

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.155  
27 August 1963  
ENGLISH

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday 27 August 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

(Bulgaria)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO  
Mr. E. HOSANNAH  
Mr. J. LENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. N. PETROV  
Mr. D. TEHOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON  
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. S.F. RAE  
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC  
Mr. M. ZEMLA

Ethiopia:

Lij MIKAEL IMRU

India:

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. J. MERCADO

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. R. KRZYZANOWSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. O. NEDA

Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. S. LOFGREN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN

Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. AHMED OSMAN

Mr. M.S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. T.R. PICKERING

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN



The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): I call to order the one hundred and fifty-fifth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. SIMOVIC (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): At our meeting today I should like to express - for the time being at least in general outline - the views of the Czechoslovak delegation in regard to item 5(e) of the agreed procedure for the consideration of -

"Disarmament measures in regard to military bases and to armed forces at such bases or elsewhere in foreign territories, together with appropriate control measures." (ENDC/52, p.2).

The Czechoslovak delegation welcomed the recommendation of the co-Chairmen that the Committee should discuss this serious question before the recess in our work in connexion with the opening of the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. We realize, of course, that it will hardly be possible in so short a time to achieve a solution of the question under discussion. However, we consider that merely an exchange of views would be most useful for the negotiations in the future.

The general favourable atmosphere which has been brought about in the world as a result of the signing of the Moscow Treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests (ENDC/100/Rev. 1) creates favourable conditions for the discussion of other international problems. That, in our view, emphasizes in an extraordinary way the obligation of all governments - and first of all the governments of the countries which are members of this Committee - to redouble their efforts in the discussion of other questions which are of great importance for the achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, which United Nations has asked the Committee to work out as speedily as possible and which all the peoples of the world are today so insistently pressing for.

The Czechoslovak delegation holds the view that one such important issue is precisely the question of the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops.

In evaluating the importance of this problem, we base ourselves to a considerable extent on our own experience acquired in the post-war years as a result of the existence of a system of such bases in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany along the whole of our western frontier. Our experience enables us to assert

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

with every right that the system of military bases and foreign troops in other countries' territory is a constant source of international tension, that it increases the risk of surprise attack and the outbreak of a nuclear war not only in the sensitive area of contact between the two most powerful military groupings of today in Central Europe, but in other areas of the world as well.

That is why we, as well as the governments and peoples of other countries, came to the well-founded conclusion and conviction that in order to ease international tension and eliminate the threat of a nuclear-missile war it is essential to carry out the liquidation of foreign military bases together with the withdrawal of foreign troops and the simultaneous elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons already in stage 1 of general and complete disarmament. We consider that the question of bases in foreign territory is one of the key problems, the positive solution of which would be an important step towards the achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The problem of the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other States was discussed in the Committee on the basis of the Soviet Union's proposals as long ago as last year in the course of a general debate on general and complete disarmament. As is well known, at that time the Western delegations adopted a negative attitude towards the Soviet proposals.

But at present, in the opinion of our delegation, the discussion of the question of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops is taking place in a changed situation in comparison with the past, and this is due, in particular, to several factors. In the first place, the question of military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops is now being discussed in our Committee for the first time as a separate item, which implies a detailed and thorough examination. Furthermore, there has recently come about in international relations the favourable atmosphere which I have already mentioned. Finally, during the past few years in the field of politics and military matters there has taken place a new development which shows the problem of bases in a new light.

The Czechoslovak delegation is convinced that in view of this situation it is necessary to set about the negotiations in a new manner, taking recent developments into account.



(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

From the historic point of view the creation of military bases in foreign territory and the stationing of foreign troops at such bases was a product of the policy of the cold war, in particular, of one of its most dangerous stages, which its authors themselves called "balancing on the brink of war". A typical characteristic of this aggressive policy was that a special role was assigned to the military factor, in particular to aggressive means of nuclear attack, which were proclaimed as its main means. The wide-spread building of military bases in foreign territory and the stationing of troops abroad became an integral part of the attempts to carry out this dangerous policy. If one considers the tremendous number of such bases, their distribution in all the continents of the world, the specific character of their armaments and technical equipment, as well as the views and statements of responsible politicians and military authorities of the West about the reason for those bases and the way in which they are to be used, it becomes quite clear how greatly the character of military bases in foreign territories differs from bases built in national territories.

The Western delegations - as the statement of the representative of Italy at our meeting of 20 August (ENDC/PV.153, pp.28, 29) has shown - try to deny this difference and to claim that bases in foreign territory are a component part of their defence system.

But what is the reality? As the delegations of the socialist countries have proved here on several occasions, that assertion of the Western delegations is devoid of any foundation; it is simply an attempt to cover up the true character and purpose of military bases in foreign territories.

Who can deny that at present for the defence of the nuclear Powers and their allies inter-continental ballistic and global missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads of tremendous explosive power to any place in the world in a matter of a few minutes are both decisive and quite sufficient?

As is well known, bases equipped with such weapons are mainly located in the national territories of the Powers concerned. In contrast, military bases in foreign territories in comparison with the aforementioned decisive strategic nuclear missile means are of minimal importance for defence. After all, even military and political leaders in the United States of America have themselves publicly stated that the United States is able fully to guarantee its own and its allies' security by means of weapons located in its own national territory.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

Of course, the situation looks quite different if one evaluates the importance of military bases and of the stationing of foreign troops in other countries' territories not from the point of view of defence - and the Western delegations try most persistently to ascribe to them precisely that role - but from the point of view of preparation for a surprise attack.

If one takes into account the tremendous amount of military means existing at those bases, including nuclear means of strategic importance, part of which is in permanent combat readiness, as well as the fact that strategic reserves have been brought thousands of miles beyond a country's own national territory and placed in the direct vicinity of the vital centres of the socialist countries, as well as other characteristics of the bases which I have already mentioned, it becomes evident that military bases in foreign territories are assigned the role of a primary means for the sudden unleashing of a nuclear war.

As a result of this, the global system of many hundreds of foreign bases, with which in the post-war years the United States and its allies have encircled the Soviet Union and other socialist States, has become a constant source of tension and suspicion in international relations and one of the main obstacles preventing the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war.

After this can anyone be surprised at our negative attitude towards foreign military bases?

How would you yourselves, the representatives of the NATO countries here, evaluate the situation if a similar aggressive system of military bases existed in the immediate vicinity of your borders and the vital centres of your countries?

The system of military bases in foreign territories was created as part of the aggressive policy of "balancing on the brink of war". But today even the leaders of the Western countries themselves are compelled to admit that this policy is an anachronism; that it has long since lost any foundation it may have had; that nuclear war is no longer a suitable instrument for settling controversial international problems; and that the only possible way is to be found in the peaceful co-existence of countries with different social and political systems.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

In this connexion, permit me to quote, for example, some words from the statement made by the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, on 10 June 1963 when he said:

"Total war makes no sense in an age where great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all the Allied air forces in the second world war."

(ENDC/95, p.1)

Thus is it not logical and has not the time come, in accordance with those reasonable views, to abolish not only with the political concept which has kept the world "on the brink of war", but also some of its products, that is, particularly foreign bases abroad? The liquidation of such foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops is all the more necessary as those bases, in spite of the new situation in the world, continue to play their invidious role as a constant source of tension and a potential conflict.

The growing contradiction between the existing system of foreign military bases - an anachronism still remaining eighteen years after the end of the war - and the present developments in the world manifests itself also in a number of other important political aspects. Military bases in foreign territories are a hindrance standing in the way of the peoples and governments of many countries striving for the implementation of general and complete disarmament, in their efforts to stand aloof from nuclear-missile armaments.

