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Chairman: Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand).

AGENDA ITEMS 17 AND 66

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2979, A/3047, A/C.1/L.149/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.150, A/C.1/L.152, A/C.1/L.153) (*continued*)

Measures for the further relaxation of international tension and development of international co-operation (A/2981 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.151) (*continued*)

1. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) said he felt that, in a question of concern to the entire human race, everything representatives said should be calculated to facilitate future negotiations.
2. Today, as for several years, armaments were impoverishing the world and increasing tension. Nay, more: the stock of nuclear material was increasing and becoming more widely distributed, while present methods of control were ineffective; in other words, any delay would make the solution of the problem more difficult.
3. The Soviet Union decision to agree to the resumption of private negotiations in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, together with the General Assembly's unanimous vote on the matter at the ninth session (resolution 808 (IX)), had justified the hope that the nightmare of atomic warfare might be coming to an end. On 8 March 1955, in the Sub-Committee, the Western Powers had submitted a draft resolution (DC/71, annex 4) calling for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression. That draft also called for the negotiation of a disarmament treaty which would provide for the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of weapons of

mass destruction, together with the conversion of existing stocks for peaceful purposes, major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments, and the establishment of a control organ. The programme was to be completed in three stages. At each stage the measures envisaged were to be carried out only when the control organ reported that it was able to enforce them effectively. Thus, the Western delegations had envisaged a comprehensive disarmament programme on the understanding that a control organ would effectively guarantee its implementation; and that basic position remained unaltered.

4. The United Kingdom and France had subsequently made additional proposals: they had suggested that the forces of the great Powers should be reduced to specific levels (DC/71, annex 9) and that the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should come into force upon the completion of the third quarter of the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces (DC/71, annex 13). That concession had been made contingent upon agreement being reached, among other things, on the institution of an effective system of control, which would operate throughout the whole disarmament programme. In general, the proposals advanced by the West had extended to, but not exceeded, the limits of effective control.

5. The document submitted by the Soviet Union on 10 May 1955 (A/2979, annex I),¹ which dealt with disarmament and the elimination of the threat of a new war, had provided that the whole disarmament programme should be fully implemented by the end of 1957. It had embodied the proposals submitted by France and the United Kingdom on phasing and on the level of armed forces, but it had not met adequately the essentially related condition regarding control. Furthermore, the Soviet Union proposals had agreed with the Western suggestion that nuclear weapons should not be used except in defence against aggression, but had specified that their use should be permitted when a decision to that effect was taken by the Security Council. Although the Soviet proposals had represented an advance, they were not clear on the question of effective control. The USSR plan also provided for the dismantling of military bases in foreign territories, the immediate withdrawal of occupation troops from Germany, the condemnation of war propaganda, the removal of every form of discrimination in the field of trade, and so on.

6. Since the Soviet Union proposals had gone beyond the Sub-Committee's terms of reference, and in view of the forthcoming Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers at Geneva, the Sub-Committee had adjourned on 18 May 1955.

7. At the Geneva Conference, President Eisenhower had suggested (DC/71, annex 17) that the United States and the Soviet Union should give each other a complete blueprint of their military establishments from

¹ See also DC/71, annex 15.

one end of their country to the other, and that each country should provide unlimited facilities for aerial photography of its territory by the other country.

8. President Eisenhower had already said in his opening statement that discussions on inspection might be oriented towards the establishment of an alarm system. For, as the Soviet Union Government had acknowledged, the most thorough system of inspection, while it might effectively control future activities, could not ensure the identification and elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. As President Eisenhower had said on 21 July 1955: "We have not as yet been able to discover any scientific or other inspection method which would make certain the elimination of nuclear weapons."

9. The Prime Minister of France had suggested (DC/71, annex 16, appendix 2) that some of the savings resulting from disarmament measures should be used through an international economic organization to carry out a world-wide programme of assistance to underdeveloped countries. Financial and budgetary controls could be provided within the general system.

