

48. It was in that spirit that the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom had submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/549) which directed attention to the basic requirements for enduring peace. The purpose was to provide the United Nations with a standard to which all who believed in peace might rally and work sincerely for the settlement of international disputes and the promotion of international co-operation.

49. There was no substitute for the performance of treaty obligations. The good citizen of the world was recognized above all by his respect for the essentials of peace. The adoption of that draft resolution would signify that the Charter of the United Nations was the most solemn pact of peace and that it laid down the principles of an enduring peace. Thus, the Assembly would proclaim that disregard of those principles was primarily responsible for international tension, and would invite all its Members to take the necessary steps in the spirit of co-operation on which the United Nations was founded.

50. On those realistic grounds, the joint draft resolution called upon all nations to refrain from threatening or using force contrary to the Charter; to refrain from many acts aimed at impairing the freedom, independence or integrity of any State, or at fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people in any State.

51. The draft resolution also called upon all nations to carry out in good faith their international agreements and to afford the organs of the United Nations their full support and free access to their territories.

52. Two paragraphs related to the dignity of the human person, to freedom for the peaceful expression of political opposition, to freedom of religion, to all the other human rights mentioned in the Universal Declaration, and to the standards of living of the peoples. All the Members of the

United Nations were called upon to participate fully in the work of the Organization. In particular, the five permanent members of the Security Council were urged progressively to broaden their co-operation, more and more, and to exercise restraint in their use of the veto, so as to make the Security Council a more effective instrument for maintaining peace. Finally, all nations were called upon to co-operate in supporting United Nations efforts in the settlement of outstanding problems, to co-operate in attaining international regulation and reduction of conventional armaments, and to agree to the exercise of national sovereignty jointly with other nations, to the extent necessary to attain such international control of atomic energy as would make effective the prohibition of atomic weapons and assure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

53. The draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom was incompatible with the Soviet Union draft resolution, which should be rejected, none of its parts being worthy either of amendment or adoption. That draft resolution was nothing but an attempt to slander, obstruct and deceive.

54. The United States delegation, having placed before the First Committee the Soviet Union's record of non-co-operation, was now submitting a draft on the essentials of peace. If the Soviet Union was prepared to accept those essentials, there was no need for a five-Power pact. If it was not so prepared, such a pact was a hollow proposal.

55. The draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States was therefore intended to secure fulfilment of the undertakings assumed under the Charter, to which the adoption of the resolution would give new life.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Monday, 14 November 1949, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Lester B. PEARSON (Canada).

Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)

1. Mr. CASTRO (El Salvador) said that the item under discussion apparently included two completely different parts, namely, the condemnation of the preparations for a new war and the conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace. With regard to the latter, his delegation entertained strong doubts as to the competence of the United Nations to recommend the signature of a peace pact between five of its Members. With the exception of very special cases, the Assembly's recommendations for the maintenance of peace must include all Members, without dividing them into groups and addressing them different proposals. The USSR proposal limited the pact to the five great Powers, and excluded 54 Members of the United Nations. However, after careful consideration, his delegation felt that, in that particular case, the General

Assembly did have jurisdiction to consider the item proposed by the Soviet Union delegation.

2. The delegation of El Salvador had arrived at that conclusion for the following reasons: in the first place, the Soviet Union recognized as the basis for its proposal that the existing differences between the great Powers could ultimately endanger world peace; in the second place, it requested a particular action whereby the General Assembly might act as a mediator. However, Mr. Castro felt that the Soviet Union had definitely undermined the possibility of the conclusion of such a pact by unilateral actions, such as the recognition of the *de facto* Chinese Government. Since the other four great Powers only recognized the Nationalist Government, his delegation did not understand how the five great Powers could conclude such a proposed pact in view of such basic differences. Moreover, the principle contained in the USSR draft resolution was covered in the Charter itself. Obviously, in submitting such a proposal, the Soviet Union had explicitly implied that the Charter did not comply

