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LIMA SQUATTERS AND SHANTY TOWNS 1986

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**EXPERT GROUP MEETING ON
SHELTER AND SERVICES FOR THE POOR
IN METROPOLITAN REGIONS**

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AND SERVICES FOR THE POOR IN METROPOLITAN REGIONS"

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Growth of Metropolitan Lima.

1.1. Growth and Structural Change.

To the date of this report (1986) the population of Metropolitan Lima will probably be of six million inhabitants (INE 1985). The city ranks high among cities of the world. If it is true that growth rates have recently lowered, it is also true that they will continue to be high enough to double population in 15 or 20 years. The most important fact behind the growth figures is that such a growth rate and size has been obtained in a relative short period of time. The 1940's census showed Lima with 662 thousand inhabitants. What is now a major conurbation was in the 40s a group of human settlements scattered over a wide agricultural plain watered by the Rimac and Chillón rivers. Peru had by then a total population of 7 million people (next year's population of Lima) and Lima had less than one tenth of the country's population. In 1986 the country has 20 million people and the capital city holds 30% of the country's population. Land use has changed drastically, density patterns have been thoroughly modified and there is now a totally new flow system of goods and persons.

Matos Mar (1984) has dealt with this question recently suggesting that "a popular overflowing and a crisis of the State" are working together, and more recently Hernando de Soto (1986) has stated that informality is a natural way out of poverty for the less developed countries of the world. The issue has not been as yet settled and will probably open a wide area to exploration and analysis. It is an important issue. It does not appear certain if a new form of urbanism is in formation in Lima imposing a new type of environment to city dwellers of the 21st century, or if we are in front of a transitory reaccommodation period responding to a specific form of city growth that lately will reach an equilibrated status to gain a global configuration similar to those shown by the metropolises of the advanced countries of the world.

Meanwhile it is worthwhile to note the velocity and violence of change in city form and in social environment in Peru. The majority of land improvement actions are informal, a-legal or illegal. They have grown outside the law and it is presumed that the process will continue to the next century unless a fundamental change on the structure of the country should occur.

Lima's historic area, once the seat of all government functions and its biggest administrative and commercial centre that was wholly identified with the national cultural elite is being now transformed into a shopping centre for the new urbanites, for the poor sectors of the metropolitan community. The core of the historic centre is a street named Jiron de la Union. Some 60 years ago about this street and about certain Cafés someone said in a sort of socio-geographical syllogism that "Peru is Lima, Lima is the Jiron de la Union, Jiron de la Union is the Palais Concert, ergo Peru is the Palais Concert."

Such a way of reasoning suggested that the whole country should be identified with the habits and the way of life of Lima's elite. By now

the same street is also representing the country but in a different way: it is used by people coming from all the regions of the nation and from the young squatters settlements that make up the metropolitan rich social mosaic. After all, it represents the country in a more democratic and general way. In addition to its condition of the major urban centre of the nation, where power, consumption and production are concentrated, Lima is fulfilling now the role of an agent for bringing together different life style as well as a bridge between rural and urban social attitudes.

There are very many other changes: new and vigorous informal commercial centres have sprung up using street and public areas sometimes competing successfully with regular business enterprises that have to adapt themselves to informal modes and also use the street for vending purposes. The change of land use in the avenues surrounding the historic centre is substantial. Those streets were the first area of expansion for downtown activities when the space available inside the centre precinct was not sufficient for the growing demands of the city. Business groups and corporations are moving out and the area is dedicated to tertiary uses and is teeming with educational entities, most of them informal, coping with the extensive demand for education of the urban youth.

Changes in the physical and visual environment have been tremendous. There are only scattered patches of the rich agricultural irrigated fields that used to surround urban areas two or three decades ago. Today someone living in the outskirts of the city can travel 40 kilometers in North-South direction looking only to paved areas and urban landscape. Social changes have been even greater.

"At mid-20th century, Peru appeared to follow in the typical (homogeneous) urbanisation, established first for Latin America by Argentina and Chile, where the emphasis on the accommodation and subordination of diverse and ethnic streams of immigrants to uniform criollo institutions and the cultural norms that gave them legitimacy. Though many Latin American capitals experienced difficulties in absorbing swollen contingents of migrants between 1950 and 1975 (leading to possibly distortions in the socioeconomic structure referred to as "tertiarization" and "marginalization"), the criollo elites managed to reaffirm the dominance of the metropolis ideologically, economically and politically. Contrarywise in Lima by the early 1960s multiple institutional alternatives to traditional urbanisation mechanisms were being developed and by the mid-1970s the patrimonial criollo value system that legitimized metropolitan dominance had become an anachronism." (Schaedel 1979).

The following paragraphs deal with questions related to social change: urban growth, urban primacy and social urbanisation.

1.2 The Growth of Lima.

In other parts of this text there are various illustrations showing urban expansion in Lima. There are also details of population growth.

Both phenomena deserve detailed studies; they are part of a single process and are dealt with separately for methodological reasons.

1.2.1. The increment of the population in Metropolitan Lima should be studied jointly with national population growth and with the changes in urban and rural percentual relations. These questions should be seen later in relation to Lima's urban primacy and social urbanisation. The study is not easy because statistical data are not complete and have not been systematically obtained.

Two forces working together to make difficult the access to shelter and services for the urban poor in Lima can be observed: at the same time that the population grows violently there is a strong population concentration in the capital city. In the 1940's census the country's population was of 7 million which is more or less the population size of Lima in 1986 while the country is about 21 million.

1.2.2. Areawise increment has been also spectacular. Urbanisation has covered all the available areas destroying in the process 400 square kilometers of rich agricultural land painfully incorporated to economic use by canals and irrigation systems built by the aborigin people before the Spanish conquest of Peru.

Today the urbanised area in Metropolitan Lima is 420 square kilometers and the average density is of 135 persons per hectare.

1.3. Urban Primacy

The concept of "urban primacy" (*) has been incorporated to the interest of urban anthropologist as a mean of explaining some cultural and social phenomena in certain geographic areas. With the exception of Brazil, Colombia, Honduras and Ecuador, Latin American countries show high indicators of urban primacy and Lima has a high index of 17. This number is obtained by adding the population of Arequipa and Trujillo and dividing the total by Metropolitan Lima population. The roots of this phenomena can be traced to the foundation date of the town in 1535 but the nature of the economic and social processes leading to population concentration are still obscure and have not been thoroughly explored. We know, however, that such concentration forces will persist in the next 15 or 20 years shaping the social profile of the country and of its capital city. Questions related to immigration, social classes and adjustment to urban life, linked to urban poverty (Doughty 1979) are related to urban primacy. Quijano

(*) Urban primacy here is measured by the rate between the size of the biggest population centre and the sum of the populations of the two other towns following in rank to the first. The index is expressed numerically as: $IPU=100(B+C)/A$ where A is the biggest town and B and C the cities of second and third rank.

(1975) has stated that the influence of urban primacy in the country is a sort of cultural colonialism.

" a process of society as a whole, taking place through each of its basic structural orders and as a dimension of the process of change occurring in each of those orders.....There is, therefore: (1) urbanisation of the economic structure; (2) urbanisation of the social structure; (3) urbanisation of the ecologico-demographic structure; (4) urbanisation of the socio-psychological cultural structure; and (5) urbanisation of the political structures." (Quijano 1975:116-117, quoted by Doughty 1979).

The weight of Metropolitan Lima is shown in the following listing.

Indicators of Lima's Central Role

28% of the country's population.
69% of the NGP.
98% of the private investment.
83% of Bank deposits.
77% of Commercial bank deposits.
70% of informal establishments.
80% of tertiary activity.
87% of fiscal earnings.
51% of public employees.
53% of university students.
39% of school teachers.
73% of the physicians.
32% of the active labour force.
36% of blue collar workers.
50% of employers.
62% of university professors.
76% of telephone users.
48% of hospital beds.

Source: National Planning Institute.

