

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.117
3 April 1963

ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday 3 April 1963, at 10.30. a.m.

Chairman

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

(Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELO FRANCO

Mr. J. MACHADO LOPES

Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSINEONOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. V. PECHOTA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato M. HAMID

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOMRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. S. LÖFGREN

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. I.G. USACHEV

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. J.K. WRIGHT
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. V. BAKER
Mr. R.A. MARTIN
Mr. A. AKALOVSKY

Deputy Special Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare open the one hundred and seventeenth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. I have four speakers on my list: the representatives of Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and India. I call on the representative of Canada.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): Before coming to the main part of my statement today I should like to refer to the meeting on 22 March when, in connexion with our statement (ENDC/PV.112, pp.15-24) the Canadian delegation circulated a table of the modifications which the Soviet Union and the United States had made in their disarmament plans during the past three years. We had not intended at the time to make the table a Conference document, but, several delegations having suggested that it might be useful to do so, we have revised it without altering it in any essential particular, and we think it is now an accurate presentation of the positions of both sides as they were and as they are. If the Conference has no objection I propose to submit the draft and to request that it be circulated as a Conference document.^{1/}

At that meeting on 22 March the representative of India urged (ibid. pp.33-34) that the Conference should concentrate its attention on the new Soviet Union proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1, Art.5) for the reduction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. The Canadian delegation agrees that that proposal deserves very careful study. When Foreign Minister Gromyko submitted the amendment (A/PV.1127 (provisional) p.38-40) to the Soviet plan (ENDC/2*) at the General Assembly of the United Nations last autumn we welcomed that move because we hoped it indicated the adoption of a more realistic approach by the Soviet Union to the vital question of reducing the level of nuclear weapon vehicles. We continue to hope that that is so. There has been relatively limited discussion of the proposal since it was first tabled in New York, but the Canadian delegation has followed with great interest what has been said about it by various representatives at recent meetings of the Conference. However, after reviewing carefully the records of what has been said we must conclude that it is still impossible to grasp the full meaning of the present Soviet position. That, I submit, is not because the Western side has not tried to understand what the Soviet Union proposes.

^{1/} Subsequently issued as ENDC/79.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

At our last session, and again more recently, Western representatives have clearly explained the main issues which the proposal raises for them. The Soviet Union must provide additional clarification before we in the West will be able to weigh the relative merits of its new approach and the approach in the United States plan (ENDC/30/Add. 1,2).

Although the Soviet representative has repeatedly asserted that he has given the Conference sufficient answers to our questions, we cannot agree. Our requests for additional information have generally been met by the reply that the West must accept the Soviet proposal in principle, and that only subsequently will the details of the proposal be revealed. The Canadian delegation believes that that sort of answer, which we have unfortunately encountered in other fields of our work, is in fact nothing more than obstruction. The principle that armaments should be reduced in the course of a balanced, safeguarded disarmament programme has already been accepted by all, and in our negotiations we must examine the concrete details of the method by which our common goal is to be reached. Unless each side is frankly informed of the essential details of the position of the other side, negotiation is paralysed from the start. As I said on 17 December last:

"Suppose one of us were about to buy a house. What would we think if the owner said: 'Before you can have any information about this house, you must agree in principle that you are going to buy it. Once you have agreed to that, then I will answer your questions about whether the foundations are sound, whether the roof leaks, whether the plumbing and heating are working properly, and so on.'" (ENDC/PV.93, p.18)

I think that illustrates the point about accepting principles and details in this connexion.

I should like now to review briefly at least some of the issues which, in the view of the Canadian delegation, the Gromyko proposal raises -- issues which we believe call for more explanation and exposition by the representative of the Soviet Union. Many of them have already been touched upon by me and also by my colleagues. I am, however, encouraged to raise the questions again since at our meeting on 27 March (ENDC/PV.114) Mr. Tsarapkin seemed to be making an attempt to tell us a little more about what the Gromyko proposal means.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Soviet representatives have insisted that the reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles by including them in equal across-the-board percentage cuts of all categories of major armaments, as suggested in the United States outline of provisions of a treaty (ENDC/30/Add.1,2), is not a satisfactory method. They have argued that, because of their outstanding power and importance, nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be treated differently from conventional armaments. Since the Soviet Union now accepts a percentage reduction of conventional armaments equal for both sides it obviously has in mind a method of reducing nuclear weapon delivery vehicles involving unequal percentage reductions of the vehicles possessed by the several parties. Although it has never been clearly stated, we have to assume that those unequal reductions under the Gromyko proposal would result in approximate parity between the Soviet Union and the United States in either the number or the destructive capacity of the weapons systems which they would retain until the end of the second stage.

The Soviet Union must realize that that process will not take place overnight. Considerable time must elapse during which some States will be undertaking greater reductions than other States. In other words, the proposal raises complex problems in phasing, as I pointed out on 17 December 1962 (ENDC/PV.93, p.20). The Canadian delegation believes that the Soviet Union should make clear, in general terms, how it proposes to balance the disparities in reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles which its proposal would seem to entail; and also explain how the reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles from present levels to the levels it proposes is to be staged and phased. That implies, of course, that the Soviet Union must be more specific about the number of vehicles which it believes should be retained if its proposal is implemented; also there should be more details about the categories and types of armaments which would be retained and those which would be destroyed.

