

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.133
17 May 1963
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Friday 17 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

(Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. F. DOBIAS

Mr. Z. SEINER

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Contd'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSHCIN
Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. S. AHMED

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAILOURDIN

Mr. J.M. EDES

Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare open the one hundred and thirty-third plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling on the representative of Czechoslovakia, I should like to congratulate United States citizen Gordon Cooper, as well as the United States on the safe and successful conclusion of his flight around the earth. This is also a milestone in the development of our knowledge of outer space and I believe it will serve as an additional incentive to those working in our Committee to redouble our efforts to settle as quickly as possible the problems before us with regard to general and complete disarmament, and particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Mr. SIMOVIC (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): In making my first statement in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, I should like to begin by thanking the Heads of the delegations of the countries represented on the Committee for the welcome which they have extended to me. On behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation, and on my own behalf, I assure the Committee that we shall do our utmost to ensure that our work contributes to the creation of a good businesslike atmosphere and to the achievement of positive results in the work of the Committee.

We are fully aware of the complexity of the situation in which we now find ourselves. The fact that these negotiations have been at a standstill for weeks and months and that, in spite of all the optimism which prevailed at the outset, no real progress has been achieved so far, is a matter of serious concern to all those who approach an assessment of the present world situation with a sense of responsibility.

The rapid development of newer and ever more effective military techniques, which are fundamentally altering the character of modern war, the constant increase in expenditure on armaments and especially the constant improvement of nuclear weapons and the accumulation of stockpiles of such weapons are fraught with grave danger to the cause of peace and security. These circumstances remind us with ever greater insistency of the imperative need to speed up the drafting and implementation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. There can hardly be any doubt at the present time that if another war were to break out it would necessarily be a thermonuclear missile war on a world-wide scale, a war which would spare no continent and would bring tremendous sufferings and ruin to mankind.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

As you know, I came to Geneva only a few days ago, and, naturally the feelings and concern of my people in regard to so important a question as that of disarmament are still vividly present in my mind. I regret to have to say that the great masses of our population are rightly dissatisfied with the course of the work of our Committee and with the situation which has come about in it.

This view of public opinion in our country was also reflected in the work of the plenary National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic last March when, on the basis of a report by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. David, the most important problems of the present international situation were discussed. In connexion with an appraisal of the results of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, it was noted that "so far the disarmament negotiations, in spite of all the efforts of peace-loving forces, have not produced the positive results which the peoples of the world have been expecting from them."

I must say, however, that despite the almost complete absence of any progress on this most important problem of today, in accordance with the character of our people and our basic faith in the future, we remain optimists and believe in the ultimate victory of reason. That is why Foreign Minister David, speaking of the present state of the disarmament negotiations, stressed that "together with all peace-loving States, we will continue to strive for progress in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament, the most important problem of today."

Although the achievement of agreement on a programme of general and complete disarmament continues to be the basic task of our Committee, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will in the future strive with no less energy for the immediate cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and for the adoption of measures aimed at lessening the danger of a thermonuclear missile war and at reducing international tension, measures contributing to the restoration of the confidence which is so necessary and is at present lacking in the relations between States, particularly between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States.

May I be permitted in my statement today to focus attention on one of the so-called collateral measures dealt with in our discussions on Fridays, which is of particular interest, namely, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States. (ENDC/77).

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

As is clear from its earlier statements, the Czechoslovak delegation regards the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries as one of the most important steps towards the creation of favourable conditions for the implementation of general and complete disarmament. Speaking metaphorically, we might say that at the present time we see in this measure precisely that link which we must grasp in order to find a way out of the impasse and gradually pass on to the solution of the other problems.

The Czechoslovak delegation has carefully studied all the arguments which have been put forward so far by the Western delegations in connexion with the discussion of this plan. Let us take a look at these arguments.

First, the Western delegations assert that the Committee is not a body whose competence would extend to negotiations on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. On 3 May the Canadian delegate stated:

"... many members of this Conference consider that the Soviet proposal should be considered in a forum other than the Eighteen-Nation Committee." (ENDC/PV.127, p.19)

At the 10 May meeting of our Committee the United States delegate frankly stated that it was the judgment of his Government that

"a NATO/Warsaw pact cannot usefully be discussed in this particular forum." (ENDC/PV.130, p.44)

Certain Western delegations are even trying to make out that only those collateral measures which directly form part of the disarmament process can be discussed in the Committee.

But what is the real situation? The request that this draft non-aggression pact should be discussed in our Committee is in complete accord with the programme of work adopted on 23 March 1962 by the Committee. (ENDC/PV.8, p.36) And although this document has already been quoted a number of times, I should like, in view of its significance, to quote from it again:

"Concurrently with the elaboration of agreement on general and complete disarmament in the plenary committee, and not to the detriment of this elaboration, a committee of the whole will be set up by the plenary committee for the consideration of various proposals on the implementation of measures aimed at: the lessening of international tension; the consolidation of confidence among states; and facilitating general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/1/Ldd.1)

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

The analysis offered by a number of delegations in the course of our negotiations, as well as the aforementioned circumstances, show convincingly that the proposal for the conclusion of a pact is fully in keeping with the three criteria forming the basis of this document.

The United Kingdom delegate, Mr. Godber, obviously had no doubts about this when on 20 February he said:

"This matter is, of course, already on the agenda for consideration in the Committee of the Whole, and I think that is probably the appropriate place in which it should be considered." (ENDC/PV.100, p.44)

If in accordance with the agreement of the two co-Chairmen of the Committee it was decided on 22 March (ENDC/PV.112, p.34) that as a rule the plenary meetings on Fridays should be devoted to the discussion of collateral measures, there can be no doubt where this question should be discussed at the present time.

This fact could not be denied even by the Italian representative, Mr. Cavalletti, who, on 10 May (ENDC/PV.130, p.24) tried to contrast document ENDC/1/Add.1 with the corresponding part of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5). No, there is no contradiction, because the Committee's programme of work is merely a logical and concrete elaboration of this Joint Statement.

Let us now turn to another argument of the Western delegations. On 26 April, the United States representative asserted that we should not solve general political problems here, and in particular problems specifically relating to European regional security. (ENDC/PV.125, p.20) On 3 May he asked:

"But can it realistically be contended that this Conference is to be the forum for solution of each and every one of the world's political problems?"

(ENDC/PV.127, p.27)

We by no means object to the assertion that our Committee cannot discuss all political problems. But no one is asking it to do so. It is clear, however, that the Committee should discuss all political problems -- or rather, measures -- that are in accordance with the directives laid down in document ENDC/1, Add.1. There is no doubt that a draft non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States falls precisely within the sphere of political questions of that kind. If the United States delegation objects that the idea of a non-aggression pact is a political question, then we should like to know which of the questions with which the Committee has dealt or is dealing are without political content?

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

Equally unfounded is the objection of the Western delegations that the question of a pact is too specific. If we were to take this attitude, then we would not be able to discuss other measures either, including the question of setting up a direct line of communication between Washington and Moscow.

The objection that the pact is too specific and regional in character is also devoid of any foundation. Everyone knows that both groups include countries which are not at all located in the same geographical area. Furthermore, can anyone deny that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries, that is, between the countries possessing the most powerful military and economic potential, as well as the intensification of peaceful competition between them as a result of such a pact, would exert a favourable influence on the consolidation of peace throughout the world?

