

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 July 1987, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. T. Terrefe

(Ethiopia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 423rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference will continue its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". In accordance with Rule 30 of its Rules of Procedure, however, any member who wishes to do so may take the floor on any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Australia, Argentina, India, Canada, New Zealand and China. I now give the floor to my first speaker for today, the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, it gives my delegation very great pleasure at seeing you occupying the Chair of this Conference. We have already deeply appreciated your guidance and we look forward to working further with you for the month of July. I must, too, express our very deep gratitude to the Ambassador of Egypt, your predecessor Ambassador Alfarargi, for the immensely skilled and capable way in which he guided our work last month.

Work towards a treaty which would ban all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time -- a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty -- has been carried out in this Conference and in its predecessor bodies for a number of years. That work has proceeded on two main fronts: the political and the technical. It is no secret that work on the political front is, in some respects, in an unsatisfactory state, but I will address that subject in a later intervention. However, work on the technical front has proceeded and proceeded well. Indeed, it has developed so positively that we Australians believe that we are on the verge of a real leap forward.

I am referring to the fact that next week the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) will reconvene in Geneva and will work towards the second global seismological monitoring experiment, an experiment which, for the first time, will include the exchange of wave-form data. This will be a remarkable and significant instance of international co-operation, not only for scientific purposes, but to demonstrate that a comprehensive nuclear test ban will be able to be verified. On the occasion of the first global experiment, 37 States participated, 75 seismological stations were linked. Clearly there will be at least a similar number on this next occasion.

In the interval between the last global experiment, in 1984, and today, work has not stood still, either nationally or in terms of international co-operation, in the field of seismological monitoring. Allow me to describe briefly Australia's own work, both nationally and in co-operation with others as an example of such continuing developments.

In view of its geographical position and because it is a large "quiet" continent in terms of background noise, Australia is particularly well placed to play a major role in seismic monitoring. This was recognized in the decision of the GSE to designate Australia as one of four International Data

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Centres (IDC) for the major network trial planned for 1988-89. The four IDCs will fulfil the requirement for the framework of the international seismic monitoring network. In 1984, the Australian Government decided, in keeping with its support for the earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, to upgrade Australia's own capacity to contribute to an international seismic monitoring network. In September 1986, the Government opened the Australian Seismological Centre (ASC) in Canberra which draws together seismic information from seismic stations and arrays on the Australian continent and in Antarctica. In June 1987, the Government dedicated a new seismic array processor (ASPRO) that will provide enhanced analysis of seismic data. This system is capable of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions down to yields of a few kilotonnes at the main United States, French, Soviet and Chinese nuclear test sites and, of course, it is well known that the United Kingdom's tests are conducted at a United States site. It is our intention shortly to commence publication, on a regular basis, of an Australian Seismological Centre Bulletin which would give all details of nuclear tests monitored by the Centre. We see this among other things as in keeping with the spirit of last year's General Assembly resolution 41/59 N on the notification of nuclear tests, in which we urged all States, including the nuclear-weapon States, to comply by making available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations all information they have on time, location and yield of nuclear explosions.

Australia's own national seismic capability is derived in large measure from international co-operation: with New Zealand; with the United States, which jointly operates the recently dedicated Alice Springs Seismic Array Processor; with other countries participating in the work of the Group of Scientific Experts. Our co-operation with New Zealand has now been formalized in the Australia-New Zealand Seismic Monitoring Agreement which was signed by the two Prime Ministers in Apia on 30 April this year. I have the privilege now, on behalf of the delegations of New Zealand and Australia, to circulate to members of the Conference English-language copies of that Agreement. I might mention that the Agreement is being issued by the Secretariat in all languages as document CD/775.

With respect to this Agreement between Australia and New Zealand, I would make the following main points. The Agreement complements the efforts being made in the Group of Scientific Experts, in which both Australia and New Zealand participate actively. The Agreement demonstrates the importance both countries attach to the seismic monitoring of nuclear tests. The Agreement reiterates Australia and New Zealand's strong and active commitment to the earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. It demonstrates the importance we attach to early progress towards the verification régime needed to support a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, both as a necessary task to be accomplished before such a treaty can come into operation and as something the effective operation of which would in itself enhance prospects for a treaty. We believe that bilateral co-operation such as this, as well as being intrinsically positive, has a valuable demonstration effect, stimulating interest in international co-operation in seismic monitoring and, in particular, in the possibility of an international monitoring network. We hope that the Agreement will give added momentum to the conviction that the time has come for the establishment of a global seismic network.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Exactly one year ago, on 18 July 1986, I tabled in this Conference document CD/717. It is the Australian proposal for the immediate establishment of a global seismic network. A decision on this proposal was not able to be taken last year, but the proposal was noted in the records and report of the Conference. And, as already mentioned, events have moved on. The reality is that the forthcoming global experiment will for all effective purposes establish such a network for the period of the experiment. The adoption of the proposal made in CD/717 would ensure that that network was established permanently. We are asking that, before this 1987 session of the Conference concludes, the Conference adopt our proposal. It is simple, it makes sense, it is utterly consistent with the stated policy on nuclear testing of all who sit at this table. It would represent a major concrete achievement by this Conference.

