
Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Summary record of the 5th meeting*

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 30 April 2014, at 10 a.m.

Chair: Mr. Román-Morey (Peru)

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Committee (*continued*)

* No summary record was prepared for the 4th meeting.

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The meeting was called to order at 10:10 a.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Tiendrebeogo** (Burkina Faso) said that while the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had contributed significantly to the promotion of international peace and security, a number of challenges remained to its entry into force, mainly owing to unfulfilled promises and unmet expectations. His Government had thus welcomed the consensus adoption of the action plan on nuclear disarmament at the 2010 Review Conference. Nuclear-weapon States must assume their full responsibility.

2. His Government attached great importance to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) and encouraged the establishment of other such zones. He hoped that the States of the Middle East would be able to overcome the remaining obstacles to the convening of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

3. His Government supported the initiative to launch negotiations on a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, which would help to address new concerns, including the risks of nuclear terrorism and illicit trafficking in nuclear materials or components. It had welcomed the second international Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. It reaffirmed the importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); the annex 2 States must ratify that treaty, so that it could enter into force, as that would be a decisive step towards its universalization.

4. His Government also called upon States to strengthen their cooperation with regard to the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with article IV of the Treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) should continue in its efforts to help ensure access to nuclear technology by all States parties, especially in respect of health, agriculture, energy, the environment, and water. He commended the Agency's technical cooperation programmes and urged Member States to provide adequate, sufficient and predictable funding to that end.

5. In the light of the numerous threats still looming over international peace and security, the international community should endeavour to strengthen and fine-tune the Treaty. The 2015 Review Conference would be crucial, as that year was also the deadline for achieving the Millennium Development Goals. It would be instructive to compare the level of financial resources devoted to the development of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction to the amounts assigned to economic and social development and environmental protection.

6. **Mr. Moncada** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that his Government believed that the same level of effort made in nuclear non-proliferation should be made towards fulfilling nuclear disarmament objectives, since the existence of nuclear weapons was itself a threat to humanity in the light of their destructive power. While the advocates of nuclear deterrence alleged that the possession of nuclear weapons had prevented a global conflagration for nearly seven decades, in reality non-violence was the greatest force of humanity. His Government reaffirmed its full commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; it believed that the priorities set out in the final document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament, held in 1978, continued to be fully relevant, especially in the light of the continued and accelerated modernization of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States bore the greatest responsibility in implementing measures to reduce and eliminate their nuclear arsenals and must conduct negotiations in good faith for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

7. His Government attached great importance to negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, and called for negotiating a binding international instrument in that regard. It also attached importance to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and drew attention to the declaration of Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace at the II summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), held in Havana, Cuba, in January 2014. His Government reaffirmed its unwavering support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and of all other weapons of mass destruction. Diplomatic efforts should be made to ensure the earliest possible convening of the delayed conference to establish such a zone, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of

the region concerned, and with the full support and commitment of the nuclear-weapon States.

8. He reaffirmed the sovereign right of States to develop their nuclear industry for peaceful purposes, in accordance with articles I to IV of the Treaty. IAEA was the most appropriate technical body for channelling international cooperation efforts for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

9. **Mr. Al-Rowaiei** (Bahrain) said that it was important for all three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to be addressed in a balanced fashion. In particular, the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be respected in accordance with article IV and exercised in accordance with agreements signed with IAEA. The Treaty must be universalized, and Israel should accede to the Treaty and submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards in implementation of Security Council resolution [487 \(1981\)](#).

10. His country welcomed the interim agreement reached by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 5 + 1 group in Geneva, and reiterated its position that a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction should be established in the Middle East, including the Gulf region, in conformity with resolutions of the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the League of Arab States. The establishment of such a zone was not just an Arab goal. The States parties to the Treaty had agreed by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference to convene a conference on the establishment of such a zone before the end of 2012, in implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and numerous other resolutions of the General Assembly, and that conference must take place.

11. **Mr. van der Kwast** (Netherlands) said that as a member of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), his Government supported efforts to bridge differences on disarmament and non-proliferation, and attached equal importance to all three pillars of the Treaty. The current pace of progress towards disarmament pillar fell well behind that for the other two pillars. The debate on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons underscored the urgent need to remedy that situation. The situation in Ukraine gave cause for concern: the breach of the Memorandum on

Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum) of 1994 had resulted in a change in the threat perception in many capitals. However, the current political climate should not be used as an excuse to lose sight of the common goal of a world free of nuclear weapons; the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use was their total elimination. All nuclear-weapon States must redouble their disarmament efforts.

12. The proliferation of nuclear weapons was one of the gravest threats to international peace and security. His Government was deeply concerned by the situation with regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the remaining challenges relating to the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the outstanding issues relating to the Syrian Arab Republic. All those issues must be addressed in a resolute manner. His Government attached priority to the strengthening of the international safeguards system; the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol should be the international standard for verification. He called upon States that had not yet concluded an additional protocol to do so without delay.

13. His Government attached great importance to the prevention of nuclear terrorism and the strengthening of nuclear security. It had hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague in March 2014, at which participants had committed to reducing the amount of the most sensitive nuclear materials, enhancing the security of remaining material, and improving international cooperation in that field.

14. His Government supported the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, and urged the convening of the conference to establish such a zone.