10. Finally, the United Kingdom had submitted a proposal (DC/71, annex 19) intended to serve as a practical experiment, particularly in the field of control and inspection.

11. The USSR delegation, on the other hand, had added little at the Geneva Conference to its proposals of 10 May 1955. First, it had reiterated its suggestions for the withdrawal of foreign troops, the settlement of Far Eastern issues and the normalization of trade relations. Most of the proposals of 10 May had been confirmed in Mr. Bulganin's opening statement or in his proposal of 21 July 1955 (A/2979, annex II)².

12. The unanimous agreement on the continuation of the Sub-Committee's discussions in New York on 29 August 1955 had been a source of great satisfaction. However, it had to be recognized that the gap between the Western and Soviet positions had not narrowed: the Soviet Union Government had neither clarified its position on control nor reacted to President Eisenhower's new proposals.

13. As on previous occasions, the USSR representative had failed to provide the requested clarification of his proposals of 10 May 1955. In the course of the discussions it had emerged that, given the scientific facts of the situation, while a comprehensive system of disarmament remained the goal, there were immediate difficulties to be overcome in the elimination of nuclear weapons, but that it would be desirable to establish a warning system which would create confidence and open the way for the establishment of the original programme.

14. On 20 September 1955, Mr. Bulganin had accepted certain elements of the Eisenhower proposals. However, the Sub-Committee had again been obliged to discontinue its work.

15. The disappointing lack of progress of the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the four great Powers on the major political issues had been bound to have repercussions on disarmament. The British and French Foreign Ministers, without abandoning the comprehensive programme, had supported the Eisenhower plan, designed to prevent a surprise attack. And the Canadian Government also had agreed that by its very boldness the plan might well strengthen mutual confidence. After all, Mr. Kuznetsov himself, in his statement at the 798th

meeting, had said that it was necessary to increase confidence. But in order to do that, an advance must be made along a broad front in dealing with the political, economic and military problems dividing the opposing groups. However, the fact that the restoration of confidence was important did not mean that disarmament must come after other problems. Furthermore, when efforts had been made at Geneva to resolve the problems of Germany and European security, the Soviet Union had adopted an intransigent and negative attitude, which had been bound to prejudice any prospects of progress in the field of disarmament.

16. The Soviet Union contended that it had accepted the three major elements of the programmes recommended by the General Assembly. But in the first place, the elimination of nuclear weapons, by the Soviet Government's own admission in its proposals of 10 May 1955, could not be enforced at the present time. Doubtless Mr. Kuznetsov, like many others, had confidence in the progress of scientific research. Meanwhile, however, the Western Powers were not prepared to accept commitments which would be suicidal in the absence of safeguards which had yet to be devised. Secondly, the Western proposals on the reduction of armed forces and armaments were explicitly related to the third element of the programme, effective inspection and control. But the USSR representatives had never given any indication that such schemes as they would be prepared to accept would be really effective and would warrant the necessary confidence.

17. Of the United Nations programme, in short, the Soviet Union had accepted only the prohibition of atomic weapons, which on its own admission could not be carried out at present. On the third point, control, it refused to go beyond unacceptable generalities; and as regards levels of forces, it sought to make much of its acceptance of a point which was related to the first and third objectives, and was subject to conditions which it continued to disregard.

18. It might well be that effective inspection and control would involve difficulties for the Soviet system. Perhaps a completely effective disarmament plan would be possible only if the Soviet leaders relaxed their monopoly over the minds of the peoples they controlled.

19. Before the Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers, propaganda proposals such as the immediate banning of the atom bomb had been abandoned, and it had seemed that, given agreement on the details concerning levels of forces and inspection, it would be possible to construct the framework of a practical disarmament scheme. The Sub-Committee had been able to come to grips with the core of the problem.