Thus the conclusion of a pact is not only a matter of concern to the peoples of Europe; it answers to the interests of all peoples everywhere. Furthermore, this is also shown by the statements of the representatives of a number of non-aligned countries which have supported the conclusion of a pact because they recognize its great importance for maintaining peace throughout the world. I should like to recall, for example, the words of the representative of Nigeria, who stated on 15 February:

"The relief of humanity would be immense .. if a non-aggression pact were concluded between the two giant military blocs - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact ..." (ENDC/PV.98, p.30)

I should also like to recall that other countries have also taken a similar positive attitude in regard to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. For example, when the President of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Novotny, visited the Republic of Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam this year, the Governments of both these countries also expressed themselves in favour of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact.

United States President Kennedy also had in mind the exceptional importance of concluding a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries, when on 25 November 1961 he said that it would be useful if NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries entered into a commitment to live in peace with each other. And finally, during the tense days of the crisis in the Caribbean area the President of the United States, in his correspondence with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, again expressed his readiness to discuss the question of reducing international tension between

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries, as well as any other useful proposals in this regard. How, then, are we to explain the attempts of certain Western delegations to minimise the importance of a non-aggression pact or even to oppose a businesslike discussion of it?

Another argument used by certain delegations against the discussion of a non-aggression pact is the assertion that the pact would only be a reiteration of certain existing obligations laid down in the United Nations Charter. I will recall, for instance, the statement of the United States representative on 3 May. (ENDC/PV.127, p.26).

But that is not the crux of the matter. It is true that the contents of the pact do not go beyond the provisions of the Charter, and that its conclusion would not require of any of the parties anything more than they are committed to under the United Nations Charter and other norms of international law. But the conclusion of a pact would not at all be merely a reiteration of obligations already assumed by States as a result of their signing the Charter. It is rather a question of applying directly the basic principles of the Charter to a specific and concrete situation which has arisen in the world - to the mutual relations between the two main military and political groups of States, and of providing specific machinery for the solution of disputes which may arise between them and for consultation in the event of a serious aggravation of the international situation.

The conclusion of such a pact - the contents of which would consist in a reciprocal assurance of the States belonging to the two groups that they harbour no aggressive designs with regard to each other and that they are ready to be guided in their mutual relations by the principles of peaceful co-operation in the solution of problems facing the international community - would have far-reaching and positive moral and political consequences. The conclusion of such a pact would also be significant in the sense that these obligations would be extended to those Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries which are still not members of the United Nations and which have, therefore, not signed the United Nations Charter.

As for the further argument, advanced mainly at the beginning of our negotiations, that our Committee is not the proper forum for discussing a pact because it does not represent all the States forming part of the two groups, the essence of this matter was elucidated with great clarity by the representative of Romania on 29 March. (ENDC/PV.115, p. 8 et. seq.) The Czechoslovak delegation shares his point of view, and would only like to add the following: if we were to follow this principle consistently, we would not be able to discuss the question of general and complete disarmament or other problems affecting a wider circle of States than those that are represented in this Committee.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

It has also been asserted in this Committee that the time is not yet ripe for the conclusion of such a pact. In this connexion I should like to recall, for example, the statement made by the Canadian representative on 3 May (ENDC/PV.127, pp.17, 18) and the statement made by the United Kingdom representative on 10 May. (ENDC/PV.130, p.16)

If this is not the appropriate time for concluding such a pact, then it is really difficult to imagine that any such time is likely to arise in the future. Instead of waiting for an "appropriate point" according to the views of the representatives of the United Kingdom and Canada, would it not be more sensible to set about the conclusion of such a pact without further delay? It is clear that such a step would substantially contribute to the lessening of the present tension and to the creation of confidence between States, and thereby facilitate agreement on general and complete disarmament.

It seems to me that there is no need to go on to analyse certain other less important arguments advanced by the delegations of the Western Powers against the discussion of the pact.

I should only like to note that the common feature of all the arguments hitherto advanced in our negotiations by the Western delegations with regard to a non-aggression pact is that they are artificially devised and devoid of any foundation.

The question arises why is it that the Western Powers, in the light of all these circumstances, oppose the conclusion of the proposed pact? Undoubtedly, it is not because our Committee, as they say, is not competent or not sufficiently representative, or because this is not the appropriate time for the conclusion of such an agreement. The true explanation of their position is obviously that the conclusion of such a pact would, above all, not be in keeping with their present military and strategic concept and that it would put a brake on their efforts to accelerate the armaments race and shake the foundations of the aggressive and revenge-seeking policy of Western Germany, on which the Western Powers are pinning such hopes in their plans. These are obviously the true reasons for their negative attitude towards the idea of concluding a pact.

In conclusion, permit me to summarize the points which show the positive significance of the proposed non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries.

First, the conclusion of such a pact would contribute to a general improvement of the international situation and to the creation of an atmosphere of confidence, which all the peoples of the world are demanding.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

Second, the conclusion of such a pact would contribute to preventing further deterioration in the relations between the two groups and to neutralizing the peace-jeopardizing tendencies arising from the present situation in the world and from the existing level of armaments and military technique.

Third, it would create favourable conditions and a basis for the solution of other important problems of the present international situation, in particular for the achievement of agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Fourth, and not least, the conclusion of such a pact would contribute to settling and normalizing the situation not only in Europe, but also in other parts of the world.

The conclusion of a non-aggression pact is not only realistic but extremely urgent, and can be implemented without any delay. It is not linked to any question of a technical nature and in no way affects the so-called balance of forces; and above all, it is not linked to questions of inspection and control, on which the disarmament negotiations have been bogged down.

Bearing in mind the importance of concluding a non-aggression pact, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will continue to strive unremittingly for its signature. In this connexion permit me to recall the words of Foreign Minister Vaclav David, who, in the aforementioned meeting of the National Assembly last March, said:

"We, as a Member State of the Warsaw Treaty, located on the Western flank of the socialist camp, are clearly aware of the great importance of the conclusion of such a pact for ourselves, for reducing tension and improving the situation in Europe. For this reason the Government of Czechoslovakia supports the draft treaty and is prepared to become a party to it, and to comply faithfully with its provisions."

On 10 May the United Kingdom delegate said:

"We are willing to join in any agreed measures to reduce tension immediately."
(ENDC/PV.130 p.13)

There is now an excellent opportunity. In my opinion, it is high time that we passed from sterile formal debates to a serious and businesslike consideration of questions. In this instance it would mean beginning a practical consideration of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries. In this connexion I will recall once again that the Czechoslovak delegation awaits with interest a reply to the questions which the representative of Romania put to the United States delegation on 3 May, (ENDC/PV. 127 p. 12) and which have so far remained unanswered.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): Following your good example, Mr. Chairman, the Canadian delegation also would like to offer congratulations to the United States astronaut Cooper and to the United States on the successful conclusion of his twenty-two flights around the earth. I must say that, reflecting on the advances in technology, one has to regret that certain aspects of political science have not advanced so rapidly. As an example of that, Major Cooper circled the earth in eighty-eight minutes, but in more than eight weeks this Committee has not progressed from items 5(b) and 5(c) (ENDC/1/Add.3) to the next item on our agenda. However, we are still hopeful that we may be able to do something to speed up our proceedings and reach the results which are so necessary in our sphere of work, results which might emulate those of the technology of the great countries which are exploring space.

Before beginning my main statement this morning I should like to say also that the Canadian delegation is happy that we have been joined by Mr. Simovic as leader of the delegation of Czechoslovakia. We listened with attention to his statement (supra, pp. 5 et seq.) this morning, and welcome the assurance with which he began of continued effort by his Government and delegation to try to reach agreement on disarmament and collateral measures. I am of course sorry to say that we do not find ourselves in agreement with the rest of his speech for reasons which will become apparent during my statement.