The peoples of the countries in which the military bases of foreign Powers are located fully realize what a mortal danger those bases would represent for them in the event of a nuclear conflict, and that is why they are striving for their liquidation. They also know that not the least of the reasons why the military and political leaders of the West have constructed military bases in foreign territories is in order that in the event of war those bases should draw upon themselves and disperse the nuclear counter-blow of the other side so that in that way the force of the counter-blow against the instigators of aggression and against their territory would be weakened at the expense of other countries.



(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

Now let us consider yet another negative aspect of the presence of military bases in foreign territories.

In a number of countries, particularly in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the presence of bases is becoming an ever greater obstacle and hindrance standing in the way of the completion of their political, social and economic liberation. It would also not be out of place to recall what an invidious role the military bases of the imperialist Powers have played and are still playing in suppressing the liberation movement of peoples in various parts of the world and in high-handedly interfering in the internal affairs of newly created States.

For this reason the peoples and statesmen, particularly of the newly liberated countries, are resolutely insisting on an immediate solution of the problem of military bases in foreign territories. This was clearly manifested at the Conference of Heads of States and Governments of Independent African Countries held at Addis Ababa in May this year where, for instance, the President of Ghana, Mr. Kwane Nkrumah, stated:

"We have seen how the new Colonialists use their bases to entrench themselves and even to attack neighbouring independent States. Such bases are centres of tension and potential danger spots of military conflict. They threaten the security not only of the country in which they are situated but all neighbouring countries as well."

The fact that those words expressed the point of view of the peoples of the entire African continent is also shown by the unanimously adopted resolution of that Conference (ENDC/93/Rev. 1), in which the elimination of military bases, the end of military occupation of the African continent and the prohibition of nuclear tests are described as constituting a basic element of African independence and unity.

The striving of the countries of Africa to achieve a positive solution of the problem of military bases is one of the specific manifestations of the hopes and aspirations of the peaceful forces of the whole world, which with an ever-increasing insistence demand the liquidation of the negative consequences of the system of foreign military bases in the interests of restoring confidence, easing international tension and averting the threat of a thermonuclear war.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

Of late these strivings of the peoples have been reinforced by the fact that the harmful consequences of the continuing existence of military bases in foreign territories have been intensified both quantitatively and qualitatively as a result of the rearmament which is being carried out in the United States. Within the framework of this rearmament, through the creation of a fleet of floating bases - submarines with Polaris missiles on board - the system of foreign military bases is in fact being extended in scope and operation to more and more areas. It is now no longer a question of relatively small territories as in the past, but of vast operational zones in various parts of the world.

This dangerous process, which is completely at variance with the efforts of the peoples to limit nuclear armaments and prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons to other States, arouses the profound indignation and opposition of all those who wish to avert the threat of the outbreak of a nuclear war and to ensure lasting peace through disarmament.

On the basis of all the foregoing, the Czechoslovak delegation considers that it is necessary to proceed without delay to solve the problem of military bases in foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops and that the Soviet proposals, in particular articles 9 and 10 of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev. 1, pp.8, 9), constitute the most suitable basis for negotiation.

The basis of the Soviet proposal is the liquidation of all types of military, air and naval bases located in foreign territories together with the withdrawal of troops and the elimination of the armaments existing at such bases. Under this proposal the liquidation of bases would be carried out in the very first stage of general and complete disarmament simultaneously with the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Such a combination of both disarmament measures is fully in keeping with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, in particular article 5 (ENDC/5, p.2).

The elimination of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons - that is, the elimination of the main means of defence of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries - must, on the other hand, necessarily be compensated by the simultaneous liquidation of military bases in foreign territories and the withdrawal of the armed forces stationed at such bases since, as we have already explained, they represent one of the most important elements of the aggressive military system of the other side.



(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

In this connexion I should like to emphasize once more that the implementation of the Soviet proposals would in no way place the NATO countries at a disadvantage or threaten their security, as the delegations of the Western countries have repeatedly asserted in the past.

It is by no means merely a question of liquidating military bases. On the contrary, this measure, together with the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons - with the exceptions proposed at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly by Mr. Gromyko (A/PV.1127, provisional p.38-40) - would have far-reaching consequences because it would make the carrying out of a nuclear surprise attack impossible by the end of the first stage of disarmament. If in addition we take into consideration that at the same time there would also be a considerable balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments by the great Powers as well as the other parties to the treaty, that would mean a substantial reduction also of the possibility of waging a war by conventional means.

Thus all the parties to a treaty on general and complete disarmament - both the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO countries - would be in completely equal positions. No prejudice would be caused to anyone; on the contrary, all would only gain, because as a result of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war the security of the peoples would be guaranteed and strengthened. Then what ground is there for the assertion that the proposals of the socialist countries would put the NATO countries in an unequal position?

Our delegation considers that articles 9 and 10 of the Soviet draft treaty, which fully cover the problem of military bases and foreign troops in other countries' territories and which were again explained and commented on at our meeting of 20 August (ENDC/PV.153, pp.13 et seq.) by the representative of the Soviet Union, have been well formulated. Those articles provide for broad international control over the implementation of the proposed measures, as well as for the assumption by States of appropriate obligations under international law in regard to foreign bases and the stationing of troops in foreign territories.

On the other hand, our delegation is compelled to note with regret that the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty of General and Complete Disarmament (ENDC/30, Corr. 1, Add. 1, 2, 3) does not satisfactorily solve the problem of military bases in foreign territories, since it allows for the presence of military bases in foreign territories up to the very end of the process of general and complete disarmament.



(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

Before concluding my statement of today I should like to call attention to yet another aspect of the question under discussion. In view of the character of military bases in foreign territories which we have already mentioned, their further retention constitutes a constant source of the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict through accident. Modern military techniques, and thermonuclear weapons in particular, in view of their destructive capabilities and speed of action, make necessary the adoption of rapid and reliable decisions and control. A system of bases far removed from the military and political centres where such decisions are taken increases to an unprecedented extent the possibility, for example, of a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of orders. A great danger also lies in the possibility of disruption of communications, and human or technical failure. In the past we have witnessed several times, for instance, the fact that the system of bases located close to the borders of socialist countries led to hasty reactions to an alleged threat from the adversary and almost led the world to a nuclear conflict.

In their statements and in the documents they have submitted, our Western colleagues realistically evaluate, on the whole, the danger of the outbreak of war by accident. That is why we hope that they will evaluate just as realistically the fundamental contribution which the implementation of the Soviet proposal for the liquidation of military bases would mean for the elimination of the danger of the outbreak of war through accident.

The Czechoslovak delegation holds the view that the solution of the problem of military bases and foreign troops on the lines of the Soviet proposals would be fully in keeping with the expectations of the peace-loving forces which demand that the world be freed from the threat of a nuclear war and that the way be opened for the achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

We are convinced that if our Western partners approach the problem under discussion, taking fully into account the new situation that has come about, in the spirit of the Moscow negotiations, then given sufficient mutual understanding and goodwill on both sides, it will be possible to achieve a satisfactory solution.

After all, this is also necessary from the standpoint of eliminating the last remainders of the "cold war", restoring confidence in international relations, ensuring the security of all countries of the world and creating favourable conditions for the solution of other international problems. In conclusion, permit me to

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

express the conviction that the liquidation of military bases in foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops will have a favourable influence on the general improvement of the international atmosphere and that public opinion throughout the world will sincerely welcome it.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): Today I wish to outline the views of the United States Government with respect to the question of bases.

