

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.428  
6 August 1987

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 6 August 1987, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Pierre Morel (France)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the 428th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. First of all, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I wish to extend a warm welcome to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, who has come to Geneva to address the Conference. Mr. Shevardnadze's visit is the most important visit by a senior political representative of the Soviet Union since the establishment of the Conference. We are all aware of the high-level responsibilities of the Minister as a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. His presence here reflects the importance that the Soviet Union attaches to the Conference. I am convinced that the members of the Conference will follow his statement with the keenest interest, bearing in mind the Soviet Union's decisive role in disarmament and the present political situation.

Today the Conference continues consideration of agenda item 8, entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament". However, in keeping with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any representative who would like to raise any issue relevant to the work of the Conference may do so.

In accordance with the schedule for this week, the Conference will hold an informal meeting immediately after this plenary meeting to take up the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. That meeting will be followed by an exchange of views on substantive issues concerning agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Argentina and Peru. I now give the floor to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze.

Mr. SHEVARDNADZE (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, I am pleased to extend my greetings to you and express confidence that under your guidance the Conference will be able to achieve positive results.

There are numerous agencies in the world dealing with the misfortunes of the human race, ranging from the torment of hunger to threats to the biosphere. However, these miseries and threats cannot be eliminated unless a solution is found to the main problem — that of destroying the material base for waging war. That is the problem of disarmament, the problem with which you are dealing as the world's only body established for that purpose.

Documents of vital importance for the future of the world have been drawn up within these walls — the treaties on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on non-emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, the conventions on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and on the non-use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes. Remarkable in themselves as major landmarks in the development of international legal thinking, they have also enhanced our common security by an order of magnitude.

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

They offer proof of the possibility of a nuclear-free and non-violent world, of an era without wars or weapons, as described by M.S. Gorbachev in his statement of 15 January 1986. In other words, they were, to some extent, a prelude to the conclusion reached by the Soviet leadership following a thorough analysis of the realities of the nuclear and space age.

We may differ as to the interpretation of particular issues, but all your previous activities and the documents adopted on the basis of consensus demonstrate that, in the sphere of security, States are capable of exercising voluntary self-restraint for the sake of the common good.

We view your activities as a manifestation of new political thinking which must be built into the machinery of inter-State relations in the nuclear age.

This thinking starts with a clear understanding of the realities of this age. Not only those realities, but the words themselves -- the nuclear age -- should make people shudder. However, too many people utter them calmly, as if they were absolutely indifferent to the possibility that all the preceding ages -- the Stone or the Bronze age, the Renaissance or the Enlightenment -- which offered mankind new and increasingly more advanced methods of meeting its spiritual and material needs, will be wiped out by an age which has brought forth the means of mankind's self-annihilation.

Can we remain calm?

Can this be called progress?

Can this be considered fatally inevitable?

To all these questions the only answer is: No.

Great ideas do not grow old; they are just filled with new content. The call of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the great citizen of this city, to "the natural human condition -- equality and freedom" can and must be interpreted in the context of our time.

Such a condition cannot be attained so long as there are weapons capable of destroying all life on Earth. It is regrettable that the advocates of so-called nuclear deterrence pass over this fact in silence.

The concept of deterrence is dangerous also because it dooms all States to life in constant fear, making them nuclear hostages.

If they complete the logical chain of arguments, the proponents of nuclear deterrence must admit that it pushes one towards total nuclear deterrence -- a situation where every State would wish to acquire such weapon systems.

I am absolutely convinced that your Conference, which made the idea of nuclear non-proliferation a reality, is aware of this danger.

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

Therefore, when we say that a nuclear-free and non-violent world is the only reasonable alternative to the doctrine of deterrence, we hope for a sympathetic response.

Although some have described such a world as fantasy, it is already emerging before our very eyes. Two weeks ago, prior to M.S. Gorbachev's interview with the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka, a nuclear-free world was more than 200 warheads further away from us. And since Reykjavik that distance has become shorter by almost 2,000 warheads.

If I am asked why I am referring to this as something that has been accomplished, I will say that for the Soviet Union this is indeed so. For we have done all in our power, we have removed everything that could stand in the way of an agreement based on a "global double zero".

We have dropped the condition concerning the British and French nuclear forces. We consider intermediate-range missiles separately from the problem of strategic and space arms, even though we would prefer to discuss them together. We have called for the total elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe. Finally, we have arrived at the concept of a "global double zero", that is the total removal of two classes of nuclear weapons from the Soviet and United States arsenals. It is no secret that the Soviet side would have to eliminate a significantly greater number of missiles than the United States side.

So what is holding things up now, ladies and gentlemen?

Our partners have found the snags. The main one is the Pershing 1A missiles.

We are being asked why we have raised this issue, and why we did not raise it earlier.

Let me say this. The question of what the West knew about the Soviet position, and when it knew it, is utterly irrelevant in this particular case. After all, determining which arms are to be eliminated is what the negotiations are all about.

What we are discussing in essence is which specific Soviet and United States nuclear systems with ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometres should be subject to elimination. The agreement in principle on that score states that all such systems without exception must be eliminated, which also means Pershing 1As.

If, however, someone has chosen to start a dispute about who those missiles belong to -- well then, we are quite prepared to discuss that point too.

We would prefer to discuss it only at the negotiating table, but we are being forced into a public debate in which we have to engage so that the truth of the matter and our position are not distorted.

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

To begin with, we are negotiating with the United States, and only about Soviet and United States nuclear weapons. We fail to see any reason for the Federal Republic of Germany to intrude in the Soviet-United States negotiations. Why? By what right? Has it not assumed an obligation under the non-proliferation Treaty not to acquire nuclear weapons?

Let me repeat that it is only with the United States that we are negotiating an agreement which, if reached, will eliminate all nuclear warheads on two classes of arms of the two States. But if we speak of all warheads that certainly includes those on Pershing 1A missiles too. How can it be otherwise?

