

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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**FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH MEETING**

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Wednesday, 16 May 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. SAHLOU

(Ethiopia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO  
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS  
Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO  
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. N. MINTCHEV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U Tin MAUNG  
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. E. PEPICH  
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU  
Mr. M. HAMID  
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. K.K. RAO  
Mr. C.K. GAIROLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGLIATI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. GONZALEZ GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. M. BIEN

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. M. MALITZA  
Mr. C. SANDRU  
Mr. I. DATCU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG  
Baron C.H. von PLATTEN  
Mr. H. BLIX  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN  
Mr. M.S. AHMED  
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Mr. B.T. PRICE  
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK  
Mr. J.H. LAMBERT

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. V. BAKER  
Mr. D. MARK  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I declare open the thirty-eighth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. EDBERG (Sweden): It is with intense gratification that the Swedish delegation has heard the answers given by Mr. Zorin and Mr. Stelle to the many questions which we advanced last week and which, as I had occasion to say then and now wish to underline, had as their purpose the achievement of greater clarity. These answers have helped to clear our minds on several points. If they have helped others to a better understanding of certain points of the drafts and thereby, perhaps, to seeing some possible avenues for further exploration with a view to a rapprochement, we have achieved much of what we hoped for. I would be less than frank if I pretended to be completely satisfied with all the answers. However, we did not expect full and immediate answers to all the points, and we have taken due note of the fact that both Mr. Zorin and Mr. Stelle stressed that the answers were of a preliminary nature. we shall be very interested to hear what further answers and comments they may wish to make at a later stage to our original questions, as well as to such supplementary questions as may arise.

For the time being, we shall content ourselves with some preliminary observations based upon a study of the answers now given. We might return later with further observations.

When we compare the two answers to our first question, it seems to us that the difference between the two delegations on this score is not a cause for great concern. In the first place, they both wish to have fixed time-limits for each stage. Furthermore, Mr. Zorin disclaimed any intention to set impossible tasks for his own country and others. Mr. Stelle said that the United States suggestions were subject to modification in the light of the measures finally agreed upon for implementation during stage I, and he did not even exclude the possibility of shortening the time-limits during the disarmament process. Thus it appears that both the Soviet Union and United States delegations have an essentially practical approach to this question.

The difference that arises is due perhaps to the different degrees of optimism that the drafters have felt. In the view of Mr. Zorin, the experiences of the great Powers after World War II do not point to any great difficulties and retarding factors anywhere in the world in the gradual conversion of the armaments industries

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or in the absorption of a great mass of demobilized men in civilian production; nor did Mr. Stelle mention any such difficulties. The elements which Mr. Stelle felt might take time were rather those relating to the establishment of control measures and of peace-keeping machinery, which were not needed after World War II. The scope of these elements are, of course, yet to be determined. We are therefore prepared to accept the observation of the representative of Nigeria that, although we should strive for a common basis for a time table, we should concentrate on what to achieve during the stages. Meanwhile, we are satisfied to note that both the Soviet Union and the United States take a practical view of this question.

The assumption behind the second question which we posed was that a military balance might perhaps be as well preserved under a system which envisaged more drastic cuts in one field than in another as in a system which demanded flat percentage-wise cuts across the board. In this area, of course, there is the vitally important difference between the drafts that one requires the complete abolition of nuclear weapons vehicles and foreign bases, while the other demands only a 30 per cent cut in the first stage. Mr. Stelle said yesterday that:

"... trying to negotiate composition, as well as level, of forces ... remaining at each stage would only delay ... our efforts."

(ENDC/PV.37, p. 7)

That a real difficulty would arise if overall composition were to be considered cannot be denied. The need, or absence of need, to face and overcome that difficulty depends upon whether a military balance can be achieved by simpler solutions. Despite the important differences between the two drafts in this area, there seems nevertheless to be a certain measure of similarity in the approach of the two drafts.

We are satisfied to note that in his reply to our eighth question Mr. Zorin said that the Soviet draft (ENDC/2) provided for the reduction of all types of armed forces and of all categories of military personnel, and that stress was laid on the disbanding of military units as a whole. As Mr. Stelle rightly pointed out, this approach has something in common with the central idea in the United States draft (ENDC/30 and Corr.1) namely, that no type of arms or units should be left unreduced.

The third, fourth, fifth and sixth questions which we advanced concerned the suggested zonal system and provisions for self-declaration of armed forces and armaments. We have noted with satisfaction that the United States delegation

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takes a flexible position on these matters and that it is open to suggestions and detailed proposals. We were particularly interested to hear what Mr. Stelle had to say about the freedom that each party should have in drawing up the zones and in the considerable size that these might be given, all with a view to making it possible for the country concerned to take into account the deployment of its forces and armaments.

With respect to the self-declaration provided for in both the Soviet and United States drafts, we believe we can see, again, some common elements. Mr. Zorin seemed to agree with us that such declarations could be a confidence-creating factor. Thus their function in both the United States plan and the Soviet plan is probably not merely to provide a point of departure for the control systems.

One ambiguity that seems to remain even after Mr. Zorin's preliminary reply may perhaps be cleared up at a later stage. This is the scope of the declaration contemplated under article 2, paragraph 5, of the Soviet draft. The declarations of which we spoke, it will be remembered, were to list all different types of major armaments and armed forces and the total existing quantities of these. We are still not quite clear as to whether the declarations contemplated under the Soviet draft article 2, paragraph 5, are of this comprehensive nature, or whether they are of a more limited character. If they are of the former kind, the difference between the United States and Soviet drafts in this connexion is perhaps not as great as it might seem.

The answers given to our seventh question, on details of when and where inspection would take place, have a great deal in common. We are not, of course, here referring to the question of inspection of retained armaments. Both the United States and Soviet delegations seem to approach the question of inspection of what is to be reduced and eliminated from their military machines from a strictly practical viewpoint, so that what was mobile might be moved to agreed depots and what could not be moved would be inspected on the spot.

We have already made some comments upon the replies given to our eighth question and I do not think we can usefully say more at the present time. However, we note that Mr. Stelle welcomed the proposals with regard to the reduction of forces in, for instance, neighbouring States whose forces are very differently composed.

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

Our ninth question concerned the problem of whether the elimination of bases, foreign or national, could be viewed in relation to the measure of danger to neighbouring countries presented by this or that base. It further concerned the problem of the application of the zonal inspection system to foreign bases. We believe that neither of those problems has found a solution. They will undoubtedly recur in our deliberations.

The answer to our tenth question, relating to a closer definition of nuclear weapon vehicles, seemed to indicate that there should not be too great difficulty in obtaining sufficient detail on this point in the treaty. On the potential nuclear weapon delivery means, however, there seem to be more substantial and important differences. However close the parties may get on this point -- and it is obviously desirable that the present gap should be bridged -- it will not be possible to eliminate completely all risks. We stated this in the preface to our questions, and we have noted that Mr. Zorin agreed with us on this point in his statement on 11 May (ENDC/PV.35).

We have studied that very important statement also for the remarks it offered on our eleventh question. Mr. Zorin's statement immediately evoked interested comments from others. In particular, the representative of India, Mr. Lall, dealt with it at length on 14 May (ENDC/PV.36) and I shall not, therefore, comment further upon it at this stage.

Our twelfth and last question concerned the need to consider the reduction or elimination of chemical and biological weapons as early as stage I. We have been gratified to note the understanding position which both Mr. Zorin and Mr. Stelle have taken on this point. It gives us hope that more and fruitful attention might later be devoted to this matter, when we shall be glad to return to it.

I have been told that at the end of a conference regarding economic co-operation the presiding delegate concluded: "Gentlemen, when we came here we were confused. After three months of deliberations we are still confused -- but on a higher level". I, for my part, feel that the level of our knowledge and understanding has risen, even though we are still far from any concrete results. As I said at the opening of my present statement, the aim of our questions was to solicit answers which would further clarify the proposals before us. We are grateful for the prompt, patient, preliminary replies which have been rendered by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States. We look forward to hearing further clarifications at a later stage and we ourselves intend, at such stages, to offer further comments.



Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): Today I should like to state my views on various questions now being discussed by our Committee.

The first is the fixing of time-limits for completing the different stages of disarmament and hence also of the time-limit for implementing the whole disarmament treaty. The discussion has shown that this problem is troubling several delegations which recognize the soundness of our view that there can be no effective treaty on disarmament unless a strict time-limit is laid down for its implementation.

There is another problem related to this one, namely, the pace at which disarmament is to proceed. I wish, in particular, to consider the justification for the claims that it would not be realistic to provide for rapid progress in carrying out far-reaching disarmament measures as early as stage I.

The Polish delegation considers that in discussing the time needed to carry out the various disarmament measures, it is not only the technical factors determining the possibility of carrying out a given measure in a certain time that must be taken into account. No less important are the political factors which militate in favour of carrying out disarmament in the shortest possible time. We fully share the opinion expressed on this point by Mr. Lall, the representative of India, who rightly drew attention to the fact that disarmament should be carried out on such a scale and at such a rate that it would be impossible to reverse the process.

It is difficult to overlook the connexion between the United States idea of spreading the various stages of disarmament over a long period of time, and the formulas used in the United States plan for the transition from one stage to the next. There is a certain inherent logic in this idea, for if stage I is to comprise only disarmament measures of little significance whose execution is, moreover, to be spread over a very long period, the lack of interest in a quick transition to the next stage becomes comprehensible.

We cannot agree with Mr. Stelle, the United States representative, who said yesterday that the time-limit for completing stage I should depend on the setting up of the control machinery which, according to the United States delegation, might take several years. Apart from these objections, the United States delegation is making an express condition by trying to secure a veto -- I would say even a double veto, one in the control council and another in the Security Council -- in respect of the decisions to be taken on transition from one stage to the next.

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The Soviet plan, on the other hand, proposes a procedure for transition from one stage to another which would, first, ensure that the transition really took place, thus guaranteeing uninterrupted progress with disarmament, and, secondly, enable a majority of the States concerned to decide whether satisfactory conditions existed for the transition to the next stage, so that the decision would not depend on any one State or group of States.

