

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FIFTY-NINTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Wednesday, 18 July 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. PADILLA NERVO

(Mexico)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. ARAUJA CASTRO  
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE  
Miss M. GOES

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. N. MINTCHEV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMECHOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. M. ZELHA  
Mr. J. BUCEK

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU  
ATO M. HAMID  
ATO GETACHEW K'BRETT

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGIATI  
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. GONZALES GOMEZ

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Nigeria: Mr. L.C.N. CBI

Poland: Mr. M. LACHS  
Mr. A. ROGULSKI  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania: Mr. G. LACOVESCU  
Mr. H. FLORESCU  
Mr. O. NEDA  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden: Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Mr. P. KELLIN  
Mr. J. PRAWITZ  
Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. L.I. MENDELEVITCH  
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV  
Mr. V.V. ALDOSHIN

United Arab Republic: Mr. A. EL-ERIAN  
Mr. G. EL-ABD  
Mr. A.E. ABDEL-MEGUID  
Mr. S. AHMED

United Kingdom: Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. P. ELERY  
Mr. J.K. WRIGHT

United States of America: Mr. A.H. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN  
Mr. D. LARK

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico): I declare open the fifty-ninth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TARADJICV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): When we separated for the recess of our Conference, we were convinced that we should reassemble here on the date set for the resumption of negotiations in order to work at drafting the treaty on general and complete disarmament with better prospects of rapidly achieving concrete and positive results in the accomplishment of this task, which is of vital importance for peace. That conviction was based on the increasingly firm and clear expression of the will of the peoples of the whole world to see agreement reached as soon as possible on general and complete disarmament, failing which the disaster which threatens mankind might become a reality tomorrow.

This firm will of the peoples of the whole world and of world public opinion found expression in the statement made by Mr. Lall, the representative of India, who, speaking as Chairman of the first meeting of the Conference after the resumption of our work on 16 July (ENDC/PV.57, p. 5 ), faithfully interpreted the various important public meetings which had taken place in the meantime. The first was the "World without the Bomb" Conference, which, as you will remember, was held at Accra on the proposal of Mr. Nkrumah, President of the Republic of Ghana. The second was the Conference on Nuclear Weapons held at New Delhi. The third and most important meeting, in which representatives from nearly all the countries of the world took part, was the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace, held in Moscow on 9-14 July. All these meetings, which showed the firm will of all the peoples of the world to fight for general and complete disarmament in order to ensure peace, and to support any action likely to contribute to the rapid solution of this problem, cannot and certainly should not be ignored by any government at all.

In some of the statements made before our Conference's short recess, various delegations expressed the hope that we would reconsider the positions taken and examine the suggestions and opinions put forward during the initial phase of the Conference's work, in order to return with positions which would allow agreement to be reached on the treaty on general and complete disarmament and on other questions calculated to facilitate the work of drafting the treaty, such as the discontinuance of nuclear tests and the questions which are to be considered by our Committee of the Whole.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Since the resumption of our work, we have heard a number of very important statements, including those made by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States, the two great Powers which possess the largest and the most powerful armies and armaments, and very interesting statements by Mr. Lall, the representative of India, and others.

Acceding to the wishes expressed by various delegations, and after a thorough examination of the Western positions set forth in the United States Outline (ENDC/30), the Soviet delegation has put forward some additions and amendments (ENDC/48) to its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. (ENDC/2). This is an important step by the Soviet delegation to meet the Western Powers' proposals half-way, in order to arrive at a compromise solution on the method of reducing and eliminating conventional armaments. We are sure that this will enable us to reach agreement very quickly on this important question of conventional armaments, and to draft the various provisions of the treaty relating to them.

At the same time, the Soviet Union has considered the opinions and wishes expressed by certain delegations, in particular that of Sweden, concerning reduction of the risk of war by accident, and has made additions to its draft providing for prohibition of troop movements and military manoeuvres with the participation of the armed forces of one or more other States; for the exchange of military missions between States for the purpose of improving relations and mutual understanding between them; and for the establishment of swift and reliable communication between the heads of government of States parties to the treaty and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Those additions and amendments, submitted by the Soviet Union to facilitate the work of our Committee on drafting a treaty, represent a serious and positive step in the endeavour to reach an agreement on the whole problem of general and complete disarmament. At the same time they show the goodwill with which the Soviet Union is working for agreement on all the questions before our Conference.

On the other hand, we have heard the statement made by the representative of the United States on 16 July (ENDC/PV.57, pp. 7 et seq.) in which he expressed his satisfaction at the progress achieved in our work in the past and the determination of the United States to take the decisive measures necessary to bring about general and complete disarmament. At the same time he described the progress made on general and complete disarmament as very slow and very modest. After such statements it could be expected that the United States would give tangible proof of its desire to go forward towards general and complete disarmament.

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After the statement by the President of the United States that, in the resumed negotiations of the Eighteen Nation Conference, the United States would "continue to seek agreement which will meet the dangers of the nuclear threat" (ENDC/44), the hope was born that the United States delegation would come here with new proposals - with compromise proposals and suggestions that would enable us to reach an agreement as quickly as possible on the elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. It could accordingly be expected that in the United States representative's very first statement amendments would be made to the United States draft to put an end as soon as possible to the "dangers of the nuclear threat", as the President of the United States put it.

No such step has yet been taken by the United States delegation; and unless the United States draft is amended in this important respect it will, as we know only too well, leave the threat of nuclear war hanging over mankind not only until the conclusion of the treaty, but also during the whole period of its implementation and even after the execution of the programme for which it provides.

It is true that the United States representative said in his statement that his observations were merely preliminary. We should therefore be entitled to expect that during our future discussions the United States delegation will put forward proposals enabling us, as Mr. Dean said, "to address ourselves constructively to this problem of working out both a treaty on general and complete disarmament and a treaty on nuclear testing." (ENDC/PV.57, p. 35).

Pending such action, however, we cannot help noting that the United States representative's statement - though preliminary and confined to general remarks about general and complete disarmament - dealt with specific proposals on a whole series of procedural matters which he called a "new approach" that the United States "envisages as most useful in the period immediately ahead" (ibid., p. 14).

What is this new approach that the United States seeks to introduce into our work? According to Mr. Dean and his Western colleagues, it is "consideration in depth" (to use his own expression) of various separate questions, removed from the context of general and complete disarmament and discussed in isolation.

For a better understanding of this method we should doubtless refer to the list of questions submitted at yesterday's meeting by the United Kingdom Delegation (ENDC/50) - questions which according to Mr. Godber should be discussed in depth. After reading through these questions, one cannot help noticing that they are

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precisely the same as - or similar to - the questions concerning which the Western delegations have been insistently asking for separate discussion since our Committee began its work. So even before the United States draft has been submitted to the Conference for examination, an attempt is being made to present to us as "a new approach", as a method of "discussion in depth", the old desire of the United States and its allies to divert us from considering and discussing a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and to examine various isolated questions separately, outside the context of general and complete disarmament though they have a bearing on disarmament. The Western countries' logic seems to follow the maxim "plus cela change, plus c'est la même chose".

Moreover, in the present instance the subjects on the list submitted by the United Kingdom delegation nearly all suggest the study of control and verification problems. In fact, of the eleven subjects on the list, eight relate to studies of verification and control measures. Moreover, some of these subjects are so worded as to prejudge the solution of the problem. This is true, for instance, of the subject: "Reduction or elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles and related measures of verification in the first stage and further measures for subsequent stages". The second part of this wording presupposes that nuclear delivery vehicles would not be eliminated in the first stage, but that their total elimination would take place in subsequent stages.

The delegations of the socialist countries have several times stressed that, in order to reach agreement on control over disarmament measures, it is necessary first to reach agreement on the disarmament measures themselves and on the time-limits within which they are to be carried out. Nevertheless, the Western countries continue to harp on their old idea of studying control problems first and agreeing on disarmament measures afterwards. This is a method which throughout past negotiations and discussions has proved ineffective and even prejudicial to any solution of the disarmament problem, and of which we were even given an example in the discussions of the former League of Nations.

To isolate certain questions relating to disarmament from the context of general and complete disarmament, and to begin discussions parallel to discussion of the draft treaty, would mean not only slowing down the work of drafting the provisions of the treaty on general and complete disarmament, but even stopping that work while these questions were being separately discussed.



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Moreover, we must not forget that the Committee has already adopted rules of procedure which clearly specify how the work of the Conference must be organized in order to arrive as quickly as possible at an agreement on the provisions of the treaty and on the collateral questions connected with general and complete disarmament. The procedure adopted so far has already produced some results, in spite of the difficulties encountered in the negotiations. As the United States representative himself pointed out, we have already succeeded in reaching agreement, except for a few points of difference, on the preamble to the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/L.7). We have also succeeded in reaching agreement, despite substantial differences on certain points, on the first three articles of the treaty relating to the obligations that States would have to assume in order to arrive at general and complete disarmament (ENDC/40/Rev.1).

It now remains for us to follow the same method for the first, second and third stages of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. There can be no doubt that our work will be greatly facilitated by the amendments and additions made to its draft treaty by the Soviet Union (ENDC/48) in order to arrive at a compromise with the Western proposals. It is to be hoped, therefore, that if we continue our work on the lines already adopted we shall achieve practical results before the end of the present session of the Committee on Disarmament, and that we shall be able to report to the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly that at least some of the provisions that should be embodied in a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament have been agreed on by the negotiators. We could then, perhaps, obtain fresh instructions from the General Assembly concerning the unsettled issues, which would give a new impetus to our work of formulating the remaining provisions of a draft treaty.

We therefore consider that the Western Powers should not press their "new approach", which is in fact merely a repetition of what they have previously proposed that we should do. Rather than propose such methods and procedures, which would only delay the work of clarifying our positions and bringing them closer together, the Western Powers would be better advised to put forward real disarmament proposals intended to put an end to the danger of the nuclear threat. It is in that sphere especially that they should concentrate their efforts and bring their position closer to that of the Soviet Union, which, through the measures proposed in its draft treaty (ENDC/2), provides for the practical elimination of the threat of a nuclear attack by

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the end of the first stage and, through the elimination of nuclear weapons in the second stage, eliminates the danger of nuclear war once and for all. It is on this point that the Western Delegations should concentrate their efforts to reach a compromise, and it is through such efforts that they could really contribute towards agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Another question which deserves special attention at this stage in our discussion is that of the discontinuance of nuclear tests. Certain Western delegations have stressed their intention to spare no effort to reach an early solution of this problem. Nevertheless, the United States representative has said that he proposes to ask for a discussion on the data obtained in the course of various researches carried out by experts of the United States Department of Defence under a programme known as "Project Vela" (ENDC/45). He also complained that only the United States and the United Kingdom had made efforts to convince themselves that it was easier than they had thought to detect, to identify and to differentiate between seismic events resulting from nuclear explosions, and that they had had to spend over \$50 million on this research work.

Yet for a long time now the Soviet Union and competent Western experts have been saying, and have demonstrated, that existing national means are adequate for verifying the discontinuance of nuclear tests. Yesterday the representative of India drew attention to the futility and uselessness of all research to prove the obvious (ENDC/PV.58, p. 30). To reach an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests it is not necessary to embark on discussion in depth of the data which the Pentagon experts would present to us from "Project Vela"; all that is needed is a political decision by the Governments of the Western nuclear Powers.

