

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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SUB-COMMITTEE ON A TREATY FOR THE  
DISCONTINUANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 24 April 1962, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. GODBER

(United Kingdom)

LIST OF MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS PRESENT AT THE TABLE

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. D.N. BRINSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV  
Mr. V.F. SHUSTOV

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. D.E. MARK

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the tenth meeting of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.

In my capacity as Chairman I think it is my duty to remind my colleagues, and indeed myself, that we have been charged by the plenary Conference with the task of continuing our discussions on this matter, and that our colleagues in the plenary Conference will be most anxious to read of such developments as may take place here.

In my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom I should like to make one or two short opening remarks, and hope to have the opportunity of making some further comments later.

If my colleagues will bear with me, I should like to sum up the position as I see it at this moment. We had considerable discussion in the plenary meeting on Friday, following our last meeting here on Thursday afternoon (ENDC/SC.I/PV.9), on the important memorandum (ENDC/28) submitted by the eight neutral countries. There was a good deal of talk, particularly from our Soviet colleagues, about whether this was "a basis for discussion", "the basis for discussion", "a matter for discussion", and so forth. I do not propose to spend time talking about that this afternoon. I think that is unprofitable. I want actually to discuss the document. I want to see where it can help us forward. That, in fact, was my position previously, and it is now. I believe we must not get bogged down in procedural points. I believe we have got to look at these proposals and see whether they will help us. That is what I want to do.

I want to clarify one point. In his last intervention in the plenary meeting on Friday, Mr. Zorin said that on the previous day I had accepted the proposals of the neutral countries, but on the assumption that the principles to which I had referred were accepted (ENDC/PV.25, page 35). He seemed to think that in some sense I was placing a limit on my acceptance of the proposals. After that intervention by Mr. Zorin in the plenary meeting, I reminded the Conference (ibid., page 41) of the three principles that I had enumerated at the meeting on Thursday. I should now like to repeat those three principles, as I enumerated them at the plenary meeting on Friday morning.

"First, it seems to me that these new proposals do accept the principle of an international network of detection posts ..."

"Secondly, it did seem to us that the memorandum accepted the principle of the establishment of an international body ..."

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

"The third principle ... is as follows:

"Then ... there is the vital question of inspection. Here it seemed to us that the memorandum did accept the principle of international inspection ..." (ibid., page 41)

Those were the three principles by which I qualified my acceptance of the document on Thursday and which I reiterated on Friday.

On Friday I went on to say:

"I should have thought those principles were inherent in the document. Therefore, if Mr. Zorin does not think they are inherent in the document, that is indeed an important statement." (ibid.)

As Mr. Zorin said nothing in reply, I am assuming that he agrees that those three principles are inherent in the document. If my Soviet colleague this afternoon does not agree that these three principles are inherent in the document, I hope he will say so, because this is where ambiguity could be detrimental to what I am seeking to do, which is to carry us forward in our discussion. It would be very helpful if our Soviet colleague could let us know whether, in fact, he does accept without reservation those three very simple principles.

At this stage I want to say a word about one of those principles, and here I am trying to find a way forward in negotiation. After the sterile discussions we have had recently, surely the best way to make progress is to choose the one principle which is most likely to command general agreement. I would call my colleagues' attention to the principle which seems to be very clearly set forth in the document: the establishment of an international commission. What does the document say in regard to this? It states:

"Furthermore, the feasibility of constituting by agreement an International Commission, consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries together with the appropriate staff might be considered." (ENDC/28, paragraph 4)

It goes on to say that this commission should be entrusted with certain tasks, such as collecting the data that is provided and interpreting and analysing it; and then it goes forward into the other processes. What I am speaking about at this moment is the question of this international body itself. I should have thought that on this, at least, we could all agree. I hope I am right if I suggest that the Soviet Union also is prepared to envisage an international body which would process the information obtained from detection systems, whether they were national or international, and would draw appropriate conclusions from them.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

If I am right in thinking that we have common ground here, perhaps this is where we can develop detailed negotiation once more in this Sub-Committee. We could discuss whether this international body should be composed entirely of scientists, or whether it should also include government representatives, as we for our part have always felt it should do. We should have to think how large this body should be. We ought to consider its composition from the point of view of the nationality of its members. And of course we should want to discuss its functions in detail. This would seem to me to be a helpful and fruitful way of proceeding; but this is merely a suggestion I am putting forward in order to get some real negotiation going here again. Frankly, I am tired of seeing us sitting round this table making set speeches at one another. I want to get into negotiation again, and I am very ready to use this joint memorandum of the eight neutral nations to help us forward in this task.

Before we conclude today's meeting I may wish to discuss one of the other principles. But I am trying to get discussion going at this stage by taking the joint memorandum of the eight neutral nations as a basis and seeking points of agreement so that we can make progress once more in this field.

I would leave it there at this moment and hope that my colleagues will be able to respond. I appeal particularly to my Soviet colleague now to enter into real negotiation again here, and to respond by telling us what he thinks in regard to the principles I have enumerated -- or to the other principle. We should build on this and not waste time talking about the basis on which we accept the document. We should use it for real negotiation, which is what the eight neutral nations asked us to do.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The United Kingdom representative has just summed up the present situation of our talks on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, now that the eight non-aligned countries' proposals (ENDC/28) have been discussed at meetings of the plenary Committee and the Sub-Committee. In doing so he dealt with the substance of the matter. It seems advisable that I also should sum up the position as representative of the Soviet Union.

As we understand it, we must now look for a mutually-acceptable solution based on the proposals submitted for our consideration by the eight non-aligned States for that purpose.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

It will, of course, not help matters if each of us tries to return to his old position. In order to advance the talks we must start by basing them on the specific proposals of the eight non-aligned States. That will be our starting point.

At first sight it looks as if both the Soviet Union and the Western Powers regarded the proposals of the non-aligned States as compromise proposals, and were ready to take them as a basis for further negotiations. Mr. Godber has just given us further confirmation of this. The representatives of the Western Powers have said so in as many words at previous meetings of the Committee and the Sub-Committee.

Nevertheless, I venture to quote from the speech made by Mr. Godber at the meeting of the Sub-Committee on 19 April. Comparing the respective positions of the Soviet Union and the Western Powers in the talks on the discontinuance of tests, he said:

"... We have two extreme positions here". (ENDC/SC.I/PV.9, page 5)

One position is that of the Western Powers, the other that of the Soviet Union. He went on to explain that -

"Anything between those two positions is a compromise". (ibid.)

He gave a quite definite opinion on the proposals of the eight non-aligned countries, and said:

"The proposals of our eight non-aligned colleagues were intended as a compromise .... between these two clearly-defined positions". (ibid.)

He also said that a solution of the problem of discontinuance of tests -

"... has to be based on a compromise of some sort." (ibid.)

At the 25th plenary meeting of the Committee Mr. Dean, the United States representative, answered in the following words the Soviet representative's question whether the United States would accept the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for further talks:

"The United States is quite prepared to accept the eight-nation memorandum - indeed, we welcome it - as one of the bases ...". (ENDC/PV.25, page 21)

Those were Mr. Dean's words.

