

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.433  
25 August 1987

ENGLISH

---

## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 25 August 1987 at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Pierre Morel (France)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the 433rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference will continue today its consideration of the reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies and the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative wishing to raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference may do so.

As I announced at the 431st plenary meeting of the Conference, I shall submit today for adoption, once we have exhausted the list of speakers, the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/779.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada and Algeria. I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, who, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, will introduce the Committee's report, contained in document CD/784.

Mr. GERMANN (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, in accordance with its mandate, the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons would like to report to the Conference on the progress of its work achieved in the 1987 session. By the same token I would like to introduce the report of the Committee as contained in CD/784 adopted at the 10th meeting of the Committee on Friday, 21 August 1987.

May I recall that since its establishment with a negotiating mandate in 1979, the Ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances has undergone different stages. While there is clear recognition that non-nuclear-weapon States are entitled to a guarantee that they will not be the object of attack by weapons the possession of which they themselves have forsworn, no effective international arrangements could be found beyond the existing solemn assurances on the subject made so far by the nuclear-weapon States themselves.

Negotiations on the subject over the years have revealed the complex nature of the issues involved, but have shown no substantive progress, and have not as yet produced any concrete result on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly an international instrument of a legally binding character. Although during the first years of the Committee's work under its negotiating mandate the item has been analysed in a comprehensive and detailed manner, no further progress has been achieved during subsequent years.

Taking into account the different approaches and remaining positions on how to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, the question this year was whether the prevailing circumstances allowed the Committee to move forward from the current state of affairs and provide something stronger and more effective.

(Mr. Germann, Federal Republic of Germany)

In the course of consultations and negotiations many delegations considered that, in fact, relevant new developments in the field of arms limitation and international relations, although having a different degree of relevance to the subject-matter, had important consequences for the security of all States, including non-nuclear-weapon States. In this context, the agreement reached between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan was highlighted, which states that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". Furthermore, the importance of the Reykjavik meeting in 1986, which opened up prospects for concrete progress in nuclear disarmament, was underlined.

While it was generally recognized that recent developments in the field of disarmament and international relations were welcome in themselves, it was argued that they had little or no direct relevance to the question of negative security assurances since they had not shown a positive impact on the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States concerned. The crucial question before the Committee, of whether there was sufficiently strong new impetus to overcome the stagnation from which the work of the Ad hoc Committee had suffered in the last few years, thus could not be answered positively, although various new proposals had been introduced and examined.

Work on the substance of effective arrangements, and discussion on various aspects including elements of interim solutions, revealed again that specific difficulties relating to different perceptions of the security interests of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States still persist and that the complex nature of the issue involved still continues to prevent agreement on a common formula. At the same time, the discussion underlined the wide support for a continued search for a common formula which could be included in an international legally binding instrument. In this context the view was expressed during the final consultations, after the adoption of the report, that all non-aligned and neutral non-nuclear-weapon States that had relinquished the nuclear option in a legally binding manner were fully covered by the unilateral declarations of the five nuclear-weapon States, but that in any case legally binding negative security assurances were clearly preferable to interim solutions such as a Security Council resolution.

The exchange of views on the latter as well as on previous proposals revealed general agreement that they contained elements requiring further study by the Committee. Accordingly, the recommendation is made to the Conference on Disarmament that ways and means should continue to be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in its work after the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee at the beginning of the 1988 session, especially in the light of the forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

May I take this opportunity to thank all participants in the debate and the final report-writing process for their fairness.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, who spoke on behalf of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons,

(The President)

for introducing its report. I should like to inform the Conference that I shall be submitting the Ad hoc Committee's report for adoption at the plenary meeting to be held on Thursday, 27 August.

I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, His Excellency Ambassador Beesley.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Mr. President, in taking the floor, I would like to offer my personal congratulations to you for the manner in which you have conducted our affairs during the month which has traditionally proven to be our most difficult month. Perhaps the pain and suffering of last year has had some beneficial spill-over. I should also like to take this opportunity of expressing my warm regards and friendly au revoir to Ambassador Alfarargi, who has already left us, and Ambassador Turbanski, who will soon be leaving us.

As we are near the end of the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament, I should like to express some thoughts on a number of matters, not all of which are on our agenda. Since this may be the last occasion on which I shall address the Conference, as I shall be leaving Geneva shortly for another assignment, I shall follow the tradition of expressing personal as well as official views, with a particular focus on where we stand as we approach the third special session on disarmament.

On the most important issues on our agenda, and indeed the agenda of all thinking people, namely nuclear disarmament, we are light years away from where we were when I joined this forum four years ago. For those who may not be aware, I presented my credentials on 23 September 1983.

