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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Part Two

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In my report of 17 September 1994 (S/1994/1068), which gave a factual account of recent developments in Somalia in the political, security and humanitarian fields, I indicated that I would submit by mid-October a second part of the report covering my assessment of progress concerning national reconciliation and making recommendations regarding the future of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). I also indicated that the second part would draw upon the results of the visit to Somalia being undertaken at that time by Mr. Kofi A. Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations. The present report is submitted in pursuance of the above. It covers developments up to 11 October 1994.

2. In its resolution 946 (1994) of 30 September 1994, the Security Council, having noted my intention to submit to the Council a second part of the report along the lines stated above, decided to extend the mandate of UNOSOM II until 31 October 1994 and encouraged me to continue with and intensify preparations of contingency arrangements for the implementation of possible decisions, including withdrawal of UNOSOM II within a specified time-frame. The present report accordingly includes recommendations relating to such contingency arrangements.

II. VISIT TO SOMALIA OF THE UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

3. I asked the Under-Secretary-General to travel to Somalia to review with my Special Representative and the Force Commander of UNOSOM II the operation's needs during this critical phase and to assess progress concerning national reconciliation. He was accompanied by my Military Adviser, Major General J. M. G. Baril.

4. The Under-Secretary-General met with many Somali leaders, including General Mohamed Farah Aidid of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), Mr. Ali Mahdi, Spokesman for the group of 12 Somali factions, Mr. Abdurahman Ahmed Ali "Tur",

Chairman of the Somali National Movement (SNM), Imam Mohamoud Imam Omar, the Imam of Hirab, and General Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed "Liqliqato", Chairman of the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference. He stressed the importance of moving the process of political reconciliation forward in order to achieve the objectives of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993 (see S/26317) and the Nairobi Declaration of 24 March 1994 (S/1994/614, annex I). He emphasized that the resources of the international community were not unlimited and that the commitment to assist Somalia could not be sustained indefinitely if the Somali leaders were unable to reach a compromise and set their country on the road to peace, reconciliation and reconstruction.

5. The Under-Secretary-General reported to me that he had found the Somali leaders he met quite keen on the establishment of a transitional government to fill the political vacuum that had existed for so long in Somalia. He had stressed to them that the achievement of such a significant step in the process of political reconciliation could be brought about only by compromise and good will among the leaders in order to save their country from sliding back into the abyss. Any attempt by one person to dominate the Somali political scene could only lead to a repetition of the recent history, turmoil, suffering and destruction in Somalia. It was, therefore, imperative for all Somalis to work together to achieve political stability in their country.

6. The Somali leaders took the position that significant developments regarding the political process were taking place within the framework of national reconciliation. At that time, they expected, with the assistance of UNOSOM, to convene before the end of September the long-delayed preparatory meeting for the National Reconciliation Conference called for under the Nairobi Declaration of March 1994, to be followed by the National Reconciliation Conference in early October 1994. The Conference would be expected to conclude its deliberations during the third week of October. The Somali leaders further expected the National Reconciliation Conference to appoint a transitional government and to examine proposals relating to the establishment of a federal system of government. They indicated that that approach enjoyed wide support among the various political factions, including those from the north-west, as it would provide some autonomy to the regions of Somalia. Some Somali leaders also thought it desirable to have the transitional government establish a national Somali army. The Under-Secretary-General emphasized that, in order to achieve durable political reconciliation, the transitional government would have to be a broad-based one.

7. On the question of security of troops, the faction leaders were informed that attacks on United Nations peace-keepers and personnel, including staff of United Nations and non-governmental organizations, as well as United Nations property, would not be tolerated. The faction leaders were also informed that the United Nations expected them to take measures to deter militia under their control from mounting such attacks and to investigate the incidents and punish the perpetrators. The Under-Secretary-General also informed the leaders that UNOSOM would react vigorously against any attack or harassment directed against it and other international personnel and property.