The memorandum of the eight non-aligned nations submitted on 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28) provides a solid basis for an agreement on this question. But the Western Powers have not been willing in the past -- contrary to what the United Kingdom representative said yesterday -- to take that memorandum as a basis for the solution of the problem. Their opening statements at the beginning of our resumed negotiations on general and complete disarmament are scarcely encouraging on this point. They continue to describe the eight-nation memorandum as vague, to say that it has no precise meaning, and the like. In their statements the Western Powers recall once again that they have put numerous questions by which they intended to vitiate this memorandum and make it unserviceable as a basis for fruitful negotiations. Only yesterday, in reply to the statement by the representative of India, Mr. Dean said:

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"But at the present stage Secretary of State Rusk is wholly right in saying that, although we accept the eight-Power memorandum as one of the bases for negotiation we have never formally renounced our offer concerning the draft treaty of 18 April 1961; we have never formally introduced any changes into those past proposals ..." (ENDC/PV.58, p. 35)

I need hardly remind you, either, that when the eight-nation memorandum was submitted to this Conference, the representatives of the Western Powers did not even accept it as one of the bases for negotiation, and that it was under the pressure of world opinion that they were compelled to change their position.

It is true, however, that in certain statements by Western representatives at the beginning of our resumed negotiations -- for instance in the statement by Mr. Cavalletti, the representative of Italy -- we note some changes of position, some encouraging signs. Indeed, in his statement of 16 July Mr. Cavalletti said:

"Since April the Conference has had before it a proposal on nuclear tests to which the Italian delegation immediately attached the greatest importance. That proposal -- the eight-nation Joint Memorandum -- is still before us and of immediate interest, in spite of the difficulties of interpretation it has met with. It is on this basis, I think, that we must start again and work urgently." (ENDC/PV.57, p. 30)

I emphasize: "It is on this basis, I think, that we must start again, working urgently", said Mr. Cavalletti. We hope that this heralds a real change of position by the Western Powers, and we are especially glad that the Italian delegation should have made itself their spokesman. If the Western Powers are willing to take the eight-nation memorandum as the basis for negotiations and to "start again, working urgently" on that basis, as Mr. Cavalletti said, it will certainly be possible to reach an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. But there is no need at all for us to embark on interminable discussions of the significance of the data submitted by the United States experts, for they could only demonstrate what is obvious and has long been maintained by the Soviet Union representatives: that control by existing national systems of detection and identification is perfectly feasible and effective.

Many other questions have been raised in the statements of certain delegations, especially those of the Western delegations, to explain their refusal to seek a

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compromise or to go half-way to meet the outstretched hand of the Soviet Union and arrive at an agreement on general and complete disarmament. But I cannot go into all these questions; I merely wish to draw attention to the strange insistence of the Western Powers -- which was particularly apparent in the statement made by the United Kingdom representative the day before yesterday (ENDC/PV.57, p. 38) -- that more and more concessions be made by the Soviet Union. Instead of asking for concessions from the Soviet Union, which has gone half-way to meet them by making amendments and additions to its draft and has accepted certain Western proposals, the Western Powers should themselves endeavour to reach a real compromise on the other outstanding issues, especially the elimination of the danger of nuclear war at the beginning of the disarmament process.

I should like to stress that the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, in accordance with the instructions of its Government, will do everything in its power to facilitate the work of our Committee and reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament. In his message to the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace held in Moscow from 9 to 14 July, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria, Mr. Anton Yugov, said:

"The People's Republic of Bulgaria, as a member of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, has made and will continue to make unceasing efforts to reach an agreement and to secure the signature by all States of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It is in such a treaty that we see the real road to the establishment of lasting peace and the peaceful development of mankind. That is the meaning and that is the great objective of the struggle of the peoples to master the dark forces of imperialism, militarism and aggression, which are still trying to bar the way to general and complete disarmament and to prevent the creation of a world without arms and without war."

Faithful to these instructions, the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria will devote all its efforts and all its abilities, however modest they may be, to attaining the goal assigned to our Conference: the formulation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I think it would be useful if I were to review this morning the basic philosophy and principles which the United States believes must be carefully observed in any agreed disarmament programme in order to

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meet the most essential requirement of not allowing the disarmament process to give any State or group of States a military advantage in the course of that process. Mr. Lall, the representative of India, rightly said yesterday (ENDC/PV.58, p. 32) that neither his delegation nor any other delegation among the eight new members would agree to any disarmament plan which would provide any party with such an advantage. Let me assure my colleagues that it is quite clear that, in so far as our analysis showed such a result, neither would we. The thought that any disarmament programme must be balanced and must ensure security equally for all is of course recorded in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), paragraph 5, and has been referred to in our deliberations here on a number of occasions.

It is the view of my delegation that a review of the United States basic approach at this point in our discussions would help us to consider in proper perspective the various issues which we hope we shall be able to discuss in depth in the course of our future meetings.

First let me affirm once again, so that there be no doubt on the part of anyone, that the United States is sincerely committed to the goal of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world and to working out a treaty to that end as soon as possible. We take the word of the Soviet Union that it too is committed to the goal of general and complete disarmament, and we therefore believe that there is no basic difference between the Soviet Union and the United States as to the amount of disarmament sought. So fortunately we do not need to waste any time over that. Our problem is how that goal can be achieved, and it is our task to work out an agreed method which will satisfy all parties concerned.

So that there shall be no misunderstanding in this Conference about the specific principles with regard to the method of implementing general and complete disarmament for which my country stands, I should like to review very briefly this morning certain fundamental points to which my delegation has consistently adhered.

First, the United States believes that a tolerable balance of forces exists today and that, as I said on 18 April last:

"... the nations of the world should seize a moment in time to stop the arms race, to freeze the military situation as it then appears and to shrink it progressively to zero, always keeping the relative military position of the parties to the treaty as near as possible to what it was at the beginning." (ENDC/PV.23, p. 6)

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Thus, we believe that an across-the-board, carefully phased and implemented, progressively larger percentage reduction best serves disarmament while at the same time disturbing balance least and ensuring the security of States most. We firmly believe that our approach of a progressive, across-the-board reduction of both nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and conventional armaments will in fact leave nations in possession of a composition of armaments -- often referred to as an armaments mix -- which they fully understand, and that that armaments mix will not be misinterpreted by or unnecessarily worry their neighbours. This reduction method will best preserve the relative military balance of all Powers as closely as possible from the beginning to the end of the disarmament process. As the percentages of cuts in all areas of military capabilities go higher and higher -- or, if you like, deeper and deeper -- the result will be that over-all levels of arms and armed forces will fall lower and lower in a balanced, proportionate manner, without causing serious imbalances in the armaments mixes upon which nations have come to rely in protecting their security.

Secondly, the United States position regarding verification is very well known to this Conference. To use the cogent words of Secretary Rusk, we firmly believe that secrecy and disarmament are fundamentally incompatible. But let us be realistic: no nation would undertake any significant reduction in its military capabilities serving the cause of its national security unless it had reasonable assurance that such reductions were also implemented in good faith by all parties concerned. Fundamental to the United States proposal for phased, across-the-board, percentage cuts in armaments is the idea that the amount of disarmament that takes place during any given time should approximate closely the capability of the established verification machinery to supervise it adequately. This means that those measures agreed to must be subject to such an amount of verification as is commensurate with the amount of disarmament involved and with the degree of risk ensuing from possible violations. We have advanced certain ideas on how such a system of verification might be designed, and we are still continuing our studies of the problem. Indeed, we intend to present our further views on the possibilities in this area in the course of our future deliberations, and we hope that the Soviet Union will join us in the exploration of this most important problem.

Thirdly, the United States believes that it is absolutely essential that, as national armaments are reduced, peace-keeping machinery is progressively strengthened

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to ensure national security and peaceful settlement of differences among nations. I shall not go into the details of this matter at this time, but I do wish to point out that it is quite clear that as disarmament progresses there will be an ever greater need for peace-keeping machinery fully capable of affording increased protection to nations. It is our view that the United States proposal for balanced, across-the-board, phased reductions provides the soundest basis for the establishment of compatible and effective peace-keeping instrumentalities.

Fourthly, I feel constrained to refer once again to the basic need for taking into account in any disarmament programme the strategic and geographic realities of the world. I need dwell only briefly on the present military picture, consisting primarily of two great military alliances. It is amply clear, I believe, that the position of the Soviet Union and the countries allied with it -- comprising some 1,000 million people and some 40 million square kilometres of territory which occupy the Eurasian heartland, stretching thousands and thousands of miles from Eastern Europe to the Kuriles, communist China and the Pacific Ocean -- affords extraordinarily great advantages in the co-ordination of armies and equipment, planning, movement and operations, including military movements of troops and armies, without crossing anyone else's land, sea or air space. There is no one else in the world who enjoys those advantages. Armies moving radially from central points to peripheral territories enjoy considerable advantages over the military forces of the United States and its allies, which must in most cases protect peripheral areas located many thousands of miles from the United States by ocean and by air. We must protect these in support of our treaty commitments.

In our considered opinion we could not carry out disarmament measures and maintain our responsibilities to the world if by so doing we would be carrying them out under conditions of greater imbalances among the Powers than existed at the time disarmament was commenced. Let us be clear about that, for that just would not promote peace. Part and parcel of our commitments to our world-wide alliances is the question of maintaining bases and troops in support of those commitments. The United States proposals deal effectively and clearly with the reduction of military bases at a time to be agreed upon; but the United States clearly cannot accept unrealistic, prejudiced or artificial distinctions between types of military bases merely because of their geographic location. On this thesis no small group of independent nations could ever unite and pool their resources against a greater

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power. We would welcome, therefore, a realistic consideration in depth of the question of bases which accords with a realistic recognition of military commitments, of geography, and of the strategic military balance existing in the world today. If we ignore that military balance, we shall not proceed to what we all want, a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

We believe that the basic principles I have just enumerated must not be permitted to be eroded during our efforts to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament. We believe that the treaty that we have put before the Conference is a carefully constructed, carefully thought-out and fair treaty; but this does not mean that the United States insists upon rigidity or inflexibility in our negotiations. On the contrary, we are determined to engage in serious and constructive negotiations in order to reach the widest possible agreement, as early as is feasible, on any of the outstanding issues, provided these fundamental principles are not violated.

At our first meeting after the recess, last Monday, the representative of the Soviet Union put forward some new proposals (ENDC/48) which he said (ENDC/PV.57, p. 21) represented steps by his Government to meet the position of the United States and the other Western Powers. I must say right away that I regard the proposals on war by miscalculation as distinctly retrograde as far as concerns the specific proposal for the prohibition of joint exercises; however, I will comment upon them later. As to the other proposal, limited though it is, I should like to welcome it as a token indication of willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to reconsider the issues that are outstanding between us and to modify its proposals, if only to a limited and rather unrealistic extent. We sincerely hope that the Soviet delegation will continue to pursue this course of accommodation on which it has now made a small, but only partial, first step. That step is a step in the right direction, but it is a long, long way from half-way.