As to who owns the missile's fuel, the missile's airframe, or, say, the wheels of its transporter, this is of no interest to us. We simply proceed from the principle that zeros must have the same meaning for both sides. If, however, the United States does not want a "zero option", as is clear from its present "72 equals zero" formula -- that would be a different matter.

We too have allies, who are concerned at the fact that a neighbouring country retains shorter-range nuclear missiles which pose a great threat to their security. They could ask for the stationing of similar systems on their territories, and the Soviet Union could meet their request.

But what would a Soviet-United States agreement be like as a result of all this? It would be truncated, emasculated and anaemic.

Literally in the past few days the opponents of the "zero option" have found another argument to try to bolster their untenable position on the Pershing 1As. They are now saying that there is an imbalance in conventional and nuclear tactical arms in Europe, and that therefore these missiles have to be retained.

But is Bonn itself, or Washington, not aware that the Soviet leadership has been persistently calling for a start without delay on negotiations to reduce conventional and nuclear tactical arms and eliminate any disparities or imbalances where they exist?

Let me say frankly: these tricks leave a grim impression. And they do not enhance trust in relations with our negotiating partners.

The Conference on Disarmament is not directly involved in dealing with the issue of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, but it does deal, and should deal, with the problem of nuclear disarmament; it acts as a moral depository of the non-proliferation Treaty. Therefore we believe that the Conference could voice its authoritative opinion on whether the practice of joint ownership of nuclear arms by a nuclear and a non-nuclear State is consistent with that legal instrument.

This must be done to prevent the non-proliferation Treaty from being undermined. There can be no nuclear weapons on Earth that are "no one's" weapons. It is extremely dangerous to create such a "legal fiction".

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

If, as some United States Administration officials and their West German partners contend, these notorious Pershing 1As are third-country systems, then the question arises again: How and by what right does that third country, namely the Federal Republic of Germany, possess nuclear weapons? As far as we know, it has no legal or moral right to have them.

But if it is deliberately trying to arrogate such rights to itself, if the Federal Republic of Germany has indeed illegally acquired nuclear weapons -- then this would certainly cause anger and indignation in the world, and could confront the world with a political crisis.

We believe it is appropriate to ask the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany at this forum directly: Has his country any nuclear systems in its arsenal?

Equally legitimate is the question that we are addressing to the United States delegate: Who actually controls the nuclear warheads for the Pershing 1As?

A great deal depends on the answers to these two questions: the fate of an agreement on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles; the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the reassessment that the Soviet Union would be forced to make of the overall strategic situation in terms of the threat to its national interests posed by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a State where even today the delirious slogans of revanchism are being heard, trying to drown out the voices of sober-minded political and public figures and mass movements calling for a responsible approach to European and world affairs.

The Soviet Union hopes that the Federal Republic of Germany will duly clarify the situation and remove the concern now being felt by many European States because of the ambiguity of its position with regard to the Pershing 1A missiles.

We wish to make it perfectly clear that unless this is done, the Soviet Union will find the situation as it exists now unacceptable and will make known its views on that situation in a clear and unambiguous manner. The Soviet people will never acquiesce in West Germany becoming a nuclear Power.

I should like to hope that all this is well understood in the Federal Republic of Germany, and that in the end healthy forces which stand for détente and for major progress in nuclear disarmament will prevail there.

I would like to believe that the Federal Republic of Germany will not become an obstacle to the achievement of a historic agreement. For the time being 72 nuclear warheads stand between us and an agreement on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. Under United States-West German rules of "dual accounting", they are being made to weigh more than the mountain of 2,000 nuclear warheads that could be deactivated and scrapped starting later this year.

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

A Soviet-United States accord on the total elimination of two categories of nuclear arms is a necessary prologue to solving the main problem -- that of eliminating strategic offensive arms and preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space.

Mr. President, it is my privilege to inform you, upon instructions from the Soviet leadership, of the objectives which the Soviet Union is seeking to achieve. They include:

The conclusion of treaties with the United States of America and international agreements on the complete destruction of nuclear weapons worldwide;

A strict and universal ban on deployment of any arms in outer space;

The establishment of an international régime under which there will be no chemical weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction in the world;

The reduction of conventional weapons to the lowest possible levels required for defence;

The establishment, on the basis of co-operation among all States in the world, of a comprehensive system of international security, under which the United Nations could, in accordance with its Charter, effectively maintain peace and security.

Allow me to outline the sequence of our practical actions to achieve these objectives.

First, at the negotiations on nuclear and space arms, the Soviet delegation has been instructed to proceed on the basis of the "global double zero" formula. Agreement has been reached to hold a meeting with the United States Secretary of State in mid-September, as a separate event not linked to the session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Second, at the Geneva negotiations we have submitted a draft treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic arms, and a draft agreement on strengthening the régime of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. These are compromise drafts taking into account and seeking to accommodate the positions of the other side.

Third, the Soviet side has sponsored, together with other socialist countries, and submitted to the Conference on Disarmament for its consideration, a document entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests". We have put forward an initiative concerning the establishment of an international verification system to prevent the deployment of any weapons in outer space.

Fourth, a proposal by a group of socialist countries for the establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security is being discussed at the United Nations.

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

I would like to address specifically the question of verification -- matters of principle and matters of application.

The experience of the past few years has shown that there is verification spoken of for propaganda purposes, and there is real, permanent verification.

Now, I would say that the philosophy underlying our approach to the problem of real verification gives a particularly full and clear idea of the evolution of our outlook, which has now developed into a system of unorthodox political views, in other words, a new political thinking.

Foolproof, indisputable, reliable and extremely strict and rigorous methods providing 100 per cent confidence that weapons are being eliminated, that obligations relating to the remaining weapons and permitted military activities are being complied with, and that the bans are not being circumvented -- this, and no less than this, is the verification that we envision.