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III. PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

8. During their meeting at Mogadishu on 16 September 1994, the leader of SNA, General Aidid, informed the Under-Secretary-General that it was now the view of SNA that the ongoing consultations within the Hawiye clan provided a sufficient basis for the political process in Somalia to proceed directly to the convening of the preparatory meeting at the end of September, to be followed immediately by the National Reconciliation Conference, which should not last more than three weeks. General Aidid contended that that new position of SNA made the convening of the Hawiye Reconciliation Conference unnecessary.

9. The reactions of the leaders of the other Hawiye subclans to this development have been mixed. Mr. Ali Mahdi, who was originally reluctant to participate in the clan conference but was eventually persuaded to do so, expressed his surprise. The Imam of Hirab, for his part, wanted more time for consultations. As at the time of writing of this report, the preparations for a Hawiye Reconciliation Conference, of which so much had been expected, had not begun. Given the hopes placed in the Hawiye Reconciliation Conference, the proposal to bypass it would seem to be a negative development.

10. As for the preparatory meeting and the National Reconciliation Conference, my Special Representative has reported that General Aidid is insisting on convening the former himself. For their part, Mr. Ali Mahdi and the group of 12 have insisted that invitations for both the preparatory meeting and the National Reconciliation Conference should be issued by my Special Representative and they have made it clear that they would not attend any meeting convened by General Aidid. However, as a result of extensive negotiations which Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) has held with both General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi, my Special Representative has recently been informed that General Aidid has now agreed in principle to UNOSOM issuing the invitations for the preparatory meeting. General Aidid's decision is expected to be confirmed in writing in the next few days. My Special Representative will continue to extend all possible support to the efforts of the Somali parties.

IV. HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

11. Humanitarian relief organizations have continued to provide support for the most vulnerable segments of the population wherever conditions of access and security allow. Under normal conditions of internal stability, security and governance, international assistance to Somalia would now be dedicated to recovery and reconstruction programmes. Unfortunately, in most regions rehabilitation interventions have had to favour ad hoc small-scale projects rather than district or regional reconstruction and development plans, because of continued insecurity and the lack of progress in the political reconciliation process. These conditions have also prevented the realization of expectations generated by the formation of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body and the United Nations Development Office. While some of the major humanitarian objectives have been met, any natural or man-made disaster in Somalia could result in a renewed massive emergency, given the absence of indigenous institutions with adequate organizational capacity and financial resources. In most regions, basic community services (health, water, education) would not be sustained

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without external support. It is essential, therefore, that relief programmes for the most vulnerable segments of the population, support for basic community services and food security and nutritional surveillance programmes be continued. In addition, the repatriation of some 500,000 refugees and the resettlement of up to 400,000 internally displaced persons must be tackled as soon as possible.

12. As I have indicated in previous reports, UNOSOM troops continue to fulfil an important role in providing security for humanitarian organizations and their activities. While the geographical area where they can support humanitarian operations has recently been reduced significantly, the protection of key installations, such as the seaports and airports of Mogadishu and Kismayo and the airport at Baidoa, and the provision of military escorts are of vital importance to continued humanitarian work in the central and southern parts of Somalia. The recent pattern of extending the UNOSOM mandate from month to month and the continuing uncertainty about the Mission's future have made planning difficult and have increased the vulnerability of relief personnel and supplies to attacks and looting.

13. At its most recent meeting, on 23 September 1994, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee expressed its concern about deteriorating security. It is the considered view of the representatives of United Nations organizations and other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations that, in the absence of a political settlement, humanitarian organizations will not be able to continue their current programmes without the support of UNOSOM troops. As the withdrawal of UNOSOM troops approaches, it will be increasingly difficult to provide the necessary protection for humanitarian programmes. In most areas, withdrawal would oblige humanitarian organizations to evacuate international relief personnel, though in some cases they might be able to return after negotiating security and operational arrangements with local authorities. However, experience has shown that such ad hoc arrangements can be extremely tenuous. Even if they were to hold, access and delivery problems would probably be experienced when key installations and entry points were no longer secured.