I should like to welcome also the fact that in one of Mr. Zorin's proposals of last Monday, on which I intend to comment briefly today, the Soviet Union has accepted in part one of the approaches advanced by the United States. I refer, of course, to the proposal by the Soviet Union for reduction of conventional armaments by percentage cuts during each stage of the disarmament process. Unfortunately I must deplore the fact that the text of the Soviet proposal, while welcome in and of itself, has not gone far enough and would in fact, if adopted, tend to create



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immediate and serious imbalances of military power. The reason for this is, of course, that the Soviet Union has chosen to adopt the United States sound approach of progressive reductions for only one type of armaments. It continues to insist on the total elimination in the first stage of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, of so-called "foreign" bases and of the stationing of troops in foreign territories, all of which are integral components of our existing defence arrangements.

I fully agree with my colleague from the United Kingdom that this Soviet proposal in its present form would, if implemented, compromise the Joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5) of last September. I refer particularly to the guiding principle that no State or group of States should gain military advantages from the disarmament process and that all States should enjoy an equal measure of security throughout that process.

The continuing Soviet insistence on the elimination in stage I of all nuclear delivery vehicles, a type of armament in which the West is generally regarded to have over-all superiority, and, in contrast, the Soviet proposal for a 30 per cent reduction of conventional armaments -- in which field the Soviet Union is regarded as possessing both superiority in arms and geographical superiority in manoeuvre -- quite clearly negate the principle of balanced reduction and would create an early disequilibrium of military power detrimental to peace. This is just not realistic. Thus, unfortunately, the Soviet Union has not met the United States position as it claims to have done. Rather, it has distorted the basic approach of gradual across-the-board reductions by not following through in its reappraisal of its position, and not coming to the logical conclusion of allowing for an over-all percentage cut in each stage.

The formula for the reduction of conventional armaments as now proposed by the Soviet Union raises some issues which I believe are deserving of special comment.

First, the Soviet proposal includes a 30 per cent reduction in the first stage of all conventional armaments as against the United States proposal that the first stage cut should include those major armaments which are more easily verifiable at the initial stage of the disarmament process. I wonder whether the Soviet Union realizes the increased amount of verification in the first stage such an arrangement as it proposes, including lighter armaments, would require, and whether it is prepared to express its views on how such verification would actually be implemented.

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Secondly, the Soviet proposal states that the Soviet Union is prepared to discuss the specific enumeration by type of conventional armaments to be reduced. The United States would welcome the opportunity to discuss this issue in considerable depth with the Soviet Union and, indeed, hopes that such a discussion will take place at a mutually-convenient time.

I would like to express the hope that the Soviet Union will further consider the problems I have just reviewed and will come to the logical conclusion that it should adopt the sound approach of balanced reductions of all armaments across-the-board by agreed percentages throughout the entire disarmament process. That would make it possible for our Conference to proceed to a detailed discussion of the specifics involved in the implementation of such an approach without trying to make imbalances at the very start of general and complete disarmament.

With regard to the other Soviet proposal, concerning reduction of risk of war by accident or miscalculation, I intend to comment on that in some detail at the meeting of the Committee of the Whole tomorrow, and so I shall not do so today. However, I am bound to say now that the Soviet proposal (ENDC/48, p. 1) for the prohibition of joint military exercises is completely unacceptable to us. I fully agree with the analysis of this proposal made yesterday by our United Kingdom colleague in which he said (ENDC/PV.58, p. 12) that such a prohibition would be detrimental to the security of smaller States, would put a premium on being a great Power, and would further add to the imbalance inherent in the Soviet disarmament proposals.

One final word on procedure. I thought the proposals (ENDC/50) advanced yesterday by our United Kingdom colleague were most helpful and constructive. I would be very happy to be able to say the same thing about the proposals of our colleagues from the Soviet Union. I do not share the views expressed today (supra, p. 8) by our Bulgarian colleague that the proposals made yesterday by the United Kingdom representative would slow down our work or would retard us in reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament. On the contrary, I think that those proposals should accelerate our work. As Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom representative, explained yesterday, his suggestion was that we should consider in depth the fundamental questions that must be resolved in the various stages of disarmament. Some of the problems he mentioned, of course, cut across the various stages of disarmament (ENDC/PV.58, p.16).

(Mr. Dean, United States)

It was my understanding that we could take up consideration of the problems he enumerated and, at the same time, the drafting of the treaty articles. In that way consideration of these matters in depth and the work of drafting appropriate treaty articles could go forward at the same time. However, as proposed by the representative of Sweden, since we have certain experts here, should the Committee wish to consider specific subjects, time might be saved by devoting a certain amount of time to those subjects. But the Committee, being master of its own procedure, can best determine how these suggestions of our United Kingdom colleague should be considered. On the whole, it would seem to me that they would help us and not retard us in our work.

Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): Like the other representatives who have spoken, the Swedish delegation wishes to express its satisfaction at being back in this Conference, where we think that, as international conferences usually go, there is a relatively propitious climate for our deliberations and negotiations. We entertain fair hopes that the new vigour demonstrated by the representatives will be matched by a new will to reach practicable and tenable solutions of this major problem of securing world peace through disarmament with which the Conference is charged. We in the Swedish delegation have learnt to listen to the speeches and read the verbatim records with a certain calm disregard of polemics, which will not lead us anywhere. Instead we attentively try to pick out any positive elements that have come forward. That perhaps make us a little more optimistic -- at least more optimistic than Mr. Lall was yesterday. We do think that the ground is now better prepared for a forward march in our Committee.

Like other delegations, we have used the recess for doing a certain amount of homework. We have had an opportunity to confer more closely with authorities at home, and we have selected for more penetrating study certain topics where our country has some experience -- either practical experience or the less direct, generalized experience deriving from science. We have devoted particular interest to certain aspects of the test ban treaty, that most urgent of all our problems; we continue to think that it is necessary now to begin the preparations for the practical working of such a treaty so as to make the time interval between its signature and its implementation as short as possible -- which is, briefly, the reason for our support of the suggestion originally made by the representative of Mexico for setting a target date for the suspension of nuclear tests.

(Lars. Myrdal, Sweden)

Now, I am not going to "jump the gun" and enter upon details about this further work which we have been undertaking. We shall duly wait for the nuclear Powers to shed more light on any new positions or any closing of the gap which they may achieve. This we will find when we read the records of the meetings in their special Sub-Committee.

The reason I asked to be allowed to speak today was really to say a few words about work procedures, particularly as the representative of the United Kingdom had yesterday been so courteous as to refer (ENDC/PV.58, p. 15) to some suggestions which my delegation had made before the recess about a more massive concentration of discussion on certain topics one at a time. I should like to amplify or interpret those suggestions somewhat, and I hope I shall not deviate too far from what was intended by the United Kingdom representative.

I view those proposals -- for a decision by the co-Chairman to announce some time in advance that we could concentrate on certain problems -- mainly as work preparatory to, and thus part of, our work on drafting the treaty on general and complete disarmament. It is only a question of finding a practical procedure, because the fact is that the two draft treaties are taking up these various topics in a different order. If we look at the very first chapter, on stage I, the United States draft (ENDC/30 and Corr. 1) starts with the problem of armaments, and the Soviet one (ENDC/2), as we all know, starts with the question of delivery vehicles for nuclear devices. Thus it is necessary to decide -- and we should do so rather in advance -- when we are going to take up one problem or another. The list (ENDC/50) which we had from the United Kingdom yesterday of subjects suitable for discussion in depth could well be re-arranged to a certain extent. We could, in the first instance, choose those topics which pertain only to the first stage. I know there will be difficulties, because one delegation might wish to put into one stage an item which another might think should be in another stage, so it would be hard to keep strictly to such a logical scheme for the discussions, but at least we could make an attempt initially to select topics from the first stage. That might mean that items like item 6 of the United Kingdom list, "Bases", or item 9, "Force levels", should be moved up for consideration amongst topics which pertain to the first stage.

In what order the co-Chairmen will decide to take the items to be discussed is immaterial to us. Our interest has only been to get a practical arrangement of the

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

discussions, and we have a twofold interest in proposing this. One consideration is that, if we knew in advance that a certain time would be set aside -- perhaps a certain week -- for discussion, for example of conventional armaments, delegations would better know which kind of expert advisers they should have available; thus they would have a maximum opportunity to provide themselves with the necessary expertise. The second practical consideration is that it would give a kind of discipline to our deliberations if we really decided to keep to one point for a considerable time until it was exhausted; we should be freed from the temptation to go off at tangents in all kinds of directions.

We could, with full confidence, leave it to the two co-Chairmen to make the selection of those topics which would actually serve the drafting of the treaty. We have made these recommendations only because we are so very eager to see some results achieved by our Conference.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation has listened with careful attention to the statements which have been made during the first two days of our resumed session, and to the speakers who have made statements today.

I should like first of all to state that the suggestions which we have just heard from the representative of Sweden for the organizing of our work seem to the Canadian delegation to have a great deal to recommend them, and we hope that the co-Chairmen and the other delegations present will consider them very carefully and see whether it is not possible to adopt, to the degree feasible, the methods of work which have been suggested.

We have listened with great interest to the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union, and particularly to that part of it which modified the previous Soviet draft of a treaty on general disarmament. We note that the Soviet Union has amended its draft to accept and incorporate essentially the same proposal in regard to the reduction of conventional armaments as had previously been put forward in the Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general disarmament (ENDC/30 and Corr. 1) submitted by the United States and supported by this delegation as well as the other Western delegations. The Canadian delegation feels that this is a step forward, although, if it were the only modification to be made, then obviously it would be objectionable for the reasons which have been pointed out by other speakers from Western countries. The Canadian delegation, however, is considering that this is

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

something to be regarded, not as the end of all negotiation or the final position, but as a beginning of negotiation on one of the most important sectors of the disarmament problem.

I think it has been mentioned several times that conventional armaments -- such things as tanks, attack aircraft, heavy artillery and so forth -- and not mere manpower give offensive powers to armies nowadays, and that the agreement on the reduction of those armaments is the vital part of what one might call the non-nuclear portion of disarmament. We therefore feel that there is an area here which can be negotiated on and which it should be possible to reach agreement upon if both sides accept this approach.

That does not simply mean, however, that the parties or co-Chairmen will have to sit down together with their assistants and try to agree on a form of words. We are not here merely to carry out an exercise in drafting such as might be given to a post-graduate student who intends to specialize in international affairs. We are here to deal with things -- armaments, rockets, tanks, aircraft, and the men who are manning them -- and we must always keep that thought before us.

Let us not be hypnotized by the mechanics of drafting phrases and articles; we can always draft words on which there will be some compromise agreement. However, if we do not consider very carefully what is behind the words, what we are really trying to accomplish with real things, real men, and real armaments, we shall not arrive at the conclusion we seek -- an agreement on how to effect general and complete disarmament.

Yesterday the representative of India, Mr. Lall, said:

"In the last analysis we are not going to accept either plan. It is not necessary at this stage, I would submit to the sponsors of the two plans, to point out any further ... the merits of the two plans."

(ENDC/PV.58, p. 27)

I do not think I shall be misinterpreting the representative of India in saying that we wish not merely to consider words but to agree together and negotiate in a manner which will enable us to deal with the realities lying behind the different draft plans.

We would hope that in this area in which the Soviet Union has modified its plan there will be a possibility for discussion and negotiation in depth and for understanding precisely what is meant by the reduction of armaments which is to be carried

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out. The need for this precision is perhaps indicated in the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union that:

"... it would be expedient to enumerate specifically in the appropriate articles of the treaty the basic types of conventional armament to be reduced by 30 per cent in the first stage ..." (ENDC/PV.57, p.23)

He went on:

"Our draft treaty has hitherto contained no such list of conventional armaments." (ibid.)

