

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.337
10 October 1967
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 10 October 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCIN

(Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES

Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Mr. J. NOGUEIRA FILHO

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL

Mr. J.R. MORDEN

Mr. A. BERNIER

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

Mr. N. KRISHNAN

Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

Mr. E. FRANCO

Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTANEDA

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria:

Mr. B.O. TONWE

Poland:

Mr. A. CZARKOWSKI

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. O. IONESCO

Mr. C. GEORGESCO

Mr. C. MITRAN

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM

Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. M.V. ANTYASOV

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

Mr. V.A. SEMENOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALIAF

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. O. SIRRY

Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Mr. F. MULLEY

Sir Harold BEELEY

Mr. I.F. PORTER

Mr. D. MOSS

United States of America:

Mr. S. DePALMA

Mr. A.F. NEIDLE

Mr. R.W. DREXLER

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

I declare open the 337th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament:

2. Before calling on the first of the speakers, I should like on behalf of the members of this Committee to welcome here the newly-appointed Polish representative, Mr. Czarkowski. We know him as a result of a lengthy period of association, during which he represented Poland in a number of international organizations, including the United Nations. I am all the more pleased to have this opportunity of welcoming Mr. Czarkowski here because I had the pleasure of working closely with him in the Fifth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

3. U MAUNG MAUNG (Burma): The delegation of Burma would like to extend sincere congratulations to the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union on their presentation to our Committee of identical texts of a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. I refer here to documents ENDC/192 and ENDC/193. Although we naturally have certain views on some aspects of the drafts, which will be set forth later in my present intervention, we welcome them as representing a notable achievement by these two great Powers, and their submission as an event of great promise and far-reaching potentialities for the international community. I may here reiterate unequivocally that my Government shares the general concern and anxiety to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that it has consistently supported all efforts made in that direction, both at the United Nations General Assembly and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

4. After more than five years of what at times must have appeared to some as unrewarding labours, the Eighteen-Nation Committee now has before it specific proposals which by further perseverance it may fashion into the fundamental step leading unmistakably to that long-awaited and long-overdue process which could eventually free innocent mankind from the tyranny of armaments and especially from the never-ending nightmare of a sudden and terrible end in a nuclear holocaust. In the opinion of my delegation, the two draft texts which are now available for negotiation by our Committee and by all interested parties do offer such an opportunity. Though they are yet incomplete and the result of restricted negotiations, the area of agreement expressed is nevertheless important; because among the States which it embraces are two on whose decisions and mutual accommodation largely depend the nature and extent of the nuclear disarmament measures that could be achieved.

(U Maung Maung, Burma)

5. Having arrived at this important stage, we feel that the negotiations for the treaty should now assume the form of broad-based multi-party dialogues. If as a result of these further collective efforts, consciously pursued in a spirit of good faith, equity and realism on all sides, we should succeed in achieving a non-proliferation treaty such as could set in motion a train of events leading successively to further meaningful steps towards general and complete disarmament, a new era of peace, co-operation and widening prosperity in the world would surely no longer remain just a visionary dream. In the view of my delegation, the immediate task facing this Committee is to evolve precisely that kind of treaty out of the draft laid before it -- no more and no less. This places a heavy responsibility on all nations, both nuclear and non-nuclear, to ensure that the non-proliferation treaty now being negotiated will be not only a viable, effective and equitable treaty but one that will assuredly lead to further tangible steps towards nuclear disarmament.

6. My delegation finds much that is positive and constructive in the two drafts now before us, as well as in the statements made by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union in introducing them to our Committee (ENDC/PV.325). We also see in the drafts evidence of a conscious attempt by the authors to fulfil the mandatory guiding principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), (ENDC/161) which, it is worth recalling, represents the first tangible area of agreement achieved specifically in regard to the question of nuclear-weapon proliferation. We appreciate the sincerity of purpose with which the authors have endeavoured to fulfil those principles. I should, however, be less than truthful if I were to say that the drafts as they now stand fully satisfy those basic requirements. I am aware also that we should view what has so far been achieved in the light of the realities of the present-day world.

7. Permit me to digress a little so that we may examine one pertinent aspect of these realities. In spite of expectations that most nations would make efforts to possess these terrible nuclear weapons, over twenty years have elapsed from the time they were discovered -- that is, from the time the first atomic bomb was used in the service of war -- and there are still but five nuclear-weapon States. This although several nations have acquired during that time not only the necessary scientific knowledge but also the broad technological and economic bases for making such weapons on their own.

(U Maung Maung, Burma)

8. There are several factors which act against nuclear weapon proliferation in the "horizontal" sense. Put in a somewhat generalized and simplified form, they are: first, lack of adequate economic resources; second, lack of sufficient scientific and technological knowledge and means; third, the control exercised by the nuclear-weapon Powers through alliances and agreements, multilateral and bilateral, which is still effective; fourth, the firm conviction that the advantages to be gained from trying to acquire a national nuclear deterrence system are not worth the effort and sacrifice which developing such a system would entail; and, fifth, a genuine devotion to the cause of international peace and security.

9. Because those inhibitory factors act in various combinations rather than singly, there is considerable assurance that a large number of States will for some time in the conceivable future remain non-nuclear-weapon States. Of course, no one would say that those factors will continue to act with similar effectiveness for all time; but then no one can deny that they are still exerting the necessary restraint as regards any marked increase in the number of nuclear-weapon countries.

10. My delegation has not alluded to the situation actually prevailing with any intention of questioning the need or the urgency of concluding a non-proliferation treaty; on the contrary, we feel there is urgent need for such a treaty, as indeed there is for treaties in the other areas of arms control and disarmament. We have called attention to the situation with a twofold purpose: first, to warn against such haste in our negotiations as would amount to sacrificing vital principles; and, second, to bring out the relevance of the situation to what the basic character and orientation of the treaty ought logically to be.