The Polish delegation is in full agreement with the representative of India, who considers that acceptance of the principle of a two-thirds majority for substantive decisions would save the control council from drawing conclusions that were incautious, ill-considered or harmful. Adoption of the principle of a two-thirds majority is not prejudicial to anyone. That principle gives everyone the same rights and the same opportunities. It provides a guarantee for the minority that their interests will be properly safeguarded. It is thus the most democratic and fair principle there is, and it is of advantage to both parties.

The arguments advanced by Mr. Dean and repeated yesterday by Mr. Stelle concerning the alleged risk of the Soviet Union capturing the votes of the non-aligned States on the control council sounded strange here. As Mr. Zorin, the Soviet representative, rightly pointed out yesterday, it is not a question of capturing votes, but of the use of persuasion which, thanks to this voting principle, remains open to all the parties. Does the United States already have doubts about its arguments and its ability to convince the other members of the council?

Mr. Godber, the representative of the United Kingdom, claims to see a contradiction between the principle of the vote in the control council and article 40 of the Soviet draft treaty. There is clearly no contradiction. Article 40 was included in the treaty mainly to stress once more the specific nature of the functions of the control council, which cannot have any rights that conflict with the Security Council's prerogatives under the United Nations Charter. The purpose of article 40, in our view, is mainly to draw a clear line of demarcation between the functions of the control council, which is called upon to establish facts, and those of the Security Council, which is competent to take suitable measures in the event of a threat to the peace or act of aggression.

The second point I wish to consider is the idea of what is called progressive zonal inspection. This proposal seems to show a recognition by the Western States that their former ideas on this subject were lacking in realism and that it is

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materially impossible to apply, especially over vast territories, the principle of total control over weapons alleged to be concealed -- in other words, that it is impossible to control all the armaments of the other party in the absence of complete disarmament. Nevertheless, here too, at the root of this new idea, there is a lack of logic; for this idea of zones still implies the need for complete control and for inspection of the whole area of the zone selected. So we are dealing with the same old concept of control over the retained armaments of States, the only difference being that this control would be limited by the confines of a particular zone, and thus much easier for those wishing to effect it.

We cannot accept the argument advanced yesterday by the representative of the United States, according to which disclosure of the overall levels of forces and armaments situated in a particular zone can be of no significance from the point of view of military intelligence if the zone is large enough. The size of the zone makes no difference to the fact that if complete control over armaments were to be authorized in zones chosen by the other party, it would be prejudicial to the defences of the country undergoing control.

In his statement of 11 May (ENDC/PV.35) Mr. Edberg, the Swedish representative, asked the United States delegation how it proposed to apply the system of zonal inspection to foreign bases. Mr. Stelle answered that question yesterday (ENDC/PV.37). He said that if a country in which such a base was situated adhered to the treaty, the base could be included in the system of zonal inspection. He thus envisages a situation in which foreign bases would not be subject to any control if the country in which they were situated had not adhered to the treaty or refused to negotiate an agreement with the control organization. We know, moreover, that the United States plan accepts the possibility of such a situation arising. It provides that the treaty on general and complete disarmament, and its first stage, shall still come into force even if the countries with a smaller military potential have not yet adhered to the treaty. It is also well known that a large proportion of the United States bases are situated in the territory of countries which can be described as not being of great military significance. Is this approach to the problem consistent with the principle of maintaining the balance while disarmament is being carried out?

The discussion which has taken place so far has strengthened our conviction that if we are to fulfil the task entrusted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the Western Powers must revise their approach to the fundamental problems of disarmament

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and control --- an approach which may be concisely defined as follows: insignificant disarmament measures accompanied by maximum control, at the same time making sure that they can evade their obligations when they choose. The essential condition for progress in our work is that the States concerned should be willing to undertake, within the framework of general and complete disarmament, quick and effective measures which will not impair the security of others.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I would like this morning to make some remarks in connexion with our discussion of outer space at yesterday's meeting, and in particular to reply to the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union at that meeting.

Mr. Zorin's statement contained a number of comments concerning the past history of outer space and related negotiations with which we do not agree. Rather than replying in kind, however, I would prefer to list a few salient facts which stand out in this entire discussion.

First, I would like to point out again that in the somewhat analogous field of atomic energy, the United States made a proposal to place all development under international control at a time when it had reason to believe it was the sole possessor of the secret of the atom. Had that proposal been accepted, the problems before the Conference would be simple compared to what they are today.

Secondly, at the beginning of 1957, before anyone had launched a single satellite into orbit, the United States proposed that all testing of space vehicles be placed under international inspection and participation to assure future development of outer space for peaceful purposes. I mentioned a few of the United States offers on this subject in my statement on Monday (ENDC/PV.36).

Thirdly, as Mr. Zorin pointed out again yesterday, the Soviet Union proposals to inhibit development of outer space for military purposes have always been linked to such extraneous proposals as the elimination of all United States bases from Europe, the Near and Middle East, and Africa. This linkage was referred to repeatedly by Mr. Zorin in his statement yesterday (ENDC/PV.37).

Let me emphasize that we are not interested in placing blame anywhere for the lack of progress to date in negotiations relating to disarmament in outer space. We suggest that the Soviet delegation should not focus on this either, if it has a real interest in the success of our present negotiations. We would also like to ask the Soviet delegation to consider whether there is not some way in which it can

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eliminate the linkage between outer space and the elimination of all foreign bases, and also the linkage between outer space and the elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles, so that we may make some progress here in this important field of outer space.

I would like now to discuss briefly again the similarities of and differences between the programmes of the United States and the Soviet Union for outer space in the context of general and complete disarmament. At the thirty-sixth meeting of the Conference on Monday, I pointed out certain similarities of and differences between the United States and Soviet proposals. The similarities are more apparent than the differences, and I listed them as follows:

"First, both support the concept that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes only; second, both would ban the placing into orbit of weapons of mass destruction; third, both would require advance notification of the launching of space vehicles for peaceful purposes." (ENDC/PV.36, p.11)

Mr. Zorin has not questioned this list of similarities, as I understand his statement.

I also listed some differences between our two drafts, and it is over these differences that there seems to have been some ground for misunderstanding.

The basic reason for one of these differences -- that concerning pre-launch notification and inspection of missile launchings -- is that the Soviet outer space proposal, in its present form, is linked to the Soviet plan to eliminate all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in stage I. As Mr. Zorin has indicated, the plan is also linked at present to the elimination of all foreign bases in stage I.

Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Soviet draft provides for the destruction of all rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons; article 5, paragraph 2, prohibits the production of such rockets and provides for the dismantling of manufacturing plants and testing grounds for such rockets; and article 15, paragraph 1, prohibits all rocket launchings except for peaceful purposes.

Like the United States outline, the Soviet draft does provide for pre-launch notification and inspection of peaceful-purpose rockets. Unlike the United States outline, it does not specifically provide for the advance notification or inspection of military rockets or, as our outline calls them, missiles. However, as Mr. Zorin pointed out to us yesterday, the Soviet plan would destroy all such rockets in stage I, and also it would not authorize any launching of them for testing purposes.

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Thus the absence, which we accurately pointed out, from the Soviet draft of provisions concerning advance notification and inspection of missiles is an academic question if the Soviet stage I concept is accepted. The difference between us for the moment is therefore not on this point but on the question whether the elimination of all nuclear weapon vehicles in stage I would be consistent with the principle of balance. For the reasons frequently indicated at previous meetings, we think that adoption of the Soviet proposal would result in imbalance.

I have indicated that, given the Soviet stage I proposal for nuclear delivery vehicles, the difference between the United States and Soviet drafts on advance notification and inspection of missile launchings is of no consequence. On the other hand, given the United States proposal for a 30 per cent reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles, the difference is of considerable significance. Continued testing of missiles would be essential, if for no other reason than maintenance, to see if after storage for a period of months or years the intricate propulsion and guidance mechanisms were still in operating condition. Such testing would have to be under supervision by the international disarmament organization in order, among other things, to verify the prohibition on the placing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. If missile testing were not supervised, a bomb might be put in orbit under the guise of a missile test. The international disarmament organization inspectors would therefore have to inspect each rocket before launching to make sure it contained no weapon of mass destruction.

There is a second difference between the two drafts, as I indicated on Monday, and it relates to arrangements for the detection of unreported launchings. This is explicitly provided for in section D, paragraph 4, of stage I of the United States outline. A network of ground-based and possibly space-borne, instruments would, we believe, be needed for the detection of unreported launchings of missiles or space vehicles. Such detection is not expressly provided for in the Soviet draft. In fact, by implication, paragraph 2 of article 15 of the Soviet draft appears to preclude such arrangements by limiting the international disarmament organization to inspection at the launching sites for peaceful launchings which have been declared by the parties under article 14, paragraph 2. It may be that the absence of provisions for the detection of clandestine launchings is of the nature of the absence of any provision for the detection of clandestine stockpiles of nuclear weapon vehicles in the Soviet draft. Thus, while the Soviet draft would ostensibly provide for the destruction of all nuclear delivery vehicles

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and would ostensibly prohibit testing of rockets for military purposes, it would apparently provide no means of assuring all States that these obligations were being carried out -- no means of finding out whether clandestine stockpiles existed or clandestine testing was going on.

For these reasons, based on our re-examination of the outer space proposals of the United States and the Soviet Union and of Mr. Zorin's statement of yesterday, we still believe that important differences exist between the two proposals.

I would like now to comment very briefly on the suggestion, which we found interesting, made by the representative of India that all weapons in orbit, and not just weapons of mass destruction, should be prohibited. This is certainly consistent with the thesis of our statement on Monday that outer space should be reserved for peaceful purposes in the same fashion as Antarctica (ENDC/PV.36). It is also consistent with the provision of the United States outline for increased international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space. We frankly had not considered this point before, because the first thing that comes to mind when one considers the military threat posed by the development of outer space is naturally the placing in orbit of nuclear weapons. However, greater sophistication and experience in outer space might well indicate that other weapons, perhaps equally deadly but not of mass destruction, have dangerous potentials there. We will be happy to give further study to Mr. Lall's suggestion.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): At the thirty-fifth meeting, on 11 May, the representative of the Soviet Union made what seemed to the Canadian delegation to be some very important statements. He addressed some of his remarks to me, and therefore I should like to try to answer some of his questions today and carry the discussion a little further. I hope it will not be thought by anyone that I am arguing simply for the sake of argument or to make debating points. When the Canadian delegation intervenes in these discussions, it is to try to bring out as clear an idea as possible of what each side is proposing, not only their particulars as disarmament measures but also the way in which they are to be controlled. As we continue to insist, all disarmament measures should, according to the sixth of the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), be implemented under such strict international control as will provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. That is what we have to make sure of as we go along.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

What I shall say today is intended to throw some light on whether the most practical way to eliminate the nuclear weapon vehicles is the 100 per cent elimination in stage I which the Soviet Union suggests or the stage-by-stage elimination, starting in the first stage with 30 per cent, suggested in the United States draft treaty. We have to get the clearest possible understanding of this, the most crucial, problem of disarmament in all its aspects and taking into consideration the conditions in the world today in the hope of reaching some position which can be agreed to by the two sides.