On 10 May (ENDC/PV.130) the representatives of the countries members of the Warsaw Pact made a number of comments on the statement I had made about collateral measures on 3 May. (ENDC/PV.127, pp. 16, 17) The representative of Czechoslovakia has also referred (supra, p. 7) to one point in that statement today. The Canadian delegation would therefore like to take this opportunity of replying briefly to some of the criticisms.

I turn first of all to the Soviet Union's proposed declaration on the use of foreign territories for the stationing of strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons. (ENDC/75) The main criticisms I advanced against that draft declaration were that it contained obligations of an entirely unilateral character and that it would create imbalance because it lacked real elements of reciprocity and was devoid of genuine mutuality. I have read carefully the verbatim record (ENDC/PV.130) of the meeting of 10 May but have found no answer to that criticism. In fact, no attempt was made by representatives of the communist members to disprove that the declaration was of a unilateral character. No doubt that was because it cannot be effectively denied.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The socialist representatives tried to rebut Western criticisms by a totally different line of argument, but they succeeded only in confirming the validity of our objections. Instead of either admitting or trying to disprove that the declaration was inconsistent with the agreed principle that disarmament measures must be balanced, the representatives of Bulgaria (ibid. p. 28 et seq.) and the Soviet Union (ibid. p. 35 et seq.) voiced grave objections to the concept of military balance. Sometimes they spoke of the balance of armed forces, at other times of the balance of power, and the representative of Poland (ENDC/PV.129, p.20 et seq.) referred several times to the balance of security. The essence of that line of argument seems to be that it does not matter if a proposal leads to imbalance in the military disposition of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries because the concept of the balance of forces is a bad one and must be rejected.

On 10 May Mr. Tsarapkin discussed the matter in detail, and he said:

"... the formula "balance of forces" as it has been expounded here by the representatives of the Western Powers, has nothing to do with disarmament or with measures for strengthening the security of States. It is clearly a militaristic formula, having in all its various versions one and the same meaning: to justify the retention of huge military forces, to justify the armaments race and to prevent disarmament." (ENDC/PV.130, p.35)

A little later the Soviet representative alleged that:

"... the concept of military balance is the enemy of disarmament. This concept is the favourite child of the merchants of death, the armaments manufacturers. This concept must be rejected as incompatible with disarmament and contrary to the task of lessening international tension and eliminating the threat of a nuclear missile war." (ibid. p.38).

No doubt Mr. Tsarapkin put forward those arguments because, as I have said, the draft declaration would create imbalance if it were implemented. But I should like to ask Mr. Tsarapkin what is the opposite to the balance of forces to which he said he was opposed. The answer, of course, is obvious: it is the imbalance of forces. And that is precisely what implementation of the Soviet draft declaration would create.

In criticizing the concept of the balance of forces Mr. Tsarapkin gave certain historical examples (ibid. pp. 35, 36) relating to the balance of power -- which is a quite different concept -- and his examples were designed to show that trying to maintain a balance of power leads to war. I have always understood that the balance of power referred to historical chains of events that have occurred when one European Power became much stronger militarily than the others and showed expansionist tendencies, whereupon the lesser Powers combined together to resist it. But which should bear the onus of war in those circumstances if war breaks out? Should it be the powerful expansionist States, or, as Mr. Tsarapkin's argument seems to suggest, those less powerful States which have combined together to defend themselves?

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

While the question of the balance of power is not strictly relevant to our present discussions, and while its introduction by the socialist delegations merely confuses the issue, the principle of the balance of forces, or military balance, certainly does have implications for our work. The representative of the Soviet Union himself admitted this in his second statement at the end of the same meeting when he said:

"... when we use the term 'military balance' we are referring to the concrete situation in the armed world as it is today." (ibid. p. 49)

Later he added:

"No one is prohibited from using the term 'military balance'. But what is it used for? When we use the term 'military balance' it is to describe the present concrete situation of an armed world." (ibid. p. 50)

The Canadian delegation is entirely in agreement with the way in which Mr. Tsarapkin defined those terms; we would describe them in the same way. And that is why we say that taking as a starting point the concrete situation in the world as it is today -- that is to say the present military balance -- implementation of the Soviet draft declaration would alter it in such a way as to give a military advantage to one side; and for that reason the proposal is, as I have said, inconsistent with paragraph 5 of the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5).

If Mr. Tsarapkin does not dispute that disarmament measures must be based on the concrete situation in the world as it is today, and if he accepts that the principle of balance as enunciated in the joint statement of agreed principles must be respected in collateral measures as well as in general and complete disarmament, then why does he object so strongly to the use of the phrase "balance of forces" or "military balance" by the Western representatives?

I believe that he provided an answer to that question on 10 May. He said (ENDC/PV. 130, p. 49) that when the West spoke of the concept of military equilibrium or balance, it meant something different from what the communist representatives meant when they used the phrase; when the Western States referred to military balance they were aiming at a further increase of their military potential rather than at disarmament; they were trying to justify the continuation of the armaments race. The conclusion which is suggested by Mr. Tsarapkin is that when the Soviet Union uses the phrase "military balance" the concept referred to is a good one, but that when the West uses the phrase it is a bad one. Therefore, it is apparent that what the socialist representatives object to is not the concept itself but what they choose to regard as Western intentions.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Thus we find ourselves once more faced with Soviet allegations about our alleged aggressive policies and the lack of sincerity in our stand on general and complete disarmament. Those allegations have been denied so many times that it is almost too much to expect that if they are denied once again the socialist representatives will cease making them. However, I would hope that they will study carefully the remarks of Mr. Lal the representative of India, on 8 May, when he said:

"... we do not regard -- and we would urge, request and appeal to the other members of this Committee not to regard -- the difference of approach as synonymous with insincerity concerning the extremely important task which has been entrusted to this Committee. We feel that that would be most unfortunate, and that it would mean that we would miss the opportunities of disarmament simply because we were misunderstanding each other's position. That would be a tragedy which we must avoid at all costs." (ENDC/PV.129, p. 16)

I should like to associate the Canadian delegation with the remarks of the representative of India. I would appeal to the representatives of the socialist countries to try to understand the position of the Western Powers and to accept their sincerity. It is clear that a rapprochement between East and West can only be achieved on the basis of mutual understanding, and it is in this light that I ask Mr. Tsarapkin and his Eastern colleagues to appreciate that when we Western representatives refer to the balance of forces, or military balance, we do so not to disguise bad intentions but to describe the starting point for establishing reductions in the present military situation. That is the essence of the United States disarmament plan (ENDC/30 and Add 1, 2), to which we subscribe.

We start from where we are and, progressively and in balanced fashion, consistent with paragraph 5 of the joint statement of agreed principles, (ENDC/5) reduce armaments and the military dispositions of States until general and complete disarmament is achieved. Therefore, when the West objects to the Soviet draft declaration (ENDC/75) we do not, of course, do so in order to justify the arms race. We object because the proposal takes the present balance and would alter it in such a way as to give one side a military advantage and diminish the security of the other.

I should like now to refer to some of the comments of the representatives of socialist countries about my remarks on the Soviet Union's proposal for a non-aggression pact (ENDC/77). On 3 May I said:

"... a non-aggression pact at some point may possibly be appropriate in the context of an East-West understanding on those broader [European political] questions". (ENDC/PV.127, p.18)

I emphasized, however, that the Eighteen-Nation Committee was not an appropriate forum for discussing the Soviet proposal precisely because that proposal was closely tied to far-reaching political problems different in character from those we are discussing here.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The first response of representatives of socialist countries was to say that that represented a new element in the Western position and that we had passed from "embarrassed silence" to "wholesale rejection", as Mr. Kurka of Czechoslovakia put it (ENDC/PV.130 p.18). But that is clearly not the case. Since the very beginning of the present round of negotiations the Western representatives have maintained that this Conference was not an appropriate forum for considering a non-aggression pact.