with its objectives and ideals. The delegation of El Salvador, therefore, could in no circumstances subscribe to that view. The USSR could effectively contribute to the carrying out of the high ideals in its proposal, if it would only adapt its international policies to the principles of the Charter, thereby lessening the existing international friction. It could, for example, exercise its influence to put an end to the intervention by certain countries in the internal affairs of Greece; it could facilitate the return of normal life in Korea; it could restore the respect for basic human rights in Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. Moreover, the co-operation of Member States with the agencies of the United Nations would greatly contribute to the preservation of world peace. The policy of the USSR in ignoring the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and the Commission on Korea had handicapped the work of the Organization. Furthermore, the excessive use of the veto had excluded peace-loving States such as Ireland and Portugal from membership in the United Nations, despite their qualifications. In that regard, the El Salvadorean delegation subscribed to the view that Bulgaria, Romania and Albania could not be considered as peace-loving States, and were therefore disqualified for membership, in view of the material help they had extended to the Greek guerrillas.

3. As regards the peace treaties with Germany and Japan, his delegation wished to recall the fact that many small States had declared war on the axis Powers. In Washington in 1942, the United Nations had agreed not to sign separate peace treaties. That declaration seemed to have been forgotten. Mr. Castro wished to point out that the Soviet Union could offer better co-operation with a view to signing those peace treaties.

4. Some delegations had alluded to the Inter-American Defense System. The El Salvadorean delegation felt it essential to note that that system was provided for in the relevant Articles of the Charter by the establishment of regional arrangements or agencies aimed at the preservation of peace.

5. For those reasons, his delegation would support the joint draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/549) but would vote against the draft resolution proposed by the USSR (A/996).

6. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) said that the terms of the item under discussion would have justified a debate upon its admissibility on the agenda. However, the French delegation had voted, both in the General Committee and in the General Assembly, for its inclusion in the agenda, in the belief that a debate was made necessary by the proclaimed purpose of the text and the circumstances of its submission. The USSR draft resolution began with formal and grave accusations against two Members of the United Nations, who were also permanent members of the Security Council. Such allegations as preparations for a new war, aggressive aims and organization of military blocs could not be brought lightly, still less should they be lightly introduced into a text submitted to the vote of fifty-nine nations.

7. When addressing the Assembly, on 29 September 1949, Mr. Vyshinsky had contended that the first two paragraphs of his draft resolution

were only statements of fact, although no supporting document or fact had been advanced. Despite those peculiarities, the matter was stranger than the manner and it should be fully examined and aired in public discussion. Paragraph 1 of the draft resolution confined itself to making serious accusations against two Powers designated by name; paragraph 2, after a condemnation of the use of weapons of mass destruction for military purposes, described as "inadmissible any further delay in the adoption by the United Nations of practical measures for the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of appropriate strict international control"; paragraph 3 after confronting the so-called warmongers previously denounced with the firm will of the peoples to avert the threat of a new war and ensure the maintenance of peace, adjured the five permanent members of the Security Council to unite their efforts to that end and to conclude among themselves a pact for that very purpose.

8. Re-reading that text led one to wonder whether or not that was dreamland. What could be the purpose of paragraph 2? Was the Assembly to be asked to condemn itself? And could it be forgotten that, on three questions, the Assembly had indicated—and by a considerable majority—the path to be followed to achieve both prohibition and control, a path which had been blocked by the very authors of the USSR draft resolution. As to paragraph 3, if one was really appealing for agreement and desired that appeal to be heard, was it conceivable that that plea should be launched in the form of an accusation and insult? If it was desired to persuade a future partner to consent to an arrangement, was it reasonable to denounce him solemnly as a warmonger, and have him repudiated by public opinion in his own country? Obviously, if the USSR did not wish to obtain the prohibition of atomic weapons and appropriate measures of control, and did not want a five-Power pact, but rather, hope that a majority vote would be cast against its draft resolution proposing those things, the text submitted to the First Committee would be no different. If the text was a propaganda document intended to provoke a rejection to be used for propaganda purposes, it would be no different either. The USSR would be pictured as bringing peace to the world, though being hindered by the warmongers; and those warmongers would no longer be any particular Power but the substantial majority of States Members of the United Nations. Furthermore, did paragraph 2 mean that if no agreement were reached upon the establishment of control, the Soviet Union would nevertheless insist that prohibition should come into force without any control at all? Those questions were pertinent in view of the fact that the USSR draft resolution submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee¹ proposed that conventions on prohibitions and control be concluded and put into effect simultaneously.