Mr. Zorin made several remarks arising out of my previous observation that Mr. Khrushchev's famous offer did not seem a very fair one because it required the West to accept the Soviet plan in its entirety and then the Soviet Union would accept our proposals for control -- or verification, as we prefer to call it. Mr. Khrushchev's offer, so explained, seems to amount to the same thing as one partner in a business saying, "You let me manage the business, and then you can keep the books." This would hardly be a fair partnership. Mr. Zorin observed on 11 May:

"So there you have the crux of the matter. Therefore it is not a question of control, but a question of the content of the plan and of the content of the measures which we propose. This is the crux of the matter. Therefore our differences are not over control, but over the content of disarmament." (ENDC/PV.35, p.60)

He went on to say:

"Our differences are that our plan is unacceptable to you. That is the crux of the matter. Let us now come to an agreement on the plan. Let us see what is acceptable and what is not, what proposals you put forward regarding the plan, how you wish to disarm in fact. When we reach agreement on this question, it will be very easy to reach agreement on the question of control, because on the principles of the approach to the question of control there are no serious differences between us, except for your desire to verify the remaining armaments." (ibid).

Mr. Zorin seems to think that the Canadian delegation has changed its ground of argument, from being dissatisfied with what the Soviet Union plan offers in the way of control to being dissatisfied with the content -- with the measures the Soviet plan contains. But this is not a change of position. The Western nations



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here have objected, and still object, to the Soviet Union proposals, on the one hand because they do not seem capable of being properly verified in accordance with the Agreed Principles, and on the other hand on the grounds which were explained by the representatives of Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, notably at our thirty-third meeting on 8 May; these grounds were the imbalance in the disarmament measures, the unclear definition of the conventional arms which would be reduced, and the lack of initial measures either for eliminating nuclear weapons or for stopping the production of fissile material for weapons uses. Yet we are asked to accept a plan containing all these defects, as we see them, in exchange for the privilege of deciding how these unsuitable measures are to be controlled.

I shall revert later in my remarks to the question of control of the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles, but first I think it is necessary to give the reason why the West feels that this crucial measure of disarmament would not be practicable in one step or stage. This, as we have tried previously to explain, is because of the facts of international life.

I believe that on reflection all members of the Conference will agree that this disarmament treaty which we are trying to formulate will not be like any other treaty. No nations have ever sat down together and agreed to disarm themselves -- at any rate, not to disarm themselves completely. We have the example of the Washington naval treaties of the early 1920's, which were made between nations that were allies in World War I, with no important causes of friction or disagreement between them. But this was what the Soviet Union would now call control over armaments, but not disarmament, general and complete disarmament is something entirely new and unprecedented.

In the usual treaty, if one party breaks it the aggrieved party still has ways of defending its interests, because it has armed strength or other means of pressure at its disposal. Take, as an example, a treaty defining the frontier between two States after hostilities between them. If one side or the other breaches the agreed frontier, the offended party still has its armed forces with which it can do something to rectify matters in exercise of its right of self-defence. Either party would think twice before breaking a treaty when to do so might involve such consequences. But under general and complete disarmament we are going to agree to put aside all armed strength. Eventually the parties to the treaty will lose the power of using armed forces, which they have depended upon in the past to

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ensure respect for their vital interests. So, in agreeing to something completely outside the experience of States so far, it is only right and reasonable that we should take every precaution to ensure that if certain measures are put in the treaty it will be possible to prove that they are in fact being complied with.

It is therefore necessary that assurances and safeguards should be built into this disarmament treaty which would not be necessary in an ordinary treaty because, as I have said, under ordinary treaties the parties have means of protecting their interests. That is why it is necessary for us to examine every disarmament measure proposed in the light of the possibility of its effective verification. We cannot say that we agree in principle to a measure, thus committing ourselves to it, and then afterwards see whether it can be verified. The Canadian delegation must therefore disagree with the representative of the Soviet Union when he says that we must first agree on what goes into the plan and then, afterwards, think about control.

Mr. Zorin seemed to think that the sense of honour between States and respect for the opinions of the international community would ensure that all parties would honour their obligations. In his view, this would be sufficient to guarantee that no State would clandestinely re-arm or conceal armament, or permit such acts. I will quote what he said:

"When they sign a treaty which has been discussed freely or has been agreed at meetings over a number of years, the States assume a great -- I would say -- historic responsibility. Every State values its good name and, obviously, it will not venture to violate a treaty or engage in concealments." (ENDC/PV.35, p.55)

He went on:

"Such a thing would be an absolutely futile adventure from the State point of view. It is unthinkable in these days when millions of people stand guard for peace." (ibid.)

I certainly do not wish to allege or suggest that the Soviet Government, or any other government, would enter into a treaty with the deliberate intention of not observing it. However, I do say that history teaches us that governments have very frequently entered into treaties, doubtless with the intention of observing them, but later, when conditions have seemed to change, they have not hesitated to denounce or violate the provisions of the treaty. The entire argument comes down to this: we cannot depend on the honour of governments to ensure that

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everything which they put their name to will be carried through fully, and this for the reasons I have given. This is not to insult any government here or its representatives, but simply to state a fact of international life.

I would say that this dependence on honour is an attitude rather different from the previous stand taken by the representative of the Soviet Union: that the Soviet Union neither wishes to take on faith the compliance of other nations with the treaty nor expects its own compliance to be taken on faith.

In determining the form of the measures to go into this treaty, and the commitments involved, we must take into consideration the possibility of a change of attitude on the part of the governments of the high contracting parties. This is why the principle of balance -- the agreed principle of balance -- is so important. If the process of disarmament should stop short or be reversed at any point, all parties must be assured that they would not be in a worse position relative to each other than they are now. This, in turn, requires a certain gradualness in the disarmament process which is most clearly brought out, in a general way, by the acceptance of the principle of disarmament by stages; the general principle of disarmament by stages is one of the Agreed Principles.

I think all this adds up to the argument that we should plan to proceed by careful, graduated stages from our present world position of non-confidence, in which security is dependent on the balance of power, to the position of confidence which we all hope to achieve when the final stages of general and complete disarmament are implemented.

While nuclear weapons exist there is always the possibility of a nuclear war, or of a conventional war breaking out which can quickly become a nuclear war. And nuclear weapons will exist under the Soviet Union and United States plans until at least the end of the second stage of disarmament. These things, in spite of Mr. Khrushchev's picturesque phrase, are not "like cucumbers in a barn": they can do incalculable damage. To say that it is impossible for them to be used as instruments of war once the specialized means of delivery of these weapons is destroyed is not, I think, realistic. The rockets which are nominally to be used for peaceful purposes will be left, and there will be the possibility of converting civil aircraft and the less specialized kinds of military aircraft so they can deliver nuclear weapons.

The argument against this possible danger which was made by Mr. Zorin, and I think by others, is that there would be inspectors of the international disarmament

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organization where these rockets and aircraft are and in the factories where they could be converted. It would be pleasant to think that the international disarmament organization, because of its moral authority and the authority granted by the treaty, could be absolutely sure that its orders not to do anything of this kind would be obeyed. But I am afraid that my experience as an executive member of the United Nations Security Council has been that the officers appointed by that Council for an analogous kind of work can be and have been pushed aside by the armed forces of States. States will possess the means of imposing their will by force on the agents of international supervisory bodies in their own territories, and if it seems in their interests to do so they can push the agents of the international disarmament organization to one side. Consequently, I do not think that it is a sound and convincing argument to say that because international control will be instituted in the first stage the fear of nuclear war or the possibility of the creation or re-building of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons will no longer exist.

All these arguments which I have given are intended to show why, in attaining the goal which we all desire -- that is, the total elimination of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon vehicles -- it is desirable to proceed step by step, and not to put our faith in drastic, and perhaps at first glance attractive, measures which would remove us from a situation where at least we know the dangers and can guard against them to another which might in fact be more dangerous to world peace by eliminating the balance which we have at the present time.

If we decide to reduce armaments in balance and by steps, and with proper verification, that means that there is agreement between the two sides. Each will know what the other is doing, each will know that the other is fulfilling its engagement. That will build up the confidence between the two great Power blocs which, as I have said before and should like to repeat, will be the only true basis for world security for some years to come.

The representative of the Soviet Union asked me on 11 May:

"... how do you envisage verifying the presence of these hidden weapons? This point is not only included in our plan but it is in yours as well. Explain it. What do you have in mind when you speak of verifying the presence of hidden weapons in the territory of a country of 22 million square kilometres? ... It suffices to raise the question in its practical aspect for you to realize

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that such an approach to this question is unrealistic.

... But these are problems with which not only we are faced and which affect our plan; these are problems with which you too are faced and which affect your plan. Well then, out with it; answer us; how do you envisage verification?

In principle, we are in favour of it. Explain to us now how you envisage this verification." (ENDC/PV.35, p.56)

This seems to me to represent a rather important change of position. As I understand it, the Soviet Union does not now object to verification that there are no means of delivery of the nuclear weapons left, and that 100 per cent of them have really been eliminated, on the grounds that this would disclose information vital to the security of their country and would be legalized espionage; instead he says that practical considerations make such verification impossible. I gather from Mr. Zorin's remarks on 11 May which I have quoted that it is only because such verification is not practicable that they would not consider it.

Perhaps I should say that Mr. Zorin's remarks yesterday in reply to the questions of Sweden, and some remarks made by the representative of Poland today, would perhaps throw some doubt on this change of viewpoint; but that is what I derived from the question which Mr. Zorin put and the comments he made on 11 May.

