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Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 22 October 1992, at 3 p.m.

President:

Mr. NANDOE
(Vice-President)

(Suriname)

- Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency [14] (continued)
 - (a) Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the Agency
 - (b) Draft resolution

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In the absence of the President, Mr. Nandoe (Suriname), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

AGENDA ITEM 14 (continued)

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY:

(a) NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TRANSMITTING THE REPORT OF THE AGENCY (A/47/374)

(b) DRAFT RESOLUTION (A/47/L.9/Rev.1)

Mr. KARHILO (Finland): The peaceful use of nuclear energy continues to be faced with serious challenges. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons has become more complicated. The demands on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards have increased. At the same time, there is a growing awareness of the problems in the field of nuclear safety.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has had to cope with an increasing workload at a time of diminishing financial means. My delegation wishes to congratulate the Director General and his staff on their outstanding work under demanding circumstances.

Finland concurs with the view expressed by the Director General that the Agency's programme mix as a whole could be looked into in the light of recent developments. Such an exercise could make it possible to revise the priorities of the Agency accordingly.

The most important current endeavour in the field of nuclear safety is the preparation of an international convention. Safe, well-maintained and well-managed use of nuclear energy will continue to constitute one of the main sources of energy in Finland. However, nuclear safety is not only a national matter, but also a subject of legitimate international concern, irrespective of borders. An early agreement on the convention would be a major achievement.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

Views on the convention's exact content and scope diverge, but the basic interests are common. In the Finnish view, its essence would be a commitment to internationally agreed safety principles. The primary responsibility for safety would rest with national organizations. Jointly agreed principles would create the necessary basis for national safety practices and better quality control. The convention should also contain provisions for suitable follow-up measures, fostering regular contacts and transparency in the exchange of regulatory findings and operational data. These are prerequisites for a credible and effective control system.

Thus far, the work on the convention has addressed civilian nuclear power plants, as this approach appears to offer the best possibilities for rapid progress. However, management and disposal of radioactive waste, including waste from military use of nuclear energy, creates safety concerns as well. While it is important at this stage to concentrate on civilian plants, the principle of international responsibility for handling of radioactive waste, including waste from military applications, should not be overlooked in the future convention.

We note with satisfaction that the legitimacy of these concerns has been acknowledged, for example, in the nuclear safety working group of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, an intergovernmental grouping that brings together Finland, all the other littoral States of the Baltic Sea and the Commission of the European Communities.

While it is vital to agree on a safety convention at an early date, there are even more urgent tasks ahead. The safety of old reactors in Eastern and Central Europe is of great concern. Every effort should be made to improve the safety of risk-prone reactors pending their shut-down.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

Finnish organizations are already engaged in this work, bilaterally as well as multilaterally. Finland is particularly concerned about some of the reactors in our immediate neighbourhood in the St. Petersburg area and in the Kola Peninsula.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

According to an agreement between the relevant Finnish and Russian authorities, Finnish experts will assist in drawing up a plan of improvement of the nuclear safety of Russian reactors in areas adjacent to Finland. More than a million dollars have already been invested by Finland in this cooperation. As part of this cooperation, the Finnish Centre for Radiation Safety will equip the Sosnovyi Bor and Kola Peninsula nuclear power plants with INMARSAT-C telecommunications stations. More rapid and comprehensive exchange of information in the event of an emergency is in everyone's interest.

Progress in arms control and disarmament, including the Lisbon Protocol on the multilateral implementation of the START Treaty and the subsequent unilateral nuclear disarmament commitments by the United States and Russia, enhances the prospects for an indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. We also welcome the cooperation between Russia and the United States on commercial utilization of highly enriched Russian uranium in electricity production as such uranium becomes redundant through the process of dismantling nuclear warheads.

Halting the spread of nuclear weapons is the main task for the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty and a common endeavour of the member States of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Finland's goal for the 1995 non-proliferation Treaty Conference is the indefinite extension of the life of the Treaty.

As a strong supporter of the non-proliferation Treaty, Finland welcomes the formal accession of China and France to the Treaty. We continue to urge all countries not yet parties to accede to the Treaty so as to make it universal by the time of its extension in 1995. We welcome the new safeguards agreements, notably with South Africa, Argentina/Brazil, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Syria.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

Of special concern are the member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States. We note with satisfaction the recent accession of Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan to the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. The commitments already undertaken in this respect by Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan lead us to expect that their accession will not be long in coming. We have noted with satisfaction the recent statements in the First Committee by Belarus and Ukraine reaffirming their intention to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty in the very near future.

We note with concern that some 40 countries have yet to conclude safeguards agreements. These agreements are not a formality. They are required by the non-proliferation Treaty regardless of whether a State Party conducts any peaceful activities or not. We continue to urge the countries concerned to proceed to conclude the requisite agreements with the Agency as soon as possible.

Turning to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), the Director General and his staff should be commended for the excellent work they have done, often under extremely difficult conditions. We are confident that the remaining essential tasks will be performed in the same competent manner and in good cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission.

The Iraqi case brought to light serious shortcomings in the present safeguards system. It is disconcerting to note that, while the IAEA performed its duties fully in accordance with existing rules and practices, it was none the less possible for Iraq to engage in large-scale activities aimed at developing nuclear weapons. Moreover there was no certainty of discovery had the inspections continued on the same basis.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

We note with satisfaction that work to strengthen the safeguards system has begun. In our view the IAEA must be able to make full use of the mandate given to it in the Statute and in the various safeguards agreements if circumstances so require.

An important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation régime is the declaration by 27 countries, including Finland, to follow the commonly agreed Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology in their nuclear exports. These countries have also decided henceforth to apply the so-called full-scope-safeguards principle as a condition for their nuclear supplies, a principle which Finland and a number of other countries have been advocating for a long time.

Finland has recently become a member of the IAEA Board of Governors. The themes discussed in this statement will be our main preoccupations during our tenure on the Board. The Agency must continue to strengthen the safeguards system, give impetus to improved nuclear safety and streamline its organization so as to maintain its relevance and cost-effectiveness also in the future. We trust that the Agency will be able to meet these new challenges of a new era.

Mr. WLOSOWICZ (Poland): Both the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the year 1991 and the substantive statement of Mr. Hans Blix, which provides information on the Agency's activities during 1992, give me a welcome opportunity to commend the positive role played by the IAEA in enhancing further international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to emphasize its contribution to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime.

(Mr. Wlosowicz, Poland)

Poland welcomes the recent accessions to the non-proliferation Treaty of China, France and the Republic of South Africa as well as undertakings made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine to accede to the Treaty in the near future as non-nuclear States. It is also gratifying that the major countries of Latin America are now taking the final steps in the process of bringing into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco. North Korea's fulfilment of its obligation to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA represents an important first step in the right direction. Also, the cooperation of the North Korean authorities with the inspection teams so far is to be welcomed.

In the Middle East we are still witnessing the dismantling, under United Nations auspices, of clandestine preparations to develop a nuclear-weapons capability. In this context we would like to note with appreciation the determined actions of the Agency concerned with Iraq's non-compliance with its nuclear-non-proliferation obligations. We commend the IAEA in particular for its efforts in the implementation of the pertinent Security Council resolutions. We support, in particular, the requirement that Iraq should submit to the Agency a full and complete declaration of its nuclear programme.

Poland accords top priority to the strengthening of the international safeguards system, which underpins the whole non-proliferation régime. We therefore welcome the confirmation by the member States of the IAEA at last month's General Conference of their determination to continue efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the system. The decisions of the Agency's Board of Governors that the members of the IAEA shall give information as to their respective transfers of nuclear materials and equipment are an important input to the safeguards system.

(Mr. Wlosowicz, Poland)

Here I should like also to mention in this context the commendable activities of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which are concentrating on the guidelines for nuclear transfers.

We believe that the favourable changes in the international environment should be properly reflected in decisions of the non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 1995. They should consolidate and further reinforce the importance of the Treaty and in particular extend its validity indefinitely.

(Mr. Wlosowicz, Poland)

Nuclear safety remains one of our greatest concerns. Poland supports all international efforts aimed at upgrading the safety standards of old nuclear installations still in operation in Eastern and Central Europe. We welcome the assistance offered in this regard by the countries possessing advanced nuclear technologies and hope that their application will minimize risk to life, health, and environment. We join others in urging that work on a nuclear safety convention be continued and accelerated.

Poland is deeply committed to cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Not only do we highly appreciate and share the Agency's lofty goals, such as preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but we also work together and benefit from that cooperation in many practical fields, such as food preservation, medicine, and the protection of the environment. Applying nuclear energy to reducing the emissions of carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxide into the atmosphere and electron-beam flue-gases purification has been the Agency's latest contribution to our programme of environmental protection.

The activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which so fully found their reflection in the report and statement of its Director General, deserve our full appreciation. It is also for this reason that we support the draft resolution on the report of the IAEA.

Mr. DEYANOV (Bulgaria): I should like to associate the delegation of Bulgaria with the other delegations that have expressed their appreciation to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mr. Hans Blix, for his detailed and comprehensive statement and for the annual report he introduced on the operations of the Agency in 1991.

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

As one of the founding members, Bulgaria has long been an active supporter of the Agency, which remains an organization of critical importance to the international community. In the new situation in the world, the IAEA continues to play a vital role in fostering global peace and security and in promoting cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Director General and his staff deserve to be commended for their tireless efforts and personal devotion to the task of adapting the Agency to the fundamental changes and of responding adequately to the new challenges of our time.

The delegation of Bulgaria considers the annual report of the IAEA to be a successful attempt to present a comprehensive and well-balanced analysis of the Agency's activities in 1991. The report clearly demonstrates that the Agency has continued to fulfil its responsibilities, as provided for in its statute and in the resolutions of the General Conference and the Board of Governors.

As a Vice-Chairman of the Board of Governors, Bulgaria participated in the process of detailed consideration and adoption of decisions related to IAEA activities during a period covered by its report. My delegation endorses this report, as it faithfully reflects the Agency's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, improve the scope and the effectiveness of its nuclear safety and nuclear cooperation programmes and serve as a major source of technical assistance to member States. Accordingly, I wish to express the strong support of my delegation for draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1 on the Agency's 1991 annual report, introduced by Australia yesterday on behalf of a number of sponsors, including Bulgaria.

Bulgaria attaches particular importance to the programmes of the Agency on developing standards and providing assistance in ensuring nuclear and

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

radioactive safety. This is in line with the commitment of the States participating in the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, as set forth in the 1992 Helsinki decisions, to work to support the technical cooperation programmes of the IAEA aimed at enhancing nuclear safety. We consider the technical assistance regularly provided by the Agency to be instrumental in helping developing countries, as well as countries in transition, to acquire the necessary expertise and support for their national programmes.

Having said this, I cannot but share the concern expressed in the Agency's report about the decline in the number of pledges towards the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund target. Notwithstanding the increase in the total value of resources, the percentage of the target met through pledges declined from 85.3 per cent in 1990 to 78.4 per cent in 1991. My delegation is afraid that this may cause considerable difficulties for the Agency in carrying out its programmes to render technical assistance to countries in need. Despite its financial difficulties, Bulgaria has never stopped making its contribution to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund of the Agency and expects that all other Member States will increase their support for this Fund.