9. Paragraph 3 called upon the five permanent members of the Security Council to conclude, among themselves, a pact for the strengthening of peace. Did that mean a declaration of the principles upon which international security should be founded or did it mean an undertaking to respect those principles? Those undertakings were already embodied in the Charter. Was it desired

¹ See document A/AC.31/L.35.

to emphasize the special responsibilities incumbent upon the five Powers? In that case, paragraph 3 should have been drafted in terms which were not contrary to the Charter. He pointed out that Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Charter, entrusted the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security not merely to the five permanent members but to the Security Council as a whole. In any case, the value of a diplomatic instrument confining itself to making a statement of that nature was not clearly evident. Was it desired to promote private conversations among the five permanent members of the Council, and, for that purpose, to give an institutional character to a Council of the five Foreign Ministers meeting periodically and competent to deal with all questions concerned with the maintenance of peace and security? If so, it would be interesting to know if those conversations would be held outside the United Nations and parallel with it, or within the framework of the Organization. If the first alternative applied, Mr. Chauvel saw no room left for the United Nations to carry on a constructive work within a field which was one of the chief concerns of the Charter. If it were the second, he was at a loss to understand the position of such a five-Power Council within the mechanism of the United Nations, particularly in relation to the Security Council which, in fact, would be superseded.

10. Whatever practical form the USSR draft resolution took, it would merely ask the General Assembly to adhere to a principle which was not found in the Charter, and to give the five permanent members of the Security Council an additional privilege. Obviously, that course, if followed, would run counter to the democratic principle of the equality of the Members of the Organization. Even assuming that those questions could be satisfactorily answered, could it be seriously believed that the institution of a new procedure and the creation of another council would produce solutions? The permanent members of the Council had not awaited the signature of a five-Power pact before meeting and attempting to settle certain problems, in particular, the German question. The difficulties were, to some extent, inherent in the problems themselves, and any treaty which did not reflect a will to agreement was useless and even harmful. What reason was there for thinking that the Government of the Soviet Union sincerely wished to strengthen peace? There had been no sign at the peace congresses, or was there in the text of the draft resolution.

11. In making that statement, the French delegation did not contend that a will to war was concealed under the apparent offer of peace, but it believed that that offer was a cloak for various objectives, the pursuit of which might lead to war. The French delegation deemed it necessary to state that the will for peace was not enough but that there must also be a will to accept the conditions of peace by showing a spirit of compromise in international relationships. However, the vocabulary of the USSR in international negotiations appeared to be singularly limited. It was almost confined to a negative answer. That contention was borne out by the various attempts to solve the German and the Japanese problems as well as the major problems which had been raised in the United Nations. That negative answer had been heard forty-one times in the Security Coun-

cil and, very recently, in connexion with conventional armaments and the conditions on which information on atomic energy could be exchanged.

12. It would be easy, and perhaps tempting, to speak of conspiracy, of blocs and of automatic majorities. But when the same, or almost the same, minority had been automatically maintained throughout the years without gaining a single vote, despite an active propaganda, the least biased observer would be inclined to wonder whether the themes put forward by the leader of the small chorus were not essentially bad. Moreover, where was the will to agreement when a Government which noted that state of affairs and the impossibility of winning acceptance of its views refused to modify them and make the slightest concession?