Furthermore, the Soviet representative says that "these are problems with which not only we are faced and which affect our plan; these are problems with which you too are faced and which affect your plan". (ibid.) But it does not arise in this form from the Western plan as set out in the United States treaty outline, which calls for only 3 per cent reduction of nuclear weapons vehicles in the first stage and proposes to verify this by the zonal sampling technique. The 100 per cent reduction in the first stage is an exclusively Soviet idea. They are unable to tell us how it can be verified that the 100 per cent elimination has really taken place, and therefore would seem to say that, even though there is no true verification possible, nevertheless we should accept their plan.

In addressing the representatives of all the Western countries here, the Soviet representative also said:

"I request [the Western delegations] to tell us how they envisage the verification of this secret retention of weapons ... It is not a question that gives rise to any difficulties for us from the point of view of principle. It is a purely practical question. We can

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reach agreement on the methods of such verification, if we reach agreement on the substance of the disarmament programme. Any putting forward of questions of that kind is an attempt to evade solving the question of the disarmament programme, of disarmament measures as such." (ibid., p. 59)

The position of the Western Powers is that we must consider the verification of the measure before we know if it is acceptable, in conformity with the sixth Agreed Principle which I have quoted previously: "All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations" (ENDC/5, p.2). If any measure is proposed which is incapable of being so verified, then it is not in accordance with the Agreed Principles and should not have a place in the eventually agreed treaty. And this -- at least in the view of the Canadian delegation -- is the case with the Soviet proposal for a 100 per cent reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles in stage I.

However, the Soviet representative may have intended to ask the Western nations how they would propose to carry out verification of the measures in the United States plan, that is, the 30 per cent reduction of nuclear weapons vehicles in stage I proceeding by steps of 10 per cent at a time. We are certainly obliged to explain to this Conference how, in our view, verification could be carried out. I will not attempt to give a full explanation of the zonal sampling plan -- that will, I assume, be done in due course by the United States delegation -- but would like to advance some illustrative ideas which may give members of the Conference a notion of the practicability of this general idea in terms of time and manpower. I should say that the figures that follow are approximate and illustrative. No doubt later, when fuller studies of the zonal verification technique are available, we shall have much more precise estimates.

Suppose we say that under the United States zonal plan of verification when there is a 10 per cent reduction in nuclear weapons vehicles and other armaments, 10 per cent of Soviet Union territory, and of the territories of all parties, should be subject to verification procedures. This would amount to 2,200,000 square kilometres for the Soviet Union. In passing I would say that vast areas of the Soviet Union, like those in my country, are not developed to the extent that a close examination of what they might contain would be necessary. But suppose that a block of 220,000 square kilometres, or one per cent, of Soviet Union territory

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is to be fairly carefully examined to see that it only contains those armaments and armed forces which are supposed to be there according to the agreement. Now, 220,000 square kilometres represents a square of 465 kilometres each side. This is less than one hour's flight for a jet aircraft, which could be taking air photographs; it is not a very long day's journey for a motorcar on reasonable roads.

But, to get an idea of the number of men and the time required to make an inspection, it occurred to me to compare this to a topographical survey. Many years ago, when I was engaged in this work, a surveyor with a plane-table could map about one square mile a day, which is approximately 2.6 square kilometres. Making a detailed topographical map of the area would probably be a longer job than looking through it to see if there were any unauthorised armaments. If one divides 220,000 by 2.6 one gets 85,000 man-days of work, that is to say, the equivalent of 500 men working for six months. The 500 men might be doubled to allow for administrative and transport personnel. Those figures are for one per cent of Soviet territory, and a simple multiplication will show what would be required to inspect 10 per cent. Given modern methods of transport and observation, it would be possible to examine such blocks of territory within a relatively short space of time -- the six months I have suggested.

Of course, the inspection proposed in the United States plan would call for the co-operation of the country in whose territory the inspection was being carried out, and this co-operation really is the most important part in order to give reassurance that compliance with the disarmament obligations is genuine. If the military and other officials of the host country co-operated with the international inspectors, the latter would only have to ask to be shown what was in a certain building or establishment and it would be shown to them. This is really what would create the confidence that disarmament measures were being carried out in good faith -- the acceptance of the obligation to show that there was nothing hidden "under the jacket".

It might illustrate the problem if I cited an experience of my own which, in a small way, constituted an attempt to apply international arms control. This relates to the period when I was Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, when the question arose whether certain armaments were or were not in the enclave of Mount Scopus near Jerusalem.

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Representatives may know that this Israeli enclave in Jordanian territory was created by agreement between the Arabs and Israelis during the 1958 hostilities and it included the Hebrew University and the Hadassah Hospital. The area was supposed to be under the control of the Truce Supervision Organization and to be manned only by Israeli police with small arms. However, as time went on the Jordanians, for various reasons suspected that the Israelis had introduced mortars and mortar ammunition in the area contrary to the agreement. As Chief of the Truce Supervision Organization, I was asked to clear up the matter by inspecting the area, and after a while it was arranged for me to do so. Everything seemed to be in order until I came to two or three rooms in the hospital which were locked up, and when I asked what was in them it proved impossible to find the keys to open the doors. Quite possibly there was nothing more dangerous in those rooms than bedpans or hospital furniture, but I could not assure the Jordanians that in fact none of the suspected weapons was there. Incidentally, this matter never was cleared up.

This illustrates the point that, if there are no "locked rooms", confidence is created that everybody is honouring obligations; but, if there are certain areas which are "locked rooms", then there is immediately suspicion that the obligations are not being honoured and that some evasion may be taking place. So I return to the point that the great value of all parties agreeing to the system of verification proposed in the United States plan would be that it would immediately create confidence that obligations were being honoured, and searches to prove the non-existence of prohibited armaments would become less rigorous.

To conclude this part of my remarks I would say that while the Soviet Union does not think that their proposal to eliminate nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage can be verified -- and we in the West agree with them -- the Western nations do consider that their proposal for a gradual reduction can be verified and is therefore a more useful proposal.

May I remind the Conference that in the proposals which were brought before the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee by the Soviet Union in March 1960 (TNDC/6) and which were based on the original proposals for general and complete disarmament given to the United Nations General Assembly on 18 September 1959 by Mr. Khrushchev, (A/4219) the elimination of rockets and military aircraft did not take place until the third stage, and in the first part of the session of the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee a good deal was said by the delegations of the Soviet Union and their



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socialist allies in favour of this plan. But when the Committee re-assembled on 7 June 1960, after a recess, the Soviet Union plan had been altered to put the elimination of all nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage as it is at present (TNDC/6/Rev.1). I wonder whether it would be permissible to suggest to our Soviet colleagues that in going from the last stage to the first stage they took too great a leap. Should they not, as the French say "reculer pour mieux sauter", and perhaps make the elimination in three jumps rather than in one long jump?

Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia): The discussion we have had since the beginning of this week seems to indicate that in considering the first stage of general and complete disarmament we have reached a certain point where it is hard to say anything entirely new in substance. The basic ideas, the principal measures and their extent, have been explained by both sides in full. It certainly may be of use if the authors of the two basic documents provide us with some additional clarifications as a result of questions put to them. But in general it seems to my delegation that the time has come to set out the points on which we may agree and the points on which, for the time being, there are differences of substance between our views. This may perhaps give us guidance in deciding what avenues we should take in the next stage of our work.

At this juncture, when a detailed analysis has been completed in our discussions here, and when some of our colleagues seem to insist, perhaps too much, on some technical details, my delegation deems it appropriate to recall the basic aspects and views which will help us get back to the possibility of a synthesis. Individual measures should be properly assessed and put in a correct context, taking fully into account such basic views. I would like to make a few remarks on this point.

The stage we have been considering is the initial stage of general and complete disarmament, that is, the initial stage of a process which, by its whole nature and purpose, should go and is supposed to go in the opposite direction from the armaments race, which puts such an enormous burden on the shoulders of our world and imperils its further evolution. A deep and complete change must be brought about in the development of the world which has taken place so far.

Many useful statements and correct ideas were heard on this subject in the general debate at the beginning of the work of this Committee. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Fawzi, said on 21 March:

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"... a world of general and complete disarmament, were it ever to come about, would be a new world to which we would have to make a new approach." (ENDC/PV.6, p.12)

At our meeting on 15 March, even the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Rusk, characterized this new approach by quoting the following words of President Kennedy's letter:

"... the fact that the immediate and practical significance of the task that has brought you together has come to be so fully realized by the peoples of the world is one of the crucial developments of our time. For men now know that amassing of destructive power does not beget security ..." (ENDC/PV.2, p.15)

I do not quote any of the statements of the socialist countries, since their position in this respect is obvious and known to everybody. In fact, the new approach, that of peace and peaceful co-existence, is the very basis of the foreign policy of the socialist States and it is the very basis of the Soviet draft treaty which we have here under consideration. We regard it as a positive phenomenon that this view on a new approach, which is identical with the basic views of the socialist countries and their foreign policies, is maintained and stressed by the eminent representatives of other countries whose policies are based on different concepts and different ideologies from those of our socialist countries. And this basic change, the necessity of which is recognized by every delegation present here, has to be brought about in the very first stage if this stage is to constitute the real beginning of the process of general and complete disarmament.

Therefore, we must ask ourselves where we want to get to in this first stage. The Soviet draft gives a clear answer to this question. It is necessary to eliminate in substance the possibility of an outbreak of a nuclear war. It is necessary to abandon the idea -- and I think this is in accordance with President Kennedy's words -- that the possibility of starting a nuclear war means the safeguarding of the security of the country which has such a possibility. Are we capable of accepting this principle and of starting to translate it into reality? Here I think, we must state with regret that some delegations proceed from different positions in criticizing the proposals contained in the Soviet draft treaty.

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The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada have maintained -- and in the statement of the representative of Canada this morning it has been repeated -- that it is neither desirable nor possible to eliminate all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles since this would, in their opinion, represent a danger to the security of the Western world. I was not able to follow the text of the intervention of the representative of Canada, as apparently there were not enough copies so that my delegation could be provided with one. But I did listen attentively to what he said. And in listening to his speech, and taking into account what has been said on this point by other representatives on the Western side, I did wonder what kind of logic was there. The Soviet Union, which is ahead in the development of the most important kind of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles -- which is admitted even by certain spokesmen of the West, who continue to speak of a "missile gap" -- is proposing that all States should eliminate all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and in this way renounce the possibility of starting a nuclear war.

