

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday 17 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A.A. de MELO FRANCO

(Brazil)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELO FRANCO

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. Machado LOPES

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. J. BLAZIK

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato M. HAMID

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mr. M. STAHL

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. S. LOFGREN

Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. J.M. EDES

Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STEELE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. A. AKALOVSKY

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil)(translation from French): I declare open the one hundred and twenty-first meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I ask leave of the Committee to make a brief statement in my capacity as representative of Brazil.

The first phase of our work in 1963, which was completed before the Easter holidays, was unfortunately not calculated to raise the hopes of the world regarding the progress of our disarmament negotiations. The interim report adopted by the Committee (ENDC/83) stands undoubtedly — in the economy of its style and in the dryness of its wording — as an admission of deadlock and even of complete failure. And it was so interpreted by the world Press. The only collateral measure on which agreement was expressed, namely, the establishment of direct communications between the Governments of Washington and Moscow, was not mentioned in the report, because apparently even on that point agreement was not firm enough.

The real truth is that the positions of the two blocs have hardened, political divisions have deepened, and speeches on both sides — despite the speakers' skill — have merely bogged us down further in questions of prestige, with no attempt to treat the problems before us in a truly scientific and diplomatic way.

As things stand today, the Brazilian delegation can see in this Conference no genuine promise of an early prospect of real negotiations or of putting new life into our work in a constructive sense. The Brazilian delegation even wonders if the decision to resume our meetings in such an atmosphere of impotence and confusion was really a wise one.

My delegation nevertheless considers the resumption of our proceedings to mean that most other delegations have come to the conclusion that some immediate progress may still be anticipated. We respect and are gratified at their sentiments; but at the same time we think that the negotiations resumed today must be treated in a new spirit by the parties. In that connexion the Brazilian delegation wishes to take its stand on that admirable document the encyclical "Pacem in Terris" of His Holiness John XXIII, which appeared so opportunely at a time when our recess gave us leisure for serious meditation.

It is not because I belong to the Roman Church that I, as representative of Brazil, urge upon my colleagues the strong words on disarmament contained in the

(The Chairman, Brazil)

encyclical. I do so as a man of goodwill seriously worried by the crucial problem of our time, since for the first time in the age-old history of my Church the Holy Father has appealed to all men without distinction of religion or philosophy.

Pope John XXIII has acquired incomparable authority in our troubled century by his noble personal qualities and the spiritual pre-eminence of his functions. While never swerving from the strict lines of his ministry, the Holy Father has, through long experience, courage, breadth of mind and simplicity, assumed the mantle of a real mediator between the ideological and political differences of our time. With no army or weapons of mass destruction at his disposal, with no economic power, or technology or science, or political prestige, or that aura of glory or material power that hypnotizes the crowd, the gentle old man of the Vatican draws the trust and hopes of the world by pricking the conscience of the great with simple truths in simple terms. He says what everyone is thinking, outside certain government councils, certain staff headquarters, certain political assemblies or certain laboratories where the destruction of world peace is being carefully devised.

The Holy Father, in a quiet voice that is yet loud enough to reach hundreds of millions of homes, sick beds and babies' cradles, speaks of the anguish and the hopes which apparently have still not broken down the barriers of mistrust, pride, ambition and fear. The Holy Father speaks of the future to the living and condemns those who wish by an all-embracing death to put out the light of that future for ever. His thoughts are simple, because the vast truth which they announce is simple too. He tells us that without disarmament there will be no peace, and that the idea of security founded on a balance of ever-growing destructive forces is a mad idea. He shows us that the ideal of peace in security can only be attained by the growth of trust, by the cessation of nuclear tests for military purposes, and by real disarmament under effective control. He reminds us that the only solution to the basic ideological contradiction dividing the world today lies in an international body with strengthened means of action operating according to the principles of law and the rules of justice.

These ideas are today shared by the overwhelming majority of human beings, who in terror and impotence watch the waste of economic and scientific resources on the folly of armaments, while most human beings by far stagnate in ignorance and poverty.

(The Chairman, Brazil)

I thank the Committee for its attention and now resume my duty as Chairman of today's meeting.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): As I have the privilege of being the first member of the Conference to speak after you this morning, Mr. Chairman, perhaps I may begin by saying that I have listened with close attention to the eloquent words with which you have reopened our discussions after our week-end recess.

It is unnecessary for me to say that the United Kingdom shares to the full the deep disappointment felt all around this table at the lack of progress in our discussions up to last week. I think that that disappointment can only serve as a spur to us all to try to renew our efforts to reach agreement on the very large number of issues which we have to discuss.

You quoted the eloquent words of His Holiness the Pope in his encyclical of last week, and mentioned how greatly his words reflect the views of the whole world in its desire to reach agreement on these issues vital to mankind. If I may say so, respectfully, Mr. Chairman, I think that we here can best contribute by engaging in real negotiation and discussion of the important issues facing us. By that I mean taking advantage of every possible opportunity for discussion, for true exchange, which means, to my mind, the putting of questions and the eliciting of replies -- in short, taking every possible step open to us to make sure that our efforts here are not merely a series of sterile exchanges, but do produce proper negotiations thereby contributing to real and lasting results.

With that preface perhaps I may now turn to the question which, by the agreement of our co-Chairmen, (ENDC/PV.108, p.34) is normally set for discussion at our Wednesday meetings, that is, general and complete disarmament.