13. France, whose sufferings from the war had been greater than those of many and equal to those of most, could not be suspected of aspiring to hegemony. France merely desired to rise again from its ruins with a view to building a better world where the individual could once again live in freedom. To that end, it had placed its trust in the Charter of the United Nations. France was ready, as had been declared elsewhere, to renounce the exercise of certain sovereign prerogatives in favour of and for the benefit of the world community. His country was aware that such a renunciation was conducive to an association for the exercise of those common rights in the service of the community. That readiness gave it the right to speak out and, with pain and regret but in all frankness, to denounce what appeared to be manoeuvres and pretence, in a field where they were out of place. For all those reasons, the French delegation would vote against the Soviet Union draft resolution.

14. On the other hand, the joint draft resolution submitted jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom (A/C.1/549) contained principles to which all the Members of the United Nations had subscribed. Accordingly, the French delegation would vote in favour of it.

15. Sir Mohammad ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) welcomed the opportunity for a reaffirmation of faith in the principles which constituted the very foundations of international peace and security. In fact, it was a tribute to the United Nations to see that the representatives of the two most powerful States could discuss such great differences so freely and strongly. That held out the hope that those serious problems could be discussed and a solution discovered in accordance with the principles of the Charter. All representatives would contribute to a better understanding of the problem and to the attainment of a fair and just solution. The great fault of international relations was the assumption that men could act with evil intent on behalf of a nation with impunity and even with advantage. Real peace would come only with the application to the conduct of nations of those simple standards in individual life which entitled a man to be called honourable. The world did not merely need the absence of armed conflict, but a peace where all righteous people would be free to pursue their lawful occupations without the fear of being despoiled of their liberty or the fruits of their labours.

16. He considered that the essential cause of the existing fears, doubts and suspicions was darkness.

Since God had made provision for mankind to be constantly led from darkness into light, it was necessary for darkness to be dispelled to introduce light in every corner of one's individual, collective, national and international activities. Full knowledge and free information would produce understanding and banish fear and suspicion. In that connexion, the representative of Pakistan wished to recall his statement made during the general discussion at the present session of the General Assembly¹ to the effect that the present ideological conflict did not only continue to divide the world but also to harass its peoples and to threaten peace and security. Tolerance was called for, and every nation must be free to develop its institutions along lines best suited to its own needs and expressive of its own genius.

17. On reading paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution, he had been most disagreeably surprised. In the background of his own acquaintance with the United States and the United Kingdom, it had come as a very great surprise that the representative of another great and powerful State should seriously believe such allegations. If one great nation held such a belief about two others, one must be uneasy about the prospects of the maintenance of international peace. Fear, suspicion and doubt was the result of lack of knowledge and information. Unless those fears were eliminated, international peace could not be secured. In the recent past, one of the main causes of war had been the principle of racial domination. Happily, the poisonous characteristics of that principle had been recognized and its final condemnation was contained in the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter. Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan wished to draw attention to recent progress in that field, and, in particular, he drew attention to the agreement recently reached between the Netherlands and the representatives of the Indonesian people; as well as to the adoption of the resolution concerning the disposal of the former Italian colonies.

18. The representative of Pakistan stated that all the essentials required to secure and maintain the kind of peace which his delegation desired were contained in the joint draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom. He had already indicated his delegation's attitude regarding paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution. The condemnation attempted therein could not be endorsed, and, furthermore, from all its knowledge of the policies of those two nations, his delegation could but repudiate that condemnation. While paragraphs 2 and 3 of the USSR draft resolutions contained two suggestions which, if divorced from the context, might help secure the object in mind, those matters were much more appropriately expressed in the draft resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom. The first four paragraphs of the latter touched upon the crux of the matter as far as the maintenance of political peace was concerned. Pakistan could confirm that, as it had suffered fears and anxieties and continued to suffer them on account of the non-observance of the principles set out in that draft. His delegation would therefore support that draft resolution (A/C.1/549) and in so doing would be supporting such of the suggestions contained in the USSR draft resolution as were acceptable.

