



Security Council

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

(for the period 12 January-24 July 1987)

Introduction

1. In its resolution 594 (1987) of 15 January 1987, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further interim period of six months and twelve days, until 31 July 1987. The Council also reiterated its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; re-emphasized the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, approved by resolution 426 (1978); called upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate; and reiterated that UNIFIL should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the resolution and to report to the Council thereon.

Organization of the Force

2. As of July 1987, the composition of UNIFIL was as follows:

Military personnel

| | | | |
|---------|-------------------------|-----|-----|
| Fiji | HQ UNIFIL | 6 | |
| | Infantry battalion | 614 | |
| | Military police company | 7 | 627 |
| Finland | HQ UNIFIL | 15 | |
| | Infantry battalion | 504 | |
| | Military police company | 9 | 52H |

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|--------------|---|-----------|---------------------|
| France | HQ UNIFIL | 32 | |
| | Composite battalion (maintenance company, defence company, armoured escort company, bomb disposal detachment) | 479 | |
| | Military police company | <u>10</u> | 521 |
| | | | |
| Ghana | HQ UNIFIL | 27 | |
| | Infantry battalion | 836 | |
| | Engineer company | 60 | |
| | Military police company | <u>10</u> | 933 |
| Ireland | HQ UNIFIL | 12 | |
| | Infantry battalion | 649 | |
| | HQ Camp Command | 71 | |
| | Military police company | <u>13</u> | 745 |
| Italy | HQ UNIFIL | 4 | |
| | Helicopter unit | <u>44</u> | 48 |
| Nepal | HQ UNIFIL | 11 | |
| | Infantry battalion | 834 | |
| | Military police company | <u>5</u> | 850 |
| Norway | HQ UNIFIL | 34 | |
| | Infantry battalion | 655 | |
| | Maintenance company | 175 | |
| | Military police company | <u>17</u> | 881 |
| Sweden | HQ UNIFIL | 8 | |
| | Logistic battalion | 629 | |
| | Military police company | <u>8</u> | 645 |
| TOTAL UNIFIL | | | <u><u>5 778</u></u> |

The deployment of UNIFIL as of July 1987 is shown on the annexed map.

3. In addition to the above personnel, UNIFIL was assisted by 74 military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). They manned the five observation posts along the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line and a post at Chateau de Beaufort. They also maintained a mobile team at Tyre and operated seven mobile teams in the UNIFIL area. These unarmed officers are organized as Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) and are under the operational control of the Commander of UNIFIL, Major-General Gustav Häggglund.

4. The Lebanese army unit serving with UNIFIL maintained a strength of 128 all ranks. The bulk of the unit was stationed in Tyre and small elements were stationed in Arzun, AL Yatun and Qana. It is with regret that I have to report the

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murder by unknown assailants, on 24 June, of the Lebanese army captain who served as Tyre liaison officer to UNIFIL.

5. Logistic support for UNIFIL was provided by the Swedish logistic battalion, elements of the French composite battalion, the Norwegian maintenance company, the Ghanaian engineer company and the Italian helicopter unit, as well as certain civilian sections (notably those responsible for communications and vehicle maintenance). The Foreign Minister of France has informed me of his Government's decision to withdraw during 1987 the explosive ordnance detachment which forms part of the French composite battalion and is responsible for mine clearing and the defusion or destruction of explosives and ordnance. I have contacted other Governments contributing troops to UNIFIL about the replacement of this important unit and I hope that this will be arranged shortly.