It is the position of the United States Government that bases, wherever located, will be reduced and eventually eliminated in the third stage of general and complete disarmament as a result of the reductions in armaments and forces undertaken throughout the various stages of our proposals. Bases by and of themselves are not intrinsically significant. Without the armaments, material and forces which make up the military potential of such bases, they have limited, if any, military purpose. We believe that as these armaments, materials and forces are brought down on a balanced basis on both sides, bases -- both domestic and foreign -- will also disappear.

For example, in the very first stage, the United States has proposed that nuclear delivery vehicles be reduced 30 per cent by type. In addition, we have proposed the destruction of the associated launching pads for missiles which will be destroyed under this measure. Certain of the missiles to be destroyed under this proposal (ENDC/30, pp.4, 5 and Add. 1) are to be those in the medium range and intermediate range categories. For the most part it is well known that missiles in these categories are, on the Soviet side, deployed in large numbers in the Western reaches of the Soviet Union. Similarly, NATO has deployed a number of such missiles in the European area to counter this Soviet threat. In each case, because of the type of missile involved, the reduction will affect each side in like percentages and each side will also be required to destroy the missile-launching portion of the bases from which those missiles are launched. In the Soviet Union the missile-launching portions of certain of the so-called domestic bases, which the West regards as threatening NATO territory in Europe, will be destroyed. Similarly, the missile-launching portions of certain of the NATO bases, which the Soviet Union claims to regard as threatening its territory, will also be destroyed. It is not, therefore, a question of whether a base is domestic or foreign that counts under our proposals, but rather the gradual and balanced reduction of armaments which will decide at what



(Mr. Stelle, United States)

point in the process towards general and complete disarmament a particular portion of a base will be reduced or eliminated.

To do otherwise would be to introduce grave imbalances in the process, imbalances which would be contrary to the fifth principle of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5).

In many respects our views concerning the reduction of all bases are very close to those expressed by the Soviet representative regarding domestic bases when he said:

"... so-called national bases are in reality various installations and services in places where a particular State's own armed forces are stationed in its own territory. These armed forces, with all the major and ancillary installations, services, workshops, depots and so on, will all be gradually reduced and eliminated as the disarmament process develops from stage to stage." (ENDC/PV.153, p.20)

With regard to bases we must take into account that there is something of a balance in armaments and forces as between the major groupings in the world today. We believe that this present balance should not be upset as disarmament proceeds if disarmament measures are indeed to be equitable and fair to both sides. The balance between the two sides is maintained at the present time by a rough balance in at least two major categories of military strength.

First, in armaments, and to a lesser extent in forces, there is a rough balance between the two sides. Secondly, the strategic and tactical deployment of these armaments and forces has helped to create and preserve the present balance. Therefore, we firmly believe that as armaments are reduced States should not at the same time be asked to undertake redeployment of armaments and men which will upset this second area of balance. All this means that as States reduce their armaments and forces in an equitable fashion, as proposed under the Western suggestions, they should be free to continue to maintain such deployments of forces within existing defensive arrangements as are necessary to maintain the military balance.

This situation is graphically illustrated if we look for a moment at the geographical and political factors which shape the defensive posture of the NATO alliance and compare them with the related factors within the Soviet bloc. In the world today we have the Soviet bloc area of control stretching in one large contiguous central land mass for well over 7,000 miles from central Germany to the Pacific Ocean,

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

and from the Arctic to the heart and beyond of Central Asia. This land mass provides the Soviet bloc with cohesion, interior lines of communication and the ability to face any particular area on the perimeter at a time and place of its own choosing with a very large and powerful concentration of forces. The rest of us in the world sit on the perimeter of the central land mass which is under Communist domination. We must, of course, be alert and watch our defences at all points along that perimeter because of the ability of moving from the centre of the land mass rapidly in any one of a number of diverse directions.

But it also happens that in the West the centres of strength are diversified and separated by great distances. The United States, for example, lies, in almost all directions, several thousands of miles from the perimeter. In addition, the free world is composed of many other States, all of varying capabilities. Only when welded together in a strong alliance in which the defence of all is shared by all do those States present a bulwark strong enough to ensure that their own individual defence is sound. In terms of defence, then, the only cure for the geographical diversity of the free world is for it to ally itself into defensive arrangements. As a result of these defensive arrangements, deployments of armaments and forces are made to the areas which, from a military and strategic point of view, are best suited to the defence of the free world. As things stand, therefore, we have two very diverse Power groups confronting each other around the world: the single, compact Soviet bloc group of States as opposed to the far-flung group of independent and diverse States which make up the free world banded together in varying degrees to ensure their own defence.

The Western alliance system did not arise overnight nor without cause. It came about as a result of certain events in recent history well known to all, which compelled the States of the West to feel it necessary to group together in their own defence. The former leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Mr. Godber, set this out particularly clearly at our meeting of 29 March (ENDC/PV.115, p.37), and we need only refer representatives to what he said without repeating in detail his clear explanation of why the defensive requirements of the West came into being.

Mr. Godber's statement made clear some of the reasons why we find ourselves where we are today. We say that the NATO defensive alliance has ensured a balance and maintained peace in Europe and the world. We maintain that it is defensive, and the proof of this is the fact that no aggression has been committed or contemplated



(Mr. Stelle, United States)

in NATO against any other State or group of States. The Soviet representative may choose to reply that our claims about NATO's defensive character are really only true because the strength of Soviet forces in Europe and elsewhere has deterred NATO. While, of course, we do not accept Soviet allegations about NATO having an offensive character, the argument which I have just cited in some respects goes to indicate why we are not ready to undertake the complete dismantling of the NATO alliance and its military defence potential in the first stage while massive Soviet conventional forces would remain on the threshold of Western Europe. For if the Soviet Union can honestly believe it deters so-called NATO aggression, how much more do we have a right to believe our alliance, with its defensive based system, has also served as a deterrent.

The present balance of military power in the world means that the Soviet proposals (ENDC/2/Rev. 1) on so-called foreign military bases would cause grave imbalances for several reasons. Initially it would mean that all common bases of the NATO alliance, freely provided by its members for the use of the alliance, would be scrapped. All NATO's means of common defence would be eliminated, while the Soviet Union would not at the same time have to abandon its own bases. The whole elaborate Soviet national base structure, with its extensive conventional armaments, could remain essentially unchanged. The major part of the conventional armaments in those bases along the borders of free world countries would not be removed or abolished. In that sense alone, then, the Soviet proposal contains imbalances as regards the deployment of armaments on bases.

Secondly, the Soviet proposal will cause imbalances because it fails to take account of the differences between the East and the West as regards geography. In fact the proposal appears to be designed to exploit to Soviet advantage the diversified nature of the Western defensive arrangements. The Soviet Union does that by proposing a measure designed to wipe out those defensive arrangements without a consequent reduction or balancing arrangement in the Soviet strategic posture.