Before we separated on Wednesday last for our Easter week-end my leader, Mr. Godber, gave our Soviet colleague a list of seven recent or fairly recent discussions in the Conference on items 5(b) and 5(c) of our agreed agenda (ENDC/1, Add.3) which he suggested Mr. Tsarapkin might do well to consult in order that he might:

"... consider whether he can honestly continue to argue that he has fully or even adequately responded to the many requests for clarification put forward not only by Western delegations but also by those of the non-aligned States represented here." (ENDC/PV.120, p.15)

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The clarifications required are, of course, clarifications of the proposal (A/PV.1127 (provisional), p.38-40) made by Mr. Gromyko as long ago as last September, which still have not been fully or even adequately elucidated. I express the hope that, while not denying himself a fair measure of weekend sunshine, our Soviet colleague has done his holiday task and is now ready with the answers -- but I must say that I express that hope without any undue conviction, in the light of his response at our last meeting.

I might perhaps remind my colleagues that, although Mr. Tsarapkin spoke then at some length about Mr. Gromyko's proposal (ENDC/PV.120, p.38 et seq.), he once again said nothing new. He repeated the old argument that the Western Powers must agree in principle to that proposal without any clear idea of the Soviet Government's views on the numbers of missiles to be retained in stage II. Mr. Tsarapkin again avoided the crucial question of what control measures the Soviet Government envisaged to ensure that under its proposal no launching pads and no missiles, whether intercontinental or other types, would be retained illegally. Once again our Soviet colleague totally ignored the apparent contradiction, to which the United Kingdom delegation and I myself have repeatedly referred, (ENDC/PV.117, p.15) involved in the inclusion of anti-missile missiles in that proposal; and he has still not answered the question raised by Sir Michael Wright at our meeting of 10 December 1962 (ENDC/PV.90, p.45) on the reasons why the Soviet Government has apparently set aside retained missiles mounted on seaborne platforms, which, as we have pointed out on at least two occasions, have substantial advantages for both sides from the point of view of invulnerability. Those are just some of the questions to which we await replies from the Soviet delegation.

So much, then, for our Soviet colleague's claim at our last meeting that:

"In order to hasten the achievement of agreement on the Soviet proposal, we have given the Western Powers answers to the questions in which they are interested." (ENDC/PV.120, p.43)

What can we do in the face of that attitude on the part of our Soviet colleague? It may conceivably be, as I suggested on an earlier occasion (ENDC/PV.117, p.14), that Mr. Tsarapkin himself is no longer interested in discussing Mr. Gromyko's proposal. In that event we would perhaps do better to stop discussing items 5(b)

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and 5(c) of the agreed agenda -- to which, indeed, we only returned in order to allow our Soviet colleague to expound and explain the Gromyko plan -- and to resume discussion of item 5(d).

At this point I ought to make it clear that so far as the United Kingdom is concerned we are interested in trying to explore the Gromyko plan, and that is the reason for the series of questions which we have asked many times -- answers to which, as I have just said, our Soviet colleague has resolutely refused to give. It may be that Mr. Tsarapkin is now, at last, ready to answer some or all of our questions. If so, and in order to set the scene for such answers, perhaps I might take a few minutes this morning to indicate what elucidation the United Kingdom delegation, for one, considers it may be justifiable to give to the general theory -- or, if one prefers the phrase, the strategic concept -- underlying Mr. Gromyko's proposal. I say "considers it may be justifiable to give" because, to be quite frank, Mr. Tsarapkin has not helped us over much about that, and if the proposed elucidation is at fault then I fear he has mainly himself to blame. However, I shall be glad to correct my following remarks in the light of any new explanations which may now be vouchsafed to us.

It will be recalled that at the General Assembly of the United Nations last September Mr. Gromyko merely said that the Soviet proposal would mean that

"... for a definite period the means of defence would remain in case someone, as certain Western representatives fear, ventures to violate the treaty and conceal missiles or combat aircraft." (A/PV.1127, (provisional) p.38-40)

Mr. Zorin said much the same thing in the First Committee of the General Assembly last November, and I have noted a certain number of observations which he made on that occasion. He said first that the Soviet proposal

"... means that for a certain time, namely during the carrying-out of the second stage of disarmament, certain defensive weapons would be retained in case anyone should be bold enough to violate the agreement and secretly keep missiles or war planes on its soil." (A/C.1/PV.1267, pp.12 and 13-15)

Mr. Zorin added that the retention of an agreed and strictly limited number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would exclude the possibility

"... of these rockets being used to unleash a world rocket and nuclear war."
(ibid., p.16)

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Mr. Zorin then went on to say that in that connexion the Soviet Government started from the premise

"... that if a State were to hide a few rockets or bombers ... this does not mean that such a State would be able to launch a nuclear war, let alone win it." (ibid.)

Finally, Mr. Zorin explained that

"... to keep a strictly limited number of means of delivery of nuclear weapons would make it difficult to use these weapons for aggression." (ibid.)

So much for Mr. Zorin.

Subsequently Mr. Tsarapkin told us, at the meeting on 10 December:

"It is obvious that, in such a situation" -- Mr. Tsarapkin was referring to the situation obtaining in the Soviet stage II -- "no State would be in a position to count on being able with success and impunity to use concealed means of delivery for its military and political purposes."

(ENDC/PV.90, p.23)

That being so, continued Mr. Tsarapkin,

"... why engage in such a dangerous venture and place oneself in the position of a violator of the Treaty, with all the very dangerous and serious consequences that would ensue?" (ibid.)

I should like, in passing, to ask the Committee to note that last remark -- "with all the very dangerous and serious consequences that would ensue".

