

United Nations
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
FORTY-SECOND SESSION
*Official Records**



FIRST COMMITTEE
21st meeting
held on
Tuesday, 27 October 1987
at 10 a.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 21st MEETING

Chairman: Mr. BAGBENI ADELTO NZENGEYA (Zaire)

CONTENTS

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS (continued)

Statements were made by:

Me. Belonogov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
Mr. Mlloja (Albania)
Mr. Ekeus (Sweden)
Mr. Icaza Gailard (Nicaragua)
Mr. Fahmy (Egypt)

*The record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned within the week of its meeting. Publication in the Official Records Edition of the United Nations will be made after the meeting and incorporated as a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session as separate fascicle for each Committee.

DISC. GENERAL
A/C.1/42/PV.21
30 October 1987
ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 48 TO 69 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. BELONOGOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): A year ago as Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations, I spoke in the First Committee on the results of the meeting held at Reykjavik between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. Now, continuing our basic policy of internationalizing disarmament efforts and of keeping the international community, as embodied by the United Nations, informed of the progress of our bilateral talks with the United States of America over the entire range of problems of arms limitation and reduction, and bearing in mind the appeal made by the General Assembly, upon the proposal of the First Committee, to the Soviet Union and the United States with regard to questions of disarmament, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary and important to report to the First Committee on its assessment of the outcome of the talks on questions of nuclear disarmament that were held during the visit of the United States Secretary of State, George Shultz, to Moscow on 22 and 23 October of this year.

In the course of the meeting with the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Sergueiyvich Gorbachev, as well as in talks at the ministerial level, a broad range of major issues in Soviet-United States relations was reviewed. By prior agreement, the consultations centred on finalizing a treaty concerning medium- and shorter-range missiles, as well as on reaching an understanding in principle that would make it possible to achieve progress in radical reductions of strategic offensive weapons and in strengthening the régime of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

The Soviet Union put forward new major initiatives aimed at ensuring that the Moscow talks would be concluded with tangible results and that the necessary conditions would be created for further progress at the Soviet-United States talks on the critical issues of nuclear disarmament.

One of the principal results of the Moscow talks was the agreement reached on the most complex provisions of a future treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles. All the fundamental problems relating to medium- and shorter-range missiles have been resolved in principle, and the question of their elimination is no longer in any doubt.

The question of the United States warheads for the west German Pershing I-A missiles was definitively resolved. It was stated in writing that those United States warheads would be destroyed within the time-frame stipulated by the treaty for eliminating all warheads on Soviet and United States missiles, using the same procedures which are provided for other warheads.

Agreement was reached on a time-frame for elimination: three years for medium-range missiles and 18 months for shorter-range missiles. The time-frame was determined on the basis of a compromise reached with respect to combined methods of eliminating missiles, including the method of firing a limited number of them.

The agreement reached at Moscow concerning the exchange of data on medium- and shorter-range missiles as early as within the next few days is of fundamental importance to the subsequent technical work to be done by the delegations at Geneva as they finalize the text of the treaty.

Significant progress was also made in the field of verification and inspection, although lack of time prevented all those issues from being definitively resolved.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

The Soviet Union is convinced that work on the problems of strict verification is of particularly great significance at the last stage of drafting the ● agreement in question. It is also important for future reference, since experience is being gained for the subsequent preparation of an agreement on strategic weapons. This ● should be done in such a way that both sides can be assured of the reliability of compliance with agreements.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

To summarize the results of the discussion of questions relating to a treaty on medium-range and shorter-range missiles, there is every reason to believe that the agreement has now been prepared in terms of its basic parameters. The work on the text of a treaty could be completed within the next two or three weeks. For the agreement to begin functioning and be effective, even before it is legally formalized, Mikhail Gorbachev has proposed declaring, as of 1 November, a mutual moratorium on all work related to the manufacturing, testing and deployment of medium-range and shorter-range missiles.

The discussion of prospects for bringing the positions of the two sides closer together on key problems in ending the arms race and radically reducing strategic offensive weapons subject to strict compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) became a central element of the Moscow talks.