20. At the Geneva Conference a number of imaginative plans had been offered, approaching the problem from different angles, but, as the representative of France had stressed, not in a mutually incompatible fashion. However, the formidable difficulty of effectively controlling the prohibition of nuclear weapons continued to exist. In view of the scientific difficulties which existed, the position of the Western countries might be summarized in the following manner. First, the elimination of nuclear weapons, since it could not be effectively controlled, could not at present be part of a programme to be implemented immediately. It was therefore useless to propose, as the Soviet Union had done at Geneva, the establishment of effective international control over the prohibition of atomic weapons.

² See also DC/71, annex 18.

It should be remembered what the Soviet Union had itself said in its proposals of 10 May 1955. Nevertheless, the West had suggested at Geneva that the search for means to establish such control should continue.

21. The Canadian delegation had always supported the prohibition of nuclear weapons as part of the general disarmament scheme, provided adequate control was both scientifically and technically feasible and was accepted by all parties concerned. In the meantime, a Government which jeopardized its security by accepting complete but unverifiable prohibition would be taking a gamble, and any attempt to exploit a country's refusal to take such a gamble was useless and dangerous.

22. Secondly, the Powers must not restrict themselves to setting up an alarm system or experimenting with pilot schemes. A broad area in the field of conventional armaments could be effectively controlled. Furthermore, future production of nuclear material could be subjected to extensive checks. Finally, the reduction of conventional armaments would include the normal means for the delivery of nuclear weapons, such as long-range aeroplanes.

23. Incidentally, intercontinental ballistic missiles were also susceptible, directly or indirectly, to a degree of control; and the major nations of the world were trying to perfect that form of nuclear attack, while defence measures would require many years for their completion. In other words, there was the danger of an arms race on a scale even more vast than at present, for no laws and no agreements would prevent scientists from perfecting intercontinental rockets, earth satellites and even interplanetary rockets. It was imperative, therefore, that agreement should be reached as soon as possible on a disarmament scheme comprehensive enough to encompass intercontinental ballistic missiles.

24. Without departing from the principle of effective control, it should be possible, within a short time, to adopt a significant programme of disarmament. There would remain the problem of the nuclear weapon, with its implications as regards the level of forces which should be retained and the types of armaments which should be allowed. Nevertheless, the international climate and the budgetary situation in various countries would be affected if a degree of mutual confidence could be achieved which would make it possible to effect that part of the programme of disarmament which was now technically within reach. Where the political and economic well-being of the world was at stake, countries should not allow *le mieux d'être l'ennemi du bien*.

25. Thirdly, warning systems could be set up against the danger of sudden attack, which had been recognized by the Soviet Union; it would be remembered that Mr. Bulganin's proposals of 21 July 1955 provided for the establishment of control posts. While, however, the West envisaged the alarm system as a prelude to disarmament, the Soviet Union insisted that such an arrangement should be part of a broad disarmament scheme—although that had not been its original position in the Sub-Committee. If agreement could be reached on the implementation of a comprehensive scheme which could be effectively controlled, it should be possible to specify the nature of the machinery to warn against a surprise attack and the proper time to introduce it in a generally acceptable scheme.

26. The Canadian delegation agreed with the Government of the United States that acceptance by the Soviet

Union of the Eisenhower proposal would have lessened tension, increased confidence and furthered the cause of disarmament. He ventured to hope, therefore, that the Soviet Union would appreciate the advantages of a plan which would in any case have to be part of the comprehensive programme the Soviet Union itself recommended. But even if the Soviet Union was not yet prepared to agree, it should still be possible to negotiate a limited but effective agreement which would provide, at the appropriate moment and in the appropriate fashion, for the warning system proposed by the United States. The fact remained, however, that the task would be more difficult in the absence of a general political settlement, and that the Eisenhower plan would facilitate the initial stages of disarmament and the settlement of political issues.

27. The scientific difficulties were certainly disconcerting. But certain long-sought objectives could be attained without delay: if security could be significantly increased, there was no reason why decisions should not be taken which might reduce international tension. In other words, the facts with regard to the prohibition of nuclear weapons had to be recognized. Nevertheless, a start should be made with such measures as were possible, as well as with effective arrangements for warning against a surprise attack. In the meantime, the scientists would continue their researches.