15. **Mr. Al Kaabi** (United Arab Emirates) said that his Government's commitment to ensuring global security had been demonstrated by its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995, its ratification of CTBT in 2000, and its conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement in 2003 and of an additional protocol in 2010. It had adopted a detailed policy on the development of a peaceful nuclear energy programme in 2008, endorsed important principles of complete transparency, and committed to the highest standards of safety, security,

non-proliferation, and full cooperation with IAEA as the fundamental principles governing all its nuclear activities and programmes. It supported the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and had started the construction of its first two nuclear power reactors in 2012 and 2013 respectively. It believed that the role and mandate of IAEA in that regard should continue to be strengthened, as the Agency played a crucial role in assisting countries to develop nuclear energy safely and securely, and its safeguards system ensured the peaceful nature of nuclear activities.

16. Significant efforts needed to be made to ensure the full implementation and universalization of the Treaty. In order to tackle the serious challenges facing the non-proliferation regime — including the lack of progress towards disarmament, the existence of States outside the Treaty, issues of non-compliance, continued nuclear proliferation threats, and challenges surrounding withdrawal from the Treaty — measures to strengthen the Treaty needed to be adopted. The action plan of the 2010 Review Conference should remain the focal point for strengthening the non-proliferation framework.

17. While every State party to the Treaty had the right to the use and development of peaceful nuclear technology, that right came with obligations; mutual trust and confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of nuclear programmes were essential building blocks of the non-proliferation regime. States must adhere to comprehensive safeguards agreements and fully cooperate with IAEA, and take the required steps to address all international concerns and obligations. Implementation of the additional protocol would facilitate the full support and confidence of the international community and was an important tool to maintain the credibility of the IAEA safeguards system.

18. Implementing the measures that had been agreed upon in the area of disarmament would strengthen non-proliferation efforts and the non-proliferation framework in general. Moreover, the only way to ensure the non-use or non-threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination. In that respect, his Government supported the ongoing discussion on the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons with a view to promoting implementation of the Treaty.

19. His Government urged the convening of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction without further delay, as progress to that end would demonstrate the Treaty's effectiveness in achieving its objectives.

20. The entry into force of CTBT was of great importance as that treaty was an important tool for building mutual trust and confidence, which in turn helped reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons. His Government condemned the nuclear testing by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and called for a swift response and diplomatic efforts to bring CTBT into force.

21. **Mr. Åkesson** (Sweden) said that his Government had never regretted its decision to give up the nuclear research and development programme it had conducted in the 1950s and 1960s, in order to be more secure and better serve international security as well. The three mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remained a sound and strong basis for efforts to achieve a world without nuclear weapons, and it was thus of utmost importance that commitments on all three pillars were implemented through tangible action by all States. The international community should continue to build an increasingly robust framework of mutually reinforcing and complementary treaties, institutions and commitments, adopting the building-block approach, as outlined in the working paper "Building blocks for a world without nuclear weapons" ([NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.23](#)).

22. Nuclear-weapon States needed to make further deep reductions in their nuclear arsenals, whether strategic or non-strategic, deployed or non-deployed, in order to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty and other agreements. His Government was particularly concerned about the continued existence of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in its own region, and urged all parties concerned to take steps to reduce that threat. To be effective, negotiations on nuclear disarmament must include nuclear-weapon States, and must address both humanitarian and security-related aspects.

23. CTBT was crucial to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; his Government had recently hosted a meeting of the group of eminent persons focusing on new and innovative approaches for

bringing that treaty into force. It was continuing its technical support for the CTBT verification regime, including through further development of a gas system to help detect underground nuclear explosions. The long-overdue fissile material cut-off treaty was another essential building block; his Government was pleased that the Group of governmental experts had recently begun its work in that context in Geneva.

24. As an active member of the IAEA Board of Governors, his Government strove to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system and additional protocols, and to uphold the Agency's important role in global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It had recently made a voluntary contribution to the Agency's enhanced monitoring and verification efforts in the Islamic Republic of Iran in support of the Joint Plan of Action and had also contributed to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative.

25. Since the early 1990s, his Government had contributed to a number of joint efforts to strengthen nuclear security and promote nuclear non-proliferation in Georgia, Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. It had also contributed to nuclear security by transferring fissile material for secure disposal.

26. The use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic and enduring consequences for humans, animals and plants worldwide, and as long as they were in circulation and spread to new countries and actors, the risk of their potential use remained. The solution was self-evident: a world without nuclear weapons. The road ahead in that regard would be arduous and without short-cuts. Nuclear-weapon States needed to realize that national, regional and international security would be better served without nuclear weapons; non-nuclear-weapon States would need to work with the nuclear-weapon States to help them achieve that objective; and all countries needed to strengthen their non-proliferation commitments.

27. **Mr. Haniff** (Malaysia) said that his Government remained convinced that, despite setbacks and challenges, the non-proliferation regime continued to be of central importance in efforts to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and an essential foundation for general and complete disarmament. It was imperative to maintain the integrity of the Treaty and strengthen its three pillars.

28. It was evident that the Treaty's disarmament objectives had not been pursued with sufficient

urgency, especially by nuclear-weapon States, whether within or outside the Treaty framework. Indeed, in spite of some efforts to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, the pace of disarmament had actually slowed. Nuclear-weapon States must step up their efforts. His Government had long supported the involvement of civil society, academia and think-tanks in the disarmament discourse. It also supported the humanitarian approach towards nuclear disarmament.