The representatives of four of the socialist States made further specific comments at the meeting on 10 May about my remarks on a non-aggression pact. I refer to the comments of the representatives of Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union (*ibid.* pp. 10, 20, 48, 39). All of those statements made two basic points: first, they showed the close connexion between a non-aggression pact and European security questions; secondly, all the representatives of socialist countries claimed that because the Western delegations did not want to discuss a non-aggression pact in this Conference, on the ground that this was not a suitable forum for doing so, they were therefore contemplating aggression. That argument would seem to rest on the same logical grounds as if someone who said that he did not want to wash his feet in the kitchen sink was thereupon accused of being in favour of dirty feet.

To cite two examples, Mr. Tsarapkin called me "the mouthpiece of the German revanchists" (*ibid.*, p. 39), and Mr. Kurka claimed that the West wished to preserve complete freedom of action with regard to its alleged aggressive plans and that this was "the alpha and omega of the explanation of their negative attitude". (*ibid.*, p. 46).

I think it is important, first of all, to emphasize that all of those statements confirm what I said on 3 May (ENDC/PV.127 p. 19) -- that the question of a non-aggression pact is directly related to far-reaching and highly important questions involving European security and a final peace settlement. As the representative of the United States pointed out at the same meeting (*ibid.*, p. 26) the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee was not set up as a general political conference. We are supposed to be devoting our attention to disarmament, and the West has at no time said that a non-aggression pact should not be discussed elsewhere. The Canadian delegation has clearly stated (*ibid.*, p. 18) that the consideration of such a pact might be appropriate in the context of East-West negotiations on European political problems. What we do not propose to do is to address ourselves to the substance of the Soviet proposal, and that is because we are convinced that this Conference is not an appropriate forum -- for the reasons given by the representatives of the socialist countries themselves.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

That leads me to my second comment on those remarks. I find it regrettable that our statements about the inappropriateness of this forum for considering a non-aggression pact should be interpreted as a sign of hostile or aggressive intentions on the part of the West. At our meeting on 15 May (ENDC/PV.132, p.20) I welcomed Mr. Tsarapkin's endorsement on 10 May (ENDC/PV.130, p.40) of Mr. Stelle's statement on 3 May that:

"Our responsibilities require that ... we understand each other's concerns and try to meet those concerns in a manner consistent with the common security."

(ENDC/PV.127, p. 29)

I should like to appeal once more to the representative of the Soviet Union and his colleagues to adopt that attitude of mind when they examine our comments about their proposed collateral measures. I urge them to cease uttering unfounded charges of aggressive intent and to accept the sincerity of the Western countries in striving for general and complete disarmament and measures to facilitate its achievement. For the same reason I should like also to express the hope that the socialist representatives will refrain from attacking the Federal Republic of Germany -- an attack which we have heard repeated again this morning (supra, p.11) -- because Western representatives have replied to those accusations on a number of occasions. Unfortunately, however, the accusations show no sign of being dropped. I regret that the representative of the Soviet Union and his colleagues have introduced unnecessary polemics into our debates by these unjustified attacks against a member of the Western alliance which is not participating in this Conference. I should like to repeat what other representatives have already pointed out: that the Federal Republic of Germany has undertaken not to manufacture nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. I should like also to emphasize that at the London Conference in 1954 the German Government made a declaration by which it undertook never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany. I hope that the Soviet Union and its allies will in the future refrain from making accusations against the Federal Republic of Germany. I hope that it will be possible for all of us to understand the viewpoint and concern of the others and to work together to achieve our common ends in a constructive and harmonious manner.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): First of all I wish to associate myself with the congratulations expressed by you, Mr. Chairman, to the United States delegation on the success achieved by the cosmonaut, Gordon Cooper. The successes achieved by the Soviet and United States cosmonauts, who have overcome obstacles much greater than those confronting us here, ought to be a stimulus and an example to the work of this Conference. I wish to express my conviction that the time will come when we too will launch our cosmonauts and our sputniks -- a nuclear test ban treaty and a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The famous Russian writer Chekhov -- the unsurpassed master of the short genre -- once said that it was very hard to write briefly. I experienced the same feeling while preparing my statement for today, which will be very brief and which I mean to be a working intervention in our meeting devoted to collateral measures.

Our colleagues will surely recall that at our meeting of 3 May I addressed to the United States representative three questions (ENDC/PV.127, p.12) in connexion with the conclusion of a NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact. I asked those questions out of a desire to make certain aspects of the problem clear and so contribute to the progress of our negotiations. Then I went on to say:

"Our questions are plain, clear and to the point. We shall be glad if the answers of the United States representative, which we hope to get without delay, are as plain, clear and to the point". (ibid. p. 12)

With regard to my questions, Mr. Stelle stated at the same meeting:

"This morning the Romanian representative posed certain questions in that connexion" -- that is, in connexion precisely with a NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact --

"to which my delegation will reply later as appropriate." (ibid. p.26)

We have been expecting the answers of the United States delegation for two weeks already, but they have not come. An old French adage says: "Promettre c'est noble ..." I should add: "Mais tenir, c'est encore plus noble ...".

The problem of working out an international document which would solemnly state the will of the NATO States and the Warsaw Pact States not to start war against each other is of such tremendous interest for the international political climate and particularly for our work here that to leave unanswered, for instance, the question

"Under what conditions does the United States delegation foresee the possibility of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and Warsaw Treaty States?" (ibid. p. 12)

is tantamount to ignoring the problem as well as the interest of the improvement of the international climate and the progress of our negotiations.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

The Conference of the Eighteen Nations does not wish to embark upon that road. For that reason I shall take the liberty of again asking the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle:

1. Is the United States delegation in agreement with the statement made by President Kennedy on 25 November 1961 with regard to the usefulness of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States?
2. Which of the provisions contained in the draft pact (ENDC/77) submitted by the Soviet Union do not suit the Western delegations in general, and the United States delegation in particular?
3. Under what conditions does the United States delegation foresee the possibility of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States? (ENDC/PV.127, p.12).

And, as an undischarged debt increases with the addition of interest, may I ask one more question:

Is the United States delegation in agreement with the statement of Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak the former Secretary-General of NATO and now Foreign Minister of Belgium -- that is, of a State which is a member of NATO -- when he declares that the idea of a NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact must be accepted?

As to the reply given to us today by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, my delegation will give it careful study and I will answer him at an appropriate time.

Mr. CAVELLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): My desire in taking the floor this morning is not to deal with any particular collateral measures or to reply to any specific statement. I would venture rather to look at our debates from a general angle and to try, if possible, to clear our discussion of the negative elements which have so far hampered and confused our consideration of basic issues.

A careful study of the contributions by the Soviet delegation and some Eastern delegations to our discussion on collateral measures shows these contributions to have so far had little to do with disarmament measures.

The statements of the Soviet delegation and certain Eastern delegations have been mainly concerned with other problems, problems of general policy, and have in fact been almost entirely devoted to attacks on the alleged warlike intentions of the Western countries.

The same drawback is to be noticed when we discuss any other item on our agenda; but hitherto collateral measures have been the favourite lists for this type of oratorical jousting.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

To explain and justify this attitude, the Soviet delegation has frequently pointed out that our Committee is not working in a vacuum, and that the general political situation between the East and West cannot be ignored. I should not like this sort of argument to keep serving as a pretext for barren polemics and for subsequent delay in our work.