The facts herewith discussed show that in the question of size and persistence of growth of Lima there is an underlying issue related to the structure of the nation and that it is not an aleatory or circumstantial phenomenon. It should be considered as permanent so far its supporting forces continue to act. If eventually those forces could be restrained the momentum accumulated would continue to increase population and concentrate economic activity. From here it can be said that both the pace and the type of growth within poverty restrictions characterizing Lima's recent history will persist, to end only when the accumulation of capital by the national society could make it possible to invest in the shelters and services needed, as well as to create the jobs wanted. Future does not look promisory, but popular strategies have shown themselves imaginative and creative.

1.4. Social Urbanisation.

In 1975 Anibal Quijano had defined the Peruvian process as one of urbanisation in various levels. Later Louise Margolies and other urban anthropologists have renamed that process as social urbanisation.

"Contemporary Latin American urbanisation cannot be understood without examining its social cultural permutations. The process of "social urbanisation" or the functional urbanisation of the countryside is seen as a mediating factor in contributing to the sustained nature of recent urbanisation. Social urbanisation denotes the socioeconomic transformation of space and the ideological extension of the urban system to former hinterlands. Early phases of urbanisation had an enclave effect, producing an urban system in which interregional relationships were virtually absent. But with the advent of industrial capitalism in the 1930s and the contribution of internal migration to the urbanisation process, social urbanisation resulted in new forms of functional integration between "country and city" and served to encapsulate the entire society into an expanding urban system. By examining the different phases of urbanisation in relation to broader global processes, it will become evident that social urbanisation has occurred on the basis of large-scale internal migration and has had a similar impact on the urban system throughout Latin America." (Margolies 1979).

Within this context internal migration does not appear as an isolated or conjunctural phenomenon. It acquires a structural character.

"....internal migration respond to forces that must be sought in a wide historical context than that of urbanisation itself, urbanisation must be seen as an intervening variable in generating present rural-urban mobility. Moreover, urban growth has been so pervasive that the consequences necessarily must be felt at all levels of society." (Margolies 1979).

The case of Lima as well as other Latin American cities shows that urban societies can organise themselves in space producing characteristic "social and physical landscape" (Leeds 1979). Beyond the chances for conserving or changing such characteristics lies the fact that they are now present and that they are going to be present in the next decade. Because of this they must be incorporated in the plans to cope with shelter needs of the metropolitan populations.

2. Informal Land Improvement as a Popular Strategy to Obtain Shelter and Security.

As it will be later shown in detail increasing portions of the population of Metropolitan Lima lives in shanty towns and in communities growing outside the law. It is also true that slowly such communities acquire status, increase their services and are winning their battle

in search of titles and legality. There are two ways of understanding this phenomenon: 1) base communities have created and developed a strategy to gain shelter and services compatible with the scarce and unstable earnings; 2) State and society have found the way to cope with pressing demands for shelter and services without having to use their own resources, which are not large either. These two positions are not opposed. In the 40 or 50 years of confrontation of interest the two sides have developed a certain level of understanding and lately a more explicit commitment. A similar process has developed, but in a shorter period between government and public street vendors and informal workers. If these two groups are taken into consideration there appears a picture of institutional overflow presented by Matos Mar (1984) or the establishment of an alternative social conduct more close to the stringent quality of economic reality in Peru.

In the extense literature that describes forms and characteristics of popular shelter production in Lima a persistent modification of government and legal action in relation to spontaneous land improvement and informal house building can be observed. The variations go from repressive action and eradication to the furnishing of basic services to propiciate informal urban growth. It is not probable that such a wide change of opinion occurred because of the good will of successive governments dealing with the subject. A definite weakness of the State machinery plus its absolute ineptitude to cope with structural issues and to comply with the specific profile of the Peruvian society should be taken into consideration. It should not be forgotten that the model of the State in use in Peru was copied in the last century from Europe and was imposed upon a society with specific social traits quite apart from the model adopted. To such a weakness are successfully opposing popular strategies prompted by reasons of extreme need.

In 1956 (Matos Mar 1984) Lima had 10% of its population living in shanty towns and squatter settlements. In 1961 that proportion rose to 20%; in 1972 it was 24%; and in 1986 is around 30%. There is not in sight a drastic change in the income of the workers nor a major collective savings increment. The above mentioned figures will not change in the near future. But also something important has happened related to the urban question: society has gained a higher level of conscience about shelter that would lead to a more intensive intervention both at national and local levels with new ways of institutionalising processes of popular housing production.

Ronaldo Ramirez (personal communication 1986) presents the history of official activity in the field of housing and shelter production as a process by which official intervention grows systematically from high to lower brackets of income. From the initial programmes directed to the erection of traditional dwellings for white and blue collar workers with income if not high at least permanent, to people with eventual earnings, or with paying capacities obtained by the sum of family incomes, and lately, to the groups with non demonstrable earnings. To this bracket the grantings of land at no cost with only plots marked on the ground are directed. To sum up popular strategy has been successful, it has carved out the future for itself in Lima as well as in other towns of the country.

3. Public Services.

Without exaggeration it can be said that public services collapsed in Lima due to population pressure. The city has not been able to maintain a level of service pari passu with its growth. It is also true that levels of service would be even lower would all shanty towns be connected and served by the existing network of services. In the model of growth imposed upon the city by the popular sectors accepted tacitly or explicitly by the government access to land and gradual house construction is proposed while the granting of public services such as water sewage and electricity is deferred until families can accumulate enough savings to cover in part or totally the required investments. Other local services are obtained by communal work. The process is slow because the possibilities of accumulation are also slow. Electric services can be obtained more easily because in Lima the resource is abundant, the network covers an extensive territory and because new lines have not too many topographic restrictions. This is not the case of water works and sewerage installations. In squatter settlements water is obtained by buying it from trucks that sell water door to door to be kept in specially conditioned recipients or cists built in front of every house. There is not sewerage nor garbage collection in the younger settlements. Groups get together to build schools and government provides the required school teachers. Health establishments are also built as a communal undertaking but longer time elapses to get them equipped.

From all this it appears that a specific model of urban growth for the capital of Peru as well as for many intermediate cities of the nation is in actual operation. It is a model of urban growth without investment in services and without initial capital.

4. A High Rate Urban Growth Model with Poverty Restrictions.

The following pages are an account of the details and characteristics of the urban growth model developed in Lima that is also operating in all Peruvian towns. It is a model allowing high rates of growth, even violent rates, for the poor seeking shelter and in a situation of scarcity of funds.

The model developed in a trial and error process is still evolving. It has been a quite dynamic process of confronting vested interests operating in the national scene. It seems to be addressed to a transformation of the bureaucratic machinery to better suit the specific profile of the national society, more complex and dynamic than ^{the} ~~that~~ was is accepted by the formal structure of the country.

There are various ways to explain urbanisation and housing production processes in Lima. It is an interesting subject matter because the case of Lima belongs to a wider geographic and social field representing also other Latin American cities, and with certain reserves, the case of other cities of the less developed world.

It is not easy to decide between these two options: 1) the house production in charge of poor urban dwellers is a sort of forced saving scheme imposed upon them by the State which by promoting invasions of land would place costs and risks in the shelter needing people without

using government resources; or 2) if it is a victory of the urban poor that have been able to impose upon an indifferent and sometimes repressive State their own mode of access to service.

It is most probably for the two explanations to be true. One can think of an interacting process, not explicitly formulated but able to induce invasion, progressive urbanisation and provision of services out of legality.

On the same token it is worthwhile to observe that legal framework or legality is in Peru an entelechy, a normative set up difficult to follow and of little use in the modern social situation of the country. This was not clear in the near history because the country was divided into a modern and a backward sector and laws were set up by and for the advanced sector. Due to the fact that after the 40s improvement in health and education, communications and public transport was active, the dividing wall was turned down and the other part of the country became interested in national questions, cities started their growing process and the awareness of the inappropriateness of the legal apparatus. For the urban newcomers there was no other way to survive than to place themselves on the other side of the law. On the other side of the law is the urbanisation process of the poor.

