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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICA

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## INTRODUCTION

1. The Security Council considered the question of South Africa at its 3107th meeting on 17 August 1992, having before it the report of the Secretary-General (S/24389). At the same meeting, the Security Council adopted resolution 772 (1992).
2. The resolution, inter alia, authorized the Secretary-General to deploy United Nations observers in South Africa, called upon the Government of South Africa, parties and organizations to extend their full cooperation to the observers and invited international organizations to also consider deploying observers in South Africa. In resolution 772 (1992), the Council also decided to remain seized of the matter until a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa is established.
3. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 772 (1992).
4. Following the adoption of the resolution, the President of the Security Council made the following statement (S/24456) on behalf of the Council:

"It is the understanding of the members of the Council that the Secretary-General will consult the Council on the number of observers he has the intention to deploy from time to time".
5. On 10 September 1992, I informed members of the Security Council of my decision to dispatch an advance party of 13 United Nations observers to South Africa on 11 September 1992 as part of the complement of 50 observers to be deployed in the country within a month.
6. On the same day, following consultations held by the Security Council, the President of the Council read a statement to the press (S/24541), in which he stated, inter alia, that the members of the Security Council deplored the killing of 28 demonstrators and the wounding of nearly 200 others by security elements at Bisho, Ciskei, in South Africa on 7 September 1992. The members reiterated their grave concern at the continued escalation of the violence in South Africa. They emphasized once again the responsibility of the South African authorities for the maintenance of law and order and called on them to take all measures to end the violence and to protect the right of all South Africans to engage in peaceful political activity without fear of intimidation or violence. The members of the Council urged all parties in South Africa to cooperate in combating violence and to exercise maximum restraint in order to help break the spiralling cycle of violence.
7. The President of the Security Council also stated that the members of the Council emphasized the need to put an end to the violence and create conditions for negotiations leading to the establishment of a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa. They welcomed the Secretary-General's decision to deploy an advance party of 13 United Nations observers in South Africa.

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8. The President further stated that the members of the Security Council called upon the Government of South Africa, parties and organizations, and the structures set up under the National Peace Accord, to extend their full cooperation to the United Nations observers to enable them to carry out their tasks effectively. They reiterated their call to other relevant regional and intergovernmental organizations to consider deploying their own observers in South Africa in coordination with the United Nations and the structures set up under the National Peace Accord in order to facilitate the peace process.

9. In a communication addressed to me, dated 4 September 1992 (S/24526), the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations informed me that the European Community Troika of Foreign Ministers, composed of the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Foreign Ministers of Portugal and Denmark, visited South Africa on 2 and 3 September 1992. Mr. Hurd had announced at a press conference in Pretoria on 3 September that the parties had accepted the European Community's offer to send observers to South Africa to be associated with the structures of the National Peace Accord, as part of efforts to end the violence. He indicated that initially, approximately 15 European Community observers were expected to be sent and that they would work in close coordination with the United Nations and with other international organizations.

10. In a communication addressed to me, dated 9 September 1992 (S/24544), the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations transmitted a memorandum submitted by the South African Government on the events which took place at Bisho, Ciskei, on 7 September 1992.

11. Taking into account ongoing developments in South Africa, and following consultations with the Government of South Africa and the parties after the adoption of resolution 772 (1992), I designated two Special Envoys who carried out separate missions to South Africa. Mr. Virendra Dayal, former United Nations Under-Secretary-General, visited South Africa from 16 to 27 September 1992. Ambassador Tom Vraalsen, Assistant Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway and former Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations, carried out a mission to South Africa from 22 November to 9 December 1992.

12. During the course of their respective visits, the Special Envoys held discussions with State President F. W. de Klerk and senior officials of the Government. They also had meetings with Mr. Nelson Mandela, President of the African National Congress (ANC) and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, President of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), as well as with leaders of other relevant parties in regard to the latest developments. Similar meetings were held with the senior officials of the National Peace Committee and National Peace Secretariat, and the Commission of Enquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation (Goldstone Commission). In addition, discussions were held with representatives of non-governmental organizations, as well as with the business, religious, human rights and development communities, along with civic associations. Discussions were also held with the leaders of the

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international observer teams that have been deployed in South Africa by the Commonwealth, the European Community and the Organization of African Unity.