I suggest that that quotation from Mr. Zorin's speech implies careful negotiations to understand exactly what is meant, and it would be necessary no doubt for those primarily responsible for the negotiations to have the assistance of military advisers in working out the detailed agreement on this subject.

I would feel also that, if it were possible to reach agreement on how conventional armaments were to be reduced throughout the three stages, it should facilitate agreement on the reduction of manpower levels throughout the three stages; because, as I have said, the power of forces is more dependent on armaments, and when you have some agreement on the armaments which are to exist at the various stages, it should accordingly be easier to adjust any differences of view which now exist concerning the manpower level reductions.

I refer briefly now to the move which has been announced by the representative of the Soviet Union in regard to Soviet acceptance of certain United States proposals on the reduction of the risk of war. We shall be looking forward to a further explanation of precisely what the Soviet Union intends in this respect.

I note that Mr. Zorin said:

"... the Soviet Government shares the view expressed in the Committee of a number of non-aligned States that it would be wise, before the completion of general and complete disarmament, to adopt certain measures for reducing the risk of an accidental outbreak of war. With this in mind, the Soviet Government is prepared to agree to such measures proposed by the United States for the first stage as the exchange of military missions between States ..." (ibid. p.24)

The meaning of that is a little obscure to me. Does the expression "as the first stage" mean that this will be the first thing to be done, rather than that it will be done in the first stage of disarmament? I ask that because it is quite clear

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

in the later part of the statement that the restriction on military manoeuvres and movements is envisaged for the first stage of disarmament only.

The view of the Canadian delegation is that if these measures -- which are intended to reduce the risk of war, the fear of war, the fear of surprise, and the suspicion which exists between States -- are good, then they should be put into effect even before the first stage of disarmament. In other words, they should come within the category of collateral measures; and, as the Committee is well aware, it has been agreed between the co-Chairmen and by the Committee that measures to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation shall be one of the subjects to be discussed in the Committee of the Whole.

My point is that, while welcoming the agreement of the Soviet Union to accept in general terms one of the United States proposals, we feel that this should be considered as one of the measures to reduce tensions and to facilitate the possibility of disarmament -- that is to say, something which can be put into effect even before starting the implementation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, or even before final agreement is reached on all the measures of such a disarmament treaty. We would reserve our right to comment further on some of the points in the detailed Soviet proposals which have been criticized by some of the previous speakers.

We should like also to welcome the suggestions made by the representative of the United Kingdom yesterday (ENDC/50) on possible areas for discussion; and perhaps I might say that it seems to me that the representative of Bulgaria has misinterpreted what was intended by that proposal. It is not intended to discuss matters which are not included in either of the draft treaties submitted; and, as for tearing them from their context, we do not feel that discussion of measures which have to be carried out in succeeding stages is necessarily tearing them from their context or departing in an unreasonable way from our main task, which is to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament. The Canadian delegation has spoken on this subject several times before, and we feel that in order to reach agreement and to carry out the type of studies which were advocated by the representative of Sweden, it will be necessary to discuss the measures in a series, passing from stage to stage rather than simply discussing what part of a particular measure can be dealt with in the first stage before considering anything about it which is put into one of the succeeding stages.



(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Finally, if I may, I should like to refer to, and just remind the Committee of, the observation made by the representative of the United States at our fifty-seventh meeting towards the end of his statement:

"The United States has committed itself to continuing study and review of the various issues that must be resolved in order to achieve the progressive and balanced reduction of military establishments. Some of the results of this continuing effort have been reflected in the modifications and elaborations of the proposals the United States has submitted during the earlier meetings of this Committee." (ENDC/PV.57, p. 15)

The Canadian delegation is aware of the studies which are being undertaken by the United States Disarmament Agency and the other organs of government, and has been consulted in that connexion; and it is to be expected that in due course we shall be hearing of possible areas in which the plan which has been jointly supported by the Western nations can move forward in a way which will, perhaps, be more constructive. However, one must say that the processes of parliamentary democracy and of the Government of the United States do not always lend themselves to such rapid decisions as some other forms of government, and perhaps we might make a small plea for some patience in this respect.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): The Italian delegation has read most carefully the important statement made by Mr. Zorin on 16 July (ENDC/PV.57, p. 16), and has begun to study the documents which the Soviet delegation has submitted to the Conference.

In spite of some unjustified attacks on Western policy contained in Mr. Zorin's statement -- to which I have already referred in my own statement of 16 July (ibid., p. 28) -- I am happy to note the spirit of conciliation with which, according to Mr. Zorin, the Soviet delegation is imbued at this second session. To tell the truth, the Soviet delegation has always claimed that its proposals and its draft treaty are not final and are not a "take it or leave it" offer; just as we, for our part, have always maintained that our proposals are not rigid and that we are willing to try any possibility of conciliation, provided that the requirements which we sincerely believe to be essential for total disarmament in a really peaceful world are satisfied. This should obviously be the attitude of both sides, otherwise our negotiations would be pointless; they would not be real negotiations but a meaningless contest in oratory.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Having thus affirmed that the Italian delegation recognizes with satisfaction the spirit that seems to underly the proposals recently made by the Soviet delegation, that we appreciate that spirit and are willing to believe that it is completely sincere, I will venture to make a few entirely preliminary comments and to put some questions to the Soviet delegation.

Let us take first the reduction of conventional armaments. The position of the Soviet delegation on this question was previously, if you will allow me to say so, rather weak and uncertain. For the provision in the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2) to the effect that the quantity of conventional armaments is to be established in the different stages of disarmament on the basis of, and in proportion to, the force levels was extremely vague and provided no guarantee; whereas the United States proposal for a percentage reduction of these armaments (ENDC/30 and Corr. 1) was clear and concrete, and left no room for doubt or uncertainty.

We are glad that the Soviet Union delegation has acknowledged the justice of our argument. Unfortunately the acknowledgement is only partial, because the new Soviet proposals, if I have understood them correctly, form a single whole within which, in the context of the other Soviet proposals, the suggested amendments lose much of their value and significance. Once the principle of the gradual elimination of conventional armaments by percentage reductions was accepted, the force of logic should have led to its application to all armaments. But this has not been so. The new Soviet proposals are still designed to maintain and combine measures of total and partial disarmament in the same stage, which would create the imbalances and insurmountable difficulties to which the Italian delegation repeatedly drew the attention of the Conference during the first part of this session.

But that is not the only point worth noting. The new Soviet proposals, if I have correctly understood them, in so far as they concern conventional armaments, remain closely linked with all the other measures in the Soviet plan. Thus, if we consider the first stage, the reduction of 30 per cent in armaments would be based on a force level of 1,700,000 men; whereas the United States plan proposes a 30 per cent reduction for a force level of 2,100,000 men. I do not intend to discuss this question of force levels now, but from what I have just pointed out it is clear that the 30 per cent reduction acquires a different significance and scope according to which of these force levels is envisaged. For, after a 30 per cent reduction of armaments, a force of 1,700,000 men would retain a much larger and, indeed,

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excessive quantity of armaments. In other words, after this 30 per cent reduction had been made there would still be a large quantity of weapons which could easily be used to arm trained reserves quickly in case of need. Now that might happen during the first stage of disarmament -- that is to say, during the most delicate and dangerous phase of disarmament, for mutual trust would still have been only partly restored.

Still in connexion with conventional armaments, there is the question of the list of weapons to which the reductions are to be applied during the various stages. We, for our part, have submitted a list. But the Soviet delegation had not previously done so; now it invites us to draw up an agreed list. This is a useful proposal, for however the reductions are to be applied, the list is necessary: we must know which weapons the agreed reductions will be applied to. The joint drafting of this list therefore constitutes a very useful task to which the Committee should apply itself.

For the purposes of this list, I think it is very important to reach an agreed definition of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. The definition given in the Soviet plan is so wide that the Soviet proposal calling for total elimination of delivery vehicles in the first stage is, for that very reason, as we well know, contrary to the principle of balanced and gradual disarmament; and if we apply this definition in accordance with the latest proposals submitted to us, we arrive at an even more marked negation of that principle. If we accepted articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Soviet draft treaty, there would remain very few weapons to which the 30 per cent reduction would apply. An examination of the list would help us to a better understanding of the real scope of the new Soviet proposals of which I have been speaking.

The task which the Soviet Union delegation proposes to us, of drawing up a list of conventional armaments, seems to fit in with the method of work suggested by the United Kingdom delegation (ENDC/PV.58, pp. 15 et seq.), which we fully endorse. The drafting of this list might well be the Committee's first task in its work on the first subject on the list proposed yesterday by Mr. Godber. I note, incidentally, with regard to the method of work proposed by Mr. Godber, that Mr. Zorin did not raise any objection in principle yesterday, and I am very glad of that. In fact the Soviet representative assured the Conference that he would study, with the other co-Chairman, the document submitted by the United Kingdom delegation (ENDC/50).

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I was therefore rather surprised this morning to hear Mr. Tarabanov severely criticizing the constructive method of work we have proposed. I hope, however, that his opposition will not be too inflexible, and that he will subsequently find it possible to accept the decisions taken by the two co-Chairmen on this matter. I am sure, moreover, that the two co-Chairmen will wish to give due consideration to the most interesting comments made on this subject today by the representative of Sweden.

I would now like to touch very briefly on the question of war by miscalculation. Here, too, what the Soviet delegation is proposing to us seems to me to be a package deal. All the proposed measures -- those which the Soviet delegation has taken from the United States plan and the new measure which it has just suggested -- form a single whole. That at least is my impression, though I hope it is not really so. The proposed prohibition of joint military manoeuvres by two or more States not only discriminates against small countries, as Mr. Godber rightly pointed out yesterday (ENDC/PV.58, p. 12), but does not stand up to logical examination.

According to this proposal military manoeuvres carried out, for instance, in Russia by millions of soldiers with weapons of great destructive power would not cause any danger of a war; but would joint manoeuvres by, for example, a few battalions from Belgium and Luxembourg constitute a danger of war? There is something here that I do not understand very well and needs to be explained.

Please understand that these few entirely preliminary remarks do not express opposition to the new Soviet proposals, which undoubtedly deserve a thorough technical study which we have not yet had time to complete. We are giving them our most sympathetic attention, and I hope that they may be the subject of a thorough technical study in this Committee itself. I repeat "technical"; for in any case these proposals represent progress in the sense that through them it may be possible to start real negotiation, which is most important. If we confined ourselves to repeating the same ideas and restating the same position, which I fear we might end by doing if we embarked on a second reading of the treaty, our work would become completely sterile.

That was what I had in mind when I expressed doubts about this second reading. In making certain well-defined proposals, it seems to me that the Soviet delegation, too, wishes to undertake a thorough examination of certain precise and concrete problems, which in my opinion is the right way to conduct our negotiations.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I wish to assure our colleagues that, for our part, we too shall not remain idle or uncompromising in our positions. We too have taken advantage of the month's recess to reflect on all the comments, criticisms and objective suggestions made here by all the delegations, and in particular by the eight delegations of countries which are not members of any military alliance.