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 227th plenary meeting.

19. In conclusion, he wished to draw particular attention to the last paragraph of the United States-United Kingdom draft resolution not merely because it laid down the essential condition for the settlement of the only principles upon which international control of atomic energy could be based profitably, but also because, by endorsing it, the General Assembly would be accepting for the first time a principle which, as international co-operation increased, would show to an ever greater degree the ultimate way towards international peace and co-operation.

20. Mr. ANDERSEN (Denmark), referring to statements made by the USSR representative at the previous meeting and on 23 September² regarding the duty of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, said that all the members of the Committee would no doubt agree that the United Nations had a duty to make an appeal for a joint effort to dispel the international tension, and a duty to devote all its energy to the maintenance of peace. While his delegation could agree in principle on the duty of the United Nations to take the initiative, the USSR draft resolution was not a suitable means of reaching that goal. Like all others, his country condemned all preparations for a new war and was anxious to have all disputes and differences settled by peaceful methods. The representative of Denmark asked, however, how anything could possibly result from a proposal in which the very parties which were called upon to co-operate, were being accused of preparing for a new war. If such accusations were deleted real understanding and co-operation would be assisted.

21. The idea of co-operating in any way in aggression was hateful to his country, which was deeply devoted to peace. Noting that the North Atlantic Treaty had again been attacked at the previous meeting by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Andersen said that, from the very first, his Government had realized that the Treaty was not intended as an instrument of aggression, but solely to serve defensive purposes. Had there been the least suspicion that the aims and contents of the Treaty might be anything else, his Government would have refrained from adhering to it. Recalling that, on 24 September 1947, the League of Nations had passed a resolution denouncing war of aggression as a crime, he stated that his Government and the Danish people still took that stand. Denmark's adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty had been due to the tension prevailing between East and West. On the basis of the fundamental principles of democracy and personal liberty, the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty stood together and were prepared—should it prove necessary—to fight together in common self-defence.

22. Stating that his Government was convinced that membership in that Treaty was fully compatible with membership in the United Nations, Mr. Andersen stated that his delegation supported the draft resolution submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom. It was proper for the General Assembly to make that appeal, and he pointed to several paragraphs of the proposal with special satisfaction. Referring to the appeal to States to refrain from threats and use of force, he said that the so-called cold war was a scourge to the whole world. No people directly exposed to

² *Ibid.* 226th plenary meeting.

it could settle down and concentrate all efforts on peaceful tasks. He also wished to emphasize the references to removal of barriers to free exchange of information and ideas, and the call to the five permanent members of the Security Council. Referring to the last paragraph of the joint proposal, he said that he fully subscribed to the statement of the United Kingdom representative on 26 September¹ to the effect that a certain measure of sovereignty must be surrendered in order to achieve effective control of atomic weapons. It was no longer possible to recognize the concept of absolute sovereignty in international law. That must be admitted and realistic efforts must be made to create a feeling of security and safety for peoples of the world.

23. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) said that the Committee was certainly considering the most serious problem which confronted the world, namely that of world peace. The USSR draft resolution contained what he considered to be the most serious accusations ever made against a Member State. That accusation was directed against two great Powers to which the world owed a great deal. The General Assembly, which had been called the "town meeting of the world" and the "organ of human conscience", must establish the moral and real facts, bearing in mind the rights of international law.

24. He noted that the draft resolution of the Soviet Union contained two parts: the first appealed to the General Assembly as the main representative organization of the world conscience, and the second implied that the General Assembly and the United Nations were useless since peace could only be established by an agreement or pact to be concluded between the five great Powers. Dealing with the first part, Mr. Belaúnde stated that, from his knowledge and experience, the Western Powers, in particular France, the United Kingdom and the United States, had long shown a great spirit of peace. Perhaps the only accusation that could be levelled against them was that they had not taken all necessary precautions in confronting the fascist aggressor. Referring to the French confidence in the Maginot Line and to the re-occupation of the Rhineland, Mr. Belaúnde stated that the Second World War had been a defensive one for the Western Powers. Democracy based on truly ethical principles was bound to peace and could lean in no other direction. On the other hand, the imperialistic States, where religious, cultural and scientific elements were subjugated, necessarily tended towards war.