Some may ask "Why do this now? or "What, at root, is at issue?" The fact is that, while various bilateral talks are proceeding, while we are talking here, while resolutions are being adopted at the Assembly, and important declarations issued elsewhere by specific groups, such as the six-country group, on the political level, it is clear that agreement to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty has yet to be settled. That agreement will come, and we believe it, because it is necessary. Even those who say it is not ripe yet never say it will not come. What do we do in the meantime? Do we simply wait? Our answer is no. We believe that we should follow what is the only sensible course of action under such circumstances: build every necessary piece of this structure -- the structure of a treaty -- so that, when the last piece is ready, no time will be lost in fitting it in and in completing the treaty. It would be tragic if we were unprepared, if we were not ready when agreement comes. Building a global seismic network now will mean that we will be ready. And, by demonstrating that a comprehensive treaty can be verified, we will forge a positive interaction between the political and technical aspects of the nuclear testing problem.

A central part of that positive interaction is the signal we will send to testing States. They say verification is a problem. What does it mean to them, what does it do to political prospects, if we deny that and say, "Let's have the negotiation first and worry about verification later"? Surely it is better to respond by saying, "If you have a problem with verification, then let's fix that problem"? On a political level this would respond to seriously-expressed concerns and would answer them. The establishment of a global seismic network is precisely such a response, precisely such an answer. We should give that response this year: we should adopt the proposal outlined in CD/717.

If we had an Ad Hoc Committee under item I of our agenda, the proposal could be discussed there. But it can be discussed in the plenary, in the Group of Scientific Experts. My delegation stands ready to discuss it in any way. Let us take this step as a real advance in international co-operation, as an essential step on the path towards an end to nuclear testing and let us do it now, this year, in the name of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he expressed to the President and I give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Campora.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (translated from Spanish) Mr. President, the Argentine delegation is pleased to greet you on the occasion of your return to the Conference on Disarmament to preside over it during the current month of July. Your renewed presence here after a number of years as representative of your country gives us confidence and assurance that there will be progress in our work in the penultimate month for the 1987 session. To that end, your acknowledged experience is a firm guarantee of better results within what it is possible for us to achieve. I should also like to welcome the new representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Max L. Friedersdorf, with whom I certainly hope to entertain as close a friendship and working relationship as I had with his predecessor, Ambassador Lowitz, who remains unalterably in our affection. Unexpectedly, I find myself in the situation of simultaneously bidding farewell to Ambassador Cromartie, to whom we should like to extend our best wishes, to Ambassador Dhanapala, to whom we wish every success in his new function, and to Ambassador Tonwe, to whom we express our wish for the greatest possible professional good fortune.

The Argentine delegation has put its name on the list for today's plenary meeting in order to refer to agenda item 5, Prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Ad hoc Committee is doing the job it was mandated to do. Its deliberations are moving ahead gradually under the chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese, whose competence in the field is certainly up to the measure of the antecedents of Italy, a country that has been a forerunner in studies and research aimed at establishing a régime for the exploration and peaceful use of outer space. The Ad hoc Committee has already completed deliberations on the first and second items of its programme of work, which, as we know, concern respectively issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race and the legal régime established in the area of disarmament by the treaties in force.

One of the issues of greatest interest which emerged in dealing with the first item was that of determining whether outer space is currently free from the deployment of weapons. The space Powers, which are few in number, have not provided a clear-cut reply, declaring, for instance, that they have not deployed weapons permanently in outer space. We believe that the international community would be truly relieved to hear that so far there are no weapons deployed in outer space. In our view, the means to be used to inform public opinion of that situation, that is, that no weapons have been placed permanently in outer space could well be the report that the Conference on Disarmament submits to the General Assembly. It would be sufficient in that respect for the Ad hoc Committee to include a paragraph stating that none of the member States represented in the Conference on Disarmament has permanently deployed weapons in outer space. That assertion avoids the complex issue of defining what a space weapon is, since what is sought is a simple statement to the effect that the member States represented in the Conference on Disarmament have not deployed weapons of any nature or kind. It is simply a matter of asserting that there have been no weapons deployed. It would then be enough, as we have said, for such an assertion to appear in the report of the Conference on Disarmament, and we hope that none of the States

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

members of the Conference on Disarmament will refuse to include such a paragraph. A declaration to that end could well constitute the point of departure for more specific and binding initiatives in future with appropriate verification measures.

In dealing with item 2 of the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee, which concerns the legal disarmament régime which has been established in the sphere of disarmament by the multilateral treaties in force, we had occasion to witness an interesting exchange of views that has, in our opinion, clarified several aspects of the matter. Firstly, it is an accepted fact that this legal régime establishes that celestial bodies can be used for exclusively peaceful purposes and that, moreover, that régime excludes the military use of celestial bodies as well as the testing and deployment of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and also of other weapons which are neither nuclear nor weapons of mass destruction. As regards outer space, it is accepted that it cannot be the subject of testing or deployment of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. It is also accepted that it is not permitted to place nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in Earth orbit. Regrettably, there is no agreement on the multilateral legal régime governing outer space with respect to the testing and deployment of weapons that are neither nuclear weapons nor weapons of mass destruction.

We must say that it worries us to hear from time to time that the legal régime for outer space should draw on that for the high seas. We believe, on the contrary, that this item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament which has as its purpose the prevention of an arms race in outer space corresponds to a basic goal, which is to avoid the legal régime for outer space resembling in any way the régime for the high seas. We believe that, were we to establish a régime for outer space similar to that for the high seas, we would have failed completely in our aim of preventing an arms race in outer space. It is enough to observe the situation obtaining on seas and oceans permanently criss-crossed by military fleets equipped with all types of weapons to conclude that there could be no more deplorable picture of outer space than to conceive of it traversed by space objects of an offensive and defensive military nature such as those that travel the high seas. The phenomenon that characterizes the naval arms race must not be reproduced in space.