11. I think I can say with assurance that a non-proliferation treaty which curbs only the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries, standing by itself and set quite apart from the over-all problem of nuclear disarmament, will have no intrinsic disarmament value. In its arms-control function it will serve only to formalize a prevailing situation; and even in this respect it can at best serve as another passive element that would mainly reinforce only one of the factors inhibiting proliferation that I have just mentioned. Obviously such a treaty will have no effect in practice on a country lacking the means to manufacture nuclear weapons or one which has taken a political decision not to cross the nuclear threshold. Similarly -- and here I am speaking in purely hypothetical terms -- it

(U Maung Maung, Burma)

will still not prove sufficiently compelling morally or provide security and other corollary inducements to a nation which possesses the means and is tempted, for various reasons, to retain its options in that respect.

12. It is vital that the treaty should have the necessary appeal to States in that category. Otherwise the world might find itself in the peculiar situation of being saddled with a non-proliferation treaty signed only by those unable or unwilling to proliferate -- or both. The treaty as a whole would thus, through inadvertence, acquire the character of one big loop-hole for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This gap cannot be closed by merely tightening further the prohibitions contained in articles I and II of the present drafts. Only a treaty that can inspire great confidence in the context of the natural concern for national security, by its wide applicability, by the democratic foundation of its intrinsic disarmament potential and by unrestrictive and assured benefits from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, could close this yawning gap. The wisdom of General Assembly resolutions 2028 (XX) and 2153 (XXI) (ENDC/185) here becomes very clear.

13. My delegation has not overlooked in this connexion the tenth, eleventh and twelfth preambular paragraphs of the present drafts, containing a declaration of intention by the nuclear-weapon Powers regarding subsequent nuclear arms control and disarmament measures. Nor have we overlooked the review clause contained in article V, paragraph 3, of the drafts, which is designed to ensure that the purposes and provisions of the treaty are being realized. My delegation has no hesitation in acknowledging that these constitute important improvements on the previous draft treaties submitted to the Committee (ENDC/152 and Add.1; ENDC/164) nor have we hesitation in commending the motivation underlying them. We do realize that one document cannot be expected to solve all the problems. Hence we appreciate the assurances reiterated by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union that the non-proliferation treaty must be merely one of the initial steps towards the achievement of other necessary measures aimed at reducing and stopping the nuclear arms race.

14. However, we cannot help feeling that the declaration of intention and the review clause, to which I have referred, fall considerably short of what is reasonably expected for making the non-proliferation treaty viable, effective and equitable and investing it with an intrinsic disarmament value. It must be logical that the non-proliferation treaty should not be limited merely to stopping

(U Maung Maung, Burma)

additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons -- for, as I have pointed out earlier, this is a situation which does in reality exist to a wide extent. It should also restrain the nuclear-weapon Powers from increasing and developing their existing nuclear arsenals, if the correct spirit of the treaty is to be upheld.

15. In the same way, since the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that the non-proliferation treaty is not an end in itself but merely a step towards total nuclear disarmament, it follows that, if the non-nuclear-weapon States constituting the vast majority of the international community are to forswear nuclear weapons, it should be equally incumbent on the present nuclear-weapon Powers to take tangible steps within a reasonable time limit to liquidate progressively their nuclear-weapon status.

16. On the other hand, we do not believe that anyone would gainsay that considerations of security are basic to the problem of arms control and that a non-proliferation treaty should take into account the undeniable security needs of all signatories. One should not be unmindful that, in the context of present and prospective realities, security needs will impose certain limitations on the will of the signatory nuclear-weapon Powers to undertake unreservedly obligations in regard to nuclear disarmament.

17. If, therefore, a specific provision for a specific nuclear arms-control measure could not be embodied in the treaty, we feel an article should be formulated, in clear-cut and precise terms, under which the nuclear-weapon Powers would assume a definite obligation to take tangible steps towards nuclear disarmament. Those steps should be explicitly defined. One would envisage them to include the concluding of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which my delegation considers is valid also as a measure of balance, since the non-proliferation treaty will have additionally a comprehensive test-ban effect on the non-nuclear-weapon States; an agreement on the cut-off of all production of fissile materials for weapon purposes and on their diversion to peaceful uses; a halt to production of nuclear weapons themselves; a verified freeze of the production of nuclear delivery vehicles; and progressive reduction and final destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and carriers.

18. Given such undertakings by the nuclear-weapon Powers, the modalities for their implementation may be worked out in separate instruments, with the non-proliferation treaty serving as the basic document from which those measures would flow.

(U Maung Maung, Burma)

19. My delegation believes that, by including such an article, we shall be building into the treaty the essence of the two-way, mutual obligation required by General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). It will act also as an indirect curb on the option which remains open to the nuclear-weapon Powers to manufacture nuclear weapons. Nevertheless an element of impulsion would still be required to provide a reasonable assurance that the obligations so assumed and undertakings so given, albeit in all good faith, would indeed be translated into reality. The article I have mentioned, like the other basic articles of the treaty, would of course be subject to review under the provisions of article V, paragraph 3, of the present draft treaty. I have already commended that provision, which represents a positive approach and cannot fail to add dynamism to an otherwise passive treaty and to inspire greater trust and confidence among all its signatories concerning one another's good faith and intentions.

20. One feels, however, that the element of impulsion inherent in that provision should be strengthened in two ways. The first way is to make mandatory the holding of periodic review conferences in order to assess the progress achieved in implementing the purposes and provisions of the treaty. Periodic review is both necessary and desirable, since the treaty is intended as an initial step towards nuclear disarmament and also because it is to be of unlimited duration. The second way is to revise the draft article VII so as to make failure to fulfil in good faith the provisions of the article on nuclear disarmament an additional basis for withdrawal.

21. My delegation firmly believes that any disarmament or arms-control measure must provide for an effective and universally-trusted safeguard system to ensure strict compliance by all parties. Only then would it inspire confidence and therefore be viable. Although the promised draft text of the crucial article III has not yet been made available to the Committee, it is clear, from what is foreseen in the fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs and from the explanations contained in the statements by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, that the system envisaged will be universal and uniform in character but will not be completely universal and uniform in application. It would seem that the treaty would thus be handicapped with an avoidable weakness.