Our negotiations are certainly one element in East-West relations, which unfortunately are still characterized by mutual lack of confidence and by the existence of several political problems which have not yet been solved.

But allow me to point out that this is no new situation. In 1959, when Chairman Khrushchev proposed general and complete disarmament in the United Nations General Assembly, East-West relations were also characterized by the same elements as today, namely, by unresolved problems and mutual distrust.

That did not then prevent the Soviet Union from proposing a treaty on general and complete disarmament, neither did it prevent us from declaring our unanimous agreement on the need to achieve such disarmament and to undertake negotiations to that end.

I believe that our premise then was that the arms race was in itself a special element of tension in the world and that, if it could be halted and its direction reversed by disarmament agreements, it would be possible to reverse events, to restore general confidence and to improve prospects for the solution of other problems.

That was, and still is today, the Italian delegation's conviction. But I begin to fear that the Soviet Government has changed its mind when I see its delegation here concerned almost entirely with political questions which are outside the Committee's competence, and refusing to advance the negotiations on disarmament.

At previous meetings in this Conference, the Soviet delegation seemed to have remained loyal to the point of view which inspired our negotiations. In that connexion, I should like to quote a statement made to the Conference on 17 April 1962 by Mr. Zorin, representative of the Soviet Union. Referring to political problems other than disarmament, he asserted that the impression should not be given that

"general and complete disarmament can be carried into effect only when all outstanding controversial issues have been settled. To qualify disarmament by imposing such conditions would quite obviously place obstacles in the path of the actual practical settlement of the disarmament problem, since there are always some outstanding controversial issues in the world. The whole problem is to create conditions for the peaceful settlement of these issues. If we await the settlement of all controversial issues before solving the problem of general and complete disarmament, we may create a situation in which a solution of the disarmament problem will meet with unnecessary and artificial obstacles.

"For these reasons, we consider it undesirable to make the establishment of a "peaceful world" a prerequisite for the solution of the problems of general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.22 n. 11)

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I should now like to ask the Soviet delegation very frankly if the idea then expressed by Mr. Zorin represents the Soviet delegation's present point of view. I should also like to ask whether it still considers the arms race as in itself a dangerous factor in building up tension, one that must be eliminated independently of the other political problems existing in the world, or whether on the contrary it subordinates any agreement on disarmament subject to the prior solution of these other problems and to the prior cessation of the arms race. If the Soviet delegation has chosen the latter alternative, its activities here in confusing and delaying our work by polemical discussions and idle arguments would be partly explained. But if it were so, our negotiations would unfortunately become practically impossible.

I want to be quite clear on this subject. We hope that all the problems that now oppress the international atmosphere will rapidly find fair and equitable solutions. But here in this Committee we have a clearly-defined mandate to discharge, irrespective of the settlement of these other questions. That mandate was given us by the United Nations, and we must carry it through to success, being convinced that in working for disarmament we are also working, as Mr. Khrushchev said in one of his speeches, to "purify the international political atmosphere."

It is also our keenest desire to see an immediate end -- subject, of course, to control control -- to the arms race; but we know, alas, that this cannot be contemplated as a preliminary to our negotiations. For only through concrete agreements -- agreements which we must reach here -- can this disastrous race be stopped and the arms spiral reversed.

We knew at the outset that the mere fact of holding a conference to frame a treaty on general and complete disarmament would not stop the arms race, and that, unfortunately, the race would continue on both sides during our negotiations until such time as we had contrived to reach our first agreements here. In that connexion, it should be noted that at Geneva in 1960 the Western countries were already submitting constructive proposals, the acceptance of which would have checked the arms race, and put us by now far on the way to general and complete disarmament. But the Soviet representative on the Ten-Nation Committee blocked every agreement, even then, by resorting to raising-the-bid tactics and rejecting every reasonable and realistic proposal, demanding everything all at once. Now the Soviet delegation seems bent on depicting the continuation of the arms race, not only as a political consequence for which the West is supposedly responsible, but also as a unilateral action by the Western Powers. The Soviet delegation stresses, for instance, the special responsibility of the West in modernizing armaments and especially improving our defences through missile-equipped submarines.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The Soviet delegation depicts the present situation as if there were in the one camp the bad men, the imperialists feverishly and secretly preparing for a war of aggression, and in the other the good and peaceful men.

We do not know a great deal about Soviet military preparations, but from time to time some news from Soviet sources gives us glimpses of the scope and present development of the Soviet war machine. We have, for instance, learned from newspaper articles and from statements by certain Soviet military leaders that nuclear submarines capable of launching atomic missiles anywhere in the world have become -- and I quote the words of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov -- the "spinal column of the Soviet fleet". Again, Radio Moscow lately gave us some facts about a still more insidious weapon than submarine-launched missiles. On 8 May Radio Moscow broadcast a talk by Colonel Alexis Lentiev, who stated that the Soviet Union not only had nuclear submarines equipped with nuclear warheads and surface crafts equipped with missiles, but was also in a position to launch missiles from its artificial satellites in orbit round the earth. "By a simple order from the earth", said Colonel Lentiev, "we could launch missiles from artificial satellites. We could do so at any time independently of the position of the artificial satellites."

Colonel Lentiev's assertion confirms the earlier statement by Marshall S. Biryuzov on 21 February last, also on Radio Moscow, that "it is now possible to launch missiles from an artificial satellite by an order from the earth at any time and from any point on the trajectory of the satellite".

If these statements -- which were transmitted by the Associated Press -- are true, we already have hanging over our heads appalling instruments of war which could at any time visit tremendous catastrophes on any country. This is a far more serious and dreadful threat than submarine missiles.

In addition to these statements, which give a partial glimpse of certain military technical developments in the Soviet Union, we have had many statements from Soviet leaders to the effect that the military forces of the Warsaw Treaty bloc are overwhelmingly superior to the defence mechanism of NATO. I shall not quote; these statements are frequent in speeches by the Soviet leaders, and they have already been often quoted here.

We wonder why the Western countries should not believe such statements and why they should not as far as possible take corresponding measures to safeguard their security, while pursuing their efforts to halt the arms race.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

My delegation once more declares, in the most categorical and solemn terms, that we want to eliminate entirely this terrible and growing danger. We want to destroy all these instruments of death. We want to do so by straightforward agreements accompanied by safeguards, framed in realism and courage, but at the same time, without blindly abandoning the security which is essential to the peaceful development of our peoples. That is the task assigned to our Committee, and we must apply ourselves to it believing in the good faith of all the participants in our negotiations and without having our attention distracted by extraneous questions.

In its statement today, the Italian delegation levels no charges against anyone but merely stresses the fact that there is a dangerous military-build-up on both sides. This fact is not unilateral. The build-up is not the monopoly of either party. Both sides are bowing to a disastrous but inevitable exigency. We trust the sense of responsibility of our countries' leaders to ensure that these terrible instruments of death will never be used; but we must hasten to destroy them. Time is running out, and we have already wasted a good deal on the barren polemics to which I have referred.

In 1960, the Western countries proposed that the putting in orbit of artificial satellites equipped with atomic bombs be prohibited, and at the same time urgently appealed to the Soviet Government to agree to that prohibition before the point of no return was reached. That initial measure of disarmament proposed by the West was rejected by the Soviet Union in the Ten-Nation Committee, and now we have unfortunately to face the fact that the point of no return seems nearer and agreement more difficult. That is a striking example of wasted time, which is certainly no responsibility of the West.

If the Western proposals had been accepted, outer space, where science is making marvellous conquests -- on one of which achieved only yesterday, I, too, should like to congratulate the United States delegation -- would have become not a new source of deadly anxiety for mankind, but a field of fruitful and trusting collaboration for man's genius.