This kind of urbanisation does not belong only to Lima. It pervades the housing producing process all over the country.

II. SLUMS, SHANTY TOWNS, AND CLANDESTINE LAND IMPROVEMENTS.

1. The Qualification of Substandard Housing Issue.

The dividing limit between good quality and substandard housing cannot be defined sharply in a country like Peru, as well as in other less developed countries of the world. This is because a large part of the country's population live in small towns and hamlets or in isolated rural dwellings that do not have services in the extension and level of quality established as international community norms. Many of these settlements do have historic and traditional values, a representative status in the national scenery and relatively socio-economic importance. A wide gray zone separating sordid and unhealthy places from those having complete public services and recreational and health facilities to the level internationally accepted, has been developed.

The picture tends to blur even more when it is considered, as in Peru, that the capital city is a primate city imposing prestige norms difficult to follow in less affluent areas; or when it is taken into consideration that the social urbanisation process has transferred the social urban conduct pattern to the rural sector without transferring the solvency that such status requires. If this picture is present in the national level it is also in operation in the metropolitan environment receiving a heavy rural migration stream. The gray zone appears here due mainly to the velocity of structural changes. Emergent popular media modify daily environmental conditions. A zone that today shows only scattered huts over sandy ground can be few years later an organised neighborhood with solid houses and public services.

If these preliminary questions as well as the dynamic character of shelter acquisition process are taken into consideration three categories of irregular land improvement and housing in Lima can be determined. There are: 1) barriadas, or shanty towns, squatter settlements, young towns or marginal human settlements; 2) clandestine land improvements; and 3) slums. Some of these categories do not house exclusively the urban poor. The breaking of legality produced by the heavy immigration movements made that entrance to shelter possible for a wider clientele with better means than the roofless migrants.

2. Land Improvement by Popular Initiative.

The major part of urban growth will be inserted in the near future in some of the informal urbanisation modes listed above, or within some new forms of the same phenomena. Both in relative and absolute numbers formal growth will be slower. The area covered by informal housing will be equivalent to that corresponding to the formal. Some types of informality in shelter will be described immediately.

2.1. Clandestine Land Improvement.

Clandestine land improvement is a process by which a landowner can subdivide property to be sold to individuals or to interested groups without complying with the required roads, public services and other improvement works required prior to selling operations. The original owners transfer those obligations to the buyers that in due time applicate to government offices for public services and titles. Numerous housing associations and cooperatives work now as pressure, organisational and defense groups for that goal. Petitions are not always successful because services cannot be easily extended to every corner of the town, costs are not always affordable and legal clearing and title granting is an onerous and tedious process.

Vast tracts of barren land adjoining agricultural fields have been parcelled using similar procedures. This land was obtained free of cost, or for a token value, from the State. It was obtained as mining concessions to quarry the sand and gravel used as construction material aggregates. Afterwards it was parcelled and sold in clandestine land improvement deals. This type of urbanisation is carried out by informal entrepreneurs as a profitable operation. It was recently found out that quarry operators had all the non agricultural land suited for urban expansion in their hands according to Municipal Planning data collection for the Metropolitan Urban Plan.

It was necessary to enact ad hoc legislation to revert those land to Municipal domain. From here it is clear that an extreme form of public land appropriation had been established by speculators. Liberallity of mining legislation, pressure against the land and government lack of capacity to control urban growth explain this situation.

The owners of irrigated and productive agricultural land became informal because of two convergent reasons: the first refers to the cumbersome bureaucratic proceedings required by the formal land improvement process, and the second came out of the landowners verification that rent from agriculture was inferior to the one produced by the interests of the capital obtained by selling the land. This is way land owners went hastily to sell their properties before agrarian reform.

2.2. Invasions.

Here ^{there} is not an owner or initial speculator. Settlings organised in associations choose a site and undertake the necessary occupation measures in a given date. The night before national holiday is a preferred time. They reach the area to be invaded massively using trucks and renting vehicles to carry some few household goods and sticks and mats to erect a provisional shelter. A suitable organisation has already been set up and responsibilities have been assigned to various commitees. Plots are marked on the ground, mats are erected and people stay on guard waiting police reaction. Sometimes there are violent scenes, sometimes the forces of law and order are passive. Also some fighting might occur with other groups demanding rights on the same land. An all around the clock invaders defense group remains on duty ready to resist eviction and to fight out other invaders. Food is prepared in communal kitchens. For the prospective

plot owner it is a difficult period of time. They will remain on their plots one or two months, or even more time, almost unsheltered with only few blankets, a stool and some other belongings. Once censuses finish registering the original and the added invaders, the group will obtain help from official or private organisations for a final lay out. In their allocated plots settlements will build one or two rooms out of sticks and mats in a feverish period of activity. To fill up makeshift tanks some water trucks will start selling water while certain groups will start operating front door stores. The specialised committees will simultaneously negotiate the extension of transportation services with private bus operators.

All lay outs reserve areas for education, health, church and recreation services. Plots are small, from 60 or less to 90 square meters. Streets are designed for vehicular transit or for pedestrian use if the topography or if the scarcity of land makes it necessary. Some 20 years will elapse from the date of invasion to final obtention of titles and services.

There is also the case of progressive and non violent invasion. With the tacit agreement of some landowners, or counting only with their lack of concern, some houses are built near the fields or close to industrial outfits. The group of houses grows slowly to obtain the critical weight needed to todemand be considered a squatter settlement. If such status is obtained the route towards titles and services will not be different from the other types of invasions.

2.3. The Takings of Land.

The takings of private and public lands have been recently accelerated. There were 282 such actions in 1985 (de Soto 1986:59). Public non agricultural land that used to be plentiful a few years ago suiting well the settling needs is not quite far from metropolitan work centres. The violent irruption of several thousand persons on land reserved for public use or on private fenced plots ~~is~~ is directed to exert pressure against authority either to maintain themselves in the site invaded or to force government to relocate invaders in some other site. Not withstanding repression most of these actions have been successful. The invaders have been relocated or have stayed in the taken premises.

This type of invasion ends always in very dense settlements because success would depend on the amount of pressure exerted. The more persons the more pressure defines the reasoning of invaders. The more persons argument serves also to make eviction more difficult.

To the variegated panorama of irregular forms of access to shelter the "false invasion scheme" should be added. It is undertaken by association and housing cooperatives that have agreed with some landowners -not allowed by zoning to improve their lands- to acquire the land. After payment the plot owners armed with mats and sticks "invade" the land. The owner does not comply. There is now a de facto situation that will be eventually acknowledged. This peculiar type of invasion with other similar forms have used 3400 hectares of agricultural land in 10 years.

3. Shanty Towns. Marginal Human Settlements, Barriadas.

To date there are 1800000 persons living in shanty towns in Lima. There are various types of shanty towns together with different modalities of non legal urbanisation. The figure presented above makes up 30% of the population of metropolitan Lima. Other Peruvian cities show even higher shanty town percentages. It can be stated, without exaggeration that self land improvement is the prevailing mode of access to urban land in Peru. In the past decade 2 out of 10 houses built were formal.

The real volume of informal house building does not appear in official statistics. Informal house builders do not apply for construction permits. The amount invested can only be estimated from the variations in the building materials demand. Such estimates are not sound either because they do not consider expenditure in non traditional materials, recycled or discarded products. Besides the fact, that part of the brick and aggregate industry is also informal. But if statistical data is not reliable the fact is nonetheless that informal house building pervades the shanty town landscape.

3.1. Profile of Lima's Shanty Towns from Official Sources.

Statistical data was compiled on the extension and characteristics of Lima's shanty towns in a joint venture operation of WHO, PNUD and the National Planning Institute (PER/85/007). Data was compiled by urban sectors namely East, West, South, North and Centre. We shall follow this work in the next pages.