29. His Government called upon all States parties to ensure implementation of the three pillars of the Treaty in a balanced and non-discriminatory way; if the international community wanted to curtail proliferation of nuclear weapons, it must also accept the need for nuclear disarmament. Negative security assurances were an important and achievable step towards both objectives.

30. IAEA should continue its commendable work in realizing the full potential of peaceful applications of nuclear technology for the benefit of all. The Agency played a key role in nuclear safeguards and verifications, and should be afforded the time and space to conduct such activities within its mandate independently.

31. His delegation reaffirmed the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination in accordance with article IV of the Treaty, and the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in compliance with respective safeguard agreements. In that regard, Malaysia remained concerned that some States outside the Treaty were enjoying those rights. The international community, and States parties to the Treaty in particular, must uphold the principles of transparency and non-discrimination in the implementation of the Treaty, without selectivity or discrimination.

32. Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be strengthened and new zones established. The conference to establish such a zone in the Middle East must be convened as soon as possible, in order to strengthen regional and global peace and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among all countries in the Middle East region.

33. He urged support for the resolution that his delegation would again introduce to the General Assembly in 2014 concerning the advisory opinion of

the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, as that resolution underscored the legal obligation of States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. It was unfortunate that while the resolution continued to enjoy the support of the vast majority of Member States, there were still some States parties to the Treaty that abstained or voted against the resolution, which gave rise to questions about their position relating to article VI of the Treaty.

34. **Mr. Emvula** (Namibia) said that it was unacceptable that there were no controls on nuclear-weapon States as they sought to strengthen their national security by threatening the survival of humanity, while non-nuclear-weapon States were being policed to prevent their acquisition of nuclear weapons. Despite a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons since the end of the cold war, the quality, precision and potential destructive power of the remaining arsenals had increased as nuclear-weapon States continued to modernize them. That skewed focus on reduction versus modernization undermined the international community's collective efforts towards disarmament and non-proliferation. Balance between the three interdependent pillars of the Treaty should be upheld at all times. Non-proliferation could be ensured only when the same standards were applied to all States. In that respect, his delegation called upon all States parties without comprehensive safeguard agreements to conclude such agreements without further delay. States possessing nuclear technology must ensure that their cooperation in that regard was guided by the norms of the Treaty and the IAEA Statute. IAEA safeguards should be an obligation for all nuclear-weapon States and not an option for some of them.

35. As a member of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, Namibia supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world, as an important measure in achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In that respect his delegation called for the immediate commencement of negotiations on the convening of a conference to set up such a zone in the Middle East. The objectives of the Treaty could not be realized by implementing its provisions selectively, and its universality could not be realized amidst regionalized proliferation.

36. His Government supported efforts aimed at delegitimizing nuclear weapons, in line with the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, and at stigmatizing the possession and existence of such weapons, including through the holding of conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Those conferences were valuable in putting human security at the centre of the debate, as opposed to military and strategic aspects, carefully hidden from the public domain.

37. **Mr. Biontino** (Germany) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had greatly contributed to making the world a safer place. He urged all States which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. In that context, his Government regretted that the Government of the Russian Federation had recently failed to honour its obligations towards Ukraine in accordance with the Budapest Memorandum, which had been instrumental in paving the way for Ukraine and other newly independent States to renounce nuclear arsenals inherited from the Soviet Union. The Treaty facilitated peaceful cooperation in nuclear matters on a daily basis, mainly through IAEA. Negative security assurances should become part of a binding treaty regime, thus further contributing to improving the security environment of a majority of countries.

38. Implementation of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference was far too slow. Further progress was needed to achieve the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world in accordance with article VI of the Treaty. His Government was firmly committed to its obligations as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and, at the same time, was resolved to help create conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In that context, a new round of disarmament dialogue between the United States of America and the Russian Federation should begin as soon as possible, and should address sub-strategic nuclear weapons as well.

39. In line with the 2010 action plan, all nuclear-weapon States should increase transparency with respect to their arsenals. CTBT must enter into force. In that respect, his delegation deplored the aggressive nuclear policy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the spectre of a fourth detonation of a nuclear device.

40. Negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty should begin in the near future. As the Conference on Disarmament moved into its 18th consecutive year of stalemate, his Government was concerned about its functionality as the sole standing multilateral disarmament treaty negotiating body; the Conference's ability to address the international community's security needs was in serious doubt.

41. His Government was actively involved in finding a diplomatic solution to the current proliferation crises, which could jeopardize the Treaty's integrity. It welcomed the positive momentum in the negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and hoped that a permanent solution could be found to that situation.

42. His Government commended the crucial, valuable work of IAEA and its safeguards system, noting that Germany was the third-largest contributor to the Agency's budget and had been operating an IAEA support programme for more than 35 years. It called on States that had not yet done so to adopt the IAEA additional protocol. In that respect, the effectiveness and efficiency of the protocol could still be improved. He recalled the offer by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to provide advice to States upon their request when implementing the additional protocol. His Government was actively contributing to nuclear security and had joined all relevant instruments designed to help prevent nuclear terrorism and reduce nuclear risks. It stood ready to continue international cooperation with all interested partners on export control policies in order to close all remaining loopholes that would allow illegal networks to traffic in proliferation-sensitive materials. Lastly, his Government hoped that the conference on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction could be convened by the end of 2014.