In my personal view, the progress in the INF talks, which now show real promise of a major breakthrough in the coming months, has come about because of conceptual changes in the thinking of both parties. In an article in the McGill Law Journal in 1983, I referred to a major Canadian policy statement by Canada's then Secretary of State for External Affairs made on 1 February 1983 in the Committee on Disarmament, at which I was present in my capacity then as Ambassador for Disarmament, which stressed the following points: that security in today's world cannot be achieved on a purely national basis; that attempts by one side to make gains at the expense of the security of the other ultimately will not work; that action produces reaction, and in the end neither side achieves a long-term gain. Applying these principles to the INF talks at a time when positions were still very far apart, the Canadian policy statement referred to in my article pointed out that such negotiations could only succeed if both parties accepted as their fundamental objective increased mutual security rather than unilateral advantage. It was suggested that it was not clear at that time that both sides had accepted mutual security as the basis of their negotiations.

That was the situation four years ago. I believe that it is no longer the case. Progress towards an INF agreement in the nuclear and space talks now presents the real prospect of important reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. An agreement on the basis of the "global double zero" formula would constitute a first nuclear disarmament agreement -- since the SALT treaties are verifiable arms limitation agreements -- that would completely remove an entire class of weapons from the nuclear

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

arsenals of the United States and the USSR on a world-wide basis. The possibility that these objectives may finally be attainable attests to the validity of the principle of mutual security instead of unilateral advantage in the disarmament process. This key principle is even more crucial for progress in the area of strategic offensive and defensive arms.

It is equally interesting to note that the February 1983 Canadian policy statement in this forum, emphasizing mutual security as the only acceptable basis for arms control and disarmament, also stressed that "an attempt by any Power to develop a policy which assumes that nuclear war can be winnable contributes to mutual insecurity." This statement was made at a time before such views were fashionable. Indeed, at the time it was made, contrary views were being expressed in articles and statements from influential sources. This concept has since become an agreed fundamental principle, as was proclaimed in the joint statement by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985 in the famous statement "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought".

Some amongst us may consider this statement to be mere rhetoric. I do not. Some amongst us seem to see apparent inconsistencies between those words and the action taken by their authors. I do not. Some amongst us may say that action speaks louder than words. I do too. And that, I suggest, is what is occurring. The world is not going to change overnight. But a beginning has been made in a major attempt to ensure that we continue to have a world in which to live, a world, if I may recall the historic post-war statement of Wendell Willkie, which has long since become "one world".

There are other encouraging signs, as other representatives in this Conference have already pointed out. The successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference last year, coupled with current prospects for the successful conclusion of the bilateral negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), have contributed to improving the atmosphere in the Conference on Disarmament markedly and even, some have suggested, to the quickening of our pace at least in some areas. However, with the exception of the negotiations to ban chemical weapons, progress on the main issues on our agenda is not always evident from day to day or even from session to session. Nevertheless, the global picture appears more encouraging when viewed over a period of four years.

There is no issue which has proven more controversial than that of verification. Even if it is not on our agenda as a separate item, it is omnipresent in our work. During my time, this issue of verification, a long-standing Canadian priority which we have regarded as the key to arms control and disarmament agreements, has gradually come to be universally accepted as the essential requirement for the conclusion of such agreements. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. van den Broek, pointed out in his statement to the CD last month, "it is increasingly recognized that asking for on-site inspection" to verify a treaty with important security implications "is reasonable and legitimate". He went on to say that "the growing consensus on the need for strict verification holds the promise of progress with regard to arms control in general". It is

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

stating the obvious to say that the Canadian Government fully shares that view. What may not be so obvious is that such a statement could not have been made four years ago.

As I pointed out in my statement last month, verification performs a series of central functions, the most important being deterrence of non-compliance, confidence-building, removal of uncertainty and treaty assessment. The success this year of the working group on verification at the United Nations Disarmament Commission, under Canadian chairmanship, in reaching provisional agreement on several verification principles, further testifies to the emerging international consensus on these issues. This has to be seen as progress. Thus while verification is sometimes portrayed as an obstacle in the way of a solution, for Canada it has always been a central part of the solution.

It is in this context that I welcome and acknowledge the importance of the statement made in this room by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Shevardnadze, when he said that "real verification" ought to involve "foolproof, indisputable, reliable and extremely strict and rigorous methods". The specific verification-related suggestions he made at that time in relation to chemical weapons, outer space and nuclear testing will be studied with care by Canadian authorities with these criteria in mind. I should like to come back later to the question of the standards to be sought in verification measures.

When I came to Geneva in the fall of 1983, the framework of a future chemical weapons convention had just been agreed under the chairmanship of my predecessor. Interestingly, in the light of the hours -- days -- weeks we spend on procedural questions related to mandates and subsidiary bodies, that level of progress had been reached in spite of the existence of an ad hoc Committee without a negotiating mandate. I suggest that there is a lesson for us to be drawn from this, particularly in the context of the report of the Group of Seven on our working methods.