For a long time the United States side referred to the absence of a common position with regard to limits on the number of warheads on individual types of strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States of America as the main obstacle to implementing the agreement of principle reached at Reykjavik on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms. In the period preceding the talks in Moscow and particularly during the meeting at Washington, the Soviet Union took certain steps to accommodate the United States in this matter. We expressed our readiness to limit the number of nuclear warheads on any type of strategic offensive weapon to 60 per cent of their total number of 6,000. Moreover, there would be a separate limit on the number of warheads on Soviet heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles within the limits of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In Moscow, Mikhail Gorbachev made some important concrete proposals for limits on the concentration of warheads on the separate legs of the strategic triad. It

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

was proposed that within the framework of the aggregate level of 6,000 warheads no more than 3,000 to 3,300 warheads be deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles) no more than 1,600 to 2,000 warheads on sea-launched ballistic missiles) and no more than 800-900 warheads on air-based cruise missiles. Those data are very close - and I stress this point - to those repeatedly mentioned by the American side.

Accordingly, we have now ensured the possibility of reaching final agreement on the major parameters of a future treaty on the radical reduction of strategic offensive weapons. The Soviet Union has taken a major step towards reaching agreement on this fundamental problem of the Soviet-American talks and, for its part, is ready to work for the conclusion of such a full-fledged agreement. Appropriate instructions have been issued to the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks.

The question of strategic arms reduction is closely linked to the problem of the non-placement of weapons in outer space and observance of the ABM Treaty. The USSR position remains unchanged; this Treaty must be preserved in the form in which it was signed and ratified. It would be no exaggeration to state that an absolute majority of States, including United States allies, share this view, which has been solemnly voiced at this session of the General Assembly.

Mikhail Gorbachev has proposed that the United States of America and the Soviet Union legally record the obligation not to exercise for 10 years the right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty while at the same time complying strictly with it.

That proposal constitutes an amplification of our previous initiatives designed to bring the sides closer together. The Soviet Union has declared that it allowed for research work, and not only that but also the development of mock-ups and models in laboratory conditions, at test ranges, in manufacturing and so on.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

We have also submitted a proposal for identifying a specific list of devices banned for placement in outer space. At ~~the~~ Washington negotiations the American side was provided with numerical parameters and the characteristics of those devices.

Everything related to the development of those devices **and** equipment below those **parameters** is not prohibited. This premise is of fundamental significance in achieving agreement on compliance with the ABM Treaty within **the** given timeframe.

The solutions we have proposed would serve as a clear and reliable guarantee that within the period when the two sides were embarked upon a genuine and deep reduction *of* their nuclear arsenals neither one would have **grounds for fearing** that the other would try covertly to tilt the strategic balance in its favour and suddenly **"outdistance"** it through some "exotic" armaments **or** systems. **Hence, there** would be no reason for withdrawal from the agreement **on** the radical reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

This **last** point was clearly **outlined** by the Soviet side during the negotiations. Unless there is agreement on strict compliance with the ABM Treaty there can be no agreement **on reductions** in strategic offensive arms, I should like to **emphasize** that this is not a bargaining position or just a phase in some negotiating haggles with the United States but a reflection of the reality of the existing strategic correlation.

TO improve the atmosphere of confidence and do away with all allegations that the Soviet Union is violating the ABM Treaty, Miichail Gorbachev has stated that the USSR, unilaterally, would impose a one-year moratorium on all work that had been carried out at the Krasnoyarsk radar station. Naturally, we expect a similar step with **regard** to the American radar station under construction at Pilingdales-moor, Scotland. In so doing the Soviet Union views such steps as a prelude to the final resolution of the issues which are of concern to the two sides.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

Unfortunately, the American side failed to display a readiness to discuss the questions relating to the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems on a business-like and constructive basis. In particular, we received no response to the proposal formally conveyed to the United States Administration in Washington to enter into substantive discussions of the aforementioned issues at a personal meeting between the Minister Of Defence of the USSR and the United States Secretary of Defense within the framework of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission.

The Moscow talks also dealt with other questions. Pursuant to the agreement reached at Washington with regard to full-fledged, stage-by-stage soviet-American negotiations on nuclear tests, the two sides agreed to begin such negotiations on 9 November at Geneva.

