

CD/PV.80
22 April 1980
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE EIGHTIETH MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 22 April 1980, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. L. SOLA VILA

(Cuba)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. BENYAMINA
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. A. DUTIONT Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. A. BEHM Ms. M. WICKES
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. A. ONKELINX Mr. J-M. NOIRFALISSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. K. PRAMOV Mr. POPTCHEV
<u>Burma:</u>	U NGWE WIN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. D.S. McPHAIL Mr. J.T. SIMARD
<u>China:</u>	Mr. LIANG Yu Fan Mr. YANG Hu Shan Mr. LUO Ren Shi Mr. PAN Zhen-Chiang Mr. XING Shie-Jie Mr. PON Yu-Shen
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. L. SOLA VILA Mr. F. ORTIZ Mrs. V. BORODOWSKY JACKIEWICH
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. RŮSEK ^{ov} Mr. P. LUKES ^v Mr. V. ROHAL-ILKIV

Egypt:

Mr. O. EL-SHAETI
Mr. M. EL-BARADEI
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. H. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. GRACZYNSKI
Mr. KAULFUSS

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PETTIFER
Mr. H. MÜLLER
Mr. W. RÖHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KÖMIVES
Mr. C. GYÖRFFY

India:

Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN
Mr. S.SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. H. SIDIK
Mr. D.B. SULEMAN
Mr. H.M.U. SILABAN
Mr. ROESTAMADJI

Iran:

Mr. H. DABIRI
Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. F. DE LUCA
Mr. C. FRATESCHI

<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. Y. OKAWA Mr. R. ISHII Mr. K. MIYATA
<u>Kenya:</u>	Mr. S. SHITEMI Mr. G.N. MUNIU
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES Mr. M. CACERES Miss L.M. GARCIA
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. D. ERDENBILEG Mr. L. ERDENECHULUUN Mr. L. BAYART
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. K. HADDAOUI Mr. M. CHRAIBI
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. R.H. FEIN Mr. H. VAGENMAKERS
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. O. ADENIJI Mr. T.O. OLUMOKO
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. M. AKRAM
<u>Peru:</u>	Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. B. SUJKA Mr. H. PAC Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. C. ENE Mr. O. IONESCU
<u>Sri Lanka:</u>	Miss H.L. NAGANATHAN

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. B.I. KORNEYENKO
Mr. V.I. USTINOV
Mr. M.P. SHELEPIN
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV
Mr. A.M. SERGUEYEV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.H. SUMMERHAYES
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C. FLOVERFEE
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY
Mr. H. DALEY
Mr. S. FITZGERALD
Mr. H. WILSON
Mr. C.G. TAYLOR

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mrs. G. DA SILVA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIC

Zaire:

Mr. KALONJI TSHIKALA KAKWAKA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): Today the Committee begins consideration of agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban", in accordance with the programme of work for the first part of the 1980 session. In addition to the documents already circulated on other occasions when the Committee has considered this item, the Committee has before it today the following documents:

(a) Document CD/86 of 24 March 1980 submitted by the Secretariat and entitled "Letter dated 24 March 1980 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the report on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, prepared pursuant to General Assembly decision 32/422 of 11 December 1979."

(b) Document CD/93 of 18 April 1980, submitted by the Belgian delegation and entitled "Prohibition of nuclear tests: proposal for an informal meeting of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of experts members of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events".

Before giving the floor to distinguished representatives, we wish to state the following: You will remember that at the 69th plenary meeting, the Committee decided to establish four Ad Hoc Working Groups, one on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, one on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, one on radiological weapons and one on chemical weapons. The mandates of those working groups are contained in documents CD/77, CD/78, CD/79 and CD/80.

I am pleased to inform the Committee that the informal consultations on the question of the chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Groups have been successful and a consensus has been reached on the nominees for appointment to these posts.

I now suggest that the Committee take a formal decision appointing Mr. El-Baradei, representative of Egypt, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on International Arrangements to Ensure Non-Nuclear Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons.

It is so decided.

I now propose that the Committee decide to appoint Ambassador Adeniji, representative of Nigeria, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

It is so decided.

(The Chairman)

Allow me now to refer to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. I propose Ambassador Kömives, representative of Hungary, for the chairmanship of this Working Group.

It is so decided.

I now propose Ambassador Okawa, representative of Japan, for the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

It is so decided.

I would like to thank all the members of the Committee for the co-operation we have received in reaching these decisions.

Mr. BEHM (Australia): When this item was considered by the Committee in March, the general considerations underlying the Australian Government's approach to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement were developed. It is not necessary for us to cover all that ground a second time, except to note once again the remarks made last year by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs when he said that, even before a trilateral comprehensive test ban agreement is presented, the Committee could begin addressing the technical and operational aspects of an international seismic detection network.

Australia thinks that it is very important that, if at all possible, we should avoid any delay between the conclusion of a multilateral treaty and the creation of an institutional framework for an international seismic detection network. Members of the Committee will recall that the leader of the Australian delegation, Sir James Plimsoll, emphasized this point in his speech of 5 February. In repeating it here, we wish to draw the Committee's attention once again to our view that the Committee must not lose any time. The elaboration of an institutional framework will be an important and significant contribution towards the achievement of a multilateral treaty. It should be addressed by the Committee as soon as practicable.

The view has sometimes been expressed that the development of appropriate and effective institutional arrangements is not really a serious matter, and that it could await the conclusion of negotiations on the text of a general treaty. In Australia's view, this is mistaken. In our opinion, the elaboration of the institutional framework is an integral part of the development of a CTB. Indeed, it is quite likely that there will be a variety of links between aspects of the general treaty and corresponding aspects of the institutional framework.

(Mr. Behm, Australia)

In his statement of 5 February, Sir James Plimsoll gave some examples of things which have to be settled before an institutional structure could be finalized. A number of delegations have discussed these examples with us. In the light of their comments and our own further examination of the question, we would like to expand our earlier suggestions to give them greater precision and clarity. In making our views more precise, we are not attempting to prescribe the Committee's work or to exclude any additional considerations. Our comments are intended to be purely illustrative. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has already made substantial progress on the technical aspects of an international seismic monitoring system and its valuable work should be taken into account.

In order to create an institutional framework, the CD would need to look at the basic means of gathering, transmitting and processing information. To be fully effective, a verification system would require a communications network which was properly co-ordinated, efficiently managed and capable of handling data in real time, that is, within one or two days of the detection of any seismic event. The links in such a communications network would need to be carefully planned, and various channels which lie outside the normal international telecommunications network would require special arrangements. A formal arrangement would have to be negotiated with WMO, for example. While these elements are perhaps not central to the theoretical basis of a CTB, they are essential if an effective agreement is to come into operation.

Before the international seismic detection network can be brought into operation, a number of important questions concerning the legal basis of an international seismic monitoring system would need to be solved. For instance, the Committee might examine whether there is a need for a separate international legal instrument or "umbrella" for the acceptance by the parties of agreed administrative and financial arrangements. This would further entail consideration of the mutual obligations and responsibilities of signatories to such an instrument, its review and amendment procedures, how States would become eligible for adherence, etc. Then, there would be the further question of the relationship between the CTB network and other international organizations such as the United Nations, the Committee on Disarmament, the World Meteorological Organization, to name but a few.

(Mr. Behm, Australia)

In addition to these legal considerations, further problems would have to be addressed. For instance, how would parties to such an instrument arrange access to communications links requiring the consent of States not parties to the multilateral CTB? There is also the question of the need for specific agreements with the host Governments of States where international data exchange centres are to be located.

In elaborating the supporting legal basis for an international seismic detection system, the Committee would also need to address the administrative and financial aspects of the system. Would the system require an administrative secretariat and, if so, what would its precise function be, where would it be situated, how would it be staffed and how would it be financed? The Committee would need to resolve these questions with respect to both the data exchange centres and the seismic detection stations. Furthermore, it would be necessary for the Committee to consider the division of staffing and financing responsibilities between the various parties to the treaty. This would entail working out the basis for a multilateral financing formula, including how such a formula might be varied in the future to take into account both increases in the number of adherents to the treaty and changes in the national criteria determining the size of the contribution by individual parties. We would also have to consider how establishment, installation and incorporation costs would be met, whether an annual report on the administrative and financial aspects of the system would be necessary and, if so, who would prepare the report, who would approve it and to whom it would be presented. This, in turn, would raise the question of whether an international management panel would be required and, if so, how its functions and composition might be determined.

Once these administrative and financial aspects had been considered, the Committee would certainly wish to examine the general question of access to data and the distribution of information. For example, how would information be made available and distributed within the network itself? How would it be

(Mr. Behm, Australia)

made available to States parties to the agreement covering the operation of the seismic monitoring system but which did not have detection stations located on their territory? Could information be made available to non-member States and international organizations? If so, on what basis? It should also be borne in mind that the data gained by an international seismic data network would be relevant not only to the monitoring of a ban on nuclear explosions, but also to the detection of all types of seismic events. Such data would therefore be of general scientific interest to geologists, geophysicists and seismologists, especially to those involved in earthquake prediction. Hence, could the information gathered by the network be made available to scientific institutions and, if so, on what basis?

There is also the related question of what role the United Nations ought to play in the institutional arrangements underpinning a CTB. Australia would favour a positive role for the United Nations in the terms of United Nations General Assembly resolution 31/90. In the third preambular paragraph of that resolution, attention is drawn to the need to improve existing United Nations facilities for the collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues in order to keep all Governments, as well as world public opinion, properly informed on progress achieved in the field of disarmament. Given the crucial role which a multilateral CTB treaty would play in boosting international confidence, the United Nations would have an essential part to play. Furthermore, resolution 31/90, which was adopted without a vote, calls upon the United Nations Secretariat to assist, on request, States parties to multilateral disarmament arrangements in their duty to ensure the effective functioning of such agreements, including appropriate review. The precise role of the United Nations in a CTB verification system would need very careful and detailed consideration.

The Committee will note that our suggestions do not go beyond the administrative aspects relating to the institutional framework of an international seismic detection system to be associated with a multilateral CTB agreement. The proposal being circulated today constitutes a first stage -- one that is

(Mr. Behn, Australia)

both realistic and appropriate. Australia is of the view that, for the time being, to attempt more to enter into questions of compliance, verification and enforcement of a CTB treaty would be unrealistic and inappropriate.