6. During the reporting period, the Force Commander continued to implement a number of measures which had been decided on in late 1986 and early 1987 in order to enhance the Force's effectiveness and improve the security of its personnel. Amongst these was the introduction of revised Standing Operating Procedures designed to ensure both that the tasks assigned to individual units are realistic and practicable in the prevailing circumstances in southern Lebanon and that those tasks are carried out in as uniform a manner as possible by all units in the Force. Minor changes were made in the sectors assigned to each battalion, in the light of experience gained after the major redeployment which had taken place at the end of 1986. The Force Commander continued to take all possible measures, within the resources available, to improve the physical security of the positions occupied by the Force. The crash programme initiated in 1986 has now become a continuing programme, to which I have instructed General Hägglund to give high priority. Progress was also made in rendering operational the composite mechanized company which has been established as the Force Mobile Reserve of UNIFIL (see S/18581 and Corr.1, para. 9). On 1 June 1987, the first elements of this unit moved into their new quarters at position 1-15 near Qana. It comprises Fijian, Finnish, Ghanaian, Irish and Nepalese elements. A Norwegian component will shortly be added to it, with the result that all six infantry battalions will be represented. The Government of Finland has generously agreed to add eleven armoured personnel carriers to its contingent-owned equipment and to make these vehicles available for use by the Force Mobile Reserve. Efforts are being made to arrange for the addition of the six remaining armoured vehicles required to bring the unit's vehicle holdings up to strength.

7. UNIFIL has had increasing difficulty in obtaining the land and buildings it needs, for example for the establishment of new positions. Under arrangements made when the Force was set up, UNIFIL rents these directly from the owners to whom the rent due is then paid by the Lebanese authorities. Since no payments have been made since 1984, land owners have become reluctant to make additional land and buildings available to the Force, and some of those with whom rental agreements already exist are pressing UNIFIL to vacate their premises because of the non-payment of the rent to which they are entitled. I have raised this matter with the Lebanese authorities and I hope that the problem will be solved soon.

8. During the period under review, five members of the Force lost their lives, A French soldier was killed in an explosion while defusing a roadside device. Two Ghanaians, an Irish, and a Norwegian soldier died as a result of accidents or from other causes. In addition, six soldiers were wounded by hostile action. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, 144 members of the Force have died, 58 of them as a result of firing and mine or bomb explosions, 61 in accidents and 25 from other causes. More than 200 have been wounded by firing or mine/bomb explosions.

Situation in the UNIFIL area

9. The situation in the UNIFIL area remained essentially unchanged. Israel continued to maintain in southern Lebanon its "security zone", which is manned by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and the so-called "South Lebanon Army" (SLA). The boundaries of the "security zone" have not been defined but are in effect determined by the forward positions of the IDF and the SLA. The "security zone" includes the area adjacent to the international border, parts of the Nepalese, Irish and Finnish battalion sectors, the Norwegian battalion sector and sizeable areas to the north of the UNIFIL area of operation. Within the battalion sectors mentioned, the IDF and the SLA maintained a total of 19 positions, of which 17 were manned permanently. During the reporting period, a position south of Kaoukaba was vacated and two new positions were established, one north of Bayt Yahun and the other south-west of At Tiri. Of three adjacent positions south of Brashit only one is now in use. IDF personnel have been observed in SLA positions on numerous occasions and the two forces often operate together. During the reporting period, there appeared to be a general increase in IDF strength in the "security zone", notably at the IDF position overlooking the Akiya Pridge in the Finnish sector.

10. Armed resistance groups continued to launch frequent operations against the IDF and the SLA using small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, rockets and mortars, as well as roadside bombs. UNIFIL recorded 5 such operations in the second half of January, 5 in February, 12 in March, 9 in April, 7 in May, 7 in June, and 11 in the first half of July 1997. Many more operations were reported from those parts of the "security zone" where UNIFIL is not deployed. In the UNIFIL area, most of the resistance operations were limited in scope and involved mainly the laying of mines; and small ambushes. But there were also a number of larger, co-ordinated attacks, which were undertaken by groups of up to about 150 men and included increasingly accurate mortar fire on IDF/SLA positions. The most serious of these incidents are described in the paragraphs that follow.

11. About half of the resistance operations recorded by UNIFIL were directed against two adjacent "security zone" positions on Tallet Huqban which overlook the villages of Kafra and Yatar in the Nepalese battalion sector. The personnel in those positions fired frequently at civilian as well as UNIFIL targets within their range. Three civilians were killed and four wounded and two Nepalese soldiers of UNIFIL were also wounded by such firing. The situation in that part of the UNIFIL area remained very tense throughout the reporting period; most of the inhabitants of Kafra and Yatar have left their villages and those that remain in Yatar require UNIFIL escort to travel to and from the village. Similarly, UNIFIL provides escorts for people working in the fields in that area. A particularly serious

incident took place on 13 June, when several small groups of **armed** elements in a co-ordinated operation ambushed an **SLA** convoy on its way from Tallet **Huqban** to **Sribbin**. Three **SLA** personnel **were** killed and several others **wounded**. **Subsequently**, the **armed** elements surrounded and disarmed the UNIFIL sentries at post 5-24 A, a checkpoint outside **Haris**. The items **taken** from the sentries **were returned** later that **day**.