I. FINDINGS OF THE SPECIAL ENVOYS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

13. Following these wide-ranging consultations, each of the Special Envoys reported his findings to me. Their findings are reflected below.

Status of negotiations

14. In contrast with the relatively minimal contact between the parties immediately following the stalemate in CODESA II, the current period is marked by a series of high-level contacts between nearly all parties in South Africa, including some of the parties not involved in the earlier CODESA process.

15. All parties appear to agree, in principle, that multi-party negotiations offer the only way forward to resolving South Africa's political problems. However, agreement has yet to be reached on the form a multi-party forum should take and its desired outcome. These issues, along with questions regarding participation, the agenda and timing of such a meeting, are among the topics being addressed in bilateral meetings.

16. In bilateral talks in the first week of December 1992, the Government and ANC appear to have made considerable progress in narrowing differences. The talks took place against the background of the Government's proposed timetable for the transition, and the November 1992 meeting of the ANC's National Executive Committee which considered the establishment of interim governmental structures.

17. Although there are fundamental differences yet to be bridged between these two parties, there appears to be a convergence of positions and a willingness on both sides to negotiate with one another and with others. A continuation of bilateral talks between the Government and ANC is expected shortly. Both parties have strongly emphasized that their positions are to be considered as proposals, and that they are determined not to exclude other parties from the process. They have, nonetheless, also expressed the strong feeling that no party should be permitted to block progress towards a negotiated transition.

18. Attempts are being made to arrange a meeting between the State President, Mr. F. W. de Klerk, and Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi in order to address the question of the resumption of multi-party talks. A meeting between President de Klerk, Chief Buthelezi and the leaders of Bophuthatswana and Ciskei was held on 10 December 1992 to discuss the resumption of multi-party talks.

19. Following the agreement reached between ANC and IFP at the 24 November 1992 meeting of the National Peace Committee, preparations have

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begun for a meeting between Chief Buthelezi and Mr. Nelson Mandela. Both organizations have appointed subcommittees of their senior leadership to prepare for the meeting. It is hoped that the preparations would expedite arrangements for an early meeting of the two leaders.

20. The Government and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) held bilateral discussions in Gaborone in early November 1992, and agreed to meet again in South Africa on 9 December 1992 to discuss the convening of a multi-party forum. Subsequently, the Government has reacted strongly to the position taken by the PAC political leadership with regard to reports that its armed wing, the Azanian Peoples' Liberation Army (APLA), claimed responsibility for recent armed attacks at King William's Town and Queens Town and that APLA planned a campaign of attacks on "soft targets". Following this, arrangements for further meetings with PAC were cancelled.

21. Further political developments include the emergence in October of a loose coalition composed of the Conservative Party and other groups on the right, and the leaders of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and KwaZulu. This "Concerned South Africans Group" (COSAG) is aimed at galvanizing opposition to what its members perceive as an alliance between ANC and the Government. Other organizations and entities across the entire political spectrum are also pursuing contacts with one another.

22. Bilateral talks between the parties have focused on serious constitutional discussions about regional structures and the devolution of powers, power-sharing provisions, and the constitutional provisions related thereto. The regional structure of a new South Africa, and the relationship of the regions to the central government, remains a major preoccupation with all the parties. Agreement on effective multi-party machinery based on the principle of inclusiveness remains an essential first step for a resumption of multi-party negotiations.

23. At CODESA II there was wide agreement in principle on the reincorporation of the homelands into South Africa, their participation in the transitional arrangements, provisions for testing the will of their people regarding their reincorporation, and the "restoration" of South African citizenship to those who chose reincorporation.

24. The leader of Ciskei has subsequently indicated his outright opposition to reincorporation, and Bophuthatswana continues to reject suggestions of reincorporation. On 1 December, Chief Buthelezi presented a new draft constitution for a "federal state of Natal/KwaZulu" which was ratified that same day by the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly.

#### National Peace Accord

25. Since the stalemate at CODESA II, the National Peace Committee has been the focal point for efforts to bring the major parties together to facilitate the peace process. A meeting of signatories of the Peace Accord, called for

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by the National Peace Committee on 24 November 1992, will provide an opportunity for the parties to review developments and to consider ways of strengthening the peace structures.