Within the framework of a comprehensive and thorough discussion of the issue of strengthening stability in Europe and reducing armed forces and conventional armaments, the Soviet side raised the question of tactical nuclear weapons, which, as is known, possess a destabilizing potential for surprise attack. I would state frankly that the United States showed no desire to deal with that problem in earnest. However, it did nevertheless prove possible to explore in a sufficiently substantive way the possibility of reaching a compromise on the basis of including in the subject-matter for future negotiations on conventional armaments the so-called dual-purpose systems.

Agreement was reached to proceed with consultations between Soviet and American representatives with a view to ensuring progress at the discussions of these matters under way at Vienna. Issues related to the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons were also extensively discussed at Moscow. With regard to the outcome of those discussions, the Soviet delegation will address it in one of its forthcoming statements here in the First Committee.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

On the whole, the atmosphere of the discussions at Moscow was constructive and businesslike. The discussions themselves were useful and, in several major areas, productive. During his meeting with the Secretary of State, Mikhail Gorbachev reaffirmed the Soviet position that the next summit meeting should produce substantial results. The Soviet Union is of the view that those results could include not only the signing of a treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles but also the identification of key provisions of an agreement on strategic offensive arms and the preservation of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. Such an agreement could subsequently be signed during President Reagan's return visit to the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the hope that a month and a half was a sufficient period of time duly to prepare an appropriate full-scale agenda for the summit meeting at Washington.

It will be recalled that a basis for working out common positions and formulations was set forth in the Reykjavik accords. Reykjavik was the true intellectual breakthrough in the most important areas of our time, and it ensured that there would be a progressive, forward development in the Soviet-American dialogue. It was the Reykjavik accords that formed the basis for all subsequent talks at various levels and predetermined an intensive process of working out agreements on the abolition of nuclear weapons.

We believe that the regularity of the contacts and negotiations between Government representatives of the two countries and the dynamism of the political relations are of positive significance. The negotiating process has been proceeding faster than ever before. The Moscow talks gave a new impetus to the movement begun in Geneva and dramatically accelerated in Reykjavik. There is practically complete agreement on major elements of a treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles; the groundwork has been laid for bringing closer together positions on the cardinal problems of reducing strategic offensive weapons. And

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

even though a date for the next summit meeting has not yet been definitively agreed upon, the possibility of holding it this year remains open. Let me put it this way: a breathing space has been provided for reflection on the ideas put forward by the Soviet leadership and for finishing the work that remains to be done to resolve outstanding issues.

The world expects a great deal from a third meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the United States and hopes that the first agreement on nuclear weapons may mark the beginning of a deeper and more substantial process in removing the universal nuclear threat. It is on that basis that the Soviet leadership assesses the significance of the next meeting with the President of the United States.

We have no doubt that the agreement on medium-range and shorter-range missiles will be signed. Today we cannot say definitely when, but it is quite clear even now that in the near future it will be prepared for signature at the highest level, as was agreed between the leaders of our two countries. As Mikhail Gorbachev has stressed, Soviet-American relations are at a very crucial juncture. Maximum consideration and understanding are needed from each side.

It stands to reason that in this delicate, pivotal situation, a great deal also depends on all United Nations Member States. The support of the United Nations and the resolve of the international community to achieve a non-nuclear world constitute a most important element for success at the bilateral USSR-United States negotiations. In today's interdependent world the concerted efforts of all States are needed to ensure universal security, particularly in the nuclear field.

Mr. MLLQJA (Albania): The agenda item entitled "Prevention Of an arms race in outer space" has already become one of the most discussed problems in this Committee and in other international forums. This arises from the ever increasing concern of peace-loving countries with regard to the great unrestrained dimensions of the extension of the arms race into outer space. In view of this common concern, the Albanian delegation wishes to state its position on this matter.

It stands to reason that all the peoples in the world have always wished that Outer space, the Moon and the other celestial bodies should be used for the benefit of all mankind. As was demonstrated by the modest initial experience, there are numerous ways in which outer space can be utilized for peaceful purposes in various fields. This desire on the part of people everywhere is understandable because no one can contradict the fact that outer space is a common heritage of all mankind.