12. Another **troubled area** **was** the **triangle** between Akiya Bridge, **Qabrikha** and Ett Taibe in the Finnish battalion sector. In addition to **roadside bombs**, **mortar attacks and ambushes**, **co-ordinated** ground attacks on IDF and **SLA** positions **were** carried **out on** 16 January and during the night of **17/18** April 1987. The latter **incident** began in the evening **of** 17 April, when the IDF and **SLA** positions near Akiya Bridge came under **mortar fire from north of the Litani**. The IDF reinforced the positions, returned **fire with tanks, artillery and mortars** and deployed helicopter gunships. Later in the night, the two positions **again came under mortar fire**, as did an **SLA** position at **Al Qantarrah**. Shortly **thereafter**, approximately 60 armed elements launched a ground attack on the latter position. The attackers were repelled and suffered **casualties**. **At about the same time**, a **civilian vehicle** approached the **Akiya Bridge** from the north. The two Finnish sentries on duty at the UNIFIL checkpoint there tried to **warn** the vehicle off because of the **heavy** firing in the area. However, the occupants **of** the vehicle, who **turned** out to be armed elements, overpowered **and** disarmed the sentries. They **took them to a nearby** Finnish position where the troops were in shelters because **of** the firing. Using the sentries **as** hostages, the armed elements disarmed the troops. Finally they withdrew, taking with them 16 rifles and 2 military radios **as well as money and other** personal effects. Most **of** these items **were** subsequently returned.

13. The IDF and the **SLA** fired frequently from their positions or when on **patrol in the** "security zone", making movement within the range of their **weapons** very hazardous. As already mentioned, the people in the **Kafra/Yatar area** were particularly harassed **by such firing**. When attacked, the IDF and the **SLA** generally responded with heavy shelling from **tanks and mortars** as well as from Israeli artillery located in the "security zone". In addition, Israeli helicopter gunships were deployed. On a number of occasions fire was directed at inhabited areas in retaliation for an attack. On 28 January a man was **killed in Brashit**, and on 19 March a **young boy in Kafra** was seriously injured **by such firing**.

14. A **new** development during the reporting period was the movement of IDF **patrols** forward of the "security zone" into the UNIFIL area, **bypassing** UNIFIL positions. On a number of occasions this led to clashes with **armed** elements from nearby villages who mobilized **to** confront the IDF patrols **when** their presence **became known**. **The following such incidents** were reported **by** UNIFIL:

(a) On 28 March, an IDF patrol moved to the vicinity of **Zibqin** in the Nepalese **battalion** sector, where it was confronted by armed elements. **An exchange of fire ensued**, in which three of the armed elements were killed and **five** Israeli **soldiers were wounded**. **Subsequently**, a **tense confrontation developed** between UNIFIL and armed elements wishing to pass checkpoints **S-5 and 5-6 to join the fight** against the IDF. **Tension** was eventually defused through **negotiation**;

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(b) A similar confrontation was averted on 29 June, when a UNIFIL patrol encountered a group of Israeli soldiers who had set up an ambush on a road north of Majdal Silm in the Irish battalion sector. The UNIFIL patrol deployed and called in reinforcements which arrived within a few minutes. At this point, the Israeli soldiers withdrew!