The following year the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons adopted a negotiating mandate and developed its first "rolling text" under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus. In the intervening years considerable progress has been achieved, article by article, in large measure due to the hard work, perseverance and initiative of successive chairmen of the Committee -- Ambassador Turbanski and Ambassador Cromartie -- and also the co-ordinators of the working groups, as well as participating delegations which have contributed dozens of working papers. The process received a boost in 1984 with the tabling of a draft treaty by the United States. More recently, major initiatives by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on the difficult issue of challenge inspection have brought us closer to resolving most remaining differences surrounding this problem. That has to be seen as very tangible progress.

We are again this year indebted to Ambassador Ekéus, whose able and dynamic chairmanship has ensured that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has achieved valuable results on key issues. Some speakers have suggested that the pace of negotiations has slowed down after the impressive gains in 1986 and the spring session this year. This is not so, in the view of my

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

delegation; it is inevitable that, precisely because we are making significant progress in the elaboration of a convention, the pace tends to slow down as new gains become harder and the points under negotiation more difficult to resolve. Moreover, Governments require time to reflect on the results obtained and consider the need to adapt their negotiating approaches accordingly.

The recent announcement by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that the Soviet Union now agrees to a fully mandatory challenge inspection régime is a most important statement, even when read in the light of the five qualifying points made later by Ambassador Nazarkin in his elaboration of USSR views on this issue. Clearly, certain important details remain to be negotiated in this area, as indicated in Ambassador Ekéus' report on his consultations. Inter alia, there needs to be agreement on the precise manner in which challenges would be initiated.

It has long been agreed that allegations of the use of chemical weapons must be dealt with as promptly as possible, and that the only adequate method of determining whether or not chemical weapons have been used is on-site inspection. Canada has considered this problem in much detail and this year, together with the delegation of Norway, we have provided a paper (CD/766) proposing an annex to article IX on this important subject. We hope that it will be possible for the Ad hoc Committee to give full attention to the important question of the verification of CW use as soon as this is practicable.

We have also broken new ground in the CW negotiations this year in developing an understanding of the type of international organization required to oversee the implementation of a CW convention. Much work remains to be done before this organization can become a reality. It is critical that we thoroughly understand what we expect such an organization to do before we can complete our work on article VIII of the draft treaty. The Canadian delegation intends to contribute substantively to this as part of our work. I suggest, however, that the mere fact that we are collectively now addressing such issues is an encouraging sign and a clear mark of progress.

I now wish to speak on an issue central to the whole CW negotiation. Canada does not possess any chemical weapons, and does not intend to produce or acquire such weapons. Two working papers tabled in this forum (CCD/434 of July 1974 and CD/173 of April 1981) reported that Canadian chemical weapon stocks had been destroyed. It is not in any spirit of polemics, but with the explicit purpose of accelerating the negotiating process, that I make the plea that all other delegations note this declaration and others like it and consider making comparable declarations -- and do so as soon as possible to build up our momentum and make clear to all the world the seriousness of our intent. It goes without saying, in the light of the foregoing, that we have made very important, concrete progress in our negotiations on the chemical weapon convention during the past four years.

Turning now to the nuclear test ban, in the Canadian policy statement mentioned earlier it was emphasized that the pursuit of a comprehensive test ban was a fundamental -- perhaps the fundamental -- nuclear issue before the Committee on Disarmament. The attainment of this objective remains a major

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

priority of the Canadian Government. The step-by-step approach favoured by Canada four years ago, an approach which now has the support of most delegations around this table, remains the most realistic in our view.

There is, of course, another subject on which verification is crucial. As in other arms control and disarmament areas, adequate verification of a comprehensive test ban would be of vital importance. There has, however, been considerable progress in the past four years in the development of a global seismic verification system, and the Group of Scientific Experts is to be congratulated for its constructive work in this area during this period. A Group which may have been considered somewhat controversial four years ago is now universally acknowledged as one of the corner-stones of our Conference on this issue. The large-scale level II data exchange experiment, which could take place as early as next year, will be especially important in demonstrating the feasibility of verification by seismic means. Canada attaches great importance to the effective utilization of wave-form data, including its adequate dissemination to all international data centres within a global system, for this verification purpose. Here too, much has been achieved during the past four years. The Canadian Government recently commissioned in-depth research at the University of Toronto which has already produced interesting and promising results. I am therefore delighted that one of the scientific experts on my delegation, Dr. Peter Basham, has been chosen to co-ordinate this experiment. We know that he will receive the support and co-operation from others which the importance of the endeavour fully warrants.

There is no reason why we cannot start practical work in an ad hoc committee at the earliest possible opportunity in order to pursue these objectives. I would recall to my colleagues that rule 23 of our rules of procedure indicates that whenever the Conference deems it advisable for the effective performance of its functions, it may establish subsidiary bodies. I refer also to the report of the Group of Seven on this very procedural issue. My delegation firmly believes that establishing a subsidiary body on a nuclear test ban, as the informal proposal of the President for the month of April and his successors made clear, is essential for the effective performance of the functions of the Conference on Disarmament on such a ban, as it would allow us both to take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives and to get down to substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues. We would hope that the proposal of the President for the month of April, my friend and colleague Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, will form the basis for consultations during the inter-sessional period and early next session.