For example, even if we assume that the first stage of the Soviet plan were completely implemented that would leave the Soviet Union with massive conventional forces and armaments on the very doorstep of Western Europe. Those forces would be organized into a completely integrated fighting machine. The West, on the other hand, under the Soviet proposals, would be a fractionated group of smaller States, each with its own separate armed force. In addition, many of the forces which now maintain the balance in Europe would be located three thousand miles from the area where they might be urgently needed.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The Soviet representative and other Eastern representatives have sought to draw some distinction between domestic and foreign bases. The Soviet representative has relied heavily in this case on such statements about bases on foreign territory as that they are aggressive, and go forth. That line of reasoning seems to constitute, in fact, the bulk of the Soviet case on the question of foreign bases. But clearly no amount of repetition will make true what is not true. The Soviet representative has never really told us what makes so-called foreign bases any different from domestic bases. Aggression is in the first instance a condition of mind. With an aggressive policy all bases could be springboards for aggression, with a defensive policy all bases bastions of defence. Certainly we cannot rely on a Soviet argument based on some assumed superior moral virtue somehow to impute characteristics to Western defense installations which just are not there.

The West is clearly not going to accept one-sided measures aimed at divesting it in the first stage of the alliance on which it depends for defence. There is no truth in the allegation that the West has built its bases as stepping stones to aggression. Rather, as the facts make clear, the bases built by the West have served to keep the peace and to help us reach and maintain the condition of balance from which we can negotiate toward viable and workable disarmament agreements.

The CHAIRMAN (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): The question with which we are now dealing is a problem which, more than any other, calls for good will and a sensible attitude towards the facts. There will be no difficulty in solving that problem, if we approach it without any ulterior motive, if we do not raise artificial obstacles in the way to the achievement of agreement and if we really strive to ensure the security of all countries. Everyone recognizes that if we could reach agreement on such questions as the destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the liquidation of foreign military bases, it would be an extremely important and perhaps decisive step towards general and complete disarmament. That is why we should concentrate our efforts in that direction. Any success in that respect will, without doubt, open up the most favourable prospects for our future work.



(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

When we discuss the question of the liquidation of foreign military bases, we cannot fail to recall certain conclusions drawn by President Kennedy two and a half months ago in his well-known address on the foreign policy of his country. We all remember that Mr. Kennedy, while emphasizing that he did not have in mind a peace enforced on the world by American weapons of war and that he meant not merely peace for Americans but "for all men and women -- not merely peace in our time but peace in all time", stated that the United States should:

"Examine our attitude towards peace itself.

"... let us re-examine our attitude towards the Soviet Union. ...

"Let us re-examine our attitude towards the cold war, ...".

(ENDC/95, pp.2, 3, 4)

We are profoundly convinced that, if the United States makes such a re-appraisal of its foreign policy, it will not only be extremely useful for the success of the disarmament negotiations but will inevitably have an effect on the attitude of the Western Powers towards the problem of foreign military bases, because there is no doubt that the concepts underlying the policy of establishing military bases in foreign territory are closely connected precisely with the attitude towards the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, towards the cold war and towards the problem of peace throughout the world. These concepts really need serious re-appraisal.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries take a negative attitude towards military bases in foreign territories. That altogether definite position has been manifested in practice in the liquidation by the Soviet Union of all military bases which it had in other States. The existence in foreign territory of military bases aimed against certain countries -- in this case against the Soviet Union and the other countries of socialism -- is a phenomenon unknown in history both with regard to its scope and the overt declaration of its purposes. It cannot be justified by historical practice. Nor can it be justified from the point of view of international law, which condemns aggression and preparation for aggression. And to assert that military bases located at very great distances from one's own territory (in this case the United States) are defensive in character amounts, to put it mildly, to violating the truth. Military bases in foreign territory cannot be considered as indicating normal diplomatic relations either, because you cannot give your oath to a country that you have no evil intentions against it and at the

(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

same time point the muzzle of a loaded pistol at its bosom. It has now been proved that the existence of military bases in foreign territory is also unjustified from the standpoint of the defence of the country possessing such bases. And plain human reason certainly cannot justify the existence of such bases, the encirclement of a State or group of States by military bases on the pretext that this is being done in the name of peace.

The establishment of foreign military bases in peacetime and the existence at the present time of many hundreds of such bases aimed against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries is one of the main reasons why international tension has become more acute and mistrust among States has been engendered and intensified. The existence of these bases has been and still is a considerable hindrance to an improvement in the international atmosphere and in the relations between States. The strategic concept itself of encircling a country with military bases, which can be used for aggression only, has such an aggressive character that it cannot but give rise to suspicions and corresponding counter-measures to strengthen the security of the States against which those bases are aimed.

The geographical position of the numerous military bases of the United States of America is in itself eloquent testimony of the purposes for which they have been established. It is clear that these purposes neither have nor can have anything to do with national defence in the strict sense of that word; they have nothing to do with the defence of the national territory and vital centres of the country which has established those bases. Even the military experts of the West do not make such assertions. Those bases are a means of military aggression and the preliminary delivery of military materials nearer to the boundaries of a potential enemy for the purposes of aggression. That is called a challenge in any language. The more intolerable the situation, the more it increases international tension and the greater is the danger it represents for the cause of peace in the era of nuclear weapons. The Eighteen-Nation Committee, as our debates show, is striving to put before the governments such solutions as would, above all, make a nuclear conflict impossible. Those proposals, consequently, should be aimed at eliminating the practical possibility of a nuclear conflict and, moreover, in stage 1 of the implementation of general and complete disarmament.



(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

The United States military bases all around the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have already been in existence for many years. But can anyone assert that the existence of those bases has brought any good to anyone or that their masters feel more assured and secure? We have heard statements emanating from the most highly placed circles of the West that that is not so, that the accumulation of weapons, their location in various parts of the world and the ease with which they can be used are still no guarantee of peacefulness.

The striving to retain foreign military bases is becoming more and more unnatural in the present international situation. As a result of the improvement of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, those bases have ceased to play a military role from a purely defensive standpoint but they continue to be a constant source of tension and threat to peace. At the same time military bases in foreign territory also constitute an extremely serious danger for the peoples of all the countries where they are located.

The Western countries seek to justify military bases in foreign territory in three respects. First, it is asserted that those bases are in the hands of States which have no aggressive intentions and therefore the bases do not constitute a threat to peace. But if one looks at the political aspect of the problem, one should bear in mind that the Soviet Union, since the time it came into existence, has more than once been subjected to aggression and that, more than any other country, it has grounds for mistrust. It seems to me that we can therefore leave aside for the time being the political aspect of the problem as being absolutely clear.

The second argument used by the Western countries in trying to justify the existence of military bases in foreign territory is the so-called "balance of forces". But that balance was upset as soon as military bases were established in foreign territory. The Western countries, and in the first place the United States, had recourse in this instance to the policy of the fait accompli. But can it be right to carry out such an action as the establishment of military bases in foreign territory and to assert afterwards that the liquidation of those bases, that is to say the restoration of the normal situation, would upset the balance? Even if we were to adopt the standpoint of those who think that in order to ensure peace it is not so much disarmament that is required as the maintenance of the balance between the opposing military groupings, even then it would be incorrect to assert that with the liquidation of foreign military bases the Soviet Union and its allies would gain some sort of military advantage.

(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

If we take just the human potential, which, in the opinion of all military experts, is of considerable importance for the military power of States, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies have a population of 300 million. The population of the Western States members of NATO, excluding the United States, is 288 million (I emphasize, excluding the United States), but the population of the Soviet Union, as is well known, is spread over a territory extending right up to the Far East. On the other hand, according to official data four European NATO States alone (the United Kingdom, France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany) had two and a half million men under arms in 1961, while the armed forces of the remaining European States members of NATO number not less than a million.