(U Maung Maung, Burma)

22. It can be reasonably assumed that an essential element in any leads towards steps in the process of nuclear disarmament -- and the non-proliferation treaty is avowedly such a lead -- is the application of international controls to all the nuclear activities of all signatory countries. Although such an approach to international control of nuclear activities will impose great responsibilities and require complicated negotiations, we feel that it deserves inclusive consideration in any attempt at the formulation of article III. One is strongly persuaded that the form and content which this article will eventually assume will be indicative of the earnestness and resolve with which initiatives are to be taken towards nuclear disarmament.

23. My delegation is gratified to find in the drafts of the treaty three preambular paragraphs and one article with commendable aims and assurances on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this connexion also we have the extremely vexing question of nuclear explosions for peaceful applications which do not violate the aims and purposes of the treaty. We feel that the non-nuclear-weapon States should be completely assured of non-discriminatory, free and direct access to such nuclear technology as does not have significance exclusively for weapons. It is vital that they shall not suffer, directly or indirectly, from undue disadvantages because nuclear explosions have such a connotation at present. Satisfactory and practical arrangements should be devised that would genuinely offer to them the benefits of such knowledge and application.

24. To continue on the general aspect of the wider dissemination of the knowledge, technology and application of nuclear power for peaceful purposes: we feel that, while the seventh, eighth and ninth preambular paragraphs, reinforced by article IV, do constitute considerable assurance of the availability of such benefits to all signatory States, nevertheless they are somewhat less explicit and precise than formulations such as would appeal to the lesser-developed States. As I have mentioned earlier in connexion with the inhibitions to the spread of nuclear weapons, there exists in the form of the "means barrier" a real impediment to the application of nuclear science to an acceleration of the development of the underdeveloped nations. Opportunity and freedom of access do not constitute the actual enjoyment of these benefits of modern science. It would be indeed unfortunate if it should turn out that the inhibitions imposed by the "means barrier" on the development of peaceful nuclear programmes in these countries were reinforced by those that might possibly arise from the international control system adopted for the non-proliferation treaty and by others growing normally out of involved bilateral negotiations.

(U Maung Maung, Burma)

25. In order to ensure the enjoyment by these countries of the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, a wider and more far-reaching international co-operation than is foreseen in the present draft treaty is required. In the case of the lesser-developed countries, it is not enough simply to offer peaceful nuclear technology and its benefits; the necessary substantial resources to develop peaceful programmes of their own should be offered through a suitable international institution by the co-operative efforts of the nuclear-weapon Powers.

26. Permit me to make a few comments on the complex question of security. As I have already said in another context, security is one of the essential elements for the success of the non-proliferation treaty. After all, arms-control or disarmament measures are predicated on and dominated by the natural concern for security of all participants, whether nuclear or non-nuclear. Operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2153A (XXI) has drawn specific attention to the security aspect of the non-proliferation treaty.

27. In my opinion, a positive approach to the problem of the security of all States would be to strive for the twin objectives of disarmament and an effective institution for international co-operation. It is clear that the latter should be an international system for the democratic and peaceful settlement of disputes among nations, for equitable resolution of conflicts of interests, operating on the basis of recognition of the sovereign equality and political and territorial integrity of nations, irrespective of their size and power.

28. The United Nations has provided a firm foundation in that respect, but much still remains to be done to enable it fully to realize the noble aims set down in the Charter. Admittedly, that is a far more difficult and higher objective than we have set for ourselves in the limited attempts towards disarmament. Nevertheless we are in the process of evolving a desirable system and, in spite of disappointments, we feel that progress in that direction is not inconsiderable.

29. While a satisfactory international system of peaceful co-operation is in the process of being evolved, we must of necessity adopt a series of disarmament measures with associated security guarantees. The security assurances are all the more important in the context of the non-proliferation treaty. My delegation has noted from the statements of the sponsors of the drafts that they are giving continued consideration to the matter. We ourselves feel that the political and military facts

(U Maung Maung, Burma)

of a world situation dominated by the nuclear-weapon Powers impose on those Powers a moral obligation to guarantee the security of the non-nuclear-weapon community from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the latter. Therefore we feel that the nuclear-weapon Powers should provide, in positive and clear-cut terms, the necessary assurances in the treaty itself.

30. I have in my present intervention offered my delegation's preliminary comments and observations on some of the more important aspects of the two drafts of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons laid before our Committee by the United States and Soviet delegations. We are not as yet expressing our views on other procedural articles, especially on the provisions for amendments and the coming into force of the treaty. We feel that they are matters for serious consideration, and we realize that their present form may well be dictated by a concern for strengthening the treaty. However, we are persuaded that their final nature would be essentially dependent upon the eventual form and content of the key articles to which I have devoted much of my present intervention.

31. Finally, I should like to assure the Committee, and the authors of the draft treaty, that we have offered our views in this statement today in a constructive spirit, keeping the larger interests of disarmament and of world peace above everything else. Certain suggestions which I have thought it necessary to make have been put forward with no motivation other than an earnest desire to see concluded a viable, effective and equitable non-proliferation treaty which would be acceptable to the vast majority of States and could usher in further concrete measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament.

32. I trust that the delegations sponsoring the identical drafts, which have clearly laboured with great patience and perseverance to produce them, will receive our comments and suggestions in the same spirit as that in which they have been offered. These are necessarily preliminary and, on the whole, general comments, because our Committee is still at the negotiating stage. When our work enters the more advanced phase of consideration by governments, my delegation may offer some further comments.

33. Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom): It is a great pleasure to follow the representative of Burma. We have listened with interest to the positive and constructive statement he has made on behalf of his country. In my remarks today I shall try to touch on some of the important points he has made. Before I proceed, however, I should like to associate myself and, I am sure, all delegations with the

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

welcome which you, Mr. Chairman, gave to our new colleague, the representative of Poland, Mr. Czarkowski. We are glad that he has joined us, and I am sure that he will make a very valuable contribution to our work.