Bulgaria is among the countries that heavily rely on the use of nuclear energy to meet most of their energy needs. Over 40 per cent of Bulgaria's power-generating capacity is being provided by the Kozloduy nuclear reactors. The regular supply of the country with such energy, and effective parallel actions to improve nuclear safety standards, are major objectives of my Government in advancing the country on the difficult road from a centrally planned to a free-market economy.

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

Democratic changes in Eastern and Central Europe have given rise to an increased public interest in and insistence on solving problems of nuclear-power-plant safety and of finding ways and means to ensure more efficient use of energy in these countries.

Bulgaria is not an exception in this respect. Both the Parliament and a number of environmental protection groups in my country are actively engaged in joint actions with the Government to promote higher standards of nuclear safety and to ensure a better performance of all the six reactor units at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant. The Government of Bulgaria remains committed to making further progress towards this end, irrespective of the financial and logistic difficulties encountered in view of the serious economic challenges that the country faces at present. It may seem natural, therefore, that to accomplish this goal my Government relies to a certain extent on external assistance both from other countries and from international organizations.

Bulgaria highly appreciates the work of the IAEA in implementing its special project set up to examine the older type of Soviet-designed reactors - the WWER 440 Model 230 - which obviously need some improvements related to nuclear safety. As reflected in the annual report, in 1991 the Agency conducted under this project a review of the design concept of this type of nuclear power plant. This review pointed to differences existing between various nuclear plants of this type, which helped to confirm the importance of carrying out plant-specific review missions in a number of Eastern European countries concerned.

Operational safety review team missions have also been conducted under this project in Bulgaria at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant, particularly at its four WWER-440/230 units. Although none of the Kozloduy reactors is of the

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

Chernobyl type, these four units require further improvement if they are to meet the higher nuclear standards applied in Europe. The other two units at this plant are of a different type - WWER-1000 - which is not only a more powerful nuclear reactor but also much safer and more reliable. Additional IAEA missions have reviewed the safety of our nuclear power plant against seismic hazards, emphasizing earthquake design acceleration and the seismic vulnerability of structures and components important to safety.

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

In the light of the results of the IAEA missions, the Bulgarian Government has taken specific measures and is now making serious efforts to implement the recommendations of the Agency experts. We are determined to do our best to improve the nuclear safety of the Kozloduy power plant, notwithstanding the fact that due to the scarcity of financial resources this course of action may cause some difficulties for the economy, as well as some social tension because of cuts in other Government-sponsored programmes.

The steps taken by my Government have involved, inter alia, a number of radical actions, such as a provisional shutdown of most of the reactor units at the Kozloduy nuclear power plant to make the recommended safety improvements. Bulgaria has received assistance for this purpose from the World Association of Nuclear Operators and various national nuclear authorities and societies that have developed specific projects to achieve a drastic improvement in the operation of the reactors. The European Community and the World Bank have also rendered extremely valuable financial support.

On behalf of my Government I should like to express the deep gratitude of Bulgaria to the Governments and international organizations that have assisted my country in this respect. We hope that this kind of cooperation will continue in the future. Our objective is to ensure the safety of all nuclear installations in Bulgaria, in order to protect the population and the environment in conformity with the relevant commitments as formulated in the 1992 Helsinki decisions.

We believe that with the detailed implementation of the European Energy Charter the long-term energy situation in Central and Eastern Europe could be significantly changed for the better.

(Mr. Dayanov, Bulgaria)

The work to develop a nuclear safety convention currently under way in the IAEA is of great importance for improving the safety of nuclear power plants while taking fully into account the specific needs of the countries concerned. The results of the Conference on the Safety of Nuclear Power, which reviewed safety issues at technical and policy-making levels and formulated valuable recommendations for future actions, provide further useful guidance in this area.

I should like to mention with appreciation the fact that bilateral assistance from the Group of 7 and the Group of 24 States and the support programmes initiated by the Commission of the European Communities, the IAEA and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development are already under way. The programmes have so far focused on analysis, consulting and training, but we hope that greater involvement in solving nuclear safety deficiency problems will be forthcoming, in terms both of providing the necessary equipment and of ensuring substantial financial support.

We understand that, because of the scope and complexity of the issue, a multilateral programme of action may also be needed to enhance the ongoing bilateral assistance. I wish to make special note of the important role already being played in this respect by the European Commission, which is responsible for coordinating the Group of 24 technical assistance on nuclear safety - carried out with advice from the IAEA - to Central and Eastern European States.

My delegation shares the view that progress in improving the nuclear safety of the reactors operating in Central and Eastern Europe can best be ensured in an environment of successful economic reforms, including the adoption of free market principles, freer trade and the creation of favourable

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

conditions for investment. Bulgaria is committed to such a transformation and has already taken a number of important steps in pursuing this process.

The recent progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and the increased reliance of the United Nations on preventive diplomacy have highlighted widespread concerns about the danger from the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the most important building block in the international regime designed to cope with this danger.

In the new international environment, the Security Council could become an effective forum for non-proliferation enforcement. As its primary responsibility relates to the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council is entitled to adopt, and should adopt, measures whose basic objective is to curb proliferation and impose sanctions on States which violate international agreements.

The international community now needs effective action to safeguard nuclear material, to detect in time, and prevent, transfers of nuclear weapons or their clandestine production. The fundamental role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this respect is well recognized and should be further enhanced.

My delegation believes that nuclear cooperation should be conditional on adherence to and strict compliance with the non-proliferation Treaty or other equally binding bilateral or multilateral agreements. My country accepts such a requirement as the basis for its own participation in this cooperation.

As a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Bulgaria is participating in the current process of enhancing its export control guidelines and other relevant instruments. The Bulgarian Government has adopted a decision to

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

implement fully the new international arrangements agreed upon by the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Warsaw this year, which are now a key element in Bulgaria's export control policy. Full-scope safeguards as a condition for nuclear supply are an integral part of the common export policy of all Nuclear Suppliers Group member States. We hope that other States will soon follow suit.

Bulgaria believes that the IAEA's ability to fulfil its statutory functions has to be further enhanced. The Agency must receive all the necessary resources to strengthen its safeguards regime, conduct special inspections and refer unresolved cases of proliferation to the Security Council.

In his statement to the Assembly yesterday, Mr. Hans Blix pointed out that the Board of Governors of the IAEA had confirmed the Agency's right to perform special inspections when there were reasons to believe that installations or material that should have been declared had not been so declared. We concur with the Director General that, in the new safeguards system now taking shape in the Agency, the information provided by the inspected State must be supplemented by additional data from other States.

In this context, we consider that actions by the IAEA's principal organs to implement the concept of universal reporting with respect to exports and imports of nuclear material, inventories, relevant nuclear-related equipment and other non-nuclear material deserve every encouragement and further development.

(Mr. Devanov, Bulgaria)

Bulgaria welcomes the recent decisions taken by the Agency to strengthen its safeguards system. My delegation is glad to note also that an appropriate reference to these decisions is contained in draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1, on the Agency's report.

The results of the inspections carried out by the United Nations Special Commission and the IAEA, which have proved Iraq's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations under the non-proliferation Treaty, will serve as a timely warning of the grave consequences that potential proliferators will have to face in the future. This is a central point with respect to the equally important chemical, biological and missile-technology areas also.

(Mr. Deyanov, Bulgaria)

Bulgaria supported the resolution adopted by the thirty-sixth General Conference of the Agency dealing with Iraq's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations. Some formulations in these resolutions have found a place in draft resolution L.9/Rev.1, submitted to the General Assembly. In this respect, I wish to mention our appreciation of the strenuous efforts of the Director General and his staff in the implementation of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), in particular the detection and destruction or otherwise rendering harmless of equipment and material that could be used for nuclear weapons.

In conclusion, I should like once again to confirm Bulgaria's strong support for the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is our firm belief that the Agency's contribution to ensuring the uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to securing a stable operation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime should receive well-deserved acclaim from the entire international community.

Guided by those considerations, my delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1, concerning the 1991 annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Mr. BURAVKIN (Belarus) (interpretation from Russian): It has been said many times from this rostrum that 1992 is a landmark year in many respects. There is hope that in world history it will be repeatedly referred to as a year of enormously important political changes that gave mankind unprecedented opportunities for peaceful development, mutual understanding and constructive cooperation.

For the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an additional fact that makes the year 1992 especially important is that a half-century ago there

(Mr. Buravkin, Belarus)

occurred an event which led to the establishment of that organization: the first controlled nuclear reaction. That achievement determined in large measure the subsequent fate of mankind and provided it with enormous opportunities but, at the same time, confronted it with a most difficult challenge which could, if not met, turn the powerful potential of the atom into a tremendous evil and a threat to life on Earth.

There is nothing surprising in that, because any scientific achievement is a blessing only when it is dedicated to benefiting mankind and promoting human well-being. Helping to utilize atomic energy for the good of mankind is the lofty mission entrusted to IAEA, and we should like to emphasize this today. The extent to which this noble and very responsible mission is carried out is, to our mind, the criterion by which we can appraise the work of the Agency.

In paying tribute to the activities of the Agency, we in Belarus - having by a quirk of fate become hostage to the horrible Chernobyl experiment, which in the final analysis resulted from criminal neglect of human life, the highest value on Earth - would like to focus our attention on IAEA's efforts in the field of radiological protection.

In this connection, we express our full support for the Agency's activities aimed at completing the review of the basic safety standards for radiological protection. The drafting and adoption of a new version of those standards is extremely important for the Republic of Belarus, especially in the light of the current corrections being made in our state programme to minimize the consequences of Chernobyl.

We are grateful to the Agency and to other international organizations and individual States for the implementation of projects in radiological

(Mr. Buravkin, Belarus)

protection that directly affect the interests of the population of Belarus. As regards the international Chernobyl project, representatives of Belarus have repeatedly spoken of the contradictory nature of the conclusions concerning the results of that project. I should like to emphasize that our view has not changed with the passing of time; on the contrary, we are becoming more and more convinced that it is correct. We must note with concern and sadness even today that statistical data, including those from such an authoritative source as the World Health Organization (WHO), all show an outbreak of oncological disease during the post-Chernobyl period in the stricken territories, especially among children. It is enough to cite just one fact: oncological disease of the thyroid gland among children is 22 times as prevalent as it was five years ago.

The Chernobyl tragedy has shown the entire world that a country which has no atomic power plants of its own does not thereby remain safe from potential and actual danger if other States have atomic power stations near its borders. Therefore we are especially interested in expanding the Agency's programme for safety at all types of nuclear installations, especially nuclear power stations. In our view, there is good reason to regard questions of nuclear safety as priority questions, all the more so because incidents at nuclear power stations unfortunately continue to take place. The latest one took place last week at the Ignalina power station, which is very close to Belarus. In 1991, as we can see from the report of the Director General, the Agency's information system received 139 reports on various incidents that took place at nuclear installations. The statistics are rather alarming.

The Republic of Belarus unequivocally advocates the establishment of a binding regime for nuclear safety. We support the current efforts under the

(Mr. Buravkin, Belarus)

auspices of the Agency to draft an international convention on the subject. The conclusion of a convention would give us a unique opportunity to establish an officially agreed international approach to all aspects of this problem.

A logical extension of the efforts designed to strengthen the international nuclear-safety regime might be a verifiable international treaty on ending the production of fissionable materials intended for military purposes. Its conclusion would lead to the establishment of a system for additional verification of warheads and nuclear materials.