25. Referring to the statement made by the representative of Pakistan, he paid tribute to the evolution which had transformed the British Empire into the Commonwealth of Nations. That evolution, as was attested by those who had gained their independence, had been due to the United Kingdom's devotion to peace. Mr. Belaúnde also wished to state his appreciation of recent United States policy. Though the USSR representative had referred to the Spanish-speaking nations as part of the "mechanical majority", as he had once reminded Mr. Gromyko those nations participated in the debates and voted with complete independence. In that connexion he also wished to refer to the evolution which had come about in the relations between the American States during recent years. Thus the Monroe Doctrine, as seen

in connexion with the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, had developed into the basic principle which, in spite of economic differences and differences in power, placed all the countries of America on an equal basis. Mention might also be made of the principle of non-intervention which had been ratified at Bogotá as well as at earlier conferences. A further principle, that of consultations, had been introduced by Argentina. Mr. Belaúnde stated that the Lima Conference had approved the principle that international order was based on respect for the personality of the State, for its complete independence, its economic freedom and cultural life. After describing the development of that principle in relation to the development of the Agreement of Bogotá and the Charter of the Organization of American States, he said that it must be borne in mind that, in the event of a conflict, it was essential to have consultations and return to the *status quo*. The country which did not adopt peaceful measures should be considered as the aggressor. However, that question must be resolved by consultation and by an organization where the two-thirds majority vote prevailed and where there was no veto. In connexion, it must be recalled that the United States had renounced the interpretation of the Chapultepec Charter which offered it certain police powers in respect of the continent, and had accepted the method of consultation for arriving at solutions of difficult problems resulting from any conflict. Noting that the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro had been criticized, he stated that that Treaty was based on equality and the principle of mutual defence. The inter-American countries had become united with the objective of establishing lasting peace in the Americas and of co-operating towards the peaceful solution of all problems outside that continent.

26. Mr. Belaúnde pointed out that those historical processes made it clear that the United Kingdom and the United States were not guilty of the accusations which the USSR had advanced but for which it had offered no proof whatsoever. He believed that the North Atlantic Treaty, like the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, was the result of the exercise of the veto which had made the Charter in some respects useless. The veto had not been intended as a privilege; what had been approved at San Francisco was the rule of unanimity. The obligation of unanimity represented a great responsibility, that of the necessity of finding a solution. The veto right had been accepted on the premise that it would never be used unless it was absolutely essential and well founded. He recalled that he had made a statement to that effect at San Francisco.

27. In the same way as an individual liberty must be bound by the moral and juridical laws of a State, national sovereignty, to those who believed in a moral order over and above that of the State, must be subject to international law which itself was subject to the concept of justice. The principle of sovereignty could not be used as a taboo since it must be limited to some extent in the interests of maintaining peace and security. A State would be the more respected and would have the more influence if it accepted such necessary limitations voluntarily. Those considerations were especially important in connexion with the need for co-operation for international control of atomic energy. Transfer of control was essential, but the necessary limitations would not harm the sovereignty of State in any way.

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 229th plenary meeting.

28. Turning to the second aspect of the USSR draft resolution, Mr. Belaúnde regretted that one of the founders of the United Nations should state that peace would never be reached through the Security Council and that the Charter was a useless document. However, even though the Security Council was paralysed by the veto, it could never be said that the United Nations was bankrupt. The General Assembly would always have the final and moral force to clear up such situations as might be completely put aside in

the Security Council. The USSR proposal had all the characteristics of propaganda, and on that occasion, it had been overdone. Stating that the USSR must be made to realize that it had followed the wrong road, Mr. Belaúnde said he felt sure that the fog of suspicion which existed everywhere would clear up if full understanding were established by means of constant consultations.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.

THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Tuesday, 15 November 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

Acting Chairman: Mr. Jean CHAUVEL (France).

Chairman (later): Mr. Selim SARPER (Turkey).

Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (continued)

1. In the absence of Mr. Sarper, Mr. ARCE (Argentina) proposed that Mr. Chauvel, representative of France, should take the Chair temporarily.

It was so decided.

2. Mr. DJILAS (Yugoslavia) stated that, by using the expression "Tito clique" to describe the representatives of Yugoslavia, the representative of the Soviet Union had revealed the real attitude of his Government towards the independence and sovereignty of Yugoslavia. By the same token, he had insulted the Charter, which defined the rights and duties of sovereign countries, as well as the Yugoslav people. Indeed, if the Yugoslav Government did not enjoy the full support of a people that had paid a high price for its independence and was still defending it strenuously, it could never have resisted the external pressure that was being exercised against Yugoslavia. As the representative of Yugoslavia had stated in the general debate,¹ the USSR proposal (A/996) contained some positive factors. Any initiative, however inadequate and contradictory, that would enable a step forward to be made towards peace and security, the prohibition of atomic weapons and control of atomic energy, relations between the great Powers, and also international relations based upon the principle of the equality of States, would have the support of the Yugoslav delegation. But, the USSR proposal contained certain fundamental deficiencies, and the actions of the Soviet Union Government were incompatible with its utterances. The Yugoslav delegation could, therefore, but consider that proposal in the light of the policy that the Government of the Soviet Union was pursuing with regard to Yugoslavia.

3. The definition of war propaganda and of the principal causes of the danger of war given in the USSR proposal was incomplete and biased. In so far as words were concerned, all Governments were usually peaceful, and open incitement to war in newspapers and on the radio was infrequent. There were, however, many other forms of war propaganda: for instance, certain

Governments endeavoured to present the conditions now prevailing in certain countries in a completely false light, in order to "morally" justify the pressure exercised against those countries and with the view to their future subjugation. On the other hand, the establishment of blocs on ideological pretexts could really only serve hegemonic purposes, which gave rise to preparations for war and threats to peace. The Soviet Union Government could not, therefore, pretend to be the only Government which was not planning the enslavement of other countries, which had not established hostile blocs against other States and which had not prejudiced the cause of peace by its propaganda. It was true that in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries, war propaganda was widespread and at times reached the stage of calling for military measures against certain countries; but Soviet propaganda, on the other hand, apart from its intrinsic harm, was providing weapons for warmongers and anti-democratic elements in the other camp.

4. In the existing circumstances, the disputes leading to war were not ideological: capitalist States such as Germany, Italy and Japan had waged war simultaneously against capitalist and socialist States. The conflicts arose out of the policy of States which, irrespective of their social structure, persisted in their wish to subjugate other peoples, to destroy their independence and sovereignty and to ignore their right to be treated on a basis of equality. The threat to peace, therefore, lay in aggressive policy and methods, and not in ideological or social concepts. Whatever ideology might be proclaimed, any propaganda tending to subjugate a State was war propaganda, and constituted part of a hegemonic plan, fraught with crises and conflicts.

5. Mr. Vyshinsky had stated in the general debate that the Soviet Union adhered to the principle of international peace and co-operation. He had, however, refrained from mentioning non-interference in the internal affairs of States, the equal rights of small nations and the abolition of all discrimination, namely, those very principles which had previously been referred to as the basis of the Soviet Union's policy. Thus, Mr. Vyshinsky's speech of 14 November had made no contribution to the peace he had mentioned so often. Mr. Vyshinsky seemed to consider the problem of peace only from the point of view of the four great Powers. Although the

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, 228th plenary meeting.