34. In his latest annual report to the United Nations the Secretary-General said "The members of the [Eighteen Nation] Committee are on the whole cautiously hopeful of early agreement on a treaty. I am convinced that if the spread of nuclear weapons is to be prevented, this can only be done by treaty. No other way can be effective for any length of time."

He said also:

"... it is difficult to conceive of any agreement in the foreseeable future on any other measure of disarmament if it is not possible to reach agreement on a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons". (A/6701/Add.1, para.14)

I believe that both those statements are true. I believe also that we can negotiate a non-proliferation treaty and that when concluded the treaty will serve to put us back on the path to general disarmament. That path is a long one, and the sooner we can get back on to it the better.

35. You may recall that those points were the theme of my last observations, on 29 August, when I also reiterated my Government's commitment to proceed as far and as fast down the road to disarmament as we could persuade others to come (ENDC/PV.326, paras.38, 58 et seq.). However, the non-proliferation treaty must come first. As the representative of Ethiopia said at our meeting on 5 October:

"... failure to achieve now what should have been done long before now will not only result in double or treble the number of nuclear-weapon Powers, thus making the danger of nuclear devastation ever more imminent, but also render disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, an unattainable mirage."

(ENDC/PV.336, para.39)

36. Over the past few weeks this Committee has given careful consideration to the texts (ENDC/192, 193) placed before us by the two co-Chairmen on 24 August. Time is, however, running out. The limited flexibility of the United Nations calendar requires that this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament must soon come to an end so that the debate in the United Nations can begin. I trust that in the short time that remains to us in Geneva we shall be able to bring matters much nearer to a conclusion, since it is difficult to see the General Assembly succeeding if we

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

fail. We are, after all, the experts. We understand the intricacies of the problem we have been grappling with over the years as no others do, and we are the body best equipped to solve them. If we want the best treaty we can get, we must do the work ourselves and do it quickly. Moreover, if we fail to do the job, there is a clear danger that the Eighteen-Nation Committee itself will be discredited; and it will then be difficult to justify the claim that this Committee should play a central part in the even more important disarmament negotiations that lie ahead once the non-proliferation treaty has been concluded.

37. I think it was clear from my remarks on 29 August that my Government regards the draft text submitted by the co-Chairmen as a sound basis for our negotiations. It is a text which has tried to take into account the interests of many countries, aligned and non-aligned, and if it falls short of perfection; if it does not satisfy everyone, that is because the nature of this subject does not admit of a perfect solution. In spite of the work already put into it, the draft may admit of improvement; and this morning I should like to consider some of the suggestions and amendments which have been put forward in this Committee, in particular the thoughtful contributions of the representatives of Mexico and the United Arab Republic. The Committee will recall that it was in fact the representative of the United Arab Republic who suggested as long ago as last March (ENDC/PV.294, paras. 25 et seq.) that some of the provisions of the preamble should be transferred to the operative part of the treaty.

38. The first subject I should like to consider is that of co-operation in the applications of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes -- and I will come later to the separate topic of peaceful explosions. The subject is dealt with both in the preamble and in article IV of the draft text. The United Kingdom delegation has made the point repeatedly that we cannot support a treaty which impedes the civil development of nuclear energy. We believe in the absolute right and the absolute need for free and untrammelled co-operation in this field; and we are convinced that the other nuclear-weapon States represented on this Committee share this point of view. I said last time I spoke that the assurances expressed by each of the nuclear-weapon

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

States in this Committee on this subject should make it impossible for any of them to adopt a restrictive attitude once a treaty comes into force, even if they wished to, which on past form would not appear to be the case (ENDC/PV.326, para.49).

39. The provisions in article IV and in the preamble are adequate testimony to that attitude; and the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, outlined on 8 June (ENDC/PV.303) the impressive record of his country in co-operation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Not only do these provisions not inhibit co-operation -- a fear which had been expressed -- but they facilitate such co-operation. The representative of Mexico said on 19 September, in connexion with his proposed revision of article IV:

"We believe that if ... the non-nuclear Powers renounce for all time certain activities and experiments which, but for the Treaty, they might carry out, it is only fair that they should receive in return as their authentic right any scientific and technological benefits derived from the experiments and activities they renounce." (ENDC/PV.331, para. 8)

40. I entirely agree with that statement. My Government is prepared, as we have already made clear, to make available to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to this treaty any "spin-off" into the field of civil nuclear technology that might be derived from our research on nuclear weapons. It is this research that non-nuclear-weapon States will be asked to forgo in the interests of all; and the principle that they should, as a compensation, share in its fruits is rightly embodied in the sixth preambular paragraph of the draft treaty before us.

41. Paragraph 2 of the draft article IV submitted by the representative of Mexico goes rather further than that in imposing on all parties --

"... the duty to contribute, according to their ability, ... to the further development of the production, industries, and other applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States." (ENDC/196)

That would cover not only spin-off but also the fruits of purely peaceful nuclear research and development, which is being denied to no one; and it would impose an open-ended obligation on civil as well as military nuclear Powers that is not called for by strict reciprocity.

42. The question of what such an obligation might entail was discussed by the representative of Canada at our last meeting on 5 October (ENDC/PV.336, para. 11).

I share the misgivings that he expressed. The United Kingdom has always made major contributions in this field from the very beginning of nuclear physics. However, this wording could lead some countries to expect to receive for nothing what other countries have worked hard to produce. That is clearly not intended, and some modification of the wording would be desirable to avoid the danger of possible unwarranted expectations.

43. On the separate but related problem of the availability of the benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the conflict seems to be between understandable aspirations on the one hand and brutal facts of reality on the other. It would be very agreeable if a State could conduct its own nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes without any hazard to the health and safety of its neighbours and without affecting their tranquillity by the military and political implications of those explosions. Unfortunately, the facts of life are simply not consistent with that aspiration. Any State that has made such a nuclear device has made a potential nuclear weapon and can make more of them. One cannot distinguish between them. In addition, the concern for economic development which prompts the interest of many States in the use of nuclear explosions for these peaceful purposes also suggests that a better use could be made of resources than on the enormous research and development costs of perfecting unilaterally the use of such devices. Recognizing these facts, yet believing also that if peaceful nuclear explosions are to become useful for economic progress -- which has still to be proved -- their benefits should be denied to none, we supported the preambular provisions incorporated in the drafts presented by the co-Chairmen on 24 August.