At meetings of our Committee it has also been emphasized that the geographical position of the NATO States and Warsaw Treaty States likewise gives no advantage to the socialist camp, because the distance from the Far East and Siberia to Europe is far greater and more difficult to traverse than the distance separating Western Europe from its main ally - the United States of America. Furthermore, the destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons would not affect conventional sea transport. And there is the experience of two world wars, during which the United States was able to come in good time to the help of its European allies despite the distance separating them. Consequently, from any point of view the relationships and guarantees of the alliance are quite sufficient and there is no need to establish military bases in order to defend any Western country whatever, if defence alone is concerned.

An attempt is also made to find a justification for military bases in foreign territories by alleging that those bases are in allied territories and therefore practically cease to be foreign military bases and that they can be equated with national bases. But the attempt to equate foreign and national military bases is completely unfounded. Do only the representatives of socialist countries hold this opinion? Permit me to recall the statement made in the Security Council by the representative of the United Arab Republic on 24 October last year:

"This is a very basic question so far as the United Arab Republic is concerned. We have witnessed in our part of the world how military bases were used as springboards for premeditated foreign aggression. The date 29 October 1956 will never escape our memory as ample proof of the threat of foreign military bases to international peace and security." (S/PV.1024, p.34)



(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

As is well known, at the same meeting the representative of Ghana stated that in the view of his Government foreign military bases are "an evil" (ibid, p.48). It is well known that a number of neutral countries have not only expressed themselves as being against military bases in foreign territories and not only refuse to have such bases stationed in their territories but are also waging a struggle for the liquidation of similar bases which remain as a burdensome heritage of a colonial past.

Is it not true that in the West also a clear distinction is made between foreign and national military bases? Here is an appraisal from the United States side showing that there is no confusion of ideas even in the West in this regard. The American journal, The Nation, of 10 November 1962, published an article by Fred Warner Neale, in which he stated, inter alia:

"For a number of years the Soviet Union has been living under the serious threat created by our bases located all around the Soviet Union ... It is a fact that (whatever our appraisal of these bases) the creation of military bases near the boundaries of other States must unavoidably be considered as a provocative act... The tension generated by military bases was a serious obstacle to the lessening of tensions in the Cold War and in regard to an agreement on disarmament, which ought to be the true purpose of a sensible foreign policy."

There are still more responsible statements on this question. I should like to recall once again what was said by President Kennedy in his address on 22 October 1962:

"We no longer live in a world where the active firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any substantially-increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace."

It is evident from the statements I have quoted that in the West, too, it is clearly recognized that the existence of foreign bases around the socialist countries is not justified. But how does it turn out? It turns out that in the West they are still inclined to approach the question of military bases in foreign territory with two different yardsticks, enabling them to treat the socialist countries as an unequal partner.

(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

But such a policy proved unrealistic even forty-five years ago when the Soviet Union was the first and only socialist State. So how can such a policy be justified or called realistic now? In preparing a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, how can one adopt any position other than that of full equality and the same respect for the defence interests of every country?

In statements made by a number of military experts and propaganda leaders of certain Western countries there crops up also another justification for foreign military bases. I refer to the view that foreign military bases might deflect from one's own country and direct on to heads of others, or, at least, dissipate the force of the counter-stroke which would inevitably follow in response to aggressive action. But such a "defence" of foreign military bases is so anti-humanitarian that it is encountered only outside the walls of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. If I dwell upon this, it is only because statements of that kind only show to what a degree the question has grown ripe for solution and how essential it is to liquidate military bases in foreign territory as quickly as possible.

I hope I shall be correctly understood if I add a few words relating specifically to my own country. The People's Republic of Bulgaria is not only a small country, but a country which has for many a year been extending the hand of good neighbourhood to all the States surrounding it, including its southern neighbours who are members of NATO. Bulgaria is not threatening anyone. Nevertheless, in the geographical area in which it is situated there have been stationary military bases, and now there have also appeared the mobile military bases of a country whose influential circles make no secret of, to put it mildly, their unfriendly attitude towards the Bulgarian social system. How can the Bulgarian people peacefully labour and develop their economy and culture if they are compelled constantly to feel the closeness of foreign armed forces sent from thousands of miles away? It can be said without exaggeration that the presence of these armed forces to the south of the Bulgarian border is one of the major obstacles to the improvement of relations between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and its southern neighbours. Foreign military bases are creating similar obstacles in other parts of the world as well. That is why our example is yet another clear proof of the need to liquidate foreign military bases.

(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

The liquidation of foreign military bases is a requirement of our time. It cannot be postponed until the later stages of general and complete disarmament. It must be carried out in the very first stage in conjunction with the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

It is no coincidence that for many years one of the major issues in the discussions and negotiations relating to the problem of disarmament has been the question of foreign military bases. The facts bear out completely that these bases are intended to fulfil both strategic and political purposes. The existence of an enormous military potential within the immediate vicinity of the borders of peace-loving States increases to an incredible extent the danger of a surprise attack, the danger of aggressive action and, consequently, the danger of a thermonuclear war.

All this shows how important it is to liquidate foreign military bases so as to create a favourable atmosphere for the implementation of disarmament itself.

Consequently, if we base ourselves on the interest of peace and security and honestly and sincerely seek for ways of solving the problem of disarmament, we cannot fail to recognize that the question of the liquidation of military bases in foreign territory is an important element of any agreement on general and complete disarmament.

In following the discussions which have taken place in our Committee on this problem of the liquidation of foreign military bases as one of the measures of the first stage of disarmament, one cannot fail to note a certain striving of the Western delegations to isolate this problem from the context in which it has been placed by the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev. 1). It is well known that in the Soviet draft the liquidation of military bases in foreign territory is envisaged as a measure indissolubly linked to the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, as well as to a substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments.

We all recognize that our task is to find a solution to the problem of the elimination of the threat of a thermonuclear war within the framework of a general and complete disarmament programme, in such a way as to ensure that this would be carried out under equal conditions for all States. And if this is our aim, we cannot fail to recognize that the liquidation of foreign military bases is not only completely legitimate, but also a natural compensation for the agreement of the USSR



(The Chairman, Bulgaria)

to destroy simultaneously its means of delivery of nuclear weapons, that is, the means which constitute the basis of the defence capability of the USSR. Actually this would be only an incomplete and partial compensation for the USSR and the other socialist countries.

The Bulgarian delegation deems it necessary to affirm once again its immutable standpoint in regard to a question which we now consider to be a question of primary importance, namely, that the complex of measures which must be carried out in the initial stage of general and complete disarmament must necessarily be aimed at the practical elimination of the threat of a thermonuclear war.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): Before I turn to the main observations which I wish to address to the Committee this morning, which will be on the subject of item 5(e) of our agreed agenda (ENDC/52), I should like to take what may be the last opportunity for some little time, and I think I shall be in order in doing so, to remind the Committee of my suggestion that an examination of the technical issues involved in nuclear disarmament, which constitutes item 5(d) of our agenda, should start in the fairly near future and perhaps at our next session. I listened with great interest, as I am sure all of us round this table did, to the very constructive statement made by our Swedish colleague, Baron von Platen, at our meeting last Thursday of 22 August (ENDC/PV.154, pp.17-18). I believe that the forthcoming recess will give all Governments represented here an opportunity not only to consider the technical issues involved in nuclear disarmament but also the way in which the Committee could best make progress in this field. I have suggested before that one way might be to introduce some new procedural machinery during our next session. This is of course a matter for the Committee as a whole to consider and discuss. But I do hope that other delegations will soon be in a position to comment on this suggestion. I am quite sure that whatever experience their countries may have had in nuclear matters, all members of the Committee can and indeed should play a useful part in this aspect of our work.