There is an important statement to start with: 35% of the country's population is living in shanty towns (PER 85:2) in 1985. To the same year the situation in Lima was as follows:

II.1. Shanty Towns in Lima and in Peru 1985 (thousands)

	Urban Pop.	Shanty Towns Pop.	Number of Plots	Title Plots	Services Water Sewage Electr.		
Peru	8610	2827	440	137.3	52%	46%	63%
Lima	5142	1384	241	45.5	43%	43%	64%

(PER 85:4)

Metropolitan population percentual variation in squatter areas has been analysed. It shows an upward trend that might lead to 50% of the country's population living in irregular neighborhoods by the year 2000. However, that percentage should be read with caution because irregular neighborhoods do improve steadily.

When growth is analysed on a sector basis relating population increase and time an interesting picture appears: a steep gradient curve representing population increase flattens suddenly to a horizontal line. It seems that in more or less 20 years all land available for house building was used up.

There is not any more land available in the northern sector and now ^{it} is pushing away excedent population. To the East pressure is exerted on agricultural land while the southern sector grows slowly due to lack of water.

The squatter areas 1983 Housing Ministry Survey determined the existence of 10000 hectares occupied by squatter settlements

II.2. Area in Squatter Settlements by Sectors

North Sector	1800 hectares
South Sector	553
East Sector	5400*
West Sector	1071

Total:	9092 hectares

* Does not include Villa El Salvador

Source: Ministry of Housing Statistics Bureau. "Human Settlements Statistics 1983" Lima 1985

From CIDAP (Population Research and Documentation Centre), INE (National Institute of Statistics) and Ministry of Housing sources the 1984 picture is as follows

II.3. Number of Squatter Settlements, Plots and Population 1984

Sectors	Number of Squatter Settlements	Number of Plots	Population (thousand)	Projected Population 1986(thns)
North	202	62197	424	604 (30%)
Centre	156	28101	182	179 (25%)
South	132	102561	664	621 (24.5%)
East	217	51613	310	287 (30.6%)
West	75	24537	146	176 (16%)
TOTAL	782	269009	1392	1868

Source: PER/85/007:11.

A use value and not a real state commodity seems to be popular housing as shown by tenure analysis. Official intervention lack of importance is shown in the next table. The number of people paying mortgages and

rent-ownership obligations amounts only to 2%. On the contrary non commercial modalities of tenure, as for example houses in lend, are much more significant. Moreover, rented houses are represented in the survey by 10%. Rented houses are mostly concentrated in the older settlements close to major routes and to intensive commercial use areas.

In other parts of this report the extension of public services to squatter areas is shown. Coverage variations among city sectors respond to specific physical constraints or to the age of settlements. Electricity has the same coverage for all sectors amounting from 60% to 70%. This is due to the availability of the resource and because lines can be easily extended. This is not the case with water supply and sewerage. Northern and western sectors far from the water works plant have to rely on independent sources, expensive to build and maintain. The South sector is a younger area of development. Here the service coverage is high due to major investment prompted to the area 20 years ago after a very important invasion.

Metropolitan average coverage, that is, overall town coverage does not differ greatly from the marginal settlement one.

II.4. METROPOLITAN LIMA: TYPES OF TENURE BY YEARS OF RESIDENCE (1983)

ZONE OF RESIDENCE	Squatter Areas		Rest of Lima		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Owned houses	234,080	77	246,413	51	480,493	61
In Mortgage	3,524	1	4,782	1	8,306	1
Rent-Ownership	2,014	1	14,850	3	16,864	2
Rented	31,714	10	170,904	35	202,618	26
In Lend	25,422	9	35,993	7	61,415	7
Other	6,544	2	14,850	3	21,394	3
TOTAL	303,298 (38)	100	487,792 (62)	100	791,090 (100)	100

Source: PER/85/007

II.5. HOME EQUIPMENT

ZONE OF RESIDENCE	Squatter Areas	Rest of Lima	Total
	%	%	%
Refrigerator	51	79	68
Gas Stove	35	66	54
Oil Stove	84	54	65
Electricity Stove	3	13	9
Blender	53	79	69
Vacuum Cleaner	5	36	24
Car	6	22	16
Owned house	77	51	61

Source: PER/85/007

4. Slums.

The possibility open to settlements to use barren land through various modes of informal land improvements has greatly diminished pressure upon city slums --if the term applies to buildings in the consolidated part of the city housing the urban poor in crowded, promiscuous and unhealthful conditions. Notwithstanding diminishing pressure, Lima's slums have grown and an important town sector is in such condition.

4.1. Slum Types.

Slum typology based upon urban structure considerations was developed by Adolfo Cordova in 1958 (Cordova 1958). This typology is still useful. Three large categories were isolated based upon criteria set up by the National Planning Office (ONPU) in 1955: decaying neighborhoods, stationary neighborhoods and modern unhealthful neighborhoods.

The first category contained two slum types: the subdivided house, "residential Spanish household" converted to multifamily dwelling (Cordova 1958:34) and rented by rooms, and tenement houses "built originally as multifamily dwellings" as a callejon, an alley with rooms at both sides that ended in a communal faucet.

The "subdivided houses" appeared in the 20s when the affluent moved out from the historic centre to more prestigious areas. "Tenement houses" were being built by private institutional investors in the nineteenth century, or earlier, to be rented to workers and petty government officials. They were functional to the economic and social system of those times.

"Modern unhealthful neighborhoods" were also functional to their times. They were built to serve the lower social strata. Two types were distinguished: high density and medium density estates.

"High density estates" type is represented by a group ironically called El Porvenir (The Future). It is a big estate composed of 4 story blocks built for rent in 1945 without any consideration to mandatory regulations or to health. Family space was compressed, light and ventilation not considered, stairs and horizontal circulation constricted. By now it covers 3.5 hectares of land. Poor construction quality and intensity of use induced rapid decay and deterioration while investors profits went up. Government undertook remodelling, diminishing density and modifying the structure to be sold to the tenants 25 years after inauguration.

The "medium density estate" type corresponds to one or two story structures built on the limit of legality as tenements: they serve Lima's workers before the upsurge of marginal settlements.

The category of stationary neighborhoods comprises the city sectors or districts pervaded by one story multifamily outfits as the above mentioned callejones and with corralones. The corralon is a walled plot located in an area with complete public services in which the owner gives some meager piece of land to tenants who would build there their own makeshift houses.

Densities obtained by Cordova are here presented.

II.6. Slums Density

Stationary neighborhoods	471 persons/hectare
Subdivided houses	604
Tenements	553
Modern unhealthful neighborhoods high density	2350
Medium density	500

(Cordova 1958:4)

Overall housing situation was summed up by Cordova (1958) as follows: Metropolitan Lima with a population of 1227000 inhabitants had 10.75% of its population living in marginal settlements, 12.3% in unfinished houses within the consolidated area of town; 13.55% in tenements; 64% in modern high density unhealthful estates; 13.7% in medium density areas and 26.9% in good quality sectors. From this work it comes out that 73% of Lima's population was ill housed.

The slum formation phenomenon should be added to the categories established by Cordova. Location advantages have induced density increment in some marginal settlement areas. Original plots are being subdivided, additions are built and stories added for renting purposes or to have relatives or new family members. The structures that were precarious in the origin support now a more intensive use and services are pressed upon. Density has reached 400 persons per hectare in some areas and crowding and promiscuity have grown.

There are not recent estimates in the number of slum dwellers in Lima. Abelardo Sanchez Leon (1979) has gathered some figures up to 1977 using data of the national census of 1972 and from National Planning Office Survey of 1967. The mentioned author presents a slum formation as a process:

"Slums, at first, do not follow urban growth. They developed in the interior of existing urban areas. City slums served to receive incoming migrants before the marginal settlement movement started in the 40s.....
.....once slums went overcrowded the marginal settlements were the only chance left for shelter to the urban poor.....due to the incapacity of the popular sector to get shelter by conventional means they have to substitute the classical slum for marginal settlements."
(Sanchez Leon et al 1979:46).