In answer to questions on this matter the Soviet representative has repeated the very general and imprecise description of armaments listed in the relevant article of the Soviet draft (ENDC/2.Rev.1). As to numbers, the only clarification which we have been offered is that they should be determined on the basis of two criteria, namely, that the number should be "minimal" and that it should at the same time be large enough — and here I use Mr. Tsarapkin's words at the meeting on 27 March —

"... to ... guarantee against a breach of the peace by one side or the other, or against the violation of commitments under the treaty on general and complete disarmament". (ENDC/PV.114, p.39)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Those criteria are not enough to enable us to form any clear idea about what the Soviet Union believes would be a sufficient number of vehicles to deter any risk of aggression. Theoretically, of course, the figure could be very high indeed. For example, at the present moment it is precisely the possession by the opposing blocs of massive retaliatory power which provides what guarantee we have that neither side will launch a nuclear war.

What the Soviet Union is proposing, in effect, is that the great nuclear Powers should reduce their means of delivery from their present high levels to what would be required for "minimum deterrence". That theory of minimum deterrence has been extensively discussed in the West by scientists, political experts and others interested in disarmament. The essence of the idea is that each side should keep a sufficient number of vehicles, all or mainly intercontinental ballistic missiles, in protected launching sites to ensure that if a nuclear attack were launched by the other side a retaliatory attack of devastating power, or at any rate one causing unacceptable destruction, could still be launched. A mutual "minimum deterrence" would require approximate equality of the vehicles to be kept by each side. Such a system of deterrence would be stable, provided there were simultaneously a cut-off of development of new armaments, testing and production. The stability would be due to the fact that if nuclear Power A wanted to destroy an intercontinental ballistic missile of nuclear Power B it would probably have to fire three or four of its own intercontinental ballistic missiles to be fairly sure of knocking out the other. But as both sides are approximately equal in those great missiles neither side would have the additional numbers to enable such an aggressive first strike to be launched with any prospect of success. Possibly it would clarify the Gromyko proposal for the Conference if the Soviet delegation were to discuss it in terms of the minimum deterrence theory.

But, as I have said, there is a very difficult problem of getting from the levels of nuclear armament existing today to a minimum deterrence posture -- where, say, each side would have 100 "invulnerable" intercontinental ballistic missiles. I use that number as a purely arbitrary example, and I would emphasize that it has no special significance. Of course we do not know exactly what each side possesses in nuclear armament today, but, for the purposes of this discussion, I shall quote from the document produced by the British Institute of Strategic Studies, The Communist Bloc and The Western Alliances -- the Military Balance 1962-3. Representatives

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

will recall that data from the corresponding document for last year were used in some of the discussions in this Conference. Table 2 at the end of the current document gives an estimate of the numbers of nuclear weapon vehicles as follows:

	<u>NATO</u>	<u>WARSAW PACT</u>
ICBMs	500	100
LR Bombers	630	200
MRBMs	250	700
MR Bombers	1,630	1,400
	<u>3,010</u>	<u>2,400</u>

That is to say, the total of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons of medium range and above is 3,010 for NATO and 2,400 for the Warsaw Pact.

We have no means of knowing how accurate the figures for the Warsaw Pact bloc are, but it can be assumed that those for the NATO bloc are fairly accurate owing to the greater publicity given to defence matters under democratic parliamentary institutions. One might remark that the apparent disparity in intercontinental ballistic missiles could be compensated for if the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics intercontinental ballistic missiles can deliver warheads of up to 100 megatons, as it is claimed they can, whereas the bulk of United States intercontinental ballistic missiles are assumed to have warheads in the low megaton range.

The point I now wish to make is that in fact at the present time we have a balance of nuclear armaments, which is sometimes described as a "balance of terror". It is not stable, because of the continuation of the arms race. Production of new types of armaments, or armaments in greater numbers, could upset the balance. I should like at this point to quote from a speech of Marshal Malinovsky, published in the Journal de Genève under dateline of 23-24 February 1963:

"J'affirme catégoriquement que, face aux 344 fusées dont nous menace M. McNamara, nous réprondrons par une riposte simultanée plusieurs fois plus importante par des fusées dont les charges nucléaires seront d'une telle puissance qu'elles balaieront réellement de la surface de la terre tous les objectifs et tous les centres industriels, administratifs et politiques des Etats-Unis et, qu'elles détruiront totalement les pays qui ont prêté leur territoire à l'établissement de bases militaires américaines."

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

This, and the Marshal's speech as a whole, cannot be described as more than somewhat peaceloving, but there are two points which I should like to make arising from the paragraph I have quoted. The first is that the "simultaneous riposte" would be against an attack by the United States, so that presumably the Soviet Union does not contemplate a preventive or pre-emptive attack itself, and the second is that the statement was intended to demonstrate the power with which the Soviet Union could retaliate — in other words, to provide a deterrent.

It seems to me that the great nuclear Powers are getting more and more into the situation that they would never use their enormous nuclear power unless the other side was about to attack them. Of course, as the representative of Italy reminded us on 27 March, even if a war began with the opposing forces using conventional weapons only, "... a conventional conflict would soon degenerate into a nuclear conflict" (ENDC/PV.114, p.13). We now have a position of balanced deterrence but on an extremely high level. Furthermore, the balance is unstable, because of the continuing armaments race.