44. We share the view which has been put forward in this Committee that the details and arrangements by which the benefits of the application of nuclear explosives to peaceful purposes should be made available to all should be considered separately outside the non-proliferation treaty. We are much indebted to the representative of Canada for the valuable ideas that he put forward in his statement of 12 September (ENDC/PV.329, paras. 19 et seq.) about the lines on which this problem might be tackled. I agree with the representative of Mexico that the non-proliferation treaty should formally commit its signatories to make available any benefits that may eventually arise from the peaceful application of nuclear explosions; and we should be happy to see such a commitment written into the body of the treaty. That would also meet the point made on this subject by the representative of Burma this morning.

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

45. This is perhaps as good a place as any at which to make clear the position of my Government as regards the provision of any potential benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions. The geography and population density of Great Britain make it uncertain whether peaceful nuclear explosives will be an industrially-useful technique in our own islands in the foreseeable future. We have not so far pursued any extensive programme in this field, and are simply not in a position to make the means and facilities for the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions available to others. We should therefore have difficulty with any language such as that proposed in article IV-A of the Mexican amendment in document ENDC/196.

46. In our view, the first sentence of the proposed article IV-A could be interpreted as obliging nuclear-weapon States to develop a peaceful explosives technology and service for the benefit of others even if they had neither the desire nor the resources to develop such a service. I must stress that this is a question, not of unwillingness to share with others something which we have, but simply of an inability to share something which we do not have and a consequent inability to undertake a treaty obligation which we cannot at this time fulfil.

47. Before leaving this subject, I should also like to express our interest in the suggestion made by the representative of Nigeria on 31 August (ENDC/PV.327, para. 57). He suggested that scientists from non-nuclear-weapon States be given the opportunity of working in close collaboration with scientists in nuclear-weapon States working on the technology of applying nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. We should like to associate ourselves with the favourable comments made on that suggestion on 14 September (ENDC/PV.330, para. 18) by the United States representative, Mr. Foster.

48. I should like next to deal with the link between this treaty and further measures of nuclear disarmament. It has been the consistent view of my Government that this treaty should and would lead to further measures of nuclear disarmament, but that without such progress the treaty would not last. That view was put clearly as recently as 26 September by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly. He said:

"A non-proliferation treaty is, of course, not an end in itself.

Apart from its intrinsic value, it will open the way to negotiations on the central problem of controlling and stopping the nuclear arms race. Unless it is followed by progress in that direction, there is

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

a risk that the treaty will not long endure. But equally that progress is dependent on the successful conclusion of the treaty". (A/PV.1567, p.54-55)

49. When I last spoke to this Committee I reaffirmed our determination to work towards further measures of disarmament. Knowing the frustrating history of disarmament negotiations since the war, I find myself in sympathy with what I think is the intention of the Mexican proposal to strengthen the obligation on the nuclear Powers to pursue these negotiations by strengthening the preambular language and putting it into the operative part of the treaty.

50. I should, however, like to offer one or two comments on that proposal. The first is that the most logical measure to embody in the operative part of the treaty would be that relating to the achievement of the cessation of the nuclear arms race, which at present appears in the ninth preambular paragraph. The treaty will, in article II, impose arms limitations on the non-nuclear signatories; and the next logical step seems to me to call for the cessation of the nuclear arms race by the nuclear Powers.

51. My second comment is that some of the measures listed in the eleventh preambular paragraph of the draft texts -- liquidation of existing stockpiles and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery -- can only be dealt with effectively in the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. That treaty is, unfortunately, still far from our grasp, and its achievement has not the same immediate urgency as the cessation of the nuclear arms race. We must stop adding to the level of armaments before we can move forward in the other direction.

52. An alternative way of moving towards that effect might be to retain the existing preambular paragraphs and to amend paragraph 3 of article V of the treaty to read:

"Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and provisions of the Treaty are being realized."

I put forward that suggestion for consideration and to make clear that I welcome the initiative of the representative of Mexico and share his objective of seeking to secure firmer commitments from the nuclear Powers to follow this treaty with immediate and meaningful negotiations to secure further measures of arms control and disarmament.

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

53. Before leaving this subject, I should like to say that my Government strongly supports the proposal made by the United States Government to the Government of the Soviet Union for bilateral talks on the limitation of defensive and offensive weapons. We hope very much that the Soviet Union will agree to such talks, which should be an important step in the right direction. If it be later proposed to hold such talks in a wider forum, the United Kingdom would be ready and willing to join in.

54. Proposals have been made by the representative of the United Arab Republic for amendments to articles I and II of the treaty (ENDC/197). I do not propose to discuss those amendments in detail, but there are two general points I should like to make about those articles, which form the core of the draft treaty. The first is that, as we all know, they are the results of long discussion on the part of the co-Chairmen. The second is that, to my mind and to the minds of most representatives who have spoken on them, they effectively provide for the closing of all loop-holes of practical significance for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Most of us here have participated in long debates over several years on the provisions which these two vital articles should incorporate. We know that earlier drafts of these articles were much longer and much more complicated, and we know that the path towards eventual agreement between the co-Chairmen on these articles lay in finding simplified language. To add to these articles now, to add further complications, would be to reverse the process. That seems to me a dangerous course. I hope that we can steer clear of it.

55. I cannot conclude without a reference to the missing article III. Indeed, it is very difficult to make a constructive speech about the treaty without saying anything at all about article III. Equally, it is almost impossible to say anything constructive about article III until there is a text before us. The Swedish representative has tabled a draft article III (ENDC/195) to stimulate discussion, and ideas have been contributed by other representatives. However, we still await anxiously the text promised by our co-Chairmen. We know that they are doing their utmost to reach agreement on a draft text and that they are making progress. Moreover, I do not think I am revealing any secrets if I say that part of their difficulty lies in the fact that it is not only a matter of discussion between themselves and that inevitably wider consultations are involved.