However, for a long time now we have been witnessing quite a different, and increasing, trend - the militarization of space. This unprecedented process has added a new dimension to the arms race and has resulted in the fact that outer space is now saturated with space-based weapons of various kinds bearing different names, but all of them have one thing in common: they are weapons launched from the Earth into outer space to be used against mankind on our Earth.

Like the arms race in general, that in outer space is part and parcel of the rivalry between the two super-Powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union; it is the result of their long-standing efforts to establish their supremacy and strengthen their military monopoly. If we look back we can see that the imperialist rivalry for military supremacy has given way to the extension of the arms race into space and to their search for new and more sophisticated weapons, much more dangerous than the existing arsenals.

(Mr. Molloja, Albania)

At this very moment when the discussion on "Prevention of the arms race in outer space" is going on, there is much talk, within and outside the United Nations, about the eventual removal from Europe of United States and Soviet medium- and shorter-range missiles. I shall not elaborate on this matter - the Albanian delegation has already expressed the stand of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania on this subject - but on the subject of the arms race in outer space, we hold that further intensification of it not only lessens the value of the 4 per cent decrease in the total nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers but also multiplies to infinity the threats to security and peace from this other direction, namely, outer space. Regrettably, we are witnesses to the fact that the two super-Powers are continuing with the implementation of their programmes of military exploration of outer space and other celestial bodies through the development, production and deployment of various space-based weapons. In the United States and Soviet military doctrines, outer space is more and more being considered as a terrain for the deployment of new weapon systems and for various military activities. In the scenario of imperialist war strategies the "Star Wars" concept has already made its way.

All this clearly shows that the super-Powers have exploited the great scientific achievements of the human mind and hand - especially those in the exploration of space - in the service of destructive war, mobilizing the most specialized staff and facilities.

The demand of peace-loving peoples throughout the world with regard to the arms race in general has been and is that it should be halted once and for all so that outer space will not be turned into a new battlefield threatening our planet Earth but will remain a peaceful domain of fruitful scientific co-operation for the benefit and development of all mankind. That is not a new demand; it has been

(Mr. Miloja, Albania)

repeated year after year against the background of further militarization of outer space, as part and parcel of the escalation of the arms race in a new form.

In conclusion, the Albanian delegation reconfirms its stand on principle that the stepping-up of the arms race in space by the two super-powers poses new threats to the security, peace and very existence of our life on Earth. The fact of the existence of this race bears witness to the conclusion that the super-powers have no real desire to disarm. They are in search of new ways and means, as in the case of the arms race in space, of continuing to strengthen their military power with more sophisticated armaments, in keeping with their expansionist aims.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): The Conference on Disarmament is deeply involved in the full and complete process of negotiating a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. During this year I have been entrusted with the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, established to fulfil this urgent and important task, and it is in this capacity that I wish today to report to the entire membership of the United Nations on the state of affairs in these negotiations, as I see it.

In Geneva a large number of constructive and useful proposals have been placed on the negotiating table. Stimulated by such initiatives the negotiations have gathered momentum. Hitherto complex and difficult problems have been solved. The combined effect of these trends and developments has brought the work on the convention to a new and advanced level. As one after the other of the obstacles to an Agreement have been removed a political breakthrough is emerging. We can state that at the end of this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament the convention is no longer a distant goal but a real possibility.

According to the draft, existing chemical weapons are to be declared when the convention enters into force. Declarations will be verified through on-site

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

inrprationr. Chemical-weapon • toakm are to be put under continuous international monitoring through on-site instrumentation and inspection. Detailed plans for their dartruaction hava to be made. Chemical weapons are to be drrtroyed, beginning not later than 12 monthn and finishing not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the convention. There is a consensus that the order of drrrtruaction of chemical weaponr is to build on the principle of undiminirhrd security for all Staten during the entire period of destruction. However, the detailed provisions governing the principles and order of destruction remain to be negotiated. The drrrtruaction proce:s will be monitored by international inspectors and through the use o f instruments. It is significant that it has been possible this year to develop very far-reaching and detailed verif ication provisions pertaining to c hemical weapons. With regard to the declaration, closure and elimination of chemical-weapon-production facilities, detailed provisions for verification, through on-site monitoring with international inspection snd instrumentation, have also been developed.