28. As the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.150) suggested, the Sub-Committee still had its part to play, in private session if it so desired. Given goodwill, it would be able to develop a plan that could be carried out.

29. Details of the timing of measures or pride in authorship must not be allowed to hamper the search for a solution, which must be governed solely by the criterion of the effectiveness of the different measures contemplated. All that was needed to attain the objective of collective and controlled, if temporarily limited, disarmament was common sense; and public opinion would insist that all other considerations should be subordinated to that imperative necessity.

30. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Syria) said that the facts had to be faced, however alarming they might be. World public opinion, which was never absent from the Committee's discussions, was entitled to know the truth. The only progress being made was in the industries of death. In the armaments race, increase of appetite was growing by what it fed on—new arms and stocks of nuclear weapons.

31. After the International Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, held at The Hague, the League of Nations and subsequently the United Nations had experienced only failure and discord, with a rising graph of armaments. Accordingly, it was an understatement to say, as Mr. Nutting had said (801st meeting), that the world was "grey"; it had been plunged into darkness. The "Geneva spirit" had evaporated from the First Committee, where the great Powers were exchanging accusations though it was doubtful whether such exchanges served the cause of peace. But to pass judgement on one side or the other would be idle; it was better to recognize that in such a disagreement all the Powers concerned were jointly responsible.

32. Mr. Nutting had already referred to one of the reasons for the failure of the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the four Powers from which so much had been expected. The matter was important because it had a bearing on both disarmament and international ten-

sion. By "Soviet transactions in the Middle East", the United Kingdom representative had evidently been referring to the armaments contracts concluded between Czechoslovakia and certain Middle Eastern countries. The question involved the United Nations Charter and the Middle East, rather than the Soviet Union, which he was not in the Committee to defend. Moreover, a knowledge of the facts of the case would facilitate the task of relaxing international tension.

33. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Western Powers had urged Mr. Molotov, at their last meeting in New York, to ban arms shipments to the Middle East, alleging that such transactions would destroy the existing balance. Similarly, Mr. Sharett, Foreign Minister of Israel, had met the four Foreign Ministers at Geneva in November 1955, and for a week New York newspapers had talked of nothing but Middle East disarmament, as if that had been the subject of the Geneva Conference. In fact, the discussion of that question partly explained the failure of the Conference.

34. A question of principle arose. Mr. Nutting had criticized certain transactions; but in fact, the Western Powers' position resulted from an erroneous conception which must be refuted if international tension was to be reduced and if it was not to spread to other regions. The Western Powers contended that there should be an arms balance in the Middle East. But that region was represented in the Committee by sovereign States no longer under mandate or trusteeship. Their defence was their own concern and their sovereign right. They were therefore not prepared to accept intervention in their domestic affairs, at a time when the concept of spheres of influence had yielded to that of the sovereign equality of all States, large and small.

35. What role were the Western Powers trying to play? What authority had they to encroach on the sovereignty of the Middle Eastern States by dictating a policy for the armaments of those States which was only increasing international tension? The Western Powers were certainly free to do as they pleased as regards their own armaments, in the absence of any freely negotiated agreement. But if their right to interfere in Middle Eastern affairs was not questioned, they would sooner or later act in the same way in Asia, Africa or South America, and tension and insecurity would ensue.

36. In order to place the question of international tension in its proper perspective, he proposed to put the following questions to the representatives of the Western Powers: what authority had they to interfere in the defence plans of other countries, to deal with the balance of arms in the Middle East, the Far East or any other part of the world, or to try to obstruct perfectly lawful agreements for the delivery of arms to the Middle Eastern countries or any other part of the world? Finally, when and how had the Western Powers been empowered to judge the balance or imbalance of armaments in the Middle East or any other part of the world?

37. The Western Powers could certainly request the General Assembly to discuss the Middle East, but how could they exercise a power which was not theirs, judge a case which had nothing to do with them and act where they had no competence? The Middle East was the responsibility neither of the East nor of the West. So far as was known, the Western Powers had not tried to maintain a balance in Europe, Latin America or Asia. Why then should they try to exercise their influence in the particular case of the Middle East?