For this radical measure the Soviet Union proposes, and is ready to accept, 100 per cent control. That means control equal to the radical measure. I think we should see all the consequences of this, because this measure would in fact also bring about a radical solution to the problem which has received some attention at recent meetings of the Conference and which the United States representative mentioned once more in his statement this morning -- namely, the question of outer space.

It has been said here that the Soviet and United States plans contain similar measures as far as certain technical approaches are concerned, but I think it is important to take into account the difference of the context in which those similar -- and at first sight perhaps in some aspects identical -- measures are being proposed. The Soviet Union proposes them in the context of the complete liquidation of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, which would involve also complete liquidation of rocket weapons which constitute the material basis for the use of outer space for military purposes. It is therefore a direct prerequisite for the solution of the problem of outer space. This would be the only way of also carrying out further radical measures related to the production of missiles and the launching of space vehicles which would ensure that no State could use outer space for purposes that were other than peaceful. This would also constitute a firm basis for the development of international co-operation in research and the peaceful uses of outer space.

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Examining the context of the United States proposal, what do we see? What effective steps can be taken to prevent rockets, nuclear delivery vehicles, from being launched in outer space if we allow 90 per cent in the first year, 80 per cent in the second year, and so on, to be produced, developed and tested, while huge stockpiles of nuclear bombs would be preserved? How can we, in such circumstances, provide effective control of any measure in this field when we open wide the door to circumvention and evasion by allowing 90, 80 and 70 per cent to be freely developed?

The representative of the United States has told us today how he envisaged the prevention of evasion, but this is the old, unrealistic claim of the United States of 100 per cent control over the 10, 20 and 30 per cent reductions being planned in the first three years of the United States proposal. I would say that the proposal of the United States, as explained by Mr. Stelle today, is an attempt to re-introduce by the back door, so to speak, of control of all missiles, linked with outer space measures, this 100 per cent control over partial -- 10, 20 or 30 per cent -- disarmament measures.

I think it has been pointed out sufficiently clearly that to treat the problem of disarmament and control in this way is to introduce an inadequate control. It is contrary to the basic principles; and it is, of course, unacceptable to the socialist States. We shall not solve the problem of ensuring security in outer space if we do not solve the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles in general -- that is, by a radical measure, as proposed by the Soviet Union, in the first stage. But today this seems to be the main objection of the United States to the solution proposed by the Soviet Union in the field of outer space.

In the light of this new approach, the necessity of which has been so clearly demonstrated in connexion with the problem of outer space -- so stressed by the Western delegations -- it seems to my delegation that the arguments of those who oppose the basic idea of the first stage of the Soviet plan by invoking so-called security reasons are obviously unconvincing.

The representative of Canada dwelt rather extensively on this security problem. Let us see whose security may be endangered by substantially curbing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war, and whose security is to be protected by the preservation of a nominally partial but in fact substantial possibility of starting a nuclear war. The representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Michael Wright, observed on 8 May (ENDC/PV.33, p. 31) that the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would

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imperil the security of smaller countries which needed United States or United Kingdom aid as quickly as possible.

What kind of aid is it which would be brought by nuclear weapon delivery vehicles? It seems to us that it is a rather problematic aid, because a nuclear attack on these countries would be tantamount to their physical destruction. Equally empty is the argument that the proper security of smaller countries may be safeguarded by the presence of military bases which the great Powers have built on their territories. What kind of security is a security which in the event of a conflict automatically attracts a destructive blow from the country against which such bases are aimed and against which an attack from those bases is being prepared and launched?

The representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, said on 11 May (ENDC/PV.35, p.7) that the process of general and complete disarmament must not break the existing military pattern. In this connexion he mentioned also the existing military picture. There have been some semantic explanations -- in accordance with the methods of some of the explanations here in the Committee -- but, after all these explanations, it still remains the belief of my delegation, and here we agree with what was said yesterday by the representative of India, Mr. Lall, that as early as in stage I of general and complete disarmament we must do away with a military pattern and picture which is based on the accumulation of the capacity to start a nuclear war, on what is called the balance of terror. I am afraid that when the representative of Canada spoke of lack of balance, as he did so fully this morning, he had in mind this balance of terror. I was rather puzzled by the strange logic of his reasoning concerning the unbalanced disarmament proposal in this field allegedly made by the Soviet Union. What kind of unbalanced disarmament is it when the Soviet Union proposes some measures which impose equal obligations on both sides as far as the delivery vehicles are concerned and also as far as conventional weapons and forces are concerned? It seems to us that our Western colleagues, in speaking about unbalanced proposals by the Soviet Union, are suffering from a certain obsession. Really, what unbalanced proposals are being put forward by the Soviet Union? In all cases these proposals involve equal obligations on both sides.

Let us take the example of those conventional forces and weapons with regard to which there is so much talk of imbalance from the Western side. The Soviet Union proposes a substantial cut in conventional armaments and forces. Under the

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conditions of such a reduction the countries of Western Europe, for instance, would maintain a higher level of armed forces than the socialist countries in Europe. Even so, there is talk of unbalance. Why does the United States, then, propose a higher level, for both the Soviet Union and the United States which evidently goes beyond the framework of mere defence? Why is the 1.7 million proposed by the Soviet Union unbalanced disarmament and 2.1 million proposed by the United States balanced disarmament? That is something which really escapes my understanding.

As far as the danger of evasion is concerned, Mr. Burns dwelt here on the possibilities and dangers of evasion in the case of the Soviet proposals. But is there not at least an equal danger in the case of a 10 per cent reduction, linked with a specific kind of inspection, that is to say, with a zonal inspection? Even in the proposals and the explanations of the Western delegations there is no link, no co-ordination, no correlation, between the extent of the disarmament measure and the extent of the corresponding control or verification measure. They are so much lacking in rational correlation that a suggestion was made -- I think, properly -- whether it would not be better to make the selection of the zones a completely casual operation. If I am not mistaken, it was the representative of Sweden who suggested that. We feel that in the objections of the Western delegations to the Soviet proposal there is a too great lack of a new approach. There is too much of those views and principles of approach which have been branded even by the President of the United States, in the words I quoted some minutes ago, as outdated and not corresponding to the necessities of the hour. If we introduce into the process of general and complete disarmament such views and such measures, then we cannot but slow down this process and create a situation in which it may at any time be halted or even reversed to give way to a new wave of the arms race, as the representative of Poland, Mr. Naszkowski, this morning pointed out in other connexions.

Therefore my delegation deems it necessary to draw attention to this strange logic of approach and to the danger of introducing into our talks on general and complete disarmament criteria of the arms race and of the policy which a certain time ago was called the policy of "brinkmanship". This would not be an approach which would help us. Of course I think that safeguards, security and all these elements must be taken into consideration, but never in such a way as to reintroduce into our talks on general and complete disarmament those views and approaches which have nothing to do with disarmament and which, when led to their

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logical conclusions, risk putting in doubt the feasibility and even the desirability of general and complete disarmament. It seems to my delegation that to introduce these elements into our talks and to make them the basic points of the approach of some delegations would necessarily lead our discussion into a vicious circle.

But it is our task to make way for new thinking and to a new approach. My delegation is gratified by the fact that this new approach and this new thinking is making some headway in our talks. With this in mind, we should soon proceed to sum up the discussion on the first stage and try to draw up a synthesis of it. We believe that the informal meeting scheduled for tomorrow could be of use from this point of view. We think that it is necessary to try to agree on what concrete results we wish to reach in the first stage.

Can we agree that we should eliminate the possibility of starting a nuclear war? Do we regard this as desirable and feasible? If those who criticize the Soviet draft because of this point do not think this is a desirable or feasible objective, they should explain their reasons. They should also say clearly and precisely whether, in their view, we can accomplish during the first stage something which would represent a new approach and would bring about a change in which the armaments race now unfortunately taking place in the world would be halted and the process reversed. If we are unable to find such a common formula for the first stage, let us simply state the points of agreement and of disagreement, and then proceed as soon as possible to the discussion of the next stage in order to be able at the required time to submit a report which would reflect our progress and also our difficulties.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I have listened with interest to the statements we heard this morning and with particular care to the last intervention of the representative of Czechoslovakia and to his closing words. I think he has raised points about which we ought to think very carefully. I agree with him that we certainly want to try and achieve as great an area of agreement as possible on the first stage. I should like to give some more thought to the question of how much longer it would be fruitful for us to discuss the first stage in this present phase of our discussions. But I quite agree that we shall have to look at the further stages in due course and perhaps go through them all before we shall be able to arrive at firm decisions.

On the other hand, I think we must still clarify our minds a little further on some aspects of the first stage. I believe that we should take up the point made by the representative of Czechoslovakia when he said that we should explain why we

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do not regard as feasible some of the Soviet proposals for the first stage. This is what some of us have been endeavouring to do during recent meetings. I do think that the quite masterly survey and penetrating statement made this morning by the representative of Canada on some aspects of this question do deserve the very careful and considered thought of us all. I believe the other interventions made this morning deserve our careful attention, including the interesting one made by the representative of Sweden, who reverted to the twelve questions that he had previously put. These questions and the answers to them have helped us all at least to evaluate the position. We may not agree with some of the answers given, but at least they do show us a little more clearly some of the points of difference.

In his statement at the thirty-third meeting of the Conference, my colleague, Sir Michael Wright, raised certain questions of balance -- some of the questions to which the representative of Czechoslovakia referred in his statement -- between the stage I programmes in the two drafts before us. Our Soviet colleague replied to Sir Michael Wright in the course of the thirty-fifth meeting of the Conference, held on 11 May.

I should like briefly to continue and elaborate on this discussion, because it does seem to me to be absolutely fundamental to the issues before us and to the form which our final treaty will have to take. I would just interpose that all of us must beware of over-dramatising the position of the first stage. We are all of us committed to general and complete disarmament. I should think that is firmly engraved on all our hearts by now, talking about it as much as we do. For the first stage we are deciding what we can most readily and most conveniently achieve, what measures will have the greatest fruitful effect on the whole world. But of course this is one stage. We all want to see by the end of the third stage the complete elimination of all these weapons. What we have to decide is what we really believe, to take the words of our Czechoslovak colleague, it is practicable and feasible to do in stage I.