26. The National Peace Accord and the structures established under it are among South Africa's most valuable tools for assisting in reducing violence and bringing about a peaceful transition to democracy. A series of contacts between the parties have been made at all levels through the National Peace Committee and the network of Regional and Local Dispute Resolution Committees. These bodies offer open channels of communication essential to building a culture of political tolerance in the country. In this regard, virtually all parties have expressed the view that the presence in South Africa of United Nations Observers has significantly enhanced and reinforced the structures under the National Peace Accord.

27. A matter of particular concern is that some of the homelands are not signatories to the Accord, and some of those which are parties to it have withdrawn from the peace structures. The homelands continue to be major flashpoints of violence, largely due to conflicts arising over the lack of free political expression. They retain on their statute books repressive legislation such as the Internal Security Act, whose provisions have the practical effect of prohibiting public gatherings and other forms of political activity. There is also evidence that the security forces of the homelands are involved in violence. The result of these repressive practices and violence are increased tension and rising numbers of dead, injured and displaced, both inside the homelands themselves and in border areas. The responsibility of the Government of South Africa to redress this situation cannot be overemphasized.

#### Return of refugees

28. Some 13,000 returnees are receiving protection and assistance from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in South Africa and another 5,000 refugees have applied to return. UNHCR's mandate in the country has been extended for another year in order to address problems of reintegration and to facilitate the return of exiles. UNHCR has reached agreement with the South African Government for the involvement of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in reintegration, focusing on the needs of women and children. A recent United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) mission to South Africa recommended that since rehabilitation programmes are not normally within the mandate of UNHCR, consideration should be given to establishing a modest UNDP presence in South Africa, within UNHCR, to assist with the rehabilitation aspects of resettling returnees.

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Areas of concern identified in the previous report of  
the Secretary-General (S/24389) and Security Council  
resolution 772 (1992)

Violence

29. Fear of violence and violence itself continue to be features of daily life in South Africa, particularly in the Witwatersrand/Vaal and Natal/KwaZulu regions. These regions account for most of the politically motivated violence in the country, which has been attributed to conflict between supporters of ANC and IFP. This conflict often manifests itself at the local or regional level where parties engage in violence and intimidation to establish and secure claims to a specific geographical area as their political base.

30. Hostility between ANC and IFP supporters in many areas is openly acknowledged, but there is a growing sentiment that it fails to explain a significant proportion of the violence. There is strong evidence of conspiracy in some quarters and the use of agents provocateurs to incite and direct violence calculated to discredit and disrupt the peace process. Here it should be emphasized that grave concern continues to be expressed regarding the existence of covert operations, apparently sanctioned at high levels of Military Intelligence, as recently as December 1992.

31. Socio-economic factors and crime often trigger political violence. "Commercial" violence often becomes politicized, destabilizing entire communities. High unemployment, inadequate housing and the lack of basic services such as water and sanitation pit groups against one another. To this volatile mix must be added the existence in the townships of certain "self-defence units" of dubious legitimacy, and right-wing "commandos" in some mostly rural areas of the country. Another critical element is the apparently growing cross-border traffic in weaponry, particularly from Mozambique. Indications are that the senior political leadership lacks political control over groups that engage in violence.

32. Despite continued violence, there is wide agreement that without the deployment of international observers in the country the level of violence would be higher. The presence of the observers is viewed as having a salutary effect on the situation.

Measures to reduce violence

33. While the primary responsibility of the South African Government for maintaining law and order is not questioned, there is a growing recognition that political leaders across the spectrum also have a responsibility to actively discourage violence on the part of their supporters.

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Investigations and prosecutions of criminal activity

34. In South Africa's current political context, there is troubling evidence of serious deficiencies in the law enforcement establishment's ability to promptly investigate violent crimes and prosecute offenders. At worst, these deficiencies translate into public perceptions of security force conspiracy or complicity in such crimes, which has frequently contributed to further violence, often directed at individual policemen. At best, such deficiencies are viewed as proof that the number of competent police personnel is inadequate.