(c) In the early hours of 2 July, an IDF patrol was confronted by armed elements south of Frun in the Finnish battalion sector. Following an exchange of fire, wounded were reported on both sides;

(d) A very serious confrontation developed on 6 July, following reports that an IDF patrol had moved to a hill feature west of Yatar, in the Nepalese battalion sector. From 0815 hours local time, armed men began to arrive from the direction of Siddiqin; they broke through UNIFIL checkpoint 5-5 and deployed near position 5-6 from where they began to fire. An intensive exchange ensued which lasted until late in the evening and covered the area between position 5-6 and the villages of Kafra and Yatar. In addition to automatic weapons, the armed elements, whose number reached about 150, used mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. The IDF employed helicopter gunships, tanks, artillery and mortars. In the course of the day, armed elements made several attempts to enter position 5-6 and in the late afternoon a strong group of men forced its way inside and fired from the position at the Israeli helicopters. The Deputy Force Commander went to the scene with reinforcements but was held up by the heavy firing. With the help of local leaders of the Amal Movement, the armed elements were persuaded to leave the position at 2100 hours;

(e) The next morning, the IDF/SLA operated again in the Yatar/Kafra area, supported by helicopter gunships. They were again engaged by armed elements. Sporadic firing continued until the evening, including artillery, tank and mortar fire, which forced the Nepalese troops in position 5-6 to move into their shelters. At 2130 hours local time, some 100 armed elements occupied the position again. The Force Commander gave orders to clear the position by force at first light but, following contacts with a local Amal leader, the armed elements left it before the order came into effect.

15. On 1 July, UNIFIL observed earth works being carried out by an SLA working party on what was apparently to become a new position on a hill some 1,200 metres forward of the present SLA position at Al Qantarrah. After investigation, UNIFIL occupied the site without incident on the afternoon of 2 July. In subsequent contacts with the Israeli military authorities the Force Commander made it clear that he could not accept any extension of the Israeli "security zone" into the area at present controlled by UNIFIL and that he would set up a permanent UNIFIL position on the hill in question if this was necessary to prevent the establishment of an IDF/SLA position there. On 6 July, the IDF informed the Force Commander that they would not pursue their project, since UNIFIL intended to set up a position of its own on the hill,

16. The IDF and, more frequently, the SLA fired at or close to UNIFIL positions and vehicles on an almost daily basis. In a few cases, this happened at a time when the IDF/SLA were responding to attacks by armed elements. But in most cases

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the firing was both unprovoked and, apparently, deliberate. During the reporting period, three UNIFIL soldiers were wounded by such firing. In addition to the two mentioned in paragraph 11 above, a Nepalese soldier sustained injuries on 1 June, when a mortar round fired from inside the "security zone" hit UNIFIL position 5-14. In another serious incident, on 12 May, several rounds were fired from an Israeli tank at position 6-14C north of Majdal Salm. One round exploded inside the position, fortunately causing only material damage. UNIFIL protested about some 300 of these incidents to the Israeli military authorities and pressed them to honour repeated undertakings to put a halt to such actions.

17. There were also a number of incidents between UNIFIL and armed elements. These arose mainly from the denial of passage to armed persons at UNIFIL checkpoints and they were most serious when this happened in the context of an operation against the IDF or the SLA (see paras. 11, 12 and 14 above). On 50 occasions during the reporting period, unidentified armed elements fired at or close to UNIFIL positions.

18. A very serious incident occurred in the early hours of 28 January, when a building in Tibnin which served as accommodation for 18 Irish soldiers was destroyed by explosive charges. Fortunately, some of the charges failed to go off, though two soldiers were injured. Despite immediate investigation, it has not been possible to determine who carried out this action.

19. The general decline of the Lebanese economy, including the rapid depreciation of the Lebanese pound and related price increases, has brought serious hardship to many families in the UNIFIL area. One result has been a rise in property crimes - robberies, burglaries, thefts - of which UNIFIL personnel have occasionally been the victims. On three occasions during the reporting period, unarmed military observers of OGL were robbed at gunpoint. A more serious incident, which had tragic consequences, took place on 20 May. In the early hours of that day, two men entered UNIFIL position 8-1 in Kafr Dunin, through a breach that had been made in the fence surrounding the position. Having removed a load of timber from the stores of the Chanaian engineer company, they again entered the position but were spotted by a UNIFIL sentry who fired at them. Both intruders regrettably died from their wounds.