We share the concern of the international community over the problems of monitoring nuclear weapons, including weapons in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and we are taking steps to see to it that there will be no such concern with regard to our country. We have withdrawn all tactical weapons from the territory of Belarus, and we have undertaken to withdraw strategic weapons as well.

(Mr. Buravkin, Belarus)

In our Republic there has been set up and is now operating a competent national body, the State Industrial Atomic Monitoring Agency, to prevent the spread of nuclear materials. However, we still need to develop legislative and normative measures and establish the necessary managerial and regulatory structures in the nuclear sphere, and we would be grateful to IAEA for help in that regard.

The delegation of the Republic of Belarus continues to take a flexible approach to programmes of scientific and technical cooperation that entail a redistribution of resources to meet changing priorities. We support the idea of periodically renewing plans for scientific and technical cooperation on the basis of consultations among the member States and the secretariat of IAEA. We emphasize that attention should be given to the advisability of assigning a special priority to projects concerned with the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.

The Republic of Belarus recently celebrated the first anniversary of its sovereignty. The first phase of our independent development is occurring against the background of a severe economic crisis. The people of Belarus have been confronted with tasks of unprecedented difficulty that were greatly aggravated by the Chernobyl tragedy. Our Government is making intensive efforts to improve the lives of people in the affected areas. Enormous material and technical resources have been devoted to the construction of housing in the so-called clean areas for those forced to evacuate the danger zone. We have set standards more rigorous than those in other countries for the radionuclide content of foodstuffs. The organization of health care and of agricultural production methods in the contaminated regions is being improved. Procedures are being perfected for the deactivation of nuclear materials and the burial of radioactive waste and deactivation products.

(Mr. Buravkin, Belarus)

However, the experience gained from efforts undertaken at the national level has clearly shown that the consequences of a nuclear catastrophe can be dealt with only through effective international cooperation. We wish to express our sincere gratitude to all States and organizations that have participated in such cooperation, and we hope that it will continue and be strengthened and enhanced. I would emphasize once again that this would be in the interest not only of our own people's future but of the future of all mankind.

Mr. NEJEDLY (Czechoslovakia): In the past year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been engaged in activities aimed at expanding the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the IAEA safeguards system. The Agency has contributed significantly to this. We have especially appreciated the accession of France and China to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which means that all five permanent members of the Security Council have become parties to that Treaty. We have also appreciated the accession by the Baltic States and the declaration by the Governments of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in which they expressed their determination to accede to the Treaty as nuclear-free States. It is in the vital interest of all States of our planet and their inhabitants that the NPT become universal. We appeal to all the countries that have not yet acceded to the Treaty to do so as soon as possible, and not later than 1995. The Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic is of the opinion that the period of validity of the Treaty should be extended without any conditions and be unlimited after 1995. We expect that all States parties to the Treaty will fulfil their obligations and that those of them that have not concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA will do so without delay.

(Mr. Nejedly, Czechoslovakia)

The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic has noted with satisfaction the cooperation of South Africa with the IAEA in the implementation of the safeguards agreement and expects full implementation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. We also appreciate the fact that a safeguards agreement has been concluded by Syria and that one is being implemented by Algeria.

We are determined fully to enhance measures to improve the control of nuclear exports, including the export of dual-use items. We support the proposals of the IAEA secretariat for universal reporting of transfers of nuclear material and equipment. We highly appreciate the efforts of the IAEA Director General and inspection teams in Iraq, which are aimed at implementing the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic fully approves the decisions of IAEA bodies on the need to improve the efficiency of the safeguards system and, at the same time, to increase the efficient use of resources provided by member States. We appreciate the work done by the IAEA secretariat and bodies in this respect. The efforts to improve the efficiency of safeguards have to be increased and, within that framework, made more consistent in their use of the potential of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation and the proposals submitted by member States in the Agency's respective bodies.

In this connection the Czechoslovak delegation wishes to recall the proposal for the implementation of the so-called alternate safeguards system, which was worked out in cooperation with the Republic of Austria and submitted by a Czechoslovak representative at the session of the Committee of the Whole of this year's IAEA General Conference. In the opinion of Czechoslovak experts, its implementation might lead both to increasing the efficiency and

(Mr. Nejedly, Czechoslovakia)

to decreasing the costs of the safeguards system. This proposal envisages the implementation of new safeguards elements for nuclear activities in compliance with new requirements under the IAEA safeguards system. The costs would to a large extent be covered by the savings realized through the rationalization of the existing, highly complicated safeguards system. We are of the opinion that at this time, when we feel the need to strengthen the system and are, at the same time, aware of the insufficiency of available resources, this proposal deserves due attention by the respective IAEA programmes as well as of its secretariat.

Another main area of IAEA activities, nuclear energy and its safety, remains the focus of our attention and interest. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, as a State with a comparatively extensive nuclear programme heretofore based on the Soviet-made reactors of the VVER type, is highly appreciative of the attention paid by the Agency to improving their technological level and nuclear safety. Expert missions that have been carried out, as well as those being considered, and other activities within the programmes adopted by the IAEA are appreciated as invaluable support for our national economy. We see this not only from a purely technical point of view, but also from the point of view of the credibility of nuclear energy and its acceptability to the general public.

(Mr. Nejedly, Czechoslovakia)

Czechoslovakia is acting in the spirit of the conclusions reached by leading experts at meetings in recent years, such as the Conference on the greenhouse effect held at Toronto in 1988, the fourteenth Congress of the World Energy Conference, held at Montreal in 1989, and the symposium held in Helsinki in 1991 on electricity and the environment. Our country is convinced that technologically advanced and safe nuclear energy - that is, using nuclear reactors of today's most advanced technical level, whose fuel-cycle problems have been resolved both conceptually and technologically, including the problems of processing and disposing of burnt-out nuclear fuel and radioactive waste - represents an ecological contribution. Tangible evidence of this is seen in the state of the environment in the neighbourhood of Czechoslovak nuclear power plants in Jaslovske Bohunice and Kukovany on the one hand and in the North Bohemian border area, with its open-pit lignite mines and its thermal power plants, on the other.

In spite of the highest priority the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic attaches to both those activities of the IAEA, we consider the problem of technical assistance and cooperation to be a highly important issue. We are aware that the insufficient attention being paid to the burning problems of the less developed countries is a source of tension and suspicion in North-South relations. Through its membership of the IAEA, and within its possibilities, our country has been providing voluntary assistance through programmes of technical assistance and cooperation.

Allow me in conclusion to express our satisfaction with the report on the activities of the IAEA for the reporting period, and to convey our

(Mr. Nejedly, Czechoslovakia)

appreciation to the Agency's Director General, Mr. Hans Blix. Despite the existing financial crisis of the IAEA he has been able, together with his colleagues, to cope with the Agency's present demanding tasks and requirements. We wish him and his colleagues much success in performing their tasks.

Mr. PAK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I join the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in recognizing that the IAEA has been carrying out its main mission, that of accelerating the peaceful uses of atomic power. In recent years, the IAEA has made sincere efforts to expand international cooperation in accelerating the development and use of nuclear energy, which is badly needed for economic development, in strengthening nuclear safety and safeguards, and in increasing technical cooperation with developing countries.

The IAEA is engaged in positive cooperation with many regions and countries in implementing the safeguards agreement and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in conformity with the desire of the peoples of the world, who want to live in a nuclear-weapon-free world in this post-cold-war era. We appreciate that.

Today, the relations of cooperation between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the IAEA are developing daily in the field of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. Technical data and various other kinds of information which the IAEA regularly provides us are useful in our research on the development of nuclear energy and on the use of isotopes, as well as for the establishment of a system of nuclear safety, protection against radiation, and safeguards.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

At the third session of the fifth Supreme People's Assembly, which was held in 1974, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea adopted a law on atomic power, which constitutes the basis of all activities for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In accordance with that law we have engaged, with broad use of radioactive rays and radioisotopes in various domains of the national economy, in research with a view to establishing a juche-oriented plan of nuclear power development and to using nuclear energy in building a self-reliant national economy.

In the context of that process, our scientists and technicians have the capability to build and run on their own a pilot atomic power plant making use of our own resources and technology. With that experience, they are continuing their efforts to put larger atomic power stations into operation by the mid-1990s.

It is the consistent, principled policy of the Government of our republic to carry out the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula by earnestly implementing the noble ideas and mission set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Since the June meeting of the Board of Governors of the IAEA we have accepted two rounds of ad hoc inspections of our nuclear facilities by the Agency. Those were the second and third such rounds of inspections; the follow-up regulations of the nuclear safeguards agreement have been agreed upon and carried out. Even after three rounds of ad hoc inspections of our nuclear facilities by the IAEA, we also provided members of the Agency with every necessary accommodation to enable them to inspect any sites and installations, regardless of the initial lists of nuclear facilities we presented.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

All these facts show that the more frequent the IAEA inspections of our country's nuclear facilities, the clearer the proof of the integrity of our Government's plan for nuclear-power development. Suspicion with respect to our nuclear programme is disappearing.

All that must be done to carry out the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is to verify its status through the inspection of United States nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in south Korea. In fact, the nuclear issue has arisen with respect to the Korean peninsula only since the United States deployment of nuclear weapons in south Korea. We who are under a constant nuclear threat are in a position to do our best to denuclearize the Korean peninsula by implementing the north-south joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Many rounds of meetings of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee have taken place, but the Committee has so far failed to adopt rules of inspection to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The reason we see no progress in the work of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee is that the United States and the south Korean authorities oppose the inclusion of United States nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in an agreement for the implementation of the joint declaration and the rules of inspection. And, to make things worse, they are raising a hue and cry over "special inspections" and "inspections of the same number" of military bases, bases which do not fall under the authority of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee, but which are supposed to be discussed in the North-South Joint Military Committee. In other words, they are in a position to complicate and delay the work of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee.

(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

The joint declaration on denuclearization, agreed upon by the north and the south, is not being implemented because of the United States position to maintain its nuclear bases in south Korea and the attitude of south Korea which could not exercise its sovereignty.

Moreover, the fact that there still exist United States nuclear weapons in south Korea has been made public increases our feeling that it is urgent to implement the north-south joint declaration on denuclearization.

Therefore, we would like to urge the south Korean authorities, if they really want the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, to shun any foreign interference and come out at the negotiating table in favour of including United States nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in south Korea in the follow-up agreement for the north-south joint declaration on denuclearization and the rules of inspection.

We sincerely hope that the United States, which is directly responsible for the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula, will take favourable measures so that the inspection of United States nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in south Korea can take place.

We will continue to make every sincere effort to show the consistency of the peaceful nuclear policy of the Government of our Republic through IAEA inspections, and to accelerate the peaceful use of nuclear energy with the technical cooperation of the IAEA and its member States.

We will be loyal to our obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and, with patience and sincerity, will make active efforts to achieve the immediate implementation of the joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Mr. ROBINSON (United States of America): On behalf of the United States, my delegation wishes to express its strong support for the draft resolution before the General Assembly today regarding the 1991 annual report submitted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As my Government has often stated, the IAEA is an organization of critical importance to the international community, including the United States. As demonstrated in its report to the General Assembly, the Agency continues to play a vital role in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in fostering international peace and security. We would also like to commend Director General Hans Blix and the IAEA secretariat for the diligence and commitment they have demonstrated in carrying out the Agency's statutory responsibilities, especially in regard to the implementation of the Security Council resolutions dealing with Iraq.