Efforts at police reform

35. There is a pervasive public sense of disbelief at the failure of the South African police (SAP) to maintain law and order and a widely held perception that the Government has failed to make full use of its law enforcement powers to stop violence. However, there appears to be an ongoing effort on its part to improve the image and methods of work of SAP. Organizational change in SAP is to be welcomed and encouraged. International exchange of expertise and training is being sought. Particular emphasis is being placed on community policing with the stated intention of moving away from the concept of a police "force" to that of a police "service". Reform of this kind demands political guidance and support from the highest levels of government, as well as consistency, perseverance and mobilization of resources. This level of commitment is indispensable.

Investigations into the security forces and other armed formations

36. Evidence of conspiracy by at least some elements in the security establishment, recent armed attacks, the continued recruitment and training of individuals for service in non-governmental armed formations, the presence of arms caches and the cross-border flow of weapons all contribute to the level of violence and risk jeopardizing the transition to democracy. In his statement to the press on 16 November 1992, Justice Goldstone referred to the Secretary-General's recommendation that the Goldstone Commission undertake a series of investigations into the security forces and other armed formations. Justice Goldstone called on "all political parties and groups in South Africa, and particularly the Government, to authorize and empower the Commission, or any other independent body, to carry out urgently and fully the recommendations of the Secretary-General". He also called on the international community to assist in this regard.

37. Justice Goldstone assured the Special Envoys that the Commission has all the legal powers needed to carry out its mandate. He stressed that he was entirely satisfied with the response that he had received from the State President regarding the resources which would be put at the Commission's disposal to conduct the necessary investigations. He also expressed satisfaction with the Government officials designated to work with him, and

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the principles agreed with the Government concerning access to information. The Government's commitments to Justice Goldstone were subsequently confirmed at the highest level.

38. The highest levels of the ANC have also pledged to cooperate with the Goldstone Commission and facilitate its work. Such cooperation is not forthcoming from PAC with regard to APLA, or the Chief Minister of KwaZulu, who has refused to cooperate in investigations of the KwaZulu police. Justice Goldstone indicated that in his investigation, he would welcome assistance from the international community and the United Nations in particular, in order to secure the cooperation of Governments which served as hosts to training camps and bases for armed formations operating in South Africa.

#### Status of Battalions 31, 32 and Koevoet

39. The status of Battalions 31 and 32 continue to be a source of concern. The South African Minister of Defence and Public Works confirmed to my Special Envoy, Ambassador Vraalsen, the Government's intention to disband Battalion 32 and transfer its members to existing units around the country by 30 November 1993. With regard to Battalion 31, the Minister stated that "it is regarded as essential" that "the whole San community ... with its unique characteristics should be accommodated in one place .... The military members within the community will be deployed in existing military units in the vicinity of Schmidtsdrift." He added that "It is, however possible that some members presently at Schmidtsdrift may in due course prefer to return to their countries of origin. Should this be the case liaison will be established with the international community."

40. To date Battalions 31, 32 and Koevoet have not been disbanded as indicated by the Government of South Africa. There is a strong feeling in South Africa that merely dispersing their personnel among other military units is unsatisfactory. In this connection, it is believed that their continued existence, in whatever formation or form, does not have a place in a new South African dispensation.

#### Question of hostels

41. Violence between hostel dwellers and the surrounding communities is the result of a complex mix of factors including overcrowding, unemployment, competition over scarce resources and ethnic differences. Key among these factors is the rivalry between supporters of IFP and ANC. Violence between hostel dwellers and surrounding communities is widely perceived as an extension of the "turf battles" between these two groups elsewhere in the country, particularly in Natal/KwaZulu.

42. The urgency of improving security at the hostels in line with the recommendations of the Goldstone Commission, which called for the fencing of hostels, has been noted (see S/24389). The securing of hostels was one of

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three main issues discussed at the meeting between the State President, F. W. de Klerk and Mr. Nelson Mandela, President of ANC, on 26 September 1992, at which time it was agreed that further measures would be taken, including fencing and policing to prevent criminality by hostel dwellers and to protect hostel dwellers against external aggression. It was agreed that progress will be reported to the Goldstone Commission and the National Peace Secretariat. United Nations observers could witness the progress in cooperation with the Goldstone Commission and the National Peace Secretariat (S/24606).