The Ad hoc Committee has now begun its deliberations on the third item on its programme of work, which concerns proposals and future initiatives for preventing an arms race in outer space. It is obvious that, to prevent an arms race in outer space, the first measure that must be taken is to avoid the deployment of weapons, and that requires both a binding commitment in that sense and the adoption of verification systems that will ensure compliance with that commitment. The Conference on Disarmament is giving proof within the context of other items that it is possible to draw up complex verification procedures when there is the political will necessary to reconcile the goals of disarmament with those of national security and industrial and commercial secrecy. Why should it not be possible to establish a binding régime for the registration of objects launched into space? That is very simple to do given political will. Regrettably, the space Powers wish to reserve a wide measure of freedom of action for themselves in the military use of outer space and

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

prefer to keep secret the nature of the vast majority of objects that they launch into space. It is then inevitable that the secrecy of the activity of some should generate a similar attitude in others.

The 1975 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space provides an appropriate basis of rules that can be perfected, first of all, by establishing their binding nature and then by incorporating in them verification clauses enabling it to be checked that the information recorded is reliable. The efficient operation of a register of objects launched into space and a corresponding verification system would solve a series of problems relating to the immunity of satellites intended for peaceful use, since it would be possible, as a result, to ascertain the purpose of a space object and, consequently, its right to enjoy immunity. Similar arrangements could be made for the registration of those satellites which have special functions, such as observation satellites, early-warning satellites, satellites for the purpose of monitoring compliance with disarmament agreements, etc.

There is, perhaps today, no greater focus of attention among the issues linked to the drawing up of disarmament treaties or agreements than that of verification. For almost two years now -- to be precise, since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 40/152/0 relating to verification, a resolution supported by the two military alliances -- we have undoubtedly been witnessing a real diplomatic competition as to who is more enthusiastic about verification formulae. Verification is today the essential and preliminary step for any disarmament agreement. Very complex formulae are being tested in the context of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and we are all aware too of the situation with regard to the verification of nuclear-weapon tests and to other items such as radiological weapons, negative assurances and so on. Verification in the context of the items we have mentioned should provide a solution to intricate situations such as, for instance, avoiding non-permitted production of substances within an industry as common and widely scattered as the chemical industry. None the less, gradually and with admirable creativity and imagination, verification mechanisms are being worked out.

But we cannot help feeling surprised at the fact that the analysis of the item relating to verification within the framework of the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space has not been the subject of greater attention despite the fact that activity in outer space originates here on the Earth's surface in a very limited number of places. The space Powers, which are few in number, also have only a few places for launching objects into space. Verification of the nature of the objects that are placed in space could be effected at the launch sites themselves and that would entirely dispel all doubts as to the military or peaceful nature of an object sent into space. It is obvious that the implementation of monitoring and verification machinery at the bases for the launching of vehicles with cargoes of a military and strategic nature would be resisted by the respective space Powers. It can be deduced therefore that the opening of such sites for the verification, albeit only visual, of loads to be placed in orbit would require a political decision by the space Powers, aimed at achieving a certain transparency in their policy for the use of outer space. To sum up and to conclude this statement, it just remains for me to point out that the prevention of an arms race in outer space depends solely on simple acts of political will by the space Powers.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and the kind words he expressed to the chair and I give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Teja.

Mr. TEJA (India): Mr. President, permit me to take this opportunity to extend to you the felicitations of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the month of July. We are happy to see the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, a country with which India has maintained long-standing and historical ties of friendship and co-operation, preside over our deliberations. I should like to assure you of my delegation's full co-operation in the discharge of your responsibilities. I should also like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey our appreciation for the manner in which your predecessors, Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt and Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, presided over the Conference during the months of June and April. Let me extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues who have joined us, Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi of Indonesia and Ambassador Max Friedersdorf of the United States of America; I look forward to working closely with them. We shall, of course, miss Ambassador Tonwe, Ambassador Cromartie, and Ambassador Dhanapala, and I would like to join others in wishing them well in whatever they may be doing. I am sure that Ambassador Tonwe, who is returning to his country, will have a very successful tour of duty in his new and important assignment. I should also like to convey our thanks, through their respective delegations, to the Governments of Canada for organizing the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal, and to the Government of Norway for the Holmenkollen Symposium on Chemical Weapons Convention organized in Oslo earlier this summer. These workshops were extremely useful and have helped us in generating new ideas on two of the major issues facing us in the Conference today.

I would like to devote my statement today to the subject of prevention of an arms race in outer space. This new chapter in the unending race for nuclear superiority is not only the most expensive but also potentially the most threatening to the cause of disarmament as we see it. In the Conference on Disarmament, we have a mandate to negotiate and while it is unfortunate that we have been prevented from doing so in the critical area of the nuclear arms race, it would be doubly unfortunate if we did nothing to prevent this new threat that looms over the planet.

We are aware of the diplomatic skills with which Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space during 1986, addressed himself to his tasks. We are confident that under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy we will be able to register substantial progress on this item during 1987.