The Agency's extensive, effective and unique system of safeguards provides the foundation of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The safeguards system provides important assurances that transfers of nuclear technology and information will not be diverted for military purposes and thereby undermine international peace and stability. In the absence of the Agency's safeguards system, suspicion rather than trust would dominate international nuclear trade. This in turn would likely lead to a climate of tension rather than cooperation among States and place severe constraints on international nuclear cooperation.

For the first time in the history of the IAEA safeguards system, a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - Iraq - was found to have violated its safeguards agreement with the IAEA by not declaring and submitting nuclear material activities to the Agency's inspection.

(Mr. Robinson, United States)

Following the conflict in the Gulf, IAEA teams have been inspecting Iraq's nuclear capabilities since May 1991 under the terms of United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991), which is directed at eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the means to produce and use them. With the assistance of the United Nations Special Commission, the IAEA has responded resourcefully and effectively to the challenges involved in fulfilling its task in Iraq. Despite frustrating and sometimes even hazardous conditions, Agency inspectors have shown courage and commitment in refusing to be diverted from their goal. The IAEA Board of Governors declared Iraq in violation of its safeguards agreement at a special session in July 1991. It strongly condemned the Government of Iraq for not submitting nuclear material and facilities in its clandestine uranium enrichment programme to the Agency's inspection, and expressed its grave concern about evident deception and obstruction of IAEA inspectors, who were denied access several times to sites they wished to inspect. In accordance with its statute, the IAEA transmitted its conclusions to the United Nations Security Council.

Apart from raising questions about the true scope of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, the inspections there have intensified efforts to take concrete steps to strengthen the existing IAEA safeguards system. The IAEA Board of Governors has recently reaffirmed the Agency's right to conduct special inspections in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements. Similarly, the Board has called upon States with comprehensive safeguards agreements to provide early design information on plans for construction of new nuclear facilities, as well as modifications to existing ones, as soon as those plans are made.

(Mr. Robinson, United States)

The Board has already given preliminary consideration to proposals on the reporting of exports and imports of nuclear material and of certain equipment and non-nuclear materials especially designed for use in nuclear activities. The proposal remains an important Board agenda item.

In addition to all these measures, the secretariat continues to review its fundamental safeguards principles, criteria and procedures to improve their efficiency and effectiveness, particularly in light of increasing demands placed on it due to new safeguards agreements. For example, the IAEA's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation is considering a range of other possible measures to enhance the safeguards system especially with respect to the detection of undeclared nuclear activities.

With regard to the non-proliferation Treaty, at the same time that Iraq was challenging the global norm against nuclear weapons proliferation, other nations took concrete steps to preserve it. The United States welcomed South Africa's accession to the non-proliferation Treaty and conclusion of a full-scope safeguards agreement with the Agency. We commend the IAEA for its intensive efforts to implement a full-scope safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and we urge the latter to continue its cooperation with the Agency. France and the People's Republic of China have also recently acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty. We also look forward to the early conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements between the IAEA and Argentina and Brazil, and with the newly independent States of the former Soviet Union. These efforts are positive steps in favour of extending the non-proliferation Treaty, which is the foundation of the international non-proliferation régime.

(Mr. Robinson, United States)

With regard to technical cooperation, the 1991 IAEA annual report makes clear the extent of the Agency's provision of technical assistance to the developing world. The IAEA has assisted countries in all aspects of the application of peaceful nuclear science and technology, from power planning and development and waste management to assistance in non-power nuclear technologies, including those related to agricultural and animal production, food irradiation, nuclear medicine and more. This is an important role which my Government continues to support strongly, and we encourage other IAEA member States to do the same.

I come now to nuclear safety and radiological protection. In reflecting upon the Agency's accomplishments in nuclear safety and radiological protection, we note with particular interest the ongoing project for international assistance in assessing the safety of older nuclear reactors, which focuses on the Soviet-designed VVER-440/230 reactors. This project will provide an important contribution to international efforts to improve the safe operation of these reactors. My Government looks forward to the IAEA's continuing efforts, in particular the evaluation of the graphite-moderated reactors.

The IAEA is taking the lead on the elaboration of an international nuclear safety convention. My Government believes that it is important that such an instrument be broadly supported and should focus on nuclear power reactors, which pose the greatest safety risks, and avoid an attempt to adopt detailed technical rules or standards. The main value of a convention will be its implementation provisions for a meeting of the parties to provide peer review of compliance with a broad set of essential safety principles.

The IAEA recently convened a review conference for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which concluded that the Convention

(Mr. Robinson, United States)

is adequate and acceptable in its current form and that no modifications to its text or annexes is warranted. Although universal adherence to this instrument has not been obtained as yet, my Government remains committed to this end.

In closing, my Government wishes to commend the IAEA for its invaluable contribution to international peace, security and welfare. The United States pledges its continuing support for the efforts of the IAEA.

Mr. ADEKANYE (Nigeria): The Nigerian delegation wishes to express its satisfaction with the annual report for 1991 of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (A/47/374) on the activities of the Agency. We commend the Director General for his statement spelling out the challenges which the Agency must confront in a rapidly changing world.

Today such challenges include the expansion of the Agency's role in promoting international cooperation in nuclear science and technology. We are pleased to note that in the past year the Agency's activities in the field of nuclear applications were pursued with vigour and that the use of nuclear techniques in food and agriculture, medicine and industry has continued to grow, based on the needs and priorities of Member States.

On the African continent, the impact of the Agency's assistance in the search for lasting solutions to the continent's food problems is now widely recognized. At its last session, the General Conference urged that the Agency intensify cooperation with other United Nations agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO), as well as the International Consultative Group on Food Irradiation, to prepare a detailed project proposal that would assist developing countries in introducing commercial food irradiation.

(Mr. Adekanye, Nigeria)

For my country, the contribution of the Agency's technical assistance and research contract programmes to our national development has remained a source of satisfaction. We note, for example, that four recently completed projects, covering the areas of nuclear science laboratories, nuclear analytical techniques, radioimmunoassay in animal production, and food irradiation, are having a major impact. At the core of that assistance programme is the transfer of nuclear technology and techniques. We look forward to an intensification of the Agency's training programme as part of its contribution to the development of our human resources so that the full benefits of such transfers can truly be enjoyed.

Against this background, my delegation notes with concern the decline in the percentage of the target for and contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund. Now that targets have been agreed to for the period 1993-95, we urge renewed commitment from all Member States to pay their contributions as a demonstration of their concrete support for the Agency's technical assistance programme, from which developing countries derive such enormous benefits. The technical assistance programme should be funded through assured and predictable resources.

A major instrument of the Agency's technical assistance to developing countries is its regional cooperation programme. In the African region, the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA) is gaining support as a vehicle for the development of African economies. AFRA membership has increased by three during the year. This interest will grow as the high-priority projects identified by AFRA States are expeditiously implemented. It is therefore our hope that greater support will continue to

(Mr. Adekanye, Nigeria)

be given to AFRA States by the international community and the donor countries to ensure the implementation of all AFRA projects.

My country has always accepted that safeguards constitute one of the principal activities of the Agency and that an effective role in that area is essential in strengthening confidence in the safeguards system, underpinning the nuclear non-proliferation regime and promoting world peace. We have therefore followed with great interest the Agency's efforts to meet the challenges arising from increasing accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the application of IAEA safeguards. We welcome the steps taken in the past year by the Agency in responding to this growing demand for safeguards, as well as its determination to explore additional avenues that would reinforce its obligations under international, multilateral and regional agreements. It is essential for the credibility of the safeguards system that the Agency continue to be guided by the principles of transparency and non-discrimination, efficiency and cost-effectiveness. As we approach the 1995 non-proliferation Treaty review and extension Conference, these principles will prove invaluable in confirming the Agency's functions assigned under the Treaty.

My delegation notes that some of these principles of the Agency's safeguards system have already been subjected to test in the course of the Director General's implementation of General Assembly resolution 46/34 A on South Africa's nuclear capabilities. His report on the verification of the completeness of the inventory of South Africa's nuclear installations and material has been read carefully by my delegation. We consider it to be a milestone in the continuing efforts of African countries to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone on our continent. We note that, in line with the

(Mr. Adekanye, Nigeria)

decision of the General Conference at its last session, the Director General will continue to assist in that endeavour.

Cooperation between the Agency and South Africa remains essential in removing areas of doubt and restoring confidence in the peaceful nature of South Africa's nuclear programme. Such confidence would be further bolstered if the stalled political and constitutional process were urgently revived so that a non-racial democratic South Africa could resume its full participation in the Agency's activities. We therefore urge the Government of South Africa to complement the promised cooperation with the Agency by concrete action in that regard.

The Rio Conference, including commitments under Agenda 21 as well as the Framework Convention on Climatic Change signed on that occasion, signalled an important role for the International Atomic Energy Agency as well as other agencies in the United Nations system. The Agency must address, among other issues, global concerns over the safety of nuclear installations world wide to strengthen confidence in nuclear power. Such a role goes beyond the achievement of an international nuclear-safety culture to assistance in the formulation of a convention on nuclear safety. It encompasses the strengthening of international nuclear liability, combining the Vienna and Paris Conventions in the field of civil liability. We urge the Agency not to relent in its endeavour to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation on these important issues. It is our hope, too, that all Member States will participate actively in these efforts so as to ensure that all nuclear installations world wide are indeed safe and well-regulated and pose no danger to health and the environment.

(Mr. Adekanye, Nigeria)

Permit me to turn to the associated issue of the disposal of nuclear and radioactive waste. Whilst the Agency's assistance to developing countries in strengthening radioactive waste management through the establishment of efficient disposal facilities for waste arising from isotope applications in hospitals and industry is appreciated, the transboundary movement of high-level radioactive wastes has remained a source of major concern to my country. Since the IAEA adopted the Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste in 1990, many Member States, including Nigeria, have stressed the need to translate the lofty objectives of the Code into a legally binding instrument. Recent events in the world have given added urgency to that need. Global concerns over transboundary movement of such waste can only be addressed through transparency and multilateral commitments. In the meantime, we look forward to the outcome of the ongoing efforts by the Agency in formulating internationally agreed radioactive waste safety standards that will reinforce current gains.

This year marks the thirty-fifth anniversary of the International Atomic Energy Agency. During that period it has fostered international cooperation in nuclear techniques and applications and played a leading role in the area of safeguards. It remains the considered view of my country that neither of the two roles should be emphasized at the expense of the other. We therefore supported the decision of the General Conference at its 1991 regular session affirming that, in order to fulfil the objectives of the Agency:

"an adequate balance should be achieved among the Agency's main activities, having particularly in mind safeguards and non-safeguards activities."

(Mr. Adekanye, Nigeria)

Progress has been made in implementing that decision. We are encouraged that in the latest decision of the General Conference the enhancement of the Agency's technical cooperation activities through effective programmes aimed at improving the scientific and technological capabilities of developing countries is once again stressed.

There is, however, an additional challenge on which little progress has been made: the need for the Agency's decision-making organ, the Board of Governors, to reflect the changed composition of the Agency's membership. Since 1978 the issue of an increase in representation of two areas - Africa, and the Middle East and South Asia - has engaged the attention of the Board of Governors and the General Conference.