43. The Government should take immediate steps to improve the security situation at those hostels known to be flashpoints for violence. Continuing efforts to address the problem of improving the security and living conditions at the hostels and in the surrounding communities, in consultation with their residents, should be facilitated by all parties.

#### Dangerous weapons

44. A similar situation obtains with regard to dangerous weapons. At the 26 September 1992 meeting between the Government and ANC, referred to above, the Government informed ANC that it would issue a proclamation within weeks to prohibit countrywide the carrying and display of dangerous weapons at all public occasions subject to exemptions based on guidelines being prepared by the Goldstone Commission. It should be noted that a proclamation to give effect to Justice Goldstone's recommendation to restrict the carrying of dangerous weapons in public has yet to be issued, although the measure has been drafted for some time.

45. The debate over restrictions on "cultural weapons" often diverts attention away from the critical issue of the supply of automatic weapons and other firearms to which all factions have ready access. The Government and all other parties should make a concerted effort to reduce the supply and control the use of firearms and other sophisticated weapons.

46. Effective steps to address the carrying and public display of dangerous weapons can contribute significantly to creating an atmosphere of political tolerance. It is imperative that political leaders call on their supporters to disavow violence and to cease equating political rivalry with warfare. It is equally important that the South African Government take the necessary legal security measures to act promptly and impartially to prevent and quell violence, whatever its source.

## II. ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA

47. The terms of reference of the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) are reflected in Security Council resolution 772 (1992) as well as in the last report of the Secretary-General on the question of South Africa to the Security Council (S/24389). Following consultations with the

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Security Council, I announced on 9 September 1992 the decision to deploy a mission of up to 50 United Nations observers in South Africa in implementation of the relevant provision of the above resolution. Ms. Angela King, Director, Staff Administration and Training Division, Office of Human Resources Management, was appointed Chief of the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa and took up her post on 23 September. An advance team of United Nations observers headed by the Deputy Chief preceded her by a week. By the end of October, UNOMSA observers were deployed in all 11 regions of South Africa. The full complement of 50 observers was attained at end-November 1992.

48. The headquarters of UNOMSA is in Johannesburg and it has a regional office in Durban, headed by the Deputy Chief of Mission. UNOMSA's current deployment is weighted towards the Witswatersrand/Vaal and Natal/KwaZulu regions, where 70 per cent of the political violence occurs.

49. UNOMSA personnel observe demonstrations, marches and other forms of mass action, noting the conduct of all parties, and endeavour to obtain information indicating the degree to which the parties' actions are consistent with the principles of the National Peace Accord and the Goldstone Commission guidelines for marches and political gatherings. Observers supplement their field observations by establishing and maintaining informal contacts at all levels with established governmental structures, political parties and organizations, as well as community-based "alternative structures" such as civic associations and other groups.

50. The functions of the structures established under the National Peace Accord with which UNOMSA was requested to cooperate are varied but also interrelated. The National Peace Committee is charged with the resolution of disputes concerning interpretation and alleged transgression of the code of conduct for political parties and organizations and with the promotion of social and economic reconstruction and development. The National Peace Secretariat has the responsibility to establish and coordinate the work of regional and local dispute resolution committees.

#### The Goldstone Commission

51. In my earlier report to the Council, I commended the work of the Goldstone Commission and stated that should Judge Goldstone need assistance, he could request it from the international community. In this regard, following consultation with the European Community, six legal experts were seconded to the Commission. The United Nations has at Judge Goldstone's request provided an expert with a background in crime-prevention, security and criminal law to assist the Commission and several members of the UNOMSA team with the requisite legal background are also specifically assigned to the Commission in addition to their other duties.

52. The observer teams in various parts of the country also attend the hearings of the Commission held in their respective locations.

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Strengthening of the peace structures

53. In its role of strengthening the peace structures, UNOMSA initiated through the National Peace Secretariat courtesy calls and visits to homelands other than Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu, which were visited separately. The meetings were designed to enable the United Nations, European Community, Commonwealth and OAU observers to familiarize themselves with measures being taken within these territories to promote the peace process and support the National Peace Accord, and to explain the role of UNOMSA and other observer missions.