Outer space is an issue on which it is more difficult to document substantive progress over the past four years. None the less, we have not stood still, and we have not retrogressed. In 1983 the Canadian delegation urged the CD to begin as soon as possible its essential task of defining the legal and other issues necessary to build upon the outer space legal régime, and made clear Canada's intention to participate actively in this work, urging the establishment of a subsidiary body on this subject. We were, of course, not the only delegation to do so. Subsequently, we tabled a series of working papers intended to advance our work. The Ad hoc Committee was first established in March 1985. Its work since then has been always arduous, sometimes productive, often interesting and frequently frustrating.



(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

I would like to clarify a point I made in an earlier statement when I referred to the régime of the high seas by way of analogy to the régime of outer space. The Canadian working paper tabled at that time did the same. I wish to stress that I did not refer to the law of the sea as a model, but by way of a law-making analogy. I wish to emphasize this point without developing it further, so as to avoid any misunderstanding concerning the Canadian position.

Given the complexity of many of the questions we have discussed under the existing outer space mandate, the Canadian Government considers that the best way to expedite our work is to put forth our views in the form of working papers. The purpose is to concretize discussions and negotiations, whether or not delegations agree with the papers tabled. Even disagreement clarifies issues, far more than general statements not focused on specific proposals. In my statement to the Conference on 2 April I cited the series of working papers that Canada has put forward, and I do not need to do so again. I would however like to refer to our workshop in Montreal in May of this year, which I had the honour to chair, as another instance of our effort to make concrete contributions in this field. I wish to thank the many delegations which have expressed their appreciation for this workshop. The Canadian PAXSAT presentation to the Ad hoc Committee represented a further effort to concentrate on the practical problems of verification.

With regard to the specific question of verification concerning outer space, I think that it is worth reiterating the point I made to the Conference in my statement of 21 July. Careful negotiation, drafting and implementation of adequate and effective verification systems is essential if verification is not to become a source of tension rather than a means of lessening it or eliminating it. We are pleased to note that the Soviet Union is giving attention to this problem, as evidenced in the proposal outlined in Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's speech to the Conference on Disarmament on 6 August. We would encourage the Soviet Union to give further thought to its proposal for an international verification system. We have particularly taken note that, as seems clear from this and other elements of Mr. Shevardnadze's statement, the Soviet Union accepts in principle that useful and practical work on aspects of verification can be done independently of a specific negotiating context, and without having previously reached agreement on the details of what is to be controlled. This is a view which has long been advocated by Canada.

By way of clarification, I should also emphasize, however, that, as reflected in our own PAXSAT feasibility study, in our view the implementation of verification systems ought, at least in most circumstances, to be treaty-specific. Canada has not advocated third-party approaches involving verification activities outside the context of an agreement or by countries not party to an agreement. A corollary to this approach has been that Canada has not advocated the putting into place of verification systems or procedures in advance of the conclusion of an agreement. These comments are applicable, of course, not only to outer space but to nuclear test issues as well.

I would make an additional, final point about our work in relation to outer space. The working papers my delegation has submitted have pointed to the potential importance of careful drafting of definitions. The somewhat

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

restrictive definition -- if I may so -- of outer space weapons which appears in Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement of 6 August reinforces us in our view that such work could indeed be useful. This is of special importance because, as I have emphasized on other occasions, the central and essential purpose of any arms control agreement and its related verification system must be to enhance stability, and thus we should close the door on any possible areas of ambiguity or uncertainty. I hope I have succeeded in indicating some progress even on outer space over the past four years.

On radiological weapons I believe that we made a useful change in our working procedure in separating the two tracks and dealing with them separately and concurrently. It would clearly be over-optimistic, however, to suggest that significant progress was made on either track. It should be noted that we have done useful work in drawing up the annexes to the report of the Ad hoc Committee, and we should draw upon them as a basis for future work. It is clear, however, particularly with regard to the prohibition of radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense, that some delegations will have to re-examine their positions in the light of their expressed desire for an agreement. To suggest that we have made significant progress on these items over the past four years would be to mislead our Governments and our public opinion.

I cannot refrain from wondering aloud, in my purely personal capacity, whether all of us ought to re-examine our positions since Chernobyl, and, I might add, Bhopal, on the consequences of attacks on peaceful facilities, leaving aside whether these questions may properly be addressed in the CD or should be considered under the Geneva Red Cross protocols. These two disasters have shown us the kind of consequences that we could imagine occurring in the event of an attack on such facilities.

Turning to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, I do not think anyone can underestimate the energy, tenacity and determination our distinguished colleague Ambassador García Robles has brought to the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Much valuable work has been done this year, and even if we have not been able to reach consensus on a document we do consider that notable improvements have been made in the text of the draft CPD.

I regret, however, that on some parts of the programme there seems to be a narrower area of consensus now than at least appeared to be the case at SSOD-I. I appreciate that, if new consensus language actually improves previous consensus texts, then we need not treat such original texts as Holy Writ -- providing, of course, we all agree that the new amendments are improvements. I think it is accurate to say, therefore, that in spite of the forest of brackets, through which it is difficult to see the original trees, the fact that we are all seriously focusing on this issue is some evidence of progress.