(Mr. Adekanye, Nigeria)

We believe that the Agency cannot and should not stand apart from the powerful cross-currents of reform and restructuring currently sweeping through the entire United Nations system. Events on our continent in the nuclear field make Africa's representation on that policy-making body a pressing necessity.

In conclusion, my delegation wishes to reaffirm its faith in the International Atomic Energy Agency. By responding creatively to the changing needs and priorities of Member States, especially developing countries, it has contributed to the development of science and technology through new technologies and their applications. It has not only strengthened the non-proliferation regime and restored confidence in its safeguards system, but has also continued to serve as a mechanism for intergovernmental cooperation in nuclear science and technology.

My delegation is confident that the International Atomic Energy Agency will continue to serve the interests of all its members. What the Agency needs most is an unambiguous demonstration by all member States of their commitment and political will to provide the Agency with the necessary resources to perform, in an efficient and cost-effective manner, the tasks entrusted to it under the Statute.

Mr. MONTAÑO (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. Hans Blix has presented to us a detailed overview of the important activities carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the last year. His statement makes clear the increase in the Agency's growing tasks and responsibilities and the major challenges it faces. As in previous years, my delegation expresses its gratitude to Mr. Blix for the information he has provided, and assures him of Mexico's firm and continued support for his leadership and for the work of the Agency. Along with the annual report of

(Mr. Montaña, Mexico)

the IAEA, the statement by the Director General makes it possible for us to make assessments of the Agency's work, the range of its activities and the difficulties - and opportunities - that it will face from now on.

There can be no doubt that one of the first issues deserving our attention is the financial situation of the Agency, which has not been spared the difficulties besetting other members of the system of multilateral organizations in obtaining in a timely manner and in sufficient quantity the resources we are all obliged to contribute. It is surprising that the growing demands for bodies such as the IAEA to carry out new or more ambitious activities are not accompanied by the necessary commitment to disburse the resources to support these responsibilities. We appeal for an end to this situation, which affects us all and is leading to an erosion in the ability of the multilateral system as a whole to act.

Mexico has traditionally maintained that the IAEA is intrinsically a body with two complementary objectives: first, guaranteeing global security in the use of nuclear power and materials by means of a system of safeguards system, and, secondly, assisting development by promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear power. This is a dual function, which must not be changed or thrown out of balance. As Mexico sees it, any attempt, deliberate or otherwise, to alter this balance can only be to the detriment of the Agency and the support it receives from Member States.

In this context, we are concerned about the fact that as a result of the financial difficulties the Agency is experiencing research contracts have been seriously affected, as is clearly indicated in the Agency's report. These contracts are the very core of the Agency's operations in promoting

(Mr. Montaña, Mexico)

nuclear science and technology to solve problems in Member States and are perhaps one of the most important cooperative efforts in the system.

Our concern is heightened when we consider the remarkable successes the Agency has had in this area of its activities. Programmes such as the campaign to eradicate the New World Screwworm in North Africa, crop production and environmental protection are clear examples of the Agency's constructive potential in this field.

On the issue of safeguards, we also recognize the important work the Agency has continued to carry out. Its efforts in discharging its mandate under Security Council resolutions have been laudable, but we continue to maintain that those resolutions are, and must be, of an exceptional character. The IAEA must keep unchanged its nature and mandate as a technical body, avoiding being politicized and not extrapolating extraordinary cases as if they were to become guidelines for the future.

The Mexican delegation would like to stress that security is a collective responsibility. There are two fundamental lessons to be drawn from the activities of the IAEA under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). The first, which has already been the subject of a ruling by the Board of Governors, is that a Member State failed to fulfil its safeguards obligations. But the second, and perhaps the more important, is that this breach occurred because of the transfer of material and other resources.

In this context, although we are indeed grateful for the Agency's decisions aimed at strengthening its safeguards system, we cannot fail to point out that this is only a partial solution to a bigger problem that requires the attention of the General Assembly. We ought to consider

(Mr. Montaña, Mexico)

together the root causes of problems of possible non-compliance safeguards, and strengthen the undertakings designed to avoid them. The example of Iraq should remind everyone to be careful in the sale or transfer of materials or technology capable of being used for other than peaceful purposes.

At the same time, we should also underline our conviction that strengthening the safeguards system must not adversely affect the sovereign rights of States. Once again, we think that the problem deserves broader, in-depth consideration, rather than merely fixing up problems once they occur or when there is suspicion of a breach.

The resolution on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, which was approved by the General Conference of the IAEA on 25 September last as resolution GC(XXXVI)/RES/586, states clearly in its third preambulatory paragraph that:

"Strengthening of the safeguards system should not lead to a diminution of the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation and ... should be consistent with the function of the Agency to encourage and assist the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and with an adequate transfer of technology".

In our view, the references to strengthening the safeguards system contained in draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1 exactly reflects this understanding.

Mr. MALIK (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): The delegation of the Republic of Iraq would like to make its contribution to the General Assembly's discussion of agenda item 14, entitled "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency".

We listened very attentively to the statement made yesterday afternoon by Mr. Hans Blix, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In order to put all the facts before the representatives here present in the General Assembly concerning the question of Iraq's compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) in the nuclear field, I should like to point out that Iraq took a number of practical steps in implementing the provisions stipulated in resolution 687 (1991). I shall deal with those provisions and measures in detail, as follows.

First, paragraph 11 of resolution 687 (1991) invited Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Iraq has implemented this paragraph through the Foreign Minister's letter of 18 April 1991 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council, wherein he stated:

"In accordance with paragraph 11 of resolution 687, the Iraqi Government reaffirms anew and unconditionally Iraq's obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968."

Iraq also reaffirmed this undertaking in the Foreign Minister's letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated 7 July 1991, as well as his letter of 28 August 1991, which stated:

"Iraq reaffirms anew its full commitment to its international obligations, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the safeguards agreement with the IAEA."

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

Secondly, paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991) requested that Iraq should agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above. Iraq implemented this provision in the following manner:

(a) The Foreign Minister addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 18 April 1991, which stated:

"In accordance with paragraph 12 of resolution 687, Iraq unconditionally agrees not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above-mentioned".

(b) The letter of the Foreign Minister addressed to the Director General of the IAEA on 10 October 1991 reaffirmed anew this commitment. It stated:

"I should like to reaffirm anew that Iraq has ceased all its nuclear activities since the beginning of the aggression against it on the night of 16 January 1991 and after the adoption of resolution 687 of 1991. In accordance with its obligations under the resolution, Iraq decided to cease its nuclear programme".

The Foreign Minister went on to state in another paragraph of his letter:

"The Iraqi Government reaffirms anew that Iraq has never endeavoured to acquire nuclear weapons, that the political leadership in Iraq has never at any time whatsoever made a decision to direct the research carried out by the Iraqi scientists specialized in the field of atomic energy towards the manufacturing of any form of nuclear weapons."

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

(c) The head of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization met with the head of the nuclear inspection team, David Kaye, an American intelligence officer, on 9 August 1991. During that meeting, he provided Mr. Kaye with a comprehensive review of the research carried out by Iraq in the nuclear field. He clarified that the Iraqi programme is not what some other parties would like to portray as an attempt that may have been close to achieving its objective, that is, the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In that review, he set forth the reasons for Iraq's opting for the enrichment process while renouncing the building of nuclear-power reactors. The head of the inspection team, in the course of that meeting, said that the Iraqi side was cooperative and that what his team had accomplished in its inspection round represented the beginning of the end of finalizing the assessment of the size of the Iraqi programme. He also said that the Iraqi programme in its current state does not contain anything that could lead to the production of a nuclear weapon.

(d) The Iraqi Governor at the IAEA during the meeting of the Board of Governors and the General Conference of the Agency on 6 May, 18 July and 20 September 1991 expounded fully the peaceful nature of the nuclear programme in Iraq. Also, the statement made by the permanent representative of Iraq to the United Nations in the Security Council on 11 October 1991 and the letter of the Chairman of the Iraqi side addressed to the head of the seventh nuclear inspection team on 14 October 1991 all contained additional information that reaffirm that commitment. That letter contained the following:

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

The latter contained a reaffirmation of Iraq's renunciation of its nuclear programmes. It also stated that research and studies into armaments had been made, but no political decision to manufacture nuclear weapons had been taken. All the research and studies carried out were experimental in nature and not aimed at the production of weapons. There is no programme for the production of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

Operative paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) also decided that Iraq should submit to the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) within 15 days of the adoption of that resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all nuclear-weapons-usable materials, their components and manufacturing facilities. Iraq has implemented that provision by taking the following steps:

(a) The Iraqi Foreign Minister addressed letters to the United Nations Secretary-General and the Director General of the IAEA on 18 April 1991, 27 April 1991, 7 July 1991, 10 July 1991, 12 August 1991 and 28 August 1991, all of which contained information, tables and annexes declaring the locations, amounts and types of all items and materials specified in operative paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991), whether subject to Agency safeguards or not. In addition, the letters contained answers to queries put by the IAEA and lists of equipment and locations of interest to the Special Commission, as well as clarifications with regard to the history and nature of the Iraqi nuclear programme, which was devoted solely to peaceful purposes.

(b) Twenty-six letters were addressed by the Iraqi counterpart to the heads of the inspection teams, containing answers to questions put by the heads of the teams as well as questions put by the IAEA.

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

(c) There are three records of the surrender of documents to the sixth inspection team on 20 and 23 September 1991.

Fourthly, operative paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991) requested Iraq to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iraq has implemented that provision in the following manner:

(a) The Iraqi Foreign Minister addressed a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General on 18 April 1991, in which he stated that "the Iraqi Government agreed to place all its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control of the International Atomic Energy Agency".

(b) The materials covered by resolution 687 (1991) were handed over to the inspection teams. The teams carried out the following procedures: all nuclear materials were placed under Agency seal; parts singled out by the teams were destroyed; raw Russian fuel, as well as plutonium and uranium, were moved outside Iraq; two high-speed heavy cameras were removed from Iraq and all hot cells were sealed, rendering them harmless, together with the mechanical robot arms.

Fifthly, paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991) requested Iraq to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 of the resolution, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified in paragraph 12. That provision was implemented by Iraq in the following manner:

(a) The Foreign Minister addressed a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General on 6 April 1991 which specified Iraq's acceptance of resolution 687 (1991).

(b) The Foreign Minister addressed a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General on 18 April 1991 in which he stated that the Iraqi

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

Government agreed to the arrangements set forth in paragraph 13 of resolution 687 (1991).

(c) During the period from 15 May 1991 through mid-October 1992, 14 nuclear inspection teams visited Iraq. With the exception of the two teams headed by David Kaye, the American intelligence officer, the teams carried out their tasks in the country with the full cooperation of the Iraqi side. Among the facilities provided to the teams by the Iraqi authorities are the following: logistical support; administrative and medical services; technical services, that is, assistance in the destruction of equipment and machinery; assistance in the transportation of unused fuel out of Iraq; the placing of all nuclear materials in one site to facilitate verification and monitoring processes; the provision of on-site headquarters for the inspection teams and the handing-over of documents and plans; the placing of equipment and machinery at Al Twetha site to facilitate the verification process. All the inspection teams have commended the Iraqi side for its cooperation and its provision of all data requested, as well as for giving serious and credible answers to all their queries.