54. Fact-finding trips were made to QwaQwa, Lebowa and KaNgwane. The UNOMSA observer team based in Pretoria (Northern Transvaal region) made frequent trips to KwaNdebele. In each case, the observer groups were received by the Chief Minister, cabinet members, local political party representation and senior administration officials.

Cooperation with other international observers

55. Security Council resolution 772 (1992) invited the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Commonwealth and the European Community to deploy their observers in coordination with UNOMSA.

56. The UNOMSA observers were joined in South Africa on 18 October 1992 by the first Commonwealth observers, currently 17-strong. The European Community observers began arriving on 29 October and now total 14 members, while 11 OAU observers arrived between 15 and 23 November.

57. A weekly coordination and briefing session is held at UNOMSA headquarters in Johannesburg for the leaders of the observer groups. In addition, regularly scheduled morning briefings are open to all team members. Similar arrangements are in place at the UNOMSA office in Durban.

58. Because many of the Commonwealth and European Community observers come from a police background, a small task force has been set up under UNOMSA coordination to examine different aspects of SAP ranging from its structures and training to its performance at the community level.

59. The international observer teams have established close working relationships at the field and headquarters levels. They exchange information regularly and frequently observe events and meetings as mixed teams.

60. Throughout the country, the teams frequently pool their resources to ensure attendance and coverage of key events which may be scheduled simultaneously at different and often widely dispersed venues.

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Contacts with political parties

61. Since her arrival in South Africa, the Chief of Mission has held discussions with a wide range of government officials and leaders of political parties and organizations in the country. At these meetings, the Chief of Mission briefed her interlocutors on the role of UNOMSA, its deployment and activities.

III. CONSULTATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

62. Following the massacre on 7 September 1992 at Bisho, Ciskei, President de Klerk called for an urgent meeting between the Government and ANC at the leadership level to discuss the question of violence.

63. In response to the proposal by the Government, Mr. Mandela agreed to meet with President de Klerk, on the understanding that the Government would make prior commitments to address three key issues, namely, the display of dangerous weapons, the securing of hostels, and the release of political prisoners.

64. Bilateral discussions were immediately resumed between ANC and the Government to address these three issues, in order to prepare the ground for the meeting between President de Klerk and Mr. Mandela. I instructed my Special Envoy, Mr. Dayal, to immediately upon his arrival in South Africa establish contacts with both parties, in order to assist, as necessary, and to make his services available to expedite the process of negotiation.

65. Given the critical importance of such a meeting, I addressed identical messages to President de Klerk and Mr. Mandela, urging them to ensure that the prevailing obstacles were overcome. I added that such a meeting would, no less, be a source of immense relief to all of the peoples of South Africa whose destiny lies in the hands of their leaders.

66. On 24 September 1992, I made a statement indicating that the obstacles preventing a meeting between President de Klerk and Mr. Mandela had been overcome, and that a meeting between them was being arranged imminently. This meeting took place on 26 September 1992. A detailed self-explanatory Record of Understanding agreed to at the meeting has been issued as a Security Council document (S/24606). Agreement was reached at the meeting on the key issues relating to the securing of hostels, release of all remaining political prisoners and the prohibition of the carrying and display of dangerous weapons. Agreement was also reached on the need for a democratic constituent assembly/constitution-making body and constitutional continuity during the interim transitional period. These developments constitute an important step forward towards breaking the CODESA II deadlock. It will be recalled that these three issues were the subject of specific observations in my report of 7 August 1992 (S/24389).

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67. Regrettably, following the agreement reached between President de Klerk and Mr. Mandela, Chief Buthelezi announced his withdrawal from any constitutional negotiations on South Africa's future, and challenged the agreement reached in the Record of Understanding, particularly concerning the ban on carrying and display of dangerous weapons, including "cultural weapons".

68. On 29 September 1992, I telephoned President de Klerk and Mr. Mandela to congratulate them on their agreement of 26 September 1992. In regard to the position taken by Chief Buthelezi, I decided to contact him to urge him to support the resumption of multi-party negotiations based on the agreement reached between the State President and Mr. Mandela.