38. Such an attitude was a violation of the Charter, which empowered the General Assembly to examine matters relating to armaments, while the Security Council had the constitutional right to formulate plans for armaments. The Western Powers, great Powers though they might be, could not usurp a competence that belonged to others.

39. Nevertheless, the representatives of the United Kingdom and France had referred to the Middle East in the context of international tension. But although the Middle Eastern question might be a major factor in international tension, it was not the Soviet Union which had created or aggravated Middle East tension; disturbed conditions in that area resulted from the conduct of the Western Powers. The Soviet Union had neither military bases nor troops in the Middle East; it had not affronted any Middle Eastern citizen. The Soviet Union was no angel, but it had not suppressed the national liberation movement in North Africa. It was not responsible for the Palestine tragedy. It was not bombarding the south of Yemen. It had not raided Buraimi, in Saudi Arabian territory. All those factors of tension, for the past century and a half, had been the responsibility of the Western Powers; and today it lay in the hands of the Western Powers to relax that tension.

40. There must be no misunderstanding, however. Syria did not belong to the "Soviet bloc" or to any other bloc. Its aim was merely to emancipate the Arab world from vestiges of imperialism, colonialism and all forms of aggression, in order to re-establish its unity and freedom. That policy would serve not only the interests of the Arab world, but also those of peace and the relaxation of international tension.

41. The United States and Soviet Union representatives had referred to military alliances and defence pacts. Not all agreements of that kind necessarily had the same effect on international tension. But since the Press had stated that divisions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had been sent to North Africa and the United States representative had said that in matters of policy the Committee need only inquire from him, Mr. Shukairy wished to put the following questions:

(a) Was it true that NATO divisions trained in atomic practices had been sent to North Africa?

(b) Was it an objective of NATO to frustrate the will of the people?

(c) Was the liberation movement in North Africa considered an act of aggression which NATO forces must resist?

42. The Arab world was one of the regions which was in a state of turmoil, and in the long run that represented a threat to peace. But the great Powers could prevent the storm from breaking. A start had to be made somewhere in treading out the baleful fires of international tension. The situation which most urgently required action was in the Arab world. His delegation therefore asked the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and French representatives to accept a policy declaring the following principles:

(a) To recognize the independence of all Arab territories not yet independent, from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf;

(b) To declare the principle of non-aggression with regard to all Arab territories;

(c) To abstain from any interference, domination or infiltration and from any subversive activities against any Arab territory;

(d) To base their relations with the Arab world on mutual understanding, respect and equality.

43. If the great Powers accepted and respected those four principles they would have made the greatest possible contribution to peace, tranquillity and progress in the Middle East and, consequently, to international peace and security.

44. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that it was clear from the debate that the most urgent problem the United Nations had to solve was that of putting an end to the armaments race, slackening international tension, and strengthening confidence between States.

45. The Soviet Union had already indicated the steps it had recently taken to relax international tension. The obstacles to a relaxation of tension should not, of course, be underestimated, but they were not so great that all effort to reach a settlement of international problems, and especially the most important problem of all, disarmament, had to be abandoned.

46. At the present session of the General Assembly, the USSR had introduced a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.151) whereby the Assembly would note with satisfaction recent efforts to relax international tension and would call upon Governments to continue their efforts to consolidate peace and security.

47. The Soviet Union draft resolution was closely linked to the problem of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. It emphasized the impossibility of averting the threat of a new war and ensuring the further relaxation of international tension without taking steps to end the armaments race; it accordingly proposed that the General Assembly should attach particular importance to the USSR proposals of 10 May and 21 July 1955, to those made by the United States, the United Kingdom and France on 21 July 1955, and to pertinent proposals by other States.