56. I should like to compliment our co-Chairmen on the efforts they are making to produce a text which is generally acceptable and which will provide a safeguard system

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

adequate to the needs of the treaty. At the same time, I hope they will not take it amiss if I urge upon them the need to impress upon all their colleagues the very great importance of having a draft article III tabled, discussed and, I hope, generally accepted here before the end of this month.

57. Finally, I should like to refer briefly to the speech made by the representative of India on 28 September (ENDC/PV.334). When I read it I was greatly impressed with its logical structure and progression; but as I continued to read I was more and more struck with the idea that he seemed to be talking about a different treaty from the one the rest of us talk about. He was talking about a treaty which would, amongst other things, halt the production of nuclear weapons. His contention was -- and he has expressed it on many occasions -- that the proliferation of nuclear weapons includes the further production of nuclear weapons anywhere, and that therefore a treaty to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons must halt the production of nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear Powers.

58. That has consistently been the view of the Indian delegation, and it is a view which I respect. Where I must join issue with my Indian colleague is in his assertion that that view is embodied in General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX). On 25 July Mr. Privedi said:

"A non-proliferation treaty should therefore have mutual obligations and responsibilities; and in parenthesis I might add that this is also spelt out in principle (a) -- this provision that the treaty should embody mutual obligations and responsibilities for nuclear and non-nuclear Powers -- where it is said that neither of them should proliferate, that proliferation should be denied to both of them." (ENDC/PV.316, para. 32)

On 31 August the representative of India said:

"What is pertinent is that proliferation has to be prevented; and, as General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) points out, proliferation by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon Powers has to be prevented."

(ENDC/PV.327, para. 73)

59. At the risk of wearying the Committee, I would recall that principle (a) of resolution 2028 (XX) states:

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

"The treaty shall be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form." (ENDC/161)

We all remember the context in which that text was discussed and adopted; and I do not understand how it can be argued that its intention was to cut off the production of nuclear weapons by the nuclear Powers. The principle discussed, and unanimously endorsed, was that non-nuclear Powers should not acquire nuclear weapons, and nuclear Powers should not help them to do so by any means whatsoever. Indeed, the whole debate on non-proliferation has proceeded on the basis that to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to prevent an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons. The language of what I might term our base resolution, the Irish resolution (1665 (XVI)), makes that point absolutely clear. The reservation to that resolution entered by the representative of India on 30 November 1961 in the First Committee (A/C.1/SR. 1209, paras. 9 et seq.) made it equally clear that, while the Government of India did not subscribe to that principle, it recognized that that was the principle embodied in the resolution.

60. Resolution 2028 (XX), an admirably balanced and constructed one, was sponsored by the eight non-aligned delegations to this Committee. The views of those delegations have been of great help in reaching the hopeful stage we have now reached in our negotiations. That resolution, in my view, does not admit of the interpretation which the representative of India seeks to give it.

61. When I concluded my remarks on 29 August I asked that we should all consider which situation would offer us the greater hope: one in which the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty had broken down or run into the sand; or one in which the conclusion of a treaty had opened the way, and pointed the way, to further effort in the field of arms control and disarmament (ENDC/PV.326, para. 61). There is no doubt in my mind which is the better course, the course which will lead more quickly to a safer and saner world. We cannot afford to slip backwards.

62. As I said at the beginning of my remarks, the next month will be crucial for the work of this Committee. Much remains still to be done if we are to go to New York able to report to the General Assembly that we have a draft treaty which we believe to be acceptable to both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. I believe we can and must complete this task, and I pledge all the efforts of my delegation to doing so.

63. The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

The Government delegation of the German Democratic Republic, headed by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Georg Stibi, which arrived in Geneva a few days ago, has delivered to me, as the representative of the Soviet Union and co-Chairman of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, a Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The Statement sets out the position of the German Democratic Republic in regard to the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which is now being considered by the Committee (ENDC/192, 193). The Statement is of particularly great interest and importance, because the consideration of that question by the Committee has entered a decisive phase.

64. The letter accompanying the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic contains a request that the aforesaid document be brought to the notice of all States members of the Committee. Accordingly we have today sent a letter to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Protitch, with the request that our letter, to which the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic is attached, be circulated as an official document of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.^{1/} Allow me to acquaint the members of the Committee with the text of the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic.

65. I present the text of the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament:

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic has for years worked for the renunciation by both German States of nuclear weapons. It supports all steps which can prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms. For this reason the Government of the German Democratic Republic welcomes the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the delegation of the USSR to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It views the draft as an appropriate basis for the early conclusion of a treaty excluding the further spreading of nuclear weapons in any form.

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic shares the view of almost all States of the world which see in the early conclusion of an

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/198. Translation provided by the USSR delegation.

(The Chairman, USSR)

effective treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a contribution to reducing the danger of an atomic world war. It also works resolutely for a nuclear-weapons non-proliferation treaty because it would enhance the security of the peoples of Europe.

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic has worked out a constructive programme for the indispensable contribution of both German States to the bringing about of European security. It proposed to the Government of the West German Federal Republic that relations between the two German States be normalized, that the use of force in their mutual relations be renounced by treaty, that arms expenditures be cut by one-half each, that the renunciation by both German States of the possession, control or share in the control of nuclear weapons in any form be agreed upon and that they participate in a nuclear-weapon-free zone in central Europe.

"The endeavours of the German Democratic Republic and of many other European States to establish an effective system of security in Europe would benefit from an international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons preventing the nuclear arming of the West German Federal Republic.

"In this connexion the Government of the German Democratic Republic feels called upon to expound its views on some questions of the contents of such a treaty.