The Committee will also note that we have not raised the question of how the Committee might go about its work on CTB. We are aware of the suggestions by some delegations that there be an ad hoc working group on CTB. For our part, we do not regard the formation of working groups as an essential prerequisite to the transaction of the Committee's business. While working groups do have an intrinsic value, it is conceivable that some important items may be better handled by the Committee in its own right in either plenary or informal meetings. As the Committee is aware, the three States which are at present conducting negotiations on a trilateral CTB have expressed their intention to give a status report on progress achieved in their negotiations. We expect that this status report will have a very important bearing on both the nature of the business we conduct and the method by which we conduct it. Hence we consider that it would be premature to advance concrete proposals on the setting up of working groups and the like.

In our statement of 5 February, we expressed the view that it would be deplorable if the CD had failed to initiate work on a CTB before the next Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which begins in August. We believe that the CD could commence work on the institutional and administrative aspects during the summer part of the 1980 session. As the Committee is aware, the Seismic Experts Group is due to reconvene during the summer part of the session. Since it is possible that some of the experts have ideas on the various subjects on our list, we consider that their participation in the Committee's work on an institutional framework would be most welcome.

To sum up, therefore, Australia's position on this item is as follows: we would welcome the early conclusion of the trilateral CTB negotiations; in the meanwhile, the CD should begin discussion of the institutional and administrative aspects of the international seismic detection network; the CD might examine a wide range of organizational questions, such as those we have proposed; this work should begin as soon as is practicable, taking into account the forthcoming trilateral status report.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Comrade Chairman, first of all, I would like to congratulate you and the elected Chairmen of the Working Groups on the decision we have just taken on the Chairmanship of the Working Groups. My delegation expresses its hope that these Groups will take up their duties without delay and promote further progress in the solution of their responsible tasks.

The Committee on Disarmament focuses its activity on questions concerning a halt to the arms race and on nuclear disarmament. In doing so the Committee responds to an urgent call of the international community.

In its resolution 34/83 J, the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly requests the Committee to initiate, as a matter of high priority, negotiations, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

The letter addressed by A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, to Dr. Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations, on 11 April 1980 proposes concrete and realistic measures upon which attention should be focused in the efforts to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament in the years to come, with priority to be given to steps towards ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and a gradual reduction of their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. The German Democratic Republic views concrete preparations for negotiations to that end as a question of highest priority.

The following developments emphasize the urgency of concrete measures to stop the nuclear arms race:

Firstly, the United States Government recently took a number of decisions on long-term programmes for the expansion and modernization of all elements of their strategic triad, which heightens the danger of a new round of the arms race in strategic offensive weapons.

Secondly, by its decision taken in December 1979 on the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles on the territory of some western European countries, NATO is trying to alter to its advantage the strategic balance of forces. Thus there is an increasing risk for peoples, in particular for Europeans, to become victims of a devastating nuclear war.

Thirdly, some States, above all South Africa and Israel, have alarmingly intensified their efforts to develop and manufacture nuclear weapons. The emergence of new nuclear-weapon States would, no doubt, entail serious consequences for the maintenance of international security.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

These facts alone make it clear that effective measures to halt the nuclear arms race are becoming ever more urgent.

In the face of this situation, Erich Honecker, Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, has stated that:

"Either political détente will be complemented by military détente and thus be strengthened, or a new round of the nuclear arms race will start, with all its burdens and dangers for the peoples".

All States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, bear a great responsibility for the choice to be made between the two options.

The German Democratic Republic believes that the revocation of NATO's decision to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles on the territory of some western European countries can contribute to the attainment of this goal. In this connexion we attach particular importance to the Soviet Union's proposals of 6 October 1979. We should also recall the declaration made by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty States at their Committee session held on 5 and 6 December 1979. That declaration reiterates the urgent necessity to halt the arms race and to proceed to the implementation of practical measures of disarmament, in particular in the nuclear field.

In the opinion of my delegation, the proposal made by seven socialist States last year, and contained in document CD/4, that negotiations be held on the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed still remain highly topical.

The exchange of views held on this proposal in the Committee in 1979 was an initial and important contribution towards preparatory consultations on relevant negotiations. Compared with last year, the Committee is in a better position now, since for the first time all the nuclear-weapon States are represented in the Committee on Disarmament. This enables them to directly take part in the preparation of future negotiations.

The socialist States' proposal to negotiate on nuclear disarmament is a broad one and takes into account the complex nature of the task. We repeat that, in our opinion, a fundamental solution to the problem of nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States is possible only on the basis of a step-by-step approach. In this way the proposal is fully in consonance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Document CD/4 contains proposals for concrete measures for the preparation of substantive negotiations. We do not share the position of the representatives of certain States who say that a comprehensive approach is not possible and not

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

acceptable. We are convinced that all relevant problems can be resolved provided there is political will on the part of all nuclear-weapon States to bring about nuclear disarmament.

Does anybody really believe that negotiations will become less complicated by postponing them again? On the contrary, the continuing nuclear arms race complicates the related problems and increases the difficulties. Therefore, to dwell on obstacles and difficulties means to delay the convocation of corresponding negotiations for the preparation of internationally binding agreements on nuclear disarmament, and to let the nuclear arms race go on.

We deem it necessary to reiterate that the security interests of all States have to be considered, and that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on specific aspects of nuclear disarmament must in no way be impeded. The difference in nuclear weapon arsenals of States will have to be taken into account when determining the degree of participation in every measure.

We fully subscribe to the provision contained in paragraph 29 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly that measures of disarmament must not affect the right to security of any State. Of course, no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. For this reason, concessions which the two biggest nuclear-weapon Powers are demanded to make in advance are not acceptable. It is not difficult to realize that measures for the limitation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament, which would be applied exclusively to a few of the nuclear-weapon States, would necessarily lead to a change in the nuclear balance of forces to the advantage of other States. That means that other nuclear-weapon States would be free to expand their nuclear weapon potential and continue building up their armaments. Therefore, the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in the negotiations on this subject is necessary from the very outset in order to guarantee strict adherence to the principle of undiminished security.

Being a co-sponsor of document CD/4, the German Democratic Republic regards working paper CD/36, presented by the Group of 21, as a constructive contribution conducive to making headway in the discussion on the problem of nuclear disarmament.

On the basis of these documents and taking into account constructive proposals made by other States, such as the Nigerian proposal to freeze the existing nuclear weapon arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States at their present levels, preparatory consultations should therefore be started without delay and concrete decisions should be taken with regard to the participants, timing and procedures of such negotiations. In addition, an inventory of all measures to be taken in the entire process of nuclear disarmament could be worked out.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

We view the cessation of the manufacture of fissionable material for weapons purposes as an important partial measure but this measure should be taken in close connexion with the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons, which corresponds to paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session.

We would welcome it if all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, express their position on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament. As a result of the exchange of views, individual initiatives and ideas could be consolidated into an action plan for concrete negotiations which is acceptable to all States. The German Democratic Republic stands ready to co-operate actively in carrying out those tasks.

Comrade Chairman, in the course of this spring session some delegations, in particular representatives of NATO countries have mentioned allegedly reported use of chemical weapons in some regions of the world. The delegation of my country, which has always advocated strict adherence to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, has noted with particular concern the information furnished by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (CD/89). This document proves that chemical weapons of American origin have been used in Afghanistan by subversive bands. It is particularly alarming that these weapons were handed over to those bands from outside the country, for which the Afghan Government has irrefutable proof.

The readiness expressed by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to investigate and examine, along with competent international authorities, the use and the functioning of these American-made grenades, and to show how those mercenaries sent into the country use them against the peaceful population has to be taken seriously.

In the light of the document mentioned it is evident that accusations expressed in this Committee by NATO members, with a view to putting the blame for the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan on others, are entirely unjustified and void of any foundation. They can only heat up the atmosphere in, and strain the work of, the Committee.

Clarification of this question is all the more urgent as it could eliminate certain doubts and improve the climate in the Committee, which is essential to a successful continuation of our negotiations.

Comrade Chairman, today a document was circulated in the Committee on Disarmament (CD/91) containing a declaration by an alleged delegation of so-called Democratic Kampuchea to the Committee on Disarmament. It is generally known which States are

(Mr. Harder, German Democratic Republic)

members of the Committee. The membership of a so-called Democratic Kampuchea is a mere invention and incompatible with the agreement reached on the composition of the Committee.

My delegation resolutely protests against such impudent attempts by a clique of murderers who are responsible for the death of over three million people and whose leaders have been sentenced to death by the people of Kampuchea. Attempts to make that clique presentable, and the circulation of its slanderous documents, can only undermine the basis of the Committee's activity. In the view of my delegation they obstruct progress in our negotiations on matters of substance. The sponsors of that sort of action will have to bear the consequences.

My delegation does not intend even to take note of this document, and it expects that measures will be taken to prevent the Committee from being diverted to matters which have nothing to do with its real tasks, and which are aimed at blocking the Committee in discharging its actual responsibilities.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, first I would also like to welcome the decision taken this morning by our Committee concerning the chairmanship of the Working Groups. I think it is a decision which augurs well for the continuation of the work of this session, and I would like to assure the Committee of our desire to make the maximum contribution to the work of the various Groups; I would like here to express the hope that, at the end of the session, these various Groups may provide us with the most fruitful results possible.

The topic of our Committee's discussions this week is the complete cessation of nuclear tests.

In the general statement I made at the beginning of this session, I said that Belgium continued to attach great importance to this objective of the cessation of nuclear tests and that it welcomed any effort, even a partial one, in this direction.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events is making an undeniable contribution to such efforts.

In the report on a comprehensive nuclear test ban transmitted to the Committee by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, seismological verification is, moreover, described as "the principal component of a global control system for a nuclear test ban".

The Committee on Disarmament has been regularly informed by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts, Mr. Ulf Ericsson, of the progress of the work of that important subsidiary body of our Committee.

However, my delegation shares the concern expressed by certain other delegations to the effect that it is essential to avoid a situation in which, once a trilateral

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

agreement has been reached on the principles of a comprehensive test ban, the elaboration of a multilateral treaty might be delayed by lack of sufficient progress in the elaboration of an international system for the detection of seismic events.

The work of the Ad Hoc Group will in due course undoubtedly constitute an important element in the negotiations on means of verifying the comprehensive nuclear test ban.

At its meeting on 19 February, the Committee noted that the Ad Hoc Group would probably not be in a position to complete its work until late 1981 at the earliest.

My delegation considers, however, that it would be useful if the Committee on Disarmament could, already this year, ascertain specifically the state of progress of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and the problems which remain to be solved within the framework of its terms of reference.