In the light of this, the question of the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles has figured, and rightly so, very largely in our discussions. Mr. Zorin, in his intervention on 11 May, said:

"I think that not only military experts but all diplomats know that nowadays the main offensive weapon for a big war is the nuclear weapon." (ENDC/PV.35, p. 46).



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I would agree with that statement in the position in which we stand today, though of course it can be argued that it is the very size of the weapons and their devastating effect which would make any Power pause before unleashing them on the world. But if we are seriously to contemplate the Soviet proposal for 100 per cent elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I, then we must also seriously consider what effect this measure in itself would have on the likelihood of other kinds of war, wars without nuclear weapons, taking place. I have in mind wars such as those which devastated Europe twice within the last fifty years. These wars are of course not as big as those which Mr. Zorin fears might be fought with nuclear weapons.

All our minds, it is true, are engaged by this terrible threat of a nuclear war, but those who experienced the last two wars know that they were grim enough, and I am sure our Soviet colleagues would agree with me on that point; their country bears the scars as much as any other. Therefore, I would suggest to our colleagues that whether stage I of the Soviet draft treaty makes such wars possible is a very important consideration. In our concentration on the nuclear threat we must not lose sight altogether of the risks that could be inherent in a policy which eliminated the one without the other. Now this is in my view a complicated military problem. It is a problem to which the answer is not immediately obvious, I would imagine, to any of us today, and any conclusions that we may reach would have to be based on a study of the relative effectiveness of the forces remaining to both sides under the treaty, with the possible additions -- and I must emphasize this because it is a material factor -- which could be achieved by a country which chose to act in bad faith.

To test whether we need have real fears of acts of bad faith this Conference must examine closely how far it is possible for a country to hide away significant numbers of conventional weapons, how far it is possible for, shall I say, para-military organizations to supplement the armed forces in a time of emergency, how quickly a country which had decided to deliver a deadly stroke could mobilize its clandestine resources, and how effectively these resources could be supplemented by the nuclear warheads which would still exist at the end of stage I, in their entirety under the Soviet plan, in a lower concentration under the United States plan.

There is no doubt at all that even the largest strategic weapons could be carried by pressing into service, for instance, fishing vessels, tanks, civil aircraft,

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and even lorries -- I will not mention suitcases. It is relevant to interpose here that even a strategic -- I emphasize the word "strategic" -- nuclear warhead, that is, one which would be capable of destroying at the very least an entire city, can now be contained in a cylinder five feet long with a diameter of two feet. There are in existence today many tactical nuclear warheads much, much smaller than this which could have a far more devastating effect than many of the high explosive bombs which we all saw wreak such havoc in the last war. So we have to be realistic about what is meant and what are the risks involved in these grim weapons which would still remain at the end of the Soviet first stage.

It is certainly technically possible -- and without a much closer examination can we be sure that this would not happen? -- for these weapons to be used even in this improvised way. Can we be sure there would be no military value -- there could certainly be a terror value -- in such improvised nuclear weapons? I put the question in this way because, after all, this is how any responsible government is bound to approach the problem. Can we be certain at the present moment that this is a military danger which can safely be dismissed? I would say that is a very big assumption for any of us to make. Do not let us imagine that just by this concentration on the nuclear delivery vehicle we are eliminating all fears all dangers from nuclear explosion. The fact is that we have to judge these dangers against the background of the treaty which we are seeking to evolve. What is this background? It is that the proposals in the Soviet draft treaty involve such a radical readjustment of the military pattern that, I submit no one could understand their implications, let alone accept them without a far more searching examination than they have yet received in this Conference.

Now, in contrast, the merit of the United States plan, as it seems to me, is that it does not propose a radical change in stage I. This of course does give our Soviet colleague in some degree a propaganda advantage, because he can claim, and he does not lose the opportunity of doing so, that the West appears to be slower in its approach to the goal of general and complete disarmament than the East. But it is no small advantage for a government seeking to reach a decision to know in advance that most of the possible consequences of that decision can be foreseen. This, it seems to me, is an argument that bears heavily on the side of those who wish for a balanced run-down of armaments. I have spoken earlier about the need for generating confidence. This is an essential part not merely of our task round this table but when we come actually to implementing the first stage measures.

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The actual start of the reduction will be a tremendous gesture of confidence. Do not let us overload stage I and so make it something which could never get started at all.

It is all very well, I think, for Mr. Zorin to claim that the real difference between the two plans before the Conference is that the Soviet treaty proposes a greater amount of disarmament in stage I with regard to the level of armed forces and armaments than does the United States plan. This of course sounds impressive, but it is by no means the only consideration that we need to take into account. The stability of the world, the balance between the disarmament measures carried out on both sides, is really, I would submit, of much greater importance, because without that stability the actual disarmament process could in itself -- yes, in itself, paradoxically perhaps but nevertheless really -- become a death-trap. To illustrate this particular point, which I think is very important, I might use an old adage that is certainly well known in the English language: "In the country of the blind, the one-eyed man is king." Now I think this is particularly relevant in this question where we have to get the balance right. It is this question of stability that I have stressed before, and that I feel bound to come back to again and again.

I shall continue to take the view that the onus is clearly with the sponsors of a plan to demonstrate to the satisfaction of all of us here that their plan does not at any time, at any stage, involve a period of even potential instability, or even of instability for a very short and temporary period. This, I think, is the charge which we have to level against these two plans; we have to see what in fact is likely to be involved here. We have had a good deal of discussion about the relative merits of the 100 per cent elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles proposed by our Soviet colleagues and the 30 per cent -- less ambitious -- reduction proposed by the United States plan.

It does seem to me that if one is going to have a plan with definite stages, although, as I have said earlier, we must not attach too much importance to the separate stages -- what we want is the whole -- nevertheless, in these definite stages we have to get agreement on something which will seem fair to all concerned, particularly to the two major leaders of the great Power blocs in the world today, something which seems fair to both sides. If one side proposes a cut across-the-board, then I think it is reasonable for it to say that whatever the relative stability existing at this moment it should be by and large retained if a uniform

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ut is made. I realize that in particular categories of particular armaments, arguments could be produced which would seek to invalidate in some degree that general point, but by and large I claim that it is basic that a percentage cut cross-the-board should retain relatively the same degree of balance of forces between the opposing blocs. But if one party wishes to bring forward a plan which provides for very large variations, for complete elimination of one particular armament, as in this case, then it is the duty of that party to convince the rest of us that it is not bringing about some element of instability through its plan. This is something which, I must say to our Soviet colleagues, though I have listened to their arguments with care, I am very far from being convinced they have achieved up to the present.

I think it was our Swedish colleague who said this morning -- I tried to take on his words -- that military balance might be as well preserved by a policy containing sharp variations as by one providing for a uniform cut across-the-board. As I have just indicated, I agree that is possible but I think it is obviously much less likely than where there is a uniform cut; and I think that if any party brings before us a plan providing for sharp variations it is for it to prove to the rest of us that in fact the use of its plan would not reveal disparities at the end of a particular stage. That, I would submit, has not in fact been done so far.

This whole question of balance is therefore, I think, one of great relevance, and one to which we should give much more thought. In evaluating this stage I we have probably got to see where we have the greatest measure of agreement. I hope, however, that we shall not allow this particular item to get out of focus and loom too large in our consideration. I believe we have got to achieve results in what we are setting before ourselves in stage I and I say frankly to our Soviet colleagues that unless they can produce far more effective arguments to justify this one very sweeping reduction I would ask them to consider whether it would not be reasonable and feasible for them to bring forward some other proposal less sweeping in its nature and easier to justify on the particular question of stability.

Tied up with that, I think, is the question of verification. I thought our Canadian colleague showed us very clearly this morning some of the very real problems which exist in this context. Our Soviet colleague has, I think, on

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various occasions over-simplified this problem in some degree. On this question of verification he said at our thirty-fifth meeting:

"... from a practical point of view, in the conditions of international control over disarmament, such concealments on the scale required for the achievement of the aims of aggression would be impossible."

(ENDC/PV.35, p.55)

That was a pretty sweeping statement, and I think it has been very fully dealt with by Mr. Burns' comments this morning. What we are really trying to find out is whether in fact concealed violations are impossible or not. Simple assertions like that, however, do not carry conviction with them.

Again, Mr. Zorin said:

"It is obvious to everyone, however, that any preparation of such forces and such military means" --

I understand this to mean the armed forces and armaments which would be needed for a clandestine attack --

"could not remain unnoticed by the international control organ. And any State would immediately be unmasked and would be condemned by the peoples of the world." (ibid.)

I find those last few words a very interesting and striking phrase. But what kind of condemnation has Mr. Zorin in mind here? After all, words would not be sufficient. A State contemplating and preparing to use force illegally would not be stopped by words. It would have to be threatened by some greater force exercised on behalf of the powers of law and order in the world. I have previously referred to the importance of the United Nations peace force, or whatever the body might be, and undoubtedly we have to give very full consideration to that subject during our discussions. I do not want to develop it now: I merely interpose that as a thought in this connexion.

Possibly, however, our Soviet colleague can help us here. Possibly, if he could be more specific about the kind of condemnation he has in mind, and if we found that we could agree with what he says, then possibly we should be moving closer together on this question of control. For it is this lack of control over the last remnants of particular categories of armaments, coupled with the vagueness about the sanctions which might be employed to redress the situation which worries us most in regard to the Soviet draft.

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Perhaps I should look again at the first part of the quotation which I have just given from what Mr. Zorin said, namely, that clandestine preparation of an illegal attack "could not remain unnoticed by the international control organ" (ibid.). Whether that is true or not depends very much on the number of international controllers, their degree of freedom of movement and their geographical distribution inside a country. Mr. Zorin said in his statement to which I am alluding that control agents would be present at all points where arms were reduced in numbers. That is what he has told us. If he could give us some idea of what this would mean in practice, we might perhaps find that after all the difference between us is not so great.

Perhaps I can pursue this point a little further -- not with the object of confusing the debate but with the aim of showing some of the points which do worry us in this vital matter. Firstly, will the places at which armaments are to be reduced be, for instance, a few locations, perhaps on the periphery of each country, or will they be scattered at random throughout the country? We know, for instance, that under the Soviet plan the controllers will visit launching pads and airfields. I would like to think that since all major countries have very many airfields this means that controllers would be able to visit a large number of places. But I am not sure about this because, of course, aircraft, from their very nature, can be flown to a few central depots. We shall find it difficult to grasp exactly what is in the mind of the Soviet Union until possibly we can talk about numbers.