At the same meeting the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, said the same thing several times. Moreover, according to a Press Association report, when he returned to London during the Easter recess he said that the non-aligned States' plan lacked precision but nevertheless called it a good basis for the talks. I will say frankly that we find this statement of Mr. Godber's encouraging.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Let us see now just what the compromise put forward by the eight non-aligned countries consists of. Mr. Godber said that the compromise would be between the two extreme positions. We have in fact before us two extreme positions. One of these is the position on which the Western Powers stand and which is defined in their draft treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests of 18 April 1961 (GEN/DNT/110), as subsequently amended by them (ENDC/9). The other position is that on which the Soviet Union stands, and which is defined in its draft agreement of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11).

What is there extreme about these two positions?

First: the United States and the United Kingdom require that the treaty shall lay down a definite quota of twelve to twenty inspections a year. The Soviet proposal of 28 November 1961 does not provide for any inspection. Those are two extreme positions.

In their memorandum the eight non-aligned countries permit visits to the territory of States where a suspicious and significant event has been located, or on-site verification. For that purpose the parties to the treaty could invite the international commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt (ENDC/28, paragraph 4).

This proposal of the non-aligned countries is, of course, a compromise between the two extreme positions - that of the Western Powers and that of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union accepts this compromise proposal of the non-aligned States. Do the Western Powers also accept it? It is important for us to know that. If they accept it, then we may be considered to have agreed on one of the most important compromise proposals made by the non-aligned States, and we can move ahead.

The second matter is the international authority. The Western Powers' draft treaty provides for the establishment of an international control organization headed by a control commission directing a wide system of international control posts. The Soviet draft agreement does not provide for any international authority, since compliance with commitments is to be verified by each party, using its own national system of detection of nuclear and thermonuclear explosions, not by an international authority. There you have two more extreme positions.

The eight non-aligned countries propose in their memorandum the establishment of an international commission consisting of a limited number of highly-qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries, together with the appropriate

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

staff. This commission should be entrusted with the tasks of processing all data received from the national observation posts, and consult with States parties to the agreement on measures for clarifying and assessing a suspicious event.

This proposal of the non-aligned countries, as you see, is also a compromise between the Soviet Union's position and that of the Western Powers. We accept the compromise proposal of the non-aligned countries. It is important to us to know whether the Western Powers are willing to accept it. If they are, then we can settle for a second very important compromise proposal put forward by the non-aligned States.

Furthermore, the non-aligned countries propose, in order to provide continuous observation and effective control, that, in addition to the existing national observation posts, new national posts should be established by agreement and that the data from these posts would also be supplied to the international commission for processing. The Soviet Union has likewise no objection to this proposal by the non-aligned countries; nor do we think that the Western Powers can object to it.

These are the fundamental compromise proposals of the eight non-aligned countries contained in their memorandum of 16 April 1962. The Soviet Government declared officially on 19 April (ENDC/32) that it was prepared to examine the proposals set forth in the memorandum of the non-aligned countries as a basis for further talks.

We are now awaiting a completely firm answer from the Western Powers to the question whether they accept these compromise proposals of the eight non-aligned countries as a basis for further talks.

If Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber were sincere when they stated at the 25th plenary meeting of the Committee that they agreed to examine the non-aligned countries' compromise proposals as one of the bases for further talks, and if the Western Powers are not going to try to cling to their old positions, as the representatives of India and other non-aligned countries have earnestly implored both them and us not to do, then the way to a rapid agreement between us will be opened. We very much hope it will be.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Before asking whether any other representative would like to speak, perhaps I should take up one point that the representative of the Soviet Union made, because there seems to be a misunderstanding based on the quotation which he read out with regard to my remarks the other day. I think it is very important that this should be correctly understood.



(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

The representative of the Soviet Union referred to the remarks which I first made in our meeting of the Sub-Committee on Thursday, 19 April (ENDC/SC.I/PV.9), which I repeated at the plenary meeting of the Conference on Friday, 20 April (ENDC/PV.25, page 5), and which the representative of India did me the honour also of repeating at the plenary meeting on Friday (ibid., page 45). I am referring to my statement with respect to the question of the two extreme positions.

Now our Soviet colleague is usually so precise in what he says that I was a little surprised to find that in this case he was perhaps not quite clear about what I said, or perhaps did not wish to be wholly clear on one aspect of what I said. What I said, quite clearly, was:

"It seems to me that we have two extreme positions here. We have the position set out in the experts' report of 1958<sup>1/</sup> on which we all based our discussions up until 28 November 1961. The experts' report of 1958 laid down that every disputed event should be inspected, that every event of which there was not certainty should be inspected. That is at one end of the scale. At the other end of the scale are the Soviet Union proposals of 28 November 1961 that no event should be inspected under any circumstances. If one accepts that these are the two extreme positions, then anything between those two positions is a compromise." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.9, page 5)

However, when I listened to the representative of the Soviet Union, he sought, unless I misunderstood him, to take the Soviet position of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11) as one extreme, which was perfectly correct, but at the other extreme he took the Western position of 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9), which was something quite different from the experts' report of 1958<sup>1/</sup>. The point was that the experts' report called for all events to be inspected, the Soviet position called for no event to be inspected, and I said that anything between was a compromise: the compromise between the two positions would be something that would call for some events to be inspected.

That seems to be borne out clearly in what I said, and it seems to have been endorsed by what the representative of India said at the plenary meeting on Friday. I am merely making the point now because I do not wish there to be any misunderstanding in relation to this statement. I hope my Soviet colleague will note the point.

That is all that I feel I can say at this moment. I would certainly hope to have the opportunity of returning later to some of the interesting points arising out of the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, you quoted yourself just now in order to correct what I said. Will you please tell me the number and page of the record?