As Mr. Burns has just observed, the co-ordination between the Western countries and their parliamentary responsibilities under the free democratic system make our studies longer and our decisions less immediate. But that does not mean that we shall not soon make our contribution to the negotiations of the Committee, for no one is more deeply imbued than we are with the desire for conciliation and the determination to reach an agreement on general and complete disarmament and on the collateral disarmament measures which our peoples are impatiently awaiting.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): Since the resumption of our deliberations we have been taking stock of the situation in our work and in this Conference. All those who have spoken have stressed the progress we have made, but they had to admit that it was inadequate and that the problems we face, and which are still before us, call for an urgent solution. Since this is so, it was more than ever important to come to this resumed session of our Conference with some fresh thoughts and proposals. That is why I welcomed (ENDC/PV.57, p. 40) on Monday, as my colleagues will recall, the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union (ibid., pp. 16 et seq.). It was a gesture, a manifestation of goodwill, and I believe it was accepted as such by all the members of this Conference.

We are still awaiting the same from the Western Powers. I must say that I noted with satisfaction the statement made by Mr. Godber yesterday in which he assured us that the Western Powers had not wasted time (ENDC/PV.58, p. 13), and I hope that before long they will present to this Committee their new proposals and suggestions on the issues which are facing us. This by itself is very encouraging. However, even before submitting their new suggestions or proposals, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom made it clear that they wanted some further proposals and amendments from the Soviet Union. In other words, they wanted some more amendments to the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2) on general and complete disarmament. At this stage I would remind Mr. Godber of Canning's statement made about 140 years ago when he, in connexion with negotiations with a European Power, said: "They are giving too little; they are asking too much."

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Mr. Dean, speaking on Monday, described the Soviet draft treaty as unbalanced and invoked geographical considerations against its provisions (ENDC/PV.57, pp.11, 33). Mr. Godber stated (ibid., p. 38) that it offended against paragraph 5 of the Joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiation (ENDC/5). We understood that those objections concerned mainly the first stage of the disarmament programme. They are indeed fundamental. My delegation has given full support to the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union, and that is why I will ask the Committee's indulgence while I deal with these matters at some length.

Geography and balance are two different categories; one is to a certain extent beyond our control, the other we are able to control. What does this magic word "geography" imply? As I said on Monday (ENDC/PV.57, p. 42), geography speaks to us with one language. The globe is cast as it is, and our countries are situated where they are. We cannot alter that. But man, in mastering nature, has undoubtedly made tremendous progress in combating whatever difficulties geography may offer. I do not think that we could deal here in terms of geopolitics, a science which has an inglorious history from Ratzel to Haushofer. If the subject was raised, I submit that it was probably raised in connexion with the problem of communications and with the provisions of the first stage of the disarmament programme -- namely, the elimination of all nuclear vehicles and foreign bases and the corresponding reduction of conventional arms and armaments. This was made clear by Mr. Dean this morning (supra., p. 15). Without drawing any analogies, I am reminded of a discussion which took place in 1898 at the first peace conference at The Hague. When a proposal was submitted not to increase for a term of five years the number of troops maintained in peacetime, the German delegate opposed it and invoked geographical considerations, and the proposal was defeated, as were many other proposals after it.

I submit that the point of geography cannot be validly applied today; in an age of such advanced air, land and sea communications distances have undoubtedly shrunk. Mr. Dean stressed this morning (ibid.) the importance of co-ordination, the advantage of not having to cross frontiers, the facility of communications. He suggested that in all these fields the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact States seemed to have serious advantages. I submit that recent events have shown that the United States has little difficulty in crossing the ocean, overcoming the obstacles of the air and carrying out movements, in spite of the claim that geography does not

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favour it. I believe that there are no obstacles to the United States in crossing the frontiers of its own allies. Land communications have ceased to be a serious advantage; railways are not today the main communications medium, and we all know that air transport is much speedier than any other. If that is what is involved, there is no problem; if it is something else, I really fail to follow the point advanced by both the representative of the United States and the representative of the United Kingdom.

I must again stress that the measures envisaged in the first stage of the Soviet draft treaty concern East and West to an equal degree; the commitments concern to an equal degree the Warsaw Pact countries and the members of the Western alliance. Adequate control will be established, international manoeuvres will be barred, and those of a national character will have to be notified in advance. Military missions will be exchanged and direct communications established between the heads of the governments most concerned, as was suggested the other day by the representative of the Soviet Union (ENDC/43). I submit that that should and can meet all the needs resulting from the commitments compatible with the obligations involved in the disarmament process and the maintenance of international security. And I wish to stress that once we begin the process of disarmament a whole series of existing commitments will be incompatible with that process and will lose their validity. So here again I cannot follow the point put forward by the representative of the United States.

The issue of geography is linked with what is called balance in the process of disarmament. Again one may ask, what does this word mean? We do, of course, reject the historical notion of balance, that known from the treaties of Utrecht and Paris; history condemned it, and it produced results well known to all of us. It was that balance which brought about the uncontrolled armaments and much worse consequences which are recorded in history. In fact it always implied "balance in my favour", and when the balance seemed to have been disturbed or upset it implied that it must be restored, again "in my favour". The pages of European history bear ample evidence in this field.

It is obvious that this is not what we want to see in our disarmament treaty. Agreed principle 5, to which such frequent reference has been made, makes this clear by saying that:

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" ... at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ENDC/5, p. 2)

This is a new notion of balance, closely linked to the essential notion of security and not to the old concept of power politics. One can hardly say that the armaments race increases security, particularly in the field of the most dangerous weapons. A race is a dynamic notion, and it is highly unlikely that it could produce a balance -- in fact, by its very definition it could not do it. These two notions contradict each other. How, then, can balance be achieved? Only by stopping the spiral and going downwards; only by drastic disarmament measures striking at the very root of the evil by eliminating the most dangerous weapons, because there the risk is the greatest. There is little doubt that the weapon in question is the nuclear weapon. By eliminating it and by doing away with its means of delivery, the Warsaw Pact alliance risks as much as does the Western alliance. The Warsaw Pact alliance has nuclear weapons; that is well known, and very good nuclear weapons; the Warsaw Pact alliance is ready to abandon those weapons, to immobilize them, and therefore it risks as much as the Western alliance.

Why are we ready to give them up? We are ready to do so because we feel that we offer them in exchange for a much safer guarantee of our security. We are convinced that by disarming, by immobilizing nuclear weapons, we shall become more secure, if the other side accepts this. The whole world will become more secure, and I believe the same logic works east and west. For what is the difference? The balance is maintained by the simultaneous measures in other fields -- conventional armies and armaments -- by the establishment of an effective control system which will safeguard the vital rights of all concerned. How then can one claim that this measure creates an unbalanced situation? I find it hard to follow that line of reasoning.

Again, Mr. Dean suggested this morning (*supra.*, p. 13) that in order to stop the armaments race we have to select a certain moment and seize it, but the point is really to seize it. The United States plan does not provide for the cessation of the armaments race. A careful perusal of this document makes it clear; and if anybody could have had any doubts, Mr. Dean's statement this morning has made it clear, for he said that he opposed the barring of international manoeuvres (*supra.*, p. 18) -- which was suggested by the Soviet Union last Monday (ENDC/48). Now what



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are manoeuvres for? For perfecting weapons; for making armies combat-ready; for increasing their fitness. That is a function of the armaments race. If we are committed to a process of disarmament we have to stop it completely. If we are not, we will go only half way. In other words, if we follow this line of reasoning we shall proceed on a double track: disarmament and the armaments race. How could one speak then of the cessation of the armaments race, as Mr. Dean did this morning? The one statement is in conflict with the other, for whatever effects are achieved by the partial measures which are included in the disarmament procedure are immediately nullified by the continuation of the armaments race, which works much more quickly than disarmament measures. That, I believe, is worthy of careful consideration.

On the other hand I should say that in the Soviet proposal we find a serious attempt to cross this decisive threshold -- and it is decisive -- from a dangerous race to constructive and planned co-operation, towards disarmament. For what is the essential problem so frequently invoked, and repeated for many years, in disarmament debates? "Security and disarmament". It has swung like a pendulum in the inter-war years and after the Second World War -- security and disarmament. How can it be resolved? I think it can be resolved only by a maximum effort towards disarmament, which becomes decisive as a constructive element of security. If these are combined -- maximum effort in disarmament, maximum guarantee of security -- then the problem is solved, and I submit that in the first stage of the Soviet proposals this threshold is crossed by the immobilization of nuclear weapons. It is only, I submit, by a radical move downwards, by making the use of nuclear weapons impossible, that the risks resulting from the armaments race can be replaced by what we call a balance, safeguarding the security of all States without discrimination and without difference.

The dangers so frequently invoked by some of the Western Powers are really imaginary, and they will become even more so once we embark on a process of general and complete disarmament. For what I believe is essential -- and it concerns all the potential signatories of a treaty on general and complete disarmament -- is that already at the first stage of the disarmament process steps should be taken which will be of a decisive nature -- steps which are irreversible. It is important to do away with the temptation to go back on the armaments track. Armaments and the armaments race are a temptation. Once we eliminate that temptation there will be no way back; the dice will be cast and there will be no possibility of rearming. What better way is there than by making the use of nuclear weapons impossible?

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This again, as I said earlier, applies in equal terms to all of us. The nightmare of an atomic war will cease to haunt us. This is not only a military measure; it is an act of a political character, an act of our conscience and our responsibility to the present generation. Either we are resigned to living with the bomb, or we do away with it. There is no short cut. Either we approve of nuclear weapons or we do not. If we do not approve of them, we do not want them. I think the great majority of our generation has on more than one occasion given its reply in unequivocal terms. We could paraphrase the words of a great poet by saying: "Away, hence from my shuddering sight, to never more return."

I think the conclusions are obvious. Neither a 30 per cent nor a 50 per cent reduction of these deadly weapons would be of decisive importance. It would not eliminate the danger of war, nor reduce the possible destruction war could cause. In this respect I can do no better than cite Prime Minister Nehru's words when he said: "Disarmament had ceased to be a problem of the reduction of armaments. One-fourth of the nuclear arsenals of the great Powers would suffice to destroy the whole world." What is more, the perfecting of these most dangerous weapons may continue; and here, I submit, lies the essence of the problem.

We are committed by our terms of reference to work out an agreement on general and complete disarmament. If we are sincere in our endeavour we are bound to take -- already, now, here -- the first step: decisive and far-reaching measures which will not only make war of mass annihilation impossible but will commit us to go on to the final goal without permitting a second thought. That is provided for in particular in the first stage, as we see it, of the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union.

Now, entering the second phase of our deliberations, I believe we should be bold enough to proceed with our work and take the decisions which are expected of us. Some continue to claim that our civilization is one of wars and conflicts, thus condemning us to whatever may happen as a result of the armaments race. This is a very serious indictment indeed, and I submit that we cannot be made responsible for confirming this fallacy. We should bear in mind that to refuse to act will make us co-responsible, for in history deeds undone count too, and our refusal to act will be held against us.

Poland, so severely tried by history, is wholeheartedly committed to the cause of general and complete disarmament. This goal was again defined by Vladislav Gomulka when he stated the other day that: "The struggle for peace is not the concern

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of one group of people in Poland only; it is the concern of the whole nation, which gives expression to it every day in its daily work, by every citizen in all corners of the country." By joining this Committee we pledged ourselves -- and we continue to do so -- to do our utmost to work for an agreed programme and for a treaty on general and complete disarmament. I can assure all of my colleagues that we shall do so.