This Conference is often referred to with pride as the single multilateral negotiating forum for arms control and disarmament. Yet many have referred to its meagre achievements since it was established in its present configuration in 1978 at the first SSOD. As we approach the third special session on disarmament we should quite properly ask ourselves if we

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

have justified the trust the international community, the Governments and the publics we represent all put in us when this forum was created. The ultimate test of this Conference is its ability to make progress on significant arms control and disarmament measures. As I have attempted to illustrate, the CD has achieved some progress, and in the case of CW, even substantial progress during the last four years since SSOD-II. However, no agreement on any issue has been concluded during the past four years -- indeed the past 10 years.

Why has there been no agreement in the last 10 years? Obviously the CD does not work in a vacuum. Is it therefore because it is influenced by the international environment, which may not have been propitious, at least at the beginning of this 10-year period? Is it that its predecessor bodies concluded the easier non-armament agreements first, leaving the more difficult and complex arms control and disarmament issues to the CD? Is it because of our cumbersome procedures? Is it the fault of the major Powers, as some allege, leaving themselves blameless and without responsibility? It would be too easy to try to justify our failures by any or all of these explanations. There is no doubt that we bear a collective responsibility, and as pointed out last week by Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, when we fail we are all the losers.

I suggest, however, that without ignoring the shortcomings or the failures of the CD, we should in the future dwell less on its faults -- and those of each other -- and instead move forward on the basis of what could be accomplished with good will, determination and skilful negotiation. I refer to concrete work, not rhetoric. If we are truly committed and determined, the only path to concrete progress and to resolving differences is to define the areas of common ground and then attempt step by step to expand on them. We need to concentrate on the practical and realizable. We might even ask ourselves if the Conference should concentrate on substantive areas where progress is feasible and consider leaving other areas such as RW, where there is little prospect for early progress, for a cooling-off period.

SSOD-III is less than a year away, and the CD will have to stand judgement on its performance. There seems little doubt that the special session will reaffirm the critical role of this Conference in the multilateral process of arms control and disarmament negotiations as it did in 1982, not perhaps because of its accomplishments but because it has no other choice. The Conference should begin by making the best use possible of the remaining time to achieve progress on major issues and, in particular, attempt to make a final breakthrough on chemical weapons.

Turning briefly to the improved and effective functioning of the CD, as I have stated before in this forum, it is my firm conviction that with better working methods and a more widespread willingness to accept sensible accommodations of interests, it is in our power to improve the productiveness of the Conference. The recent report of the Group of Seven, of which I am a member, made some practical suggestions on two procedural issues which have been at the source of much wasted time over the years: the establishment of subsidiary bodies and our report-writing methods. It is regrettable that it was not possible for the Conference to agree on at least some of these suggestions. It is my impression, however, that the spirit in which the suggestions were made by the Group of Seven has had some influence during the last phase of our session, at least on parts of the CD report. Some other

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

sound practical suggestions have also been made which could in the future help resolve problems relating to the establishment of subsidiary bodies, particularly as the climate improves as a result of major agreements which may be in the offing. The possible solutions proposed, which obviously will require more time for reflection, would move the procedural debate from the mandate question to the work programme, which in itself would be an improvement.

Obviously, many other procedural problems need to be resolved in addition to yearly re-establishment of subsidiary bodies and report-writing. I referred to some of these in a plenary speech on 30 August 1985, and I will not repeat them, but I feel certain that they will eventually appear in the programme of future work of the Group of Seven. We should not give undue weight to procedural matters; it behoves us to ensure that we have done everything in our power to remove procedural obstacles to the effective performance of this Conference. It would be a mistake to rely on the next special session on disarmament to solve these problems for us.

Before concluding, I should like to disclaim any attempt at a definitive overview of the work of the Conference and its predecessor during the past four years. It would be presumptuous to attempt such a task. None the less, I have attempted to indicate where there is evidence of some progress in our work and where there is not.

It may appear to some that there has been more achieved in bilateral negotiations between the super-Powers than in multilateral negotiations in the CD. For my part, I have expressed my views on frequent occasions on the importance of the symbiotic interrelationship between bilateral and multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations, more particularly in an article in which I addressed that question in the Fortieth Anniversary issue of the United Nations periodical Disarmament. In brief, as indicated in that article I believe that it can be demonstrated that even the existing purely bilateral arms control agreements reflect considerable multilateral input, and, of course, vice versa. So let us not minimize the importance of our efforts, particularly in the case of concrete contributions such as working papers and the efforts to find common ground based on them. Even our rhetoric can be of some use in indicating the international climate.

What is new and, in my view, of great importance is the extent to which the major Powers are using this forum for high-level policy exchanges concerning their bilateral negotiations. This is a most welcome development. It suggests, of course, that it is incumbent upon the rest of us to take this forum at least as seriously.