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): The difficulty is that the statement has been quoted so many times that it can be seen in so many different places. The original statement appears in the verbatim record of the ninth meeting of the Sub-Committee, document ENDC/SC.I/PV.9, prov. page 6 of the English text. I quoted from it at length at Friday's plenary meeting of the Conference (ENDC/PV.25, page 28), and the representative of India also quoted from it at some length (ibid., page 45). It has been repeated several times. I hope this reference will help the representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Perhaps we might continue clarifying this text. I think I quoted you quite accurately. I do not understand what you found inaccurate in my account of what you said.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): What I found inaccurate was that the representative of the Soviet Union, after referring to my statement, went on to say: Yes, we have two extreme positions -- the Soviet position of 28 November 1961 and the Western position of 18 April 1961. That is what I understood him to say. The representative of the Soviet Union was basing his argument on my comments in which I did not refer to the 18 April 1961 position. I referred to the position under the experts' report of 1958, which said that all events would have to be inspected.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): When we speak of the two positions, we mean the positions adopted by the countries, the States. The position of your State and that of the United States are reflected and set out in your draft treaty of 18 April, not in the experts' report at all. If we are speaking of the positions, I am right, and Mr. Godber was wrong in calling the experts' report your position; for your position is not defined in the experts' report, but in your draft treaty of 18 April, as later amended. I consider that I was right to refer to that document and not to the experts' report.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I do not wish to pursue this point much further; to do so would be discourteous to our United States colleague. But in fact it is abundantly clear that I referred to two extreme positions, and I spelled out what those were. It is perfectly proper for the representative of the Soviet Union, if he wishes to do so, to refer to the position of the Western Powers in its draft treaty, but he is not entitled to use my words "extreme position" as explaining the Western position of 18 April 1961. That was the Western compromise position and not the extreme position. In other words, the representative of the Soviet Union is not entitled to try to put words into my mouth with regard to the "extreme position". He may interpret it, of course, however he wishes, but he should not assume, or seek to assume, that he is interpreting what I have said in using the words "extreme position", because I used them in relation to the experts' report of 1958 and not in relation to the draft treaty of 18 April 1961. I hope this is now clear.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): When you talk of extreme positions you mean, not the extreme positions between the States on the two sides represented here, but the extreme position between the experts' report, which is neither your side's nor our side's position, and the Soviet Union proposal. You are dealing with the question at different levels. If we are making comparisons or distinctions, we must compare comparable things. We must compare positions of States. But you were comparing the experts' report with the Soviet Union's proposal of 28 November, and the two are not comparable. For the purposes of comparison we must take your present position and our present position. Those can be compared.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I must point out, for the sake of clarity, that I am entitled to compare what I like with what I like, and in my speech I made it abundantly clear that I was referring to two extreme positions. I did not at all say that one was my position; I was taking two extreme positions and pointing out that one involved inspection of every event, the other of none, and that therefore a compromise must be between those two. If the Soviet representative wishes to refer to the two positions of the two delegations prior to the present time, he is fully entitled to do so, but not to use my words from last Thursday in support of his argument. I hope that is clear.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened with the greatest interest to the statements made today by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. I shall refer to them later in my remarks.

In our discussion of a test ban treaty at the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth plenary meetings, we all agreed that we should give earnest consideration to the eight-Power memorandum submitted to us with respect to a proposed nuclear test ban treaty. Each side, I submit, has demonstrated by this act a certain spirit of initiative and a willingness to consider the ideas of the eight Powers represented at our Conference. My delegation intends to approach the coming discussion in that same spirit, in the hope that this objective discussion will lead us to a mutually-acceptable solution of the problem of a nuclear test ban treaty.

We are indeed gratified that the Soviet delegation has apparently shown some willingness to re-examine its own position on this matter. Nevertheless, in the view of my delegation, much exploration of the Soviet position will be required before the extent and scope of any real change in the Soviet position which this may involve becomes apparent.

I believe it is now clear to all that the two sides have been unable to reach an agreement on the former bases of our negotiations. This does not mean, I submit, that we should or could abandon all of our former carefully and patiently worked out scientific and technical ideas about location and spacing of control posts and detection and identification with respect to a nuclear test ban treaty. The acceptance of the eight-Power memorandum as one of the bases, but not the exclusive basis, for negotiations means, however, I take it, that we are going to begin in an objective spirit to explore in detail one of our bases for negotiation.

In this respect, therefore, the joint memorandum of the eight Powers has brought a new approach to our negotiations. Much of that memorandum of course remains to be clarified and explored. My delegation conceives of such exploration and clarification as the next major task in our negotiations. Through this process -- and I say this hopefully -- we may soon reach the point where detailed negotiations can take place.

What Mr. Zorin said at the last plenary meeting, when he accepted the joint memorandum as one of the bases for negotiations, leads me to believe that he in part shares this view. If this is true -- and I hope it is --, we shall have no difficulty in proceeding in our work of clarification and elaboration and further study of the joint memorandum. This is exactly the process which my delegation

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believes the eight nations had in mind when they made their suggestions. We must of course examine with great care the document before us, learning which of its elements both of our sides can accept and which of its elements can be built upon and elaborated to reach our goal of an adequate and effective nuclear test ban treaty. In the course of exploring the joint memorandum I will want to discuss with my Soviet colleague certain of its elements upon which the views of the Soviet delegation, so far at least, are not altogether clear. I shall by the same token be prepared at this and at our future meetings to explain in detail the position of my Government on the various elements of the joint memorandum. I sincerely hope that my Soviet colleague will, as soon as possible, embark on constructive and informal questioning and exchanges so that the process of making the positions of both sides clear can begin.

I want to turn now to the joint memorandum itself. To begin with, what precisely is it that the eight nations are trying to suggest to us? My answer to this question is that after careful study there would appear to be four main elements in the joint memorandum which will have to be considered in working out an adequate and effective nuclear test ban agreement. These four elements are in fact basic principles which underlie the means for assuring the observance of a nuclear test ban.

I believe the eight Powers have told us that in any verification arrangements we ought to provide for:

- (1) Effective detection through an international network of control posts which may be based on existing national systems, supplemented by international stations or a combination of both;
- (2) An international organ or body whose duty will be receiving and processing data from the control posts, and thereafter taking action on the basis of the data it receives and analyses from this new system of control posts;
- (3) Some effective means of establishing the identity of any detected event where data from the detection apparatus are in themselves inadequate to determine whether a nuclear explosion or a natural event took place; and
- (4) An obligation -- I repeat, obligation -- on the part of the country on whose territory the unidentified event has taken place to allow this international organ or body the right to identify the event in

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the only way possible -- that is, in the only way at present known to science -- by sending to the territory of the country where the unidentified event has taken place an objective, scientific inspection team which will report back to that international organ or body.

These last two principles are of course particularly important when we consider the problem of the identification of underground or underwater events. I believe that both sides should be able to agree that these are the basic principles underlying the suggestion of the eight nations and the basic principles to which we must now address ourselves. They are certainly familiar principles, but our task now is to re-examine them in the light of the terms of the joint memorandum to see if we can find answers to the questions as to their exact meaning which have arisen and will arise. However, agreement on the basic principles I have mentioned only points the way towards the specific modalities that will have to be worked out in order to set up such a system of verification. I believe we should also now explore in more detail, on the basis of the principles in the eight-Power memorandum, certain of the elements which will have to be considered when they are put to work in a verification system. It is on this point that science and technology can come to our aid in our efforts to design, build, install and operate, at least in part, an adequate verification system. We realize that the eight nations must have had certain scientific technical ideas in mind when they conceived the broad outline of a verification system. For our part, we will certainly look forward to their participation with us in further exploration of those areas as we proceed with our negotiations.

I would now like to discuss very briefly some of my delegation's ideas with regard to each of the four basic principles. First let me consider the international control post network. To begin with, I would like to point out very briefly some of the elements which my delegation believes should be taken into account in the design of a network of control posts for the detection and identification of nuclear tests. In the first instance, an effective system should be capable of detecting a sufficiently large number of tests in all environments -- outer space, high altitude or the atmosphere, on or under water and underground -- to give real assurance that a potential violator will be deterred from undertaking clandestine tests. As I have said in the past, the United States has an open mind on this subject, within the limits of available objective scientific data. We are willing to re-examine with all or any of the participants in the Eighteen Nation Committee -- including

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such representatives of the eight nations as may wish to participate or as may be designated -- the type, manning, location and equipping of a control post network which will give all of us reasonable assurance that nuclear tests, wherever conducted, will be detected.