Since 1983, there has been rapid progress in the development of anti-satellite weapons and ballistic missile defence systems. Yet in our Conference, there is unfortunately little progress and the Conference seems bogged down in peripheral issues. What lends urgency to our plea for negotiations on this question is our apprehension that the pursuit of space-based defence can lead to a breach of existing arms control agreements,

(Mr. Teja, India)

thereby precipitating unrestrained competition and, in the process, unravelling the entire web of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, increasing the likelihood of a nuclear war, not to speak of the enormous resources deployed in this area.

The debate between offensive and defensive weapons is an old and unresolved one. I would not like to enter into a discussion of the technical possibilities and/or limitations of the ballistic missile defense systems currently being researched. It would be sufficient to note that extending the arms race into outer space will not lead us from mutually assured destruction to mutually assured survival; the only logical means to achieve that is nuclear disarmament.

The non-aligned and neutral countries have been sceptical of such theories and exposed the dangers of basing doctrines of security on the so-called logic of nuclear deterrence. We have consistently taken the position that the development of space-based weapons and arms race in outer space must be prevented. The Six-Nation Initiative has placed particular emphasis on this issue. The Delhi Declaration calls for the prohibition of the development, testing, production, deployment and use of all space weapons. The Harare Declaration adopted at the eighth non-aligned summit calls upon "the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations urgently to conclude an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent the extension of arms race in all its aspects into outer space and thus enhance the prospects of co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space." In particular, the leaders of the non-aligned countries stressed the urgency of "halting the development of anti-satellite weapons, the dismantling of the existing systems, the prohibition of the introduction of new weapon systems into outer space in order to ensure that the existing treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems are fully honoured, strengthened and extended as necessary in the light of recent technological advances". It is clear that, once the fragile web of existing arms control arrangements begins to be unravelled and these treaties are violated, it will become progressively more difficult to undertake any constructive disarmament negotiations.

The reasoning that there does not exist a specific agreement prohibiting the introduction of a ballistic defence missile system is, in our view, no justification; the fact remains that there does exist a corpus of international law, adequate and coherent, though not comprehensive, which, if interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, cannot only prevent an arms race in outer space but also indicate the areas which require strengthening in the form of additional legal instruments to provide for a comprehensive legally-binding structure. At present, the law in relation to arms relations in outer space consists of treaty provisions. These treaties are both bilateral and multilateral, the most significant among them being the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the bilateral ABM Treaty of 1972. The two have to be viewed against the backdrop of other agreements. Until recently there has been uniform compliance in keeping with the ultimate objective but, of late, differences of interpretation have arisen. These differences can be reconciled if we acknowledge that impartial interpretation is based upon compliance with treaty obligations in good faith.

(Mr. Teja, India)

A number of detailed analyses have been made of the existing international legal régime. Without going into details at this stage, I should like to state that the most fundamental of these agreements is the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the "threat or use of force". The Charter, which is applicable to outer space in accordance with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty exemplifies the concept further by recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. The term "peaceful purposes" has been traditionally understood to imply non-military purposes. Until the mid-1970s, this interpretation was accepted by both the super-Powers. More recently a new, qualitatively different interpretation has been advanced by one of the space Powers, according to which peaceful purposes is defined as "non-aggressive". This is tantamount to sanctioning militarization of space. My delegation believes that the reference to the Charter of the United Nations in the Outer Space Treaty makes the interpretation of "non-aggressive" redundant. This view is also strengthened by the understanding of the Antarctic Treaty, where the term "peaceful purposes" is still interpreted to imply non-military purposes.

Another significant treaty is the bilateral United States-Soviet Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Certain technological developments and on-going research programmes have led to divergent opinions about the scope of this Treaty. These issues need to be resolved urgently while keeping in view the basic objective of the Treaty, and, if need be, through strengthening the provisions in the light of recent technological advances.

Semantics will lead us to involved discussions on the meaning of research and advanced research, development and testing, laboratory testing, field testing or demonstration testing, but these exercises will not be conclusive. Language is intended as a means of communication. We believe that the only valid criterion for deciding when faced with such semantics is to accept that which is compatible with the widest, broadest and universally acceptable principle of peaceful purposes, in outer space. United Nations General Assembly resolution 41/53, which was adopted with an overwhelming majority of 154 votes, refers to the activities of "exploration and use of outer space" as to be carried on "in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding". Given this criterion, which, we think, we can all accept as reasonable, we feel that there need not be any dispute about interpretations of what is prohibited and what is permitted.

So far I have alluded to the first two aspects of the mandate given to the Ad hoc Committee of our Conference. An impartial consideration of the technological aspect of the proposed BMD systems reveals its inherent shortcomings, which in turn only confirm that development of such systems cannot lead us away from nuclear deterrence, but merely heighten the precarious edge of deterrence by leading us into a new cycle of the arms race. Secondly, I have tried to bring together some of the strands of the current international legal régime which, if seen in their complementarity, clearly indicate its adequacy. There is, none the less, a need to make it more comprehensive. Before I move to suggestions in this sphere, I would like to refer to another aspect of the arms race in outer space, namely, anti-satellite weapons.