I am not asking our Soviet colleagues to commit themselves on this point now, because it is much too early in our debates, but we should have a better idea if we knew very roughly -- I stress that, very roughly -- what is the number of control points that Mr. Zorin has in mind, for instance, in his own country and in the United States. Is it 10, 20, 30, 100, 300, 1,000? What has he in mind? At the moment we have no idea what it is. Clearly, we in the West, from our very approach to this problem of control and verification, would be much happier with a scheme which had 300 or 1,000 control posts than with one that had only 10 or 30. These are purely illustrative figures; I am not attempting to relate them to the problem. Then we could perhaps genuinely begin to feel, if we had these larger numbers, that the inspectors could obtain the knowledge which Mr. Zorin himself states is essential to the proper functioning of the disarmament plan and to the preservation of peace.

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But, of course, there is this other factor which we should not forget: These control officers, even if they were widely distributed throughout a country, could still be ineffective as observers of the matters that they had been sent to verify if they had insufficient freedom of movement. Such freedom is essential. If our Soviet colleagues would concede that the controllers would have at least the same degree of freedom as, for instance, all of us here in this room enjoy in this country of Switzerland, then I think we would have moved closer together. I do emphasize that as a very salient point in the effectiveness of the verification officers.

Mr. Zorin has appealed to us to say how we envisage carrying out inspection with the aim of discovering hidden weapons. I think Mr. Burns today gave us some very graphic illustrations of how this could be worked out and what in fact would be involved. We, for our part, in the United Kingdom have made a fairly exhaustive study of the problems of verification and we shall be ready to discuss with our colleagues in considerable detail what can be done and what cannot be done. Personally, I rather doubt whether this is a matter which could be really satisfactorily dealt with in these large plenary meetings. One has to face this fact: it does raise questions of very considerable technical complexity. But equally I do not take the view that the right approach is to seek to settle all the political problems and only then to deal with the technical issues. The fact is that, in most questions of government nowadays, the arbitrary division between political, military and technical issues, leads one nowhere. This is true even in the restricted field of internal government within a country.

What we have got to try to do is reach a solution by a series of successive approximations, if I can use a mathematical term here, in which political and technical views are looked at alternately until some kind of solution satisfying everybody is hammered out. I think we have got to think of the practicalities of this. I myself have in the past proposed that it would be useful in certain circumstances to think in terms of sub-committees; this might be one of the avenues where that thought could be followed. But certainly such studies as we have made of verification techniques do not lead us to the conclusion which Mr. Zorin sometimes seeks to put into our mouths: that 100 per cent inspection of remainders is always technically possible; in fact, such studies as we have made lead us to think quite the reverse.

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There are some notable difficulties which would be encountered in any plan which we try to implement, but they would be encountered very early in the Soviet plan, before confidence had been built up. This is one of the main reasons why we do see difficulties in accepting this Soviet plan. I have given a good deal of thought to how the verification procedures could work out in relation to the time limits which we have discussed. I thought the very first of the questions posed the other day by our Swedish colleague, which related to the time limit, was significant in this regard. He asked both the Soviet and United States representatives questions with regard to the time involved. In his questions he did make quite clear that possibly there could be variations in the time limits in both those plans. I do not quarrel with that idea at all. But he did say:

"Could we at least have a more specific explanation from the Soviet delegation of how it could achieve so much in so short a time and one from the United States delegation of why it could not go faster after stage I?" (ENDC/PV.35, p.29)

I am dealing only with stage I here at the moment. I only added that last part of the sentence because sometimes I do not quote fully from some of my colleagues, and I wanted to give the full quotation here.

I am dealing really with this question to the Soviet delegation about how it could achieve so much in so short a time. And what is the time that it sets? Article 19 of the Soviet Union draft states:

"1. The first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be initiated six months after the Treaty comes into force,... within which period the International Disarmament Organization shall be set up.

"2. The duration of the first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be 15 months." (ENDC/2, p. 13)

Therefore, we are given six months in which to set up the IDO. We are given fifteen months in which to carry through the whole of this massive stage I. And in that period we have got not only to set up but also to organize effectively the inspectors on a fairly large scale and to make them available all over the world, wherever they are required. Then, in this fifteen-month period which our Soviet colleagues suggest, they have got to verify the destruction of 100 per cent of nuclear delivery vehicles. I do not honestly see how that can be done even with the best will in the world. That is why I think these proposals are unpractical. They are



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seeking to overload the first stage in a way which could prevent it from ever being started. That is what worries me. The IDO has to be set up; the staff has to be trained in some degree; there must be some sort of administration for it; and then it has this massive task which has been somewhat graphically defined for us this morning by Mr. Burns in his statement. It is not an easy task. It is no good brushing it on one side, because it is this force and the way that it operates which is going to promote the confidence which we all know in our hearts is absolutely essential if we are ever to achieve this task that we have set ourselves.

It is getting this IDO set up, getting it organized and seeing it work in the early stages which is going to give us a great deal of that confidence which we need to see the whole scheme through. Therefore, it is essential that sufficient time be given. It is not only a matter of inspecting piles of weapons of war which the nations say they have put in certain places. If there is to be 100 per cent elimination, we must face up to this problem of what has been called the "weapons hidden under the jacket" or the "bombs in the cupboard". I really do not see how one could expect such a new body to tackle such a job in that short period of time.

The other day our Soviet colleague, replying to Mr. Edberg, the Swedish representative, did develop this point. In that intervention he spoke at some length about what was done immediately after the last world war. He gave us striking figures of the dismantling of military machines in his own and other countries. These were very impressive but had not the faintest bearing on the problem which confronts us. This was a red herring which matters not the least in this argument. It is not a matter of a unilateral decision to destroy things in one's own country, under one's own control. This is a confidence-building measure. This is a measure under which you will destroy because you know others are going to destroy too. This is a very different matter and means that you have got to be satisfied -- on both sides, because there can be no unfairness in this -- that this disarmament is being carried out. Before any major country is going to agree to get rid of its vast war potential it has to be sure that its competitors are going to do the same thing. That is where the difficulty arises. Therefore, this answer does not meet the case and we do require a more realistic approach. I am sorry to emphasize this so much, but I think it is basic to our whole problem.

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I am not going to develop this morning the question of possible detection systems and zonal sampling techniques. I have already said that I believe they hold out very considerable promise. I only say to our Soviet colleagues once more that if they want to accomplish these things in this very short period of time they have got to convince us that -- to use the words which our Czechoslovak colleague used -- it is feasible and practicable. So far, I fear, they have not done so. I want to make progress, but do let it be real and realistic, something we can all recommend to our governments as something we can stand by. At the moment I feel it would be unwise to seek to travel in the first stage very much further than is already provided for in the United States draft. But obviously I would be happy to look at any particular categories on which it was felt there would be variations. I believe, by and large, that if we want to succeed, if we want the first stage to go well, we should not overload it. Do not let us give the international disarmament commission an impossible task. If we do, we are only courting failure.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

I do not want to prolong today's meeting beyond the scheduled time in view of the repeated criticism that has been expressed on this subject, I shall confine myself to a small group of questions connected with today's statements and shall postpone answer to other questions until our next meeting.

I must admit that the statements which have been made today have dealt with a number of extremely important questions. In my opinion, however, the most important thing now is to focus our attention on the group of questions relating to the first stage of disarmament. I shall therefore confine myself largely to them and shall concentrate on certain observations made by the United States representative, the Canadian representative and also, though only to a limited degree, by Mr. Godber.

Where the statement by the United States representative is concerned, I should merely like to point out that when he spoke of a former control plan in the field of atomic energy and referred to this control plan as one of the important steps proposed by the United States, I think the account he gave was too brief and failed to indicate that this control plan in the field of atomic energy which was proposed by the United States at the very beginning of the work of the United Nations was essentially a plan for preserving the United States monopoly in the field of atomic

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energy and for bringing the entire atomic industry of other countries, not under international, but to all intents and purposes under United States control. This plan, known as the "Baruch Plan", was not accepted by the Soviet Union because it meant continuing and perpetuating the United States monopoly in the field of atomic industry without in any way impairing the atomic capacity already built up in the United States while bringing the atomic industry of all the countries of the world under control. Of course, such control could not solve the problem of eliminating the threat of an atomic war and was not therefore acceptable to the Soviet Union. This was far from being a concession by the United States, as Mr. Stelle has tried to depict it, but was an attempt to preserve its atomic monopoly.

The second point that arises out of Mr. Stelle's statement is that he has now in fact admitted that the Soviet Union's plan does provide for pre-launch notification of peaceful-purpose rockets. But he also said that this is linked to the whole of the first stage of the Soviet plan. This is, of course, true. I confirm that this is linked to the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the dismantling of bases during the first stage. This is absolutely correct.

But Mr. Stelle went on to say that the United States plan involves control over launchings of military rockets. He asserted in this connexion that it would be necessary from time to time to verify whether military rockets were in operating condition and that for the purpose of such verification international military rocket launchings would have to be internationally controlled. This, however, means that we are concerned, not with the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, but with the control of military rocket launchings, which have no connexion with the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. This control would be exercised at a time when 70 per cent of these rockets would still be retained by the United States and other countries. This would do little to promote the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. I think it would do nothing. Thus, this observation reveals the basic weakness of the United States position on the question of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

I should now like to say a few words about the statement by the representative of Canada. I will begin with a brief historical observation. Mr. Burns referred to the Washington naval treaties but, so far as I remember, these treaties did not envisage any control measures, although they provided for a reduction in capital ships, for certain restrictions on the construction of such ships, etc.

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I would add that to the best of my recollection, at that time in the League of Nations, Mr. Gibson, a United States representative --who, although he was not that country's official representative in the League, took part in the consideration of a number of questions -- adopted a position of strong opposition to any control measures in matters of disarmament. Perhaps I am mistaken, in which case Mr. Stelle will correct me, but, if my memory serves me right, this position was characteristic of the United States at that time.