Now I would like to say a very brief word about national detection systems. As is well known, the United States has always believed that internationally manned control posts would provide the most impartial and at the same time the most scientific and trustworthy arrangements for the collection and transmission of data on nuclear tests. Nevertheless, in the interest of trying to conclude a nuclear test ban treaty with our Soviet colleagues, we are quite willing to examine carefully, objectively and scientifically the character of the system upon which we might eventually be able to agree. All we ask is that it be effective in detecting, locating and, where possible in the atmosphere, outer space, under water or underground, identifying nuclear explosions to ensure that testing has in fact ceased. The problems of standardized instrumentation, the spacing of control posts and the reliability of data-reporting have always appeared to us to be greatly simplified and made more objective and scientific by an internationally built and manned system.

However, it may well be scientifically and administratively possible to construct, on the basis of the systems existing in many countries of the world, an international, supplemented or integrated control post network which will give the necessary degree of assurance and which, through mechanical, technical and other safeguards, will also provide reliable, scientific and trustworthy data. We are willing to examine this question. There are many aspects of this problem which will need to be explored carefully. I can only say that we are certainly prepared to go into all suggestions and to undertake in concert with others the objective technical examinations which may be required.

I turn now to a second point which appears to be implicit, if not explicit, in the joint memorandum. This is the principle of an international scientific or headquarters body which would process and analyse data reported to it by the control stations. Here is an area on which there appears to have been a large measure of agreement between the West and the Soviet Union in the past and upon which I hope we may quickly be able to build in drafting our nuclear test ban treaty. It is, it seems to me, a point of principle with which, in our last two plenary meetings, Mr. Zorin was apparently in agreement. What is required in our view is the creation of an international body which will be:

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(1) armed with an agreed and objective series of criteria against which to check recorded data from properly placed control posts with appropriate instrumentation in order to determine, wherever possible, that a nuclear test has or has not taken place;

(2) provided with agreed criteria with which to isolate those data which are only indicative of the fact that a test could have taken place, where it is not possible by the use of data from detection systems instrumentation to ensure that a test has not taken place;

(3) equipped with procedures and methods to ensure that the data showing testing could have taken place are adequately investigated so that the true nature of a particular unidentified event is scientifically established; and

(4) staffed with impartial, scientific personnel so that all participating States can have confidence and trust in the objectivity of whatever conclusions the body may draw.

A third point which will require elaboration will be the solution to the problem of identifying those events or happenings which are detected but which cannot be identified by the control post network. Here, the international control body should be able to perform a useful function by exercising its impartial and scientific judgement as to what events require identification.

I believe there are no divergent views among us on the necessity for determining whether a nuclear test has taken place. In that one aspect of the problem I certainly hope that all members of this Conference are in agreement.

But the process of establishing the nature of any particular detected event has been the subject of differing views on both sides. My delegation has not asked and does not now ask that all questionable events be identified. It does hold the view, however, that there must be a capability to identify positively a limited number of doubtful cases. We defer to science and to technology to tell us how that identification can be accomplished. We have, however, felt that the manner of selecting cases for identification and the number so selected should be determined scientifically and objectively, in such a way that a potential violator would be deterred from conducting clandestine tests.

We accept the fact that the joint memorandum is put forward as one of the bases for our negotiation, as a political compromise in this respect, the details of which are left for the Sub-Committee to work out. We feel, nevertheless, that any political compromise on this subject must accomplish the single objective of



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stopping all tests for ever and that there must not be constant suspicion that tests are taking place that cannot be detected and identified. This is the reason we believe that inspection and control should provide a reasonable degree of deterrence. For, if we accepted an inspection arrangement which allowed clandestine tests to proceed without a reasonable chance of discovery, we would be tossing aside the substance of an agreement for the mere shadow of it. This would neither satisfy nor reassure the people of the world of our most serious intention to stop all nuclear tests in all environments.

In this respect my delegation shares with Mr. Gromyko the view that we should not be called upon to trust the word of any one State. I think all the eight nations are agreed in this; otherwise they would not have provided for a system of verification in the joint memorandum.

To recapitulate the position of the United States on the question of on-site inspection is as follows: (1) We believe that certain events will be detected but remain unidentified. (2) We believe these events must be identified in sufficient numbers to ensure that a test ban treaty is not being violated. (3) As of the present, our best scientific advice is that on-site inspection of unidentified events is the only way in which positive identification can be assured. (4) But we have an open mind on the subject and we are willing to see this identification carried out by any means demonstrated to be scientifically feasible and effective. (5) We believe that, in the absence of other proven scientific methods, a test ban treaty should include an obligation -- I repeat, an obligation -- on the part of the participating States to permit an effective number of inspections on the basis of agreed criteria to identify such detected events. We also believe that adequate identification is fully provided for by the joint memorandum, and we hope that the Soviet Union will feel itself guided by the joint memorandum in this respect as well.

Let me conclude my remarks by summarizing the views of the United States on the issues contained in the joint memorandum:

(1) There appears to be agreement now between the two sides that the joint memorandum can be an effective and useful document and that it can be one of the bases, but not an exclusive basis, for further negotiations.

(2) There is also, on the basis of the joint memorandum, apparent recognition of: (a) the necessity of an international network of control posts; (b) the requirement for an international scientific headquarters body; and (c) the need for an effective means to identify certain events which might be nuclear explosions.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The United States delegation will approach these negotiations for a nuclear test ban in a spirit of objective scientific examination.

My delegation intends and is indeed anxious to explore, on the basis of the joint memorandum, any scientific aspects of the verification system which may be required. Much remains to be done in our work of concluding a test ban. The Soviet Union has promised speedy agreement on the basis of the principles set forth by the eight new members of this Conference. I await with real interest what the Soviet Union will be able to tell us in this respect. I say with regret that I do not think that we have heard this as yet from our Soviet colleague. I can assure the Soviet representative that the United States stands ready to continue our work to reach a conclusive agreement in the same spirit of give-and-take negotiations with which we have always faced the problem of concluding an effective nuclear test ban treaty.

I come now to a point with which I believe that you, Mr. Chairman, have already dealt adequately and effectively. After the plenary meeting last Friday, I wanted to be sure that the representative of India had correctly understood the substance of your remarks at the Sub-Committee meeting on the previous Thursday afternoon. When I was listening to you in the Sub-Committee on Thursday afternoon, it seemed to me very clear that you were making a sharp distinction between the 1958 report of the Geneva experts, which held that every suspicious event had to be identified by on-site inspection, and the Soviet Union position of 28 November 1961.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that, as the Indian representative noted on Friday last, you were actually contrasting the position held by the experts in 1958 that all unidentified events had to be subject to on-site inspection with the fact that the Soviet 28 November position provided for no on-site inspections.