The Committee should also be informed of the present possibilities of national participation in a system for the international exchange of seismic data.

The Committee should also be able to form an idea of the additional means which would have to be deployed in the various regions of the world in order that such a system might contribute effectively to the verification of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests.

To this end, the Belgian delegation suggests that the Committee on Disarmament could hold a meeting with the participation of experts members of the Ad Hoc Group in order to receive specific answers to these questions and determine what still needs to be done to ensure that the system envisaged is capable of operating effectively in due time.

If the Committee could agree to this suggestion, I am sure that Ambassador Jaipal and his secretariat would be able to contact the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to organize an informal meeting of the Committee on Disarmament for this purpose. The meeting might be held at the end of the period 7-18 July, when the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts will be holding its tenth session at Geneva.

At that time, our Committee will also be able to benefit from the experience gained during the workshop organized by the Federal Republic of Germany at the Gräfenberg Observatory on standardized procedures of handling data on seismic events.

The informal and informative nature of such a meeting would, of course, not prejudge the final results of the work of the Ad Hoc Group.

Also, the initiative which my delegation is proposing is, of course, entirely unrelated to any procedural decision which the Committee might take concerning its work on the complete cessation of nuclear tests.

Our proposal, which, I hope, will contribute to fuller understanding of the issues at stake, is described in document CD/93, which my delegation has placed before the Committee.

Miss NAGANATHAN (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, my delegation intervenes somewhat belatedly on a subject to which this Committee has already addressed itself. If my delegation intervenes late, it does so with the advantage of having been able to give more careful consideration to the several statements that were made in this Committee on this item, namely the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

We are glad that the vexed procedural question of the Chairmanships of the Ad Hoc Working Groups has now been resolved and, as is envisaged, the Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be able to commence its work in earnest as soon as our summer session resumes.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament is the one new item which our Committee decided to include in its agenda this year. Compared with the differences of view which surfaced on some of the other items on our agenda -- at least in taking the procedural step of establishing working groups -- both the inclusion of the comprehensive programme of disarmament in the agenda and the establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group were possible with perhaps the minimum of controversy. Both this Committee and the Working Group therefore commence with what might well be described as an advantage. I might add that besides the useful work undertaken by this Committee's predecessor-body, the CCD, we now have an even more authoritative guidance in the form of the recommendation of the United Nations Disarmament Commission which, during its session last year, drafted the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. These elements have now been referred to our Committee for further elaboration, so that a negotiated document could be adopted by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which is to be held in 1982.

The elements of the comprehensive programme drawn up by the Disarmament Commission include under paragraph 7 the five broad areas which the comprehensive programme of disarmament should encompass. It is not my intention to take the time of this Committee to reiterate at length the importance we ourselves attach to these separate elements. The Disarmament Commission has given due importance and emphasis to the whole range of the Programme of Action that was set out in the Final Document of the first special session just twelve months earlier. I would only wish to re-emphasize that under disarmament measures nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority. My delegation is acutely conscious of the fact that we are reiterating this at a time when the threat of a nuclear war -- at least between June 1978 and the time

(Miss Naganathan, Sri Lanka)

of the special session and now -- has by no means receded. The Cassandras might even say that recent developments have brought such an eventuality closer. It is therefore all the more important that this Committee engages itself even more earnestly on the subject of nuclear disarmament.

My delegation has dealt with what this Committee as well as the Disarmament Commission regards as the first step or measure which must be taken in the nuclear disarmament complex, namely the nuclear test ban. My delegation has commented on it during the first part of our Spring Session and, if need be, we shall revert to it.

Mr. Chairman, may I return to the purpose of my intervention which is sub-title IV of the Disarmament Commission's recommendation on the elements of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, entitled "Machinery and Procedures". This section commences with a reference to the central role of the United Nations, and includes provision for review and verification of agreed measures. Under this sub-title, the Disarmament Commission has asked this Committee to undertake "an examination of the requirements of an institutional and procedural nature, to facilitate the disarmament process and to ensure implementation of disarmament agreements including the relevant proposals referred to in paragraph 125 of the Final Document, or made elsewhere". Any programme of disarmament would have to be a subject of frequent if not constant review. No less important are arrangements for adequate verification or effective control of the agreements that have been reached. It is within the scope of institutional arrangements and the need for review and verification that Sri Lanka, during the first special session on Disarmament, introduced the proposal of my President, His Excellency J.R. Jayewardene, for the establishment of a world disarmament authority. In doing so, we described that authority as in no way intended to detract from, or diminish, the functions and powers of any existing organ or machinery within the United Nations system. We then pointed out that the establishment of such an authority would also be within the ambit of the functions and powers of the General Assembly and the Security Council, both of which are also empowered under the Charter to establish such organs as they deem necessary for the performance of their functions.

May I say that the need for such an authority or institution was seen by other delegations, which advanced certain comparable and complementary proposals which were also placed before the special session. Those ideas, and some of that thinking, have

(Miss Naganathan, Sri Lanka)

taken more tangible form in subsequent resolutions that received the approval of the General Assembly of 1979. The delegation of Pakistan, during its intervention on 20 March, referred to the need for the establishment of such an authority as the third and final phase of the measures to be included in the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Sri Lanka delegation will provide further elaboration of this proposal in the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament when it commences its work.

My delegation would wish to make only one other comment while on the subject of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. During the interventions that were made on 27 March, some delegations cautioned the Committee about the need to avoid introducing anything in the form of a calendar, or a time-frame, or deadlines, in the elaboration and negotiation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. We readily recognize the validity of that note of caution. My own delegation's brief membership of this negotiating body has provided it with education enough of the complexities of procedures, let alone disarmament negotiations per se. We can therefore have no dispute with the advice that deadlines attaching to any comprehensive programme of disarmament would have limited value, if any at all. Nevertheless, my delegation is constrained to ask whether this note of caution about time-frames is uniformly applicable to every measure of disarmament which this Committee considers. The complex of nuclear disarmament is vast and wide-ranging. We are frequently reminded that disarmament, whether in the nuclear or the conventional field, can take place only in the context of the undiminished security of all States. Disarmament negotiations are slowed, if not sometimes reversed, by events which this Committee and even the best-intended negotiators could not have foreseen.

Yet, allowing for all this, would it be unreasonable to ask that a time-frame be considered not for a disarmament measure as such, but what in fact is a prelude to the measure itself. For example, Mr. Chairman, would it be unreasonable to ask for a cessation of nuclear tests before the next special session? If that should appear like an unwarranted degree of optimism, if a test ban treaty itself is beyond our reach, is a moratorium on testing beyond our capacity to agree upon? My delegation is of course aware that at the last special session some nuclear-weapon States expressed reservations even on this.

(Miss Naganathan, Sri Lanka)

Our Committee this year has taken what many members have described as historic steps, with the establishment of four Ad Hoc Working Groups, i.e. one on Chemical Weapons, one on Negative Guarantees and one on Radiological Weapons, in addition to the Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. It is beyond our capacity to envisage a time-frame, if not for all these items, then, for some? May I conclude, Mr. Chairman, by reassuring my colleagues in this Committee that the question that I have raised is not with a view to introducing a further element of controversy into the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Rather, its purpose is to provide the Ad Hoc Working Group with some reassurance that its task should not be limited to drafting a document which will on closer scrutiny be hardly distinguishable from the Programme of Action of the special session's Final Document, or a more verbose version of the elements of the comprehensive programme of disarmament which the Disarmament Commission has referred to us.

Mr. GHAREKHAN (India): Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to offer to you our warm congratulations on your assumption of the Chair. It is a matter of satisfaction that a distinguished son of friendly Cuba is in the Chair. You can be assured of my delegation's full co-operation. I should also like to express appreciation of the excellent work done by your predecessors, Ambassador Yu Pei-Wen of China and Ambassador McPhail of Canada, who guided the work of the Committee in March and February. My delegation is also happy to note that Chairmen of the four Working Groups have been appointed. We offer them our full support in the difficult task facing them.

It is a sad commentary on the sense of priority of this Committee that the highest priority item on the disarmament agenda is taken up last. Ever since thermo-nuclear war became a horrifying reality in 1945, the international community has put nuclear disarmament at the top of the agenda in disarmament negotiations. Year after year, the United Nations General Assembly, in its numerous resolutions, has continued to attach paramount importance to the question of nuclear disarmament. The distinguished delegate of Sri Lanka has this morning emphasized the need to focus attention once again on nuclear disarmament. Nothing has happened in recent years which would justify the slightest deflection from this priority. On the other hand, developments during the past several months have once again emphasized the urgent need to make concrete progress towards the cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Europe, already the most heavily armed continent, faces a new spiral

(Mr. Gharekhan, India)

of the nuclear arms race. Deployment of a new generation of nuclear-weapon systems by one side inevitably leads to countervailing decisions by the other. SALT II, which was at best a measure of arms control but not of disarmament, also faces indefinite postponement. Military budgets of the countries belonging to the major military alliances are on the increase and research into seeking better ways by which man can destroy man is being given priority.

My delegation is deeply perturbed at the attempts which are made to enshrine doctrines of nuclear deterrence as accepted norms in international relations. The international system is sought to be structured on assumptions which equate the possession of nuclear weapons with power and influence and, more, with the right to dominate. As long as the nuclear-weapon States remain committed to such an equation, nuclear disarmament will indeed remain an ephemeral goal. Appeals by such States to others to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons, and ill-advised attempts to maintain a closed monopoly over nuclear technology, would be received with justifiable cynicism and would lack credibility. What is equally disturbing is that even some of the non-nuclear-weapon States seem to acknowledge the special security concerns of the nuclear-weapon States, thereby according legitimacy to the concept of nuclear deterrence and, by implication, to the use of nuclear weapons. We have even heard statements to the effect that there should be parity in the nuclear-weapon arsenals of all the five nuclear-weapon States before nuclear disarmament could be seriously taken up. My delegation rejects such theories.