Almost 500000 persons were living in slums in Lima representing 25.3% of the population of 17 districts in which there were slums as established by the 1968 Slum Census of the National Planning Office. That number represented 18% of Metropolitan Lima total population (2705300 persons) (Sanchez Leon et al 1979:49). Slums were also present in marginal settlements in that year. The following table presents density variations from 1956 to 1970.

Density Variations 1956-1970

Marginal Settlement	Location	Population 1956	Density	Population 1970	Density
Matute Puerto	Central Area	3352	1018	6693	2034
Nuevo San Cosme Leoncio	Hill Area	4822	814	6980	1179
Prado Leticia	Hill Area	5674	782	5982	825
Reynoso	Central Area	1338	294	4572	1004
	Hill Area	2360	233	5335	528
	Riverside Ar.	2367	132	4053	227

(Sanchez Leon et al 1979:51).

In December 1976, the Housing and Construction Ministry (Sectorial Planning Office. Evaluation of the Development Plan 1975-76, Lima) found that out of 610566 dwellings in Lima 52% were in slum condition affecting in a 54% the total resident population of 3225841 people.

5. Employment and Income in Squatter Areas.

Data on income and employment in Lima's squatter areas is presented later in the statistical addenda. Figures shown there are self explanatory and need not further comment. However, one aspect should be underlined. The figures presented do not show any striking difference between overall Metropolitan Lima and squatter areas socio economical profile. When "rest of Lima" and squatters' data are compared differences appear. They are not strong enough to produce a highly contrasting picture. Population, regarding income and employment characteristics, tend to be homogeneous all over Metropolitan Lima. As it seems in the long run, middle class will increase greatly equalising income and employment traits. The differences in environmental quality --of outstanding importance in Lima-- might respond to cultural reasons and not only to economic status. The heavy rural immigration in the past decades has definitely left a mark in Lima's image.

III. INTERVENTION MODES

1. Recent history of Government intervention.

The history of informal land improvement in Lima shows simultaneously: 1) Government lack of capacity to cope with the housing needs of the poor; and 2) the growing admittance of the value of popular strategies and alternatives to secure shelter, services and employment for themselves. If one sees what has been happening in the area of shelter in the last fifty years, there appears a persistent modification of the attitudes towards informality in the housing field. In the work of Hernando de Soto (1986) relating informality in Peru a most interesting process is exposed. The following is a summary of his findings regarding this particular matter.

1.1. Informality in its origin.

The above mentioned author points out that the majority of the residential neighborhoods in Lima were built outside land improvement regulations and that the land owners exerted political influence on Government officials to obtain the wanted legal status. The very same owners encouraged by their success in the rich neighborhoods repeated the scheme in the less affluent urban sectors.

1.2. First recognition of land invaders.

Based on the so established land improvements built outside the law, migrants settled down on marginal and riverside unused land. A river flood wiped the huts out and the squatters were relocated on the slopes of a nearby hill. The first official acknowledgement of the squatters' "rights" occurred in 1932. That same year 4 out of 100 housing units in Lima were informal.

1.3. Political awareness of the invaders.

The 1940's great earthquake damaged Lima severely and at the same time prompted illegal land occupancy. During the 50's the volume of squatters grew extensively and they became object of interest to political parties. They also acquired consciousness of their own political force and became aware of their negotiating and defense power. In 1954, 28 housing units out of 100 were informal.

1.4. Legal recognition.

In February 1961 the Squatters Law was approved (13516). This law granted legality to the squatter settlements built up to that date, it also assigned funds for remodelling, improvement and legalisation of those settlements. It established also a pertinent government framework.

A special category of land titles was created (property could not be sold), a mandatory organisational set up for squatter communities was

designed, and lastly, new invasions were to be punished and government decided to launch popular land development programs of social interest to substitute informal housing schemes.

An important effort was undertaken to fulfill these goals but, the promise of legalisation was again an incentive to informality. In 1968, 57 out of 100 housing units were informal in Lima.

1.5. Clash with the Government.

The biggest of Lima "invasions" occurred in 1971 when public and Church owned lands were taken. The squatters resisted eviction and during the fight Salvador Saldivar, one of the leaders of the group, died. The case got worse, the Minister in charge of the eviction was forced to resign and an agreement was inevitable: Government moved the squatters. Another area was chosen, designed and protected by the authority. Villa El Salvador was born. Government adopted a policy of direct intervention and sometimes promotion of squatters communities. Around 1975, 62 out of 100 housing units were informal.

1.6 Associations and Cooperatives.

In the early 1970s the Agrarian Reform made it mandatory to fix urban limits up and to define which agricultural land should be kept as such and which should be developed for urban use. The land owners in the last category considered better to sell parcelled informal plots without any improvements, to housing associations and cooperatives. The owners of agricultural land outside urban limits preferred also the informal way. After due agreement and payment, they promoted the invasion of their own land. A great number of housing associations were created and large amounts of agricultural land was consumed.

1.7. Achievement of urban status.

In 1979, a law was passed ending the restrictions to property established for squatter settlements in 1961. The areas with titled plots which had passed through the remodelling process were to be regular town neighborhoods. Today they form undifferentiated parts of the city. At that time 65 out of 100 housing units were informal.

1.8. Recognition of ownership and communities self organisation.

The granting of titles to the land occupiers was accelerated. The new Municipal Law granted to the local governments the management of urban land. This used to be a Central Government prerogative. Lima's Metropolitan City Council acknowledges the existence of the squatters organisations set up and deals with them.

1.9. Oriented invasions.

In 1984, various housing associations and housing cooperatives gathering 7000 families, invaded a 640 hectares track of barren land East of Lima. The case would have been of minor interest had it not been directed and organized by the Lima's Metropolitan Council. I quote de Soto (1986:56).

"It was the administrative proceedings related to the adjudication of land from the hands of the Ministry of Housing to the Lima's Council what exasperated municipal officials and convinced them to give green light to the invasion. Truly, the Mayor himself, Alfonso Barrantes, worried by the cumbersome bureaucratic procedure, consulted the issue two months before with the Ministry of Housing, Javier Velarde Aspillaga, who -according to his own declarations- had to admit that due to the impossibility of accelerating the bureaucratic procedures, the invasion of Huaycan was the only possible way out."

1.10. Frustrations with cooperatives and housing associations.

By 1985 the irregular promoters of cooperatives and housing associations were so active and so well established in their activities that they were using mass media in order to increase the number of associates of the informal land occupancy enterprises. The Municipality acted to stop them and was partly successful but the houses and facilities already built could not be eradicated. The Council had to register such areas and the Congress passed out a law demanding to give them titles in 60 days. By the end of 1985 69 out of 100 houses were informal.

Up to this point I have used extensively de Soto's (1986) work. His reasoning ends with the assertion that the reviewed process is "a long march towards private property". The fact that recognition to titulation over invaded land was finally granted seems to make him right, nonetheless I think that the development of the present day system of explicit and non explicit relations between the authority and popular groups is a much more rich and complex issue. To the urban poor shelter and employment are basic needs, needs related to survival in the urban environment. Ownership, even in the case of entitled plots, ~~it~~ is not a merchandise it is only related to use. Commercial transactions of urban property in squatter areas is very rare and most of the plots stay in ownership of the original invaders. The same strategy to survive explains the varied and complex association forms that were created in the marginal settlements such as mothers' clubs, head of families associations, regional groups, parochial and other groups of defense or interest. Within this panorama ownership becomes a means and not an end by itself. Diego Palma (1986) suggests that informality develops due to the "special logic" of capitalist development in Peru. Internationalisation of capital leads to "unbalanced development" in the marginal countries and with it an

excess in supply of employment ending in low and non permanent incomes. The social answer is the implementation of different strategies to obtain the lacking incomes. "The squatters' activities and organisations are oriented towards maximisation of the meager income creating and interchanging use values...." (Palma, 1986).