Now I turn back to item 5(e). This is a subject on which the United Kingdom delegation has on several previous occasions addressed the Committee, but I do not propose to go through all the arguments which we have deployed from time to time on this subject. I do not, for instance, this morning propose to go into the arguments based on considerations of balance or imbalance between the groupings of East and West,

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

or the arguments which can be based on the geographical dissimilarities between these two groups. They have already been fully dealt with this morning by the United States representative.

What I do wish to do is to take up some of the points which were made at our meeting of 20 August (ENDC/PV.153) by the Romanian, Soviet and Polish representatives and this morning by the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian representatives in support of the Soviet stage I proposals on the bases. I should like first of all to remind the Committee that whatever the differences between the United States and Soviet plans regarding bases in stage I, both plans contemplate the elimination of all bases, whether domestic or so-called foreign bases, by the end of stage III.

It is of course true that, as our Soviet colleague reminded us last week, the United States plan (ENDC/30, Corr.1, Add.1, 2, 3) makes an exception of such agreed bases as will be needed for forces to maintain internal order and the personal security of citizens after the end of stage III. It is also true that the Soviet plan (ENDC/2/Rev.1, Corr.1) apparently overlooks this obvious requirement. Internal security forces will clearly have to be based somewhere. But apart from this relatively minor and negotiable point, both plans attempt, as I say, to fulfil the aim on which we are all agreed in principle and which was of course embodied in the relevant sections of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the 1961 Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5, pp.1, 2). If I may say so, I thought that the statements made on Tuesday 20 August (ENDC/PV.153) by our Eastern European colleagues to which I have referred tended to lose sight of that fact and, as a result, they lacked a certain sense of perspective.

My colleagues will recall that when we were considering nuclear disarmament measures I suggested that we were primarily arguing about means, not ends. This is equally true when we consider the question of bases. Our task is to seek agreement on appropriate measures for inclusion not merely in stage I but in all three stages of our disarmament plan. As I have said, there is nothing sacrosanct about any one of those three stages. What matters is the final product when the disarmament process is completed.

I suggest that to argue that any given problem be it nuclear disarmament or certain types of bases, can only and must only be solved in stage I, as our eastern European colleagues so often urge, is unrealistic. You, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as Bulgarian representative, argued this thesis this morning. But I wish

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respectfully to remind you that such an argument finds no justification whatsoever in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. I wish to add on this point that this apparently radical approach makes the reaching of agreement not only on any given issue but on general and complete disarmament as a whole extremely difficult. I do hope that the advocates of such an approach will ponder that fact from time to time, and I do hope that they will also remember the saying that a radical is a man with both feet firmly in the air.

It seems to me that the drafters of the Soviet plan neglected to take fully into account the many relevant and complicated factors -- geographical, strategic, political and so forth -- which are involved in the very existence of bases and which should not be overlooked when putting forward specific plans for their elimination. We in the West have often explained why we cannot accept the "all or nothing" approach adopted by our eastern European colleagues in arbitrarily singling out one particular aspect of this whole problem, namely, so-called foreign bases, and calling for their special treatment at the very outset of the disarmament process.

Such a proposal does not in fact constitute a principle of disarmament which the West must accept just because the eastern European States say that they do. Nor does a domestic base necessarily differ in any significant respect from a so-called foreign base just because our eastern European colleagues say it does. I must say that in view of what the Western delegations, and in particular the United Kingdom delegation, have said before on this last point -- and perhaps I may specially recall certain remarks made by my former leader, Mr. Godber, at our meeting of 29 March (ENDC/PV.115, pp.37 et seq.) -- I have been surprised that our Soviet and Romanian colleagues tried again last week to argue, to use Mr. Tsarapkin's words, that

"... there is a fundamental difference between national bases and foreign military bases." (ENDC/PV.153, p.20)

Our Romanian colleague said much the same thing on that occasion when he claimed that

"Military bases organized on foreign territories are a clearly defined military institution, distinct from national bases, from a military-strategic point of view ...". (ibid., p.7)

Our Czechoslovak colleague made the same assertion today. Our Italian colleague dealt with that satisfactorily to my mind last Tuesday, 20 August (ibid., pp.28, 29) and our United States colleague has done so again today. But I think I must make some observations from the standpoint of my own delegation.



(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

I must confess that I fail to grasp this distinction which is being forced upon me. It seems to me to be a distinction without a difference. What difference really exists, for example, from a military-strategic point of view between bases on NATO territory from which nuclear delivery vehicles can be operated and bases in the Soviet Union from which nuclear delivery vehicles, armed with nuclear warheads, can be aimed at targets in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe? I recall that our Soviet colleague told us last week that the security of countries which allowed the location of so-called foreign bases on their territories is, to use his own words, "seriously jeopardized" (ibid., p.13). Our Romanian and Polish colleagues spoke in similar but perhaps more specific terms. Mr. Macovescu told us that such States "are inevitably exposed to a retaliatory blow..." (ibid., p.8). Mr. Blusztajn told us that such States, to use his words, "are taking considerable risks" and that "a whole series of military counter-measures" are "aimed against those bases..." (ibid., pp.24, 25)

Perhaps, then, I may be allowed to ask our Romanian and Polish colleagues two simple questions. First, if these blows, these military counter-measures which they mentioned, can in fact be launched -- I am sure they can -- is it altogether surprising that our defensive planning in the West cannot entirely overlook the possibility, however theoretical, that such blows could be launched in certain situations not merely as retaliatory measures but as preventive or pre-emptive measures?

Second, can my two colleagues tell us where these blows will be launched from?

So far as my second question is concerned, I think I can answer it myself. The Committee will recall that our Soviet colleague told us last Tuesday at our meeting of 20 August:

"As is well known, the Soviet Union liquidated long ago its bases in foreign territories." (ENDC/PV.153, p.19)

If that is so, I can only assume that the answer to my second question will be:

"From Soviet domestic bases where nuclear delivery vehicles are stationed or from which they can be operated". Where, then, is this alleged difference, from a military-strategic point of view, between Soviet domestic missile bases and equivalent bases on NATO territory?

Our Soviet colleague told us last week:

"Bases in foreign territories are mailed fists with concentrations of troops and the most modern military equipment, especially, of course, thermonuclear weapons placed adjacent to the territory of a State or States regarded as potential targets for attack." (ibid., p.20)

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

We in this Committee can all recall certain statements to the effect that some of our colleagues, at least, consider NATO to be potentially aggressive. Naturally, I cannot in any way accept that description of the NATO alliance. But whether we be considered aggressive or not, why should Soviet thermonuclear weapons be any less of a threat to us in Western Europe, for example, than our weapons may be to the Soviet Union and its allies? I need hardly remind the Committee that those Soviet weapons are placed adjacent to at least one important NATO country and, in the case of other NATO countries, are placed so close that we could expect only a few minutes' warning of their arrival. To use a slang phrase, how adjacent can you get? Surely, in this instance, to a degree which nullifies the distinction which our East European colleagues so often try to draw between domestic and so-called foreign bases. That is my answer to our Czechoslovak colleague who asked us this morning (supra, p.3) how we should evaluate the presence of nuclear weapons on our borders.

Our Soviet colleague argued last Tuesday that many countries do not have foreign military bases on their territory and that their security is not harmed by that fact. I can agree with the first part of that statement, but I think the second part depends on various factors which may change according to circumstances at any given time. There is nothing immutable about a country's decision not to accept foreign bases. Since our Soviet colleague referred on that occasion to Sweden as one of the countries which did not have foreign bases, I hope our Swedish colleague, Mrs. Myrdal, will not take it amiss if I remind Mr. Tsarapkin of some pertinent remarks in this connexion made by Mr. Edberg at our meeting of 11 May 1962. He asked:

"... whether some national military bases in one country could not be regarded as equally menacing to the security of a neighbouring country."