The Soviet Union and other socialist delegations here have argued that the United States plan for reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles does not eliminate the danger of nuclear war in the first stage of disarmament. However, it seems to the Canadian delegation that it would have a tremendous stabilizing effect if the nations adopted and put into operation the first stage of the United States plan. It might not put a complete end to the danger of nuclear war, but, as we have explained in previous statements, we do not believe that this world can ever completely rid itself of that danger as long as a knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons exists. The danger can be reduced to a minimum by agreement between the great nuclear Powers to reduce their armaments and eventually eliminate them, under proper safeguards and with proper verification. But it is mutual confidence-building and the general agreement to stop the arms race which will provide safety — not any specific measure, however ingenious. If the United States proposal were adopted there would be a stop to the arms race, because production would be ended except for replacement of specified types, not to exceed agreed levels, as provided in the revised article submitted by the United States delegation on 10 December 1962 in document ENDC/69.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

If the Soviet Union, on the other hand, believes that there is a better method of achieving at an early stage of the disarmament process a balanced deterrent at a lower level than that which would result from the adoption of the United States outline of basic provisions, it is our view that it should explain the figures it has in mind and also the way in which it believes the minimal levels could be reached.

When we have some idea how and when an agreed level of nuclear weapon vehicles is to be reached we must consider how verification can be effected. Western representatives have drawn attention frequently to what we regard as one of the chief virtues of the United States outline of basic provisions for the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles and verification of the reductions. Implementation of progressive across-the-board percentage cuts in all categories of major armaments as proposed in the United States plan would not require measures of total verification over the whole territory of States at the outset of the disarmament process. On the contrary, the idea in the United States plan is that at each step in the disarmament process the amount of verification would be closely related to the amount of disarmament. As disarmament went forward and as the quantity of armaments destroyed progressively increased, so would the amount of verification required to ensure confidence by all that those measures were being observed.

We all recognize that one of the major problems we face in undertaking a programme of general and complete disarmament concerns the establishment of mutual confidence. In the Western view it is more realistic to think that that confidence can be created by adopting a gradual approach, rather than by including in the first stage of disarmament measures which would demand the establishment of the most far-reaching and complete control provisions. That was one of the main reasons why we regarded the original Soviet proposal for the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage as unsatisfactory. If the representative of the Soviet Union will study our statements at earlier meetings of this Conference when the original Soviet proposal was under discussion he will see that we pointed out to his predecessor the major verification problems which in our view that proposal involved. In that connexion I might call attention to only one of the Canadian delegation's statements, made as early as 3 May 1962 (ENDC/PV.30, pp.6 et seq.), in which I discussed some of the problems raised by the proposal that all nuclear weapon vehicles should be eliminated in the first stage, and in which I asked how the Soviet Union proposed to convince the West -- and vice versa -- that all nuclear weapon vehicles would be destroyed at any given time.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

It seems to me that the present Soviet proposal, at least as far as I have been able to understand it on the basis of the very limited information given us, raises much the same problem. The Soviet representative has not yet told us at what moment in the course of the first stage the agreed and strictly limited number of nuclear weapon vehicles to be retained by both sides will be reached. If those agreed levels are to be attained at a very early point, that will obviously require very far-reaching control provisions at an equally early point. Not only must States be assured that parties retain only the agreed levels of delivery vehicles, and no more; they must also be assured that the process of reducing vehicles to the agreed levels is being adequately verified, so that at no time in the process will one side acquire a decisive advantage over the other.

The Canadian delegation was, of course, interested in what Mr. Tsarapkin had to say on 27 March about the all-important matter of verification. He said (ENDC/PV.114, p.40) that the Soviet Union accepted that control should be extended to cover the missiles which would be retained as a result of implementing the Gromyko proposal. We take it, therefore, that the Soviet Union is now suggesting that control should be applied in two ways to the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles under its plan: it should apply to the destruction of the nuclear vehicles -- that destruction should be supervised -- and also there should be a check on the vehicles which would be retained in an agreed number.

While the Canadian delegation welcomed that clarification, we noticed that Mr. Tsarapkin had nothing to say about how States were to be reassured that no nuclear weapon vehicles were being concealed or retained beyond the point at which they should be destroyed. It seems to me obvious that there would be a direct relationship between the amount of assurance States would require in that respect and the level of weapons which it was agreed should be retained. Obviously, if the balanced deterrent force envisaged in the Gromyko proposal were set at a very low figure it would be essential that the most complete verification arrangements be instituted to insure against the possibility that a potential aggressor might conceal some nuclear weapon vehicles in significant numbers. If the weapons which were to be retained were few, clearly a very few concealed weapons could upset the balance. If a larger number of retained weapons were involved, a larger number would have to be concealed before a potential violator could hope to strike with impunity, and the problems involved in seeking to conceal that larger number would increase. That is in accordance with the principle which I mentioned in my short discussion on the theory of minimum deterrence (supra, p.8).

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Canadian delegation therefore believes that the Soviet Union, if it wishes the West to consider seriously its new position on nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, must tell us a great deal more than its representative chose to at our meeting on 27 March. The Canadian delegation hopes that he will soon do so, and it is for that reason that I have raised these questions this morning.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I am grateful for the opportunity to speak at today's meeting, the fourth during our present session which has been set aside for discussion of items 5(b) and 5(c) of our agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3). I listened with great interest to the statement just made to the Conference by our Canadian colleague, and I look forward to studying his remarks carefully in the verbatim record. It seems to me at first hearing that in much of what I have to say I shall be following, and indeed to a degree echoing, some of the things which he has just said.