69. On 29 September 1992, I addressed a letter to Chief Buthelezi, in which I appealed to him to make a renewed effort to meet urgently with Mr. Mandela, in order to move the peace process forward and to achieve a lasting settlement. I also wrote to Mr. Mandela informing him that I believed that the people of South Africa as a whole would welcome any initiative emanating from such a meeting, which should set the tone for national reconciliation and cooperation. I pursued this matter in subsequent communications with both Mr. Mandela and Chief Buthelezi.

70. I also addressed letters to the leaders in the homelands, urging that all concerned redouble their efforts to expedite the resumption of multilateral negotiations, and emphasizing the need for a renewed and determined effort to put an end to the violence and to remove any remaining obstacles that might impede the resumption of negotiations.

71. I also addressed Mr. Clarence Makwetu, President of PAC, on the same subject.

72. On a regular basis I have had the opportunity to discuss the situation in South Africa with the Permanent Representative of that country to the United Nations as well as with other interlocutors. Through him, I urged the Government of South Africa to resume, as rapidly as possible, multi-party negotiations aimed at ending the present stalemate. I also expressed my concern at the escalating violence.

73. During the course of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, I met with Mr. Thabo Mbeki, Director, International Affairs Department of ANC and Mr. Clarence Makwetu, President of PAC. Mr. Mbeki briefed me on the latest developments concerning bilateral discussions between the Government and ANC. Mr. Makwetu informed me of the outcome of discussions held between PAC and the Government in Gaborone in November 1992. I impressed upon both the importance of resuming multi-party negotiations and containing violence so prevalent in South Africa.

74. The situation in South Africa was also reviewed with the Chairman of OAU, President Diouf of Senegal, and the Secretary-General of OAU, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, during their visits to the United Nations.

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75. All my interlocutors expressed support for the efforts being made by the United Nations to facilitate a peaceful transition to a democratic society in South Africa and assured me of their continued cooperation.

76. On 27 November 1992, I received a letter from the Permanent Representative of South Africa (S/24866) containing a statement and accompanying background paper issued by State President F. W. de Klerk setting out a proposed timetable for the transitional process in South Africa. The timetable envisages that a fully representative government of national unity will be in place no later than the first half of 1994.

77. On 4 December 1992, a joint media statement was issued by the Government of South Africa and ANC which indicated that they had held bilateral discussions from 2 to 4 December 1992. The discussions recognized the importance of resuming multilateral negotiations as soon as possible to ensure speedy movement to a democratic dispensation. To this end, bilateral discussions will continue.

78. On 17 December 1992, I met with Mr. Roelf Meyer, Minister for Constitutional Development of South Africa, who reported to me on the progress being made regarding bilateral discussions between the Government and the parties and prospects for the resumption of multilateral negotiations which would involve all parties. Various other issues relating to the situation in South Africa were also discussed.

#### IV. OBSERVATIONS

79. Based on my consultations and the reports of my two Special Envoys, I would make the following observations and recommendations concerning the situation in South Africa for consideration by the Security Council.

80. All parties must recognize that continued uncertainty over the country's future can only lead to further violence, instability and economic decline. Recent developments therefore give cause for guarded optimism about the prospect for progress towards a negotiated settlement in South Africa. I am pleased to note that there is substantial agreement to expedite arrangements for multi-party negotiations. These are positive trends which should be encouraged and supported by the international community. With respect to the CODESA process, the principle of inclusiveness must be recognized as essential for achieving the transition to democratic rule through free elections and new constitutional arrangements. It is imperative that all parties refrain from unilateral actions or public statements which alienate others or render the process more difficult.

81. While it is recognized that the Government has primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, all political leaders must take immediate action to curb political violence. To this end I would urge all parties to attend the planned meeting of signatories to the National Peace Accord in order to examine ways and means of putting an end to the violence and to

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strengthen the structures. Lack of political freedom in the homelands continues to be a source of tension and violence. Those in a position to influence the authorities in the homelands should strongly urge the repeal of repressive legislation and restraint of their security forces. Scrupulous adherence by all parties to the Goldstone Commission guidelines for the conduct of public demonstrations would also foster and sustain the peace process.