48. The USSR had always advocated disarmament and the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The main objects of disarmament were to stop the armaments race, prohibit atomic and hydrogen weapons, and establish strict international control over the application of such measures. As the United States and United Kingdom representatives had given a distorted picture of the Soviet position with regard to disarmament, he wished to define it once more.

49. The USSR proposals of 10 May 1955 contained a disarmament programme which took account of the positions of the Western Powers and brought the USSR and the Western Powers much closer together. They incorporated, in particular, the proposals made by the United States, the United Kingdom and France concerning the ceilings for the armed forces of the five great Powers. They stipulated that the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of those States would be carried out in two stages: 50 per cent during 1956 and the remaining 50 per cent in 1957. They also provided for a corresponding reduction of military expenditures.

50. The USSR proposals also included the proposals made by the United Kingdom and France in April 1955 with regard to the timing of the various disarmament measures, and provided that the complete prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction should enter into force after the reduction of

armed forces and conventional armaments had been carried out to the extent of 75 per cent of the total agreed reduction. The Soviet Union proposals also provided that the elimination and destruction of those weapons should take place at the same time as the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments by the final 25 per cent.

51. The Soviet Union's acceptance of the proposals made by the United States, the United Kingdom and France with respect to the levels of the armed forces of the five great Powers invalidated the Western Powers' objection to the prohibition of atomic weapons, which was that such weapons offset their alleged inferiority to the USSR in the field of conventional armaments.

52. The representatives of the Western Powers had been obliged to admit that the Soviet Union proposals of 10 May 1955 were substantially closer to their own proposals. Mr. Nutting, for instance, had acknowledged it in the speech he had made at the 801st meeting.

53. In the circumstances, it might have been expected that the Western Powers, in their turn, would take steps in the same direction. Unfortunately, that had not been the case. Not only did they refuse to bring their positions closer to that of the Soviet Union, but they were even averse to coming to any final agreement on the points of the disarmament programme which the Soviet Union had accepted. Furthermore, the Western Powers had apparently abandoned the positions they had taken up before the USSR had presented its new proposals. The United States and the United Kingdom had now taken a stand which threw the disarmament problem back ten years. They were once again trying to substitute proposals on the exchange and verification of military information for consideration of the problem of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

54. The Western Powers' draft resolution (A/C.1/L.150) not only contained no recommendation concerning the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons; it did not even mention the necessity for prohibiting such weapons.

55. In order to make some progress towards a solution of the problem, it would be helpful, in summing up the work already done, to come to a definite agreement on the main points on which the positions of the parties already coincided or had become closer. The USSR delegation proposed that the Western Powers should note that agreement had been reached on the ceiling of the armed forces of the five Powers, on the order in which the measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons should be carried out, and on the necessity for establishing effective international control over the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

56. A joint statement that agreement had been reached on those different points would have considerable importance. It would constitute a positive beginning which would facilitate further progress towards disarmament, and it would be enthusiastically received by the peoples of all countries. However, the Western Powers not only set their faces against such a statement, but even refused to consider specific measures for reducing armaments and prohibiting atomic weapons. They tried to veil their refusal by alleging that the USSR underestimated the importance of international control.

57. Such an allegation, of course, was contrary to the facts. The USSR had proposed the institution of effective

tive international control over the execution of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The question of the rights and powers of the international control organ should, in its opinion, be linked to the implementation of the measures to promote the relaxation of international tension and of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. The rights and functions of the control organ should be progressively extended as the reduction of armaments and the relaxation of international tension progressed.

58. During the first stage, the USSR proposals provided for control measures designed to prevent a surprise attack by one State upon another. For that purpose, control posts would be established on the territory of all the States concerned, on a basis of reciprocity, at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in aerodromes. As modern warfare involved, in addition to nuclear weapons, enormous armies and vast quantities of armaments, large land, sea and air forces had inevitably to be concentrated at certain points. Accordingly, by establishing control posts at strategic points, it would be possible to detect immediately any concentration of troops or armaments for a surprise attack. Clearly, therefore, acceptance of the Soviet Union proposal would strengthen confidence between States and promote the further relaxation of international tension.