(Mr. Ekus, Sweden)

However, getting rid of existing chemical weapons and chemical-weapons production facilities in an effective and verifiable manner, although a formidable achievement in itself, is not enough. The convention must contain provisions to ensure that new chemical weapons are not clandestinely developed and produced in the future. Over the years, much time and effort has gone into the area of future non-production of chemical weapons. I therefore find it particularly gratifying that this year political hurdles have been overcome and substantial progress has been made. The negotiating parties have demonstrated a genuine will to achieve results by making sometimes painful compromises. This augurs well for the continued negotiations, in that it shows that, given enough time and effort, it is possible to strike a balance between security concerns and other important national and international interests.

Notwithstanding the great advances made in this area, more work is needed on the detailed modalities before the existing provisions can be fully developed and completed. In order to get a fully reliable convention it is unavoidable that some chemical industries should be subject to a degree of international monitoring. A major component of such a monitoring system would be annual reporting of data to the international authority, in some cases complemented or followed up by on-site visits.

There is full agreement that the convention, in all its aspects, must be verifiable. This routine verification system is tailor-made to fit the implementation of each of the provisions. However, in addition, and as a safety-net, the convention will need a non-routine verification mechanism. We are in the process of working out a set of provisions that would make it possible to resort to so-called on-site verification on challenge should serious doubts about compliance with any of the provisions arise. The issue of challenge inspections

(Mr. Ekus, Sweden)

has for 8 long time been politically complicated. Following a gradual and painstaking process, a break-through occurred towards the end of the last session of the Conference. It is now agreed that it will be necessary to have access to a mechanism by which concerns about compliance can be investigated on-site within a very short time span and that such visits by an international team of inspectors may not be refused. We are confident that this agreement in principle will shortly be translated into treaty language.

Let me emphasize that the convention will not contain any discriminatory elements between States parties. On the contrary, it will, for example, ensure access to sensitive chemicals and technology for the parties and encourage co-operation between them in the chemical field.

In order to make sure that the convention's prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and its provisions on their destruction are effective, we shall need a fully developed international organization to deal with the implementation of the convention. This international authority will be entrusted with the task of receiving, processing and analysing declarations on weapons and their production facilities, as well as relevant data concerning the chemical industry. It will be responsible for providing technical instrumentation necessary for the automatic monitoring of relevant activities and facilities. An inspectorate must be established within the international authority so that teams of inspectors may be employed as required. It is also clear that documentation and other facilities for proper analysis will be needed. The powers, functions and interrelationship of the various organs of the international authority are a logical consequence of the tasks it has to perform, and it is therefore significant that delegations now agree that the time is ripe to sort out the details.

(Mr. Ekou, Sweden)

It also is a good sign that our negotiations have reached the stage when delegations want to address concrete and practical issues that must be dealt with in the period between the signing and the entry into force of the convention, thus paving the way for effective implementation from the very first day of its entry into force.

The use of chemical weapons in violation of international law must be condemned. There is growing international concern that chemical weapons might be resorted to. The draft convention contains, as I have already mentioned, a prohibition of use. And what is even more important, with all the provisions of the convention in place, a barrier will have been created that completely excludes the possibility of the use of chemical weapons. That makes it all the more important that the convention should become universal.

Universality is the very essence of multilateral disarmament and of the aims so often expressed in this Committee. Disarmament issues are a matter for all. The States negotiating chemical disarmament at Geneva come from all parts of the World, geographically as well as politically. Thus, the wide spectrum of security interests necessarily involved in such a comprehensive convention can be taken into account. It is also important that States not participating in the day-to-day negotiating process should keep in close contact with those which are, so that all concerns can be taken into account. The present draft convention is included in the report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly (A/42/27) and is thus available to all. We recommend that all Governments should study the provisions contained in it. The negotiations are now at an advanced stage. However, many details remain to be elaborated. The negotiators are working hard to take care of the concerns of all, and there is still time to make adjustments. As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, I am, of course, always available to talk with anybody wishing to discuss the draft convention, and I am sure that other members

(Mr. Eksus, Sweden)

of the Conference on Disarmament would be eager to do the same, so that the convention can be all-encompassing in the true sense of the word.