"Owing to its lack of sources of natural energy the German Democratic Republic takes a greater interest than some other States in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Precisely for this reason it supports the Soviet draft treaty binding the signatory States to promote the peaceful use of atomic energy and providing for comprehensive international co-operation in this sphere. The participation of all signatory States in the peaceful use of atomic energy on a basis of equality would be reliably ensured under this provision of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Government of the German Democratic Republic therefore sees no discrimination whatever in a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such a treaty could check the atomic arms race, counteract the waste of resources for military purposes and thereby release considerable

(The Chairman, USSR)

additional scientific and financial potentialities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic resolutely works for an effective control of the peaceful use of atomic energy orientated on the basic objectives of the treaty thus guaranteeing the observance of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It views the control by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to which the big majority of United Nations Member States belong as a suitable instrument to ensure the adherence to the provisions of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic rejects any attempt to prevent an effective control of the observance of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. A so-called control by EURATOM, a closed monopolistic grouping formed exclusively by members of NATO with considerable influence being exerted by the West German Federal Republic, is incompatible with an effective control of the observance of the provisions of a nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty since it would mean nothing but a self-control by the West German Federal Republic.

"The Government of the West German Federal Republic, which maintained for years that international control was an absolute prerequisite for any move towards relaxation and disarmament, today most stubbornly opposes a uniform control of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It becomes clear now that it wants to evade an effective control to keep open -- in one way or other -- access to nuclear weapons.

"The assertion of the West German Federal Government that it 'definitively renounced the production of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons already on 3 October 1954' is intended to disguise the real state of affairs. The then West German Chancellor Adenauer declared in a statement on 3 October 1954 that the West German Federal Republic only obligated itself not to produce nuclear weapons on its own territory. The West German Federal Republic has, however, by no means renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons, their production abroad or their use and the training of the West German army in the handling of nuclear weapons. It has, for example, concluded far-reaching agreements with the Republic of South Africa on the production and testing of atomic weapons on South African territory.

(The Chairman, USSR)

"The West German Federal Republic has the prerequisites for its own nuclear arms production. Its opposition to uniform control by the International Atomic Energy Agency can only be interpreted as the intention to keep roads open to the production of nuclear weapons, alone or in co-operation with other States, and to control over nuclear weapons within the framework of regional groupings.

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic holds the view that a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be concluded for an unlimited period. Only then can such a treaty become fully effective for the noble aim of safeguarding peace, of humanity, international relaxation and security.

"In open contradiction to the establishment of an atmosphere of confidence among all States, which is an indispensable requisite for taking steps towards effective disarmament, the Government of the West German Federal Republic demands a 'time limitation in the treaty' or far-reaching possibilities for revision. Both are suited to encourage aggressive intentions.

"The West German Federal Government opposes the cancellation clauses of the draft treaty because they do not permit an arbitrary withdrawal from it. This makes it quite clear that the West German Federal Government aims at keeping open an access to nuclear weapons for a later date.

"It is not by chance that the Government of the West German Federal Republic raises every possible objection to a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. These objections are designed to cover up the actual reasons for the West German Government's opposition to the conclusion of such a treaty.

"The West German Federal Government regards nuclear weapons as suitable instruments for implementing its efforts to revise the status quo. The aggressive sole representation pretension and the striving for a revision of the frontiers in Europe are to be given weight with atomic weapons as 'a military potentiality'. In this connexion the Government of the German Democratic Republic points to the fact that the Government of the West German Federal Republic persistently refuses to agree on a binding renunciation of the use of force with the German Democratic Republic and to recognize the existing frontiers in Europe.

(The Chairman, USSR)

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic has a special interest in the speedy conclusion of a treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons since the maintenance and safeguarding of peace is the highest concern of its foreign policy and because preventing West German atomic armament is a key question for security in Europe and the future of the German nation. It expresses the expectation that the member States of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will be guided by resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly, according to which a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons may contain no loop-holes which could permit a direct or indirect further spreading of nuclear weapons.

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic will, for its part, make every effort, in accordance with resolution 2149 (XXI) of the United Nations General Assembly, to facilitate the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It reaffirms that its proposal for both German States to renounce the possession, control or share in the control over nuclear weapons in any form is valid now as before. At the same time, the Government of the German Democratic Republic is of the opinion that such a renunciation by the German Democratic Republic and the West German Federal Republic could also be achieved by their accession to a world-wide treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the draft treaty submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"Accession by both German States to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be an important contribution to European security and could have a favourable effect on efforts for effective measures for nuclear and conventional disarmament."

66. The statement which I have just read out is regarded by the Soviet side as an extremely important document aimed at facilitating the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We would point out to the members of the Committee that the Government of the German Democratic Republic, which has always consistently advocated an immediate solution of the non-proliferation problem, has expressed quite definitely in its Statement to the Committee its support for the treaty which is being considered by the Committee, and has again confirmed the interest of the German Democratic Republic in the speediest possible conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(The Chairman, USSR)

67. The position of the German Democratic Republic in regard to a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, like all the proposals of the Government of the German Democratic Republic relating to the strengthening of peace in Europe, bears witness to the high sense of responsibility manifested by the German Democratic Republic in its approach to the most important problems of European and international security. In making the Statement addressed to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the Government of the German Democratic Republic has again demonstrated its deep devotion to the cause of peace and disarmament and its concern to avert the threat of nuclear war.

68. The Soviet delegation would also draw the attention of the members of the Committee to the warning contained in the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic concerning the position adopted by the Federal Republic of Germany in regard to a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is well known that influential circles in West Germany, who count on the gaining of access to nuclear weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany, are doing their utmost to hamper the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, or at the very least to ensure a situation in which it would be possible to circumvent that treaty and leave themselves a loop-hole for nuclear armament.

69. Now that the negotiations on the draft non-proliferation treaty have reached a very crucial stage and a draft article on control is being prepared, West Germany, as may be gathered from statements made by political leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany and from press reports, is making efforts to avoid establishment of the uniform and generally-accepted system of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the means of control over compliance with the treaty. The question arises why the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is striving to ensure that this control, where West Germany is concerned, should be carried out not by IAEA but by EURATOM, which would in fact be tantamount to the establishment of self-control. Why should any exception be made for the Federal Republic of Germany, which possesses all the facilities for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, when the overwhelming majority of countries, including countries where the development of peaceful atomic industry is at a very high level, advocate adoption of the IAEA system of safeguards as the means of control over compliance with the non-proliferation treaty?