59. The USSR proposals provided that the control organ should have the right, during the first stage, to require from States any necessary information on the execution of measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces. It would also have unimpeded access to records relating to budgetary appropriations for military needs.

60. Once the necessary conditions for the extension of the powers of the international control organ had been created in that way, the organ would carry out its control functions during the second stage. It would have permanently in all signatory States a staff of inspectors having, within the bounds of their functions, unimpeded access at all times to all objects of control.

61. The USSR accordingly attached great importance to the question of control. The system which it proposed effectively guaranteed the observance of the obligations assumed and all States parties to the convention were placed on an equal footing with regard to the fulfilment of those obligations.

62. The representatives of the Western Powers had tried to justify their change of attitude on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons by references to so-called "new circumstances" with regard to the control over the prohibition of atomic weapons. The technical difficulties to which they referred were not in fact new. The possibility of keeping stocks of atomic weapons outside the reach of any control system had existed when the question of prohibiting those weapons had first arisen. That point had been made repeatedly by the representatives of both the USSR and the Western Powers. The fact that the Soviet Union proposals referred to that difficulty was not new in itself. That difficulty notwithstanding, the USSR still thought it possible and necessary to reach agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the establishment of effective control over that prohibition.

63. Pending the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohi-

bition of atomic weapons, the Soviet Union proposed that the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union should assume the obligation not to be the first to make use of atomic and hydrogen weapons and should invite all other States to do the same. In that connexion, it should not be forgotten that a convention of the same type, the Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare, signed at Geneva in 1925, had been very effective during the Second World War in preventing military operations of that nature.

64. Mr. Nutting had alleged that the USSR was offering mere "paper pledges". Did Mr. Nutting think that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was also just a paper pledge? He would like to ask the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France whether they recognized the force of moral and political obligations in international relations, and whether they were prepared, pending the conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, to declare with the Soviet Union that they would not be the first to use atomic and hydrogen weapons.

65. The USSR supported the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.149/Rev.1) to discontinue experiments with nuclear weapons. If that draft were accepted it would facilitate further progress towards disarmament.

66. The Western Powers were proposing examination of President Eisenhower's plan for exchanging military blueprints and for mutual aerial inspection, instead of making further efforts to conclude an agreement on the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons, and the establishment of control over those measures. Under existing circumstances aerial inspection and the exchange of military blueprints would not lead to the reduction of armaments, and would not help to prevent a surprise attack, but would only increase international distrust and tension. In the absence of an agreement on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, information provided by the exchange of military blueprints and by aerial photography might be used to increase armed forces and stocks of conventional or atomic armaments. In that connexion there could be no ignoring a statement made recently by Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry, Commander, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe, in which he had stressed the growing importance of aerial reconnaissance for the effective use of nuclear weapons. That opinion was shared by General Maxwell Taylor, Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

67. It was obvious that to implement the proposal for aerial inspection and for the exchange of military blueprints, without putting an end to the armaments race, would be playing into the hands of certain aggressive military groups.

68. The representative of Canada had said that the plan of the Western Powers would have no chance of success unless the Soviet Union was prepared to relax its monopoly over the minds of the peoples it controlled. The purpose of the Western proposal was therefore to change living conditions in certain States. That obviously was not calculated to strengthen confidence between States.

69. The USSR accordingly could not agree to the four-Power proposal that the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission should first examine the question of implementing the plan for exchanging mili-

tary blueprints and mutual aerial inspection. On the other hand, President Eisenhower's plan might be considered as one means of control during the final stage of the application of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

70. The solution of the disarmament problem was not easy to find and there were many obstacles still to be overcome. The USSR considered that, in order to break the present vicious circle, the terms of an agreement on the principal points which were acceptable to both sides, or on which the area of disagreement had considerably narrowed, should be drawn up once and for all, and as soon as possible. Among those points were the question of the ceilings for the armed forces of the five great Powers, the question of the order in which the measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons should be applied, and the question of international control. He would like to ask the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France whether they were prepared to draft the terms of such an agreement.