Negotiations never take place in a vacuum. They are influenced by developments in the political surroundings. A successfully concluded chemical-weapons convention would have implications beyond the limits of its precisely drafted treaty language. Thus, developments in negotiations in the nuclear field have highlighted the interrelationship between nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons, adding to the importance of the conclusion of a comprehensive chemical-weapons convention. Furthermore, growing international concern over the production, development, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons has increased the urgency with which the negotiators have worked towards achieving a total ban on such weapons.

In this context, I should like to refer to the numerous important supportive initiatives by some States, aimed at enhancing the understanding of the issues involved and at creating confidence between the negotiating parties. We express sincere appreciation to those who have arranged useful demonstrations and visits to plants and facilities and organised valuable workshops and symposia,

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

The First Committee has, inter alia, the differential role of assisting in disseminating information on negotiations and in deepening the understanding of the problems involved. We therefore welcome the fact that constructive efforts are being made in the Committee to merge various initiatives into one single draft resolution on the issue of chemical-weapons negotiations. It would be helpful to the negotiations and a message of great significance to the world community if the General Assembly this year could express itself with one voice on this issue.

Mr. ICAZA GALLARD (Nicaragua) (interpretation from Spanish): First, we should like to express to you, Sir, our pleasure at seeing you preside over the work of this important Committee. Zaire, a fraternal non-aligned country, has consistently held positions that we share on items of vital importance, such as the ones we are discussing here. Because we know you well and because we know of your qualities, we know that you will effectively and fruitfully guide our Committee's work. We also wish to congratulate the other officers of the Committee.

In his address to the General Assembly at this session, His Excellency Daniel Ortega Saavedra, President of the Republic of Nicaragua, stated the following:

"In the midst of much suffering, we welcome and applaud the progress made between the Soviet Union and the United States towards taking steps to ensure disarmament, including the prohibition and then the elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons." (A/42/PV.30, p. 22-25)

In his statement at the plenary meeting of countries members of the Non-Aligned Movement, President Ortega reiterated those sentiments. However, with regard to the agreement in principle achieved by the two super-Powers, two different interpretations are possible. Some believe that it marks the beginning of a new climate of détente and better co-operation that will have a favourable impact on the search for solutions to the many continuing serious problems afflicting mankind today. Others believe that those important disarmament

(Mr. Israa Gallard, Nicaragua)

agreements will not necessarily be followed by an improvement in conditions that can lead to the peaceful settlement of other problems but that, on the contrary, regional tensions may be exacerbated and further troubles experienced in equally sensitive areas where international peace and security are at stake,

For that reason, while recognizing the importance and historical significance of these agreements in principle, we must maintain a guarded optimism, accompanied by an increase in our efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament for the sake of international peace and security in an environment propitious to trust, co-operation and dialogue on the basis of the principles of the Charter.

We have repeatedly pointed out that the agreements in principle achieved by the USSR and the United States represent the reduction and destruction of only 3 per cent of currently existing nuclear arsenals. We therefore fully agree with the position expressed by the leaders of the six countries members of the Initiative for Peace and Disarmament - Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania - who, in their joint statement issued on 7 October of this year, stated:

"The expectations of the world are now focused on the next Summit Meeting between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. Expressing the aspirations of all peoples of the world, we believe that it would provide an ideal opportunity for the realization of the next important steps towards nuclear disarmament. Specifically, it is urgent to conclude agreements on the reduction of strategic arms, the complete halting of nuclear testing and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The recent agreement proves that, given political will, all obstacles can be removed." (A/42/652, ex, p. 3)

With regard to the first point mentioned, namely, strategic arms, it is important to bear in mind the commitments made at the Reykjavik summit

(Mr. 1 0 8 8 8 Gallard, Nicaragua)

meeting to reduce long-range missiles by 50 per cent and to limit stockpiles to 6,000 nuclear warheads.