The Soviet Union is proposing an exceptionally wide variety of forms and methods of verification -- both national and international. All of them have been set forth in detail in the document submitted to your forum on 9 June 1987, concerning the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests -- and, by the way, some of them have already been and are being used in practice. I would like to remind you that United States scientists equipped with appropriate monitoring instruments stayed for a long time in the area of our nuclear test site. The USSR Academy of Sciences has reached a new agreement with United States colleagues for the installation of monitoring equipment and the exchange of data.

It is worth recalling that a short time ago our country made an extraordinary effort to achieve a cessation of nuclear testing. For a long time we maintained our unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, and tried to persuade the United States by the force of example.

We ask the Conference on Disarmament to assist in achieving a Soviet-United States agreement banning nuclear tests. I wish to emphasize that this is not a plea to take sides, but rather an appeal for moral and political assistance in attaining a truly universal objective, which is to make nuclear testing a thing of the past.

However, for the time being nuclear testing continues, and you know who is to blame. Nuclear testing is still a fact of life for mankind.

It would be easier to reach agreement at the Soviet-United States talks if one could be sure that other States, too, support a ban on nuclear testing and stand ready to become parties to an international treaty on the subject. This is why we believe that the search for agreement at the Soviet-United States negotiations and the preparation of a comprehensive treaty within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament should be undertaken concurrently.



(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

As a practical step to advance the preparation of such a treaty we propose that a special group of scientific experts should be set up, which would be assigned the task of submitting to the Conference well-founded and agreed-upon recommendations on the structure and functions of a system of verification for any possible agreement not to conduct nuclear weapon tests.

We believe that there is also a need to establish an international system of global radiation safety monitoring, involving the use of space communication links. Such a system would be useful for more effectively verifying compliance with a ban on nuclear testing, once such a ban is imposed. At the same time it could be used to monitor the extent of pollution of the atmosphere, the soil, ground water and the sea on a global and regional scale. It would also provide an additional safeguard in case of any malfunctions or especially accidents at nuclear power plants.

We establish a strong link between nuclear arms reductions -- at this stage, reductions in intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles -- and an accord on measures of verification.

These include an exchange of initial data concerning the two sides' missiles, and verification of such data through on-site inspections.

We insist on continuous monitoring of the process of destroying the missiles. The elimination of the missile production base and infrastructure will also be subject to verification.

The system of verification that we propose is designed to create an atmosphere of absolute confidence that the agreement will not be circumvented in any way.

And finally, we believe that there should be mandatory access to Soviet and United States military facilities in third countries where missiles could be stationed.

As you can see, we are expanding the area of confidence to the maximum by opening up the territory of the Soviet Union to inspections. However, complete confidence naturally presupposes complete reciprocity. An example and a confirmation of this is Stockholm and the decisions adopted there. This, I would say, is the material expression of the principle of confidence; this is new political thinking in action. Naturally, we would like its geographical scope not to be confined to one continent.

In our opinion, verification will have a particularly important role to play in preventing an arms race in space.

We would be extremely grateful if you took a close look at the proposal for the establishment of an international verification system to make sure that outer space remains peaceful. Is not the idea of inspecting every space launch a reasonable one? There are as yet not that many space launch centres in the world, and the presence of international inspectors there would reliably guarantee that the objects placed in outer space are not weapons and are not equipped with any weapons. But we go further, and propose not merely

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

a presence but a permanent presence of groups of inspectors at all space launch sites. Information about each upcoming launch, including the location of the site, the type of launch vehicle, general information about the object to be launched and the time of launch would be given in advance to representatives of the inspectorate.

What doubts can there be about the sincerity of verification proposals made by a Power which is very actively involved in launching space objects?

All States engaged in space activities would be placed in an absolutely equal position, and permanent monitoring by inspectors would guarantee the reliability of verification. After all, a space launch complex is something that cannot be hidden. In this case the technology itself ensures relatively simple and effective verification. Furthermore, our proposal provides for the right to conduct an on-site inspection should suspicion arise that a launch was carried out from an undeclared launch site.

And, in the event of a total ban on space strike arms, the Soviet Union would be willing to extend inspections to storage facilities, industrial plants, laboratories, testing centres, etc.

If a State has no intention of putting weapons in space, there can be no reason for it to object to international inspections of its space activities.

Space is a common asset of all mankind. It is much more than a training ground for military technocrats who cast away traditional humanistic ideals. It is a sphere for the peaceful application of peaceful efforts. It is this vision of outer space that the Soviet Union intends to pursue most vigorously.

Reflections about space inevitably lead one to think about the distances that humanity has to travel in order to reach its cherished goals. Some of those distances have yet to be covered from beginning to end, others have been covered half of the way, and there are still others where the end of the road is already in sight.

I would like to make a few comments about one long-sought goal which is within reach and which the Conference on Disarmament has almost attained, an event of great significance for all of mankind -- a complete ban on chemical weapons and the elimination of their stockpiles. Two thirds of a century have passed since the first gas attack at Ypres, which marked the beginning of the military use of this barbaric weapon of mass annihilation. Ever since, Governments of many nations and various international forums have sought to devise legal constraints on the production and use of lethal substances, but only now, in our time, is it becoming possible to adopt a historic convention to that effect.

What could stand in the way of this? Only attempts to outline the draft of a future treaty with one hand while assembling canisters of binary chemical weapons with the other.

Need one say how immoral this is, how incompatible with the goal before us?

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

The Soviet Union will continue to co-operate actively with all the participants in the Conference on Disarmament so that the long-awaited convention becomes a reality. We did not dramatize the debates and differences that emerged in the process. One thing alone was considered absolutely imperative -- that the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of their stockpiles should be adopted, and as early as possible.

I am instructed to inform you that the Soviet delegation at the negotiations on this question will proceed from the need to make legally binding the principle of mandatory challenge inspections without the right of refusal. This decision is another vivid manifestation of our commitment to genuine and effective verification, in accordance with the principles of new political thinking.

In order to build an atmosphere of trust, and in the interests of an early conclusion of an international convention, the Soviet side invites the participants in the chemical weapons negotiations to visit the Soviet military facility at Shikhany to see standard items of our chemical weapons and observe the technology for the destruction of chemical weapons at a mobile facility. Later we will invite experts to the special chemical weapon destruction plant now being built in the vicinity of the town of Chapayevsk.