2. Action of Local Governments.

Hernando de Soto (1986:59) has shown that between 1957 and 1985 eleven different public bureaus (or eleven different names for the same bureau) have dealt with government activities related to squatter areas and housing for the poor. Most of the time during the above mentioned period the question was under Central Government care. It is only in 1981 when the new Municipality Law was set out that the issue went into Municipal jurisdiction.

Local government has been historically a weak institution in Peru. The mentioned law has initiated a process of strengthening such an important institution for democracy and development. The transferring of functions to the local government has been only partially fulfilled. Really the transference of the management and control function without the transference of proper funds has only moved responsibility from one entity to another. Resources, really not big remain in the central budget. Those important aspects of local development and improvement such as administration and investment in public services such as water supply and sewerage, electricity and communications remain within the Central Government area of management and decision.

In 1981, squatter areas were put under the surveillance of municipalities and, in the case of Metropolitan Lima, in charge of the Executive 'Bureau of Marginal Human Settlements of the Province. The Metropolitan Council did not have enough funds to invest in projects capable to modify the given housing situation, nor was a Metropolitan Master Plan available to handle with an urban environment in such an active growing and changing process that overcame easily the limits and norms settled by the late 1970s which also were prepared because of the failure of previous normative planning documents. There was neither a legal body capable to deal with, orient and control the very many informal ways of access to land and housing in Lima. The first three years of municipal government were spent in the reception of employees, archives, work places and offices coming from the Central Government, as well as in the adaptation of the municipal administrative set up to the newly acquired role and functions. The World Bank came to aid Lima's Metropolitan Council granting a 150 million dollars loan to be spent on roads and urban transport projects, on garbage recollection and handling and on administrative organisation and development. The second autonomous municipal administration (socialist, 84-86) put into operation the loan building roads in the squatter areas and reorganised the public transport network, improving the recollection and disposal of garbage and preparing an Urban Operational Emergency Plan for the teeming urban fringe of Lima actively consumed by informal land speculators; a new administrative organisation for the Council was set up and it later undertook the task of working out a new Metropolitan Development Plan. The legal frame of reference for the management of squatter areas was not

changed. It still belongs to the Central Government domain. A large portion of municipal resources in the area of housing had to be used in the cumbersome paper work handling related to improvement, remodeling and title granting to squatters, as well as to resist the pressure exerted upon the municipality by groups of squatters or prospected squatters to settle disputes over land, relocation of excedent people from renewal operations, legal regularisations, authorisation to build up public services and other diverse conflictive issues. In one year of operation the squatters bureau office was "taken" 5 times by ireful demandants.

The problem of bureaucratisation also exasperated the local government. Aiming to direct urban growth over barren land apt to be used in land development schemes, the local planning officials selected land in the areas qualified as emergency zones. There it could be possible to implement a land improvement scheme, modest at first, then able to mature to acceptable levels of quality. The Municipality was not able to obtain the transference of the land required by the project from the Central Government. (The Liberty and Democracy Institute (de Soto, 1986: Fig. 4) has proven that 247 administrative operations were needed to secure transfer of land from public to private domain). The Metropolitan Lima Council chose to lead squatters to the occupation of the selected areas. In July 1984, 11 housing associations gathering 7000 families arrived to the site to occupy pre assigned plots. Some other groups entered the area. The first comers held positions and after some quarreling and reassignment of land a quite interesting unit planning came about. An internal autonomous organisation was established and local technical assistance office paid by the Metropolitan Council started to work in situ: the Huaycan Office.

Within the line of action adopted by the Metropolitan Council in the Emergency Operational Plan similar schemes were implemented to the North of Lima (Laderas del Chillon) and to the South (Pampas de San Juan). A quite peculiar strategy of land granting and improvement directed to the urban poor, where the local government and shelter lacking groups were working in a joint venture scheme in search for housing, was in operation. The Central government also cooperated at first by its passivity in the invasion period and lately more directly by investing in public services and transport.

One year before Mayor Barrantes (socialist) finished ^{his} ~~its~~ period and after elections brought Alan Garcia (social democrat) to the presidency, the national government entered the arena of squatter settlements and housing for the poor. Once again, all invasion and irregularly improved neighborhoods were granted legal recognition. A law was passed in Congress demanding the Municipality to grant titles to irregularly occupied plots in 120 days and, at the same time, determining that if such goal was not accomplished the Central government would do it. Being aware of the dimension of the deed -because of the amount of work involved in the legal aspect of the question- the local government accelerated the titling machinery, not before asking to change certain aspects of the articulate that were against environment and historic monuments conservation policies (some archaeological areas had been hastily invaded). There was also omission regarding public services implementation. Some of these questions were changed in due time. Lima's Metropolitan Council may reach the 80% of the goal to the end of 1986. It is now quite clear that the squatters

titling matter is in this year a matter of political confrontation between the Left and the Social democrats with undoubtedly benefits for the marginal urban dwellers.

3. Central Government Actions.

I have already referred to the Central Government action during 1986 regarding title granting to irregular land improvement dwellers. In what relates to direct investment in housing and lodge construction there have been also important changes. The recent policy statements of the Central government confirms the trend established 15 years ago -with some periods of moderate retreat- directing investment to land improvement with preference to non agricultural land, and to the construction of core houses instead of complete apartments and houses. Facing such an strong demand it seems to be proper to distribute existing meager funds into a broader number of recipients.

There is a long history of government intervention in the housing field in Peru. Back in 1945 "neighborhood units" were built following the international prototypes in vogue after the Second World War. They were self sustained communities of 1000 families, with complete educational, recreational services and park areas. Neighborhood Unit Nr. 3 was built as a part of a string of similar developments to house workers of a parallel industrial street joining Lima and the port of Callao. Apartments were given in rent to families qualifying to obtain the benefit. The scheme was not completed but during the 50s 10 or more residential complexes were built in 3 or 4 story blocks. A change in national housing policy gave the lodges to residents in an ownership-rent plan, while the government passively consented occupancy of non agricultural land. Following de Soto (1986:43) 9 out of 10 invasions were successful.

In the mid 60s the State was operating in 5 parallel channels: 1) Building great residential schemes for the middle income brackets, 2) Handling legislation to grant titles, remodelling and improving sanitation in irregular neighborhoods; 3) furthering the mutual loan system for medium cost housing; 4) fostering land improvement projects for the low income sector; and 5) trying to resist the illegal occupancy of land. Funds came from the central government budget and from international aid and credit institutions. Such institutions were not in favor of subsidising housing. The families incorporated in the approved programmes should be able to afford their obligations and the sums collected ought to be reinvested. The urban poor were left out of such programmes. For them official access to land and housing was out of reach.

During the 70s, and after a brief repressive period, the State encouraged and expressly oriented some important experiments in land improvement of barren and unused land for the ever growing sectors of the urbanites with scant resources. It is the period of Villa El Salvador to which we will come later with the detail it deserves. During this period the construction of big housing schemes was limited.

From 1980 to 1985 architect Fernando Belaunde was again elected president of Peru (his first period was from 1963 to 1968). By this time the issue of shelter and housing for the poor urban dweller was quite critical. The economic situation of the country ^{external} was getting worse with an increasing inflation rate and an expanding foreign debt. The government set for itself the task of implementing a National Housing Plan, a Bank of Housing Construction Materials and a Social Mortgage Fund. The overall plan was financed by the Housing Bank together with the Mutual Loan System and the Mortgage Central Bank. The operative arm of the National Housing Plan was ENACE (National Building Enterprise), an institution of the government housing sector operating with replicability funds and with the resources from FONAVI (National Housing Fund), collected nationally by the Housing Bank out of the pay rolls charging both patrons and workers. From 1980 to 1985 58948 housing units were built in the country, 8955 were one family units and 17277 apartments, 8998 core houses and 23278 site and service plots (ENACE 1985). Out of these figures Lima got the greater part: 11495 units in multifamiliar blocks, 5893 one family houses, 4537 core houses and 13179 site and services plots. Lots and housing units were given to white collar and blue collar workers contributors to FONAVI by lottery among those interested and qualifying. Informal and other kind of workers had not access to this programme.