Then again, on 14 December 1962, the representative of Poland at that time,

Mr. Lachs, told us that the Soviet proposal would

"constitute no incentive for excessive use, but will ensure that any use is for punishment only" (ENDC/PV.92, p.21)

Mr. Tsarapkin elaborated that remark to some extent on 20 March 1963 when he said that the proposed retention of certain missiles

"would be a deterrent which would invalidate any attempt to retain missiles of aggression secretly in violation of the treaty. Any State which might venture to embark upon aggression would realize perfectly well that sure retribution would follow." (ENDC/PV.111, p.33)

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I should like to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that Mr. Lachs and Mr. Tsarapkin spoke of "punishment" and "retribution" and that Mr. Tsarapkin emphasized that any State which violated the treaty would be sure of punishment.

At that same meeting on 20 March Mr. Tsarapkin went on to say:

"The retention by the United States and the Soviet Union of intercontinental missiles, which would deter any aggressor who might contemplate violating the treaty, as well as the retention of anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles capable of protecting the security of States in the event of such a violation, would make any concealment of armaments pointless." (ibid., p.34)

At the next meeting of this Committee, on 22 March, our Polish colleague, Mr. Blusztajn told us:

"... the theory that a limited number of nuclear weapons can perfectly well act as an effective deterrent is advocated by many Europeans and United States specialists

"Hence the application of the new Soviet proposal should satisfy the advocates of the mutual deterrence theory." (ENDC/PV.112, p.27)

Lastly, at the meeting on 27 March, our Soviet colleague suggested that the main criteria when determining the quantities of missiles to be retained should be as follows:

"... the quantity should be minimal so that, while being an additional guarantee against aggression, it could not at the same time serve the purposes of war or make possible the implementation of aggressive designs. The quantity of missiles to be retained should correspond to the needs of such a guarantee against a breach of the peace by one side or the other, or against the violation of commitments under the treaty on general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.114, p.39)

I am afraid the Committee may feel that I have been quoting at rather undue length, but I make no real apology for doing so, for it seems to me essential that we should know as clearly as possible what is the theoretical basis of Mr. Gromyko's proposal, and, in the absence of answers to questions, we can only try to establish that by quoting and referring to the statements made by the Soviet bloc representatives

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themselves. What do those statements amount to? I suggest that they show clearly that the Soviet Government, at any rate up till our meeting of Wednesday last, was proposing, as Mr. Godber pointed out (ENDC/PV.120, p.15) on that occasion, that two-thirds of the disarmament process should take place under the protection of our respective nuclear umbrellas and that for one-third of the process -- that is to say, stage II -- the security of East and West should be protected by something approaching the concept of a minimum nuclear deterrent on both sides.

If that is so, then so far, relatively speaking, so good. But now I come to the place where I find difficulties. At our last meeting, as will be recalled, our Soviet colleague made some remarks on the subject, and I for one found them very puzzling. Mr. Tsarapkin said that the Western representatives were trying to ascribe to the Soviet Union "some far-fetched concept of minimum deterrence" (ibid., p.39). He went on to say:

"... if we consider carefully the ideas which he expressed" -- I assume that here Mr. Tsarapkin was referring to statements made by General Burns and Mr. Godber at the meetings on 3 and 10 April -- "we see that concealed behind the verbal husk of statements about the neutralization of 'concealed' means of delivery is an obvious attempt to justify the maintenance of the present situation, where the armaments race is being constantly intensified." (ibid.)

I must say quite openly that those remarks by our Soviet colleague are to me confusing or misleading, or perhaps both. What is it that we have to look at here? On the one hand, our Soviet colleague appears to be telling us that his Government proposes that during the greater part of disarmament the peace of the world should be maintained by precisely the same method as it is at present, namely, by the balance of nuclear deterrent power. The quotation which Mr. Tsarapkin read to us from the statement made by Marshal Malinovsky on 22 February last (ibid., p.37) showed only too clearly that the Marshal, at any rate, believes in the validity of the deterrent capability of nuclear weapons as a method of maintaining peace.

We in the United Kingdom understood from the remarks of the Soviet bloc representatives which I have already quoted that the Soviet Government was proposing that this method of maintaining world peace should continue to exist in stage II

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under Mr. Gromyko's proposal. On the other hand, Mr. Tsarapkin now appears to be embarrassed by the contradiction between this new approach on the part of his Government and the line — I fear I must call it "the propaganda line" — which he and his predecessors have so often produced in this Committee: namely, the Soviet Government's desire to rid the world of the threat posed by nuclear delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons at the very outset of disarmament. So what does our Soviet colleague do? Not unnaturally, he tries to have his cake and eat it. Instead of frankly admitting that his Government now advocates the concept of minimum nuclear deterrence, or something very close to it, he tries to imply that that is a fictitious concept invented by the West and that the Soviet Government is proposing something different.

It is essential, of course, that we should know what the Soviet Government is proposing, and whether it is, in fact, different from what we have been led to believe by Mr. Tsarapkin and his Eastern colleagues. As Mr. Tsarapkin has now introduced what I can only call this element of confusion into our discussions, I feel bound to ask him to clarify his Government's approach to this matter and to explain to us the general theory underlying Mr. Gromyko's proposal. He could do that, I think, by answering the following three questions, which I have so framed that it is possible to reply quite simply to each of them "yes" or "no".