I want now to conclude by addressing, to my mind, the heart of the problem that faces us in arms control, that is to say, the nature of the transaction we would be dealing with. In doing so I will draw upon a recent statement I made in a conference in Ottawa. It is the essence of an arms control and disarmament agreement that the contracting parties agree to renounce, limit or destroy armaments or military forces in return for treaty commitments by other parties to do the same. To ask States to renounce or scrap weapons in return for treaty obligations as an alternative measure of protecting their security is to demand of them a very serious and difficult

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

decision. In effect, a State accepts a treaty in lieu of weapons as a means of protecting its security. This is an extremely important undertaking, since a primary responsibility of any Government must be to protect the security of the country, however defined or perceived. Given the traditional -- and contemporary -- concern with national security, the importance of verification becomes evident: it is the means by which a party ensures confidence, throughout the life of an arms control agreement, that other parties are complying with their obligations while at the same time demonstrating its own good faith. In a world where there are relatively few internationally effective sanctions, verification must inevitably play a critical role in ensuring that a treaty is and remains effective and does not become a source of tension rather than a means of lessening or eliminating it.

There is a very special role that verification must play. Events of recent years have underscored the crucial importance in certain arms control agreements of compliance with their provisions, and, thus, of verification of compliance. It is axiomatic that in an imperfect world, just as there can be no arms control without confidence in compliance, there can be no confidence in compliance without adequate verification. It follows that verification can be seen as the very foundation upon which the whole edifice of arms control agreements rests.

We have seen how even clear-cut and specific verification mechanisms in some multilateral agreements such as the biological and toxin weapons Convention of 1972, which is not merely an arms control agreement but a genuine disarmament agreement, have proven inadequate to dispel suspicions of violations. We have seen in the Gulf War the consequences of the absence of any verification process in the 1925 Geneva Poison Gas Protocol, which is, admittedly, only a non-first-use treaty, but an important one -- of the kind advocated by many for the control of nuclear weapons. We have also seen how evidence derived from the verification mechanisms of some bilateral agreements (such as the ABM Treaty and the threshold test-ban Treaty) can prove ambiguous, and give rise to disputes and suspicion rather than confidence and good faith in dealing with situations suggesting controversial activities.

These few examples -- in multilateral and bilateral agreements -- demonstrate not only the importance of verification and compliance, but the political sensitivity of the whole process of detecting and handling events suggesting possible non-compliance. Indeed, recent concerns about verification and compliance seem in some cases to have eroded confidence among the parties to arms control agreements rather than reinforced it. None the less, it is the Canadian position, which I wish to emphasize, that the careful negotiation and drafting of adequate and effective verification provisions and the establishment of the necessary implementing mechanisms is essential to preventing such a deterioration of confidence. This applies a fortiori to agreements involving nuclear weapons and nuclear tests.

In my Ottawa statement, I pointed out that "Clearly, no verification can be totally foolproof. A verification mechanism must be able to detect, beyond a reasonable doubt, any violation of an agreement that would permit a State to acquire, or clearly indicate an intention to acquire, a military capability threatening to the national security of any other party". I analysed in that statement, at some length, the standard of verification which might be

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

acceptable. Since I have circulated copies of my Ottawa statement to all delegations, I will not take the time of the Conference to read it into the record.

Mr. President, in concluding may I say what a pleasure it has been to work with you and your predecessors, with the Secretary-General, and with all my colleagues in other delegations, and with the secretariat, including both those now present and those who have left us. It has been my pleasant experience to enjoy cordial relations with each of you, irrespective of differences in our political positions and our perceptions of one another's positions. That, of course, is the only way we can work successfully to ensure that with the spirit of camaraderie which prevails in the Conference we can also develop a spirit of conciliation which opens the way to concrete substantive progress. Ultimately, even if we cannot always influence policies made in capitals, we can ensure that we remain sensitive to changes and shifts in position; that we are aware of new developments and particularly new openings; and that we are alert to opportunities to develop and expand common ground. So I must say in my own defence, and in a kind of right of reply to many of my friends, that, yes, I have indeed given many working luncheons at which I have made you all work as well as eat, but I make no apologies, in that at least I have benefited from these informal exchanges, and I hope that others have able to do so as well.

In a concluding comment, may I express on behalf of my wife, Ruth, as well as myself, appreciation for the kindness and hospitality which so many of you have given to us during our four years here.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Canada for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. On behalf of all the members of the Conference and on my own behalf, I should like to express our regret at the departure of our esteemed colleague Ambassador Beesley. Ambassador Beesley has represented his country in the Conference with the talent and wisdom of which we are all aware. He served as President of the Conference during the month of August last year in a manner which earned the appreciation of all the members of the Conference, and particularly, I may add, that of the President for the current month.