In making this announcement I hope that the participants in the Conference will duly appreciate our desire to untie the most complicated knots that have appeared in the process of drawing up the convention.

Our external affairs are inseparable from our internal development, and the policy of restructuring, renewal, democratization and openness prompts us to act in a positive manner wherever the Soviet Union is represented, including here at the Conference on Disarmament.

Today, as never before, the most pressing problems of the contemporary world determine the role and importance of the Conference. In fulfilling its mission, this representative Conference can assert itself more forcefully by practical deeds matching the magnitude of the tasks before it.

There may be a need to consider the possibility of adopting a more intensive schedule of work. We would consider favourably a year-round schedule for the Conference with two or three recesses.

Why not hold an additional session of the Conference this year to complete the bulk of the drafting of the convention banning chemical weapons?

At present it is impossible for the Conference to work with high efficiency without establishing an optimum balance between bilateral and multilateral negotiations on security problems. There should be no antagonism here, but rather the principle of complementarity and mutually enriching interaction.

(Mr. Shevardnadze, USSR)

Promptly informing the participants in the Conference about the status of Soviet-United States negotiations, particularly on questions relating to items on the agenda of your forum, could be a first step in this direction. We intend to discuss this with our United States partners and establish an appropriate procedure. We hope to be able to find mutual understanding with them.

Why are we talking about the need to intensify the work of the Conference? Because the negotiating machinery is running at a rate that is significantly slower than the pace of the arms race. A dangerous gap is emerging between political thought and political will, and military technology. This is evident from the records of the Conference itself: 15 years have passed since the conclusion of the Bacteriological Weapons Convention, and the Convention banning the military use of environmental modification techniques was drawn up in 1977.

The Soviet Union regards improvement in the functioning of the Geneva forum as one way of redressing this disparity. We believe that in time the Conference could become a permanent universal body for disarmament negotiations.

And, of course, the Conference on Disarmament should not become accustomed to the fact that the issues involved in ending the nuclear arms race, though they appear on its agenda, are actually not discussed here. Indeed, these issues should be made the focus of its activity. Today there is no other way. Nuclear disarmament cannot be the province of just a few Powers. No Government can stand on the sidelines in this matter, for the nuclear threat is global in its consequences. Those consequences transcend national boundaries and ideological differences. They do not recognize neutrality and they spare no one.

If that is so, it is unjust to keep non-nuclear States from participating in solving the problems of nuclear disarmament. As M.S. Gorbachev has repeatedly emphasized, a maximum degree of internationalization is needed in these efforts. Genuine democratism and humanism in international relations call for just such an approach.

Proceeding from this premise, the Soviet Union will act constructively to enhance the prestige of the Conference as the principal nuclear disarmament forum, not just for exchanging views but for adopting decisions of the greatest importance.

Time is bringing us closer to the moment when word will finally become deed. The time of accomplishments is at hand — the accomplishments of which we have long been dreaming and towards which we have travelled along difficult roads.

May these accomplishments include your contribution, too. May it be tangible, substantive and significant.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union for his important statement, and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of Argentina, His Excellency Ambassador Campora.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, we are all conscious of the fact that the term of the presidency for the month of August that you have begun as representative of France coincides auspiciously with the recognition given today to the Conference on Disarmament as a multilateral disarmament body through the address of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze. The statement made by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union stands out in these times when the international situation calls for new initiatives and new ways of thinking. I am therefore very pleased to welcome Mr. Shevardnadze, and at the same time I wish to assure you, Mr. President, of my close co-operation and warm friendship, as may be expected of any Argentine diplomat in respect of a representative of France.

We would ask the delegate of Ethiopia to convey to Ambassador Tadesse Terrefe our congratulations on his business-like approach to the presidency of the Conference during the month of July. We also wish to welcome the new representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo, whose experience in the multilateral world will be of benefit to us in our work.

With the agreement of all my colleagues in the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to add special emphasis to the words of welcome that I will be extending as we greet the new representative of Brazil, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja. The international community is aware of the close co-operation between Argentina and Brazil in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, under the guidance of their heads of State, Presidents Raúl Alfonsín and José Sarney. This co-operation is the most significant contribution that the two countries can make to regional stability. It also provides world public opinion with proof that the nuclear policy of the two countries is of a transparency that leaves no doubt whatsoever as to its totally peaceful purposes. Mutual confidence between countries from the same geographical region, based on the exchange of information and scientists, visits to each other's nuclear facilities, joint projects, constitute the best safeguard that one can imagine to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In welcoming the Ambassador of Brazil, the delegation of Argentina wishes to reiterate the commitment that we have given his predecessors in the past, to work closely and unswervingly together to serve the cause of international peace and security at the world-wide as well as at the regional level. His diplomatic talent and the high level of the offices that he has held in serving his country fully justify our hope that Ambassador Azambuja's contribution to the vital work of the Conference on Disarmament will be of great benefit and importance.

We are convinced that the time has come to make the maximum effort to intensify negotiations to bring about a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons before a new arms race begins in this area. We believe that

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

it is quite possible to arrive in a reasonable time frame at a convention that would eliminate the danger of these weapons and strengthen the security of all States and, in addition, would not indirectly create situations of inequality or discrimination that may arise as a result of different levels of development.

In this area it is always essential to highlight the importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, better known as the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as this was the first instrument to prohibit the use of a type of weapon of mass destruction. None the less we should recognize that as a result of the situation created by the right of retaliation, the Protocol has become essentially a "no first use" agreement, and the fact that it is being flouted at present should lead us to think seriously about the convention that is being negotiated in this Conference. Almost half a century went by before the conclusion of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons, which marked the first step towards the elimination of a whole category of weapons. This was the first measure containing a genuine disarmament element, not only because it prohibited the development and production of these weapons, but also because it provided for the destruction of stockpiles that then existed. The convention that we are negotiating should complete the process initiated through the 1925 Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention with a view to prohibiting this type of weapon of mass destruction fully and without delay.