I think that the exchange of views at our three previous meetings devoted to items 5(b) and 5(c) -- that is to say, the 111th, 112th and 114th meetings -- has proved useful. During those meetings, for example, a little further light, if not very much, has been shed on the Soviet proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1, Art.5) for the retention of certain types of missiles until the end of stage II, in order to discuss which we have returned to items 5(b) and 5(c).

Our Soviet colleague, of course, keeps telling us, as he did on 27 March (ENDC/PV.114, p.40), that the explanations given by his delegation create a sufficiently clear and full picture of the substance of that proposal, or that his delegation has given clear-cut answers to the questions asked of it by the Western Powers, or again that there can now be no further mention of a lack of clarity in the Soviet proposal. I am afraid I am bound to reply that, despite what our Soviet colleague may say, the Soviet proposal is still obscure to us on many important points. Those points will have to be clarified before we on the Western side are in a position to understand it and to assess its implications.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Sometimes we do seem to be nearing that stage. There are moments when Mr. Tsarapkin seems on the point of disclosing his own and his Government's ideas, but then, at the last minute, he disappears like Mont Blanc into mists which shroud him from base to summit. For instance, I think many of us round this table were rather surprised at our meeting on Wednesday last -- I remember that my own leader, Mr. Godber, made this point (*ibid.*, p.46) -- when, instead of answering some of the matters raised by Western representatives at previous meetings, our Soviet colleague spent so much time abusing the Western position on nuclear weapons. He is, of course, perfectly entitled to do that under item 5(d) of our agenda, although it has no direct bearing on the items now under discussion. If, indeed, he has lost interest in his own Government's proposals to that extent, then we should clearly do better to continue with the next item on our agenda. But I am not quite sure. At the very end of our meeting of 27 March (*ibid.*, p.40) there came one of those transient thinnings of the mist, and Mr. Tsarapkin disclosed some information to which our Canadian colleague has just referred (*supra*, p.12) and to which I shall return in a minute.

But first let me say that I hope the Soviet delegation will soon be able to clarify what seems to the United Kingdom delegation to be a fundamental contradiction in the Soviet proposal. I devoted part of my statement on 22 March to this point, and my remarks can be found in the verbatim record (ENDC/PV.112, pp.9-10). Since our Soviet colleague has not yet replied to my remarks perhaps I may take the liberty of reminding him of what I said then. I pointed out that the Soviet proposal specifies, among other things, the retention of an agreed and strictly limited number of inter-continental missiles which, in Mr. Tsarapkin's own words,

"... would be a deterrent which would invalidate any attempt to retain missiles of aggression secretly in violation of the treaty.

Any State which might venture to embark upon aggression would realize perfectly well that sure retribution would follow."

(ENDC/PV.111, p.33)

At our meeting of 22 March the representative of Poland, Mr. Blusztajn, also tried to explain to us the purpose of these retained inter-continental missiles, and I noted some of the remarks which he made on that occasion as recorded in the verbatim record. He first told the Committee that:

"... a limited number of nuclear weapons can perfectly well act as an effective deterrent ..." (ENDC/PV.112, p.27)

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

He went on to say:

"... the application of the new Soviet proposal should satisfy the advocates of the mutual deterrence theory." (ibid., p.27)

Our Polish colleague also reminded us on that occasion that:

"... the Soviet proposals also provide for the retention by the two nuclear Powers of a certain number of anti-missile missiles and 'ground-to-air' anti-aircraft missiles up to the end of the second stage. This would provide adequate protection against the threat of surprise attack." (ibid., p.27)

As I pointed out at the same meeting (ibid., p.9), if the certainty of punishment which our Soviet colleague stressed is never to be in doubt, or, in other words, if the concept of mutual deterrence to which our Polish colleague referred, is to work, then both sides must be assured that there would be no way of escaping the effects of the agreed and strictly limited number of inter-continental missiles if they had to be used. The certainty of punishment is therefore an integral and, indeed, a fundamental part of the concept of mutual deterrence. Therefore, the smaller the number of inter-continental missiles involved the more important it becomes to ensure that the credibility of the respective deterrents cannot be upset by the use of illegally retained missiles. That is a point on which our Canadian colleague laid stress this morning and I have laid stress on it myself in the past. I submit that it is axiomatic.

As I understand the Soviet proposal it suggests that the danger that either side might retain illegally missiles over and above the agreed number would be averted by the retention by both sides of anti-missile missiles. But, as I pointed out on 22 March, there seems to be a serious and potentially a dangerous contradiction here. Perhaps I may quote what I said then:

"But if a State should have a good anti-missile defence and, therefore, the ability to ward off all inter-continental ballistic missiles directed against it -- whether they be legally or illegally retained missiles -- then surely it need no longer be influenced in its behaviour by the knowledge that violations would bring inescapable punishment. In a word, the two systems -- one side's anti-missile defence and the other side's inter-continental missiles -- would tend to cancel each other out. The sure punishment stressed by Mr. Tsarapkin would no longer be sure; the inescapable retribution would no longer be inescapable." (ibid., p.10)

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

I am sorry to quote at such length from my own remarks, but I feel bound to dwell on this problem because it does seem to me of great importance when we are talking about the concept of mutual deterrents. So far, our Soviet colleague has not given us the benefit of his views on this important point, and I therefore hope that he will come forward soon and clear up for us the apparent contradiction in the Soviet position.

I should like next to say a few words about the remarks our Soviet colleague made towards the end of his statement on 27 March. I am glad to say that on that occasion he did provide us with some further elaboration of the Soviet proposal when he said:

"The Soviet Union is willing to agree to the establishment of control over the remaining missiles directly at the launching pads.