My delegation has noted with considerable concern a kind of an offensive which has been launched during the past couple of years to divert the attention of the international community from the vital issue of nuclear disarmament to the field of conventional disarmament. It has been said that since the end of the Second World War it is conventional weapons, and not nuclear weapons, that have caused hundreds of thousands of casualties in various regions of the world. Would the proponents of such views have preferred the wars to have been fought with nuclear weapons instead of conventional weapons? As long as this world is structured as it is and as long as the root causes responsible for various conflicts remain, wars are unavoidable. It is a matter for deep and sober reflection that many millions would have died had nuclear weapons been used in such wars. Conflicts, as history has shown, have sometimes an uncontrollable propensity of escalating into regional wars and global armageddons. In such situations the very presence of nuclear weapons makes it possible that a thermo-nuclear war might break out. It is this terrifying eventuality that we need to keep our attention focussed on, and work towards, the total

(Mr. Gharekhan, India)

elimination of nuclear weapons. My delegation acknowledges that conventional disarmament is an appropriate subject for negotiations and should be taken up. But it should be pursued just where the arsenals are the largest and most destructive. An ill-advised shift of attention to conventional arms transfers would, in effect, operate against the interests of uncommitted States, since the allies of nuclear-weapon States would continue to receive arms under alliance arrangements. In our judgement, conventional arms transfer is a subject of low priority compared to the menace of nuclear war.

Nuclear-weapon States themselves, of course, are aware much more than non-nuclear-weapon States of the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war. They have repeatedly assured the international community of their sincere commitment to pursue the objective of nuclear disarmament. My delegation takes these commitments very seriously. Indeed, it is in that light that we view the SALT negotiations. Nuclear disarmament is a complex issue and it would be unrealistic to expect rapid progress. However, we feel that the degree of complexity is often exaggerated. If there is a genuine will to make progress towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race, it should not be beyond the intelligence of man to devise and implement appropriate measures in this regard. After all, the problems and the complexity are man-made and do not have a divine origin.

One of the steps that the nuclear-weapon States can take is to give an undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, pending nuclear disarmament. Such an undertaking, far from undermining their national security interests, would, we are convinced, in fact strengthen their security. The General Assembly declared as long ago as in 1961 in its resolution 1653(XVI) that "the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations". One of the nuclear-weapon States had voted in favour of that resolution. We further believe that such a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States would clear the way for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. It is, therefore, necessary to undertake negotiations towards achieving this goal.

(Mr. Gharekhan, India)

One of the obstacles, we are told, to negotiating an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons is that the security situation in Europe necessitates a strategic doctrine based on the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons even against a conventional attack. If this were indeed the case, then my delegation would like to know if any serious attempt has been made to negotiate a balance of conventional forces in Europe which would render recourse to the use of nuclear weapons unnecessary? Do the Mutual Force Reduction talks in Vienna even address themselves to the question of eliminating nuclear weapons from that continent? If Europe is indeed the key to nuclear disarmament, then we would urge negotiations which specifically answer the question: what mutually acceptable balance of conventional forces ought to be evolved in Europe, which would render the nuclear option unnecessary? As we all know, doctrines of nuclear deterrence are only used to escalate the nuclear arms race to increasingly dangerous levels. The international community might perhaps have reason to suspect that it is not the adherence to this or that doctrine which makes a non-use undertaking difficult but rather the perception of the nuclear-weapon States that possession of nuclear weapons is synonymous with power and influence.

It is true that two of the nuclear-weapon States have made bilateral arrangements on the avoidance of nuclear war. While that agreement is to be welcomed in itself, the subject of the avoidance of nuclear war is of interest to the entire international community and not just to two or three States. Impressive publicity is accorded to extensive civil defence measures that are taken to protect populations in case of an outbreak of thermo-nuclear war. We are told that, instead of perhaps 50 million people, only 25 million would be killed as a result of such measures. These bleak exercises can bring comfort only to arm-chair strategists and planners for whom human beings are expendable pawns in the serious business of maintaining the holy balance of power. For those who have assumed to themselves decisions that affect the survival of mankind, efforts to inject sobriety into our deliberations are brushed aside as impractical and irritating. My delegation, however, is confident that the non-nuclear-weapon States will continue their determined efforts to press for early and genuine progress in

(Mr. Gharekhan, India)

nuclear disarmament. We noted with interest the proposal submitted by the socialist States in document CD/4 calling for negotiations, in a practical context, for the stoppage of the production of nuclear weapons and their gradual reduction as initial measures towards achieving nuclear disarmament. We feel that such negotiations, which would be complementary to our own recommendations with respect to the non-use of nuclear weapons, should be undertaken in a working Group of our Committee, which should be set up early during the second part of the current session. It would be difficult to explain to the world at large the rationale behind setting up working groups on comparatively less important and less urgent issues, with the exception of course of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, without at the same time establishing a working group to deal with the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Chairman, this Committee was set up with high expectations to negotiate disarmament measures, not procedures. During our session these preceding weeks, we have not exactly covered ourselves with glory. We perhaps tend to forget, sitting as 40 wise men and women in this chamber, that there is a world outside which watches our activities very closely. In my statement during the early part of this session, I had said that we must ask ourselves whether we are not in danger of becoming irrelevant to the hopes and aspirations of the ordinary citizenry of the world. That danger appears to loom larger today than when I made that statement. In making a beginning, however modest, towards dispelling the threat of nuclear war, we would go a long way in genuinely discharging the mandate given to us by the world community and reassert our proper role as a multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Gharekhan for the kind words he has addressed to the Chair and to my country, and for his statement.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" to which I shall address myself in this statement is certainly, together with the item relating to the nuclear test ban, one of the most important on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. Not for nothing did the General Assembly of the United Nations, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, proclaim with the consensus of all States Members of the Organization that "existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth", which means that "mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction" and is faced by a dilemma which the Assembly posed in the following terms: "we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation".

It is therefore altogether understandable that, in the same Final Document of 1978, the General Assembly should have recognized that "all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations", which means that their representatives have not only the right but the duty to express themselves with complete candour on this matter.

What is not very easy to understand is the approach -- which I prefer not to qualify, for if I did so, the term I would have to use might seem too strong -- adopted by certain of these groups against which Dwight D. Eisenhower, with the twofold authority conferred on him by his status as President and General, put his fellow-countrymen on their guard in his farewell message. These are the groups whose influence is out of all proportion to their relatively small membership, the groups which nullified the long and strenuous efforts of the Governments signatories of the SALT II Treaty by making it impossible for that treaty to be ratified during the second half of 1979, when such ratification should normally have taken place.

It is almost one year since, on 19 June 1979, we heard Mr. Seignious, the then Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, refer in this room to what had happened in Vienna on the previous day in the following terms:

"But I can imagine no more propitious time to come before you than now, with the events of the Vienna Summit fresh in my mind. I was personally

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

moved as I witnessed the signing of the SALT II agreements. It is indeed an act of statesmanship, and a momentous occasion for the entire world, when the leaders of two nations which have the capacity to destroy each other, and in doing so to contaminate much of this planet, choose instead to work together to limit the nuclear arsenals they have within their power. This is no small accomplishment, and it has not been an easy task. SALT II took over six years to complete."

At the same meeting, the representative of the other super-Power, who is still among us, stated the following:

"The Treaty which was signed in Vienna is the result of long and strenuous efforts by both sides. The new treaty is realistic and concrete. The Treaty in essence establishes quantitative limitations on arms and curbs their qualitative improvement. It should be noted in particular that the Treaty is based on the principle of parity and equal security. Provision is made for the reliable verification of the fulfilment of all obligations under the Treaty by both sides."

Ambassador Issraelyan went on to say:

"Speaking in Vienna, L.I. Brezhnev stressed that 'Each provision -- I would even say, each word of the Treaty -- has been weighed and thought over dozens of times. Naturally, it is a compromise; it could not be otherwise. Each side would like the text of the Treaty to be somewhat different, more suitable for its interests, but each side had to give ground on some points, taking into account the partner's legitimate interests'."

I am sure that, after hearing the representatives of the two super-Powers at that memorable meeting on Tuesday, 19 June 1979, many of us may have had certain reservations in our assessment of how far the SALT II agreements just signed in the Austrian capital could be regarded as a measure of genuine nuclear disarmament; but I am equally certain that no one questioned the correctness of what the United States representative, whom I have already quoted, said in the final paragraph of his statement. That paragraph was as follows:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"All of us share a common goal -- peace with security. If each of us uses the talent, the imagination, the intelligence and the perseverance that we individually may have and that you, the major nations of the world, have as a resource, then surely you share the views of both President Carter and President Brezhnev when they agreed that there is a common bond for survival, a common bond for the reduction in the arms race and a search for the ability -- for the sake of our children and grandchildren -- to live in a secure world."

Further, I consider it axiomatic that all members of the Committee on Disarmament were especially pleased to note that among the texts approved in Vienna -- which, on the proposal of the delegation of Mexico, made at that same meeting of 19 June, were circulated as official documents of the Committee on Disarmament under the symbols CD/28 and CD/29 -- there was a paragraph in the Joint Communiqué of the two super-Powers which was worded as follows:

"Recognizing that the United States of America and the USSR have a special responsibility to reduce the risk of nuclear war and contribute to world peace, President Carter and President Brezhnev committed themselves to take major steps to limit nuclear weapons with the objective of ultimately eliminating them, and to complete successfully other arms limitation and disarmament negotiations."

Six months later, a similar position was reflected, in the resolution which the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted by consensus on 11 December 1979, thanks to patient negotiations which the delegation of Mexico had the privilege of co-ordinating.

In that resolution, 34/87 F, entitled "Strategic arms limitation talks", which is among those transmitted to us by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in document CD/55, the Assembly noted that it had not been possible for the SALT II Treaty "to go beyond certain limitations which, taken together, permit considerable increments, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to the levels of the nuclear arsenals existing at present".

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

In introducing the relevant draft resolution to the First Committee on 26 November 1979, on behalf of the eight sponsoring States (Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sweden and Mexico, all of which are members of the Group of 21 of the Committee on Disarmament), I ventured to illustrate the soundness of that view by means of a number of examples, including the following two:

"First, the number of nuclear warheads -- which are the ones which in the last analysis constitute the so-called 'nuclear weapons', since land, submarine or air launchers could more appropriately be defined as nuclear-weapon carriers -- at present possessed by the United States, according to the most authoritative informal calculations, since unfortunately on this matter there is no official figure in the documents of 18 June, stands at approximately 10,000. That figure, in accordance with what is allowed by the provisions of the SALT II Treaty, could be increased to 17,846 warheads, which represents an increase of approximately 90 per cent. Of course, none of those figures includes warheads of so-called tactical weapons. Although we also lack official information with regard to the Soviet Union, it seems that, if one takes into account the importance the latter attaches to the principle of equality, it can be asserted that its situation must be very similar, if not identical, to that of the United States as regards the proportional increase in warheads allowed by the Treaty.