The nuclear test ban draft treaty which the United Kingdom and the United States tabled on 18 April 1961 was, of course, already a compromise between the two extreme positions mentioned by our United Kingdom colleague, in that we only called for on-site inspection for a limited number of unidentified events. While I fully recognize that there might be a difference of opinion about the various positions in our draft treaty as compared with the completely changed position of the Soviet Union of 28 November 1961, the fact is that we believe that our draft treaty was already an attempt to meet the Soviet point of view.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

In fact, we moved towards the Soviet point of view in some twenty respects. But far from moving forward from its agreement last year to fifteen control posts and three on-site inspections, the Soviet Union suddenly, in its proposal of 28 November 1961, said it would accept no international system and no on-site inspection.

Therefore, I think it is somewhat unfortunate that the eight new members of the Conference, or even those who have taken part in previous disarmament talks, should feel that we were saying that we had continued to put forward an extreme position in relation to another extreme position. I fully realize that people may have different points of view about this situation, but I did not wish to remain silent and to have that silence interpreted as an agreement that our position of 18 April 1961 was or is an extreme position. I think we have tried in every way to meet the points of view of our Soviet colleagues. We have done our best, within the limits of our present state of scientific knowledge, to arrive at a nuclear test ban treaty which would not go beyond scientific necessities and at the same time would not unduly trespass upon Soviet territory or in any way constitute espionage. Again, I realize that anyone could have a different point of view, but I did want to make sure that no one would think from reading the verbatim record of our Sub-Committee meeting that we had acquiesced in a view that our 18 April draft treaty position was an extreme position.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The United States representative has just told us that he does not regard the United States position as extreme. But then, no one expected Mr. Dean to agree that his position is extreme. It is not only we, his colleagues in these talks, who regard his position as extreme, but also all the non-aligned countries of the world. Apart from himself, that is, no one regards his position as moderate. The whole world apart from the Western Powers, which hold this position, considers it extreme. The representatives of the non-aligned States have said so quite definitely, and we have told him so many times. In this matter, therefore, his opinion is contradicted by that of all the rest of the world.

What the United States representative said today sounded as though the United States were ready to take the proposal in the eight-nation memorandum as a basis; but his comments show that the United States is still pulling back to its former extreme position even on the highly important question of whether the control posts

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

should be operated nationally or be international, or whether inspection should be obligatory - compulsory - or carried out only by invitation of the country, as the eight-nation memorandum proposes. On that subject I should like to remind Mr. Dean of a passage in the statement by the representative of India, Mr. Ball, who declared on behalf of the non-aligned States which submitted the memorandum that the positions of the two sides participating in the talks on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests had led the Conference into a blind alley and could not get it out. He said:

"I trust and sincerely hope that when the three delegations resume negotiations, taking as a basis this joint memorandum of ours -- and I feel they are going to take this as a basis and are going to resume negotiations -- they will not go back to either of their extreme positions."

(ENDC/PV.25, page 48)

And later he said:

"There is 'no go' on the basis of the two extreme positions ....Please do not go into these negotiations on the basis of those two extreme positions." (ibid)

Why do the non-aligned States continually and insistently express this concern? Why do they make these anxious and pressing appeals to the principal parties to these talks not to return to their old positions? Because they are genuinely concerned for the future of the talks. They know that no agreement can be reached on the basis of these old positions. To go back to them is to go back to deadlock. These old positions cannot release us from deadlock. That is proved by the whole history of the talks. Our consciences -- ours and yours, Mr. Dean, Mr. Godber -- tell us quite plainly that the old positions will not get us out of the deadlock, nor help us to make progress with our talks or to come to any agreement.

As far as we can see now, therefore, we can reach agreement on a mutually-acceptable basis by agreeing to the proposals of the eight non-aligned States. We have told you again today that we accept the main propositions of the memorandum of 16 April of the non-aligned States; we accept those proposals as compromise proposals, as a basis for our further talks. And if the United States and the United Kingdom representatives would consent, would say merely one little word to indicate their willingness to take this memorandum as a basis, we could quickly draw up the necessary agreement and this question could be settled. Unfortunately, however, what Mr. Dean has said means that the United States is quite unable to detach itself from its old positions. The United States representative again confirmed this in the observations which he made today on the memorandum.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

But I would beg Mr. Dean to reconsider his attitude to the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States, and I strongly urge him not to follow the false and dishonest line of treating the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States as though it were a document restating his old position on international control, inspection and control posts. Nothing of what he said appears in the memorandum.

I beg Mr. Dean to take the memorandum as it is, just as the eight non-aligned countries have submitted it to us, without any of his comments. If we take this memorandum as a basis, we shall soon agree. But once you start commenting on it, discussing it and interpreting it as you have today, we shall again face a deadlock and nothing else; and this endeavour of the non-aligned States to help our talks, help us to reach an agreement and help us to get this business out of deadlock will in its turn peter out ignominiously.

I address yet one more appeal to my United States and United Kingdom colleagues to take the memorandum of the eight as it is, and not to read into it something which it does not contain, or try to interpret it as a special formula reflecting their old positions on these cardinal issues of our talks.

I did not get a clear idea of what Mr. Dean said today from the interpretation, and I shall have to study the verbatim record of his speech carefully. I think I shall have to return to this matter again, and perhaps say something about his statement today in addition to what I have just said.

The most important thing we have to do, however, is to accept the non-aligned States' proposal as a compromise. We cannot at present see anything else equivalent to these proposals of the eight or acceptable as a solution of the problem of discontinuance of tests.

I again emphasize that any attempt to force the discussion of this question into the rut of your old positions would be a very dangerous diversionary manoeuvre and would inevitably bring the whole matter into another deadlock. And I would warn my United States and United Kingdom colleagues against the temptation of embarking on such a course.

We expect that careful study of the situation and a correct evaluation of the Soviet Union's goodwill in agreeing to these compromise proposals of the eight non-aligned States will enable the United States and the United Kingdom to surmount these internal obstacles which are still hindering them from coming to terms with us on this question. It is to be hoped that the further course of the talks will fulfil our expectations.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): It seems clear to me that the participation of the eight nations in our Sub-Committee on nuclear testing would be very helpful. At our plenary meeting last Friday it was suggested, and I believe each of our delegations agreed, that it would be helpful to add some of the sponsors of the eight-Power joint memorandum to the membership of this Sub-Committee on nuclear testing.

Therefore I would suggest that the Sub-Committee request the sponsors of the joint memorandum to select two or three, or such number as they choose, of these delegations to join us in our work in the Sub-Committee. The expansion of the membership of the Sub-Committee might then be formally approved at a plenary meeting of the Conference.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I wonder whether the representative of the United States would mind if I were to defer consideration of his suggestion for a few moments, because, as United Kingdom representative, I want to make one or two comments relating to our discussion this afternoon.

Before we conclude our general discussion today, I should like to take up one point which has already been dealt with, and then I should like to develop another point which I think is rather important. I indicated at the beginning of this afternoon's meeting that I would deal with one point and that I hoped later to deal with another point.