V. PARAMETERS FOR UNOSOM REDUCTION AND WITHDRAWAL

14. It will be recalled that, following the completion of the operation undertaken by the Unified Task Force and the transition from that Force to UNOSOM II in May 1993, it was envisaged that the international community's remaining tasks would be carried out within a specified period of time. The Somali political organizations and factions had committed themselves in the Addis Ababa Agreement to a political process which would run for a two-year transitional period, effective from the date of signature of the Agreement, that is until March 1995. During this period, transitional governing mechanisms would be established whose primary objective would be to foster the reconciliation of the Somali people by building up its democratic institutions, restoring the machinery of government at the national, regional and district levels, completing disarmament and launching a programme of rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic infrastructure. In the Addis Ababa Agreement, the leaders of the Somali organizations and factions had called on the United Nations and the international community to assist the people of Somalia in achieving those objectives. When the Security Council decided to accept the

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Somali leaders' call for assistance, it was envisaged that the two-year transitional period would be the time-frame within which the mission of UNOSOM II would be completed. This objective was reaffirmed in Council resolutions 865 (1993), 897 (1994) and 923 (1994).

15. As endorsed by the Security Council in a presidential statement of 12 August 1994, a gradual reduction of UNOSOM's strength is under way. By the end of October 1994, its force level will have been reduced to 15,000 all ranks. The deployment and capabilities of the reduced force will be concentrated in three major centres: Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu. It will maintain a mobile reserve unit to respond to emergencies. In the Force Commander's judgement, the 15,000-troop strength is the minimum viable force level for continued implementation of the present mandate and the initiation and execution of a safe and orderly closure of the mission if this is decided by the Security Council.

16. With respect to security during the period of withdrawal, recent incidents at Belet Uen and Balad, in which UNOSOM personnel were attacked and assets looted, indicate that the withdrawal of UNOSOM troops and assets could be difficult and dangerous in some areas. In the worst-case scenario, UNOSOM forces would have to withdraw in face of hostile action by Somali factions and/or widespread banditry, which would prevent the use of commercial air and sea transport. In order to cope with this threat, it will be necessary for Member States to provide UNOSOM with the support required to extricate personnel and equipment safely from Somalia. I have accordingly approached several Member States who possess the naval and air assets required to reinforce UNOSOM during the critical withdrawal phase, whether or not such withdrawal is carried out under hostile conditions. Such assets would have to include naval elements with fire support and sealift capabilities, as well as military aircraft. In this connection, the Government of Italy has informed me that it is prepared to make available five to six ships and 300 to 400 marines for that purpose. I am expecting further contributions from other Governments. While hoping that its withdrawal can proceed smoothly, UNOSOM must prepare for the worst-case scenario. It is my estimation that a secure and orderly withdrawal of UNOSOM troops and assets will require a period of between 60 and 120 days, depending on security conditions.

17. Every effort will need to be made to ensure that the withdrawal of the Force is properly coordinated under the authority of the Secretary-General. The security of the personnel of United Nations and non-governmental organizations, as well as those of UNOSOM, will depend critically on an orderly and well-coordinated process, with a single, clear and undisputed chain of command.

18. Lastly, the manner in which a final withdrawal of UNOSOM II is executed will have important implications for the future deployment of United Nations forces on peace-keeping missions.

VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

19. The General Assembly, by its resolution 48/239 of 24 March 1994, provided financial resources for the maintenance of UNOSOM II through the period ending 30 September 1994 at a monthly rate of \$77,442,517 gross (\$76,382,417 net).

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Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the current mandate of UNOSOM II in accordance with the recommendations set out in paragraph 22 below, I shall request the General Assembly at its current session to make adequate financial provisions for the extension of UNOSOM II.

20. In this context, it may be useful to recall that the Security Council had agreed to the establishment of the Trust Fund for Somalia pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) and maintained in resolution 814 (1993) for the re-establishment of the Somali judicial and penal systems and the Somali police. The total cost of this programme is estimated at \$19.08 million, while cash contributions of only \$8.08 million have been received in respect of the police training programme. It is anticipated that the shortfall in funding the programme would amount to approximately \$11 million by March 1995. In view of the Organization's inability to attract adequate voluntary contributions for the Trust Fund, it may be necessary to utilize resources provided for UNOSOM from assessed contributions to meet the urgent needs of the police training programme.