It considers that such launching pads should not be more numerous than the remaining missiles." (ENDC/PV.114, p.40)

The control which the Soviet Government now envisages would apparently be limited in its scope to control over an agreed and strictly limited number of certain missiles in special categories. None the less I think that that is the first sign given by the Soviet delegation in this Conference that its Government may have revised its position regarding verification of remainders. If I have interpreted Mr. Tsarapkin's remarks correctly, I think that they represent an encouraging move forward and that they suggest that the Soviet Government is now looking at these matters with a greater sense of realism than hitherto.

Having said that, however, I would express the hope that our Soviet colleague and his Government will draw the logical conclusion from their apparently new approach to the admittedly difficult problem of verification of remainders in the disarmament field as a whole. In any case, I hope that Mr. Tsarapkin will elaborate for us the full meaning of his remarks to which I have just referred. He has explained that, under the Soviet proposal, control over a specific number of launching pads and missiles is now contemplated: but it is not clear to me -- as indeed I understood it was not clear to our Canadian colleague -- how the Soviet position on control excludes the possibility that one or other of the countries concerned could retain illegally other launching pads and missiles. It seems most important for us to hear what our Soviet colleague has to say on that score. It has a direct relevance to what I have already said, both at our meeting on 22 March (ENDC/PV.112, p.9) and again

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

today (supra, p.15), namely, that the smaller the number of inter-continental missiles retained the more important it becomes to ensure that the credibility of the respective deterrents cannot be upset by the use of illegally retained missiles.

I am grateful for having been allowed to put these points. I need only add that when our Soviet colleague does reply the United Kingdom delegation will study his answers carefully in the earnest hope that they may justify our belief that we are at last beginning to make some progress in this field.

Mr. MARK (United States of America): This is the third week in which our Committee finds itself dealing with one aspect of the problem of general and complete disarmament, namely, the measures to be adopted in stage I for the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles and other forms of armaments. The Western point of view has been set forth quite clearly, and it was further elaborated this morning by the representatives of Canada and the United Kingdom, who also made very pertinent observations about the reticence of the Soviet delegation in coming forward in depth with the facts necessary for a sensible discussion and evaluation by all delegations of the Soviet Union's latest proposals in this field.

A perusal of the statements which have been made in the past two weeks by most of the delegations from the Warsaw Pact countries has left us with the unmistakable impression that they have ranged somewhat far afield. Their speeches have sounded very similar to those which we were hearing when we discussed item 5(a) of the agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3) last year -- that is to say, an overall appraisal of the first stage, and in some cases of all three stages, of the Soviet (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and United States (ENDC/30) plans. Only a little attention has been devoted to the particular problems covered by items 5(b) and 5(c) themselves, and most of that has been focused on Foreign Minister Gromyko's proposal of last September (A/PV.1127 (provisional), p.38-40).

This morning we should like to try to strike a somewhat happier balance by adverting both to the general considerations of disarmament, which have been so much stressed by the Soviet delegation and its associates, and to certain important factors related to the narrower question of reduction of armaments. In this way we hope that we shall make it possible, before too long, to refer items 5(b) and 5(c) to the co-Chairmen for an intensive review of draft treaty texts in anticipation of a move to item 5(d) and to subsequent items in plenary discussions.

(Mr. Mark, United States)

It is clear by now that the main argument advanced unanimously by the Communist countries on stage I of general and complete disarmament is not an argument based on world realities or political experience. Rather, it appears to involve an incessantly repeated appeal to popular emotions intended to build up pressure on the West to adopt a Soviet disarmament plan favouring the military, political and strategic interests of the East in an entirely one-sided fashion.

That Soviet argument states flatly that the indispensable first step in disarmament must, in and by itself, completely eliminate the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war by disposing of all, or almost all, nuclear delivery vehicles during a first stage of twenty-four months. In other words, mankind is to be saved from its present serious predicament by an ingenious remedy sponsored uniquely by the States of the Soviet camp.

It is not at all evident why the Communist countries think that they alone appreciate the disaster for humanity that would arise from a nuclear war, and that they alone are anxious and ready to prevent that disaster. We in the West are just as aware of that supreme political challenge of our era as are our Eastern colleagues. It is our desire, just as much as it is their claimed desire, to advance as rapidly towards complete disarmament as is safe, sane and possible. In the matter of global life and death, ideology and economic or social structure have no legitimate role to play. General and complete disarmament is almost universally recognized as a sensible goal which, when reached, will provide a way out of our global predicament. But disarmament can neither be worked out, agreed upon, carried out or consummated in a vacuum of theory divorced from practical considerations.

It has been generally acknowledged that States will agree to disarm themselves only under conditions which satisfy their basic requirement to preserve their national identity and security. Some of the most fundamental of those conditions have, indeed, been committed to written form and approved by all Members of the United Nations. I am referring to the Soviet-United States Joint Statement of Agreed Principles worked out in September 1961 (ENDC/5). Those principles envisage a disarmament agreement covering a number of stages in which the world will be led progressively towards a zero level of national armaments, except for internal police forces and for manpower needed for an international peace force. The principles prescribe that the process shall be accomplished without disturbing the international military balance by giving any participating State advantages at the expense of other States. They say nothing about

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the need, now insistentlly alleged by the Soviet bloc delegations, to accomplish the great bulk of disarmament in the very first stage. The clear implication of the joint principles is that the objective of eliminating all types of nuclear and conventional armaments, ammunition and armed forces, is to be achieved over several stages.