As for the problems that arose during the visits of the two teams headed by David Kaye, they did arise from the conduct of the head of the two teams and some of their members, who had intentionally created problems in order to serve certain political objectives of the countries for which they work. The second nuclear inspection team insisted on carrying out an inspection during the Holy Feast of Sacrifice. The sixth nuclear inspection team went into the administrative buildings of the Atomic Energy Board, stealing personnel files of the employees and sending them to Washington and not to the Special Commission.

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

The French newspaper Libération, in its issue dated 22 October 1991, quoting a doctor who was a member of the David Kaye team, reported that the latter had purposely clashed with the Iraqi authorities to provide a cover for a new American act of aggression against Iraq.

(d) All the nuclear inspection teams that visited Iraq inspected more than 60 sites in all parts of the country. More than half of the sites inspected were unrelated to the Iraqi nuclear programme. The inspection teams spent 3,449 working days in Iraq, during which they carried out 279 inspection visits, including 106 visits and return visits to the sites of Iraq's nuclear programme, 60 visits to support sites and 47 visits to sites totally unrelated to the programme.

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

These included visits to the prison at Mousel, the main sewage plant at Baghdad, a civilian shelter and the fields of a privately owned field. The inspection teams have made 40 surprise visits and have taken 600 specimens for radiation tests. They have supervised the destruction of more than 2,000 items of materials and equipment and the demolition of buildings on 47,750 square metres, at Al-Ethir, Hatin, Tarmia and Al-Shourkat. The inspection teams have sealed over 900 items of material, machinery and equipment and have destroyed 4,000 tonnes of iron used in the EMIS programme.

Before the inspection teams carried out their destruction procedures, Iraq had voluntarily destroyed more than 26,000 items such as spare parts, machines and other equipment, all of which were subsequently scrutinized by the inspection teams themselves. We also destroyed large quantities of raw materials, including 1,500 tonnes of Margin steel.

Dr. Zefirero, leader of the most recent nuclear inspection team, has stated that the Iraqi nuclear programme has become "zero"; that is the whole truth.

Mr. Blix may recall that in New York, on 12 March 1992, the head of the Iraqi atomic-energy organization furnished him with a document containing a full and final report on Iraq's nuclear programme. We were told that this report was sent to 150 experts and specialists all over the world. Mr. Blix will also recall that only 24 questions were put to us on that report; the answers to those questions were either contained in the report itself or in letters from the Iraqi side to the leaders of the inspection teams.

Sixth, the Security Council resolutions asked Iraq to cease all nuclear activities of any kind with the exception of the use of isotopes for medical, agricultural and industrial purposes. Iraq has implemented that request in the following manner:

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

(a) Between 24 July to 10 October 1991, the Foreign Minister addressed five letters to the United Nations Secretary-General and the IAEA, in which he made it clear that Iraq had renounced all nuclear activities and that its previous activities no longer existed either on the practical or on the scientific levels owing to the destruction inflicted on the Iraqi nuclear facilities by the aggression of the coalition forces.

(b) The head of the Iraqi atomic-energy organization reaffirmed to the leader of the fourth inspection team that, as a result of the total destruction of its scientific facilities, Iraq had been rendered incapable of continuing its scientific activities. The team members saw for themselves the extent of the destruction inflicted on those facilities and agreed that they have become unusable.

(c) The inspection teams that visited Iraq reported no activities contravening these above obligations.

Seventh, Security Council resolutions asked Iraq to cease all movement and destruction of materials or equipment related to nuclear weapons or to other nuclear activities without notifying the Special Commission and obtaining its prior approval. Iraq has implemented this stipulation in the following manner:

(a) On 28 August 1991, the Foreign Minister addressed a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General stating that Iraq had decided as of 28 June 1991 to cease the movement and destruction of all materials or equipment related to Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

(b) The nuclear inspection teams that visited Iraq have verified this. An agreement was reached with the third nuclear inspection team on moving some equipment to other sites to facilitate the supervision of that equipment. The

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

equipment was transported under the supervision of members from the team. A quantity of yellow salt was moved from Takrit to Al-Tweitha at the request of the seventh nuclear inspection team; the move was verified by the eighth inspection team. The seventh nuclear inspection team also requested that lots of uranium dioxide be moved from site D to site C within Al-Tweitha. And Iraq requested the movement of liquid wastes containing uranium from Kissek to the Al-Jezira laboratory; approval was not obtained until Agency inspectors were present for the move. Iraq has implemented all this in a straightforward manner and none of the inspection teams that visited Iraq has reported anything to the contrary.

Eighth, Iraq has dealt in a positive manner with the IAEA safeguards agreement and its annexes. Since November 1991, the competent authorities have transmitted the required information, and subsequently this information has been updated continuously.

In his statement to the Security Council on 11 March 1992 concerning Security Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, reaffirmed that respect for Iraq's sovereignty, security and its legitimate right to progress and science would create the climate necessary for a just and equitable implementation of Iraq's obligations under those two resolutions.

Ninth, in its resolution 687 (1991) the Security Council

"Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons". (Security Council resolution 687 (1991), para. 14)

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

Most regrettably, the Security Council has totally ignored that paragraph and has taken no steps towards its implementation. To the contrary, the Council, in its resolution 715 (1991), postponed all movement towards the establishment of such a zone pending the implementation of the future plan to monitor Iraq's compliance with Security Council resolution 687 (1991). Thus, the Security Council and the States that wield power over it have permitted Israel to increase its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction with impunity.

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

It is also regrettable that the Security Council has not taken the measures necessary for the implementation of its resolution 487 (1981), which demanded that Israel place its nuclear facilities under international control after its aggression against the Iraqi Osirak reactor, which was for peaceful purposes.

From the foregoing it becomes quite clear that Iraq has fully met its obligations concerning the provisions of resolution 687 (1991). A number of fair and objective statements by the heads of the inspection teams have pointed out the cooperation by the Iraqi authorities. The reasons why some are raising doubts and levelling false accusations concerning Iraq's alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the above-mentioned resolution are very clear indeed. They have an ulterior political motive that has nothing to do with the implementation of the resolution.

The three permanent Western members of the Security Council, foremost of which is the United States of America, constantly, unreservedly and publicly declare that they wish to change the political leadership of Iraq, despite the fact that this runs blatantly counter to the Charter of the United Nations and the content of the resolutions of the Security Council itself. The objective of those three States is to blackmail Iraq and put it in the position of the accused so as to use their trumped up charges in maintaining the unjust economic embargo against the people of Iraq. They wish to take advantage of the situation in order to be able to threaten the use of military force against Iraq whenever they wish, realize their illegitimate wish to change the regime in Iraq and destroy the Iraqi economy.

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

The people of Iraq have made great contributions to human civilization. The museums of Europe are full of the achievements of this people's great civilization. Abraham, the father of all prophets, was one of them. Our people invented writing and established the first legal system in the world that determined rights and duties. Now this people is being subjected to a blatant injustice. How long will this proud people put up with this injustice, and how long will humanity tolerate it?

Placing these facts before the General Assembly, the delegation of Iraq hopes that all States will view objectively the steps taken by Iraq for the implementation of the provisions of resolution 687 (1991) and that those States will arrive at the right conclusion. Iraq also hopes that all States will work with us to lift the economic embargo against the people of Iraq since all the causes for its imposition have ceased to exist, in accordance with the Security Council resolutions.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania) (interpretation from French): The report on the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) offers us a convincing picture of the scope of the Agency's activities and the progress made in the implementation of its programmes. We should like to pay tribute to the Director General and his secretariat for their success in taking on the tasks that were entrusted to them in spite of a host of difficulties, including financial.

In view of the intrinsic links between the basic functions of the Agency, we support the need to strengthen cooperation and technical assistance along with activities for nuclear safeguards and safety, thus guaranteeing better and more fruitful international cooperation and enhancing the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

The Romanian Government is grateful to the Agency and its member States for the technical assistance it has been provided in various forms. International cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is part and parcel of our policy in the sphere of nuclear energy based on advanced technology, such as in the case of the CANDU reactors. To this end, a major contract was signed this year with partners in Canada and Italy for one of the most important investment projects undertaken by our State, aiming at the start of operations of the first part of the nuclear facility at Cernavoda in 1995.

Romania gives high priority to the Agency's activities for implementing safeguards on the use of nuclear energy and improving the operation of its safeguards system, which plays a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and contributes to the development of cooperation and international trade with regard to nuclear material, equipment and technology.

Our view on safeguards is clear: Romania is a Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has agreed to its comprehensive safeguards regime. By the same token, it has made comprehensive safeguards a condition of any cooperation or provision of material in the nuclear sphere. Romania has also subscribed to the guidelines of the group of nuclear exporters and the guidelines on both nuclear transfers and the transfer of dual-purpose nuclear material, equipment and technology.

Recent events have shown the need for sustained efforts in order to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and make the NPT truly universal.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

The role played by the Agency in the implementation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) confirmed the need to strengthen the safeguards system and to give the Agency the means to ensure that nuclear energy is used for peaceful purposes only. We should like to commend the Director General and his colleagues for the competent and efficient manner in which they have carried out the complex missions entrusted to the Agency by the Security Council.

In a world which needs energy but is also concerned about pollution and the deterioration of the environment, nuclear safety and radiation protection should be given high priority in the Agency's programme. We attach special attention to these activities, and we note with satisfaction that the expanded programme on nuclear safety, adopted after the Chernobyl accident, has had positive effects in science and technology and also in terms of the credibility of nuclear energy among the public.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

Because of the obvious importance of a convention on nuclear safety, we have decided to take an active part in the preparation of a draft which would fill gaps in international rules and regulations and provide increased protection for society and for the environment.

Like many other countries, Romania is seriously concerned over the inadequate state of certain older nuclear reactors situated in the region. We welcome the activities undertaken by the Agency to evaluate and improve the safety of those reactors. To shut them down completely would cause energy problems in the countries that use them; but an accident could have disastrous consequences for everyone.

Romania is resolved to see to it that the nuclear facility at Cernavoda functions in conditions guaranteed to meet the highest international nuclear safety standards. At the same time, the Romanian Government will strengthen its national body dealing with nuclear rules and regulations. We thank the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the assistance recently given us in this sphere, especially the recommendations of the group of experts which visited Romania this year.

The Romanian Parliament has just ratified the Vienna Convention on civil liability for nuclear damage and the Joint Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention.

My delegation has become a sponsor of the draft resolution on the report of the IAEA. We feel that the draft reflects the current objectives and concerns regarding the activities of the IAEA in an adequate and balanced manner.

Since its establishment, the IAEA has been very successful in carrying out its noble task of ensuring promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while contributing to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

safety of nuclear installations, the development of its member States through technical assistance programmes, and international cooperation. Romania is resolved to give the Agency its full support so that it can discharge in an ever improving manner its functions and responsibilities, which have already assumed world-wide importance.

Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea): On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Korea, I should like to express my appreciation to Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for his important statement yesterday afternoon introducing the 1991 annual report of the Agency.

My delegation would also like to congratulate the Director General and the secretariat of the IAEA on its thirty-fifth anniversary and commend their hard work and significant contribution in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in preventing its use for military purposes for more than three decades.

We also welcome the admission of the Republics of Croatia, Slovenia and Uzbekistan to membership of the IAEA at the thirty-sixth session of the General Conference last month.

My delegation has noted with satisfaction the Agency's accomplishments over the last 12 months in both the promotional and the regulatory aspects of its activities. One of the areas to which my Government attaches great importance is non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the role of the IAEA in implementing and strengthening the safeguards system.