71. The USSR was prepared to confirm its agreement with regard to the establishment of effective international control over the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. If those points of agreement were specified once and for all, consideration of the disarmament problem would be easier. It was the duty of the United Nations to facilitate a rapid solution to the disarmament problem and to contribute to the relaxation of tension and to international co-operation.

72. Mr. ANDERSEN (Denmark) recalled the high hopes which had been inspired by resolution 808 (IX), adopted unanimously by the General Assembly, on the principles of disarmament, and by the Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers at Geneva in July 1955. Those hopes were still warranted, although the failure of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee to reach agreement thus far had caused some disappointment.

73. That feeling of disappointment was premature and might even be harmful. The unanimous adoption of resolution 808 (IX) by the General Assembly did not mean that differences of opinion and of interests had disappeared. That resolution simply implied that all concerned would make an honest effort to achieve a compromise. That approach to the problem and the attempt to reconcile conflicting views were still the only method which could lead to a solution. A decision by a majority was no solution; the only way was by agreement.

74. His delegation wished to pay tribute to the members of the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-Committee for the work they had done. Although no agreement had been achieved, some progress had been made because both parties had made concessions. In view of the complexity of the problem, that might be thought to constitute something positive and there were still grounds for optimism.

75. It was obvious that in their own interests States in possession of nuclear weapons must seek an agreement, since the threat of the use of atomic weapons was mutual and deadly. It was to be hoped that States would continue to bear that fact in mind in their negotiations.

76. His delegation thought that negotiations should start from the existing factual situation. Any attempt to change that situation as a prerequisite to disarma-

ment measures would only postpone or prevent progress. In that connexion, the USSR had repeated its criticism of defensive alliances such as NATO. However, it was noticeable that the USSR representative had not described NATO as aggressive. It was known that that association was purely defensive, and it had been proved that that collaboration for the purpose of common defence had given to the peoples concerned a feeling of security which they did not wish to give up until better systems of security had been found. That applied to many other countries both in Western and Eastern Europe and in other parts of the world, but it should not prevent an agreement on the first steps of disarmament. On the contrary, the initiation of an adequately controlled disarmament might be the key to increased relaxation of international tension.

77. The Disarmament Commission should study the plans formulated by the Heads of the four Governments during the Geneva Conference, in order to work out at an early date a plan to prevent surprise attacks and ultimately to reach agreement on a controlled reduction of armaments.

78. It was a regrettable fact that for technical reasons control in the field of atomic weapons had become difficult. The French representative had warned against that danger several years before, and the Danish delegation agreed with that representative in thinking nevertheless that it was no reason for discouragement. The Danish delegation had learned with satisfaction that the Disarmament Commission had taken up the problem of the prohibition of national test explosions for military purposes.

79. The Danish delegation thought that it was essential to agree on the beginning of mutual action to attain a controlled reduction of armaments. It hoped that measures of that type would help to relax tension still further and would serve as a basis for fully satisfactory disarmament.

80. Mr. MOCH (France) pointed out that the USSR representative had politely criticized the stand taken by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada, but had remained silent on the position taken by the representative of France. He hoped that that was not an attempt at dividing those representatives, which in any case would be unsuccessful. He asked the USSR representative to re-read carefully the statement made by the representative of France. Either the parties would adhere to their existing positions and peace would remain dangerously unstable, or some kind of synthesis would be achieved and those questions on which common ground could not be found would be temporarily deferred.

81. In his analysis of the four-Power draft resolution, the USSR representative had singled out the provisions relating to the Eisenhower plan. He had not mentioned those provisions of the draft resolution which were designed to implement initial measures of disarmament. It was obvious that the solution lay there, as a number of representatives, in particular all those of the Scandinavian countries, had pointed out.

82. He hoped that his appeal to reason would be heard and that the Committee would unanimously adopt the four-Power draft resolution which would make it possible for the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission to resume its work on constructive lines.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.