The chemical weapons convention as we have known it so far would be a non-discriminatory treaty, since all the parties would be on an equal footing once the process of destruction of chemical weapons and existing production facilities had been completed. At that stage the treaty will serve as a model, because it will be unlike the non-proliferation Treaty, which lays down in law the existence of two categories of States: those that possess nuclear weapons and those that do not. In the future convention there will be a single category of States with the same rights and obligations, and an identical verification mechanism applicable for all States, and it will not be a means of allocating world power, like the non-proliferation Treaty, but an instrument with an egalitarian purpose within the international community. Thus we have within reach the possibility of drawing up a treaty that would not be discriminatory from the political and military standpoints. It is also important; that it should not be discriminatory from an economic and technological viewpoint. In this regard the future convention should not be devised in such a way as to allow for its use to maintain inequalities in the field of trade or technology or to prevent the development or transfer of chemicals, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.

During the course of the negotiations, we have noted that time and again the need has emerged to reconcile three legitimate interests of States: Firstly, that of completely eliminating the possibility of the threat of chemical warfare; secondly, that of guaranteeing that a State's security would not be undermined; and, thirdly, that of ensuring unimpeded development of chemical activities for peaceful purposes. Clearly, a strict monitoring régime would offer greater safeguards, but it could affect the development of

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

the chemical industry for peaceful purposes. Conversely, a less strict verification régime would detract from confidence in the convention and would create a lack of security at the international level. Consequently the aspect of security and the aspect of the peaceful uses of chemicals should be properly balanced in the convention. The way in which this question is resolved will determine whether the objective sought through the convention will be successfully attained. When these two aspects are raised, it is the ultimate objective that should guide the negotiations.

This criterion should be reflected, in the first place, in the definition of chemical weapons. We are all aware that article II of the convention is crucial to its effectiveness. The present wording was provisionally adopted in 1984, and should be studied at an appropriate time in the light of progress in our work and the clearer picture we now have of the convention. Progress in the negotiations has also highlighted the need for the toxicity criterion to be determined in a precise and practical manner, and that the concepts used should be uniform throughout the text of the convention.

The establishment of an order of destruction is another of the major tasks before the Ad hoc Committee. Just as the existence of chemicals that pose a greater risk for the convention is recognized, it should also be recognized that there are chemical weapons that are more dangerous than others and, consequently, they should be destroyed first, otherwise we would be jeopardizing the principle of promoting confidence at the start of the destruction phase.

The principle of not undermining the security of any State during the chemical weapon destruction phase of is of fundamental importance. The disparity between chemical-weapon and non-chemical-weapon States will be maintained during the period of destruction of stockpiles and even subsequently should there be chemical-weapon States that are not parties to the convention. Consequently, one cannot rule out the threatened or potential use of chemical weapons. To make up for that disparity and make the principle a reality, States parties, particularly those that do not possess chemical weapons, should be assured of the possibility of some capacity to defend themselves against chemical warfare. Bearing in mind that what is involved is defence against a weapon of mass destruction, protection measures should guarantee the safety not only of the military but also, and particularly, of the civilian population.

With respect to the non-production of chemical weapons, monitoring should in no way detract from the inalienable right of all States parties to the convention to research, develop, produce, acquire, transfer and use all chemical substances for peaceful purposes, with the only quantitative restriction applying to a certain limited quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals per year for non-prohibited purposes. Similarly, the provisions of the treaty should not be interpreted or implemented in a discriminatory fashion, as this would affect countries' economic, social, scientific and technological development. Agreement by States parties to the convention to renounce possession of chemical weapons, particularly States that do not possess them, should provide a guarantee of access to the exchange of all chemical substances, equipment and scientific and technological information and international co-operation for peaceful purposes. Just as the undertaking

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

to destroy chemical weapons and existing production facilities, and not to produce chemical weapons, will be subject to verification, commitments regarding assistance and co-operation in the field of peaceful uses should also be assessed. The future convention will set up a variety of bodies which could perform this function.

It should be emphasized once again that the future chemical weapons convention will mark an important milestone in international relations in the area of disarmament, because its significance lies in the mechanisms of verification and monitoring that will be adopted for on-site as well as challenge inspections. It is essential to make progress in sensitive areas such as challenge inspection, counting on the clear-cut determination of the great Powers to resolve those issues on which there is still no consensus, drawing on the guidelines that are being drawn up step by step under the wise guidance of the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus. The statement of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that we have heard today will no doubt facilitate a solution to the issues that remain pending in the area of challenge inspection.

We are convinced that the threat of chemical weapons will not be totally eliminated until we have universal accession to the convention. This objective would be facilitated through joint action by States at two levels concurrently: At the world-wide level, through effective and judicious action by military Powers possessing chemical weapons, and at the regional level, through the political handling of procedures for accession to the convention and the responsibilities deriving therefrom. In this way an appropriate and adequate regional balance would be achieved in a world-wide framework of confidence created by chemical disarmament by the countries with the greatest war-making potential.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement, and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. Peru is next on the list of speakers. However, I have received a request from the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, who wishes to exercise his right of reply. With the kind permission of the representative of Peru, for which I offer him my special thanks, I give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STÜLPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): The distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has put a direct question to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, to the Conference on Disarmament -- whether his country, has nuclear systems in its arsenals. The answer, Mr. President, is no. The Federal Republic of Germany supports the position of the United States Government, the owners of the warheads of the Pershing 1A, that these warheads should not be included in the current INF negotiations. This is also the position of the North Atlantic Alliance. Since the nuclear warheads of the Pershing 1A are not in the arsenals of the Federal Republic of Germany, but in the arsenals of the United States of America, my country remains in full compliance with its obligations arising from the non-proliferation Treaty.



The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement, and I now call on the representative of Peru, Mr. Felix Calderón.