"Secondly, the importance of the provisions of paragraph 9 of article IV of the Treaty, which allows both parties to test in flight and to station a new type of light intercontinental ballistic missile, its importance from the point of view of the considerable increase in the nuclear arsenals of the two States indicated in that paragraph is axiomatic if one reflects on the fact that through those provisions the United States has been authorized to develop the underground mobile missile known as MX, whose manufacture and deployment will entail a cost estimated at the astronomical figure of \$60 thousand million. The Soviet Union, of course, will have a similar authorization."

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Despite that negative and somewhat disheartening finding, which was expressed in operative paragraph 2, the Assembly, proceeding with the utmost objectivity, highlighted in paragraphs 1, 3, 4 and 5 the various positive aspects of the Treaty and of the Joint Statement signed on the same date as that instrument. Thus, the Assembly stated that it shared the conviction expressed by the United States and the Soviet Union in the Joint Statement that "early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war".

The Assembly welcomed the agreement reached by the two contracting parties with a view to "continuing to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security" in order to achieve, inter alia, the objectives of "significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms" and "qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms".

For this very reason, the Assembly, in the resolution on which I am commenting, emphatically expressed its confidence that the SALT II Treaty would enter into force "at an early date in accordance with the provisions of its article XIX, inasmuch as it constitutes a vital element for the continuation and progress of the negotiations between the two States possessing the most important arsenals of nuclear weapons" and that such negotiations, "intended to achieve, as soon as possible, agreement on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms" would begin "promptly after the entry into force of the Treaty" with the objective of "concluding well in advance of 1985" the new agreement which will replace the Treaty and which is usually referred to as SALT III.

It is well known that the confident hope thus expressed by the General Assembly of the United Nations has until now been totally frustrated. The situation in south-west Asia, which did not exist during the period June-December 1979, should not, in our view, be adduced as justification.

In an article published in the International Herald Tribune of 1 February 1980, Paul Warnke, former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, stated the following:

"Détente connotes a lessening of frictions, of dangers to world peace. As détente fades, the urgency of arms control increases ... Détente should remain a long-range goal. But control of strategic nuclear weapons is an immediate necessity ... the cause of national survival would be best served by prompt entry into force of the SALT II Treaty and renewed efforts to obtain more sweeping controls on nuclear arms ...".

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

To anyone who might argue that the foregoing views may have been influenced by the prominent role which Mr. Warnke played in one of the crucial phases of the SALT negotiations, it might be answered that Mr. Warnke is far from being alone in taking this position. Of many similar examples which could be quoted, it seems to me sufficient to mention what was stated by no less a person than Mr. Harold Brown, United States Secretary of Defense, in a recent interview published in the U.S. News and World Report of 11 February 1980:

"We are not saying that the SALT treaty that we've got is not a good idea. We think it's a very good idea. In fact, we think it's a better idea than ever now that the general level of tension between us and the Soviets has increased."

The opinion of my delegation is similar to that expressed in these two statements, as will surely be recalled by those who heard the statement which I had occasion to make at the meeting held on 5 February 1979 which inaugurated our work.

In addition to the failure to ratify the SALT II Treaty, there are other factors connected with the present and future deployment of various types of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe which would seem to make it even more urgent for the SALT III negotiations to begin without further delay.

In this connexion, I believe that the members of the Committee on Disarmament may be interested in the statement on this subject which was unanimously approved, as a result of three days of intensive work, by the Pugwash Workshop recently held at Geneva from 11 to 13 April 1980, which was attended by some 30 eminent persons -- diplomats, government officials, scientists and professors -- from NATO countries, Warsaw Pact countries and neutral countries.

The full text of this statement is as follows:

"The Pugwash Workshop wishes to stress the necessity for all States to behave in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Final Document which, as is well known, was approved by consensus at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament on 30 June 1978. Among those provisions, the following are particularly relevant in the case of nuclear weapons deployment in Europe:

- (1) That while the attainment of the objective of security is an inseparable element of peace, 'the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind'.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

- (2) That 'the adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage'.
- (3) That at each of the disarmament stages 'the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces'.

"An objective analysis of the existing situation in Europe carried out in the light of the above provisions leads to the conclusion that a workable agreement to limit nuclear weapons deployment is possible and would be advantageous to all parties. Increased security for all is more likely to be achieved by limiting -- and still better, by reducing -- nuclear weapon deployments, than by an escalating arms race, quite apart from the economic gains.

"It appears that, therefore, every effort should be made, as a matter of urgency, in order to start immediate negotiations before a point of no return is reached in a qualitative nuclear weapons race which would be an ominous development of incalculable and most dangerous consequences.

"Bearing in mind the relevant statements made by responsible officials both from NATO and the WTO, it seems feasible that the two sides adopt the few preliminary measures which would be required in order that the negotiations on a workable agreement on the limitation of nuclear weapons deployment in Europe may begin without further delay.

"Such measures, to be adopted within the framework of the three agreed principles of the Final Document quoted above, could, in the opinion of the Pugwash Workshop, be as follows:

"To facilitate negotiations under more favourable conditions, it is proposed that during the preparation of the negotiations and during the negotiations themselves, both sides should agree not to take any practical steps that would change the present balance of nuclear forces in Europe."

My delegation shares the opinion expressed by the Pugwash Workshop -- in which I had occasion to participate -- regarding the urgent need to start the negotiations concerned before, as the Workshop very aptly put it, a point of no return is reached. Accordingly, we venture to suggest that, if the SALT II Treaty does not enter into force in the very near future, serious consideration should be given to the possibility of moving to the forum of the Committee on Disarmament the disarmament negotiations which it was planned to conduct under SALT III, among

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

which the negotiations concerning the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe would occupy a position of major importance. The nuclear weapon States would thereby have the benefit of the opinions of the non-aligned and neutral members of the Group of 21 which, because of the impartial views they can justifiably be expected to hold, could contribute the element of conciliation which so often seems beyond the reach of the nuclear-weapon States, possibly because of their undue concentration on the interests of their respective military alliances.

It should not be forgotten that the Committee on Disarmament is clearly the most appropriate forum for the conduct of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Firstly, the Committee includes all five nuclear Powers among its membership. Secondly, it also has the participation of a further 35 members which may be regarded as sufficiently representative of all non-nuclear-weapon States. It is doubtless for this reason that the General Assembly of the United Nations solemnly declared that the Committee is the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum". Consequently, it seems clear that it would be difficult to find a body more suited to deal with a matter which, as has been stressed in so many international documents, is "of vital interest" to all peoples.

It is therefore particularly regrettable, especially if the top priority allotted by the United Nations to nuclear disarmament is borne in mind, that the Committee on Disarmament has so far been unable to carry out any negotiations in this area, for even the prohibition of nuclear tests, a matter which undeniably falls fully within the Committee's jurisdiction, has since July 1977, or for almost three years now, been withdrawn de facto from the multilateral forum through the so-called trilateral negotiations.

In this connexion, it should be recalled that the General Assembly, in its resolution 34/83 B of 11 December 1979, expressed in unequivocal terms its conviction that "the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should become urgently and most directly involved in substantive negotiations on priority disarmament questions and play the central role in the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly".

We do not believe it possible to adduce the rather large membership of the Committee as an excuse for failing to use it in particularly delicate negotiations. It was precisely to avoid this pretext that in 1979, when the rules of procedure of the Committee were being drawn up, the delegation of Mexico suggested that it should be expressly provided -- as it finally was in rule 23 -- that subsidiary bodies with a limited membership could be established if the Committee so decided.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

I should like to conclude by making some comments which may link up with and complement those made at the beginning of this statement, and to emphasize that, contrary to what some have affirmed, it is illusory and absurd to think that the scale of a nuclear war could be controlled at will.

In this connexion, it seems appropriate to recall that, as one of the many indirect beneficial effects of the special session of the General Assembly in 1978, a meeting was held in Washington in December 1978 which was attended by 300 persons concerned at the fact of living in a world where nuclear devastation can take place barely 30 minutes after the launching of nuclear missiles by either of the super-Powers. The purpose of this conference was to conduct a joint examination, with the assistance of some of the most authoritative internationalists, experts in disarmament questions, physicists and other scientists, as well as some retired admirals and generals, of the main aspects and consequences of a possible nuclear war. An account of the discussions and results of the meeting, which was co-sponsored by the Centre for Defense Information -- one of the six disarmament research institutes invited to participate in the special session of the General Assembly-- and by the Institute for Policy Studies, may profitably be consulted in the issues of the well-known review The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists for April, May and September 1979. Here I should merely like to stress that the first of those issues contains a summary of the conclusions on which there was a consensus among all the participants. It reads as follows:

"A limited nuclear war would inevitably escalate into a full-range general nuclear war.

"To believe that one could win a nuclear war was insane.

"Civil Defense programs geared to the evacuation of cities were illusory.

Long term effects of a nuclear exchange would nullify this program.

"We really know very little about the nature of nuclear warfare. Dry numbers can be no substitute for what in reality would take place: death, destruction, psychic trauma, chaos. As Nikita Khrushchev put it, 'the survivors would envy the dead'".

It was doubtless such findings as these that prompted the General Assembly of the United Nations, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, to reach the unanimous conclusion that:

"Removing the threat of a world war -- a nuclear war -- is the most acute and urgent task of the present day."

Such findings should also, we believe, induce the Committee on Disarmament to do everything within its power to contribute to the performance of this task, on which the item of our agenda relating to "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" undoubtedly has a direct bearing.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): I wish to congratulate you on your assumption of the Chair of this Committee for the month of April and I also wish to pay my respects to Ambassador Yu for his work as Chairman of the Committee last month. May I take this opportunity to thank my distinguished colleagues around this table for the confidence they have shown in me in designating me as Chairman of one of the Working Groups. I also wish to thank previous speakers for their kind words in this regard.

When I took the floor on 20 March, I touched briefly on the question of radiological weapons and said that my delegation would have some concrete comments to make on the joint Soviet Union-United States proposal in the Working Group on Radiological Weapons. Since then, however, a number of my colleagues around this table have been making such comments on the joint proposal in this Committee and I have therefore decided today to address myself to some of the individual paragraphs of that proposal.

Perhaps I should begin by repeating our basic way of thinking on this matter. We do not think the urgency of concluding a treaty on radiological weapons is as great as that of achieving progress in nuclear disarmament. This is, first, because the aim of the treaty would be to prohibit in advance weapons which do not even exist today and, secondly, because some authorities have expressed doubts about the military effectiveness of these weapons.