First, is Mr. Gromyko's proposal based on the concept of mutual minimum nuclear deterrence, or something like it? Second, if it is, does that mean that during stage II of the Soviet disarmament plan the threat — I repeat, the threat — posed by nuclear weapons will still exist? Third, if so, does that mean that the Soviet Government envisages that during that period, namely the Soviet stage II, the peace of the world will be maintained by minimum nuclear deterrents on both sides which, because they pose the manifest threat of nuclear retaliation, will ensure that nuclear war will never, in fact, break out? I look forward to hearing our Soviet colleague's considered replies to those three questions.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): At our meeting of 10 April the representative of the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.120, p.35 et seq.) made some comments on a previous statement (ENDC/PV.117, pp. 5 et seq.) of the Canadian delegation which, it seems to us, should

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be answered with a view to clarifying the problem we are discussing, namely, the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles, and, in relation thereto, what we have come to call the Gromyko proposal (A/PV.1127, (provisional), pp. 38-40).

At that meeting Mr. Tsarapkin gave us the official version of Marshal Malinovsky's speech of 22 February (ENDC/PV.120, p.37). I had quoted the speech (ENDC/PV.117, p.9) as it was reported in the Journal de Genève, and it now appears that that version was incomplete since it did not make it clear that Marshal Malinovsky had said that the Soviet Union could strike with a number "several times greater" (ENDC/PV.120, p.37) than the 340 missiles mentioned by Mr. McNamara in his testimony before the United States Congress. Mr. Tsarapkin repeated the relevant passage from the Marshal's speech, and explained:

"It follows quite clearly from this text ... that NATO has neither qualitative nor quantitative superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles." (ibid.)

Presumably all this could mean that the Soviet Union has two or three times the number of such missiles possessed by the United States — that is, the equivalent of intercontinental ballistic missiles or Polaris missiles — and might therefore have 680 or 1,020 such weapons. Mr. Tsarapkin intimated that, possessing this superiority, it is very generous of the Soviet Union to offer to reduce to a strictly limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, as proposed by Mr. Gromyko. In passing, I would point out that if the Soviet representative will re-read the Canadian delegation's statement of 3 April he will see that when we referred (ENDC/PV.117, p.7) to unequal percentage reductions of nuclear weapons vehicles we did not claim that one side or the other was superior. We said that the Soviet Union approach implied inequality — either the United States had more than the Soviet Union or vice versa.

Later, at our meeting on 10 April, Mr. Tsarapkin had this to say:

"We said to the Western Powers: 'Explain your views regarding the numbers of missiles to be retained. We shall study them and then we shall be able to begin real negotiations.' " (ENDC/PV.120, p.39)

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What I have to say now is rather speculative on the question of how a discussion on this point might be carried forward. The Canadian delegation hopes, of course, that one way or another the great nuclear Powers will indeed begin negotiations — real negotiations — on this point, and there is every opportunity to explore the positions and views of the nuclear Powers represented here.

Suppose the Western Powers should suggest a number, as Mr. Tsarapkin proposes. Suppose they suggested 228, which is 70 per cent of 340; or 114, which is 35 per cent of 340. We should like to know what the Soviet Union would propose as the way in which the two sides should reduce their intercontinental ballistic missiles or equivalent vehicles to that number. Assuming that the Soviet Union had 680 such vehicles, that would leave 452 to be reduced in the twenty-four months which it stipulates for its first stage plan, which would work out to a destruction of nineteen Soviet Union vehicles per month, while the United States was destroying four or five per month.

However, here is where one of the difficulties over control comes in. We have seen that the Soviet Union admits that it has "a few times more missiles of this category than the United States." "A few times" more might mean three times instead of twice, that is, 1,020 instead of 680. How is the West to be assured that another 340 intercontinental ballistic missiles or their equivalent do not remain somewhere in the vastness of Soviet Union territory? And that is the answer to Mr. Tsarapkin's objection that:

"... when it comes to the Soviet proposals on the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of a limited number of missiles, the Western representatives raise the question of inspection of the whole territory of the countries." (ibid., p.42)

I said that was the answer to Mr. Tsarapkin's objection. I should say it is part of the answer, and the other part of the answer is of course that the Gromyko proposal is not something which stands by itself but something put forward in connexion with the existing Soviet proposals — which indeed it modifies slightly — that all nuclear weapon vehicles, including intermediate range ballistic missiles and nuclear bombing aircraft, should be eliminated in the first stage. As the Canadian and other Western delegations have explained numerous times, it is the Soviet Union proposal for total

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abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage which creates the necessity for complete verification, meaning right of access by international disarmament organization inspectors to all parts of the territories of the countries concerned. On the other hand, the United States disarmament proposals, which do not stipulate 100 per cent reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage, would only require limited measures of verification, as I explained in my statement at our meeting on 3 April (ENDC/PV.117, p.11).

While the Canadian delegation believes that there may be in the Gromyko proposal a valuable element to be incorporated in the eventual disarmament treaty, we have not yet heard anything which will change our view that the proposal for overall percentage reductions in the United States basic outline of disarmament treaty provisions (ENDC/30) is a more practicable and fairer approach to the problem, and is more in accordance with the agreed principles (ENDC/5) calling for balance and verification at all stages of the disarmament process. As the Soviet Union, according to Mr. Tsarapkin's statement, possesses this considerable superiority in nuclear power, a percentage reduction would preserve to it during the disarmament process the security which its power of retaliation assures it now.