The Bank of Construction Materials allowed the acquisition, on favorable credit conditions, of materials needed for self-help construction. Social mortgage made possible the access to mortgage funds to the medium sector previously left out.

The National Water Supply Plan directed investment to water work projects in numerous intermediate size towns and in poor Lima's neighborhoods.

The amount of work accomplished was quite considerable and even more important if it is considered that the country's economy was worsening while inflation was destroying every financing operation making recuperation of capital impossible.

When in July 1985 a new government acceded to power, it was decided to abandon the policy of direct investment in housing construction to dedicate government efforts to land improvement in site and services projects. A progressive land improvement plan was designed to locate families on site with only minimal services, partially improved streets and water supply as a communal faucet. The design was thought to be progressively completed. The plan is now in implementation with various projects under construction in intermediate towns of the country. Lima has not been included in the 1986 plan. To date it seems that squatter areas will be a local government concern while investing in progressive land improvement projects will be in government hands to serve workers that contribute to FONAVI.

There are not withstanding jurisdictional interferences of great importance. Autonomous municipal administration is young in Peru. Local government has not as yet developed proper master plans nor has the administrative experience needed and funds are scarce. Central government administration was used to control the country from the capital city without consideration of municipal rights and has not

shown interest in transferring some of its prerogatives. Central government has had difficulty in securing the land required for its projects and local government is unable to control and orient urban growth because decisions on major public and service works belong to the Central government.

IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION

It has become clear that the housing question in Peru cannot be dealt with from a technocratic approach. It seems more than ever linked to political confrontation among the prevailing ideological streams operating in the country. This confrontation will be increased in the near future. On one hand, there is an increasing interest of political parties in the new urbanites that grew in number at a steady pace. And on the other hand, the pressure to get services and urban facilities will also grow to the point that it cannot be ignored. Concurrently - and reinforcing popular pressure to get the lacking services- there is the fact that the rural migrants had been steadily transforming their rural habits to acquire an urban social profile. Their children are now urban citizens, they conform a major segment of urban population and their claims have to be taken into consideration.


Within this perspective there are three questions that should be analysed. They were already present in the attitudes of central and local government as well as in the squatter communities. It seems that the State achieved a role making feasible urban improvement for the poor putting aside great building projects to foster land improvement schemes with minimal services to be upgraded concurrently with urban consolidation and growth. Water supply, sewerage, electricity, public transport and communications cannot be obtained in adequate levels of quality by autonomous community work. Recent experience shows that a reasonable understanding between shelterless groups and local government is possible. Various experiments now operating prove that a discreet direct intervention of local government is accepted by interested communities and leads to appropriate technical and social schemes. Finally the valuable and indispensable role played by base communities in their own development is increasingly evident. The social environment of the poor has been able to create a most important resource wealth in terms of organisational and mobilisation capacities. This type of organisations work as direct democracies, that without being free of certain manipulation, show effectivity to deal with their own problems. Their microlevel organisations are women groups -a most important sector in a social area where abandoned or single mothers are the only support of the family- represented by mothers' clubs related to health, nutrition programmes and to the work in small industrial and handicraft workshops; fathers' associations vinculated to education; defense and negotiating groups to secure property and obtain access to services; regional groups representing tiny villages dispersed all over the country to which migrants profess permanently loyalty and many other forms of cooperation, mutual help and assistance. It should not be forgotten that such groups in the long history of squatters development have won the battle to abstract legality fostering a peculiar and specific way of urban growth in all Peruvian towns.

In the actual panorama of world economy it cannot be possible for Peru, nor to other poor Third World countries, to accumulate enough capital to be invested in traditional housing and low cost land improvement projects of the size needed. This assertion becomes stronger in the sight of the equally important deficiency in health, education and in the provision of employment to the growing population. In the scheme outlined above of a State is an agent to making development possible with poverty constrains, the local government is an agent implementing projects for the poor and base communities are agents of their own promotion. This might be a modest but realistic approach to the shelter and service for the poor issue.


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
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
O. PERU: POP : 20'027 100 (1986) AREA : (285 215 Km²)
 AVERAGE INCOME 1000 US\$ DEBT 14'000 000 US\$ (approx)




1- URBAN POPULATION OF PERU (PERCENTAGES) 1940-1981




2- METROPOLITAN LIMA AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION 1940-1985




3- METROPOLITA LIMA AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL URBAN POPULATION 1940-1985




4. POPULATION GROWTH METROPOLITAN LIMA AND PERU 1940-1985




5. METROPOLITA LIMA: VEGETATIVE AND MIGRATION GROWTH RATES 1940-1985




6. URBAN POPULATION OF PERU BY SIZE OF AGGLOMERATIONS 1940-1981



7. PERU RELATIVE WEIGHT OF URBAN AGGLOMERATIONS 1940-1981



8. PERCENTAGE OF SHANTY TOWNS IN 9 SELECTED CITIES: PERU 1985




9. METROPOLITAN LIMA

SERVICES IN SHANTY TOWNS BY SECTORS


(PERCENTAGES)

WATER SEWAGE ELECTRIC


NORTH




CENTER




SOUTH




EAST




WEST





10. METROPOLITAN LIMA: SQUATTER POPULATION BY DISTRICTS - 1986



11 DISTRICTS OF METROPOLITAN LIMA.








13 DENSITIES



14 LOCATION OF SHANTY TOWNS

15. RECENT
INVASIONS
1986.




16 . ACTIVITY CONDITION (1983)

	REST OF LIMA	SQUATTER AREAS	METROPOLITAN LIMA
INACTIVE	50.84	48.09	44.42%
UNEMPLOYED	4.48%	6.4%	4.76%
EMPLOYED	44.68%	46.50	45.81%


17 EMPLOYMENT LEVELS (1983)

ADEQUATELY EMPLOYED	60%	48%	54.5%
UNDER EMPLOYED	32%	42%	36%
UNEMPLOYED	8%	10%	9.5%
	REST OF LIMA	SQUATTER AREAS	METROPOLITAN LIMA

18 OCCUPATION (1983)



19 INCOME (1983)



PART II. THE CASE OF HUAYCAN.

1. Antecedents.

2. The Land Site.

- 2.1.Land Occupancy.**
- 2.2.Geographical Location.**
- 2.3.Location Factors.**
- 2.4.Land Tenure.**

3. The Project.

- 3.1.The Special Huaycan Programme.**
- 3.2.The Technical Project.**
- 3.3.Urban Structure.**
- 3.4.Housing.**
- 3.5.Comments on the Urban Model.**
- 3.6.Settlers-Technicians Relationships.**

4. Project Development.

- 4.1.Initial Organisation.**
- 4.2.Control Invasion.**
- 4.3.Urban Design Process.**

PART II. THE CASE OF HUAYCAN

Summary of the paper written by Gustavo Riofrio.

The role of the State in relation to popular housing has specific characteristics in Peru derived from more permissive attitudes regarding popular demand of housing. In contrast with other Latin American countries, investment in traditional housing has been small, but more tolerance has existed in relation to spontaneous land improvement. To date there are three modalities of access to housing for the popular sector:

- a).conventional housing for low income groups (site and services, core housing).
- b).barriadas or spontaneous young towns.
- c).barriadas or young towns sponsored by public authority.

Cooperatives and housing associations should also be added to the above mentioned categories.

This paper deals with land improvements which are neither spontaneous nor conventional. This is the case of Villa El Salvador (31000 families); Huascar (6100 families) and Huaycan (12000 families). Huaycan has been sponsored by the local government while the other two were in charge of the Central government. These type of settlements have the following characteristics:

- They are sponsored by the State, not by spontaneous settling actions. State is in charge of lay out and allocation of plots.
- There is more security regarding tenure and better chances for upgrading.
- State acts directly in settling organisation.
- The settlement evolves in a typical barriadas way, land occupancy comes first and construction comes later.