In spite of those common sense considerations, we find that the Soviet disarmament plan requires that all, or virtually all, of the most powerful weapons existing today -- nuclear delivery vehicles -- shall be liquidated within two years from the entry into force of a disarmament treaty. The representative of Poland confirmed on 22 March that:

"There can be no doubt that at present the most important element in this balance" -- here he was referring to an overall strategic balance between East and West -- "is constituted by strategic nuclear weapons with special emphasis on intercontinental missiles." (ENDC/PV.112, p.27)

Nevertheless, in disregard of the existing world situation and of its many other unresolved problems, the Soviet Union would dispose of that balance in one fell swoop, or at least change its terms drastically. It would do that without regard to the consequences of such a move for world-wide military and political stability, which could thereby be seriously and dangerously upset. Indeed, it tells us that if it cannot have its way in that, then we can have no start at all on general disarmament. Either we adopt the Soviet programme for supposedly ending the threat of nuclear war right away, or we shall have to live with that threat for the indefinite future.

The United States delegation has never been able to believe that that Soviet approach could be explained solely as an example of Soviet attachment to humanitarian motives. It has always appeared to us more as a plan to use the disarmament process to the greatest extent possible to change the world strategic balance radically in favour of the Soviet Union. It has seemed to us that the Soviet Union has been guided much more by its own immediate political interests than by any total commitment to immediate and radical steps towards general and complete disarmament.

Our impression was much reinforced by a passage in the East Berlin speech of Chairman Khrushchev on 16 January this year. His words, in informal translation, were the following:

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"Take a basic question, such as disarmament. Until a German peace treaty is concluded it is obviously difficult to count on serious progress in the matter of reaching agreement on disarmament. These two questions are not juridically connected with one another. They are independent questions. However, disarmament is possible only with the clearing up of the international atmosphere, that is, with the strengthening of confidence between States, and with the creation of those conditions which will not drive us on to ever newer appropriations for armaments and to the increase of armies. And it is just the lack of settlement of the German question which drives forward the growth of armed forces and the increase of military expenditures."

We do not say that Chairman Khrushchev is wrong in stating that progress in disarmament must inevitably be related to the general state of world affairs. We do say, however, that such an approach -- and, indeed, the subordination of disarmament to such issues as the Soviet project for a German peace treaty -- is entirely inconsistent with the all or nothing Soviet proposals for the first stage with which we are confronted here. On the other hand, how much more in keeping with a pragmatic consideration of realities is the United States plan for a systematic and continuing percentage reduction of armaments towards zero through three stages of reasonable length. That time period would also, incidentally, allow the world time for the major readjustment in dozens of political, military, economic and psychological inter-relationships which total disarmament would entail.

As I suggested a moment ago, the basic motive of the Soviet plan appears to be to advance the narrow interests of its Soviet sponsors. The plan would be unfair enough if it only proposed that nuclear delivery vehicles, which the Polish representative Mr. Blusztajn called (ENDC/PV.112, p.27) the main element of the strategic balance, should be eliminated rapidly, while there was only a thirty per cent reduction in conventional armaments, thus drastically altering in stage I the existing military mix of national armed forces. Even worse, however, is the Soviet programme's demand that the remaining conventional forces on the Western side should be disunited and fragmented, while the main force on the Eastern side, the Soviet armed forces, remained a unified and centralized military machine.

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That result would arise from Soviet insistence (ENDC/2/Rev.1.Art.9) on the first stage liquidation of all so-called foreign military bases, including the restriction of naval vessels to territorial waters and the prohibition of any joint military manoeuvres by two or more countries. Mr. Dean outlined very clearly on 14 December last (ENDC/PV.92, pp.11 et seq.) just why NATO cannot and will not allow itself to fall into any such trap, and it is disheartening now to find that the delegations of the socialist countries are still blithely ignoring our firm position. Indeed, they even continue to expound the old line that it would be unfair for such bases to remain in existence as an allegedly offensive threat to the USSR, after the USSR had, in the first stage under its own plan, disposed of all, or almost all, of its nuclear delivery vehicles which are, it is claimed, the sole defensive counter to such bases.

Apparently, it has done no good for us to point out to our Eastern colleagues, as we have done many times, that if their plan for the first stage liquidation of delivery vehicles were adopted then foreign military bases would also be deprived of such vehicles. If the bases then remained solely as bases for conventional forces they could not possibly pose a threat to the unified and concentrated conventional forces of the USSR, but would merely serve to bolster and unify the defensive deployment of Western conventional forces.

On the other hand, if the Western programme for progressive reductions of each type of major armaments were adopted, the situation in stages I and II would continue, from a narrow military-strategic point of view, to be similar to that already existing, and would thus pose no new risk for the East. In any event, however, from the broader political point of view the situation would of course be much changed for the better owing to the new international confidence that would arise from the major reductions in armaments in stages I and II and from the general implementation of a treaty dedicated to total disarmament in due course.

We have not found a single argument in all of the recent speeches of the Soviet bloc delegations which would tend in any way to indicate any unfairness to them arising from the implementation of the United States disarmament proposal. For them to claim to prefer their own first stage approach on delivery vehicles proves nothing, of course, about whether the United States approach, though different, would be fair to them. We are convinced that it would be completely fair.