To these arguments the representative of the Soviet Union may repeat what he said on 10 April:

"... we reject such a militaristic approach which is utterly contrary to the cause of peace and to the cause of disarmament. We insist upon and demand negotiations on real disarmament measures." (ENDC/PV.120, pp.37-38)

In connexion with that, the Canadian delegation would observe that using the pejorative adjective "militaristic" to describe the attitude of any delegation does not eliminate the fact that, as armament is a military matter, disarmament raises military considerations for all those Powers undertaking it. It is impossible to observe the agreed principle of balance without considering the military implications of disarmament measures. Western delegations have frequently pointed out that the Soviet proposals for the first stage, such as the reduction of all military bases on allied territory, are designed to strengthen the military power of the Soviet Union and its allies relative to that of NATO.

Mr. Tsarapkin also referred (ibid., p.35) to my statement at the meeting on 3 April that:

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"... we do not believe that this world can ever completely rid itself of that danger" — that is, the danger of nuclear weapons and warfare — "as long as a knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons exists."

(ENDC/PV.117, p.10)

And he went on to say that it meant that the Western Powers considered nuclear disarmament to be impossible and rejected it.

Speaking for the Canadian delegation, I deny that arraignment. I adhere to what I said originally, since I believe it to be objectively true and to be supported by the opinion of most scientists who have thought about the subject. However, what we are here to do is to reduce that danger to its lowest possible terms, to an absolute minimum, and that as quickly as possible. Perhaps my meaning might be made clearer by an analogy. The disease of typhoid in past centuries has killed thousands and hundreds of thousands of people. Humanity wants to be free from the danger of it, as from the danger of other mortal diseases. Medical science has managed through improved sanitation, inoculation and other measures to reduce the danger from the disease to a very low minimum, yet the danger still exists as has been brought to our attention very tragically in recent months.

What we are here to do is to find the practical means for reducing the danger from nuclear war to a minimum in the shortest possible time. Those practical means must be in accordance with the agreed principles (ENDC/5) of September 1961.

I should like also to make a few remarks on what Mr. Tsarapkin said about "the appeals and demands of the peoples of the world for the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war". (ENDC/PV.120, p.29) We gather he was asserting that the Soviet Union was responding to those appeals while the Western countries were not. The Canadian delegation rejects that allegation. The NATO nations have democratic institutions which ensure that all appeals and demands of our people are heeded, including the desire to be free of the danger of nuclear war. We have representatives here of all continents of the world and their peoples who have repeatedly voiced appeals for the elimination of the nuclear threat, and the Soviet Union has no monopoly of virtue in this matter. The fact is all of us here are seeking a way to eliminate the nuclear threat, and the disagreement is as to how it can be done.

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Let me illustrate this with another analogy. People suffering from or threatened with diseases such as cancer or tuberculosis have a strong emotion, the fear of suffering and death, and that is stronger than the general fear of nuclear war. We know, unfortunately, that for ages charlatans have exploited that fear by pretending to have a cure for the disease, some patent medicine, some nostrum. And what is it that distinguishes the charlatan from the honest physician? It is his claim of infallibility and quick cure, together with a refusal to divulge the ingredients of his mixture or how it works. The honest physician, on the other hand, bases himself on the known facts of medical science, makes no unfulfillable promises of early cure, and explains to his colleagues and all the world all about his methods of treatment. And I may say that in this important sphere of activity, also, control and verification are an essential part of the procedures.

In general, we do not object to the Soviet Union representative reminding us of the desire of all peoples to end the threat of nuclear war, but we do object to hearing such exhortations from him when we ask for clear and sufficient details of Soviet Union disarmament proposals, especially with regard to nuclear weapon vehicles. If the Soviet Union delegation wants to develop agreement on the Gromyko proposal, which seems to the Canadian delegation to open rather a hopeful possibility for negotiation, then it has a duty to explain how that proposal fits in with the rest of disarmament, how it accords with the agreed principle of balance, and how compliance with the measures it suggests can be verified.

Failing such explanations we can only believe that the Government of the Soviet Union has not worked out how the proposal is to be implemented in the detail necessary to determine whether it is practical or not. We hope that we shall be receiving, and soon, the explanations and additional details from the representative of the Soviet Union which Western representatives have frequently asked for. Failing that, the Soviet Union delegation will not convince us that the Gromyko proposal is a complete and well thought out step towards agreement on general and complete disarmament and not merely a political gambit.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): My delegation is grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for calling to our attention in your capacity as representative of Brazil,

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the encyclical of His Holiness Pope John XXIII published last week. My delegation and my Government welcomed that document, and I should like to read to the Committee the statement of the United States Government:

"The United States Government warmly welcomes the stirring message by His Holiness Pope John XXIII to all men of good will. Pacem in Terris is an historic encyclical, worldwide in its import and strongly in keeping with the spirit of the ecumenical conference. No country could be more responsive than the United States to its profound appeal to, and reassertion of, the dignity of the individual and man's right to peace, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

"Pope John's call for disarmament with security for all, for a strengthened world order through a strengthened United Nations, for extension of human rights, religious freedom and economic opportunity to all men, expresses the desire of mankind the world over. These should be the aspirations of all Governments to make possible the attainment of the encyclical's central goal: peace based on justice, on truth and on respect for the rights of nations and individuals."

My delegation joins with you, Mr. Chairman, in hoping that that will inspire our work here.

Unfortunately, the statements on various aspects of general and complete disarmament which we heard at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.120) from the representatives of Romania, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union have left us with the impression that the Eastern delegations on this Committee are not as yet drawing any closer to the West in their overall approaches on fundamental disarmament issues.