43. **Ms. Tan** (Singapore) said that, in recent years, concerns about non-compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and fundamentally divergent perceptions about its adequacy, fairness and purpose had led to a crisis regarding its legitimacy and relevance. The chasm between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States had grown wider over the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament on the one hand and the perceived over-emphasis on nuclear proliferation on the other. Israel, India and Pakistan remained outside the ambit of the Treaty and the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea had withdrawn from the Treaty and maintained a nuclear programme that was not subject to any international safeguards regime.

44. Singapore firmly supported the objectives of the Treaty and its three mutually reinforcing pillars, which represented a delicate balance of interests. Failure to achieve progress in one pillar would have a detrimental effect on the others. The first pillar, nuclear disarmament, remained a long-term aspiration, as it required nuclear-weapon States to reject nuclear deterrence as part of their long-term national security policy. However, even small steps in that direction would be significant. Nuclear-weapon States could do much more to reassure non-nuclear-weapon States of their commitments under article VI of the Treaty. The United States of America and the Russian Federation, which possessed nearly 95 per cent of all the world's nuclear weapons, had a special responsibility to lead by example. In that regard, her delegation welcomed the call made by the President of the United States in 2014 to cut the two States' nuclear arsenals by one third more than the level that had been agreed to in the Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the New START Treaty). All nuclear-weapon States should refrain from making qualitative improvements to nuclear weapons. States parties to the Treaty must find a way to involve non-States parties with nuclear weapons capabilities in disarmament discussions; their exclusion fundamentally undermined the collective effort towards complete nuclear disarmament.

45. The entry into force of CTBT, a key tool to advance disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and build mutual trust and confidence, was long overdue. Her delegation welcomed the ratification of CTBT by Guinea-Bissau, Iraq and Norway and urged all States, particularly the remaining countries listed in annex 2, to sign and ratify that treaty. In addition, negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the framework of the Conference of Disarmament had been stalled for too long and progress must be made in that regard.

46. Singapore supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and was a party to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), which had played a critical role in the continued peace, stability and security of the region. Her Government encouraged all five nuclear-

weapon States to sign the Protocol to that Treaty without reservations as soon as possible. It also urged all relevant parties to work together to expeditiously convene the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

47. Nuclear non-proliferation should be strengthened on several fronts, as the risk of proliferation of nuclear technology and material and dual-use items for military purposes remained a major concern. Nuclear security measures, encompassing both civilian and non-civilian nuclear material and facilities, should be enhanced at the national, regional and international levels. States should accede to and fully implement key international legal instruments, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment; Singapore would soon be acceding to those instruments. In addition, States parties to the Treaty that had not yet done so should signed comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols with IAEA. Singapore had acceded to an additional protocol in 2005.

48. States parties should work towards a more robust international export control regime that would guard against illicit trafficking without hampering legitimate trade. While her Government took seriously its counter-proliferation obligations, Singapore being a major transshipment hub, it also emphasized that all parts of a supply chain, not just certain jurisdictions or ports, should tighten their export control regimes. Singapore had a robust export control system and fully abided by its international obligations, including under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). In addition, it participated in relevant multilateral and regional initiatives, including the Container Security Initiative of the United States Custom and Border Protection, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation.

49. Singapore urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to the Treaty, fully comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions, and cooperate promptly with IAEA in the full and effective implementation of its comprehensive safeguards obligations. Her delegation was encouraged by the recent progress made between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany, as well as with IAEA, to address the international community's concerns over

the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. Her Government believed that with honesty and strong political will from the relevant players, it would be possible to reach a lasting and comprehensive agreement.

50. Enhancing the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology could help to improve the socioeconomic conditions of many countries. Singapore supported the right of sovereign States to the peaceful use of nuclear science and technology under article IV of the Treaty. However, that right came with the responsibility to use such technology in a safe and secure manner. The international community, and IAEA in particular, should assist with training and capacity-building to help States establish the necessary regulatory and legal infrastructure to promote the highest standards of nuclear safety and security and enhance their emergency preparedness and response capabilities.

51. The Treaty was facing serious existential challenges and must evolve to keep pace with current realities. Developments outside the Treaty, in particular involving non-State parties, must be taken into account, as they had an effect on the credibility and relevance of the whole regime. States parties should reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty through concrete action and propose practical and pragmatic steps to advance its core objectives.

52. **Mr. Bhattarai** (Nepal) said that preparations for the 2015 Review Conference required a holistic approach that took into account the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The action plan on nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2010 Review Conference had renewed hope for global disarmament and non-proliferation; its implementation was critical to enhancing trust and confidence among nations. The same spirit of hope would be required in order to make progress at the 2015 Review Conference and beyond.

53. Nepal consistently advocated for the general and complete disarmament of all weapons of mass destruction, including biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological weapons, in a time-bound manner. In an interconnected and interdependent world, where the definition of security could no longer be confined to the traditional notion of military security, such weapons did not provide any effective guarantee of security. Nepal also strongly opposed the

weaponization of outer space. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones in all regions could serve as building blocks towards complete disarmament at the global level. In addition, the full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East would be a significant step towards non-proliferation. However, those initiatives should not be seen as a substitute for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The fulfilment of those obligations remained as critical as ever.

54. The only guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination. Until that objective was achieved, nuclear-weapon States should guarantee to non-nuclear-weapon States their compliance with the provisions of effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable negative security assurances.