Mr. CALDERÓN (Peru) (translated from Spanish): The delegation of Peru welcomes the presence of His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Eduard Shevardnadze, at the Conference on Disarmament, on a day that is particularly meaningful for mankind, today 6 August. It is on this very day that our spirits are filled with unhappy memories of the devastation of Hiroshima. The hecatomb of Hiroshima is a vivid expression of the previously unthinkable extreme to which the violence of war can lead, and it is also a stark example of the contempt for the most basic norms of international humanitarian law that men can reach if they yield to the Faustian temptation of victory at any price.

Peru considers that the day on which the Hiroshima holocaust is commemorated should become a day for meditation and reflection throughout the world on peace and disarmament. We must remain true to our past to prevent inertia accustoming our minds to coexistence with nuclear weapons. If living under the threat of nuclear war is an offence to the human race, it is an even greater affront to the moral conscience of peoples that nothing or almost nothing has been done in 42 years to change this state of affairs.

Before turning to agenda item 8 on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, which is the item before us this morning, I wish to make a few comments on four issues which in our view, notwithstanding the importance of those not covered today, require additional comment in the light of new developments since last April. First of all, we will address the question of a nuclear test ban. It would appear that the efforts of delegations represented here to come up with an agreed formula to allow for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this topic may well suffer a fate similar to that of Sisyphus in hell, because of the lack of political will on the part of certain of those involved. Clearly, the decisions of sovereign States may not be impugned, but we cannot silence the clamour of the entire world, over Governments' heads, calling more and more insistently for a final stop to be put to nuclear tests, not only because the military significance of nuclear weapons, whether outmoded or modern, is questionable, but because, bearing in mind the overstuffed nuclear arsenals, they reflect in themselves a self-destructive wish.

Peru has for several years been working with the indefatigable Ambassador Alfonso García Robles in his commendable efforts to find an honourable solution that would save the face of the Conference on Disarmament vis-à-vis international public opinion. It is regrettable that conceptual manoeuvring continues to conspire against this noble objective, and it is even more regrettable that those who bear primary responsibility for promoting nuclear disarmament have to a certain extent been encouraging the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in an attitude of arrogance and defiance which is at variance with the solidarity that should exist among peoples.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

We have noted a feeling of weariness at this interminable procedural struggle, giving renewed impetus to the proposal adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolutions 40/80 B and 41/46 B, for activation of the amendment procedure specified in article II of the partial test-ban treaty so as to extend the ban to underground tests. Peru also considers it appropriate to point out that, in its view it would be hard to expect satisfactory results from the forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament or the fourth NPT review conference if the agreement reached does not include an unquestionable commitment to begin negotiations that would make it possible to bring about a definitive halt to nuclear tests within a reasonable period of time.

Quite apart from this overall perception of the problem, the continuation of nuclear tests on Mururoa atoll is prompting concern in the South Pacific. Peru is of the view that this situation cannot and must not pass unnoticed, as what is at stake is the ecological integrity of the South Pacific. It is for this reason, and not through any animosity, that Peru has sought the support of Colombia, Chile and Ecuador, which, together with our country, form the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific, with a view to approaching the Government of France through the appropriate diplomatic channels to make it possible to send a new scientific mission to Mururoa atoll and neighbouring areas to verify that the nuclear explosions on the test site are indeed harmless and that the levels of radioactivity are below internationally tolerable limits. These steps could be carried out in accordance with the precedent established by the Atkinson mission in 1983.

In keeping with this position, a few weeks ago, during the tenth session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), which was held in Montevideo, Peru proposed that the Council of this regional body should embark on a study of alternative measures, which could include an additional protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco to prevent radioactive contamination of the marine environment in the oceanic masses falling within the zone of application referred to in article 4, paragraph 2 of the main Treaty. This proposal was adopted by consensus, and its implementation will of course have to take account of the provisions of article 7 of the Treaty of Rarotonga. Within the same context, concrete steps have also been taken to promote co-operation between OPANAL and the South Pacific Forum.

The prohibition of chemical weapons has now become the major issue before the Conference on Disarmament, given the continuing possibility of arriving at a comprehensive treaty on the subject in the near future. It is true that progress has not been spectacular, but the important thing is that there is a determination to negotiate. Furthermore, we have observed a commendable effort to find imaginative solutions to unusual problems, with a particularly constructive contribution from the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, who, with dedication, sound judgement and skill, has set an appropriate pace for our work and maintained a high level of enthusiasm.

However, there are a variety of outstanding issues which undoubtedly require a great deal of work. We are thinking first and foremost of on-site challenge inspections, the question of jurisdiction and control, verification

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

of destruction and procedures to carry out such destruction, and the use of chemical facilities and products for peaceful purposes, including the strengthening of international co-operation. Furthermore, there is a problem which, even though it is not an urgent one, is none the less relevant to this forum. We are referring specifically to the procedure that will have to be followed once the Ad hoc Committee has successfully completed its work. The disagreeable recollection of the last multilateral instrument negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament leads us to proceed cautiously in this regard. As we are aware, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques was opened for signature by States in 1976, despite the fact that there was no consensus in this negotiating forum regarding the scope of the obligations stipulated in article I. The same must not happen in the case of chemical weapons, and we are duty-bound to prevent this from occurring.

Within that context, it would appear desirable to envisage the establishment of a new body open to all members of the international community, whose task would be to give an official stamp to the work of the 40 States which make up the Conference on Disarmament. In a complementary manner, this would make it possible to define more clearly the process of transition that will necessarily take place between the adoption of the new convention, its signing and its entry into force. This would prevent unforeseen situations from arising in the interim period, and would rule out arbitrary procedures that could undermine all the efforts of nearly two decades.