The root of the trouble is fourfold. First, the Eastern delegations tell us that we must overload the first stage of the disarmament treaty with measures related to the elimination, or near elimination, of nuclear delivery vehicles that would, at the very outset of the disarmament process, require radical readjustment both of the world strategic balance and of the composition of national forces. Second, they refuse to describe to the Western delegations how their scheme could be carried out in one stage in an equitable way which would ensure that each side reduced its armaments in step with the other side, and which would provide measures of control

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adequate in scope to match the breadth of the Soviet scheme. Third, although the Soviet programme would drastically alter the existing basis for the world balance in stage I, it would not provide for the substitution of improved peace-keeping measures until stage III, if even then. Fourth, the Soviet stage I plan, in addition to its proposals on nuclear delivery vehicles, would, by its prohibition of so-called foreign military bases, force the fragmentation and scattering of the remaining Western forces while leaving the Soviet military machine unified, centralized and dominant in Europe.

In the course of defending the Soviet plan (ENDC/2/Rev.1) the Soviet representative has taken some liberties in interpreting the agreed disarmament principles. For example, he tried to create a new definition of what the stages of a disarmament treaty are to mean. He said that they must differ from one another in the measures that they contain and in the purposes at which they aim. He claimed that the idea of stages was adopted so that "objects differing in their nature and importance" (ENDC/PV.120, p.33) could be accomplished in the course of the disarmament process. In his view, that appeared to rule out the percentage reduction approach advocated by the West.

I do not know how the Soviet representative ever came to that interpretation of the agreed disarmament principles. The fourth agreed principle merely states that:

"The disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time-limits." (ENDC/5, p.2)

There is no requirement there that each stage concentrate on different types of measures, and indeed in the Soviet plan itself the Western percentage approach is accepted when it comes to conventional armaments.

We should point out, of course, that the United States plan (ENDC/30) gives adequate justification for proceeding by stages. The end of each stage would be a moment for stocktaking, for seeing that pledges had been fulfilled correctly, and for ensuring that all was ready to proceed further.

Stage I would be a time for getting started, for initiating the disarmament process in virgin territory. The international disarmament organization would have to be established and brought into efficient operation. A number of measures would have to be implemented to ensure a general halt to the arms race, as a preliminary to the start of the actual stage I reductions.

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Stage II, under the United States programme, would have a different emphasis. There would be the termination of all arms production, even for replacement units. Nuclear weapons would be brought under direct limitations instead of being reduced indirectly through a focus on fissionable materials, as in stage I. More significant measures to improve peacekeeping capabilities would be initiated, and all militarily significant States would be obliged to adhere to the disarmament treaty.

Finally, stage III would bring the disarmament process to a conclusion, with all of the different tasks that such an event would entail. Inspection arrangements would have to become all-embracing. An international peace force — an adequate international peace force — would have to be available. The difference between the end results of this final stage and the results of the **preceding** stages would under our proposals be very marked indeed. However, there is no basis for the Soviet representative's idea that each stage must be different in the type of disarmament measures for which it provides.

We are similarly unable to comprehend the arguments which both Mr. Tsarapkin and Mr. Tarabanov raised against what we read to be the clear meaning of the fifth principle, which declares that:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ENDC/5, p.2)

In this connexion we have talked about devising measures of disarmament which would preserve during the disarmament process whatever general strategic balance now exists between East and West until we approach the end of the third stage, when military and strategic concepts will of course lose their meaning. Eastern delegations complain, however, that that would make the disarmament process synonymous with the present armaments race, or at least with the balance of deterrence that now exists. The representative of Bulgaria, for instance, said on Wednesday last:

"Paragraph 5 of the joint statement of agreed principles emphasizes that the aim should be, not a balance of military power — I repeat, not a balance of military power — hence of terror, but balanced disarmament measures so that security is ensured equally for all." (ENDC/PV.120. p.24)

Mr. Tsarapkin expressed similar thoughts.

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We believe, however, that any such view of the fifth principle ignores the fact that it was devised specifically as a statement of what was to happen in the years during which the disarmament process goes on. It is not directed to the goals of disarmament or to the situation which will prevail after stage III has been completed. It is a principle giving interim guidance.

It instructs us so to work out our disarmament measures that no State or group of States gains military advantage from the implementation of these measures. The key words here are "military advantage", and they can be understood only in the context of what the military situation was before disarmament got under way. The aim of this principle is to keep any State or group of States from obtaining military benefits from disarmament during stages I, II or III, but before the end of stage III.

That is why the Western delegations have stressed that disarmament measures cannot be divorced from an appraisal of where the East and West stand militarily in relation to each other at the present time or, rather, at the time when a disarmament treaty is to be signed. Proposals such as those of the Soviet Union which would affect the East and West in varying degree, because of the differing geographic and strategic positions of the two camps and because of the differences between their existing military machines, raise all sorts of questions of military advantage for one side and increased insecurity for the other. Proposals such as those of the United States, which do not significantly tamper with the existing strategic balance but merely reduce armaments quantitatively towards zero during three stages, avoid these pitfalls. That is why we said of Mr. Tarabanov on 3 April, with regard to the Western disarmament plan:

"If he knows of any such problem involving some military advantage for the West over the East or, for that matter, for the East over the West, let him come forward with specific facts rather than with generalized allegations." (ENDC/PV.117, p.23)

We are still waiting to hear specific facts from the Eastern delegations.

I should now like to take up what has been discussed already by both my United Kingdom and Canadian colleagues this morning, that is, Mr. Gromyko's proposal (A/PV/1127 (provisional) p.38) of last September regarding nuclear delivery vehicles. At our meeting on 10 April the Soviet representative asserted:

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"We have explained in detail our approach to the question of the number of missiles to be retained by the United States and by the Soviet Union."