He was also a member of the Group of Seven, to which he brought his extensive experience in multilateral diplomacy. As the Conference knows, he is also a member of the International Law Commission, to which he was elected by the General Assembly by a vote which reflects his status as a jurist. However, when speaking of Ambassador Beesley one cannot mention only his professional qualities; reference must also be made to his personal qualities, which not only earned him the friendship of his colleagues, but also helped us to find solutions to the various problems facing the Conference. I wish Ambassador and Mrs. Beesley, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, a happy future in his academic activities and in his personal life.

I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, His Excellency Ambassador Hacene.

Mr. HACENE (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I would like to extend to you my sincere and warm congratulations as you take over the task of President of the Conference. The unanimous opinion of your contribution to the work of the Conference is a just reward and a deserved tribute to your devotion to duty and to your great qualities as a diplomat.

My congratulations are also extended to your predecessor, Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, for the competent and effective way in which he carried out his duties. I would also like to take this opportunity to say how much we regret to see some distinguished representatives -- Ambassadors Alfarargi, Beesley, Cromartie, Dhanapala, Tonwe and Turbanski -- leave the Conference. Our wishes for success go with them as they take up their new posts.

Finally, I would like to extend a welcome to our new colleagues, Ambassadors de Azambuja of Brazil, Rodrigo of Sri Lanka and Friedersdorf of the United States of America, and assure them of co-operation on the part of the Algerian delegation.

In its statement during the first part of the session, my delegation mentioned the new prospects which the international situation seems to afford in the field of disarmament. The promising dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States on the elimination of one category of their nuclear weapons provided justification for this optimism. It is encouraging to note that the two parties are discussing reductions in their nuclear arsenals and not, as in the past, mere limits on increases.

Faced with this new situation, the Algerian delegation expressed the hope that the current negotiations would help to initiate a genuine dynamic of disarmament and establish equal security for all. Despite some delays, the process of negotiation on medium-range and short-range missiles seems to be making progress. This is a promising sign which confirms the international community in its expectation of a new era in which the two major Powers embark in a resolute way on an effective and global process of disarmament.

From the efforts made to reduce armaments levels in Europe and create the necessary security measures, Algeria, as a Mediterranean country, expects, inter alia, confirmation of the natural links which exist between security in Europe and security in the Mediterranean, and effective acknowledgement of the indivisible nature of security and peace between the two regions. This legitimate aspiration, which is shared by the Mediterranean members of the non-aligned movement, was underscored at the Conference held last June in Brioni in Yugoslavia.

In my previous statement I also expressed the Algerian delegation's hope that the willingness shown by the United States and the USSR in their current negotiations would be matched by new impetus in the activities of our Conference. Without wishing to be pessimistic, one is forced to note that this session is not fundamentally different from earlier sessions, because the efforts intended to lead the Conference to renew its vocation as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD-I are still fruitless.

(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

Symptomatic of this situation is the lack of agreement on the establishment of appropriate subsidiary bodies for items 1, 2 and 3 on our agenda. In this respect, it is unfortunate that the prospects for agreement which emerged at the forty-first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations regarding the granting of an agreed mandate to the ad hoc committee on the basic question of a nuclear test ban did not take concrete shape.

It is equally unfortunate to note that the spirit of flexibility shown by the Group of 21 in order to make such possibilities for agreement a reality did not lead to the results expected. The same arguments designed to place the nuclear test ban in a long-term context were once again put forward.

My delegation has already had occasion to speak on this subject; therefore I will merely recall that the lack of negotiations under item 1 cannot have any valid justification, particularly in the light of the new political and technical developments which have been recorded on this issue. In this context, the input of the Group of Seismic Experts, which has embarked on a new stage of its work, deserves our commendation.

Yet again, the Conference was unable to agree on the establishment of an appropriate structural framework to deal with the question of nuclear disarmament and cessation of the nuclear arms race, other than through informal meetings. We can recognize the slight improvement during this session on this subject through the consideration of a list of topics. Nevertheless, we remain convinced that the establishment of a subsidiary body would be a more appropriate measure for the consideration of item 2 on the agenda, and would be the proper framework to allow the Conference to make its contribution to an undertaking where the future of the whole international community is at stake.

This requirement also means that specific measures must be negotiated urgently in order to prevent nuclear war and thus dispel the threats hanging over the very survival of mankind. In this light, the international consensus, underpinned by the joint Soviet-United States declaration that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, would in normal circumstances have been a starting-point for constructive work on item 3 of our agenda. Consequently, the lack of agreement on the Group of 21's proposal contained in document CD/515/Rev.3, together with the fact that no structured debate has been organized on this subject, cannot but give rise to frustration.

A chemical weapons ban is still the sole topic on which genuine negotiations are taking place. The Ad hoc Committee dealing with this task has made further progress under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ekéus, to whom my delegation would like to pay special tribute. This progress is reflected in particular in the "rolling text" bearing the symbol CD/CW/WP.167. Nevertheless, some aspects of the future convention remain controversial, and the Ad hoc Committee even marked time during the second part of the session on questions which were thought to be on the point of being settled. Thus it is extremely important that all delegations should show their firm resolve to arrive at solutions on the main issues still pending, and that nothing should further complicate an already complex situation.