I think the time has come to proceed in a businesslike way. As far as procedure is concerned, we have had a proposal (ENDC/50) from the United Kingdom representative. I see some difficulty in adopting his procedure, for it would mean discussing each of the subjects separately, and that might lead to a prolonged exchange of views of a rather theoretical character, because, due to the very nature of the subject, we cannot consider the various disarmament measures in isolation; they must be treated in their mutual relationship. Past experience makes us doubtful whether separate treatment of each would serve a useful purpose. Whether we call it a "vertical approach" or otherwise, I believe it would be much more helpful if we could proceed in the manner adopted at our earlier stage. I think we should continue now, having dealt with the preliminary parts of the disarmament treaty, with an analysis of the disarmament measures provided for and visualized in the first stage of the disarmament process. I believe this is an urgent task to which we are all committed. In spite of the difficulties which were raised during the early days of our deliberations -- we should persevere in our efforts to reach what it is our obligation to reach, an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

Mr. Chairman, we have listened carefully to the observations made today by the delegations of the United States, Italy and Canada regarding our new proposals (ENDC/48), which, as we said at the first meeting, have been submitted in order to bring our points of view closer together and to facilitate agreement on a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

I must frankly admit that the reaction to our proposals, particularly that of the United States delegation, causes us grave disappointment. In effect, what has the representative of the United States said today? In essence his speech suggested that he is dissatisfied because we have moved closer towards the position of his Government. This is what is really behind his statements today. We have moved closer, we have adopted certain specific proposals from the United States plan

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word for word, but the United States is dissatisfied with this. Strange as it may seem, this is a fact. What does the United States want?

The representative of the United States is dissatisfied because, for instance, we have not accepted entirely the principle of a percentage cut in connexion with the reduction of conventional armaments, or rather because we have not extended this principle to other kinds of armaments. That is why the United States is dissatisfied with our perfectly genuine and specific concession and acceptance of its proposal. You cannot deny, however, that in our specific proposal, which you have before you, we have taken your specific proposal for a 30 per cent reduction in conventional armaments in the first stage, a 35 per cent reduction in the second stage and, in the third stage, a reduction to the level necessary for arming a militia or police force after general and complete disarmament.

This is an actual fact: we accept your proposal. Why are you dissatisfied? You say that we accept this principle only for a specific category of armaments. But in reply to this I would point out that in your own proposal and in your own plan (ENDC/30 and Corr. 1) you do not extend this principle to all kinds of armaments either. This is another hard fact. In your own proposal you talk of a 30 per cent reduction in the first stage, but not of all types of conventional armament. Is this a fact or not? Anyone familiar with your outline will say that it is a fact.

You take four categories of conventional armament and say that they should be reduced by 30 per cent, but you do not deal with other categories. Why do you not extend your principle to all kinds and categories of armament, including conventional armaments? You claim that we do not extend this principle to other types of armament. But you do not do this either. Although we have said that we wish the 30 per cent reduction in conventional armaments to be extended to all types and categories of conventional armaments, you oppose this. Why? Now, according to your speech today, you would like the principle of a percentage reduction to be extended as widely as possible. Why do you not wish to extend this principle to mortars, to individual categories of aircraft, and to small arms? Why do you oppose this? Your attitude is completely incomprehensible.

A second example: do you extend the principle of the 30 per cent reduction to foreign bases? You do not, and in your plan there is not a word about a reduction in bases in the first stage. Why do you not extend your principle of a 30 per cent reduction to bases, if you consider that this principle is universally applicable? There is no logic at all in your attitude.

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You say you have reasons, strategic reasons. I shall revert to these. But I wish to make it clear that you yourselves do not extend the principle of a percentage reduction to all types of armament. Furthermore, you do not extend the percentage cut to armed forces. Is this the case or is it not? Try to disprove it. Now you propose a reduction from 2.6 million to 2.1 million. Is this a 30 per cent reduction? No, it is only 20 per cent. Why do you reduce by 20 per cent in this case instead of by 30? Why do you ask us to reduce all types of armament by 30 per cent, including nuclear delivery vehicles? Where is your logic?

Gentlemen, you have no principles at all. You would like us simply to accept your entire proposal on the first stage. Mr. Lachs, who said today (supra, p. 29) that you are giving too little and asking too much, is right. Nothing is coming from your side. So far you have conceded nothing, not even on one question. You have not made a single proposal to meet us. But we on our side have made specific proposals, which you cannot deny. These are taken straight from your own proposals, and yet you are still dissatisfied.

I consider it necessary to state quite plainly at the very beginning of our discussions that we cannot agree on such a basis. What sort of a basis is this for negotiations? We are making genuine concessions and putting forward genuine, quite specific proposals, but the United States is dissatisfied. Why? Because all its proposals have not been accepted. No, if you wish to negotiate on an equal basis, please table your proposals and say what you are prepared to concede and on what questions you are prepared to compromise. Do you not know what we wish to secure from you?

Of course you do, for we referred to this in detail and expounded it in the last stage of the negotiations, in our final statement which, perhaps, you did not like. This statement of 14 June was made in all seriousness. We thought that you would think over this statement in the course of the past month. We considered it essential, before the completion of the first stage of our work, to state our view and to make clear the basis for a possible agreement in order to avoid misunderstandings. Now what did we say? We said the following, and I quote from the record of the meeting on 14 June:

"General and complete disarmament cannot be achieved without a treaty containing firm obligations, a definite time-limit, and a guarantee of uninterrupted transition from stage to stage." (ENDC/PV.56, p. 32)

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This is our primary requirement - what is your reply? So far, nothing. You stick to your old position. No general treaty, no firm obligations, no definite time-limit, no guaranteed uninterrupted transition from stage to stage. This is an actual fact.

Then we said:

"There can be no general and complete disarmament without the banning and complete liquidation of nuclear weapons." (ibid.)

Have you in any way changed your attitude on this question? Are you prepared to include in the treaty the banning and complete liquidation of nuclear weapons, instead of leaving obscurities about the arming of international armed forces with nuclear weapons? Are you prepared to make a clear statement that you oppose the arming of such forces with such weapons? It would be a genuine step forward if you made such a declaration. But so far there has been nothing of the kind.

Thirdly, we said:

"Agreement is impossible when one of the parties seeks military advantages for itself, and attempts to preserve until the final completion of disarmament not only the means of nuclear attack but also springboards for aggression near the territories of its partners." (ibid.)

Do you concede anything in this matter, are you moving forward in any way at all? Do you propose liquidating any of your bases located near the territory of the Soviet Union? Or do you think that we should agree to disarmament while exposed to your bombers and your rockets based on territories of other States near the frontiers of the Soviet Union? You talk of a realistic approach. But is it realistic to think that the Soviet Union would undertake a decisive reduction in its armed forces and liquidate all its nuclear delivery vehicles, the most powerful in the world, if you leave your rocket installations and bases and your nuclear bombers in territories bordering on the Soviet Union? What do you take us for? We are grown-up people. Every one of you understands that this is impossible. There are thus two alternatives: either you genuinely wish to negotiate a disarmament settlement, or you wish only to talk about disarmament. Without concrete steps on your part in this field there can be no disarmament. This is of course perfectly clear to everyone.

Furthermore, we said on 14 June:

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"It is futile to count on agreement if control is viewed as a means of infringing the security of States and providing intelligence on existing armaments, rather than as observation of the carrying out of disarmament measures." (ibid.)

Are you taking any steps in this direction, are you proposing anything? So far nothing has emerged. There has not been a single statement from you, though we have been in session for three days already.

Finally, we said on 14 June:

"It is impossible to reach agreement on measures for the maintenance of peace and security which violate the provisions of the United Nations Charter and flout the sovereign rights of States." (ibid., p. 33)

Yet this is what you are proposing. You wish to bypass the Security Council by establishing an international armed force, and you propose compulsory jurisdiction and arbitration by the International Court. This is most definitely contrary to the United Nations Charter. Now, please, say clearly whether you will modify your attitude on any of these vital matters or not.

This is our position, which we described with perfect clarity at the final meeting of the last session of the Committee. For a month we have been expecting you to consider the entire question and to take some step forward; but not only do you not take any step forward, but you are even dissatisfied because we are moving closer to you. What sort of negotiations are these? Perhaps John Finney, the correspondent of the New York Times, wrote correctly in the review of the situation before the resumption of our work on 14 July which he contributed to the paper:

"I believe at the present time the United States Government is attempting to have a double policy, striving to give the impression of movement while in fact standing pat."

This is a very pertinent observation and a very apt statement. Mr. Finney is, of course, not one of our correspondents but one of yours. He wrote this from Washington. He is very close to the White House and to your Government, so is he writing the truth or not? If it is the truth, then of course our prospects are very bleak. If it is not the truth, then prove it; prove it by making genuine proposals and by a more positive attitude to the steps which the Soviet Union is taking to meet you.

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That was the first remark which I wished to make about today's speeches.

Secondly, the representatives of the United States and of the United Kingdom yesterday, and those of Italy and Canada today, dealt in their speeches with the principle of balance and of a balanced and realistic approach; and today the representative of the United States referred to the need to take strategic and geographical factors into consideration. I should like to say a few words on this subject. The representative of Poland has already mentioned it, and in my view has very correctly analysed certain aspects of this entire problem. I should now like to say something about the matter from a different angle.

The United States representative spoke today and the United Kingdom representative spoke yesterday of the military commitments of the United States of America towards its allies in the military blocs. He said that it was necessary to be realistic and take all these military commitments into consideration, but that the Soviet proposals did not do so, ran counter to those commitments, and were therefore unrealistic.

I must state first that the military commitments of the United States to its allies in the military blocs pursue offensive and not defensive ends. The Soviet Union has not threatened and does not threaten the allies of the United States, and will threaten them even less in the process of disarmament. Therefore the question of giving some sort of special consideration in the disarmament plan to these United States commitments in no way arises.

Let us assume that you do not agree with our estimation of your commitments. You clearly know them better than we do, since you undertook them. Let us assume that you do have some commitments of a defensive nature. Even if we concede this for the sake of argument, why, frankly speaking, should the programme of general and complete disarmament be adapted to the military plans and commitments of NATO or any other military bloc of the Western Powers? Why? After all, we are not drawing up a rearmament plan, which would, of course, have to allow for the military obligations of this or that bloc in case of war. We are speaking of disarmament, and general and complete disarmament at that. Why do you wish to adapt this plan for general and complete disarmament to obligations within individual military blocs?

Turning now to our specific proposals, especially those intended for the first stage, I should like to draw attention to the following point. If all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and foreign military bases are liquidated in the first



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stage, the resultant situation will be the same for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In what sense is this so? Neither the United States (the most powerful State of one bloc) nor the Soviet Union (the most powerful State of the other bloc) will be able to go to the assistance of their respective allies with nuclear weapons, since these will have been destroyed. The position here is equal, so why do you speak of imbalance?

You will reply that we further demand the liquidation of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops. However, this demand likewise does not create any unilateral military advantages for the Soviet Union. In point of fact the armed forces of the USSR will be reduced to 1.7 million in the first stage, and there will also be considerable reduction in the armed forces of the other parties to the Warsaw Pact. That being so, even after the withdrawal of the United States forces from Europe the total strength of the armed forces of the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Turkey, Greece and the other European members of NATO will not be less than that of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries.