With respect to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, it is clear that first of all a verifiable distinction must be drawn between the placing of objects in orbit with hostile military intent and the placing of those with non-hostile military intent. Under article IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the prohibition, which extends only to objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, applies once the object is placed in orbit, in other words once a circuit around the Earth has been completed. On that basis Peru supports all initiatives aimed at amending the 1967 Treaty as a means of finding a partial solution to the problem, but it would advocate the simpler amendment of prohibiting the placing in orbit of any object carrying any type of weapon whatsoever. We do not think it would be necessary to introduce new elements such as the concept of "space weapons", as what defines the prohibition is non-placement in orbit. Nor is it possible to accept new criteria concerning the length of time the objects remain in orbit, because the approach followed in the 1967 Treaty is much more appropriate in that it prohibits even the temporary presence of a delivery system in outer space, provided it completes a circuit around the Earth.

Now, in so far as an amendment of this type would not involve weapon systems that can destroy objects in outer space from the air, land or sea through direct hits or using the principle of directed energy or other principles of physics, it is clear that their viability will depend on the concurrent effort being made to multilateralize the basic obligations of the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, as well as those that are necessary to prohibit all anti-satellite weapon systems which are not based in outer space. It is understood that all of this should not undermine any régime for the full use of space for the benefit of mankind as a whole.

By definition, if one wishes to prevent the transfer of the arms race to outer space, the set of prohibitions to be agreed on should be comprehensive and free of all unambiguity; in other words, there should be no problems of interpretation such as that posed by article V of the ABM Treaty, because that would simply undermine mutual confidence and thus weaken the scope of these obligations. But perhaps what would be really important would be to set up guidelines or parameters which would allow for the regulation of advanced technology. While not taking the existing non-proliferation régime as a model, because it is lopsided and discriminatory, Peru is of the view that it would be possible to explore formulas that would impose contractual limitations on the development of certain advanced technologies for hostile purposes that have a destabilizing effect on the status quo. Of course, the aim would not be to impede or discourage technological progress, but rather to regulate it so as to place it at the service of our needs and aspirations, and not to have it used for destruction and endless military competition.

This reflection leads us directly to another, relating to the important role that effective prevention of the arms race in outer space could play in halting and reversing the arms race as a whole. We think that there is a direct relationship here, and it is vital to avoid this new spiral in the arms race. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the real problem does not lie here but in the causes and epiphenomena which encourage the arms race urbi et orbi. In other words, it remains an urgent and top priority to fight against the untiring search for illusory security through the indiscriminate build-up of weapons, of which the extension to outer space is only the most sophisticated manifestation.

There has been great interest this year in item 7, on radiological weapons. A dual approach has been put into practice, which is most welcome. However, the results of the contact groups' work have been discouraging so far. It is of very little use to prohibit radiological weapons if these are going to be reduced to their most basic expression while nuclear arsenals are kept at their present levels; and as a discussion exercise an effort of this kind is discouraging. The question of banning military attacks on nuclear facilities should not continue to be linked to the above, because whereas in the first case we are speaking of weapons in the strict sense of the term, nuclear facilities are relevant if they are considered as military objectives or targets in the event of armed conflict, but can in no way be classified as weapons. In other words, radiological weapons may be the subject of disarmament measures, but this is not the case for nuclear facilities, protection for which falls under international humanitarian law.

In this regard it is useful to recall that article 35, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions have been supplemented by the provisions contained in the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and its

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

three protocols. The same could be said with respect to paragraph 3 of the same article and article 55 of the Additional Protocol, which cover one aspect of the protection of the natural environment not envisaged in the ENMOD Convention. Similarly, we are of the view that there is room for improvement in the provisions of article 56, paragraph 2 (b), which could be extended to all nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes. In this case, it is politically counter-productive to seek to draw distinctions in this type of facilities on the basis of specific thresholds of radioactivity whose definition is questionable. It would be paradoxical to extend protection to nuclear facilities which have a military purpose.

In this context, one may wonder whether the Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum to establish norms of international humanitarian law. In any event, one of the precedents that I have mentioned should enable us to keep open the possibility of resolving the problem of military attacks on nuclear facilities in the context of an ad hoc diplomatic conference that could be convened by the United Nations General Assembly.

Item 8, on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, has stirred up a great deal of interest because of the conceptual and programmatic elements that it involves. The Ad hoc Committee is approaching its 150th meeting, and the fruit of this work is not clearly apparent. This year we have even noted a certain step backwards in so far as we have seen the questioning of certain principles, priorities and activities enshrined in the Final Document of 1978, which constitutes the starting-point and frame of reference for the work of this Committee. We will go into the other aspects of the comprehensive programme of disarmament at other times; meanwhile, Peru is of the view that the priorities that should be enshrined in the paper should be the same as those stipulated in paragraph 45 of the Final Document of 1978 and supplemented by the provisions of paragraph 46 -- priorities that are interpreted in a certain order bearing in mind the urgency and elementary sense of preservation involved in the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

With respect to the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Peru will not agree to this concept being distorted by identifying the establishment of these zones as an alternative means of halting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones is much more than this, and basically implies mutual obligations both for the States within the zone which renounce nuclear weapons and for States outside the zone, particularly the nuclear Powers, which are called upon to respect that status and refrain from using or threatening the use of nuclear weapons against the States in the zone. Thus there are no one-way obligations, nor can or should the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone be used to remedy the intrinsic shortcomings of the NPT. It is this singular nature of the concept which obliges the States parties to safeguard the balance of obligations both within and outside the area, ensuring that the right to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy will not in practice lead to a change in the levels of security prevailing in the zone. Of great importance here is the way in which the verification system is interpreted and, above all, the efforts made by the States of the zone directly concerned to prevent any over-broad interpretation which irreversibly damages the mutual confidence that should prevail among them.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

In more than 11 years the Conference on Disarmament has not been capable of producing a single agreement that would justify its existence. The proposals made by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union are most welcome and timely. The fact that no results have been achieved over the past 11 years makes it imperative for us to conclude the convention for a total ban on chemical weapons and their destruction, failing which we could provide grounds for a belief that the "attack-defence" equation which underpins the arms race spiral involves an endless dynamic interaction similar to that between Eros and Thanatos in the Freudian conception of the life of the psyche.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair.