55. As affirmed in article IV of the Treaty, all States had the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. However, nuclear-weapon States bore the primary responsibility for nuclear safety and security. IAEA could also play a central role in facilitating effective implementation of safeguards standards. Knowledge-sharing and cooperation with developing countries on nuclear technology for scientific, humanitarian and development purposes must be enhanced in order to ensure that the technology benefited all equitably.

56. His delegation affirmed its belief in multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions to global problems. It called for the observance of an immediate, unconditional and permanent ban on nuclear weapon testing and closure of all nuclear weapon test sites. It also supported the early conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty. The strong support for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons expressed during the High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament was a step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons and should receive prompt follow-up.

57. **Archbishop Chullikatt** (Holy See) said that the longer States parties delayed in fulfilling the aims of the Treaty, the greater the risk of a cataclysmic tragedy involving the use of nuclear weapons. If the commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons continued to be implemented at such a slow pace, confidence in the viability of the non-proliferation regime would

weaken and the risk of further proliferation would increase. While the principal nuclear-weapon States expressed a strong interest in curtailing proliferation, their commitment to divesting themselves of nuclear weapons lacked the same urgency, and they continued to maintain that those weapons were needed for their security.

58. The military doctrine of nuclear deterrence was a prime obstacle to meaningful progress on nuclear disarmament and was being used to justify the modernization of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The conferences on the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons had spelled out the horrors that would befall humanity in the event of the accidental or deliberate use of nuclear weapons. The logical course of action was to make urgent and expedited progress towards a global legal ban on nuclear weapons that would accompany the global bans on other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological weapons.

59. However, only a political process could achieve such a ban. The 2013 High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament had been an attempt to generate such political momentum. His delegation encouraged the major States to take more substantial and resolute action to eliminate the scourge of nuclear weapons, which could indiscriminately annihilate non-combatants and combatants alike, in times of both war and peace. Nuclear-weapon States should work with the non-nuclear-weapon States to develop a legally binding instrument banning the possession of nuclear weapons. No attempt should be made to achieve such a ban without the participation of the major nuclear States, or to act outside the framework of existing mechanisms and institutions.

60. The Holy See renewed its call for the abolition of nuclear weapons in order to free the world from the spectre of mass destruction.. It was unacceptable that the nuclear-weapon States continued to spend more than \$100 billion per year to maintain their nuclear arsenals, when such resources were desperately needed for economic and social development, including the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, to meet the needs of the world's poorest people.

61. His delegation hoped that preparatory work would begin as soon as possible on a comprehensive agreement leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Such efforts would not obstruct the steps

already envisioned, such as further reductions in arsenals of weapons, the entry into force of CTBT, and the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty. In that regard, it was vital that the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction should finally be convened for the sake of the peace process and the security of the region, as well as for the credibility of the Treaty.

62. **Mr. Nduhuura** (Uganda) said that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction posed an ever more serious threat to peace and security. All efforts to build a better and safer world should be inspired by a shared vision and commitment to justice, equity and peace, and should focus on promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, reducing conflict and deepening mutual understanding and respect.

63. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against their use or the threat of their use. In that regard, there was a need for States to renew their commitment to fulfilling their obligations under all three pillars of the Treaty, in particular those set out in the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. His delegation was deeply concerned about the continued lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The mere possession of nuclear weapons contravened the principles of international humanitarian law. Furthermore, any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constituted a flagrant violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter. Therefore, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon States must refrain, under all circumstances, from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. In that regard, it was important to recall that all State parties had a right to receive security assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

64. His delegation stressed the need for States to adhere to the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in respect of nuclear disarmament. As long as some States had nuclear weapons, others would aspire to also acquire them as a deterrent measure, leading to an arms race that would increase the potential for further proliferation. Uganda was a signatory of CTBT and fully supported the banning of all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military

or civilian purposes. Such a ban would inhibit the development of nuclear weapons, contribute to nuclear disarmament and prevent further damage to the environment. The CTBT must be brought into force as a matter of urgency; those Member States that had not yet ratified the Treaty were urged to do so.

65. Non-nuclear-weapon States should be able to harness nuclear technology for a wide range of peaceful uses. The demands of a fast-growing population would eventually outstrip the capacity of the available renewable and non-renewable energy sources. The inclusion of nuclear energy in the mix would not only help to meet that demand, but also accelerate industrialization and mitigate global warming and the effects of climate change. Every aspect of human development, including health, education, agriculture, industry and infrastructure, depended on reliable access to energy. In that connection, he noted that energy production in Uganda, as in much of Africa, was still too low to accommodate the demands. In line with IAEA regulations, his Government had established an Atomic Energy Council to serve as the national regulatory authority.

66. It was in the interest of the survival of humanity that nuclear weapons were never used again. The effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, whether by accident, miscalculation or design, would be grave and catastrophic. All States shared responsibility for preventing the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons, and for achieving the universalization of the Treaty and the fulfilment of its objectives, including nuclear disarmament. It was therefore the collective responsibility of the international community to ensure full compliance with all nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament obligations and to address all situations that threatened international peace and security.