The first point that I want to make quite clear relates to the references that have been made to the statement which I made in the Sub-Committee on Thursday and to the comments that it drew not only here this afternoon from the representative of the Soviet Union but also at the plenary meeting of the Conference on Friday from the representative of India.

My own understanding of the intervention of Mr. Lall on Friday was that he did fully understand the significance of the position. I did not think that he misunderstood the position. However, if he did, no doubt he will take the opportunity to make that clear. But I understood him to accept that position, because what I said was so abundantly clear. Although it does appear in the record so many times, perhaps I should repeat it just once more. I said:

"It seems to me that we have two extreme positions here. We have the position set out in the experts' report of 1958 on which we all based our discussions up until 28 November 1961. The experts' report of 1958 laid down that every disputed event should be inspected, that every event

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

of which there was not certainty should be inspected. That is at one end of the scale. At the other end of the scale are the Soviet Union proposals of 28 November 1961 that no event should be inspected under any circumstances." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.9, page 5)

I said then that those are two extreme positions. I repeat that now: they are the two extreme positions. But of course, as everyone knows, the Western position as set out in our draft treaty of 18 April 1961 was by no means an extreme position, and certainly I should never have said that it was. It was indeed a very carefully worked out compromise, a compromise basing itself in very large degree on what our Soviet colleagues themselves had agreed to at that time, as Mr. Tsarapkin knows better than anyone else. We were seeking to build on agreements that had been reached at that time with a compromise. The effective point of the compromise, to which I was really drawing attention in that intervention, was that it did provide for a quota of on-site inspections. That was why I made it so clear.

In the next paragraph, after referring to the proposals of the eight non-aligned nations, I said:

"If they are a compromise, then by definition, as I have tried to set out, they must imply some on-site inspection." (ibid.)

I really could not have made it clearer than that, and I do think it was understood.

That being so, I was pleased when I heard the representative of India approving my intervention. He read out those words of mine, and he read them out with complete approval. He said that he entirely agreed with my statement that in fact this was a compromise between the two extreme positions. It seems to me that this was quite clear.

I want to come to that -- I am just referring to it again now -- in relation to the other point that I wish to make. I said earlier that I was suggesting one subject which we might take up profitably and follow. It has been touched on by both my colleagues here today, and we can no doubt study it again further. But, in the light of what our Soviet colleague has said today, there is still one point on which I am very far from being clear. This is a point on which I have tried to get clarification ever since Mr. Zorin made the statement in the plenary meeting on Thursday morning that he accepted the joint memorandum of the eight nations as a basis of discussion. I asked him in the plenary meeting just what that meant and just how far it took us. I stated that Mr. Zorin:

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

"... has made great play with the fact that he says he has accepted the proposals of the eight unaligned countries as a basis of negotiation, but he has in no way refuted what I pointed out to him in the message from Mr. Khrushchev which he read into the record on Monday of this week. I would suggest that those two positions are not compatible. It is for this reason that I want to be clear as to just exactly what our Soviet colleagues are offering us in this regard." (ENDC/PV.24, page 45)

What I was referring to was that Mr. Khrushchev in his message had made it quite clear that he was not willing to accept any on-site inspection by anybody at all, that he would not have any foreigners on Soviet territory for this purpose. He said that the Soviet Union would never agree to this. It seemed to me that it was impossible, if one accepted that statement, to accept at the same time what was implicit in the eight-Power document.

Now it is perfectly true that this document, on the particular point of inspection, states that parties to the treaty could invite the commission to visit their territories. Well if one of the parties has said in advance that it will never have foreigners on its territory, then the only conclusion one can draw is that it accepts this document as a basis on the understanding that it will never invite the on-site inspection which we hold to be essential. Therefore, it would be possible for a country to say that it accepted this document as a basis for discussion, while at the same time being determined never to extend any such invitation. I hope that is not the case. But if it is not the case, we are still entitled to a clearer assurance on that point. I asked a question in this regard on Thursday morning, again on Thursday afternoon and again on Friday morning. However, as far as I am aware, I still have not had a clear answer to it. Such an answer would help us very much. It would be most helpful if we could have that assurance.

At the meeting of the Sub-Committee on Thursday afternoon, 19 April, I said to the representative of the Soviet Union at that meeting, Mr. Zorin:

"But you have not dealt with the specific question I put to you: Does this in fact mean that you accept the principle of on-site inspection which is implicit in the eight-nation document?" (ENDC/SC.I/PV.9, page 29)

I asked that question and received no reply. On Friday morning, at our last meeting before the Easter recess, I referred to this once more. And then, Mr. Zorin questioned -- and this again raises doubts in my mind -- the three principles to



(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

which I had referred on Thursday, as though they were detracting from the eight-Power memorandum; he thought there was particular significance in the fact that I had said:

"assuming the principles to which I have referred are accepted."

(ENDC/PV.24, page 13)

In my last intervention on Friday I reminded my colleagues of what those three principles were, as I have done here again today. The third of those principles, as I spelt it out then, was this. I said:

"Then, of course, there is the vital question of inspection. Here it seemed to us that the memorandum did accept the principle of international inspection." (ENDC/PV.25, page 41)

It has not been confirmed or denied to me whether the Soviet Union does accept and is prepared to honour the principle of international on-site inspection. Does it accept? That is the question to which I want an answer. I listened very carefully to what our Soviet colleague had to say this afternoon on this, but again I thought he did not give that clear answer for which I have repeatedly asked. I may be doing him an injustice here because from the interpretation it is not always possible to pick up the meaning exactly. I shall study the verbatim record with great care, but I would ask my Soviet colleague to make it clear that he does accept the principle of on-site inspection and that he does accept the fact that on-site inspection could and would, if necessary, take place on Soviet territory. I ask this because of the doubts which were raised in my mind by that very recent memorandum from Mr. Khrushchev to my own Prime Minister, which seemed precisely to deny that principle. I do think that if we are going to make the progress for which I hope in regard to this document, it is important that we should be quite clear.

Our Soviet colleague in his last intervention seemed to suggest that it was wrong of our United States colleague to be seeking to develop things in relation to what is in the eight-Power document. Of course it is not wrong to do that. However we are accepting this document to help us along, we obviously have to get a common interpretation so that we may each of us know precisely what would be carried out in any agreement we were able to build on it. This is just one of the dangers which seemed inherent in what appeared to be the over-emphasis of our Soviet colleagues on using this memorandum as a basis for our discussions. However we treat it as a basis for our discussions, we have to work out where we can build

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

agreement round some of the ideas contained in it; but, as I have made clear and as my United States colleague has made clear in the past, this of course cannot be exclusive. We are of course entitled to develop positions in relation to the principles set out in this document.