(ENDC/PV.120, p.38)

At the same time, however, the Soviet representative suggested that there was no point in discussing any specific quantities when there was no general agreement. He contradicted himself further when he suggested that the Western delegations express their views on the quantities of missiles to be retained. I submit that this kind of zig-zag tactic on the part of the Soviet delegation seems to add up to a Soviet refusal to negotiate the main issues, something which the Soviet delegation has been claiming it was in favour of doing.

My delegation, as well as many other delegations around this table, has repeatedly requested the Soviet delegation to clarify and elaborate the various aspects of its proposal for the retention of certain quantities of specified delivery vehicles until the end of stage II. (ENDC/2/Rev.1, Art. 5). We have done so in an effort to obtain the information which would enable us to assess properly the change in the Soviet position regarding nuclear delivery vehicles, a change which we had hoped could move us forward towards resolving this most difficult problem on a mutually acceptable basis.

It is up to the Soviet delegation to fill in the many blanks which exist in the Soviet proposal. In fact the Soviet representative seemed to share that view when he objected (ENDC/PV.120, p.39) to the interpretation made by the representative of Canada that the Soviet proposal was based on the concept of minimal deterrence (ENDC/PV.117, pp. 7-8). Thus we believe it is high time for the Soviet delegation to come forward with its own explanation and elaboration of its proposal and to stop talking in terms of conflicting generalities which only tend to confuse the issue.

On the other hand, perhaps the Soviet delegation believes that its general presentations with respect to its proposal have been sufficient for the purpose of general discussion in the plenary meetings and that more detailed deliberations might take place between the two co-Chairmen. For its part, my delegation would not object to our deliberations here moving to the next item of our agreed agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3) at some point in the very near future, while the two co-Chairmen attempted to bridge the gap which exists between the two sides on the question of reduction of armaments.

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There is one matter, however, which my delegation would like to touch upon in some detail now. It is the question of verification, and in particular the Soviet Union's position on it in connexion with its proposal for the retention of an agreed, strictly limited number of certain nuclear weapon delivery vehicles until the end of stage II.

My delegation has already had the opportunity of welcoming (ENDC/PV.117, p.25) the statement made by the Soviet representative on 27 March that

"The Soviet Union is willing to agree to the establishment of control over the remaining missiles directly at the launching pads."

(ENDC/PV.114, p.40)

In expressing our welcome to that statement we believed that the Soviet Union had at long last recognized, albeit as yet to a very limited extent, the need for providing assurances that the agreed levels of armaments to be retained would not be exceeded. At the same time we stated (ENDC/PV.117, p.26) that we did not believe that the verification measure proposed by the Soviet Union would alone be adequate to provide such assurance. Indeed the Soviet Union has disregarded the most important aspect of verification of agreed levels, namely, that there should be assurance that no armaments would be retained or produced clandestinely over and above the declared armaments subject to verification under the Soviet proposal. In spite of that major inadequacy of the Soviet position we had hoped that acceptance by the Soviet Union of at least the principle that agreed levels must be subject to verification was an indication of a positive evolution of Soviet thinking on that problem.

It was in that spirit that my delegation had also hoped that the Soviet Union would in due course extend the principle of verifying agreed levels not to just one particular measure but to all measures which might be agreed upon and which would involve the maintenance of certain levels of armaments or armed forces at the various stages of the disarmament process. I must say, however, that at our last meeting the Soviet representative threw some cold water on our hopes when he stated, in effect, that the Soviet position on verification of agreed levels remained unchanged. For instance, he accused the Western representatives of twisting the issue and of raising the question of verifying general and complete disarmament instead of the question of verification of the implementation of the retention of an agreed, strictly limited number of missiles (ENDC/PV.120, p.40).

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One particular point that the Soviet representative described as detail, in his familiar assertion that the Western Powers were dealing only in details, was the problem of providing assurance that no clandestine missiles would be retained or produced. He felt that the statement by the United States representative on 3 April (ENDC/PV.117, p.26) to the effect that the Soviet proposal for the retention of a strictly limited number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would require such assurance, meant that the United States wished to establish control over the entire territory of a country at the very first stage of disarmament. He said also that, while suggesting the idea of progressive zonal verification in relation to their own proposals, the Western Powers raised the issue of verifying the entire territory of the Soviet Union in connexion with the Soviet proposal for the retention of a limited number of missiles.

I submit that those arguments by the Soviet representative are devoid of logic. The United States view is that verification measures should be related to various disarmament measures undertaken at the different stages of the disarmament process. Having in mind, among other things, the difficulty of establishing extensive verification arrangements in the early stages of disarmament — a difficulty of which the Soviet Union seems to be particularly conscious — the Western Powers have repeatedly stated that we should design a disarmament programme which, by avoiding unrealistically radical disarmament measures in the first stage of disarmament, would avoid the concomitant problem of installing extensive verification arrangements in that stage.

The Soviet Union, however, has insisted on its proposal for the virtual elimination in the very first stage of nuclear delivery vehicles, that is of the very armaments which the Polish representative, on 22 March (ENDC/PV.112, p.27) called "the most important element" of the East-West strategic balance. Yet the Soviet delegation now complains that the verification arrangements which the West regards as necessary in connexion with that radical proposal are excessive. Clearly the Soviet Union cannot have it both ways. Either it should accept the orderly approach of progressive across-the-board reduction of armaments, and thereby ease the problem of verification in the initial stages, or, if it wishes to press for its own very

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far-reaching proposals on the reduction of some armaments in stage I, it must also accept the very far-reaching arrangements required to verify the implementation of such measures.