(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

Problems related to verification and compliance continue to be the subject of intensive consideration and consultation within the Ad hoc Committee. From experience to date we should draw the lesson that a realistic reply to these undoubtedly important questions lies in the search for a balance between two requirements. On the one hand, the convention must contain provisions which will ensure that all States parties will comply with the commitments they undertake. On the other hand, these provisions should not lead to the creation of situations of needless tension or hamper the development of the civilian chemical industry, particularly in the developing countries. This is why it seems to us especially important to provide for effective procedures and the democratic functioning of the organs of the future convention.

My delegation would like to take this opportunity to recall the great importance which it attaches to the development of international co-operation in chemicals under the future convention. We would express the hope that the forthcoming consultations on articles 10 and 11 of the draft convention will make it possible to pave the way for fruitful work on this matter.

In the final analysis, despite the problems which have been encountered, we must highlight the efforts made within the Ad hoc Committee to find common ground on many thorny issues. This good will certainly deserves mention, and should be shown on the other items on our agenda.

I would now like to make a few comments on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and to say how much we appreciate the valuable contribution of Ambassador Pugliese as the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee. In the view of the Algerian delegation, consideration of the items discussed during the session allows us to draw the conclusion that the Ad hoc Committee will in the future have to undertake more substantive work in keeping with the urgency of item 5 on our agenda. It is true that the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee under this item for the third year running is a worthy achievement, but it must be admitted that the work done to date does not reflect in practice the recognized importance of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Consideration of the applicable legal régime has revealed loopholes and flaws which will have to be rectified if we really want to prevent outer space from becoming a "potential battlefield". To meet such a challenge, political good will on the part of all will be necessary, and it would be pointless in our view to place the role of our Conference in opposition to the framework of negotiations between the two main military and space Powers in order to justify the lack of appropriate negotiations on item 5 of our agenda. Specific proposals have been made under this item, and it is desirable for our Conference to give them all due attention.

To conclude, I would like to express our concern at the debate within the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. It is regrettable that the Committee has not been able to carry out the task conferred upon it under United Nations General Assembly decision 41/421. The work in this body in fact has taken a backward step as compared with previous sessions, as can be seen from the proliferation of brackets in the new text of the CPD. Worse still, parts of the programme which were in fact taken in extenso from the Final Document of SSOD-I have been the subject of

(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

reservations. Faced with this state of affairs it must be recalled that, while mutual concessions can be justified if we are to arrive at an agreed draft CPD, this should not lead us into a process which would distort the foundations and the very nature of such a programme. We venture to express the hope that the good will and the shared aspirations which were manifest when the Final Document of SSOD-I was adopted will in the future be more evident during our work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I have no more speakers on my list for today. Do any other delegations wish to speak?

As I announced at the beginning of the plenary meeting, I propose that we should now take a decision on the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/779. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I should like to inform you that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will meet this afternoon at 3 p.m. in Conference Room III.

I should like to make a small correction to the timetable of meetings for this week. The meeting to be held tomorrow, Wednesday, at 4.30 p.m. in this room will be an informal meeting of the Conference, and not consultations, as mentioned in the unofficial document distributed last Thursday. At that meeting, as the timetable indicates, we shall give a second reading to the technical parts of the draft reports to the General Assembly and the substantive paragraphs of the draft report for 1987 to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Finally, I should like to remind you that the informal consultations on the substantive paragraphs, which are open to all delegations, will continue today immediately after the plenary meeting, in Conference Room I. Consultations will also be held this afternoon starting at 3 p.m.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 27 August at 10 a.m.

I give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): I asked for the floor to remind delegations that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is meeting today at 3 p.m. in room III.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden for his reminder, and I wish not only to confirm it, but to express the wish that the now very strict timetable for the completion of our work for August will be respected.

I give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. LUDEKING (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. President, before you conclude the meeting, I would like to avail myself of the opportunity -- I do not know whether it is premature -- to thank Ambassador Beesley on behalf of all Western delegations for his dedication and the important contribution he personally made to the work of this Conference. I think we are all particularly grateful for the excellent personal as well as working relations we enjoyed with him, and I think he did a lot to instil the spirit of camaraderie he referred to in his statement, and whose importance for our work here cannot be underestimated. The Conference on Disarmament has always appreciated and benefited from his wise and thoughtful advice, which every so often helped to overcome obstacles and achieve progress here in our work. Thus it is with deep regret that we see you, Mr. Ambassador, leave this forum, and we all wish you all the best for your future new assignment.

Let me conclude on perhaps a more personal note. I am rather new to this Conference but, nevertheless, I have for a long time been familiar with the name of Ambassador Beesley and his contributions to other areas in the multilateral field -- for example, the Law of the Sea Conference -- and thus I am personally very sorry to see you, Mr. Ambassador, leave, which precludes me from benefiting from your experience, and I regret that there will not be any future co-operation, in this forum at least.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Are there any other requests? I see none. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.