(Mr. Teja, India)

Satellites, for our country as for many others, are a part of an effort to use technology for the benefit of our peoples. We are all aware of the applications of satellites in telecommunications, meteorology, remote-sensing, navigation and scientific research. At the same time, these very functions also have another aspect: the verification of arms limitation agreements. More recently, wartime combat support functions have also been included in satellite capability. While some may be indirect, i.e., in the areas of communications and navigation, others may be more direct, such as radar location of targets and navigational guidance for attack missiles. Perceptions of these attributes and their development have, side by side, also spurred attempts to develop anti-satellite weapons. If satellites have been accepted as an aid to confidence building by virtue of their role in verification, then putting them at risk would only serve to exacerbate tensions and have a destabilizing effect on any crisis.

In virtually all missile defence concepts, satellites are foreseen to perform essential functions, either as sensors or as relay stations in the attack, and they must, therefore, possess a defensive capability. This is the close connection between the development of the BMD systems and the development of the improved anti-satellite systems, in addition to the inherent ASAT potential of many BMD systems. It is, however, the distinctions between BMD systems and the ASAT systems which are more significant for us, as these indicate the approach that can be adopted to develop a treaty banning ASAT weapons. The significant ASAT methods like spacemines, jamming and deception measures and attacks on ground stations, have no BMD analogue. The levels of performance for a BMD and for attacking satellites are very different. ASAT can be mounted from a friendly territory, its targeting is relatively easier and can be undertaken over a long period of time, its survivability is easier as it is likely to operate in a crisis situation rather than in a hostility situation -- in short, while the technology is similar, the technical differences between an effective BMD system and an ASAT system are significant.

These distinctions are relevant in designing any ASAT ban -- which, to be comprehensive and effective, must not only ban testing, development and deployment of all ASAT weapons but also eliminate existing such weapons. Even at present, the issues of verification and compliance are likely to require considerable reserves of political goodwill and trust before they can be resolved; with any delay in the undertaking of negotiations and possibly if faced with deployment, it would become that much more difficult. One possible structure for such a treaty could be in the form of a general formulation, with specific protocols applicable to different categories of satellites. Evidently, the categorization of today may not remain as exhaustive for tomorrow. This explains the necessity for separate protocols, which can be derived from and placed under the umbrella of the general treaty formulations. For the present, three categories for which specific protocols could be relevant would be NEO (Near-Earth Orbits), HEO (Higher Earth Orbits) and GEO (Geosynchronous Orbits). However, this is merely indicative and not an exhaustive listing. The formulation of the general provision would be an indicator of the underlying political commitment. Elements of such a proposal have already been tabled in this Conference and it is now necessary that we take a comprehensive look at it.

(Mr. Teja, India)

Closely related to this, but wider in scope in terms of its applicability to all objects launched into space, is the Registration Convention of 1975. My delegation believes that this convention needs to be strengthened, especially the provisions relating to article IV, which provide the information about the characteristics of the objects launched. Such an exercise is fully in consonance with the objectives of the Convention, as stated in the preamble, namely to "contribute to the application and development of international law governing the exploration and use of outer space". Under the existing scheme, while we know from independent reliable sources that about three fourths of the satellites launched are used for military purposes, the description most frequently provided under the requirements of the Registration Convention read "Exploration of upper atmosphere and outer space". Admittedly, the dividing line between military and non-military uses is thin, but to be able to examine it and judge it impartially, we need to be able to get close to it. My delegation would be in favour of the idea that an expert group be convened to help the Ad hoc Committee in such a task. To begin with, the mandate of the expert group would be to devise the necessary parameters on which information needs to be provided under article IV of the Registration Convention. Such an activity would not only further the objectives emphasized in the preamble, but also be a significant aid to confidence-building.

A better understanding of this aspect would contribute to our discussion on the proposal for a multilateral agreement conferring on space objects immunity from attack or interference. Clearly, such an agreement would need suitable verification, on which, too, proposals have been submitted to this Conference.

We have the means to begin to consider specific provisions and measures aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. It is the earnest desire of the delegation of India that, with the wholehearted commitment and co-operation of all other delegations, the Conference on Disarmament will be successful in safeguarding outer space, as the common heritage of mankind, for the generations to come.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me and to my country. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): Mr. President, in an earlier intervention, I paid tribute to you and your predecessors for the wise and skilful way in which you have directed our deliberations. I will not repeat that, but I hope that it is understood that I remain even more convinced of our wisdom. May I take this opportunity, however, of associating myself with the views expressed by so many of my colleagues who have made known their regrets at the retirement of Ambassador Ian Cromartie, our British colleague, and the transfer to other duties of Ambassador Dhanapala and Ambassador Tonwe. We will miss them all and I hope that our paths will cross again.

May I also say, since the main topic of my comments will be verification, how really encouraging it is to have heard so many references to verification in each of the speeches we have heard this morning. I do not know if we have had a previous occasion where that has proven true, and I doubt if it would

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

have occurred a year ago, and this is extremely encouraging. Indeed, I have asked for the floor today to table two documents. The first of these is a summary report of the Outer Space Workshop which was held for heads of Conference on Disarmament and observer delegations in Montreal on 14-17 May 1987. The second is a Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals compiled by the Verification Research Unit of the Canadian Department of External Affairs. Delegations may recall that in my comments to the Conference on 30 April I drew attention to Canada's emphasis on practical work towards arms control agreements. Consistent with this approach we have undertaken continuing research on the verification of such agreements. The two documents that I am tabling are both examples of this practical approach.