All members of the Committee are well aware that the problem of verifying agreed levels has been one of the major stumbling blocks throughout all the disarmament negotiations for several years. It was also a major point on which the United States and the Soviet Union disagreed in developing their joint statement of agreed principles in 1961. (A/4879 - ENDC/5). Now that the Soviet Union has apparently accepted at least the principle, though not all of the implications or necessary measures, of such verification with respect to one of its proposals, it would seem to us only logical for it to accept the general application of that principle.

Indeed we fail to see why the Soviet Union should refuse to do so. The main argument the Soviet Union has been advancing against verification of agreed levels has been that such verification would be tantamount to espionage. But, if the Soviet Union is now prepared to expose to inspection its most important armaments over a period of at least several years, why should it be concerned about subjecting to verification such less sensitive armaments as, for example, tanks, aircraft, naval vessels and so forth, particularly since such arms, as distinct from missiles and their launching pads, are highly mobile?

As I have already stated, my delegation does not regard the proposed Soviet arrangements for verification of retained levels as adequate for the purpose, although we do hope that adequate measures to implement the principle of verification of retained levels can be worked out in the course of our negotiations. If the Soviet Union were to agree that the principle of providing assurance that agreed levels are not exceeded should apply to the whole disarmament process and not only to a specific measure, we are confident that, given good will on both sides, satisfactory arrangements could be worked out and agreed upon. For our part, we have already advanced certain suggestions based on an approach which relates the amount of verification both to the amount of disarmament at a given stage and to the risks involved.

The Soviet delegation has so far failed to respond in any meaningful way to those suggestions. Nor has it advanced its own ideas concerning how we should cope with the problem. In spite of the disappointment we experienced as a result of the

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Soviet representative's statement at our meeting on 10 April (ENDC/PV.120, p.28 et seq.) we still nourish the hope that his statement at our meeting on 27 March to which I referred earlier (supra, p.24), is a sign that the Soviet Union has been giving some thought to the problem and that we may expect from the Soviet delegation further views which would show that the Soviet Union is indeed prepared to provide meaningful and adequate assurance to the parties to the treaty that all disarmament obligations, including those relating to the maintenance of agreed levels, are being fulfilled.

Mr. LALL (India): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to support the moving appeal which you made at the commencement of our meeting today for realistic negotiations. We agree with you that it is unfortunate that in the past phase of our work we were unable to record any significant progress and that it was also not found possible to put into our report (ENDC/83) to the United Nations even the agreement of principle, which we were glad was reached (ENDC/PV.118, p.52) on direct communications between Washington and Moscow.

Mr. Chairman, we should like to join you in hoping that the two sides will intensify their own search for practical forums for negotiations regarding disarmament. In this connexion we ourselves have felt that we could welcome the statement (supra, p.23) made by the representative of the United States that, if his colleague of the Soviet Union felt it would be desirable and practical to pursue negotiations for examination of Mr. Gromyko's proposal in meetings of the co-Chairmen, the United States would be glad to do so. My delegation has always felt that the greatest possible use should be made of all the institutions of our Conference, and particularly the institution of the co-Chairmen. If indeed the two co-Chairmen could pursue further negotiations on this crucial, central issue of the degree of retention of nuclear deterrence — or nuclear dissuasion, or nuclear umbrellas, or whatever they want to call this aspect of disarmament — and if they wished to pursue it in meetings of the co-Chairmen, we for our part should be very glad indeed, and of course we should expect them to report on their negotiations to this Conference in plenary session.

On 22 March (ENDC/PV.112, pp.33-34) we took the liberty of suggesting that this particular issue — namely, the degree of retained nuclear weapons and delivery systems through the first two stages of the plan, and perhaps thereafter if

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agreement was reached -- was a very crucial one, and that we should concentrate our attention on it. The representative of Canada, in his statement on the subject at the meeting of 3 April referred (ENDC/PV.117, p.5) to the fact that the delegation of India had suggested that the Committee should concentrate its efforts on it. Since then we have been discussing it.

We thought that the representative of the United Kingdom today tried to raise questions which his delegation regarded as important in this context. We should like to say to our colleagues that we must all try to look at the questions that are raised by any delegation. It is quite possible that the representative of the Soviet Union does not consider that the questions raised by the United Kingdom representative are extremely important. Let us concede that. He does not consider them important. On the other hand, the United Kingdom does consider them important. Therefore, we should hope that, in a certain spirit of give and take, it would be possible for delegations, even when they do not themselves regard a particular issue as of great significance, to deal with it if other delegations do regard it as an issue of importance. In that way we can clear obstacles from our path. Otherwise, what seems to happen is that a delegation regards certain issues as important, another delegation does not regard them as important, and therefore no progress is made because the issues remain and they obstruct further development. So we hope that it will be possible for the delegations mainly concerned to clarify the issues which have been raised, either in plenary meetings or by using other channels of our Conference such as the co-Chairmen's meetings.

We were glad to note too that, in connexion with the proposal made by Mr. Gromyko, the United States representative seemed to express the hope (supra. p. 26) that adequate measures of verification of retained levels could be worked out in negotiation. That is certainly a crucial issue, and we would certainly welcome it if such measures could be worked out in further negotiation.

The CHAIRMAN (Brazil) (translation from French): Before reading out the communique, and if no other representative wishes to speak, I should like, as representative of Brazil, to thank particularly the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and India for the support they gave to the few remarks I made at the beginning of this meeting.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and twenty-first plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. de Melo Franco, the representative of Brazil.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Brazil, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States of America and India.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 19 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.