So I come back to this particular principle which is of great importance, whether in fact our Soviet colleagues do accept, and would accept when the occasion arose, the need to have on-site inspection to prove whether in fact any disputed event had been a nuclear explosion. It is no good for them to say that this could be dealt with by instrumentation. There has to be this ability to have an inspection if there is disagreement. I reminded the Committee again on Friday of what my leader, Lord Home, said in this regard: There will be cases of dispute, and if the treaty is to be effective there must be ways of resolving such disputes. The only way anyone can suggest that would be effective and would carry conviction with it would be actual on-site inspection. This is one of the fundamental keys to this whole problem and to its solution, and it would help me very much if our Soviet colleague could say that he does accept fully the obligations for on-site inspection, as and when they would arise.

I am not asking that all such events should be inspected. This is the difference between the extreme positions I was talking about, the extreme position of the 1958 experts' report and the extreme position of the Soviet Union on 28 November last -- the one saying that all events should be inspected, the other saying none. There could be a quota of inspections; but what I consider to be absolutely basic if we are to make progress in regard to this aspect of the proposals of the eight nations is that these inspections could take place and when the need arose would take place. It would help if we could have information in regard to that.

The other principles which I have enumerated, which my United States colleague has enumerated, are matters which we can discuss further, I am sure, and develop more fully in the effort to find some basis for agreement. Our earlier discussions, after all, covered these points in greater or lesser degree. We could go forward with much greater confidence if my Soviet colleague could give me that assurance which so far, in spite of repeated questioning, I have been unable to get.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): You see that the United Kingdom representative, speaking -- admittedly in very guarded language -- about the non-aligned countries' compromise proposals, is now asking questions which only go to prove the desire of the Western Powers, or at any rate of the United Kingdom representative, to steer our talks towards recognition of their old attitudes, especially on inspection. But I must again emphasize why the proposals of the eight non-aligned States on this subject are compromise proposals.

Your earlier position, to which you are apparently still clinging, is to fix some sort of annual quota for on-site inspection or verification which would be carried out compulsorily by decision of an international agency without the consent of the party on whose territory the inspection takes place. But the interpretation, the formulation of the question which Mr. Godber is now putting forward is not only not in accordance with, but conflicts with the contents of the proposal of the eight non-aligned States. We suggest that you should take this proposal, including the part dealing with inspection, as it is. Although the Soviet Union, in its proposals of 28 November 1961, completely rejected any form of international verification and the creation of any kind of international agency, it now, in consenting to accept the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States as a basis for the talks, also accepts the statement of principle contained in paragraph 4 of the memorandum, but accepts it as at present drafted, and not as Mr. Godber and Mr. Dean are trying to interpret it. We accept the wording of paragraph 4 of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned States. I will read it:

"All parties to the treaty should accept the obligation to furnish the Commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event. Pursuant to this obligation the parties to the treaty could invite the Commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt." (ENDC/28, page 2).

That is the wording of the proposal of the non-aligned countries on questions connected with on-site verification. We accept it in the form in which those countries themselves have put it to us. If you accept this proposal of theirs, one of the most important questions on which we disagree will thereby be settled and done with, and the way will be opened to further talks and speedy agreement between us.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Thank you very much, but I am afraid that does not answer my question. My question was a simple one; it related to the fact that the acceptance in this form did not seem to carry one far enough when one compared it with what Mr. Khrushchev had said. However, if that is all my Soviet colleague can say, I must note this and consider it. But it does show the weakness here. And, after all, if we are to make progress on this memorandum we must know precisely how it is to be interpreted; we must all interpret it in a similar way if we are going to get agreement. It is no good having an agreement in which we do not all interpret a thing in exactly the same way. I do not think there is any point in my putting the question again. I must take note of what my Soviet colleague has again said, but the fact remains that I have still not had a clear answer to my question.

If there are no further comments on this, I should like to turn to the point raised by the representative of the United States concerning an invitation to some of our neutral colleagues to join us in our future deliberations. Personally, I would very much welcome this. I am afraid the subsequent discussion has rather put out of my mind the precise form of the United States proposal; I wonder if the representative of the United States would like to refresh our memories as to how he suggested this should be done.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): My suggestion was that our Sub-Committee should request the sponsors of the joint memorandum to select two or three, or whatever number they choose, of those delegations to join us in our work in this Sub-Committee. The expansion of our membership, if agreed to here, might then be formally approved by the plenary Conference.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Would our Soviet colleague like to comment on this proposal?

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, you have again expressed dissatisfaction with the reply I have just given you concerning inspection.

In view of this, I should like to read to you once more, the relevant passage from the statement by the Soviet Government dated 19 April:

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"... the question of inviting the Commission for the purpose of verifying in loco the circumstances of the occurrence of any particular suspicious events should be decided by the States themselves. All these propositions undoubtedly deserve attention and could be a useful basis for reaching agreement on the discontinuance of all nuclear tests ...

"... The Soviet Government expresses its willingness to study the proposals set out in the Memorandum of the neutralist States as a basis for further negotiations." (ENDC/32, page 4)

So, you see, the Soviet Government, in its statement of 19 April, accepted this suggestion to invite the Commission, as it is formulated in the proposal of these eight non-aligned States itself. I will quote it again:

"Pursuant to this obligation the parties to the treaty" (that is, the States) "could invite the Commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt". (ENDC/28, page 2)

The Soviet Government accepts this. I do not know what further evidence the United Kingdom representative needs. I cannot produce more authoritative testimony than the actual statement by the Soviet Government to prove that it accepts this proposal of the non-aligned States.

With regard to the proposal by the United States representative that the Sub-Committee's membership should be enlarged, I hardly think that we are competent to settle this question. The Sub-Committee's composition was determined by the Committee itself meeting in plenary, and I do not think we could decide the question in this discriminatory way by adding two or three members. Why only two or three? Why not six, or eight? If you add six or eight, you in fact get nearly the whole membership of the plenary Committee. We can therefore examine this question either in this Sub-Committee with its present membership, or in plenary meetings with the participation of the non-aligned States. Then we shall not be slighting anyone or excluding anyone from participation in detailed discussions. Moreover, it seems to me that this procedure, which we have so far been following, will be the most democratic and, what is most important, does not discriminate against anyone.

At all events I must point out that, in my view, we are neither entitled nor competent to decide this question. Competence to decide this question is vested in the plenary Committee. If you would like us to submit a unanimous recommendation of some kind to the Committee, I would ask you to take account of the view I have

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

just expressed that it would be undesirable to permit any sort of discrimination, to exclude anyone or to invite anyone to discuss this very important matter. We consider that the present procedure providing for debate in this Sub-Committee as well as for debate in the plenary Committee with the participation of all the States is the most correct and the most suited to our purpose.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I should first like to make two comments as United Kingdom representative.

In response to the first comment made by the representative of the Soviet Union, I had the copy of the statement by his Government before me when he referred me to it. I noted, of course, the sentences to which he referred. It was because I was seeking clarification of those sentences that I asked him my question. And in that context I would remind him that that same statement, only three or four paragraphs earlier, refers specifically to Mr. Khrushchev's message to my own Prime Minister, which in fact raised my original doubts. Therefore those doubts, I fear, still remain. I am sorry I have not been able to get that clarification for which I asked.