I do not lack proof of this. The United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Macnamara, speaking on 16 June at the University of Michigan, stated openly:

"In manpower alone NATO has more men under arms than the Soviet Union and its European satellites."

That is what he said. I have not changed any of his words, although I do not agree with the last phrase. I assume that the United States Secretary of Defense must be in possession of precise data. He could hardly make such a declaration to, in effect, the whole world unless it rested on some precise information. What are you afraid of? We are equally placed in respect of nuclear armaments, and in respect of conventional-armed manpower you are not in a worse situation than we but in a better one.

Moreover, liquidation of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons will in fact mean the almost total liquidation of military air forces and naval fleets, or at least of war planes and ships that could be used for offensive operations. If you are afraid of an attack by us, remember that we should not have the means to carry it out either. Consequently the problem of ensuring the safety of the military allies both of the United States and of the USSR vanishes, since no one would any longer be in a position to threaten it.

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Furthermore, in agreeing to the liquidation in stage I of its global rockets, against which there is no defence and which the United States does not yet possess, the Soviet Union is making the greatest unilateral concession. Liquidation of the military bases of the United States in Europe and elsewhere in the world will only be partial compensation for this enormous concession. To insist that the Soviet Union should waive even such partial compensation is, to say the least, unreasonable. In Mr. Dean's own words, it is unrealistic.

Here is a final argument. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have stated that liquidation of the means of delivery in stage I would disrupt NATO and deprive the United States of the power to support its allies. But who actually suggested this measure? It was suggested by General de Gaulle, the President of France, one of your allies and a principal member of NATO. Surely you do not suspect him of wishing to undermine NATO? I do not know what friction there may be between France and the United States concerning NATO, but the French Government and General de Gaulle himself have repeatedly declared that France wishes to play a major role in NATO, and the General is certainly no supporter of the destruction of NATO in any degree. Why then do you accuse us of wanting to disrupt NATO? You should speak to General de Gaulle on this subject. He made the proposal to Mr. Khrushchev when the latter was in Paris on an official visit.

There is therefore no serious foundation for all your arguments about imbalance, the disruption of NATO, the lack of realism of the plan, and so on. You may still be able to say something on this subject at the propaganda level, but not for long, since people will grow aware of the situation and see that there is no serious basis for your objections.

Therefore, in this talk about a realistic approach and a balanced programme, we do not in the least agree with your contention that your programme is balanced but ours is not. Just how is your programme balanced if you, in reducing by 30 per cent in stage I all means of delivery, including the Soviet Union's most powerful means of delivery, do not come forward with a single proposal regarding foreign military bases? What kind of balance is this? This alone strikes one immediately. We have already spoken about this in sufficient detail at the earlier meetings of the Committee. But you did not refute it and could not refute it, because it stands out a mile. What kind of balance is this? The United States' means of delivery are situated at these very bases. Seventy per cent of delivery vehicles remain at these bases under your plan. What kind of balance is this?

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Furthermore, the United States plan does not provide practical measures for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and the elimination of all stockpiles thereof. Under the plan it is even intended to equip the international force with nuclear weapons. You say that your plan is balanced and is in accordance with the Agreed Principles on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/5). Is it really in accordance with the Agreed Principles on general and complete disarmament? Nothing of the sort. The Agreed Principles speak of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons without any reservations; but you make reservations. Neither did you want to lay down in the working draft of the first articles of the treaty (ENDC/40/Rev. 1) that all nuclear weapons should be prohibited and eliminated. You were opposed to the words "prohibition of nuclear weapons". You were also opposed to providing that the international force should be armed with "non-nuclear weapons". You are definitely opposed to this. It means you are against the Principles on general and complete disarmament upon which we agreed earlier.

Finally, on control, it is known that the opening-up of 30 per cent of a country is perfectly adequate for locating all the important strategic objectives in its territory; but by the end of stage I the United States will still have 70 per cent of its means of delivery and all its nuclear weapons intact. Do you want us to agree to a principle of control which would provide an opportunity for striking a nuclear blow at more precise targets after the whole defence system of a country had been disclosed? This really is an unrealistic approach. Just where is your realism?

I do not wish to prolong my statement by referring to a number of other matters. I think that we shall do so later. But it is already perfectly obvious from what I have just said that the points made by the United States representative in criticism of our position have no foundation.

The United States position has been, is being and will be subjected to serious criticism. You have not yet replied to our arguments, and the United States attitude is in fact unchanged on the most important items, particularly the elimination of means of delivery, the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, and the dismantling of foreign bases. Without such change an agreement is impossible. However much you now speak of changes in working methods, this will not help matters. A change of attitude, not methods, is needed. A change in your specific proposals is needed. We have adopted this course, and we have submitted specific proposals. So far you have not done likewise.

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My last remark concerning our new proposals I should like to make in connexion with what the Polish representative has already said. It concerns military manoeuvres. Your basic argument, which was put forward yesterday by Mr. Godber and has been repeated by you all today -- with the exception, apparently, of the Canadian representative -- is that the prohibition of military manoeuvres by two or more States constitutes discrimination against small countries. According to Mr. Godber, equality between large and small countries is needed, equality between the heavily-armed and the lightly-armed. But if one takes the view that the equality of great and small Powers should consist in the right to be equally armed, all small countries should be equipped with nuclear weapons.

This is of course ridiculous; you yourselves are apparently against this. Why, then, do you observe inequality in this respect? Incidentally, you are, so I hear, being criticized by one of the member-countries of your bloc -- the Federal Republic of Germany -- in that you do not grant it full equality. Hitler's Germany, as you know, declared that it had no parity in armaments. It is a matter of history that at the Disarmament Conference in 1932-1933 the German delegation stated that it would not disarm until it was granted parity in armaments. That is what matters are coming to. We are opposed to such a situation. There can be no equality in this matter. It is simply unrealistic and dangerous to the cause of peace.

Furthermore, our proposal for the prohibition of military manoeuvres has precisely the same and equal significance for all small States -- both members of NATO and members of the Warsaw Pact. In this respect we are ensuring equality. We are not discriminating against small member-countries of NATO; we are proposing a measure which concerns all countries members of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

The representative of Italy, if I understand correctly, today asked how one can forbid Belgium and Luxembourg to conduct manoeuvres. The representative of Italy is perfectly well aware, however, that it is not Belgium and Luxembourg conducting manoeuvres, nor Norway and Luxembourg or Greece, but the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany conducting manoeuvres with the small member-countries of NATO. To whom, then, are you talking about violating the rights of small countries? Surely that is not the point at issue! Surely small countries do not conduct manoeuvres themselves! They are used simply as supplementary armed forces in your bloc. That is the point. They take part as auxiliary troops alongside the main forces of the bloc -- the great Powers, the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the rest.

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Why are you talking about the interests of small countries? It is a question, not of the interests of small countries, but of the United States, the United Kingdom and the whole of your military bloc. The representative of Poland is right in this: we must choose one of two courses -- either we want to reduce international tension and achieve disarmament, or we want to carry on the arms race. Manoeuvres are one of the elements for continuation of the arms race, particularly when they are carried out on a large scale and cover whole territories and vast regions.

The representative of Italy has today reproached the Soviet Union with the intention of conducting manoeuvres. He asks whether this does not represent a threat to everyone else. However, Mr. Cavalletti, what does the United States proposal, which was submitted with your agreement, say in this connexion? Section F, "Reduction of the Risk of War", says:

"1. Advance Notification of Military Movements and Manoeuvres.

Specified Parties to the Treaty would give advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres to other Parties to the Treaty and to the International Disarmament Organization." (ENDC/30, page 11)

This was your request, but we are complying with it. Our draft proposals were as follows:

"The States Parties to the Treaty agree to notify in advance substantial military movements or manoeuvres of their military armed forces within their national frontiers." (ENDC/48)

Your request is being fully complied with for the Soviet Union and any country party to the Warsaw Pact. What more do you want? It is not really a matter of notification, but of ending large-scale manoeuvres. That is the important point.

The aim of our proposal is to ease international tension and eliminate all danger of co-ordinated action by one bloc against another. Your proposal, on the other hand, is directly opposed to this. Why? Because you do not want to reduce international tension. You want to proceed with armament and not disarmament. This is the only interpretation of your attitude. How otherwise can you object to a ban on military manoeuvres by two or more countries in the first stage of disarmament?

Here we are signing a treaty leading to general and complete disarmament, and yet we are opposed to ending manoeuvres by countries belonging to blocs. This is not logical. If you really want general and complete disarmament, you cannot oppose this.

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And now my final comment, regarding the proposals submitted yesterday by the United Kingdom representative concerning the procedure of our Committee (ENDC/50). Many delegations have already expressed their opinion on this point. I feel that it might be better to talk this matter over in some detail with our co-Chairman and colleague Mr. Dean in an attempt to reach agreement. But one thing we are clear about, and should like to state here and now, is that we will not accept a procedure eliminating discussion of a firm draft treaty. That we shall not do. We already have a definite decision of the Committee in this respect, and as basic documents for discussion we have the Soviet draft treaty and the United States outline. Except for a few points, we have at least more or less agreed the preamble and the first three articles of the treaty. The attitudes of the parties have been clarified, and we know where effort is required to reach agreement. These are important steps forward -- but we must go further.

We must tackle the first stage of disarmament. It exists both in our draft and in that of the United States, and involves definite obligations concerning conventional armaments, nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and so on. Let us now discuss specific treaty provisions.

Various considerations have, however, been put forward: it has been suggested that we should first agree in general principle on matters which have been examined in depth. Does this imply another general discussion? If so, we are opposed to it. We should like to make a specific examination of the draft treaty and the outline before us. Let us have a basic discussion on these two documents.

The representative of Canada suggested today that the main thing is not to draft texts, but to understand and harmonize basic attitudes. He argued that the drafting of a text was not important, words were not important, but definition of the true position and establishment of a basis for a text were. What does this mean -- basis for a text? The basis for a text is represented by concrete disarmament and control measures. These are already there, in the draft treaty; these are the basis for an agreed text. Yet what do you want to do? Take some particular question out of the general context and discuss it afresh in isolation? But can we harmonize our attitudes on conventional armed forces without reference to other proposals for disarmament in the first stage? Of course it cannot be done, for these things are mutually interdependent. We must first of all agree what disarmament measures to include in the first stage.

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Let us recall what we did when we were discussing the first chapter, which surveys the general scope of disarmament. We took both the Soviet and the United States texts, and tried to determine the points of agreement and what disarmament measures should be included in the programme for general and complete disarmament. To some extent we achieved this. There were certain differences: the United States refused to include a ban on nuclear weapons, and so we recorded this; when they refused to include the dismantling of foreign bases as a separate paragraph, this was also noted. All the other paragraphs were agreed. We have then in outline the main features of the whole programme for general and complete disarmament.

We should now proceed with the first stage on these lines, examining the range of disarmament measures proposed for it and distributed between our draft and that of the United States. Let us discuss what measures we can agree to include. We shall possibly differ on certain matters, but we can leave them in abeyance or put them in brackets, as we did before. On certain questions we do agree: we shall, of course, include such things as the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and, as you say, the reduction (we prefer elimination) of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles; and there must also be some measures for reducing the risk of war. We have met the United States position half-way on these particular points, and there is now the possibility of agreement on these points. Let us then have a look at the whole of the first stage from beginning to end; we shall first discuss the general scope of disarmament measures in this stage and then examine each separate category and each article within it.