It is the essence of an arms control and disarmament agreement that contracting parties agree to renounce, limit or destroy armaments or military forces in return for treaty commitments by other parties to do the same. To ask States to renounce or scrap weapons in return for treaty obligations as a preferable way of protecting their security is to demand of them a very serious and difficult decision. In effect, a State accepts a treaty in lieu of weapons as a means of protecting its security. This is an extremely important undertaking, since a primary responsibility of all Governments must be to protect the security, however defined or perceived, of their respective countries. Given the traditional and contemporary concern with national security, the importance of verification becomes evident: it is the means by which a party ensures confidence, throughout the life of an arms control agreement, that other parties are complying with their obligations, while at the same time demonstrating its own good faith.

It is the Canadian position, which I wish to emphasize, that the careful negotiation and drafting of adequate and effective verification provisions is essential to preventing a deterioration of confidence in an arms control or disarmament agreement. This applies a fortiori to agreements involving nuclear weapons and nuclear tests. In a world where there are relatively few internationally effective sanctions, verification inevitably must play a critical role in ensuring that a treaty is and remains effective, and does not become a source of tension rather than a means of lessening or eliminating it.

As pointed out during a seminar in Ottawa on 19 June at the Conference on Nuclear Weapons and the Law, verification can be perceived to perform a series of central functions, but there would seem to be four of particular importance: deterrence of non-compliance; confidence-building; removal of uncertainty; and treaty assessment.

Through its primary role in holding out a credible prospect of detection of non-compliance with an agreement, verification serves to protect the security of all the parties to an agreement. When adequate and effective verification increases the risk of detection that a prospective violator would face, the temptation to seek advantage by violating an agreement is reduced and deterrence is enhanced. There are political costs to a violator in being exposed.

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

Second, verification also seeks to demonstrate compliance, not merely non-compliance or possible non-compliance. Continued evidence of compliance with an agreement can develop and maintain confidence in the intentions of other parties. The concept of good faith is central to the law of treaties as a whole, and arms control in particular, and is applicable both to the fulfilment of treaty obligations and to their interpretation. Thus, increased trust based on demonstrated good faith could have positive benefits for the conduct of relations between the States in question as well as for international relations generally. Equally so, the cynical assumption of the automaticity and inevitability of bad faith on the part of the other side negates the whole arms control process and risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Verification has a third role, however -- perhaps even the most important -- that of clarifying facts and removing uncertainty where doubts arise. When an ambiguous activity is detected, an effective verification system will counteract false alarms by producing clear evidence. If uncertainty continues with respect to an activity's legitimacy, it may be an indication of an inadequacy in a treaty provision, as much as an indication of bad faith.

Finally, verification can provide a means of surveillance and appraisal of the effectiveness of the treaty itself. By providing a broad range of objective, operationally relevant data, verification provisions can provide an invaluable information base for the continuing review and assessment of a treaty's operation in practice and, perhaps, point the way to possible changes in either the substance of the treaty or its manner of application, as well as providing useful and instructive guidelines for future treaties.

It was with these considerations in mind that we invited heads of the Conference on Disarmament and observer delegations to attend the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal on 14-17 May 1987. The Workshop was intended to provide tangible evidence that the Canadian Government takes seriously the responsibility which the Conference on Disarmament has accepted "to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space". It will be recalled that the Canadian delegation has already submitted a series of working papers to the Conference on Disarmament on this subject. We have tabled three working papers dealing respectively with the stabilizing and destabilizing characteristics of arms control agreements on outer space; with international law relevant to arms control in outer space; and with terminology relevant to outer space.

These working papers were not meant to propound a specifically Canadian governmental viewpoint, but rather to build upon and contribute to the pool of information in this area and to outline the issues as comprehensively as possible. Consistent with this objective, the purpose of the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal, and I thank the distinguished representative of India for his kind comments, was to provide an opportunity for an exchange of views, in an informal setting, on a number of broad legal questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, focusing in particular on the current legal régime relevant to outer space. The Workshop also exposed

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

participants to the presentation of some of the results of Canadian PAXSAT research concerning the use of space-based remote sensing techniques for arms control and disarmament verification.

Today, I would like to table a summary report on the Outer Space Workshop as CD/773, together with its annex, the detailed report. The report seeks to provide a distillation of the issues and viewpoints which emerged during discussions at the various segments of the Workshop. In keeping with the aim and atmosphere of the Workshop, the report does not attempt to draw conclusions or recommendations from these deliberations, and we must apologize if any delegate, any observer, feels that his or her views were not adequately reported, but we have certainly done our best.

We are pleased that representatives of 35 countries, in addition to Canadian officials, and an honourable representative of the Conference on Disarmament secretariat, were able to attend the Workshop. The positive response to the Canadian Government's invitation attests, in our view, to the importance attached by all member and observer delegations of this Conference to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Canadian Government fully shares this interest and this concern. It is hoped that the Outer Space Workshop has stimulated some new ideas and approaches to this subject and brought out the complexity and variety of viewpoints on many of the questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space -- complexities and varieties which we must try to develop into common ground. Clearly, there can be no "quick fixes" in this area. It is our hope that the Outer Space Workshop has contributed, in a modest way, to our efforts to achieve progress.

I now turn to the Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals. It will be recalled that when I last spoke, I mentioned that I had carried personally the message from the Prime Minister on the Peace Run. I am glad I did not have to carry this particular Compendium with me on that occasion -- it's pretty heavy stuff. But one principle that underlies the Verification Research Programme of Canada's Department of External Affairs is that verification can be profitably examined independently of specific treaty contexts. While the verification provisions of a particular treaty must be determined by the purpose, scope and nature of that agreement, much valuable work on general principles, provisions and techniques can be done well before actual negotiations begin and, of course, during such negotiations. The work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which recently began examining the question of "verification in all its aspects", is an example of a potentially profitable international study of procedures to assist arms control negotiators.