Time is running short. Let us set to work in full awareness of the dangers inherent in delay.

Allow me, Mr. Chairman, to urge you most earnestly and cordially, in your capacity as representative of the Soviet Union, to join with us in a thorough and serious study of the problems with which the United Nations has instructed us to deal. The delegations here present -- and, outside this room, world public opinion -- are sagacious enough to distinguish between paltry propaganda, which may aggravate dissension among the peoples, and sincere efforts to promote better relations and concord. These efforts are, and will continue to be, the single focus of all my delegation's activities. They are the aim of all the Western delegations, which hope that the delegations of the East will finally make a constructive and positive response to our appeals.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): Before beginning my statement I should like to add my congratulations to those offered by other representatives to the United States delegation on the magnificent performance of Major Gordon Cooper.

I listened to the Italian representative's statement with interest mingled with some surprise. I wondered what our Italian colleague was driving at. At the end of his statement he at length put his cards on the table when he said: "You representatives of the Eastern countries are indulging in paltry propaganda; your speeches are shot through with barren polemics, while we representatives of the Western countries abide by the decision of the United Nations General Assembly, which has entrusted us with an important task that we wish to accomplish as soon as possible."

The representative of Italy said that he does not believe that there are good and bad men in this Committee. But, listening to him, I thought that he rather deviated from his asseveration. He does in fact believe that there are good and bad men in the Committee, although he did not say so. He will allow me to disagree with his assessment. I do believe that the Polish delegation has nothing to reproach itself with; our statements here are not made for the sake of empty polemics; and we do not indulge in paltry propaganda. We endeavour to convince our Western colleagues of the soundness of our position. When we submit a proposal, we usually do so without laying down prior conditions. On the contrary, it is the Western delegations that lay down such conditions. One example will suffice. We propose the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, with no prior conditions. The Western delegations tell us that they cannot sign such a pact unless we accept certain prior conditions of a political nature. We submitted our disarmament plan with no ulterior motives. Our draft declaration on the renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons was proposed with no conditions attached. It seems to me that it is the Western delegations that have introduced here the idea of conditions.

Our Italian colleague complains that we want to stop the arms race although we know that is impossible. I suppose it is because they think it is impossible to halt the arms race that the Western delegations have made no proposal to that effect in their draft on collateral measures. Indeed, all that remains of the Western proposals is their own plan for general and complete disarmament, which was submitted to us on a "take it or leave it" basis.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The Italian representative complains that we are near the point of no return in the utilization of outer space for military purposes. We quite agree with him that something must be done to stop this arms race, which may well spread to outer space. We also agree with him that something must be done to prevent outer space becoming a race-course for an arms race. But he is probably aware of the recent discussions in the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which has just met in New York.

He knows very well that we proposed a draft declaration on the peaceful uses of outer space, and that the Western delegations opposed an agreement which would prohibit the use of satellites for espionage purposes.

To conclude my comments, I think that our Italian colleague's statement has introduced a polemical note which should have no place in our discussions. The Polish delegation will confine itself to a careful study of the proposal put before us.

During our discussion on the draft declaration concerning renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union (ENDC/75) the Western delegations endeavoured to cast doubts on the soundness of the draft declaration by advancing a variety of arguments. The Polish delegation has already had occasion to submit these arguments to a critical analysis. Today I should like to deal with one argument that keeps cropping up in the statements of our Western colleagues, namely, that the implementation of the Soviet draft declaration would involve the United States and their allies in unilateral commitments not offset by any compensation from the Soviet Union.

This argument merits close study; for it merely reflects the Western Powers' picture of the function and nature of an agreement on disarmament, and of how pledges under such an agreement should be kept.

As the idea of collective security has spread, we have observed the development in relations between States of a new type of international agreement under which the individual interests of specific States are subordinated to the general aim of maintaining world peace. These agreements impose on States commitments which are offset by their right to enjoy the benefits of the security system so created. The United Nations Charter is an example of an international agreement based on such principles. Our efforts to achieve disarmament should obviously be based on the same principles. True, it may be asserted that the individual interests of States demand the preservation of freedom of action in the field of armaments; on the other hand, the collective interest of the international community and the maintenance of peace in the world demand that this freedom of action be limited and subordinated to the need to ensure collective security in the general interest.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

This is the angle from which we should consider the question of reciprocity and equality of commitments. Reciprocity consists above all in the fact that all States parties to a treaty accept identical obligations and enjoy equal rights -- and there is no derogation from this principle if for various reasons the fulfilment of pledges given involves some countries in greater sacrifice than others.

Many examples can be quoted of commitments under which certain States have unilaterally renounced certain acquired rights. Yet the agreements concerned have never been considered as violating the principle of the equality of the parties.

Take, for example, the agreement concluded in 1817 between Great Britain and the United States on the demilitarization of the Great Lakes region. As you know, the conclusion of that agreement was proposed by the United States. For the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Adams, the measure was necessary because in its absence the two countries would be drawn into an arms race. In a letter to the President of the United States, Mr. Monroe, he wrote as follows:

(continued in English)

"But the most important circumstance was the increase of the British armaments upon the Canadian lakes since the peace. Such armaments on one side rendered similar and counter armaments on the other indispensable. Both Governments would both be subjected to heavy, and in time of peace, useless expenses, and every additional armament would create new and very dangerous incitement to mutual irritation and acts of hostility."

(continued in French)

Great Britain at first opposed the American proposal, on the ground that such an agreement would upset the balance of forces. Finally, it had to give way. And, although the putting into effect of the clauses of the agreement involved the withdrawal of more ships by Great Britain than by the United States, this Agreement is not regarded either in the diplomatic practice of the two countries or in international jurisprudence as infringing the principle of equality and giving advantages only to one party.

Another example is the agreements concerning the demilitarization of the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal. Here again, the demilitarization commitments concerned only those States exercising sovereignty in the zones concerned and involved only acts by them. But there was general agreement that such a demilitarization measure was necessary in order to guarantee free navigation for all States and to give it firmer foundations.

(Mr. Blusztain, Poland)

Let us now take the example of the agreement on the Antarctic signed in 1959. Although that agreement was signed by twelve countries, the demilitarization obligations concerned only a few of them. But no one regarded the agreement on the Antarctic as impairing the principle of equality between the parties.

Lastly, let us look at the idea of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. As you know, it expresses a willingness to renounce certain rights that States enjoy in the field of armaments for the sake of a nobler principle of general interest, namely, the cessation of the dissemination of nuclear weapons. The pledges that some States are prepared to give in this case are really unilateral in nature; for they involve no direct counterpart from the nuclear Powers.

A study of the discussions at recent sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and a perusal of Member States' replies to the United Nations Secretary-General's letter on the implementation of the Uden plan suffices to show (DC/201/Add. 2, 3, DC/204/Add.1 and Add.1 Corr.1) that the States which are ready to renounce the right to possess nuclear weapons in no way consider that a pledge to do so would infringe the principle of equality. On the contrary, they consider that in assuming such an undertaking not only are they not harming their individual interests but rather are they forwarding a task of great scope which may well exert a strong influence for peace and international security.