In a worldwide perspective there are not many alternatives to promoters and users of popular houses. There is the experience of conventional design and ^{of} spontaneous land improvement. The case herewith presented might be a new approach to this important subject.

Huaycan project has not finished yet but has advanced enough to evaluate some results.

1. Antecedents.

The land had been qualified of archaeological value but some of the groups interested on it found out that only a portion of it had that character.

The Metropolitan Council and the district's local authority, Ate-Vitarte, decided to use the land as the planned scheme for various groups interested in the zone.

2. The Land Site.

2.1. Land Occupancy.

Lima's Metropolitan Council (LMC) was suffering pressure from various groups wanting to occupy the site. Then, the LMC decided to invade first.

2.2. Geographical Location.

The site is a barren alluvial valley of 546 hectares in the medium Rimac River Valley, 17 kilometers from downtown Lima and 1.5 kilometers from an existing major road.

2.3. Location Factors.

Huaycan represents the opening up of a new site not integrated to the city's network. It is however part of the area allocated for urban growth by the local government planning office that prefers the use of barren land for the settlements location.

2.4. Land Tenure.

The land belonged to the Poppe family and to a landholding named Pariachi and Huascata. Part of the adjoining barren land went into the Poppe's family hands by means of an irrigation project to increase agricultural land. Changes in legislation halted the project.

3. The Project.

3.1. The Special Huaycan Programme.

On May 1984, the LMC created the Special Huaycan Programme (SHP) to manage the urban development project of Huaycan in an intent to foster and implement "popular participation".

The SHP had scant personnel and no budget. During the first 6 months personnel consisted of two architects, one assistant and a secretary.

The Huaycan Programme was loosely connected to the bureaucratic apparatus due to this it had the advantage of a more fluid and imaginative relation with settlers.

The SHP work-group developed activities on the site in compliance with local government ideology. The settlers cooperated directly in the design and execution of the project. The philosophy established was to be a stepping ahead from spontaneous tendencies within a context of scarcity of resources and municipal legal weakness.

3.2.The Technical Project.

The most important feature of the adopted design refers to the use of non conventional technology and to the adoption of a planning module similar to higher classes condominia. This was the communal housing unit (CHU).

3.3.Urban Structure.

Space has been organised in groups of CHUs surrounded by main roads. There is not a continuous or repetitive lay out. The CHUs area is about one hectare and each plot is 90 square meters and owned individually. Each settler owns also a portion of the correspondent communal area. Services and open space are common property. Each CHU has one faucet and one electrical connection. The extension of services in the interior of the CHU are in charge of the settlers. By this method, 200 water and electricity connections will serve 12000 families. The design provides only 66 meters per hectare of roads as against 250 of conventional designs.

There are also one-family lots of 135 square meters for commercial or handicraft workshop uses.

The first stage of the project has the following characteristics:

Area: 230 hectares
Population: 12000 families
CHUs: 200 units.
One-family lots: 900 units.
Health centres: 5
Sanitary stations: 10
Nurseries: 12.
Primary schools: 9
Secondary schools: 4.
Communal centres: 195.
Church: 1.
Municipal building: 1.
Library: 1.
Markets: 3.

In addition there is a water supply, electricity, street lightning and improved roads.

Areas First Stage.

Lots in CHUs: 170 hectares.
Commerce and workshops: 10.8

180.8 hectares.

Civic centre:	1
Communal centres:	14
Bus terminal:	0.5
Markets:	2

	17.5

Streets and open space: 31.7

Total: 230 hectares.

The existence of organised groups of families inspired Huaycan urban module. Each group lodged 60 families that share a communal space. The second level of organisation corresponds to a group of CHUs that conform a sector. Certain services are allocated to these sectors. The overall design does not consider an urban centre but the location of central services show concentration activity along the main road.

3.4.Housing.

The use of non conventional technology in house construction is proposed. Close contact between settlers and technicians is therefore required. Innovations have been introduced in the water supply and waste disposal system.

3.5.Comments on the Urban Module.

The basic idea is that the technician does not impose an idea but only proposes it. Organisation, construction and planning are simultaneous processes in Huaycan.

3.6.Settlers-Technicians Relationships.

There is a consistent interest in population participation in every decision-taking process. This is not to say that the design was worked out by the settlers themselves. It is the result of a continuous process of discussions among technicians taking into consideration the popular way of doing things. Even though the project seems to differ from organised popular tradition it appears closely related to the settlers actual needs. This is the main reason for the acceptance and compromise of settlers.

4. Project Development.

4.1.Initial Organisation.

Once the Huaycan project was announced expectancy grew up and parallel lists of inscription for the municipal sponsored one were opened. In July 5th 1984, 23 groups agreed to follow the municipal allocation plan and LMC accepted to legalise the settlement.

4.2. Control Invasion.

Future settlers filled up forms and paid 10 US\$ to be deposited in the municipal bank as inscription fees. In July 15th land was invaded with municipal supervision. 2000 families went to the site of the 12000 registered. All entrances to the area were guarded by special groups to deter other invaders from entering the site. A confrontation occurred with other independent groups that were forced to occupy a nearby site.

The preliminary period lasted two months giving time to planners to develop an overall lay out.

4.3. Urban Design Process.


In October 1984 a Local Management Committee was created and on the same date main roads were marked on the ground and land was allocated to the different intervening groups. CHUs were also marked and groups of 60 families moved to their final location.

Construction work started on communal lands and on roads. LMC helped with some machinery but the most important part of the job was done by hand by settlers.

In 1985 the municipal budget had some funds for Huaycan to be used in water and electricity. Individual plot allocation started with popular participation in the design of each CHU. Settlers then moved to their individual plots and house construction started.

Meanwhile community organisation was strengthened and the first settlement congress was called in July 1985.

There were 3000 families in Huaycan up to that date. The area changed rapidly and is still in an active process of growth. The Central government using temporal labour force undertook road building and LMC continued to improve the area. Now there exists (1986) in Huaycan a primary school, a health centre and various communal kitchens and dining rooms. In April 1986 a public telephone service was installed and a State owned bus line started servicing the area.




SUPER MANZANA IV

ESQUEMA DE UBICACION



DISEÑO FINAL DE UCV MODELO No.69




DETALLE SUPER MANZANA IV - P.E. HUAYCAN

13 UNIDADES COMUNALES DE VIVIENDA (UCV)
60 LOTES DE VIVIENDA POR CADA UCV


63 LOTES VM.-COMERCIO-TALLER
140 LOTES VIVIENDA
1 NUCLEO DE SERVICIOS


POBLACION:
845 LOTES x 5 PERS./LOTE: 4,225 Háb.

FUENTES: OF. PROGRAMA ESP. HUAYCAN, M.L.M.
RESPONSABLE: GUSTAVO ROPRIO



ORGANIGRAMA DE LA ASOCIACION DE POBLADORES DE HUAYCAN












estudio: G. Riofrío

dibujo: M. Riofrío.

PROGRAMA ESPECIAL "HUYCAN"

ETAPAS DE OCUPACION:

-  PRIMERAS ZONAS OCUPADAS
-  ZONAS OCUPADAS CON REUBICADOS DE INVASION
-  ZONAS EN PROCESO DE OCUPACION
-  ZONAS DESOCUPADAS
-  VIAS HABILITADAS, SIN ASFALTO
-  LOTES COMERCIALES OCUPADOS



PROGRAMA ESPECIAL "HUAYCÁN"

PRIMERA ETAPA:

250 hectareas
200 UCV
12,000 familias
900 lotes comerciales

- CURVAS DE NIVEL, LIMITE DE CERRO
- ▨ ZONAS DE EQUIPAMIENTO (EN CONSTRUCCION)
- ZONAS DE EQUIPAMIENTO FUTURO
- UBICACION DE LOTES COMERCIALES
- ▤ AREAS LIBRES