It is for the foregoing reasons that Canada has undertaken considerable research work of a specific nature relating to verification. One aspect of that research relates to the multitude of verification proposals now extant. In the years since the Second World War, during which time arms control negotiations have been almost continuously in progress, large numbers of verification proposals have been put forward from many sources from which many lessons can be drawn. Many proposals have been made by Governments in connection with arms control topics that are still under discussion, if not active negotiation; others have been developed by interested analysts and

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

published in open literature. Even those proposals which are several years old may remain highly relevant to current conditions.-- It is for this reason that the Canadian Government has compiled a Compendium which is intended to be a quick reference catalogue to almost 700 arms control verification proposals originating in publications and statements of Governments and intergovernmental bodies as well as in academic literature on the subject. We are making this Compendium available to the Conference on Disarmament so as to ensure that all delegations have an opportunity to work from the same comprehensive information base compiled in a readily available format. The Canadian Government hopes that this will contribute to progress towards developing arms control and disarmament agreements.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement. I give the floor now to the representative of New Zealand, Dr. Graham.

Mr. GRAHAM (New Zealand): New Zealand joins Australia in submitting the Seismic Monitoring Agreement between our two countries to the Conference on Disarmament for its information. This Agreement formalizes the co-operation and exchange of information that has occurred between our two countries over many years and which will continue to develop and expand in the years ahead. Among other things this Agreement reflects the important part which seismic technology can play in arms control, especially a comprehensive nuclear test ban, something which both our countries take very seriously indeed. Pending some breakthrough on the policy issue of a CTB, it is important that the interim time be used productively to perfect a technical infrastructure which will permit verification of a complete test ban when one is concluded. We are happy to play our part in that process. It is our belief that the wisdom of concluding a CTB sooner rather than later will be accepted before very much longer by all the parties involved.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and now I give the floor to the last speaker for today, the representative of China, Ambassador Fan.

Mr. FAN Guoxiang (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. President, not so long ago I extended my congratulations to you and today I wish to express warm congratulations to you on your outstanding achievements. I wish also once again to express our gratitude to the Ambassador of Egypt for his work. I wish also to express my respect to those outstanding colleagues who have left or are leaving us, namely Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Tonwe of Nigeria, who is leaving us soon, and the Ambassador of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala, who has got another assignment. This is a normal thing to happen in the Conference on Disarmament, people coming and going. However, when I see so many outstanding colleagues leaving us, I feel rather sad.

In my statement today, I wish to offer some comments on the prevention of arms race in outer space. The prevention of an arms race in outer space has become an issue of increasing concern to the peoples throughout the world. This is well justified. There is a Chinese saying, "The tree leaves do not rustle unless there is wind". With the intensified efforts of the two major space Powers to develop space weapons, people cannot but worry about the dire

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

prospect that weapons might be deployed in outer space. When the first man-made Earth satellite entered into orbit and when the first Apollo spacecraft made a successful landing on the Moon, the people of the world warmly hailed these remarkable achievements as pioneers to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space by man. At that time, people were not concerned about an arms race in outer space.

However, today, 30 years later, outer space is congested with various types of satellites and space vehicles for military purposes. Besides, as land-based weapons capable of hitting objects in outer space appeared a long time ago, the emergence of exotic space-based weapons is no longer something inconceivable or remote. It has become a well-known fact that in recent years the two major space Powers have increased their efforts to develop space weapons. While one major space Power, investing huge amounts of financial and human resources in developing space weapons, has claimed from time to time that "breakthroughs" have been achieved, the other major space Power, not willing to be outdone, has openly declared that it will never allow itself to lag behind. Chasing each other, the two are locked in a fierce competition. Naturally, people will not turn a blind eye to all this. Although the two are conducting negotiations on space weapons -- talks between them are better than no talks -- they have not hitherto been able to make any substantive progress in banning space weapons. At present, they differ only on the speed and scope of the development of space weapons. What they are seeking is a timetable based on their respective needs for the development of space weapons rather than a true prohibition of all types of space weapons. The stark reality that the two major space Powers are vying with each other in the development of space weapons has naturally aroused grave concern in the international community. The fact that the Conference on Disarmament was able to establish smoothly an Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space fairly early in 1987, is in a certain sense, a reflection of the sense of urgency that the people of all countries have in their grave concern about the arms race in outer space.

The international community has another reason for its concern about the arms race in outer space, for it will lead to a qualitative escalation of the arms race between the two super-Powers. Their strategic nuclear forces are now in a rough equilibrium, with neither side being able to overwhelm the other. An extension of the arms race into outer space is bound to bring about new changes in the strategic stances of the two sides, make nuclear disarmament even more complicated and difficult and exacerbate the spiral escalation of the arms race, thus jeopardizing international peace and security. The grave consequences of such extension of the arms race into outer space affect more than the security of the two major space Powers. Many countries are already worrying that the various types of missiles with nuclear warheads produced by the two major nuclear Powers might fly to and fro over their airspace. Once weapons are deployed in outer space, disaster may befall any country at any moment. The peoples throughout the world are naturally more worried about this. Therefore, prevention of an arms race in outer space and of the weaponization of outer space is an issue of major importance that concerns the security of the people of all countries.