On the other hand, in Japan, the utilization of nuclear energy and of radioactive material is restricted to peaceful purposes under national law, while on the international side Japan has committed itself to the peaceful use of nuclear material under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a number of bilateral agreements on nuclear co-operation and has also accepted strict safeguards under our agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In any case, Japan considers it would be of no little significance for the nuclear-weapon States to submit to international controls regarding the military use of radioactive material. Care should be taken, of course, to see that the peaceful utilization of radioactive material is not hampered. This should include both peaceful use within national borders as well as transfers across borders for purposes of international co-operation.

Finally, Japan believes in the promotion of disarmament on a step-by-step basis with measures which are feasible. My delegation therefore considers that the Soviet Union-United States joint proposal could be a useful basis for this Committee to begin studying the question of banning radiological weapons.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

With these general remarks, I would now turn to the joint proposal contained in CD/31 and 32. My intervention at this stage is not to make comments or proposals on the proposed text, but rather to seek clarification on some of the paragraphs in order to facilitate the work of the Working Group.

(1) Definition

I wish to take up paragraph II which provides the definition of radiological weapons. First, with respect to the term "device" as used in subparagraph 1, I would appreciate it if we could be provided with some explanation or information about the kind of device that can be conceived in this context. Secondly, my delegation feels that any radioactive material, whether meant for peaceful purposes or for military purposes, can cause damage or injury by means of radiation. In other words, it is the radiation emanating from the material and not the material itself that will be causing the destruction, damage or injury; the material itself cannot provide the clue to whether it is destined for military use or peaceful use. What do the sponsors mean in subparagraph 2 when they talk of "any radioactive material ..., specifically designed for employment, by its dissemination, to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of the radiation ..."? Will any kind of standard or criterion be adopted to measure the level or the quantity of radioactivity that will be considered to be permissible or prohibited? Otherwise, how are we to distinguish radioactive material for military use from radioactive material for medical purposes, for example? And how are we to verify that radioactive material for military use is not being developed, produced, stockpiled or acquired by any party to the treaty?

(2) Peaceful use

Now I would like to turn to paragraph V. In this paragraph, as regards the peaceful use of sources of radiation, it is provided that the related provisions of the treaty "shall be without prejudice to any generally recognized principles and applicable rules of international law concerning such use". I wonder in this respect what specific principles and rules the United States and the Soviet Union have in mind in this context.

(3) Consultation and co-operation

Now I would like to deal with paragraph VIII. First, with regard to subparagraph 1 of this paragraph, I would like to ask clarification concerning what procedures are actually contemplated by the term "appropriate international procedures", through which consultation and co-operation shall be undertaken

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

"within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter". I would also like to know what kind of functional relationship is envisaged between "international procedures within the framework of the United Nations" as mentioned in subparagraph 1, and the "Consultative Committee of Experts" as provided for in subparagraph 2, as well as recourse to the Security Council of the United Nations as referred to in subparagraph 3. For example, is the Consultative Committee of Experts to be convened prior to the lodging of a complaint with the Security Council with respect to an alleged breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the treaty? Further, I would be interested in concrete examples of the "assistance" envisaged in subparagraph 5 that would be provided to any State party to the treaty which has been or is likely to be harmed as a result of violation of the treaty.

My delegation hopes that clarification on these points will be given by the co-sponsors of the joint proposal at the early stage of the work of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Okawa for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, the United States delegation welcomes the selection of the Chairmen of the four Working Groups whose mandates were agreed earlier in this session. The choices announced today are those supported by my delegation and many others from the beginning. We find it regrettable, therefore, that the Committee lost so much time in arriving at precisely the same result. My delegation is prepared to co-operate fully with the Chairmen of the various Working Groups, to make up for their late start. Let us also hope that a happy outcome will soon be forthcoming on the question of the request by non-member States to address the Committee. Mr. Chairman, at our last plenary I reserved the right to comment on the telegram from Kabul circulated in the Committee which, inter alia, spoke of the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan. I shall give the comments of my Government this morning.

During the period since Afghanistan was invaded by Soviet armed forces last December, there have been repeated reports that chemical weapons are being used against both civilians and soldiers in Afghanistan. The United States Government, as well as a number of other Governments, have expressed their profound concern about these reports.

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

The tendentious message from Kabul which has been circulated as document CD/89 can only deepen that concern, for it represents a blatant and transparent attempt by the puppet régime installed in Kabul and its masters to deflect international attention from the continuing reports that occupying Soviet forces in Afghanistan are using lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons against defenseless people there.

The United States categorically denies that it has ever supplied any type of chemical weapon or agent to any of the parties in the Afghan conflict. In the past, the United States supplied, to Governments with which it has had security relationships, non-lethal agents of the type widely used in the world for maintaining public order. Many such agents are also readily available commercially. We have no knowledge, however, that such United States manufactured agents have been transferred by any Government to Afghans resisting foreign domination and occupation.

The crude concoction that has been provided to the Committee by the Kabul régime is of a piece with a press conference staged in Kabul on 10 April and televised both there and in Moscow, excerpts from which were also shown on Swiss television. During that press conference, three canister-type grenades, allegedly manufactured in the United States and ostensibly captured from resistance forces, were displayed as "evidence" that the United States was supplying those forces with "lethal chemical weapons". As a part of that spectacle, a cat was placed in an air-tight box which was then filled with what was said to be the agent from one of the grenades. Apparently to liven up the show even more, a dog was injected with what was alleged to be a serum made from the contents of the grenade. Neither the cat nor the dog looked very happy about the experience. But the grenades shown at the press conference, and described in the message contained in document CD/89 as "chemical grenades, the lethal effects of which last for a long time in the atmosphere", bore the clearly visible inscription "CS" -- the designation of common tear gas.

It is in the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan that the world does not yet possess conclusive physical evidence of the use of lethal chemical agents. At the same time, the persistent accumulation of reports from that unhappy land must cause all civilized nations profound concern. To quote from a statement by my Government at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights:

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

"The Commission is aware of refugee accounts and circumstantial evidence that Soviet or co-operating Afghan forces may have used lethal chemical agents in their efforts to suppress continued Afghan nationalist resistance. Some of these accounts describe such effects as including blindness, paralysis and death. There is additional, clearcut evidence that Soviet troops have brought chemical decontamination equipment to Afghanistan and that Soviet or co-operating Afghan airstrikes have taken place in areas of that country where lethal chemical agents reportedly have been used."

The United States is on record as favouring an independent international investigation of all -- I repeat all -- reports of the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and in south-east Asia. We seek a prompt, thorough and impartial investigation which should include examination of the sites of alleged chemical attacks and interviews with refugees and others. Such an investigation would provide the world community with a factual basis for making an intelligent judgment on this issue. The United States is prepared to co-operate fully in such an investigation and calls upon others to do so, as well.

In the view of my Government, the world community has a clear responsibility to pursue this issue. Reports of the use of lethal chemical weapons against the people of Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Laos are a matter of concern for all nations. If those controlling these territories have nothing to hide, they should have no difficulty in agreeing to, and co-operating in, such an investigation. Their willingness to do so would be a concrete contribution to international confidence, the strengthening of which they profess is a major objective of their foreign policies. It would also reinforce the basis for any future arms control agreements.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): Ladies and Gentlemen, it is 1.05 p.m. There are still two countries on the list of speakers, and the Chair also wishes to make a statement.

We therefore propose that the meeting be suspended and that our formal meeting be resumed at 3 p.m.

If I hear no objections we will meet again at 3 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 1.05 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): By a concurrence of circumstances, it falls to me to be the first to speak at this meeting of the Committee after the members of the Committee have listened to the statement -- unequalled in its pretentiousness -- made by the representative of the United States of America at the end of the Committee's morning meeting. Like others, we reserve the right to speak at the appropriate time and to expound in detail our position regarding the aforementioned statement of the United States delegation. I will now deliver our delegation's prepared statement.

Before beginning its statement, however, the Mongolian delegation would like to express its satisfaction at the solution of yet another question of an organizational nature -- the question of the Chairmen of the four Ad Hoc Working Groups. We hope that these Working Groups will begin their work without delay and will make the necessary progress in the advancement of the important questions which are before our Committee.

Comrade Chairman, today the Mongolian delegation would like to make a few comments on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and also on the question of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

At the present stage, when the first part of the current session of the Committee on Disarmament is drawing to a close without any substantive results being achieved, my delegation addresses itself again to the question whether it is necessary to re-state the priority nature and exceptionally important significance of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament in the whole complex of disarmament problems. In our view, it is still highly necessary.

It is precisely this type of weapon of mass destruction -- a weapon now developed to an incredible extent both quantitatively and qualitatively -- which has confronted mankind with a dilemma on whose solution the very existence of civilization and life on earth largely depends.

In spite of all the importance of the agreements and treaties hitherto concluded with a view to the cessation of the arms race, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that the arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race, has not only not been halted but is continuing at an ever-increasing pace.

Particular concern and anxiety are being aroused by the action taken by military-industrial circles in the West with a view to destroying everything positive which has been achieved by the world community over the past decade, and for the purpose of bringing about a return to the times of the "cold war" and creating an atmosphere of distrust between States.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The Mongolian delegation will refrain from enumerating the crisis situations created in various parts of the world as a result of short-sighted policies of this kind. I would like simply to draw attention to one serious fact which has far-reaching and sinister consequences -- namely, the NATO decision to deploy new types of United States medium-range nuclear missile weapons in Western European countries.

The idea underlying these plans is none other than to achieve military superiority. Such a policy is fraught with great danger not only for the peoples of the European continent but also for international peace and security as a whole. Implementation of this decision would destroy the existing approximate balance of military forces; and this would directly undermine the fundamental principles of conducting disarmament negotiations on the basis of equality and equal security.

The countries of the socialist community, striving resolutely for the adoption of genuine disarmament measures with a view to ensuring lasting peace and international security, have consistently and actively presented, and are still presenting, concrete proposals for curbing the nuclear arms race and for the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Their motto in this noble struggle is "Disarmament is the ideal of socialism". Today, it is particularly gratifying for us to note that those wise words were spoken by the brilliant thinker and creator of the first socialist State in the world, V.I. Lenin, the 110th anniversary of whose birth is today being commemorated by all progressive mankind.