On the second point -- the representation here of the neutral States -- I am sorry that our Soviet colleague takes this view, because I should have thought that it would be helpful in this smaller body if we could have their participation. Certainly we do not wish to make any invidious choice in this matter. I thought the proposal of our United States colleague was that we should suggest to the eight nations that they themselves nominate one or two representatives to join us. This seems to me to be very reasonable. If they do not want to do that, then naturally they will tell us so. I should have thought that they could have told us here more precisely what was in their minds in regard to the memorandum. They might have been able to assist us in discussing it. I find it a very sound suggestion.

However, if our Soviet colleague is not willing to go along with such a suggestion, possibly he could consider it further and we might refer to it in a plenary meeting in some way. We might be able, with the benefit of all our colleagues present, and after our Soviet colleagues have had an opportunity to consider it further -- I realize it was a proposition put forward suddenly -- to get agreement both on whether there should be additions to our Committee, and also, if so, how that should be accomplished. I myself would certainly not wish to be so

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

exclusive in this body that we never welcomed anybody to join us. I would have thought it would be very educative to them to be here with us and to participate in our discussions. Perhaps we can give some further thought to this.

I certainly support the proposal which my United States colleague has put forward. But if there is not unanimity on it, no doubt we can consider it further. If necessary the suggestion can be raised in plenary after our Soviet colleagues have had time to give a little further thought to it.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like now merely to give you an answer on the subject of the Soviet Government's reply on the question of inviting the Commission to verify circumstances in loco (ENDC/32. page 4).

You say that you still have doubts because a few lines earlier in this statement by the Soviet Government there is a reference to the message of 12 April 1962 from Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of the Ministers of the USSR, to Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (ENDC/27). I did not think, however, that I needed to give any explanation. I supposed that it was just as plain and clear to you as to any other reader of this statement by the Soviet Government that entirely different subjects are involved. The Soviet Government's statement of 19 April certainly refers to Mr. Khrushchev's message to Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, of 12 April 1962, but in what context, in what connexion? It says:

"Trying somehow to cover up their dangerous policy, to divert the attention of the peoples from the actions of those who intend to increase still further the tempo of nuclear competition, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom state that it is impossible to agree to the discontinuance of nuclear tests unless a wide-spread system of international control is established. But what purposes would be served by such a system, if one takes into account that it is absolutely unnecessary for verifying the fulfilment by States of their obligations under an agreement? An exhaustively clear answer to these questions was given by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, in his message of 12 April 1962 to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan, in which he emphasized that it was a question of giving an opportunity to the organs of NATO to have their own agents in our territory

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

under the pretext of international control, and in addition to military bases and troops stationed near the frontiers of the Soviet Union, to obtain our permission to carry on intelligence work in the territory of our own country. But the Soviet Union will never agree to this."

(ENDC/32, page 3)

The reference here is to your demands for the establishment of a wide-spread system of international control. But the proposals submitted as compromise proposals by the non-aligned States on 16 April cannot possibly be supposed to contemplate the establishment of a wide-spread system of international control. That is one matter.

The second matter is this. Our agreement to take as a basis the proposals on inviting the Commission to verify in loco the circumstances of the occurrence of any particular suspicious events, you must regard as a concession by us. In agreeing to this proposal of the non-aligned States, the Soviet Union is certainly making a substantial concession.

With regard to the suggested participation of non-aligned countries, we are in favour of this. So far from opposing it, we pressed for the inclusion of non-aligned States in the Disarmament Committee. We upheld and defended this idea, and we are gratified that non-aligned States are now co-operating with us in the consideration of disarmament problems. We are also in favour of non-aligned States considering problems of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. It was at your suggestion that the three-Power Sub-Committee composed of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union was set up. It was at your suggestion, not ours.

We agreed to it, and we are now discussing in it the cessation of tests. You wish the discussion of this matter to take place among a larger number of participants, to invite non-aligned States to take part. We warmly support this. We certainly cannot agree that it is not due to us that a Disarmament Committee with eight non-aligned States among its members is considering the questions before us. We believe that this is due to the Soviet Union and the position it has adopted. But you now apparently for some reason wish to cut down the number of non-aligned States to be given an opportunity of taking part in the discussion of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, and to enlarge the Sub-Committee by two or three. We will not accept such a reduction. We will not agree to it. Why should a particular group of non-aligned States be excluded? Why should some States take part and others not? On what grounds? How are we to decide which non-aligned States



(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

are to be invited and which are to be excluded from participation in the Sub-Committee's work -- by drawing lots or by playing pitch-and-toss? It would be wrong to divide the non-aligned States into two groups, one worthy to take part in the Sub-Committee's work and the other not. The worthy would attend the Sub-Committee's meetings, while the unworthy would wait in the Disarmament Committee until the question came back to it. This would be wrong and, I think, even insulting to the non-aligned States which were excluded.

Everything considered, this proposal smacks to us of discrimination towards some non-aligned States, and is therefore unacceptable. At any rate, I personally cannot accept it. You can raise this question in plenary, or have it discussed between the co-Chairmen. I do not think that we here are competent to decide it. In addition, I urge you to consider the remarks I have just made.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): On the first of the two points our Soviet colleague refers to, it was just because of the extravagant language to which he called our attention that my fears were first aroused. I am afraid they have in no way been dissipated. There seems to be no prospect of getting further clarification at this moment, so I will leave it there.

On the second point, the question of neutral participation in our Sub-Committee, I think that the Easter weekend has not done our Soviet colleague a lot of good; he does not seem to be in the best of humour this afternoon. I thought our United States colleague had put forward a very reasonable proposition, one which, I would remind Mr. Tsarapkin, was based on whether the neutrals would so wish in the first place, and if they so wished, whether they would want to choose one or two from among themselves. All this talk about the worthy and the unworthy seems to be wholly beside the point. It would be entirely for the neutrals to decide if they wished this to happen, and it would be for them to choose which ones would participate. But of course all the neutrals, like the other members of our Committee, participate whenever we take the matter up in plenary meetings.

I thought it was the wish of our Soviet colleague that we should carry forward as fast as possible not only our talks in relation to nuclear tests but those on general and complete disarmament as well. I thought it would help to speed up the work, and that was why I thought the proposition was put forward by our United States colleague; for this reason I welcomed it. But of course this is not a matter of tremendous importance; it just seemed to me to be a sensible proposal. However,

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

perhaps we could all think further about it in the light of what our Soviet colleague has just said, although I am bound to say I am a little surprised at the vehemence of his reaction.

Does any other representative wish to address the Sub-Committee? If not, then on the question of the next meeting, I understand that the co-Chairmen are going to be fairly busy tomorrow afternoon on some other matter. Therefore, would it be convenient if the next meeting were held on Thursday, or does anyone have any other proposal to put forward?

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I think Thursday is too far ahead. Perhaps we could do what we have done before when in doubt. I would suggest to our next chairman, Mr. Dean, that we should perhaps agree on the date of our next meeting a little later -- that we should agree on the date say, tomorrow morning.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I understand that is agreeable to our United States colleague. I am always ready to end on a conciliatory note, and I shall be happy to agree to this proposal of our Soviet colleague.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.