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If there is now a general de facto balance of military power or, at least, deterrence, between East and West, why should we not capitalize on that situation and start from that fact rather than complicate our task by seeking to negotiate a new balance during each stage of disarmament? Yet that is exactly what the Soviet plan would have us do. The de facto balance has arisen because each great Power has been uninhibited in applying its economic and industrial resources to building up the kind of military machine which suited its needs. Each of us has arrived at a self-chosen mix of armaments, and each side feels its own mix to be in some sort of approximate balance with that of the other side. Let us therefore start from that point by freezing the situation where it is. Our plan would not only prevent any further upward spiral but would, on the contrary, start all of our military establishments on the downhill path to zero.

That is the essence of the United States plan, and it accomplishes it logically, realistically and persistently in all military fields. Its approach on the progressive reduction of armaments covered by items 5(b) and 5(c), in relation both to past stockpiles and to future production, is entirely straightforward, and, as the exchange between Mr. Tsarapkin and Mr. Stelle at the meeting on 27 March (ENDC/PV.114) brought out clearly, that is equally true of the United States provisions for reducing nuclear weapons, which will be discussed at subsequent meetings under item 5(d).

The representative of Czechoslovakia was mistaken when he said at that meeting (ibid., p.20) that the United States proposal for a 30 per cent reduction would merely meet the Pentagon's supposed desire to dispose of its obsolete armaments. Our proposal, in fact, would permit no such thing since it would require a cut of 30 per cent in each and every type of nuclear delivery vehicle and in all significant types of conventional armaments. The most modern weapon systems would be affected equally with older systems.

Similarly, there appears to be no foundation either for the fears expressed at the same meeting by the representative of Bulgaria (ibid., p.8) that the United States proposal would somehow lead to a postponement in the start of disarmament because each side would speed up the arms race in order to get an optimum mix of armaments before signing the treaty. The United States is, in general, quite satisfied right now with its own mix, and we assume that the Soviet Union also must be satisfied with its mix. If it were not we would be at a loss to explain all of the self-confident statements in recent months about Soviet military might by Chairman Khrushchev, Marshal Malinovski, Marshal Koniev and other Soviet leaders.

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Given this situation, we can see that the United States plan would basically maintain the same satisfactory mix on each side, though in steadily decreasing quantities throughout stages I and II. Therefore, we cannot understand Mr. Tarabanov's conclusion that the United States disarmament programme would enable certain Powers to "... at some stage enjoy a decisive military advantage over their opponents." (ibid. p.8). If he knows of any such problem involving some military advantage for the West over the East or, for that matter, for the East over the West, let him come forward with specific facts rather than with generalized allegations.

While, in our view, the United States first stage programme adopts a reasonable, fair, practical and politically realistic approach to general disarmament, we cannot say the same for the Soviet plan. Quite apart from its fundamental defect of gross imbalance and favouritism to the Soviet side, which I have already discussed, there are other features which raise grave doubts about its feasibility. Those doubts have all been noted in past analyses of the Soviet plan by Western delegations, but have never received a serious response from the Soviet delegation.

First, there is the problem of defining nuclear delivery vehicles. It does not arise under the United States proposals since all major armaments, whether they were delivery vehicles or not, would be reduced in the same way. However, under the Soviet programme it is essential to know which arms would be subjected to the 100 per cent first-stage cut and which arms would be diminished by only 30 per cent.

Of course it is easy to say that certain weapons, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, are clearly in the category of nuclear delivery vehicles. The same can be said for recognized dual-purpose armaments, designed to be used with either conventional or nuclear warheads. But what are we to say of the many conventional types of armaments which probably could be easily converted to fire nuclear warheads? If they were not to be included under the Soviet plan there would be a serious gap in the Soviet scheme to dispose of all, or almost all, nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage. On the other hand, if they were to be included it would mean putting virtually all artillery pieces, tanks and almost all aircraft into the category earmarked for 100 per cent, or almost 100 per cent, destruction, and that would vastly overload stage I. In fact, for all practical purposes, stage I would then become a substitute for a three-stage disarmament programme, even without the additional Soviet suggestion of last autumn to dispose of all nuclear warheads themselves in stage I. In those conditions we would have to devise a sequence of three or more steps for the all-embracing Soviet stage I which would amount to what we have in the past called three separate stages.

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That leads to another defect of the Soviet proposals, which the representative of Canada mentioned this morning (supra, p. 11). By exactly what process does the Soviet delegation envisage the implementation of its scheme for the 100 per cent, or almost 100 percent, reduction of certain types of armaments in stage I? Whether we have that liquidation in one stage or spread it over three stages we must ensure that it takes place in such a manner as to ensure that all parties are moving in step and at an equal pace while they go from the situation of being completely armed to the goal of being complete disarmed. Obviously it is much more difficult to solve that problem and to carry out a coherent programme when varying percentages of reduction are being applied to different categories of armaments than when all major armaments are being treated in a like manner.

Soviet first-stage proposals on cutting back armaments production are equally unsatisfactory. Only certain factories are apparently to be shut down, while others will remain completely unaffected. Yet controls are to be installed only at those production facilities which are shut down; the rest are to remain untouched by any verification measures and unvisited by international inspectors. That is an invitation to stepped-up production at the remaining plants. Moreover, no arrangements are offered for guarding against any possible clandestine production in violation of such treaty commitments as would exist.

Finally, we are led again to the failure of the Soviet Union to offer any new idea at all on the problem of how to ensure that first-stage commitments to reduce to agreed levels would really be fulfilled. There is no plan for guaranteeing that forces and armaments would in fact be at the levels at which they are supposed to be.