This aspect of the question was, I think, very aptly brought out by the Brazilian representative, Mr. de Castro, who on 6 May, referring to the declaration of the five Presidents of the Latin-American Republics (ENDC/87), described their action as being likely -

"to make a positive contribution towards sparing, as far as possible, the countries associated in this declaration the tragic consequences of a nuclear war, and towards fostering by this example of a trial demonstration at regional level, the adoption of a universal contractual instrument capable of transforming the whole world into a denuclearized zone." (ENDC/PV.128, p.9)

I think the few examples I have given show clearly that the criteria used by our Western colleagues in assessing the draft declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75) are unacceptable. It should be obvious that in the conditions of an accelerated arms race a disarmament measure designed only to ensure quantitative equality of sacrifice would really be of little value. This we have proved over and over again by close examination of the basic principles of the Western disarmament plan (ENDC/30, Corr.1, Add.1,2, Add.2 Corr.1). We are firmly convinced that only disarmament obligations which ensure qualitative equality of sacrifice and whose implementation can create conditions in which

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

the parties will enjoy genuine equality of rights and benefits -- only such obligations, I repeat -- can take us forward on the road to general and complete disarmament. Hence, in realizing disarmament measures, the first aim must be reciprocity between the sum of the sacrifices made by all countries and the situation created by implementing the measures. For example, acceptance of the obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons completely would enable all States -- those making the greatest contributions to the realization of the objective, those whose contribution would be smaller, and those with no contribution to make -- to enjoy in the same measure the benefits of a world free from the fear of nuclear war and to enjoy equally the boon of collective security. That is the meaning of disarmament, and only on that basis can the value and timeliness of a proposed disarmament measure be judged. May I add a few words concerning an argument that often comes up in discussion on the Soviet draft declaration, namely, that the putting into effect of this declaration would be contrary to the principles underlying the legitimate defence of States. I should like to say that nobody here questions the right of legitimate defence. All States have the right to take any political or military measure in the exercise of their individual and collective defence in the event of aggression. But, since this is a right enjoyed equally by all States, it should not be exercised by one State or a group of States in such a manner as to endanger the security of other States. That is one of the fundamental principles which should govern international relations in peace-time.

What the Soviet Union proposes in its declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons would create normal conditions enabling all States to assert their rights of legitimate defence without jeopardizing the vital interests of other States and without endangering the security and peace of the whole world. The Soviet declaration is an attempt to lift the heavy burden now encumbering international relations, an attempt to free us from the consequences of the cold war and to found relations between States on principles of neighbourliness.

There lies the inner meaning of the Soviet draft declaration. There can be no doubt that carrying it into effect would help to reduce international tension, increase confidence between the great Powers and military blocs, and facilitate the accomplishment of our main task, the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): On behalf of my Government and, perhaps more particularly, on behalf of the many scientists and specialists engaged in the United States programme for the peaceful exploration and exploitation of outer space, I should like to thank the representatives of the Soviet Union, Canada, Romania, Italy and Poland, and other representatives who have spoken privately to my delegation this morning, for their kind and friendly remarks about the successful space flight concluded last night by Major Gordon Cooper. With this feat Major Cooper joins that small but highly distinguished company of astronauts and cosmonauts of the Soviet Union and the United States who are pioneers in this new field of human research. In that work the horizons are so vast, the opportunity for progress so unlimited and the demands on human ingenuity so enormous, that I think we all recognize the immense scope for co-operation that exists in these peaceful endeavours. That co-operation is quite properly the subject of the efforts of the Committee on Outer Space, the technical sub-committee of which is indeed meeting this week in Geneva. However, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has the responsibility for working out measures that will ensure that disarmament is extended to outer space as well as achieved here on earth. Major Cooper's accomplishment reminds us of the awesome duty assigned to this Committee and, with my Soviet and other colleagues, I hope that it will spur us all to renewed devotion to disarmament and the cause of universal peace.

My delegation would like to make some comments today on the remarks that have been made in the Committee about the United States proposals on the reduction of the risk of war (ENDC/70). I should like also to speak about some remarks concerning my delegation's attitude towards proposals that have been advanced by the Soviet Union and its allies.

With respect to United States proposals on the reduction of the risk of war I should like to repeat what I have said a number of times previously: the United States does not regard those proposals as being competitive with other proposals on collateral measures that have been or might be made. We do not say that they are better than other proposals, but we do say that they have value, and we believe they present no real problems for either side and, therefore, that early agreement on them should be possible.

I do not intend to speak about the United States proposal on a direct communications link. That is currently under discussion between the two co-Chairmen. However, I should like to comment with respect to the two other proposals of the United States in this field: the proposal for an exchange of military missions and the proposal for advance notification of major military movements. (ibid. pp. 8, 4)

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The representative of the Soviet Union on various occasions has said that advance notification of major military movements might possibly enable one side to gain some sort of advantage over the other side. I have tried to explain why we do not believe that would be the case, since what we envisage is merely an extension of limited practices that in fact already exist, but an extension in a manner that would make for a more orderly arrangement. One does not get the impression from the general and sweeping observations of the Soviet representative about this proposal that it has been carefully considered by the Soviet delegation. But perhaps, on the other hand, the true situation is that the proposal is not fully understood by the Soviet delegation or the Soviet Government. One of the principal reasons for our advancing this particular proposal was that we sincerely believed it would be an arrangement that would be compatible with the well-known security concerns and sensitivities of the Soviet Union. We do not envisage any arrangement that would increase Soviet anxieties, for it is obvious that our purpose is reassurance and not the aggravation of tensions or concerns.

My delegation would be prepared to discuss this matter informally with the Soviet delegation if that would facilitate progress. If, after such a discussion of the ideas which the United States has in mind, they still posed problems for the Soviet Government, then of course we should have to recognize that arrangements of this nature would not be possible. On the other hand, there is the possibility, and indeed we believe the probability, that after full explanation, the worries that appear to exist at the present time on the part of the Soviet Union would be eliminated. In that case we would then be able to draft suitable arrangements. Nothing would be lost, and much might be gained. If we did not succeed there would be no grounds for recrimination, but to fail even to make the effort would, we believe, be unfortunate and indeed difficult to justify.

I should like now to make a few observations on comments that have been made concerning the other United States proposal -- the proposal for exchange of military missions. In the past we have expressed our inability to understand the fears expressed by the Soviet delegation that the exchange of military missions would result in an exchange of spies. That is not exactly what the Soviet representative has said, but it is what he has clearly implied. What we frankly do not understand is how an exchange of missions of the type we propose could have that result, as the use of the mission, as we have stressed, would be solely at the discretion of the host country. We just do not understand how there could be what the Soviet delegation refers to as an exchange of spies, even assuming the worst of motives on both sides. Moreover, the entire purpose of the proposal would be

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

negated if there were any attempt by either side to misuse the missions. The purpose of these missions would be to increase confidence, to improve understanding, to reduce chances of miscalculation. The exchange would be between two powerful sovereign governments, both of which possess heavy responsibilities because of the power that rests in their hands. For our part, we do not believe that either Government, once it had decided to enter into such an arrangement, would wish to take any action to reduce, jeopardize or destroy the effectiveness of the missions.

I have pointed out that the arrangement should be such that its continuation would be dependent upon the continuing view on the part of both parties that it was serving a useful purpose.

The general philosophy behind this proposal is our belief that in time of military crisis a government may well wish to have at its disposal additional means for making its true intentions clear to the other side in order to dampen that crisis. The mission would only be as useful or as effective as the host government wished to make it. But we submit that the important thing is that the mission would be available. Governments thus would not be faced with a situation in which the absence of such an arrangement would inhibit their ability to communicate clearly and authoritatively the facts of a given situation. There might well be situations where a government might wish to have the mission verify at first hand events as they took place so that the other side did not misunderstand those events. A host country, particularly if it preferred to observe restraint in a given situation, might welcome the presence of the mission as a means of communicating its restraint or absence of tenseness in order that they would be recognized by the other side and reciprocated.

We submit that such efforts in time of crisis are most likely to be effective if both countries have given careful advance thought to what might safely be shown and to what would be most likely to prove convincing to sceptical observers in an emergency.