The constructive proposals and initiatives of the socialist countries were reflected again in the Moscow Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty member States dated 23 November 1978, and in the communiqué of the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of those States dated 6 December 1979.

The socialist countries, fully aware of the complexity and difficulty of solving this problem, consider it important to begin negotiations on all aspects of the cessation of production of nuclear weapons as a first step, with a view to moving onward to the gradual reduction and complete destruction of stockpiles of such weapons. This concrete proposal is reflected in the working paper presented jointly by the socialist countries (CD/4), which was introduced in the Committee on 1 February 1979.

I should like to draw attention once again to a number of basic points in this paper which my delegation considers it important to emphasize in connexion with the consideration of this item of the agenda.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In our opinion the joint proposal of the socialist countries contained in document CD/4 provides a good possibility for taking concrete steps on the way to the implementation of the priority objectives set forth in the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We note with satisfaction that, at its last session, the Committee had a useful exchange of views on document CD/4. Members of the Committee belonging to the Group of 21 expressed their views on it.

At its thirty-fourth session the General Assembly in resolution 34/83 J requested the Committee on Disarmament to continue, at the beginning of its 1980 session, consideration of the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" and to undertake preparatory consultations on the question. In the same resolution, the Committee was also requested to initiate, as a matter of high priority, negotiations, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. In our view, all members of this multilateral negotiating organ, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, have a responsibility for solving precisely this task of the Committee. Conscious of this responsibility, those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet expressed their views on the matter under consideration should do so in the common interest, with a view to starting genuine negotiations in this vitally important area of disarmament. In present conditions, when all nuclear States are represented in the Committee, it would be particularly appropriate that negotiations on the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and on their elimination, as well as the necessary preparatory work, should be conducted in this forum, in which all the main groups of States are equally represented. In this connexion, our delegation wishes to stress once again the special responsibility of all nuclear States, without exception, in achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament. Differences in the levels of the arsenals of nuclear Powers do not in any way relieve some nuclear Powers -- at the expense of others -- from their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

In view of the strategic balance now established between the USSR and the United States of America, attention should also be drawn to the unquestionable fact that, of the three remaining nuclear-weapon States, two are allies of the United States, while China persistently adopts a negative position with regard to nuclear disarmament, as we well know. In the matter of the special responsibility of the nuclear Powers, we must, in our view, bear in mind the existing state of affairs.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The main task at this session of the Committee is to move on to concrete preparatory work, with a view to determining the subject of the negotiations and the specific problems to be considered.

In the process of the adoption of effective measures with a view to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, measures for a comprehensive nuclear test ban must occupy a special place. The Committee on Disarmament is this week embarking on the consideration of the item on its agenda relating to this problem. The Mongolian delegation, in its statements at previous sessions of the Committee, has indicated its views on this question and, in particular, it has expressed the hope that the trilateral negotiations on a nuclear test ban will be successfully continued, with a view to achieving a mutually acceptable solution. As before, we consider that all nuclear-weapon States, and also States with a substantial military potential, should participate in the multilateral negotiations on this question of paramount importance.

The Mongolian delegation adheres to the view expressed in the conclusions of the report contained in document CD/86, namely that a comprehensive nuclear test ban could serve as an important measure of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, both vertical and horizontal, and would have a major arms limitation impact in that it would make it difficult, if not impossible, for nuclear-weapon States to develop new designs of nuclear weapons and would also place constraints on the modification of existing weapon designs.

I should now like to make a number of observations of a general nature on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

As is known, the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session adopted resolution 34/84, in which it welcomed the conclusion of the Committee on Disarmament that it is urgent to reach agreement on effective international arrangements in this regard.

Last year, the Committee on Disarmament set up an Ad Hoc Working Group and held a series of meetings and informal consultations on this question.

The submission of four working papers, including document CD/23 submitted by the socialist countries, and also the active participation of members of the Committee in the consideration of the different aspects relating to the scope, nature and form of such agreements, are evidence of the fact that conditions already exist in the Committee for further detailed consideration of this question, with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable international agreement on it.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

We consider that the Committee on Disarmament, in accordance with the mandate given to it by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, should continue the negotiations as a priority task at its present session. It was for this purpose that the Committee once again established an Ad Hoc Working Group on this question. Regrettably, however, for a number of reasons that are well known to everyone negotiations on the question of substance have not yet been resumed in the Committee.

In its approach to the question of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States, the Mongolian delegation proceeds first of all from the premise that an effective international legal affirmation of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States would constitute an important step in checking the nuclear arms race and strengthening the régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and would also help to reduce the threat of a world nuclear war.

The solution of this problem would also contribute substantially to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different regions of the world.

Mongolia, like many other countries, adheres to the opinion that the most complete and effective solution of this problem would be the conclusion of a comprehensive international agreement, i.e. the elaboration of a convention which would be an instrument universal in scope and would provide for a single treaty obligation for all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. The draft international convention submitted by the socialist countries takes precisely this approach to the solution of the problem.

With regard to the question of scope, it should be emphasized that the draft convention of the socialist countries ensures wider participation by non-nuclear-weapon States. We consider this approach to be the most correct one, since in this case there is no need to draw a distinction depending on whether this or that State is an ally of any nuclear-weapon State or not. Since article I of the draft document clearly provides that non-nuclear States parties to the convention renounce the production and the acquisition of nuclear weapons and have no nuclear weapons in their territory or anywhere under their jurisdiction or control, we see no reason to draw a distinction between non-nuclear-weapon States depending on whether or not they are allies of a nuclear-weapon State, once they accept the above-mentioned obligation.

We feel that further constructive and business-like consideration of these matters in the Ad Hoc Working Group would help us to move on to our main task, namely the elaboration and approval of the text of the future convention.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Finally, I should like to draw attention to document CD/89, which has been circulated to the Committee. I need not enumerate here all the incontrovertible facts contained in this important document, since they speak for themselves. I should simply like to add that, according to information available, chemical hand grenades seized from a subversive group sent into Afghanistan from abroad were stamped: "Manufactured in the Federal Laboratory, Salisbury, Pennsylvania, USA, 1978." The Mongolian delegation considers that the statements made by various delegations here in the Committee were obviously directed to the wrong quarter and have no valid basis. In this connexion, the question naturally arises: what response can the authors of the groundless assertions to which my delegation referred in its earlier statement in the Committee -- what response can they offer to the readiness expressed by the Government of Afghanistan to investigate and examine the circumstances of the actions in question, along with competent international authorities?

With your permission, Comrade Chairman, I should like to say a few words about document CD/91 which was circulated today and the author of which is the representative of so-called "Democratic Kampuchea". We were most surprised that, in a letter signed by a person who represents no-one, reference is made to some kind of statement by the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea in the Committee on Disarmament. We have not heard of any such delegation in this forum. We wish to express our absolute disagreement with this document. In this connexion, my delegation declares that the people and Government of the Mongolian People's Republic recognize the People's Republic of Kampuchea and maintain friendly relations with the Kampuchean people which has put an end once and for all to the bloody régime and genocidal policy of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, the henchmen of hegemonist and expansionist forces.

Mr. RŮŽEK^{OV} (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to express my delegation's satisfaction with the fact that the Committee has today appointed the Chairmen of the four Ad Hoc Working Groups. We firmly believe that this positive decision has created a basis for the intensification of the work of our Committee. May I congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, for reaching such a useful decision; and may I also congratulate the four Chairmen appointed and wish them much success in their work.

In the last statement my delegation expressed some remarks as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned. In my today's intervention I would like to deal with the agenda item 1, which is directly linked with nuclear disarmament in general. The elaboration of the treaty on general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is in our opinion of prime importance and requires a speedy solution. We consider the fulfilment of this task as a major step and necessary pre-condition for any substantive and real progress in the field of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, together with other socialist countries, has advocated the unconditional cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests from the very beginning and has actively supported all constructive proposals calling for such measures. I would like to mention one of them which still has a full validity. I have in mind the initiative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which submitted to the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, to be negotiated by all nuclear-weapon States and by 25 to 30 non-nuclear-weapon States. This proposal received broad support in resolution 3478/XXX. For its part, Czechoslovakia expressed its readiness to take an active part in such negotiations. It is regrettable that they have not yet taken place because other nuclear-weapon States have not accepted this method of proceeding. However, at the present time we welcome all those voices which call for taking concrete steps aimed at creating the necessary organizational basis in order to find a mutually acceptable solution to be carried out as quickly as possible. We support fully the idea of establishing within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament an ad hoc working group on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests with the participation of the representatives of all nuclear-weapon States and with the aim of discussing questions relating to the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

(Mr. Růžek, Czechoslovakia)

It will be only for the benefit of the cause of disarmament if our Committee were to use the presence of all nuclear Powers in order to achieve a decisive breakthrough in considering this question.

My delegation is firmly convinced that the Committee on Disarmament has all necessary means to make a further step on the road leading towards the elaboration of such a treaty.

Furthermore a good deal of work has been carried out both as far as general provisions of such a treaty are concerned, not to speak about a degree of concrete progress achieved by the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts.

Comrade Chairman, in conclusion of my statement today, let me express the opinion of my delegation that the existing situation as far as the nuclear test ban is concerned makes it possible for all nuclear Powers, whose representatives are present here, to demonstrate their declared readiness to contribute practically in order to achieve progress in the field of disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Růžek^{OV} for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. LIANG Yu-Fan (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, my delegation welcomes the fact that the four Working Groups now finally have their Chairmen. We hope to see some progress in the deliberations of these Working Groups. Mr. Chairman, document CD/89 as recently distributed contains unfounded vilifications against China. These are the familiar tricks of a super-Power to try to evade condemnation by world opinion of its armed invasion of Afghanistan and its use of chemical weapons. We do not feel it is worth our while here to refute them in detail. I should like to point out, however, that it is futile to distribute material in order to try to make the international community acquiesce in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): I would like to put on record my delegation's position in connexion with document CD/91, distributed recently to delegations of the Committee. My delegation was surprised and embarrassed to learn that certain totally discredited persons, calling themselves Democratic Kampuchea, claim to have a delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, and indulge in sending a letter to this Committee, a letter which my delegation cannot but reject in a most clear way.