20. UNIFIL continued to co-operate with the Lebanese authorities, United Nations agencies and programmes, the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations in extending humanitarian assistance to the local population. Co-operation with the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator remained particularly close. In May, UNIFIL distributed some 1,000 tons of foodstuffs and a large amount of medicines, financed by various European organizations and shipped by sea to Tyre. As before, many Lebanese were treated at UNIFIL medical centres and some 3,600 at the UNIFIL hospital in Naqoura, including more than 200 in-patients.

21. From time to time, the families of prisoners known or believed to be held in a prison in El Khiam in the Israeli "security zone" have sought the help of UNIFIL in having the prisoners released or in obtaining permission to visit them or in simply discovering their fate. UNIFIL has been unable to assist these families, since the

Israeli authorities profess total non-involvement with the prison and refer all such requests to the SLA, which has denied access to the prisoners not only to representatives of UNIFIL, but also to those of other international organizations, notably the International Committee of the Red Cross.

22. During the reporting period, the Lebanese authorities and a number of Lebanese personalities drew my attention to the damage that was being done to the archaeological site of Tyre because of the illegal excavation and sale of antiquities. It was recalled that reference had been made to this matter in Security Council resolution 459 (1979). The question was raised as to whether the mandate of UNIFIL could be extended in order to give it responsibility for protecting the antiquities of Tyre. I expressed my grave concern at the damage that was reportedly being done to the archaeological heritage in Tyre, but had to point out that: (a) control of illegal digging was a police function which would not normally be undertaken by a peace-keeping force; (b) it would require much manpower at a time when UNIFIL was already stretched in carrying out the other functions entrusted to it by the Council; and (c) as most of the Tyre archaeological site was outside the current area of operation of UNIFIL, a geographical, as well as a functional, extension of its mandate would be required, which might not be acceptable to all the parties concerned. I have however instructed the Force Commander to discuss with the Lebanese authorities what UNIFIL might be able to do to help in this matter, without any change in its mandate and within its existing manpower and priorities.

Financial aspects

23. By section IV of its resolution 41/179 A of 5 December 1986, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for UNIFIL at a rate not to exceed \$12,125,000 gross (\$11,922,000 net) per month for the 12-month period beginning 19 January 1987, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the period of six months authorized under its resolution 586 (1986). By its resolution 594 (1987) of 15 January 1987, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNIFIL to 31 July 1987. Should the Council decide to extend UNIFIL beyond its current mandate period, the costs to the United Nations for maintaining the Force during a six-month extension period would be within the commitment authorized by the Assembly in its resolution 41/179 A, assuming continuance of the Force's existing strength and responsibilities. In the event that the current strength of the Force is increased or its mandate is extended beyond 31 January 1988, the Secretary-General will report to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and to the General Assembly during its forty-second session on the additional requirements needed for maintaining the Force.

24. In paragraph 25 of my last report (S/18581 and Corr.1), I drew to the Council's attention the serious financial situation faced by the Force. I regret to have to report that the situation has not changed and, in fact, has continued to deteriorate. UNIFIL has always encountered difficulty in meeting its expenses, particularly as regards the reimbursement of troop costs at the full rate set by the General Assembly. This has been due to a shortfall in the UNIFIL Special

Account resulting from the non-payment of assessed contributions, in whole or in part, **by** certain **Member States**. In my last report, I mentioned that the United States Government has informed **me** that the Administration was **seeking** from Congress a supplemental appropriation of \$21.6 million. The requested supplemental **appropriation was not approved. Because** substantial arrears due from various **Member States remain unpaid**, the accumulated shortfall in the UNIFIL **Special Account** was estimated to have reached \$281 million at the beginning of July 1987. Consequently, reimbursement to the troop-contributing Governments **has** continued at the reduced **rate** of \$600 per person per **month**.

Observations

25. The situation in southern Lebanon **has** remained highly unstable. The refusal of Israel to withdraw completely and **its insistence on maintaining** the "security zone" **continue to thwart** efforts to **start a process to restore international peace and stability** in the **area**.

26. **In the central part of the area of UNIFIL** (and to the north of it) the **various Lebanese** resistance groups **have** intensified their **campaign against the IDF and its Lebanese allies**, who have often responded with great violence to attacks **against** their positions. The main sufferers **from these** hostilities have been the civilian population. **Several villages in the area of UNIFIL have again become depopulated**, their **inhabitants living as refugees** in villages further from the "security zone" or in Tyre. UNIFIL **has** continued to do all it **can** to protect civilians, in close co-operation **with the** Local Leaders.