If the representative of the United Kingdom thinks that, for example, conventional armaments, which he puts first on his list of subjects, should be discussed within the context of the first stage, we are ready to do so. We are not against it. But we think it purposeless simply to take conventional armaments and begin a new general discussion on them. We should only be repeating a general discussion already held, we should be making no progress, and we should moreover be digressing from the work of drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We cannot adopt such a course. We have clear instructions from the General Assembly to draft an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

We have already agreed on a working procedure and have decided that the main task is the drafting of an agreement, that is a treaty on general and complete disarmament; we have even started the task. Why should we turn back or turn aside?

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

We have no justification for this, and so the proposals by the United Kingdom representative (ENDC/50) can be used by us in discussing the first stage of disarmament. We will give some thought to how this can be done, and I feel that Mr. Dean and myself will be able to find a practical solution. In this connexion I may recall that the representative of Sweden appealed for a practical solution, and I understand this perfectly.

We must not now start new general discussions. We must in fact decide what are our points of agreement on first-stage disarmament measures and how we can draft a treaty on that basis. If it proves impossible to draft everything from beginning to end in final form, let us continue our practice of leaving some things in brackets. Experience shows that we sometimes remove the brackets and produce a new wording. But what is important is that the whole discussion should not be divorced from the draft treaty, but should keep close to it. If everyone is of this opinion, then we have a common basis, and I believe the other co-Chairman and myself will be able to agree on a working procedure, on which we will report at a meeting in the very near future.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): In view of the lateness of the hour I promise to detain my colleagues for only a few minutes, and I shall reserve for another occasion my other comments arising out of what has been said this morning.

In relation to the proposal (ENDC/50) that I put forward yesterday I would say straight away that I have listened with interest to what various representatives have said, both yesterday and to-day, in response to it. In his last intervention our Soviet colleague suggested that it would be proper to discuss it in greater detail with the other co-Chairman. I welcome that aspect of his speech. In clarification, all I would say is that certainly our proposal is not intended as a backward step; it is intended as a step to facilitate our work and to help us forward, so that we shall have discussions which really get down to the basic issues. What I had in mind was to highlight the need for particular debates in regard to particular subjects -- related, if you like, to particular articles. So I hope very much that these discussions will be fruitful.

One or two representatives made comments on the proposal which rather puzzled me. I did not really understand the references of our Bulgarian colleague, who seemed to object that verification is included a number of times. Of course, in



(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

including it in that way I had very much in mind the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2), which I believe does find a certain amount of favour with our Bulgarian colleague. In that particular draft treaty practically all the articles, in the first stage anyway, refer directly to verification as well. So perhaps Mr. Tarabanov will look at it a little more kindly if he will compare it in that way. I do not wish to say any more on that except that I thank representatives for the consideration they are giving to our proposal and that I hope it can facilitate our work.

With regard to the other aspect of the speech of our Soviet colleague, he went over a good deal of ground. He made a number of points, practically all of which we have listened to before, and every one to which we have listened before has been answered fully and adequately before in previous debates. That is the sort of thing that I do not wish to perpetuate. I think we all know the positions in relation to these various issues. I would just take one point as an example: when Mr. Zorin was talking about the question of an international peace force, he posed a rhetorical question to the West in which he asked: "Are you prepared to make a clear statement that you oppose the arming of such forces with such weapons?" (supra, p. 33) I would say to him that the answer to that question has been given in the past. It is quite simply to put the opposite question to him: "Are you prepared to ensure that the international force shall be so equipped as to be able to deal with any potential aggressor?" That is the real answer to his question.

Our Polish colleague said in his speech, to which I listened with interest, one thing in particular which I find difficult to accept, and it was the one thing in particular which our Soviet colleague picked out and with which he said he agreed so fully. That is interesting. The point was this, and I made a note of it when he said it. He said:

"Once we begin the process of disarmament a whole series of existing commitments will .... lose their validity." (supra, p. 31)

The Soviet representative said how right he was (supra, p. 37). With great respect, I would say how wrong they both are. My answer is that in this respect it is not in fact at the immediate moment of entering into the first stage of disarmament that we can expect to see all these things disappear. That is not realistic. Of course we want to see them disappear, and of course they must disappear as the disarmament process goes forward; but it would be very wrong to pretend that suddenly, with the signing of a treaty, all this can be put on one side. Human

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

nature is not like that. What we must have is a scaling-down and then the elimination in the later stages of the disarmament process. That is the distinction that I would draw in regard to that matter.

Our Soviet colleague also paid a good deal of attention to his proposal put forward earlier this week, one which I myself found it necessary to disagree with: the question of two or more States holding manoeuvres together (ENDC/48). He made a great deal of the assertion that the West cared more about its military groupings than about anything else. But I made our position abundantly clear yesterday, as may be seen from the verbatim record. After discussing the effect it might have on small States, I went on to say:

"It is also true that, if such a proposal were accepted it would have its effect on various military groupings throughout the world. We shall see these groupings disappear and dissipate as the process of disarmament is brought to fruition; but we have to keep this principle of balance clearly in mind throughout the whole process..." (ENDC/PV.58, p.12).

That is what I said yesterday, and that indeed is the position of the West on this particular matter.

I should like to make just one comment on the speech of the representative of Poland. He did us the honour of quoting to us a British statesman, Canning. I think he quoted him as follows: "You are giving too little; you are asking too much." (supra, p. 29) In fact, if one were to be strictly pedantic, one might point out that he changed one word. Now, if he will allow me to change one word in the next line of that quotation from Canning, I will give it back to him like this: "You are giving too little; you are asking too much; but we are with equal advantage content." That, I think, is what Canning said, with only one word changed in my line, just as there was only one in his. Speaking as an Englishman, may I say that that represents our position exactly to-day as it did with Canning then? So we are with equal advantage content, and that is what we want to achieve here.

I think I dealt yesterday with the aspects he was dealing with today concerning the need for the West, just as much as for the East, to have a realistic approach. In view of the time, I shall not take up that particular argument further, but I should like to say that I welcome the suggestions of our Swedish colleague and hope that they will be borne in mind in the discussions between the co-Chairmen on the other matter I raised.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I have just one very small procedural point that I want to put, and that is in relation to Conference documents. In the Agreement on procedural arrangements adopted on 14 March, paragraph 4, it is stated that:

"Normally, verbatim records will be made available after a delay of two weeks for public use through the United Nations Secretariat at Geneva and New York unless otherwise decided." (ENDC/1, p. 1)

In practice it has not proved possible to adhere to that decision, although I think we are now more or less up to date so far as the issue of Conference documents is concerned, and I am assured that all the verbatim records up to 15 June, when we went into recess, should be issued by the end of this week. It is satisfactory that we have had all the documents, and that is very important; but I would hope that in the future it will be possible also to keep more up to date in the issue of verbatim records. There is really great interest in our activities and in the progress of our discussions in my own country and, I believe, throughout the world, and the verbatim records can of course give a far better indication of what we are talking about than can any of the documents.

I have been asked on a number of occasions by my colleagues in the House of Commons whether something can be done to speed up this particular process. I am not sure whether the reasons for delay in the past have lain more with the very understandable difficulties which our Secretariat has had to face, or with a certain delay on the part of some delegations in submitting corrections to the provisional verbatim record. In any event, I should like now to suggest that our two co-Chairmen might perhaps look into this matter in consultation with the Secretariat, and if possible let us have an early report on it. For my part, on behalf of the United Kingdom, I should be very grateful indeed if something could be done to speed up the issue of these records. I make this plea merely in order to enable others to enjoy the pleasure of perusing at an earlier date some of the pearls of wisdom which fall from the lips of so many representatives around this table.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I shall be very brief. I listened with the greatest interest to the statement by my colleague from the Soviet Union this morning. He seemed to me to emphasize what we have all been saying here, and that is that we must, I am afraid, forgo rhetoric and really get down to the facts and to figuring out how we can work with each other in order to achieve disarmament.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

It so happens that it is a fact that there are in the world today a large number of nations which are separate political sovereignties and which have got together in one form or another of alliance. The official title of the Soviet Union is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, although one or two of those Republics have sufficient independence to enjoy separate voting rights in the United Nations. Now, if all the people in NATO or in any other alliance should decide, as they would have a perfect right to do if they wished, to form a union such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, then all those bases which are now foreign bases would be on the territory of one country, and the position would become perfectly legal.

I mention that merely to show that we must approach these matters in depth and that we cannot continue to regard these legal fictions. As I said earlier, we have to face the geographical facts in this question of conventional weapons. Our plan was worked out as a very carefully balanced one. Mr. Zorin has said with a good deal of feeling that they took the engine out of the car and appropriated the entire engine, so why do we object? I would merely point out that you cannot take the lighting system out of the car or the tyres off the car and then object to what is left; you have to treat this thing as a balance.

The point was made that we have had a great deal of progress over land and that the United States has complete ability to reach by air, by sea, by rockets or by missiles all parts of the world; but the basic purpose of the Soviet plan would be to deprive the United States and all its allies of the right to do that in the first stage. There is no sense in being specious about these things; we must look at facts, and all the rhetoric and all the quotations in the world are not going to get us away from those facts. I therefore hope that at our next sitting we can get down to more facts and have a little less rhetoric.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I would just like to say a few words in reply to certain remarks and observations which have been made about my statement this morning on procedural questions. Several representatives -- particularly those of NATO countries -- said that I had misinterpreted, or at least misunderstood, the comments and proposals made by the United Kingdom representative concerning the discussion of the subjects he proposed for examination yesterday; and the United Kingdom representative himself advised me to read the verbatim record to see exactly how he had expressed his ideas. I should be the first to be pleased if I had misunderstood his statement; but I read in the record:

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

"Therefore, in the treaty text which we are going to produce" -- this certainly means the text of the treaty -- "we have to hammer out treaty articles which will have to embody our findings and our agreement in relation to the major problems which, as I said, I have tried to isolate. I felt that if we could have discussions on these items, as I have indicated, either in plenary meeting or in some other form, it would facilitate the drafting of articles in relation to them ..... It would be perfectly proper ..... that, having thrashed out a position" -- that is to say, after discussion of all these subjects -- "in regard to one of these items, we should then proceed to write draft articles incorporating the agreement which we might have achieved in relation to it, and we could then embody that in our total of agreed points." (ENDC/PV.58, p.39)

This method which is proposed to us, of discussing isolated problems and defining these problems in advance without first discussing the texts which are before us, can certainly not be followed; for, as I have already said, it would delay our work -- one might even say that it would wreck it. What I should like -- and I am in agreement with the representative of Sweden -- is that when, as discussions proceed on draft texts, a particular question arises, we should discuss and define it. We could go on discussing the question until it was clarified; but what we must not do is to discuss particular questions in isolation, drawing up now, in advance, a list of questions which would be discussed interminably.

I think the statements made today by various representatives of NATO countries, which I need not mention by name, have shown that these delegations do indeed wish to isolate questions, discuss them separately, and then draft articles in the light of the principles derived from the discussion of those questions.

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I should like to say, on behalf of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in regard to the observations made by the United Kingdom delegation, that the Secretariat will do everything in its power to ensure that these records are produced in proper form, in accordance with the United Kingdom representative's request.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its fifty-ninth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Padilla Nervo, representative of Mexico.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, the United States, the Soviet Union, Sweden, Canada, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 24 July 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.