(ENDC/PV.35, p.35)

Mr. Edberg also said on that occasion:

"An imaginary country may, it seems, feel as insecure because of such neighbouring national bases as another country may feel embarrassed by what have been termed foreign bases." (ibid.)

He concluded:

"This is actually a result of geography, history and the political situation of today." (ibid.)

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

If our Soviet colleague still believes, in the light of those pertinent remarks, that there is a distinction between home and foreign bases, I hope he will endeavour to enlighten us. But in doing so, I do hope he will remember Mr. Godber's warning at our meeting of 29 March (ENDC/PV.115, p.43) not to try to convince us that we should feel less dead when struck by a nuclear bomb coming from a domestic rather than a foreign base. I hope, too, that he will remember that under the revised Soviet plan (ENDC/2/Rev.1, Corr.1) the threat -- I repeat, the threat -- of thermonuclear war will remain until the end of stage II, that is to say, throughout two-thirds of the disarmament process. Finally, I hope he will remember that, so far, he has given us in Western Europe no adequate assurance that we could in no way be threatened either in stage II or in stage III by illegally and clandestinely retained nuclear delivery vehicles of appropriate range.

I should now like to examine another and, in my view, equally dubious argument put forward by our Soviet, Romanian and Polish colleagues last Tuesday, 20 August. (ENDC/PV.153) This runs as follows: Domestic bases are ipso facto peaceful, whereas so-called foreign bases are by their very nature aggressive and offensive. To use their language, the latter bases are allegedly "springboards of militaristic aggression". Our Soviet colleague said last Tuesday that foreign military bases are, among other things -- to use his words -- "an aggressive weapon".

Mr. Macovescu told us:

"No one could give any convincing proof -- no matter how many statements were made -- that foreign military bases are not advanced starting points for unleashing an armed attack against the States around which they had been set up." (ENDC/PV.153, p.7)

"That", he said somewhat categorically, "is their main purpose." (ibid.)

Mr. Blusztajn also elaborated this theme. He declared that the role of so-called foreign bases:

"... becomes considerably more important if it is regarded from the point of view of offensive strategy." (ibid., p.25)

He went on:

"Such bases give a potential aggressor an opportunity to concentrate near his victim's frontiers the military forces necessary for embarking upon aggression." (ibid.)



(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Finally, Mr. Blusztajn asserted, and again, I think, perhaps somewhat categorically, that such bases

"... can be effectively used only as part of a surprise operation." (ibid.)

Well, what are we to make of that argument? I do not think that anyone would deny that, in theory, aggressive action of any sort -- whether it be conventional, nuclear, or both -- could be launched from a so-called foreign base. But equally I do not think anybody would deny that such action could also be launched from a domestic base. There are plenty of historical examples of aggression committed from domestic bases. I do not have to remind our Polish and our Czechoslovak colleagues that Nazi Germany did not need foreign bases to commit aggression against their countries, nor were such bases required for aggression against Scandinavia and the Low Countries in 1940. I need hardly remind our Soviet colleague that aggression was committed very recently by an ally of the Soviet Union against a non-aligned country -- a member of this very Conference -- and that such aggression was launched primarily from what I am sure Mr. Tsurapkin would regard as domestic bases.

The conclusion I draw from all this is that domestic and what are called foreign bases can be used for either offensive or defensive purposes. How such bases are used depends primarily on the intentions of the government or alliance of governments concerned. If Western foreign bases are considered to be "springboards of aggression", despite plenty of evidence that they are nothing of the sort, then that amounts to doubt about Western intentions. But the West is equally entitled to consider Soviet domestic bases and the domestic bases of its friends and allies as potential springboards of aggression also. I am not being unduly controversial if I say that at times we too have had our doubts about the intentions of Eastern European States. I am sure there must be a Russian proverb equivalent to the English saying: "What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander".

However, in view of the improved atmosphere in which our discussions are now happily taking place I hope that in future we can accept each other's word for it that our respective intentions are peaceful and defensive and that we can therefore all refrain from contriving, to quote from Plato, "some magnificent myth that would in itself carry conviction to the whole community".

I should like to conclude my remarks by asking our Eastern European colleagues to look again at the Western plan (ENDC/3) in the light of what I have said. I hope they will increasingly realize that under our stage I proposals the reduction of armed

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forces and the 30 per cent cut across-the-board in all nuclear and major conventional armaments will inevitably be reflected in the reduced overall effectiveness of bases, both domestic and foreign. In other words, bases will automatically tend to wither away not only in stage I but throughout the whole disarmament process. Nevertheless, the Western plan envisages specific measures regarding bases in stages II and III. I hope that in due course the Committee will agree that the Western plan is both sound and realistic. Indeed, so far as domestic bases are concerned the Western approach does seem to be shared by our Soviet colleague, and our United States colleague this morning very usefully drew attention to what Mr. Tsarapkin said on this subject at our meeting on Tuesday, 20 August. (ENDC/PV.153, p.20) So far as foreign bases are concerned, I noted with interest that at that same meeting our Polish colleague also seemed to agree with the Western approach when he said that:

"After the total elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the limitation of conventional armaments, the maintenance of military bases on foreign soil would be meaningless from the military point of view. Those bases would lose their *raison d'être*." (ibid., p.26)

That, if I may say so, is very much the Western approach, although I do realize that Mr. Blusztajn was thinking primarily in terms of stage I measures. But if he and our Soviet colleague could get together during the recess and could, so to say, marry up their respective positions and then apply their offspring to general and complete disarmament over all three stages, then I believe that the present gap between East and West over the question of bases could be significantly narrowed and we should arrive at a situation which, to adopt words which you used just now, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as representative of Bulgaria, offer full security and "full equality to us all" (supra, p.25).

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The delegation of Canada has listened with attention to the speeches which were made by the representatives of Romania, the Soviet Union and Poland at our meeting of 20 August (ENDC/PV.153), and to the speeches made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria at today's meeting, on the problem of what they habitually refer to as foreign bases, which, as I have said before at this Conference, I believe could be more accurately termed bases of an alliance. I am glad to say that the speakers I have named argued their case without polemics, and for my part I welcome that evidence of an intention on the part of our colleagues from Eastern



(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Europe to pursue the debate in this Committee in a spirit which is in harmony with the hopes which the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) on a partial test ban has raised.

As for the substance of what our Eastern European colleagues had to say on this question, I have been unable to discover anything significantly new. I should like, however, to take up, one by one, three basic points which communist speakers always make when the subject of military bases is discussed and which figured prominently in the speeches of the representatives of Romania, the Soviet Union and Poland on 20 August.

The first of those arguments is that what they call "foreign bases" represents one of the essential elements in the danger of nuclear war and that therefore the early removal of those bases would contribute substantially to lessening the danger: and I would certainly agree with what was said just now by the representative of the United Kingdom, that the bases which both sides maintain on either side of the dividing line are essential elements in the military arrangements which the two major alliances have developed for their defense. In that sense those bases are one of the many manifestations of the mutual mistrust between East and West which lies at the base of the present arms race. In that connexion a statement of Mr. Tsarapkin's, made on 20 August, would seem to require some explanation. I refer to what he is reported as saying at that meeting:

"As is well known, the Soviet Union liquidated long ago its bases in foreign territories." (ENDC/PV.153, p.19)

However, what is well known is that the Soviet Union has troops in East Germany and perhaps in other countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact. I do not understand how to reconcile that fact with Mr. Tsarapkin's statement, unless he intended only to refer to bases for missiles carrying nuclear warheads.