67. **Mr. Al-Mubarak** (Kuwait) said that his country would continue to support the efforts to convene, before the end of 2014, the postponed conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. It regretted that as yet no agenda or date for the conference had been set. Attempts to introduce any terms of reference for the conference other than the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 action plan would not be conducive to its success. Any meetings on the conference and other preparatory meetings must be conducted under the aegis of the

United Nations. The IAEA safeguards system and additional protocol were essential to the non-proliferation regime. Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty or to submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards continued to provide a rationale for other countries to acquire and possess nuclear weapons.

68. His country reaffirmed the right of all States to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and commended the role of IAEA in ensuring that right. It also welcomed the interim agreement concluded with the Islamic Republic of Iran by the 5 + 1 group and the action plan agreed to with IAEA, and hoped that those developments would result in a permanent agreement that removed any suspicions surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme.

69. **Mr. Rachmianto** (Indonesia) said that the adoption of CTBT had been one of the prerequisites for the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As an annex 2 country, Indonesia had taken the lead by ratifying CTBT in 2012; it urged all States, and in particular other annex 2 States, to do the same without delay. His Government would continue to play its role in efforts to achieve universalization of CTBT, and, in collaboration with the CTBT Preparatory Commission, would be hosting a conference at the end of May 2014 to promote CTBT in the Asia-Pacific Region.

70. It was important for nuclear-weapon States to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; his country called on the nuclear-weapon States to sign and ratify the protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone as soon as possible. It continued to be concerned by the slow progress on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and the failure to convene the conference scheduled for 2012 in that regard. As Chair of the third Conference of States parties and signatories of treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and Mongolia, and in accordance with article 106 of the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, Indonesia proposed holding a meeting of States parties and signatories of treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and States having declared their nuclear-weapon-free status within the framework of 2015 Review Conference.

71. He urged that the wide support expressed at the High-level meeting of the General Assembly on

nuclear disarmament for a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons should be promptly followed up. Continued discussion of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, accompanied by activism on the part of civil society, academia and youth, could play a powerful role in building awareness and political capital in favour of nuclear disarmament. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only guarantee against the threats they posed.

72. **Ms. Al-Thani** (Qatar) said that the optimism generated by the High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament was tempered by concern about the failure of efforts to convene the conference on establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Decades of failure by the Disarmament Commission to achieve any notable progress raised questions about the value of holding its annual sessions. The Conference on Disarmament had likewise been stuck in place since 1996 because of the lack of political will. The nuclear-weapon States had not translated their commitments to disarmament into actions on the ground.

73. The proposal to hold a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction had been an important outcome of the 2010 Review Conference, and a significant step towards implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East that had been a condition for the indefinite extension of the Treaty. That conference had not yet taken place on the scheduled date because of the refusal of a single State to participate, and it had emerged from recent discussions at the Disarmament Commission that certain States wanted to wait until the 2015 Review Conference to schedule a new date. The Middle East was the prime example of the ineffectiveness of the Treaty in providing security to States parties. If the international community did not carry out its responsibility to induce Israel to accede to the Treaty and submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards, other countries would be encouraged to pursue nuclear-weapon capabilities outside of international supervision. That conference should be convened as soon as possible under the auspices of the United Nations in order to avert the risk of a nuclear arms race in the region. It was also important for the 2015 Review Conference to reaffirm the need for

technology transfer to afford States parties their right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

74. **Mr. Ružička** (Slovakia) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remained a unique and irreplaceable framework for maintaining and strengthening international peace, security and stability. The balance between its three mutually reinforcing pillars must be preserved. States parties needed not only to see real progress towards nuclear disarmament, but also to be reassured about the absence of activities not consistent with the Treaty. At the same time, the importance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy continued to rise in many civilian applications and might help in addressing challenges in the spheres of energy, health, research and development. All States which were not parties to the Treaty should accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty must be universal, both in scope and in quality. His country continued to support the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. The total elimination of nuclear arsenals would require a substantive and constructive engagement of nuclear-weapon States and was essential to averting the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of their use.

75. The nuclear programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of the Syrian Arab Republic continued to give rise to serious concern. Recent developments with regard to the Islamic Republic of Iran were encouraging, and it was to be hoped that more progress would be achieved to successfully address that issue. The recent violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine represented a challenge to the principles of the non-proliferation regime. His country regretted that the planned conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction had been postponed, but was encouraged by the recent informal meetings held in Glion, Switzerland.

76. Nuclear power was a mature, efficient, cost-effective and increasingly safe technology that provided numerous benefits to humanity, and provided a substantial percentage of his country's electricity production. Trust and confidence were the key elements for its development. IAEA full-scope safeguards and the additional protocol to the comprehensive safeguards agreement could ensure that nuclear energy was developed under the best

non-proliferation conditions. Those instruments needed to be reinforced and universalized. Slovakia had recently undergone the European stress tests and incorporated lessons learned into its national action plan, and he encouraged other countries to perform risk and safety assessments for nuclear power plants in operation and under construction in cooperation with IAEA.