Over the past year, significant developments have taken place in favour of non-proliferation and the strengthening of safeguards. In the field of non-proliferation, the two declared nuclear-weapon States, China and France,

(Mr. Lee, Republic of Korea)

have finally acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), a welcome and important step towards achieving a truly universal non-proliferation regime.

The newly independent States with significant nuclear activities which were part of the former Soviet Union, such as the Baltic States, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, are also expected to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States in the not-too-distant future.

The accession of more nuclear and non-nuclear States to the NPT augurs well for the successful conclusion of the 1995 Review Conference to extend the NPT. Furthermore, Argentina and Brazil have agreed to open up their nuclear activities to each other and to IAEA inspection. The Tlatelolco Treaty is also likely to enter into force in the near future and render the entire area of Latin America a nuclear-weapon-free-zone.

Regarding South Africa, last month the IAEA General Conference, after examining the report of the Director General on the result of the IAEA's thorough inspection and verification of all South Africa's nuclear installations over the last year, decided to remove the item on South Africa's nuclear capabilities from its agenda for the next session.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, after a delay of more than six years, finally concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which entered into force in May this year. Yet it would seem to be still too early for the IAEA to make any judgement on the completeness and accuracy of the initial inventory report by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I shall revert to this issue later.

With respect to the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system, my delegation welcomes the measures taken by its Board of Governors, and subsequently endorsed by the General Conference in Vienna, to strengthen the safeguards system and improve its effectiveness and cost efficiency.

(Mr. Lee, Republic of Korea)

My delegation also welcomes the Agency's reaffirmation of its existing right to undertake special inspections, which could help the Agency deal with any clandestine nuclear activities. The endorsement of the Director General's proposal for the earlier provision of design information was also a welcome achievement.

We also believe that the proposed system of universal reporting of exports and imports of nuclear material and sensitive equipment, which has yet to be finalized through further consultations, could contribute to increasing transparency and building confidence between both nuclear and non-nuclear States.

We encourage the Agency to devise soon new proposals accommodating the various concerns of the member States, making it possible for an efficient and viable reporting regime based on the principles of non-discrimination and universality to be put into effect at an early date.

In view of the increasing requirements of the Agency's safeguards activities vis-à-vis States developing nuclear energy, and considering the Agency's continued financial difficulties, it has become all the more necessary and urgent to streamline and rationalize the Agency's safeguards system. While fully supporting the Director General's effort to explore desirable measures in this respect, my delegation believes that the streamlining or cost-saving measures should be considered without sacrificing the effectiveness of the safeguards system itself.

(Mr. Lee, Republic of Korea)

My Government is willing to contribute through active participation in the process of consultation on this matter, including participation in the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation.

As Mr. Blix pointed out in his statement, we are moving into a post-cold-war world, when fewer resources might be used for military purposes, including nuclear weapons - a development that favours non-proliferation at the global level. In this context, my delegation wishes once again to draw the attention of the General Assembly to the initiatives and the commitment of the Government of the Republic of Korea with respect to non-proliferation in our part of the world.

In December last year, following President Roh Tae Woo's November Peace Initiative on a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula, the South and the North of Korea reached a historic agreement in the form of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This inter-Korean agreement marked a first step forward towards attaining non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the peninsula and promoting a new order of peace and stability in North-East Asia. Notwithstanding this encouraging development, the suspicions and concerns surrounding North Korea's nuclear-development programme remain.

At the multilateral level, despite a visit by the Director General to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and despite three IAEA inspections of North Korea's nuclear installations and materials over the past five months, what has transpired so far does not provide sufficient evidence to remove suspicions about North Korea's nuclear programme.

At the bilateral level, the South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission, at its ninth meeting in Panmunjom, which ended just this morning, failed to produce agreement on the mutual inspection regime based on the principles of

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reciprocity and challenge inspection. Thus, the contention of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that it has neither the will nor the capability to build nuclear weapons has yet to be verified at the multilateral and bilateral levels.

During both the Board of Governors meeting last month and the IAEA General Conference that followed, representatives of more than 20 Member States expressed serious concern about North Korea's still-unverified nuclear programme. They urged the authorities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to continue to be cooperative with respect to IAEA inspections and to agree to comprehensive reciprocal-inspection measures with a view to implementing the North-South agreement on denuclearization as soon as possible. In this connection, my delegation once again calls upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to refrain from building or operating reprocessing-related facilities, in full compliance with the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The earlier remarks of the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea concerning the causes of the stalemate in the South-North nuclear negotiations do not deserve any comment from me or the attention of the General Assembly as they contained not a single new, constructive or practical element.

Allow me to turn to the question of nuclear safety and the safe disposal of radioactive waste, which comprises one of the most important aspects of the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Although individual States are ultimately responsible for the safety of their nuclear facilities, international cooperation to ensure more effective and efficient nuclear safety is more important now than it has ever been.

(Mr. Lee, Republic of Korea)

While appreciating the various initiatives of the IAEA secretariat in this regard, my delegation urges the Agency and the Member States currently engaged in the negotiations on the draft international convention on nuclear safety to accelerate their efforts to reach consensus at the earliest possible date - hopefully by the next session of the IAEA General Conference.

We also welcome the initiative of the Agency and the progress that has been made thus far, to work out a comprehensive series of internationally agreed radioactive-waste safety standards and hope that phase I of the programme will be completed by 1994, as envisaged. My Government is considering making a financial contribution to facilitate the implementation of the programme. In this connection, as was recommended by the General Conference, all States with nuclear-power development programmes are called upon to make them fully available to the IAEA with a view to enhancing operational safety. Included here are Operational Safety Review Team missions, Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team missions and the incident reporting system.

We are increasingly concerned about the safety of nuclear-power reactors in North-East Asia, where the most extensive nuclear-power programmes are being developed and implemented. Recently my Government called upon the countries in the region to give serious consideration to the establishment, in close cooperation with the IAEA, of a regional-cooperation programme in the field of nuclear safety.

We urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to join the Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology and other regional nuclear-safety cooperation programmes and also to make use of the IAEA's services for the purpose of

(Mr. Lee, Republic of Korea)

upgrading the operational safety of indigenously developed nuclear reactors that are already in operation or are under construction. Here I include the IAEA services such as those of the Operational Safety Review Team and the Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team.

With respect to the promotional aspect of the Agency's mandate, my delegation recognizes the recent initiatives and efforts of the IAEA and of Member States to promote the peaceful application of nuclear science and technology for the purposes of progress in medicine, agriculture and industry - particularly in the areas of food irradiation and portable water supply. My delegation calls upon the Agency and other relevant specialized agencies, international organizations and non-governmental organizations to increase their joint efforts in this respect - with particular emphasis on technical assistance and cooperation to meet the growing needs of the developing world.

In a constantly changing world the IAEA and its member States should be able to confront emerging needs and new challenges in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. One such need is the necessity to control the growing quantity of weapons-grade nuclear materials - plutonium and enriched uranium - separated in the nuclear cycle or recovered from dismantled nuclear weapons.

In his statement the Director General expressed concerns and made suggestions about international measures to ensure the peaceful storage or use of fissionable material recovered during the dismantling of nuclear weapons or separated from spent fuel and about the role that the IAEA can play in the process. My delegation took note of these concerns and suggestions, and we hope that the IAEA secretariat will initiate in-depth studies on this

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important issue, which is giving rise to increasing international concern, and that it will come up with proposals and options for consideration by the IAEA and the General Assembly in the months ahead.

In conclusion, my delegation wishes to reiterate the commitment of the Government of the Republic of Korea to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its full support for and cooperation with the IAEA. In this spirit, my delegation has become one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1. We hope that the draft resolution will be adopted by consensus.

Mr. GALAL (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): At the outset, Sir, allow me to express the satisfaction of the Egyptian delegation on the important statement made by Mr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in introducing the annual report of the Agency. The tireless efforts by the Director General and the secretariat of the Agency to discharge their respective responsibilities are the subject of great satisfaction for us.

My delegation is completely satisfied with the adoption by the General Conference of the Agency at its last session of the resolution concerning the implementation of IAEA safeguards for the Middle East region, by consensus, for the second year running. The reiteration of this position by the members of the General Conference supports our principled unwavering position on the necessity of placing all nuclear installations in the Middle East under IAEA comprehensive safeguards as an important confidence-building measure that should make it possible to arrive at comprehensive and just solutions to the intractable political problems of the Middle East region, from which the region has suffered for over four decades.

The IAEA plays an important role in promoting the system of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This role is recognized as a fait accompli both at the international and the regional levels. It is also an essential instrument of international movement towards the elimination of weapons of mass destruction that threaten not only the Middle East region, but the very future of humanity the world over, and which affects most adversely the aspirations of all peoples after security and stability.

Proceeding from this, Egypt welcomes the constructive steps taken by the Agency recently with a view to ridding the safeguards regime and monitoring

(Mr. Galal, Egypt)

system of certain shortcomings and ensuring the implementation of the obligations under the non-proliferation Treaty.

The fact that the Agency has taken such steps attests to the flexibility of its system and its ability to keep pace with the many international changes that have become the predominant features of our period. These measures strengthen our confidence in the ability of the Agency to discharge its responsibilities.

The adherence and commitment to the non-proliferation Treaty by most members of the international community is such that statements have been made in the General Assembly requesting the extension of the duration of the Treaty as an urgent need, in order to spare the world the grave dangers posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. This prompts us to ask the international community to rise with the same degree of commitment and deal with the failure of achieving the universality of the Treaty despite the 25 years that have passed since it entered into force. The credibility of the measures adopted by the Agency to tighten the safeguards regime and monitoring system would be of limited scope so long as there are States that act at will outside the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty.

In this context, the context of regional disarmament, one must stress the importance of the accession by all the States of the Middle East without exception to the non-proliferation Treaty or the IAEA safeguards system, since this, in our estimation, is the best way to dissipate the sense of danger and insecurity that still hovers over the region, obstructs the peace efforts and makes every attempt at moving forward fall short of expectations.

The use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes is among the legitimate objectives of every country of the world, particularly the developing

(Mr. Galal, Egypt)

countries that could find therein the appropriate means to improve their economies, catch up with the world's economic growth and ensure the well-being of their peoples.

Before concluding my statement, I should like to commend the IAEA's activities in providing technical assistance to developing countries in the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. We sincerely hope that this positive cooperation will continue in line with the legitimate requirements of this group of countries.

The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes or positions before the voting. May I remind delegations that, in accordance with General Assembly decision 34/401, explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. MALIK (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): The delegation of the Republic of Iraq would like to explain its vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/47/L.9/Rev.1. First, Iraq is very keen not to politicize the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or of any other United Nations agency.

Secondly, the eighth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution are an unnecessary insertion in the draft by a limited and well-known number of Western countries with a view to singling out Iraq and making it appear to be a violator of the international resolutions and agreements. As I explained to you in detail in my statement a short while ago, we have carried out our obligations vis-à-vis the provisions of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) in the nuclear field. You have undoubtedly

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

noticed that the Director General of the Agency, Mr. Blix, did not complain about any failure on our part to implement these provisions. But the aim of some Western countries has been to exploit this topic among others, for political ends which include the continuation of the inhuman blockade imposed on the Iraqi people in order to starve them.