VII. OBSERVATIONS

21. In my recent reports to the Council, I have repeatedly had to state that the process of national reconciliation has not kept pace with achievements in the humanitarian area and that security has been progressively deteriorating, especially at Mogadishu. The commitments that the Somali leaders had entered into under the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Nairobi Declaration were not being carried out. UNOSOM's goal of assisting the process of political reconciliation was becoming ever more elusive, while the burden and cost of maintaining a high troop level was proving increasingly difficult for Member States to justify.

22. The protracted political impasse has created a vacuum of civil authority and of governmental structure, leaving the United Nations with no function to build on in its efforts to help Somalia emerge from its present chaotic condition. The presence of UNOSOM II troops has had limited impact on the peace process and limited impact on security in the face of continuing interclan fighting and banditry. The Council has already decided that the mission of UNOSOM II should end in March 1995. If the Council maintains this decision and all UNOSOM II forces and assets have to be withdrawn, time will be required to ensure that the withdrawal takes place in a secure, orderly and expeditious manner. As indicated in paragraph 16 above, this may take as long as 120 days. It may also require extensive air and sea support from Member States and it is important that the availability of such support is confirmed as soon as possible. In the light of these considerations, I recommend that the Security Council extend the Mission's mandate until 31 March 1995.

23. It should not, however, be assumed that there will be no progress in the process of national reconciliation. On the contrary, I have instructed my Special Representative that, during the new mandate period which I hope the Security Council will approve, he should maintain to the full his efforts to help the Somali leaders achieve national reconciliation, at least to the extent of agreeing to establish a transitional government. In the event that progress can be made in this direction, I shall not hesitate to revert to the Security Council with recommendations for the continuation of some United Nations

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presence in Somalia beyond March 1995 if that is justified by the overriding objective of restoring effective government.

24. It will be especially important to maintain unified command and control if the withdrawal of UNOSOM forces from Somalia has to be carried out in hostile circumstances. Any unilateral attempt by troop-contributing States to protect or extricate their contingents will be more likely to deepen the problem than to solve it. In such delicate situations, a breakdown in command and control can prove catastrophic. The Council is accordingly asked to urge troop-contributing States to respect the unity of command and control under the authority of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the UNOSOM Force Commander.

25. The five-month extension here recommended will give the Somali leaders time to begin consolidating any positive achievements which may arise from the ongoing process of political reconciliation. I hope that the Somali leaders, faced by a strong and overwhelming desire on the part of the people of Somalia for peace and reconciliation, will finally find the inspiration to make peace. There is no other solution for the people of Somalia after the years of civil strife which have brought so much suffering and which have frustrated the efforts of the international community to help restore stability.

26. The international community has provided generous assistance to help overcome the worst aspects of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. While humanitarian organizations are committed to continuing their operations, it must be made clear that they can only do their work if adequate security arrangements are in place. The Somali leaders will bear the ultimate responsibility for the safety of international and national relief personnel and their assets both during and after the withdrawal of UNOSOM troops. If, in the coming weeks and months, agreement were to be reached on the establishment of a transitional government and civil and administrative institutions, the work of humanitarian organizations and the much delayed transition to reconstruction and development would be facilitated. This positive scenario, however, remains for the time being only a hope and humanitarian organizations will continue to rely on the support of UNOSOM troops. It cannot be excluded that, following the withdrawal of UNOSOM, Somalia will plunge again into anarchy and chaos, the responsibility for which will rest squarely on the shoulders of its leaders.

27. The establishment of a viable and acceptable peace can only come from the Somalis themselves. The international community cannot impose peace on the people of Somalia; it can only assist in the process of re-establishing peace and security there. Such assistance, however, cannot be sustained indefinitely. But reaffirmation of the Security Council's decision that the UNOSOM II mandate should end in March 1995 will not mean United Nations abandonment of Somalia. Should the Somali authorities succeed in creating and maintaining favourable security conditions, the United Nations and the international community can continue to play a role in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Somalia, thus consolidating the achievements of the Unified Task Force and UNOSOM. The United Nations could also retain a certain presence after the withdrawal of UNOSOM, to continue assisting the Somali political organizations and factions in the process of national reconciliation. However, the feasibility of international assistance of this kind will be very much dependent on the degree of security prevailing in the country.