82. At the 26 September 1992 meeting between State President de Klerk and Mr. Mandela, an agreement was reached in respect of the release of all political prisoners, the securing of hostels, as well as the banning of the display of dangerous weapons. Regarding political prisoners, a Joint Committee consisting of government and ANC representatives has made considerable progress. By 15 November 1992, the agreed date for the release of political prisoners, 536 cases had been disposed of by the Joint Committee. At the same time some of the cases submitted by ANC have yet to be resolved. The Government stated it would issue a proclamation to prohibit, countrywide, the carrying and display of dangerous weapons at all public occasions subject to exemptions based on guidelines being prepared by the Goldstone Commission. The granting of exemptions was to be entrusted to one or more retired judges. On this basis, the terms of the proclamation and mechanism for exemption shall be prepared with the assistance of the Goldstone Commission. I would urge the South African Government to take steps to expedite the full implementation of the agreements on these issues. All parties have expressed their deep concern over the illegal flow of weapons into the country. Consideration might be given to ways of cutting off the illegal supply of weapons from whatever source they may derive.

83. I welcome the decision of the Government of South Africa to extend the necessary assistance to the Goldstone Commission in order to facilitate its work and urge all parties in South Africa to cooperate fully with the Goldstone Commission's forthcoming investigation into the security forces and other armed formations. I also welcome the assurance given by the highest level of leadership of ANC to cooperate with the Goldstone Commission and facilitate its work. Justice Goldstone's standing in the international community and the United Nations active support for him and his Commission have reinforced the Commission's capacity to address difficult and sensitive issues. The United Nations and the international community will continue to assist the Commission, as requested by Mr. Justice Goldstone, in conducting its investigations. For my part, I will continue to extend all necessary support to the work of the Goldstone Commission.

84. As a means of building community confidence in and developing the human resources of the South African police, I would urge expansion of the present programmes for the exchange of information and expertise between South Africa and other countries on community-policing techniques, as well as on the recruitment, training and management of police personnel. Such programmes can only improve the morale and stature of the police, and enhance their credibility as an impartial service dedicated to public safety and security of all South Africans.

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85. In order to help the South African police improve its investigative policies and procedures, and the skills of its personnel, police officers of various countries with the requisite skills and experience should be invited to South Africa to observe and, as appropriate, advise South African police personnel on the conduct of investigations. These international police officers would be deployed as technical advisers, and would be separate from the police officers already participating in the international observer missions presently in the country.

86. Women's organizations emphasize their concern over violence and intimidation directed at women from a variety of sources, including the police. I would strongly urge that special attention be given to this question, especially in view of the crucial role women can play in maintaining cohesion and stability in their communities. One aspect of democratization which should not be overlooked is the need to bring the country's women into the political process as full partners. Political violence, intimidation, poverty and dislocation of families and communities are among the factors currently preventing their full participation. Future democracy, reconciliation and development in South Africa cannot take place without the contribution of all its people.

87. The contribution of the international observer teams has been welcomed by all concerned. Some nevertheless have contended that UNOMSA needs to be strengthened and others are of the view that its mandate should be expanded. Effective means have been established for coordinating the work of UNOMSA with that of the other international observer teams from the Commonwealth, the European Community and OAU operating under Security Council resolution 772 (1992). By all accounts, the international observers have performed well in adapting their operations to meet the needs on the ground and have had a salutary effect on the political situation in general. Given the delicate situation now prevailing in South Africa, characterized by unacceptable and in some locales rising levels of violence, I intend to modestly reinforce UNOMSA with an increment of 10 additional observers.

88. While progress has been made in enhancing and reinforcing the structures established under the National Peace Accord, much more remains to be done particularly with regard to the National Peace Committee and the National Peace Secretariat. The Government of South Africa should ensure that adequate resources are made available to facilitate the operations of the National Peace Committee and the National Peace Secretariat at all levels.

89. There has been distinct progress in implementing the observations and recommendations made in my report of 7 August 1992 (S/24389). It remains essential that the Security Council stay actively seized of the situation, as it has undertaken to do. The goal of a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa must remain one of the highest priority to the Organization and I shall keep the Council informed of further developments, so that it can react, as needed, with understanding of the process under way.

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