Thirdly, we in Iraq are against the use of double standards in dealings with countries, a viewpoint which is shared by a large number of countries.

(Mr. Malik, Iraq)

It would indeed be good to have one single agreed standard that is applied to all countries without exception. Doubtless, representatives have noted that the decisions by the General Conference of the IAEA this year contain no reference to the fact that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, nor to the nuclear threat posed by Israel. Nor has there been any reference to the fact that Israel has not acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty as requested by Security Council resolution 487 (1981).

Are not these double standards? Is this not discrimination?

For those reasons, the delegation of Iraq finds it extremely difficult to accept the preambular paragraph 8 and the operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution.

On this occasion I should like to express my personal appreciation to Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia for his spirit of cooperation in discussing this draft resolution.

Mr. ODEH (Jordan) (interpretation from Arabic): Before the vote on draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1, on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), my delegation wishes to express its satisfaction at the responsible international change reflected in this draft resolution in order to protect mankind's life and health and the safety of its environment.

I am in duty bound to express my thanks to the Agency for its noble and important role, which it performs in the interests of all mankind. However, my delegation regrets that the draft resolution is not balanced because in its preambular part it refers to one country of the Middle East region and fails to refer to another, Israel, which possesses a number of nuclear facilities and has not acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty to this day. Israel still

(Mr. Odeh, Jordan)

refuses to place its nuclear facilities under the Agency's safeguards, which runs counter to the international reorientation I have referred to.

I should like to draw attention to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), which stipulates that measures to be taken in accordance with that resolution represent, inter alia, steps towards the goal of ridding the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction.

Therefore the least we expect of the draft resolution now before us, which refers to a certain country in our region, is that it should refer also to the other country. Reason might accept discrimination between one country and another that possess nuclear weapons according to their political regimes and their ability to control their nuclear weapons. But reason does not accept discrimination between countries possessing nuclear facilities in terms of the danger emanating from refusal to place those facilities under the safeguards and control of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Leakage of nuclear radiation in a given country has nothing to do with its political regime. The danger to mankind and its environment that might result from radiation has nothing to do with the source of that danger.

Thus my delegation cannot feel completely satisfied with a draft resolution that ignores the Israeli nuclear facilities - one of which is but 20 miles distant from population centres in Jordan - particularly when the Chernobyl disaster is still vivid in our minds.

For those reasons my delegation is obliged to abstain in the vote on the draft resolution now under consideration, even though we appreciate the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its good faith with regard to the protection of mankind, its health and its environment.

Mr. AL-HADDAD (Yemen) (interpretation from Arabic): I wish to express deepest thanks to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the extremely useful statement we heard yesterday here in the Assembly.

My delegation has studied the Agency's annual report for 1991. My country deeply appreciates the efforts of Mr. Hans Blix and his colleagues. We agree that it is necessary to increase the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in all areas of development.

My delegation was hoping to be able to support the draft resolution in document A/47/L.9/Rev.1. However, it feels that all resolutions must be balanced and non-discriminatory. That is why we are obliged to abstain in the vote on that draft resolution. Israel's nuclear installations are not mentioned in it, and that is true of other subjects treated in the draft resolution.

The PRESIDENT: I should like to announce that the following countries have become sponsors of draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1: Estonia, Lithuania, Samoa and Togo.

The Assembly will now take a decision on draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1.

Separate votes have been requested on the eighth preambular paragraph and the sixth paragraph of that draft resolution. Is there any objection to that request? It appears not. I shall therefore put those paragraphs to the vote first.

The Assembly will now take a decision on the eighth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Iraq

Abstaining:

Algeria, Cameroon, Cuba, Ghana, Malaysia, Mexico, Myanmar, Sudan, Uganda, Yemen

Preambular paragraph 8 was adopted by 123 votes to 1, with 10 abstentions.*

* Subsequently the delegation of Nicaragua advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

The PRESIDENT: I now put to the vote operative paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Iraq

Abstaining: Algeria, Cameroon, Cuba, Ghana, Malaysia, Mexico, Myanmar, Sudan, Uganda, Yemen

Operative paragraph 6 was retained by 124 votes to 1, with 10 abstentions.*

* Subsequently the delegations of Gambia and Nicaragua advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

The PRESIDENT: I now put to the vote draft resolution

A/47/L.9/Rev.1 as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Cuba, Iraq, Jordan, Sudan, Yemen

Draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1 was adopted by 146 votes to none, with 5 abstentions (resolution 47/8).*

* Subsequently the delegations of Benin, Nicaragua and Paraguay advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour.

The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes. May I remind delegations that, in accordance with General Assembly decision 34/401, explanations of vote are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. SALAS (Mexico)(interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Mexico voted in favour of draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1 because we consider that it is of the utmost importance to support the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and reaffirm our confidence in the role the IAEA plays in promoting the peaceful use of atomic energy. As we all know, the General Assembly for many years sought to express the international community's support for the IAEA's work without singling out any of its activities. While we support the intent of paragraphs 4 and 5, we feel that their inclusion for the first time in the resolution is not necessary, particularly in the light of the last preambular paragraph, which refers to specific decisions of the Agency. We are concerned about the trend to cite isolated decisions of the General Conference and make special reference to them in General Assembly resolutions.

Similarly, our abstention in the separate votes on the eighth preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 6 reflect our reservations about the practice of singling out certain practices of the Agency, however important they may be. This type of selectivity undermines the delicate balance that should exist in the work of the Agency. It does so to the detriment of the importance attached to other activities, such as those concerning the IAEA's technical cooperation.

The delegation of Mexico regrets the fact that at a time when a growing number of resolutions are being adopted by consensus in the Assembly, on this

(Mr. Salas, Mexico)

subject we are moving backwards. This is of no benefit to the General Assembly or the IAEA. We hope that this situation will not recur in the future.

Mr. MUJICA CANTELAR (Cuba)(interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Cuba wishes to explain its position on draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1 concerning the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In general, the resolution we have just adopted contains a set of ideas concerning the work of the IAEA which our country fully endorses, because of the importance Cuba attaches to the work of the Agency, with which we have had fruitful cooperation in the framework of current programmes for the use of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes for the country's economic, social and scientific development. Accordingly, my delegation welcomes the resolution's positive tone concerning the strengthening of the IAEA's technical cooperation, which is so important for developing countries.

However, the delegation of Cuba cannot support some of the references which appear in the resolution, references which led it to abstain in the vote on those paragraphs. In particular, my delegation wishes to state its reservations concerning the endorsement in operative paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). Cuba had an opportunity to state its reasons for voting against that resolution as a non-permanent member of the Council when the resolution was adopted; those reasons are still valid, and therefore we could not vote for that paragraph.

(Mr. Mujica Cantelar, Cuba)

For these reasons, in my delegation's opinion, the resolution lacks the necessary balance. As a result, despite the fact that we endorse many of the elements it contains, we considered it necessary to abstain.

Mr. HASSAN (Sudan): My delegation has just abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1 for the following reasons.

Firstly, though this draft resolution contains some positive and constructive paragraphs, both in the preambular and operative parts, my delegation still finds it unbalanced, because there is no mention at all of Israel's nuclear capabilities or its non-adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty and the safeguards systems. A draft resolution of such paramount importance should be comprehensive, non-discriminatory, balanced, and impartial. Unfortunately, this is not the case with draft resolution A.47/L.9/Rev.1.

Secondly, the draft resolution refers in two paragraphs to Iraq's non-compliance with its safeguards and non-proliferation obligations. To our understanding and knowledge, Iraq has accepted Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and is in compliance with its implementation.

A draft resolution on the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency should not be politicized and should be very objective. Unfortunately, this is not the case with draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1. For these reasons, my delegation abstained.

Mr. BAAH (Ghana): My delegation views with concern the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and draft resolution A/47/L.9/Rev.1, which contains ideas that Ghana endorses.

The usefulness of the development of nuclear-energy technology is of great importance to Ghana. However, the delegation of Ghana could not support the eighth preambular paragraph or operative paragraph 6, on which it

(Mr. Baah, Ghana)

abstained because it feels that the draft resolution is unbalanced and leaves something to be desired.

The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

May I remind members that, in accordance with General Assembly decision 34/401, statements in exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes for the first intervention and to five minutes for the second and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. KIM (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): With reference to the south Korean statement, I wish to make our position clear.

The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula and the nuclear suspicion that remains unresolved stem from the deployment of United States nuclear weapons in south Korea. Therefore, fundamental to resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula are the withdrawal of United States nuclear weapons from south Korea, the inspection of the nuclear bases in south Korea, and the removal of the serious apprehensions of our nation, which has been under nuclear threat during the last 30 years.

To this end, it is urgent to adopt an agreement and regulations on inspection under the joint declaration of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and to inspect United States nuclear weapons and bases in south Korea. The north-south Joint Nuclear Control Committee, although it has met several times, has not yet adopted regulations on inspection to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, nor has it carried out an inspection of the United States nuclear weapons and bases in south Korea. This is due to the fact that the south Korean authorities are not in a position to take action to include the nuclear bases and weapons in the regulations on

(Mr. Kim, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

inspection or to exercise its sovereign right regarding the question of the United States nuclear weapons and bases.

In the meeting with the south side, our side asked whether or not the United States nuclear weapons would be withdrawn from south Korea, but they said that we should refer this matter to Pentagon officials in Washington. It is most deplorable that the south Korean authorities do not have a say in the presence of nuclear weapons from other countries that are now on their own soil, nor can they verify the withdrawal of these nuclear weapons.

At the twenty-fourth South Korea-United States annual security meeting recently held in Washington, the United States and south Korean authorities agreed in principle to resume next year the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, which are well known as nuclear exercises. Such provocative nuclear manoeuvres cannot but be considered as an intentional act aimed at hampering the process of peace and reconciliation on the Korean peninsula and at blocking the implementation of the Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Judging from the fact that the "Team Spirit" military exercises were suspended before the inspection of our area by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it is all the more unjustifiable to resume them at a time when nuclear inspection is under way.

If the south Korean authorities are really concerned about the future of the Korean peninsula and interested in realizing its denuclearization, they should take an independent position, stand free from outside forces, and respond as soon as possible by adopting the regulations on inspection, so that the overall inspection of United States nuclear weapons and bases can be done as agreed upon by the north and the south.

(Mr. Kim, Democratic People's
Republic of Korea)

As far as we are concerned, we have declared time and again that we have no nuclear weapons nor any intention or capacity to make them. We have no need to produce them. It is our firm intention, in line with our invariable anti-nuclear peace policy, to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes and not to develop nuclear weapons. The truth of the peaceful nuclear policy of our Government and the will to denuclearization have already been proved by several ad hoc inspections by the IAEA. After the third ad hoc inspection, the inspection team, at its request, was given opportunities to inspect two places not included in the initial declaration. We do what we say, and we never speak empty words.

We will remain loyal to our obligations to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, with patience and sincerity, make every possible effort to implement the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea): I thank you, Mr. President, for allowing me to speak at this late hour in exercise of the right of reply.

My delegation listened carefully to the usual remarks made by the preceding speaker in the expectation of finding some new, constructive or practicable elements which deserved my comment. Having failed to do so, I see no need to make further comments on his remarks, even for the sake of the record.

The PRESIDENT: May I take it that it is the wish of the Assembly to conclude its consideration of agenda item 14?

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.