With regard to the halting of 811 nuclear-test • xpAoaion8 tha two major nuohmar Powers announced at the recent meeting of their foreign ministers at Washington that they would begin negotiations for the ultimate purpose of eliminating such tests. We believe that although that is a positive development it is nevertheless insufficient. It is insufficient because this is a matter that has been before the General Assembly for more than 30 years and which has repeatedly been given the highest priority. Further, it is insufficient because in order to achieve a complete test-ban a multilateral treaty is required, and that can be achieved only within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. For those reasons, my delegation attaches the greatest importance to the proposal put forward by the Group of 21 to • at8blich an ad hoc committee for that purpose.

Lastly, with regard to the prevention of the arms race in outer • ☐☐☐☐☐ WY wish to repeat once again our well-known position: we are against the militarisation of outer space. The 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems must be complied with, and progress must be made in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee established by the Conference on Disarmament pursuant to the request made by the General Assembly in resolution 41/53. It is especially important to put an end to the development of anti-satellite weapons. On that important question, our position is also well known. Space is the heritage of all mankind and must be used solely for peaceful purposes. Any strategic defence or Star Wars system, far from constituting a guarantee that it will contain the advance of the arms race, entails a new and dangerous escalation in that race and raises the philosophy of containment and security through military predominance and sophistication to a universal scale. That philosophy must be abandoned.

(Mr. Icaza Gallard, Nicaragua)

The Conference on Disarmament at Geneva has made important progress in arriving at a treaty on the prohibition on the production, development, stockpiling, procurement, possession, transfer and use of chemical weapons. Those efforts deserve our encouragement and support, in the hope that in 1988 a comprehensive treaty may be concluded which, together with appropriate mechanisms for verification, will make it possible to eliminate from the face of the earth of that category of weapons, which should never have existed.

(Mr. Icara **Gallard**, Nicaragua)

Every year 20 million to 25 million children under the age of five die from **malnutrition** and diseases that could **easily** be **prevented**. In the meantime, military expenditures amount to 25 times more than all official development assistance in the world, and in the third world almost 1 billion **persons are living** under the poverty line. The external debt of developing countries in 1986 went beyond the \$1-trillion mark, which is significant given the present levels of world military expenditures.

All those important matters were pondered **and** analysed at the recent International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. We opted for non-participation in the polemics that developed around its results. This, like all matters of great importance, requires sustained efforts. The idea of **an** international fund to channel to development the resources released by disarmament measures should not be set aside. The forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will offer an opportunity to continue making progress on this problem and give new momentum to multilateral efforts in all disarmament fields. Given the extraordinary **importance** of the agenda of that third special session, the idea of holding a special session of the Won-Aligned Movement at an appropriate level prior to the third special session should be seriously considered.

Given the importance of the matter of conventional disarmament in recent years, we consider it necessary to repeat some basic ideas on the question. First, account should be taken of the priorities established with regard to disarmament negotiations in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which was formally reaffirmed at the twelfth. Conventional disarmament is linked to the attainment of considerable progress in the nuclear field. Isolated conventional disarmament would perpetuate existing imbalances in the security of States. In this regard special responsibility

(Mr. Icaza Gallard, Nicaragua)

falls to those States with the major military arsenals and other militarily important Statrr. Given the close relationship between conventional disarmament and specific situations of A regional or subregional nature, it is extremely important for that process, while part of general and complete disarmament, to be based, as affirmed in the Atatement of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries,

"... on full respect for the principles of non-intervention, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and the peaceful solution of disputes in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations." (A/41/697, para. 53)

If those principles and thr specific characteristics of the situation are not taken into account, rigid models or processes of conventional disarmament at the regional or subregional level cannot be imposed. This applies to Central America, which today has embarked upon a new and decisive effort for peace, after the signing on 7 August of this year in Guatemala by the Presidents of thr five Central American Republics of the document entitled "Procedure to establish firm and lasting peace in Central America".