77. **Mr. Trung** (Viet Nam) said that the States parties to the Treaty needed to redouble efforts to ensure that the 2015 Review Conference would take place in a positive atmosphere based on effective implementation of the 2010 action plan. In the face of a number of challenges, it was crucial to reaffirm a commitment to the continued role of the Treaty and to reiterate that the three pillars of the Treaty must be implemented in a balanced and comprehensive manner. Nuclear-weapon States must fulfil their obligations under article VI and the 13 practical steps and progress also needed to be made in the negotiation of negative security assurances and of a fissile material cut-off treaty. The entry into force of CTBT was essential, and the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be further strengthened. Any further delays in convening the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and any other weapons of mass destruction would call into question the credibility of the Treaty and the commitment by key players to the establishment of such a zone in a region already fraught with tension. He also called on the nuclear-weapon States to continue engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with a view to acceding to the protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

78. Challenges to nuclear proliferation should be addressed in a comprehensive manner. Diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of disputes, whenever and wherever possible, should be given a chance, taking into account the legitimate interests of the parties concerned, including the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was critical to revitalize the disarmament machinery, including the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission, based on the principles agreed to by consensus at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978. The recent High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament and nuclear security summits had achieved some success in relation to the

implementation of the 2010 action plan, as had cooperation between a number of States parties, including developing countries, and IAEA to ensure nuclear safety and security and promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

79. Since the 2010 Review Conference, his country had ratified the additional protocol to the comprehensive safeguards agreement, and had acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. It was in the process of ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Viet Nam was also strengthening its legal and regulatory framework for nuclear safety, security and safeguards in order to conform to the latest IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications. Its Da Lat research reactor had converted from highly enriched to low-enriched uranium in 2011 and repatriated spent highly enriched fuel to the Russian Federation in 2013, and it had recently signed a letter of intent with IAEA and the Republic of Korea to implement a pilot project for radioactive source location tracking in Viet Nam. In its development of nuclear power plants, it cooperated closely with IAEA to ensure full compliance with IAEA standards. It had also contributed to the work of IAEA as a member of its Board of Governors from 2013-2015 and served as the Chair of that Board for the 2013-2014 period.

80. **Mr. Diallo** (Senegal) said that despite progress made at the bilateral level through the conclusion of the New START treaty, nuclear proliferation continued to threaten international peace and security because of the persistence of the arms race and the absence of political will to put an end to it. Senegal was in favour of the total eradication of all military nuclear activities and welcomed the adoption of General Assembly resolution 68/32; it looked forward to the implementation of the proposal to convene a United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament in 2018. Efforts must be made to strengthen the authority of the Treaty, through respect for the commitments made. The nuclear-weapon States, or States which based their security policy on nuclear deterrence, must adopt a consensual approach, even though nuclear disarmament remained a gradual and progressive process, in parallel with non-proliferation efforts. The universalization of the Treaty, and the

entry into force of CTBT, as well as the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty, were key milestones along the route to general and complete disarmament.

81. With regard to nuclear non-proliferation, efforts should take place within the multilateral framework of the United Nations, on the basis of consensus. Senegal had ratified the major instruments of the international nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security regime and was also in compliance with its obligations under Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). It was a signatory to the 2007 Algiers Declaration on nuclear security in Africa and welcomed the outcome of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit at The Hague.

82. In order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it was essential to strengthen the monitoring capacity of IAEA. The additional protocol to the comprehensive safeguards agreement, which allowed for in-depth inspections with shorter advance notice, should be universalized. Cooperation and partnership should be developed between the African Union, the United Nations and IAEA for nuclear technology transfer for peaceful purposes, which had the potential to be an economic catalyst for the countries of the South. Support needed to be provided in strengthening institutional, human and technological capacities, especially in the sectors of energy, health, industry, agriculture and related activities. A transparent international regime needed to be established, based on trust.

83. He welcomed the entry into force in 2009 of the Treaty of Pelindaba that made Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It was regrettable that the planned 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction had not yet taken place.

84. **Mr. Baeidinejad** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that in order to promote the universality and full implementation of the Treaty, concrete substantive recommendations needed to be formulated, which could include the recommendations made in the outcomes of the 1995 and 2010 review conferences. Nuclear disarmament leading to a nuclear-weapon-free world continued to be the essential objective of the Treaty, and nuclear-weapon States had primary responsibility in that regard. It was a source of grave concern that almost 45 years after the entry into force of the Treaty, no single serious step had been taken by those States towards fulfilling their obligations.

Instead, they continued to develop new types of nuclear weapons, modernize their existing weapons, and include them in their military and security doctrines, and were assisting some non parties to the Treaty in developing nuclear weapons by transferring nuclear equipment, materials and know-how, and they were refusing even to begin negotiations on disarmament. Such activities undermined the objectives of the Treaty and jeopardized its integrity and credibility. Nuclear-weapon States must demonstrate genuine political will in support of negotiations on nuclear disarmament by adopting practical nuclear disarmament measures, including commencement of the dismantling of their nuclear arsenals.

85. The 2015 Review Conference should take advantage of the momentum created by the 2013 High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament, which had demonstrated once again that the total elimination of nuclear weapons remained the highest priority. General Assembly resolution 68/32, which incorporated the proposals submitted to that meeting by his country's President on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, represented an appropriate road map to direct all international efforts on nuclear disarmament. He called for the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a comprehensive and balanced programme of work that would provide for the urgent commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons.

86. The Committee should make strong recommendations regarding universalization of the Treaty, which was particularly important in such volatile regions as the Middle East, where the nuclear weapons of the only non-party to the Treaty in the region posed a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States and remained the only obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone therein. Although the 2010 action plan had been a long-overdue step forward in implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, Israel's refusal to participate in the planned 2012 conference on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, despite the readiness of all the countries of the region, constituted an act of defiance to the Treaty and the international community and seriously challenged the implementation of the Resolution. At the same time, the conveners could not be exonerated from their responsibility with regard to

the implementation of the Resolution. An agreed plan of action and timetable for universalization of the Treaty in the Middle East should be one of the main priorities of the 2015 Review Conference.