It seems to the Canadian delegation that the question of bases must be dealt with in precisely the same manner as any other element in the defence structure of States in the course of disarmament. The dismantling of such bases will only contribute to greater stability and the lessening of the danger of war if it is carried out in accordance with the principles which, we are agreed upon, must govern each and every aspect of the disarmament process. For political and military reasons the Soviet Union and its allies doubtless see some of the bases maintained by the Western alliance as a cause for concern, and hence would like to see them abolished. The Western Powers, however, as has been mentioned by our United States and United Kingdom colleagues today, may legitimately feel concerned about the military dispositions and the level

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of Soviet forces. It seems to me fruitless to try to single out particular elements in the defence postures adopted by the other side for special treatment. Our only hope if we are to make progress towards general disarmament is to observe strictly the basic principle that disarmament proposals, if they are to form the object of realistic negotiations, must be framed in a way that will not at any stage lessen the security of any party.

The second major point which representatives of the socialist countries always make when discussing this question is that those military bases constitute a threat to the security of the States on whose territory they are situated. With all respect, that is a matter which must lie in the judgement of the States concerned. It is for them to form their views whether the existence of allied bases on their territory enhances their security or reduces it. I have no wish to review at this time the course of events which led to the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance and the establishment of the present system of Western defence. I would only repeat that the measures which NATO members have taken for their collective security have been in response to what individual members believed to have been real and present dangers. We may indeed deplore a situation in which we must take steps to protect ourselves against possible aggression, but we would feel a great deal less secure if those measures were not implemented. The delegation of Canada hopes that that situation will change, and change in the near future, so that it will be possible to make a reduction in the defences of all nations concerned; but that must be done in accordance with the principles which were agreed upon for the elaboration of disarmament measures.

The third argument which representatives of socialist countries invariably advance, and which has been dealt with by others of my colleagues previously today, is that those bases contribute to international tension because they are by nature aggressive. The representative of Romania at our meeting of 20 August -- and it has been quoted before today -- said:

"No one could give any convincing proof ... that foreign military bases are not advance starting points for unleashing an armed attack against the States around which they have been set up. That is their main purpose." (ENDC/PV.153, p.7)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The representative of Romania is right; we could not convince him or his Warsaw Pact colleagues that the purpose of those bases is not aggressive. That is because our judgement and their judgement about such bases are subjective. We feel that our bases are certainly for defence, while the bases facing us in the Warsaw Pact countries could be bases for aggression -- and their judgements are just the reverse of that. It seems to me that that argument is analogous to the one concerning whether a given weapon is defensive or offensive. One of the best descriptions of the distinction between a defensive and an offensive weapon which I have seen was offered recently by an eminent United States strategist with whose work I think most of us are familiar. Mr. Art Buchwald, writing in the New York Herald Tribune, has said that an offensive weapon was one that was pointed at you and that a defensive weapon was one that you pointed at the other guy. That puts the case quite simply, although it was a joke. A military base is defensive if the intentions of the State which establishes it are defensive. In the case of those members of the Western alliance -- of whom Canada is one -- who maintain forces on the territories of their allies, their intention is to participate in a system of collective security, the purpose of which is to preserve the territorial integrity of the members forming that alliance. The Soviet Union and its allies may claim that the apprehensions which have led the Western alliance to establish its present defensive arrangements have no basis. However, in the light of the present numbers and armaments of forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries, it certainly does not seem to the members of NATO that their defensive arrangements are either unnecessary or the result of unreasonable apprehensions. Here perhaps I may quote Shakespeare:

"How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds makes ill deeds done!"

Perhaps that might be modified in connexion with the question of bases and armaments:

"How often the sight of means to do ill deeds in the hands of others makes us fear that ill deeds will be done."

The replies I have just given are no doubt as familiar to the Committee as the arguments which they rebut, and, I think, rebut effectively. If I have repeated them again this morning it is in the hope that eventually the representatives of the Eastern European countries will be brought to approach the problem in a more realistic light.



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There is a further consideration of a more general character to which I wish to draw the Committee's attention. We are all agreed that the disarmament process must be implemented in a manner which will not be detrimental to the security of either side. On many occasions, including today, Western representatives have demonstrated in detail why the proposals of the Soviet Union respecting bases would upset the present uneasy balance between East and West. I do not intend this morning to go over familiar ground in drawing attention to the imbalance which we believe would result from the implementation of the first stage proposals in the Soviet plan. However, it is useful I think to bear in mind the emphasis which the Soviet Union and its allies, including the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria this morning, have placed on the link which exists in the Soviet proposals between the elimination of foreign bases plus the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the other disarmament measures which they propose should be carried out during the first stage. That link was emphasized by the three representatives of the socialist countries who spoke at our meeting of 20 August. To take only one example, Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"Such measures -- alongside the elimination in stage I of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons with the exception of the so-called protective umbrella -- include the complete liquidation of all foreign military bases in the territories of other countries and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from those territories. These measures for stage I of disarmament are indissolubly interconnected and must therefore be carried out simultaneously." (ENDC/PV.153, p.13)

There are two points which I wish to make in respect to that statement. In the first place, the representative of the Soviet Union makes it clear that, in the Soviet view, the elimination of foreign bases must be accompanied by the abolition of almost all categories of nuclear weapon vehicles, leaving only a few specified numbers and types remaining at the end of stage I. He goes on to assert that a situation would then be created in which the complete elimination of bases would in no way place the Western Powers at a disadvantage. The Committee knows that the Western Powers do not accept that argument; but even if we did, the Soviet stage I proposals, as they affect bases, are dependent upon the effective implementation of its proposals concerning the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles. In the discussion of that problem, the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles under items 5(b) and (c) of our agenda (ENDC/52), the Soviet Union was not able to explain to the satisfaction of this Committee how its proposals with respect to the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in stage I

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could be effectively verified, nor indeed was it able to explain enough about how in its view the elimination would be carried out to convince us of its practicability; and until the representative of the Soviet Union has done so it does not seem to the delegation of Canada that he can reasonably expect the West to consider seriously the Soviet proposals on the related problems of bases. I might say that the linking of those two proposals together in that way seems to us to be justifying an inequitable proposition by predicating its implementation on another which is impossible.

My second point concerning the link which the Soviet Union recognizes between the question of bases and the reduction of nuclear weapons vehicles and force levels is simply this: it indicates that the item we are now considering cannot be discussed in isolation from other problems which we must face in the course of negotiating general disarmament. The Western Powers are in full agreement that our ultimate goal is a world in which military alliances will have become unnecessary. In the course of a balanced disarmament programme the progressive reduction of armaments and force levels will affect what the Soviet Union calls foreign bases just as they will affect the entirety of States' defensive establishment. In the view of the Canadian delegation, therefore, any examination of the problem of bases leads us immediately back to the central problems on which disarmament negotiations must concentrate, namely, reductions in armaments and force levels. I would urge my colleagues from the socialist countries to consider this point carefully. Until a common approach has been hammered out in the field of the reduction of armaments and particularly the question of the progressive elimination of nuclear weapons vehicles, it seems to my delegation that a discussion of bases is unlikely to yield useful results.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and fifty-fifth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Lukanov, representative of Bulgaria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the United States, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom and Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 29 August 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.