We believe that the existence of the arrangement we propose would itself cause both Governments to give thought to this matter, thus avoiding the possible necessity of hasty improvisation.

It is entirely possible also that the two Governments might in a time of crisis find it desirable to reach some sort of temporary understanding or agreement that would calm tensions. The availability of missions to give added assurances concerning such understandings might well mean the difference between the feasibility and acceptability of such understandings. Indeed the existence of such missions might provide stimulus and responsibility for thinking about possible arrangements.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

We have tried to indicate to the Soviet delegation that we believe the functions we envisage would not be appropriately handled by mere augmentation of embassy attachés. Attachés have a general mission of gathering information, whereas the missions we envisage would serve an entirely different function, for they would be there to serve the host country and would have every incentive to assure the host country that they were fulfilling their obligation.

We believe that the extent to which the functions of the mission might be developed in ways that would improve relations and mutual understanding would naturally depend upon the common assessment of both Governments that the missions were proving to be worthwhile as a new experiment in international relations.

On 19 April my delegation urged that this proposal should be explored so that a momentum of movement could be established in our Conference. (ENDC/PV.122, p.11) The United States delegation will be prepared to discuss this matter informally with the Soviet delegation if that would facilitate common understanding.

There is, we believe, no reason why this measure too could not be quickly agreed, and we hope we can move on to quick agreement on this relatively simple but potentially quite useful proposal. Surely we cannot forgo a closer exchange of views than we have thus far had on this proposal, for there are even fewer problems connected with this particular idea than with the proposal for advance notification of major military movements. We would hope for a further quiet exchange of views. At the minimum we could then say that we had not let slip a possibility for improving our relations, for reduction of the risk of war, for an increase in international confidence, and that we had not let this opportunity pass without an effort to explore it in depth.

I should now like to turn briefly to a line of argumentation that we have heard in this Committee concerning my delegation's attitude towards certain proposals advanced by the Soviet Union and its allies. For example, the representative of Romania has spoken at some length during our last two Friday meetings, (ENDC/PV.127 and ENDC/PV.130) and again this morning, (supra p.19) on the question of my delegation's attitude towards discussion in this Committee of a non-aggression pact between the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact. I should like to make a few comments on what he said.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Mr. Macovescu objected (ENDC/PV.127, pp. 8, 9) to an earlier comment by my delegation that the nature of this particular Soviet proposal was the problem and not the fact that there had been a lack of Western response to it. He said that this attitude proceeded from a false premise that one party alone holds the monopoly of correct and rational proposals while everything coming from the other party fails to answer that requirement. I must submit that the representative of Romania seems to have failed to grasp the point of my remarks. The point with respect to a non-aggression pact was that it was the nature of that particular type of proposal that made it inappropriate for discussion in this Committee.

My delegation has tried to set forth its position clearly on this matter. Our position is that this particular proposal addresses itself to a general political problem and is by nature a political question. As we have said before, the world has many political questions, and many of them are indeed long overdue for solution. Indeed their solution would be very helpful to the work of this Committee. But this Committee cannot, we submit, take upon itself the functions of a general political conference. If we did so, there would be no place where we could draw a line to separate what was appropriate for discussion from what was not appropriate for discussion. The result would be that we should have no time left over for those matters with which we are specifically charged as a disarmament conference.

We think this explanation is quite uncomplicated, quite frank and quite reasonable. Surely we have enough to occupy our time in the field of disarmament without engaging in long discussions about the merits or lack of merits of general political proposals.

Indeed, the validity of this view would appear to my delegation to have been clearly demonstrated by the fact that at no time has any Eastern delegation indicated how or upon what basis any line could be drawn to distinguish between those political questions that should be discussed in this Conference and those that should not, if the Conference were to enter into a discussion of purely political problems.

The representative of Romania made an effort which seemed to us to draw out of context remarks made by President Kennedy. I am referring to his comments of 3 May (ibid. p.11) and the question which he repeated today. (supra, p.20) He quoted the remarks made by President Kennedy in the President's interview with Mr. Adzhubei. He then asked whether the United States delegation was in agreement with the statement made by President Kennedy. I should like to assure Mr. Macovescu that the United States delegation is in full agreement with the President of the United States. That is a matter on which Mr. Macovescu need have no anxiety whatsoever.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

But let us not play with words. The President in his interview discussed many subjects and I hope and believe that Mr. Macovescu has read the full text of that interview. He must therefore realize that President Kennedy, in responding to various questions asked by Mr. Adzhubei, was indicating that there were various steps that could be of value. Some of those steps would be of value by themselves. A non-aggression pact was not one of those. The true spirit of the President's remarks is contained in an earlier part of that same interview, and I urge Mr. Macovescu to read it again. I am referring to the following comment by the President:

"I think we should have not only an agreement between our countries, but take those steps which make peace possible. I don't think that paper, and words on paper, are as significant as looking at those areas which provide tension between our two systems and seeing if we can dispel that tension."

I submit that that is the real gist of the President's remarks.

Surely it must be clear that it is action on those political issues which are presently causing concern that should be undertaken by governments. If those matters can be resolved, then there might be some meaning to undertakings which under those conditions could symbolize a new era in international affairs.

But we submit again that such political questions are not for us in this Committee to resolve. We here do have equally important work to do -- that of developing areas of agreement in the field of disarmament, which would not only be of immediate value but would also in turn facilitate the resolution of political problems. I hope we can devote our attention to our real task -- disarmament.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should just like to say a few words about the Polish representative's statement. As always, Mr. Blusztajn was very quick to reply, and I should like to commend his intelligence and the speed with which he gives us his ideas on our statements. But I hope he will be good enough to read the text of my statement in the verbatim record, because I think that will allay some of the misgivings he expressed.

If I am not mistaken, Mr. Blusztajn said that my statement was polemical. Well, my precise intention was to avoid any unfortunate polemic, which I think only holds up the Committee's work and gives us no help in reaching agreement.

The Polish representative also seems -- although I am not quite sure of this -- to have understood me to say that I think it impossible to stop the arms race. Obviously, I said no such thing. If I had thought it, it would be absurd for me to be sitting here at this table. On the contrary, I do think that it is possible to stop the arms race.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Its direction can be reversed; but that goal can be reached only through agreements concluded among us. I do not think a halt to the arms race can be regarded as a prior condition to our negotiations.

That is really all I meant, and I hope that if he cares to read my statement, Mr. Blusztajn will find all his doubts on the subject dispelled.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Does any other representative wish to speak? If not, then before concluding our meeting I should like, as Chairman, to inform the members of the Committee that the two co-Chairmen instructed me to report to the Committee the agreement reached between them on the procedure to be followed for the future consideration of disarmament questions: it is recommended that on Wednesday next, 22 May, the Committee should continue its examination of items 5(b) and 5(c) of the co-Chairmen's recommendations concerning the procedure of work of the Committee on the first stage of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. (ENDC/1/Add.3) On the Wednesday following, 29 May, the Committee will continue its examination of these items and, when the list of speakers on them is exhausted, it will pass on to the examination of item 5(d) of the same document, namely: "measures in the field of nuclear disarmament together with appropriate measures of control. (Articles 16 and 17 of ENDC/2, appropriate paragraphs of Sections C and G of Stages One of ENDC/30, and taking into account items 4 and 5 of ENDC/50.)"

Does any representative wish to speak on this recommendation of the co-Chairmen? If not, I shall consider it adopted.

The recommendation was adopted.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and thirty-third meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. S. K. Tsarapkin, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Canada, Romania, Italy, Poland and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 20 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.