87. Realization of the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to the peaceful use of nuclear energy was one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. It required full compliance of all parties in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information, as well as technical cooperation among States and between States and international organizations. All States parties, in particular developed countries, had an obligation to fully respect that right and facilitate its realization. The review conferences had all reaffirmed the sovereign right of each State party to define its national nuclear energy policy, including its fuel-cycle policy, which should be respected by all other States parties to the Treaty.

88. **Ms. Mørch Smith** (Norway) said that the primary task of the 2015 Review Conference would be to achieve a broad-based understanding of how to address nuclear threats and how to facilitate the peaceful application of nuclear energy. The two international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons hosted by her country in 2013, and by Mexico in 2014, had reinforced awareness that no State or international body would be able to address the immediate humanitarian emergency that would follow a nuclear detonation. The broad and active participation of many States and of a wide range of stakeholders at the two conferences had reflected the recognition that the catastrophic effects of a nuclear detonation were an issue of concern and relevance to everyone. The third conference would facilitate further discussions on the humanitarian perspective in the run-up to the 2015 review conference.

89. The violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum entailed by Russia's illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula was a major setback to the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and could have significant consequences with regard to negative security assurances.

90. Nuclear disarmament depended on full confidence that no one could circumvent the non-proliferation regime. The ongoing negotiations between the 5 + 1 group and the Islamic Republic of

Iran, and the agreement reached between that country and IAEA, were promising; IAEA would play a key role in verifying a future long-term agreement. She urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to resolve outstanding issues related to its nuclear programme. Her country strongly condemned the nuclear and missile tests carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

91. The New START Treaty was a welcome first step towards further disarmament, which should cover all categories of weapons and involve all nuclear-weapon States, and should be based on the principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility. Verification was crucial; Norway would continue to support the development of reliable verification systems, such as the United Kingdom — Norway Initiative on the Verification of Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement. The IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocol protected collective security and facilitated peaceful uses of nuclear energy; they should be applicable to all States. Efforts should also be intensified to reinforce existing regional nuclear-weapon-free zones and make real progress on the entry into force of CTBT. Efforts to secure all sensitive nuclear material and to develop international cooperation on fuel cycles should be continued, and work towards a fissile material cut-off treaty should be intensified, while reducing existing stockpiles. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) must be fully implemented. All countries had a joint responsibility to move forward on all three pillars of the Treaty and create conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. Civil society, including non-governmental organizations and academia, were key partners in that endeavour.

92. **Mr. León González** (Cuba) said that Cuba attached great importance to nuclear disarmament. The only realistic solution to the nuclear threat was the complete elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons. The issue had been on the agenda of the General Assembly since 1946, and the great majority of Member States were urging the adoption without delay of a convention on nuclear disarmament that would establish legally binding measures to eliminate and completely prohibit nuclear weapons within a given time period.

93. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons set out clear legal obligations on nuclear disarmament, in article VI. Unfortunately, 46 years

after its adoption, that article had still not been implemented. The majority of nuclear-weapon States were opposed to initiating negotiations to eliminate and ban nuclear weapons, clinging to the alleged power the possession of such weapons gave them, even though history and scientific research had demonstrated that using the power of the atom as a weapon of war would lead to genocide and the annihilation of life on the planet.

94. The agreements adopted at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences had not been fulfilled owing to a lack of political will among several States, including certain nuclear-weapon States and others that believed themselves to be under the protection of the so-called “nuclear umbrella”. The reasons for the impasse and the means to overcome it should be the focus of discussions so that the 2015 Review Conference would yield practical and concrete results and the agreements adopted by States would no longer remain lost in history.

95. The Treaty's legitimacy and effectiveness depended on implementation of its three pillars in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner. His delegation opposed the unilateral measures imposed by certain countries as well as the interference of the Security Council in the mandate granted in the Treaty to IAEA as the sole authority with competence to monitor the implementation of the commitments undertaken, by means of the safeguards agreements signed by Member States.

96. His delegation reaffirmed the inalienable right of States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in line with the Treaty. It also reaffirmed the need for all States parties to participate in the exchange of equipment, material and information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

97. His Government was deeply concerned that nuclear deterrence remained an essential part of the defence and security doctrines of some States and that substantial funds were being dedicated to the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Discussions of the post-2015 development agenda should recognize that the colossal global military spending, which included the costs of production and improvement of nuclear weapons, was a fundamental misuse of international resources that could be used to

promote development and definitively eradicate poverty.

98. Non-nuclear-weapon States needed to receive assurances from nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States should be adopted as a matter of priority.

99. The failure to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction was unacceptable, as the convening of the conference was an important and integral outcome of the 2010 Review Conference. The establishment of that zone would represent significant progress towards nuclear disarmament as well as a major step forward in the Middle East peace process. The conference should be convened without delay in 2014.

100. At the second Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), held in Havana, the Heads of State and Government of Latin America and the Caribbean had reaffirmed the importance of nuclear disarmament and renewed their firm commitment to adopting concrete measures to eliminate and prohibit nuclear weapons. The declaration of Latin America and the Caribbean as a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty) had been further strengthened. The CELAC leaders had formally declared Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace, which included nuclear disarmament as a component.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.