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

As already stated, the two major space Powers are at present the only countries that possess and are continuing the development of space weapons. They have naturally become the focus of attention of the international community. They ought to assume special responsibility for halting the arms race in outer space. If the two major space Powers truly have the political will to stop the arms race in outer space, they should adopt practical measures in undertaking not to develop, test or deploy space weapons, and on this basis conduct negotiations with a view to concluding as soon as possible an international agreement on the complete prohibition of space weapons. Resolution 41/53, on prevention of an arms race in outer space, which was adopted by the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, also "urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in the constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space".

Since prevention of an arms race in outer space was placed on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, quite a number of delegations have advanced propositions and proposals on the subject, covering a wide range of elements relating to the issue. The Ad Hoc Committee on outer space may address these proposals in an orderly manner on the basis of a consensus view on their priorities to be determined according to their relevance to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Attention should be focused on the study and solution of the issues that are most directly related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. At present, there are already many proposals before us on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Some delegations suggest that an agreement on the prohibition of ASAT weapons should be reached first. Since ASEP weapons are the space weapons that exist at present, to start with their prohibition is of certain practical significance. The Chinese delegation, therefore, can go along with this proposal. However, I wish also to point out that the prohibition of other types of space weapons should by no means be ignored. These include the exotic ABM space weapons, such as directed energy weapons, kinetic weapons and other types of space weapons currently being developed by the two major space Powers. We should prohibit all kinds of space weapons.

Last year, in my statement on prevention of an arms race in outer space, I noted that the existing international agreements on outer space were reached under respective specific circumstances at the time of their conclusion. Therefore they all have certain limitations. With the development of space science and technology, especially due to the fact that the two super-Powers have been using new technologies to extend their arms race into outer space, These legal instruments, though of positive significance, no longer entirely suit the present needs and are not adequate for the prevention of an arms race in outer space in a fundamental way. In order to attain the ultimate goal of the "demilitarization of outer space", it is necessary to conduct negotiations on new international agreements, with the "non-weaponization" of outer space as the main objective at the present stage. If the arms race is to be prevented from extending into outer space, this work should no longer be delayed.

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

Outer space, a common heritage of the whole of mankind, should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. China is opposed to an arms race in outer space. We oppose it, no matter who conducts it. We have consistently advocated that the exploration and utilization of outer space must be carried out in the service of peace and of the economic, scientific and cultural development of all countries and for the benefit of the entire human race. China, the first inventor of ancient rockets, once made its contributions to human civilization and progress. Today, the Chinese people are also engaged in peaceful uses of outer space. Our space technology, though still at the stage of research, experiment and initial application, has already started its service in peaceful uses of outer space. China has already entered into co-operation and exchanges with some countries and international organizations in the peaceful exploration and uses of outer space. China has launched and is going to launch a variety of applications satellites covering geodesy, geo-resources surveys, communications, broadcasting, meteorology, etc. They have contributed and will continue to contribute vigorously to China's economic modernization and to its economic, scientific and cultural exchanges with other countries. The Chinese people will do their best to this end.

Thanks to the able guidance of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy and the active participation of many delegations, the 1987 Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space has made some progress in its work. Through an extensive exchange of views, some issues have been clarified. This has contributed to a better understanding of the positions and views of all parties. This year, some delegations have submitted new proposals on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Meanwhile, the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has also conducted deliberations on the issue of outer space, particularly on its priority position. There has been a deeper understanding of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and a willingness to work actively for the realization of that goal.

Before concluding my statement, I wish also to avail myself of this opportunity to express my profound gratitude to Ambassador Beesley of Canada and, through him, to the Government of Canada for the opportunity accorded to me to participate in the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal. The valuable efforts made by the Canadian delegation to promote the work of the Conference on Disarmament on preventing an arms race in outer space are recognized by all.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his statement. This concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I recognize the representative of India, Ambassador Teja.

Mr. TEJA (India): I am taking the floor in my capacity as the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 on agenda item 3. I would like to introduce, on behalf of the Group, the draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 3, as contained in document CD/515/Rev.3, dated 21 July 1987, which has already been circulated. It is universally accepted that the subject of the prevention of nuclear war, as covered by this agenda item, is of critical importance to the international community. This importance is also reflected in the joint statement of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, issued in November 1985, that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought. The Group of 21 believes that the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee with the proposed mandate would enable us to commence serious

(Mr. Teja, India)

discussions on this subject in the Conference on Disarmament. We hope that the draft will facilitate a discussion being taken in the Conference. I would therefore request you, Mr. President, on behalf of the Group of 21, to put this mandate to the Conference on Disarmament for a decision at the earliest possible time.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Teja for introducing this document.

In conformity with the timetable for this week, I should like to recall that, immediately after this plenary, a meeting of Contact Group "A" of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons will be held in this same room.

Before I adjourn today's plenary meeting, I should like to inform you that, at our next plenary meeting on Thursday, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, His Excellency Leo Tindemans, will be addressing this Conference as our first speaker. On that particular occasion, I should like to announce that our plenary meeting will start at 10.30 a.m., instead of at the usual time of 10 a.m., in order to accommodate the Minister's schedule. If I see no objection, I shall take it that we can proceed accordingly.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will meet on Thursday, 23 July, at 10.30 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.