I have no more speakers on my list for today. Do any other delegations wish to speak? I give the floor to the representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, very briefly, I know the hour is late, but I would like to respond if I might. Our delegation has listened with great interest to the statement of the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, in which he described proposals for various aspects of the chemical weapons convention. We will, of course, study this statement in depth during the coming days and we will no doubt have more detailed comments in the future. I would like to take the opportunity to welcome this initiative of the Soviet Union, and express our optimism that this proposal will bring our positions closer together.

Of course, our delegation recognizes that closing the gap between the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union is but one step toward a CW convention, albeit an important one. There are 38 other equal negotiating partners, whose views must be taken into account. I remarked last month in this Chamber that we have seen, during this session, a gradual convergence of those views. We must acknowledge, however, that significant differences remain on some of our more complex issues, such as monitoring non-production in the civil chemical industry; the organizational infrastructure that will oversee the convention; challenge inspection; and security during the period between the treaty's effective date and the conclusion of chemical weapon stockpile destruction. Then there is a difficult problem of what to do with those chemical plants that do not fall within the present definition of a chemical weapons production facility, but which nevertheless have the capability to produce chemical weapons, or their key precursors. Further, after the Conference reaches consensus on a treaty text, how do we persuade other chemical-weapon-possessing States outside the Conference to accept it? This threat posed by non-parties is a problem we should address in future meetings. The issues I have mentioned are not all the issues remaining unresolved, nor are they necessarily the most important, but they illustrate that there are deep-seated differences, based on national interests, and they illustrate that we still have much work ahead of us. As we move toward conclusion of our 1987 Conference on Disarmament session, and begin preparations for next year, we know that our task is not an easy one, but we also know that, with constructive steps, such as the Soviet Union has taken today, that task will be considerably easier.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

Our delegation also welcomes the opportunity to meet with Soviet representatives to gain a further understanding of these proposals mentioned today, before we return to our capitals to begin preparations for our future negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.

As the Conference delegations are aware, Vice-President Bush, on behalf of the United States, tabled a draft chemical weapons convention here three years ago, and our delegation has been engaged in concluding a convention based on that proposal and the views of all delegations to this Conference, and will continue to do so.

With respect to the Pershing 1A missiles of the Federal Republic of Germany, the long-standing United States position is clear. The United States will not negotiate on third-country systems, or on existing programmes of co-operation with our allies, in these bilateral negotiations. Therefore, the German Pershing 1A missiles have not been, are not, and will not be on the table in the United States/Soviet INF missile negotiations. With respect to the situation beyond these bilateral negotiations, NATO has taken the position that the German Pershing 1A force makes an important contribution to deterrence -- an honourable policy -- and to the security of the NATO Alliance, especially in the context of a "double global zero" outcome for United States and Soviet land-based INF missiles. Future plans for the German Pershing 1A force will therefore be determined by the Federal Republic of Germany in co-operation and consultation with its NATO allies.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement, and I give the floor to the representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to say a few words in response to the statements made by the representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf, and the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel. First of all, we should like to note Mr. Friedersdorf's comment concerning the ban on chemical weapons, and to assure him and all other participants in the negotiations on this important issue that the Soviet delegation intends in the near future to dwell in greater detail on the initiatives which were contained in the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade Shevardnadze, and naturally, it will be available for discussions with all delegations, and will be happy to answer any questions that may arise in this regard, so as to expedite negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons to the maximum possible extent.

We have taken note of the fact that, in connection with the question raised by Eduard Amvrosievich Shevardnadze, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany gave us a clarification from which it follows that the 72 warheads in question do not belong to the Federal Republic of Germany, and that the Federal Republic of Germany possesses no nuclear weapons at all, and also that it does comply with the non-proliferation Treaty. The Soviet side takes note of this important statement, even though we are unclear how it can be reconciled with the other part of Ambassador von Stülpnagel's remarks

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

to the effect that his country supports the United States position on the bilateral INF negotiations. However, the United States representative, speaking after him, said that the United States would not conduct negotiations on third-country systems, that the question of Pershing 1A warheads, if I understood him correctly, would not be on the negotiating table, and that the future of these systems would be determined by the Federal Republic of Germany in agreement with its North Atlantic Treaty allies. So the question arises: where does the truth of the matter lie? And all this confirms the seriousness of the doubts raised and questions asked by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. For this reason we should like to continue to hope that this major question of principle will be fully clarified.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement. I give the floor to the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Taylhadrat.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, my delegation did not want to let the opportunity go by at this morning's meeting, despite the fact that the speaker is no longer with us, to express my delegation's appreciation for the important statement made to this Conference by Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. The statement was very weighty and cogent on a number of issues related to the bilateral negotiations being conducted between the Soviet Union and the United States, but it also touched on fundamental aspects of the work being done by the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral forum on disarmament.

In our view, Mr. Shevardnadze's statement was a vigorous manifestation of the Soviet Union's support for the Conference on Disarmament, and it highlights the importance that the USSR attaches to this forum. We consider Minister Shevardnadze's initiative in providing the Conference with important information concerning the state and progress of the bilateral negotiations to be of particular significance, and we also particularly welcome his statement that he would discuss with the United States side how an appropriate procedure could be established for keeping the Conference appropriately informed about the bilateral negotiations. My delegation, which has referred to this matter on several occasions, hopes that those consultations will indeed lead to the establishment of a mechanism through which the flow of information between the bilateral and the multilateral negotiations could be institutionalized. Finally, through the delegation of the Soviet Union, we wish to convey to Minister Shevardnadze our appreciation for his coming to the Conference and for the important statement he made this morning.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Venezuela for his statement. Are there any other speakers? There are not. Let me now inform you that the Secretariat has distributed this morning at my request an unofficial document that sets out the meeting schedule for the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. As usual, this document is merely indicative and may be adjusted later if necessary in the light of the work of the Conference. If there are no objections, I will take it that the Conference accepts this timetable.

It was so decided.



The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I should like to remind you that immediately after this plenary, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, following which we will resume our consideration of substantive matters relating to agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 11 August at 10 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.