We are aware of Soviet criticisms of the Western plan for zonal inspection, which we still think to be a reasonable and minimally burdensome approach because it would give progressively greater assurance, by means of the sampling method, that commitments were being met. In any case we have heard of no Soviet alternative proposal to deal with the undoubted problem of agreed levels of remainders, which has been recognized here by all non-Soviet bloc delegations and which would exist in an aggravated form under the Soviet plan for the total or almost total first stage elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles.

That brings me back to Mr. Gromyko's proposal of September 1962 for retaining a few missiles of agreed categories on Soviet and United States territory until the end of stage II. At our meeting on 27 March Mr. Tsarapkin said (ENDC/PV.114, p.28) that that

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idea was meant to be a concession to Western views, but he undermined his own thesis when at the same time he denied that the plan would in any way compromise the basic approach of the Soviet programme. If the latter proviso is true, then it would seem that the Gromyko plan is not really intended to change anything essential, and all the serious defects in the Soviet programme which have been enumerated would tend to apply with equal force to the modest modification by Mr. Gromyko.

That would, for example, be particularly true of the continuing Soviet demand that all so-called foreign military bases still be liquidated in the first stage, with wholly one-sided harm to the Western alliance. In addition, to the extent that the retained missiles would really be at a very low minimal level, as the Soviet delegation has implied even though it refuses to provide us with any figures, the consequences to the world military equilibrium would not differ too substantially from what they would be under the first Soviet plan (ENDC/2*). Finally, as in the case of other plans involving retained levels of arms, the Gromyko programme would create serious problems of effective control arrangements to make sure that those missiles actually retained corresponded fully to the numbers which were authorized to be retained under the treaty.

The representative of the Soviet Union, one week ago, to his credit, did make an attempt to deal with the last-noted problem. For the first time in these negotiations, he admitted that retained arms do pose a verification difficulty that can legitimately be of concern to some delegations. In contrast to his statement on 20 March, when he had denied (ENDC/PV.111, p.34) that there was any real risk of violation of an agreement to retain only specific limited numbers, Mr. Tsarapkin proposed on 27 March (ENDC/PV.114, p.40) some degree of verification to cope with the problem.

For our part, we earnestly hope that that new-found awareness on the part of the Soviet delegation of the need to verify remainders will soon be extended to other areas of general and complete disarmament, where it is equally important. We do not wish in the slightest degree to discourage that necessary evolution of Soviet thinking. However, we must point out, as the United Kingdom and Canadian representatives have done this morning, that the remedy offered by Mr. Tsarapkin at the meeting on 27 March did not answer the problem.

The real issue is whether each side can be sure that the missiles retained by the other side correspond to the agreed figures. The Soviet delegation has suggested that inspectors verify that the number of missiles at declared missile launching sites do

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indeed correspond to the agreed limits. That hardly moves us very far ahead, inasmuch as, for our part, we have little doubt that matters will turn out to be quite correct and proper at the declared sites.

What we would be anxious to know is whether there were any undeclared launching sites which had been built or retained clandestinely in violation of the treaty. We should also want to learn whether there was any clandestine stockpile of missiles or any clandestine production of such armaments. To have adequate assurance on those points would require a much more extensive and carefully devised arrangement than the mere inspection of declared sites. As the Canadian and United Kingdom representatives have pointed out, satisfaction on the matter of precise verification arrangements is the key element of any scheme such as the Gromyko plan for reciprocal, mutual, minimal deterrence.

We still hope that further clarifications will be forthcoming from the Soviet delegation on the various ramifications of the Gromyko proposal. Such explanations might serve both to allay our entirely justified doubts and to reply to the very important and still unanswered questions posed by the United States and other Western delegations at a number of past meetings, in particular at the meeting on 10 December 1962 (ENDC/PV.90). Such a response, together with some evidence that the Soviet Union had taken into account the many other serious criticisms of its first-stage disarmament plan, would provide us with some encouragement that our efforts here were beginning to bear some fruit. At this juncture, encouragement is a much-needed commodity.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translation from Russian): I have no further speakers on my list. Does any other representative wish to speak? If not, I have to inform the members of the Committee that, in accordance with paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1767(XVII) of 21 November 1962 (ENDC/64), the Committee must submit to the General Assembly a report on its work, and this report must be submitted not later than the second half of April of this year. The two co-Chairmen have prepared a draft report, which will in due course be circulated to the members of the Committee so that it can be considered at our next meeting, taking into account the views that may be expressed by the members of the Committee.

Mr. MARK (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, with regard to what you said about the co-Chairmen's recommendations on the report to the United Nations General Assembly, which were to be distributed, it was our understanding also that the text would be amended later, if necessary, to reflect any developments which might take place in the Conference next week.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translation from Russian): I said that the text of the report would be considered at our next meeting, taking into account the views that may be expressed by the members of the Committee.

Mr. MARK (United States of America): I think the co-Chairmen deliberately wish to keep open even their own recommended text of the report to include any important developments that might take place next week.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translation from Russian): The sentence, as I phrased it, leaves all the possibilities open to all the members of the Committee. I think there are no differences between us on that.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and seventeenth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Tsarapkin, representative of the Soviet Union.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

"The delegation of Canada submitted a working paper on the comparison of some significant developments in United States and USSR disarmament plans (1960-1963).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 5 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.