27. UNIFIL has also **been** affected **by these hostilities**. In several cases, UNIFIL positions have **been** occupied by armed elements engaged in attacks against IDF/SLA positions and UNIFIL positions, especially in the Nepalese sector, continue to **be** the target of deliberate **harassing fire by the** IDF and **more** frequently **by the SLA**. They **are also, on occasions**, caught in cross-fire during armed exchanges **between the IDF/SLA and** resistance groups. Regrettably, one soldier was killed and six **were** wounded as a result of hostile action during the current mandate period. I would like, however, to point out that **this is** in sharp **contrast to the** 10 killed and 43 wounded in the period which ended on 19 January 1987.

28. The security **measures and the new operating procedures** introduced **by the Force Commander** have contributed **significantly to the** decline in casualties. **But the need for the greatest vigilance** remains: UNIFIL soldiers are carrying **out their responsibilities** in a highly volatile part of the world and there will be **no relaxation in my efforts to enhance their security. I renew my appeal to all those** involved in the **hostilities in southern Lebanon to treat, UNIFIL and its personnel with the respect due to those sent on a mission of peace at the request of the Lebanese Government and with the full backing of the international community, to help them fulfil their tasks and to do nothing which could put their lives at risk.**

29. As for the Governments involved, their positions remain as I have described them in my last report (S/18581 and Corr.1, paras. 30-32). As there has been no change in the position of the Government of Israel, it has again proved impossible

to **make** progress towards implementation of Security Council resolution **425 (1978)**, which requires complete **withdrawal of Israeli forces** from Lebanon. It is also a **matter of great regret** that the assassination of Prime Minister **Rashid Karame** of Lebanon on 1 June 1987 **has** proved a major setback to the hopes expressed in my last report that **progress would** be made **towards national** reconciliation in Lebanon.

30. In these **circumstances** - the continuing Israeli presence **and the inability** of the central Government of Lebanon to **exercise** effective authority - violence persists in the southern **part of the country**. In **this very** complicated **situation**, it remains exceedingly difficult **for** UNIFIL to carry **out** its **task of** preventing hostile activity and **restoring** international peace and security, without, from **time to time**, finding itself **in confrontation with one or more of the parties**. It is greatly to the credit **of** General **Hägglund** and those under his command that they have **been** able to prevent the violence from **escalating**.

31. In a letter dated **16 July 1987**, the **Permanent Representative of Lebanon** has conveyed to **me** his authorities' request to extend UNIFIL for a further **six months**. The letter also says that the Lebanese authorities, in spite of the situation in **southern Lebanon** resulting from the continuing Israeli **presence**, are convinced that UNIFIL remains an essential element of stability and provides the **best means of** achieving **peace** and security in **the area**. For **the reasons** I have given in previous reports to the Council and especially to **avoid a vacuum** which could **cause the** present conflict to intensify **and** spread, I recommend **that the** Security Council accept the Lebanese authorities' request and renew the mandate of **UNIFIL** for a **further period of six months**, that is, until 31 January 1988.

32. I **must again**, however, draw to the Council's attention the demands that **this** recommendation **implies** for **the Governments which contribute** troops to UNIFIL. If it accepts the recommendation, **the Council** will **be asking** those Government, both **to continue to** send **their** personnel on a dangerous **mission** and to bear **much of the cost** of doing so. **While** again paying tribute to the unselfishness and dedication of the troop contributors who have responded **so** generously in the past to the **Council's** requests, I **must** underline the unfairness of **a situation in which**, because of past and present withholding by some Member States of their assessed contributions, those Governments do not receive the reimbursement which the General Assembly has decided **they should receive**.

33. Finally, I pay tribute to Major-General **Gustav Hägglund**, the Force Commander, **and to all the men and women under his** command and control, both military **and** civilian, for **the courage** and determination with **which** they have faced **another** very difficult mandate period. Their discipline and bearing have **been** of a **high** order, reflecting credit on themselves, **on their countries** and **on the United Nations**.