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

I would like to voice my Government's strong disapproval of such a practice which imposes on this Committee the discussion of issues which cannot but lead to the paralysis of its work. The Hungarian delegation also reserves the right to express its opinion on this issue later, after further consideration of the whole situation.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): I would like to associate my delegation with the position which has already been expressed by some distinguished delegates, namely those of the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. They have expressed an opinion with regard to document CD/91. My delegation is also surprised to find this paper among the documents of the Committee. Of course, the simplest way of dealing with this document would be to dismiss it, since neither my delegation nor, I presume, any other is aware of any consultations or consensus which would have resulted in the enlargement of the Committee to more than the 40 members who are present here and who are mentioned in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. For this reason, my delegation refuses to take note of this document.

At the same time, I cannot fail to place on record, here and now, the position of my delegation regarding the problem of inviting non-members to participate in the work of the Committee. In the view of my delegation, this issue was deliberately complicated by the Chairman for the month of March who, being aware of the controversial nature of the request of so-called Democratic Kampuchea but probably unaware of the accepted and tested forms of the work of the Committee, decided to circulate that request as document CD/76. The Chairman for the month of March could not fail to realize that his action would divert the Committee's attention from the disarmament negotiating process -- with which it has been charged by the General Assembly -- by involving it in artificial, sterile and counter-productive political discussions. That action resulted naturally from an attempt to secure -- in the Committee on Disarmament, a negotiating body independent of the United Nations -- a status which would have equated the Socialist Republic of Vietnam with a group of individuals representing only themselves or, at best, the fugitive and genocidal régime of Pol Pot. We are not impressed by the fact that the mandate of that group has, for the time being, the recognition of the majority of the members of the United Nations. My Government cast a negative vote in this respect, on the strength of arguments which I have no intention of repeating now. Indeed, as the

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

distinguished representative of the USSR stated a few days ago, we are confident that in time the international community will reassess its position with regard to that criminal régime. In the meantime, however, we see no reason why we cannot champion the cause of the legitimate Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): This morning, when I came to the Committee, I saw document CD/91; and, when I started to read it, I saw that a self-appointed permanent representative was sending the text of a statement of the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea to the Committee on Disarmament. I immediately looked around because I wanted to recall how many members there are in this Committee. As far as we know, the Committee has a long history of growth from 10 to 40, but this morning it seems we have 41 members. This artificial, self-appointed representative and new member of the Committee on Disarmament is sending this so-called document to try to continue undermining the work of the Committee, as are some of his supporters.

I would like to say that it is a happy day for all of us now that we have set up four Working Groups and have appointed their Chairmen; and I wish them all success and promise them the active participation of my delegation. So, we can say that it is a really historic day in the Committee. We have been put on the track of negotiations, but at the same moment we can see an unfortunate trend in recent months to undermine the Committee. This has not of course, been very successful because to use the tool of a so-called self-appointed representative of Democratic Kampuchea to the Committee is not very successful and is not very honourable for those who are supporting such an initiative. My Government has recognized the People's Republic of Kampuchea, with its capital at Pnemh Penh. We have an Embassy there, and we have very active relations. We recently met the leader of this country, and are happy that very often we see on French and Swiss television the new life of fully liberated Kampuchea. The city of Pnemh Penh was dead, reduced from a population of one million to only 20,000; but now it is reviving. I think that all of us are witnesses of this, so it is really a very unfortunate moment to allow communications from such a self-appointed representative of those who have killed. It is perhaps the first time in history, since the end of the Second World War, that 3 million people were killed. All of us know this and, with all this in mind, my Government does not want to take note of the pamphlet that has been circulated.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): The Chair would like to refer to this situation. Before I announced at our plenary meeting last Thursday that the distribution of communications from non-member countries as official documents would not be authorized without the Committee's approval, a communication was received and subsequently distributed by the secretariat at my request. The communication in question is that contained in document CD/91. I do not intend to evaluate the relevance of this communication to the corresponding item on our agenda. It is for the Committee to do that. My delegation has its own opinions on the question but we shall refrain from expressing them at this time, reserving Cuba's right to set out its position in this Committee if this proves necessary. Its position on the matter is very clear and well-defined.

Nevertheless, as Chairman of the Committee, I am obliged to draw the attention of members to the following facts.

First of all, there is no "delegation of Democratic Kampuchea to the Committee on Disarmament", since no decision has been taken by this Committee on its request to participate in the Committee's proceedings. For this reason alone I was tempted, before distributing this document, to submit it for consideration by the Committee. Nevertheless, I refrained from doing this in order to avoid any suspicion of discriminatory action by the Chair and regarding my impartial position in this matter.

Secondly, this so-called "delegation" makes comments about the distribution of document CD/87 which the Chair categorically rejects. The abusive language used in the communication to refer to the Chair's decision to have this document distributed is unprecedented in this Committee. I leave it to delegations to judge whether these comments constitute a positive contribution to our work in the Committee on Disarmament. For my part, in my capacity as Chairman, I have an obligation to protect the authority of the Chair of this Committee and for this reason I feel obliged to make these statements.

Mr. LIANG Yu-Fan (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, after listening to some delegations, I am afraid I must speak again. I will be brief. First, I do not think there is anything to complain about regarding the distribution of CD/91. The attack some delegations made against Democratic Kampuchea will not change either the puppet nature of Heng Samrin's régime or the identity of those who are behind this régime. I also heard the Polish delegate single out for blame the Chairman for March -- meaning, of course, my delegation. We all know that the question of participation by non-members in some of the deliberations of the

(Mr. Liang Yu-Fan, China)

CD has been discussed for some time. I would like to point out that when some delegations -- including the Polish delegation -- suggested discussing these applications one at a time in this order, my delegation never raised any objection. In fact, we have already discussed two applications. My delegation proposes that we discuss the third and the fourth applications. We can discuss them right now. It just will not do to try to blame my delegation for the delay in solving this question of applications by non-members.

The Chairman (translated from Spanish): The statement by the delegation of China is noted.

Distinguished representatives, this morning we distributed a working paper relating to our Committee's work programme during the period up to 29 April.

Since we are already in a position to begin substantive negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Groups, we should now decide on a time-table or schedule for the various meetings which the Committee and its subsidiary bodies will be holding up to the end of the first part of the session, as we had indicated.

As the Chair and the Secretariat see it, this time-table or schedule would provide advance information on meetings and might help delegations to make arrangements in order to follow the proceedings in a satisfactory manner.

Since this afternoon's meeting was not scheduled this morning, we wish to propose the following changes in this working paper, which has been distributed informally.

On Wednesday, 23 April -- that is tomorrow -- at 3 p.m., the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons should be held.

On 24 April, after the formal meeting, an informal plenary meeting should be held on a nuclear test ban. These are the changes in our time-table or schedule of work which the Chair wishes to propose to delegations.

If there is no objection, we could approve this time-table up to 29 April.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): We must, obviously, make some changes in the programme of work, but perhaps not very radical changes. Would it not be possible to move the meeting of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons to tomorrow morning? Since this will be the Group's first meeting, and it will not in all probability last very long, perhaps it could be scheduled for 11 a.m. If the Group of 21 is to meet, we might perhaps ask that Group to hold its meeting at 9.30 a.m., and the meeting of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons could be held, say, at 11.30 a.m.; then the informal meeting of the Committee could be held at 3 p.m. and all the other meetings could be held in the order you have suggested.

(Mr. Israelyan, USSR)

I would therefore like to address the following request to the Group of 21. Could the members of that Group hold their meeting, say, from 9.30 a.m. until 11.30 a.m.? If so, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons could begin its work at 11.30 a.m. If it is necessary for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons to continue its meeting, it will no doubt be possible to agree on a time for it to do so -- perhaps even on a time tomorrow.

Thus, we would make only a minor change in the programme for tomorrow; and on Wednesday we would proceed with our work in the order you have suggested.

Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia): I hope that we will not spend too much time trying to agree on the schedule. We have already spent a long time in trying to agree on more substantive problems than the programme of work. My delegation would accept any proposal, but perhaps the easiest would be to change the meeting schedule for this afternoon -- to move what was planned for today to Monday afternoon, if the afternoon is free; then the rest of the programme could stay as it is now.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): We have held talks about the time-table. The Chairman of the Chemical Weapons Working Group has stated that it is impossible for the Group to start this afternoon at 3 p.m. The changes for Thursday, 24 April, would not mean moving the Radiological Weapons Group but simply that, immediately after the official plenary, an informal meeting would be held on the NTB. With regard to Ambassador Issraelyan's proposal -- to hold the meeting of the Chemical Weapons Group at 11.30 a.m. or 11 a.m. tomorrow -- we did not consider this because we were aware of the meeting of the Group of 21 at that time. Many delegations from this Group will doubtless be working in the Chemical Weapons Group.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): I would like to join my distinguished colleague from Yugoslavia. I must say I think that the proposal is a good one, and it meets with my delegation's opinions. I think, Mr. Chairman, that Monday afternoon could be used for any Working Group that would find it necessary to meet again, and therefore I think that the sooner we start the Working Groups, the better. In this connexion, what you proposed is, in my view, a very simple and very convincing revision of our time-table and I would be happy if this meets with the approval of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): As the last speaker has just said, the purpose of keeping Monday free of activity was to enable groups, if they so wished, to use that day for meetings in the afternoon or to permit any other group of members of the Committee -- be it the Group of 21, the Group of Western Countries or the Group of Socialist Countries -- to hold meetings also. This was the idea that the Chair had in mind.

I shall read out again the amended version of the proposal.

Tomorrow, Wednesday, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons would meet at 3 p.m., since the Group of 21 will be holding its meeting at 11 a.m. and cannot change the time of that meeting.

On Thursday, 24 April, at 10.30 a.m. we would hold our formal plenary meeting and immediately afterwards we would hold an informal plenary meeting to discuss a nuclear test ban, and all the rest would remain unchanged.

On Thursday at 3 p.m. the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons would meet.

On Friday the Group on Negative Guarantees would meet at 10.30 a.m.

For Monday at 10.30 a.m. a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has been scheduled by the Chair as tentative, because we are not sure that Ambassador Adeniji, who has been elected Chairman of that Working Group, will be in Geneva on that date.

On Tuesday, 29 April, we would hold the last plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament during this part of the session.

The afternoon of Monday will be free for any purpose that may be necessary.

Is there any objection?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): As was agreed at our plenary meeting on Thursday, I intend now to convene an informal meeting to discuss the question of the Committee's documentation and related matters. The informal meeting will start five minutes after this plenary meeting rises. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 24 April, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting is now concluded. So as not to lose time, I request delegations to be in the conference room at 4.30 p.m. to resume our work in an informal meeting.

The meeting rose at 4.25 p.m.