representative had alluded (333rd meeting), was represented, not by the signatories of the Treaty, but by the United Nations. The representative of Iceland had stated that the United States troops had withdrawn from his country, but had forgotten to mention that they had maintained military bases there. That attitude of the United States could be compared to the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the island of Bornholm, on Danish territory, after hostilities had ceased.

35. Mr. Wierblowski recalled that the USSR representative had made a proposal, the preceding year, for the reduction of armaments by one-third¹ and that, in the current year, he had proposed a resolution on disarmament in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee². If Mr. McNeil had not opposed those proposals, he would have obtained the figures he desired concerning the armed forces of the USSR. In fact, Mr. McNeil was opposed to all proposals on disarmament, on the grounds of the distrust prevailing in international relations. In order to dispel that distrust, one should begin by making concessions.

36. Replying to the representative of the Netherlands, the representative of Poland said that it was not true that hatred among peoples was being preached in the USSR. On the other hand, the American Press contained numerous examples of incitements to hatred and contempt. He quoted an article which had appeared in *Colliers*, in which the former military commandant in Berlin, General Frank Howley, had called the Russians liars, crooks and bandits. He pointed out that such propaganda was not of a nature to promote good relations among peoples.

37. He noted that most representatives, either because of a persecution mania or because of a political manoeuvre, saw the spectre of communism everywhere. He recalled, in that respect, the document "M", which had been manufactured by the British Intelligence Service, with a view to lending credence to the preparation of a communist plot in Germany. That theory was not a new one, and those who preferred to ignore the wishes of the masses, and to concoct stories would achieve no result.

38. As to the alleged Soviet nationality of the Polish Minister of National Defence, to which the representative of the Netherlands had alluded (333rd meeting), Mr. Wierblowski recalled once again that the allegations which had been made on that subject were untrue, and observed that the Commander-in-Chief of the Dutch Armies was not born in the Netherlands and had lived in Germany all his youth.

39. He said that Poland felt it had been betrayed by France during the "phoney war" of 1939, and that the Poles who had fought in France in 1940 had been deceived in the same way as the French people, by the French Government of that time. Poles knew that the Red Army, which had occupied Byelorussia and Western Ukraine, had merely accomplished an act of historical justice.

40. He felt that the joint United States-United Kingdom draft resolution was harmful. It had no bearing on the problem at issue, because it did

not name those who had violated the Charter and who were none others than the authors of the proposal themselves. In that regard, it was well to remember that at a Press conference, a few days previously, a United Kingdom representative had stated that his country would not comply with the decisions of the Assembly relating to Trust Territories, and that the United Nations flag would never be unfurled beside the British flag in those territories. In those conditions, how could one have any faith in the loyalty of the United Kingdom towards the United Nations?

41. The joint draft resolution did not provide for the destruction of atomic stocks and did not put an end to war propaganda. It put an end neither to the isolation of Eastern Europe nor to the North Atlantic Treaty. It was merely a hypocritical call on the small nations to assume all the responsibility of the cold war. If the United Kingdom was ready to make concessions, it would seem that its inclination depended on the party with which it was dealing. In any case, that draft resolution proved that the United Kingdom had made no concession to those countries against whom it had started the cold war. On the other hand, the USSR draft resolution offered a compromise. For that reason the Polish delegation would support it.

42. Mr. ORDONNEAU (France), in reply to the argument which had been advanced by the representative of Poland against French policy in 1939, pointed out that it was not France which had been responsible for the fact that Franco-Polish relations were no longer what they had been in the past. In a historical survey of the secular relations of brotherhood between the two countries, he recalled that in 1939 the United Kingdom and France had declared war on Germany in order to come to the defence of Poland, whereas the USSR had come to an agreement with Germany in order to carry out a new partition of Poland. Finally, if Munich was a painful memory for France, it must be an equally painful one for the representative of Poland. France, at least, had not benefitted from the partition of Czechoslovakia and had not claimed the territory of Teschen.

43. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) asked for permission to reply to the allusion which the representative of France had made to the USSR.

44. The CHAIRMAN stated that representatives could reply to remarks which had been made concerning their countries at the following meeting.

45. Mr. ANDREN (Sweden) proposed the adjournment and, there being no objections, the CHAIRMAN declared the meeting adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Annex to the Plenary Meetings*, document A/723.

² See document A/AC.31/L.35.