Therein we find an intricate eet of commitments which are to enter into force simultaneously. They range from the non-use of territories to attack other States, suspension of all forms of assistance to irregular forces or insurgent movements by extra-regional Governments, initiation of processes of national reconciliation, all the way to the resumption of pending negotiations on security, verification, control and limitation of weapons. Those negotiations are to be carried out with the participation of the Contadora Group exercising a mediating role; fundamentally they relate to aspects left outstanding in the Contadora Act for Peace and Co-operation in Central America. In this context, my Government has repeatedly stated that it is ready to see all foreign military advisers leave the Central

(Mr. Icaza Gallard, Nicaragua)

American region, the elimination from the area of all foreign military manoeuvres, and an end to the installation of foreign military bases on Central American soil.

After declaring the South Atlantic a zone of peace and co-operation last year, we now have the initiative of doing the same for the important region of the South Pacific. We not only support this initiative but we believe that, in light of the recent Guatemala Agreement and the implementation of the commitments contained therein, Central American countries should seriously ponder the idea - repeated year after year at all levels by the delegation of Nicaragua - of declaring Central America a zone of peace and co-operation, free of all forms of foreign military presence. An important step in that direction was the recent unanimous adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 42/1, which expresses universal support for the Guatemala Agreement and the efforts of the Presidents of the five countries to achieve firm and lasting peace in Central America.

Mr. FAHMY (Egypt) : My Ambassador had the opportunity to convey to you, Sir, our congratulations on your election as Chairman of this Committee. Having worked with you in Geneva, I should like to add my personal congratulations.

I have the honour to present to the Committee for its consideration under agenda item 51 draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.8, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East". It is our firm belief that nuclear weapons constitute the greatest threat to the survival of mankind. Nuclear disarmament, while a complex goal, is an urgent one. The prevention of nuclear proliferation is a limited but worthy step in that direction.

Egypt, for its part, will continue diligently and resolutely to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. To this end we have fought and shall continue to fight against nuclear-weapon proliferation. Our record in this regard speaks for itself. We have exerted particular efforts with regard to the establishment of

(Mr. Fahmy, Egypt)

such a zone in the Middle East - a goal of paramount importance to the citability of the region.

It goes without saying that we felt a great degree of satisfaction at having seen a consensus evolve around the content of this resolution in past years. With regard to resolution 41/48, adopted last year by the Assembly, I should like to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report in implementation of Paragraph 10 of that resolution. We are also gratified to see that pursuant to paragraph 8 of the said resolution and the equivalent paragraphs of resolutions of previous years, all States of the region and a number of nuclear-weapon States have now conveyed their views in this regard - views which we believe to be in favour of the establishment of such a zone in so far as they are consistent with the relevant paragraphs Of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(QYL Fahmy, Egypt)

At this juncture I feel compelled to declare that we would consider any deviation from what was agreed upon by us all at the first special session on disarmament as a very serious set-back to international endeavours aimed at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in general and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in particular, and as a devastating set-back to the efforts to establish such zones in the Middle East.

I should also like to express our serious concern and anxiety at the recurrent information which has become available challenging the veracity of commitments made to keep the Middle East region free from nuclear weapons. Adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards would give credence to the sincerity of the commitment of all States in the region not to acquire nuclear weapons in any manner, and would constitute an important step in, as well as a constructive contribution to, our efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Egypt urges all States of the region to take such measures and calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain for their part from any action which would not be consistent with the goal of establishing such a zone in the Middle East.

Draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.8, which I have the honour to introduce today, contains elements on which a consensus has already evolved over the years. Its importance lies not in novelty or new ideas; we have not attempted to introduce new elements of substance or make any procedural changes. Many of the elements agreed upon remain to be translated into concrete action. The importance of this draft resolution emanates from the fact that all the elements remain valid today, with an even greater sense of urgency, and are part and parcel of a valuable consensus, which, we believe, can become the corner-stone of a future nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

(Mr. Fahmy, Egypt)

The adoption by this Committee of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.8, without a vote, would constitute reaffirmation by all concerned of their commitment to the establishment of such a zone. In calling for the Committee's continued support, we also call upon all those directly concerned to take appropriate measures to give this draft resolution tangible expression.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I should like to remind members that in conformity with decisions taken by the Committee the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions on disarmament items - agenda items 48 to 59 - is today, Tuesday 27 October 1987, at 6 p.m.

I wish also to invite those sponsoring draft resolutions to introduce them as soon as possible, even during the second phase of the Committee's work.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.