(The Chairman, USSR)

70. We would emphasize that the Government of the German Democratic Republic, as is evident from the Statement that we have read out, expresses itself in favour of the IAEA system of safeguards, thus contributing towards agreement on this question.

71. In solving the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons we continually meet stubborn resistance from West Germany, which is creating obstacles to the speedy conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. In this connexion the question arises: is Bonn prepared to conclude an effective treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, or does it intend to oppose the preparation of such a treaty?

72. We should like to hope that in the approach of the Government of the Federal German Republic to that important question the principle of reason will eventually prevail. As is quite rightly stressed in the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic:

"Accession by both German States to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be an important contribution to European security and could have a favourable effect on efforts for effective measures for nuclear and conventional disarmament." (ENDC/198, p.5)

73. We hope that the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic, which is of great importance for the solution of the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, will be studied very carefully by the participants in the negotiations.

74. Mr. DePALMI (United States of America): The United States has several times had occasion in the past to comment on self-serving attempts by the authorities in East Germany to enhance their image. I shall not take up the time of the Committee by referring to the substance of the latest attempt, which, as I heard it, was quite transparent. Once again unsupported allegations are made concerning the intentions of the Federal Republic of Germany. I can only regret that the representative of the Soviet Union has felt it necessary to make himself a party to such allegations. These allegations are unfounded, and the record will demonstrate that they have no basis in fact.

(Mr. DePalma, United States)

75. On the question of procedure, I understand that, in accordance with past practice, the delegation of the Soviet Union wishes to circulate this communication under cover of a letter from the representative of the Soviet Union and as a document of the Soviet delegation. If I have understood this correctly, the Soviet delegation is following our past practice, and there can be no objection.

76. The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to make only one comment on the statement which we have just heard. The representative of the United States of America rejects the arguments taken up in our statement to the effect that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is opposing the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. Let us look at the actual facts that are taking place today. Today we are engaged in long-drawn-out negotiations on a question which could and should have been solved long ago but for the opposition of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. That fact alone speaks for itself.

77. This question, which is very important and which we have been discussing for a long time, is still unsolved. Unfortunately -- I would say, most unfortunately -- we still do not see any end to its solution. And the sole reason for this is precisely the opposition of the Federal Republic of Germany to the solution of this question. That altogether incontestable fact speaks for itself. It does not even call for further comment, and so I shall refrain from making any, leaving to each member of the Committee the possibility of forming his own judgement in regard to the situation that has come about in solving the important question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

78. Mr. TRIVEDI (India): I wish to make a few comments on the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom, who joined issue with my interpretation of resolution 2028 (XX). As the representative of the United Kingdom says, this admirably balanced and constructive resolution was sponsored by the eight non-aligned delegations to this Committee. It was drafted by those delegations. I had the privilege of being one of those members. It is true, of course, that the intentions of the draftsmen are not the ultimate criterion, the ultimate criterion is the decision of the General Assembly in voting on the resolution. However, it would be incorrect to say that the intention of the draftsmen was

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

different -- in my humble capacity, I was also one of the draftsmen of that resolution -- and that they intended to limit it to only one aspect of proliferation or to vivisect the entire problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

79. Secondly, on the actual question of the interpretation of the resolution, as I have said before, it is not so much a question of the context in which a principle was drafted or the intentions of the draftsmen; it is the principle as such that has to be taken into account. Principle (a) had a certain context, no doubt, but when it is interpreted that principle has a permanent value; it does not disappear with the disappearance of that particular context. The principle does not disappear because there is a settlement now between the two alliances on the question of nuclear-sharing arrangements. In fact, the nuclear-weapon Powers have been using the word "loop-holes" now in all kinds of contexts; and in his very profound speech this morning our Burmese colleague said, very rightly, that the treaty itself would be a loop-hole if it did not include certain essential requirements. Therefore the principle has to be interpreted as such, and the principle says that the treaty should not permit the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon Powers to proliferate. In any case, no principle has ever said that the nuclear-weapon Powers should be allowed to proliferate.

80. Thirdly, the principles of resolution 2028 (XX) have to be taken in their totality. All the five principles have to be taken together. When I gave my interpretation of the principle, I was relying not only on principle (a) but also on principle (b), as well as on principle (c), but particularly on principle (b), which says: "The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers". As I said in my last statement: "There is no balance ... between a platitude on the one hand and a prohibition on the other." (ENDC/PV.334, para. 14)

81. Finally, it is not very useful to go into these details about how to interpret a particular principle of a particular resolution. What is important is how to achieve non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. There are two aspects to it. One is what proliferation really means -- the dictionary meaning, the meaning of the resolutions, the background of the negotiations and so on. That is important. But what is equally important, if not more important, is how to achieve non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Trivedi, India)

82. The position the Indian delegation has taken is that, even if the intention is to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons -- only one aspect of the problem, the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries, or the non-armament of unarmed countries, as I once said --, even that cannot be achieved unless the treaty itself embodies a requirement that all countries shall stop producing nuclear weapons. Here I am in the distinguished company of a distinguished predecessor of the representative of the United Kingdom -- Mr. Nutting -- whom I quoted once before. He said very clearly that, unless the cut-off in production of fissile materials for weapon purposes were agreed upon, other countries would inevitably join the nuclear race. He continued:

"Are they going to sit by and say, 'All right, we will resign superiority to the three or four or five nuclear Powers, and they will exercise a domination over us all while we, the smaller Powers, will have to disarm'?"

Mr. Nutting concluded that the countries of the world were not going to tolerate a situation of that kind.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 337th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador A.A. Roshchin, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Burma, the United Kingdom, the USSR, the United States and India.

"The following document was tabled:

'Letter dated 10 October 1967 from the Representative of the Soviet Union addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.'

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 12 October 1967, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.