I give this example simply to show that Mr. Burns' statement today that control is essential in all matters relating to disarmament is not in accordance with the historical facts or with the position which the Western Powers have adopted on disarmament questions in the past. On those very questions, on the questions of naval disarmament to which Mr. Burns referred, the Western Powers took up no such position. Thus, control is far from being axiomatic, but is a debatable issue.

Furthermore, Mr. Burns essentially set out to prove that our proposal for 100 per cent elimination of delivery vehicles is impracticable and that gradualness in the reduction of delivery vehicles and other types of armaments is practicable. I listened closely to Mr. Burns' statement, but I did not find any substantive arguments to prove that the Western proposals are practicable, while ours are impracticable. Perhaps I am incapable of following your line of reasoning, but you did not put forward a single argument to show that gradualness is practicable whereas a radical solution of the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles is impracticable. I did not find a single argument in this statement.

You went on to make a particularly interesting remark:

"If the process of disarmament should stop short or be reversed at any point, all parties must be assured that they would not be in a worse position relative to each other than they are now. This, in turn,

requires a certain gradualness in the disarmament process ..." (supra, p.19)

That is the argument which you put forward in support of gradualness. What sort of argument is it to suggest that the process of disarmament may stop short? It means that you are largely basing your case on a negative assumption, on the assumption, not that the disarmament process will proceed, but that it will stop short. In the first place, why do you make this assumption? Why is your position based on this negative assumption which is not made by all of us. We assume that the disarmament process will proceed without interruption if we sign a treaty, whereas you base your position on its stopping short.

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In other words, your whole idea of the need for gradualness largely hinges on this negative assumption that the process of disarmament may stop short. This premise is, however, completely unsatisfactory. We want to achieve a treaty which will ensure that the disarmament process does not stop short. We pointed out yesterday and in previous statements that the United States plan in fact includes features which show that the United States is counting on the possibility of the process of disarmament stopping short. This is why it is introducing the veto for the permanent members of the Control Council and in respect of decisions on this point in the Security Council. This is why the United States does not specify an overall time-limit for the whole disarmament programme. We note this fact.

If this is your basic assumption and if this is the only reason for your assertion that gradualness is necessary, I can reply that we have no use for your initial premise nor for gradualness because we consider it necessary to draw up the disarmament programme in such a way as to ensure that the programme will be carried out from beginning to end, that it is governed by this principle. But you obviously start from a different premise, on which you base the need for gradualness. We have no use for such an approach, because it is harmful.

You went on to the question of 100 per cent elimination of delivery vehicles and 100 per cent verification of retained armaments. I asked you to advise us all on how this is to be carried out. The answer you gave today was:

"... it [this problem] does not arise in this form from the Western plan ..." (supra, p.22).

How can you say it does not arise, Mr. Burns? I shall take your plan and read out paragraph 2.d. in section A, entitled "Armaments". You support this plan so it is permissible to say that you write:

"In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in a Treaty annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing reduction and would provide assurance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels". (ENDC/30, p.6)

In other words, you must verify the retained armaments. You must verify 100 per cent of the retained armaments in order to guarantee that they do not exceed the agreed levels.

Furthermore, the following statement is made in paragraph 3.c. of section B, entitled "Armed Forces":

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"In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex on verification, the International Disarmament Organization would verify the reduction of force levels and provide assurance that retained forces did not exceed agreed levels". (ENDC/30, p.8)

But here again you must carry out 100 per cent verification of this reduction, i.e. of the retained armed forces, too, in order to provide such an assurance. Why then do you say that this question does not arise for you? It does arise for you. But for some reason you do not want to reply to it. I put the question to you because it comes up in your plan, but you say that it does not and that the question does not arise in this form from the Western plan. Yes, it does arise. But I will tell you why you are unwilling to answer this question. Because you have no satisfactory answer -- that is the crux of the matter. The answers which you tried to give today indicate that you have great difficulty in giving a satisfactory answer to this question. This was also confirmed today by Mr. Godber, the United Kingdom representative, who said quite frankly that considerable difficulties would be involved in verifying the retained armaments.

You gave an example of how verification might be carried out and suggested that the methods used for topographical surveys might serve as a basis. You mentioned an area of 220,000 square kilometres, which represents 1 per cent of the territory of the Soviet Union. In order to cover this territory for topographical survey purposes in six months some 500 men plus 500 auxiliary staff would be needed, i.e., a total of 1,000. It would take six months to cover this territory. But we have not only fixed armaments but mobile armaments. You might survey an area on a particular day, but the aircraft might have flown elsewhere and the tanks have been transferred to other areas -- this is really not the same thing as a topographical survey. After all, topography involves a survey of an area and an area remains where it is; all you need to do is to cover it once and take photographs. But, according to your own calculations, to cover the territory of the Soviet Union even for topographical survey purposes would necessitate the employment of 100,000 controllers for six months. Yet you say that this could easily be done. That is your reply.

It is precisely because you realize the unsatisfactory nature of this reply that you promptly take the line that this question does not arise from your plan and say that this is "your answer". If you will pardon my saying so, this question does arise from the first stage of your plan if your thesis that it is necessary to verify

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the retained arms is not put forward for the sake of argument, but is really meant to be taken seriously. If you believe that this is really the action which has to be taken, then tell us how you think it should be organized? Along the lines of a topographical survey? Moreover, you yourself gave a very telling illustration based on your experience in the Middle East. You were unable to enter two rooms because they were locked. This made you suspicious. You were unable to tell the Government of Jordan definitely whether or not weapons were there. You declined to do so. Being an honest man, you found it impossible to give an incorrect answer. But how many such rooms would there be in a territory of 22 million square kilometres? How many houses? How many depots?

As you were unable to give an answer in the case of the two rooms which were locked, do you really expect that the entire territory of any country -- the United States or the Soviet Union -- will contain only open rooms? Surely you do not imagine that this will be so? This only shows how unrealistic your approach is and how much it smacks of propaganda, since only for propaganda purposes is it possible to talk of 100 per cent verification of what remains and to claim that the Soviet Union does not want this. I tell you that since we want 100 per cent elimination of armaments, we also want 100 per cent verification in order to ensure that nothing remains. You say that this is a change in our position. No. Our position has always been that 100 per cent elimination should be accompanied by 100 per cent verification. This is what we have always said. You ask how the Soviet Union thinks the detection of clandestine stockpiles should be undertaken. My answer is that we should discuss this together. How do you envisage the detection of clandestine stockpiles? After all, a number of provisions in your plan also refer to clandestine activity. It will get you nowhere to attempt to evade the issue by arguing that the Soviet representative should give an answer, because an answer is required from you no less than from us.

We are realists and we therefore say that the verification of which you speak is unnecessary. It is sufficient to verify what is reduced and for the destruction to be verified visually by the controllers. This gives, if not a 100 per cent, then at least a 98-99 per cent guarantee that the actual disarmament process is proceeding correctly.

Since you want the situation to be further clarified and are criticizing us on that score, you give us an answer and tell us how you envisage this, since you yourselves raise this question in your own plan. You cannot evade an answer and the answer you give is clearly unrealistic; it cannot satisfy reasonable people.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

This is why Mr. Godber said today that verification of retained armaments will present considerable difficulties. He is right. But we take the view that it is altogether pointless, since such an undertaking would entail verification of the armaments of all States, to which no one will agree. And if there is to be 100 per cent destruction, any error that is made will be insignificant.

Mr. Godber asked a number of other questions today. What freedom of movement would the controllers have? Would control be exercised throughout the country? How many places would there be for the destruction of armaments and where would they be, etc.? There are two replies I can give.

In the first place, these questions cannot be answered until we all know what we are to destroy and in what quantities and sequence. Such questions are otherwise futile. Tell us if you agree to 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles. If you do, let us work out together where and how this destruction is to be carried out. We are quite ready to do this. But it is difficult to say in advance how many places there are to be, because I do not know what is to be destroyed. You yourselves realize that this is an entirely unrealistic approach to the question.

In the second place, why do you put this question to me? Mr. Stelle said quite clearly yesterday, in replying to the Swedish representative's questions, that the United States is more or less in agreement with us on this matter; it agrees that there will be depots in which the armaments to be destroyed will be concentrated, that there will be certain places where the various types of armaments will be destroyed and that the types of armaments which are not movable will be destroyed on the spot. Our positions seem to coincide on these points. You should put this question to Mr. Stelle, particularly as he is closer to you at the table and is also closer to you in general. I think Mr. Stelle is in just as good a position to give a reply as I am; in any event, you can discuss this question together and submit proposals on it to us all. This is a general question. Why should I reply to it? The fact that Mr. Godber and Mr. Burns put such questions points to the fact that they have no other arguments. They cannot give any substantive arguments to back up their position. They are looking for other arguments so that they can find some way out of the situation and can say that the crux of the matter lies in the Soviet Union's alleged unwillingness to state how many posts there will be, whether there will be posts throughout a country, whether there will be freedom of movement, etc. These are all minor points, Mr. Godber. We can reach agreement on all this; these are practical questions. But let us agree on what you are



(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

prepared to accept in the matter of disarmament. This is what we have to decide. The discussion of all other questions hinges on this. If you are not willing to accept concrete measures of disarmament, there is no point in our discussing these questions. What purpose would this serve?

My last comment relates to Mr. Godber's statement that we should not carry out the first-stage measures too hurriedly, because the measures involved are too vast in scope, create a new situation and alter the military position, and because it is necessary to preserve the stability of the world. That is the main idea put forward by Mr. Godber today to justify the need to proceed gradually with the reduction of existing types of armaments, and so forth. This was his main argument. But, Mr. Godber, is there really any stability in the situation today? What kind of stability is there when you, the Western Powers, yourselves put forward a proposal that we should specifically discuss the question of the possibility of war by accident? What kind of a stable situation is this? You yourselves admit the possibility of the accidental outbreak of a large-scale war -- not of a minor war, but of a large-scale war. Can the situation be described as stable when only yesterday or the day before President Kennedy ordered the Marines to land in an area close to Laos? What kind of a stable situation is this? The whole trouble is that you wish to preserve this stability, or more accurately, this lack of stability, until the third stage of disarmament. This is where the trouble is. We, however, wish to eliminate even the possibility of the outbreak of a large-scale nuclear war as early as the first stage. What we wish is to eliminate forthwith the instability of the situation in this vital matter. This is the basis of our approach. You, on the other hand, with your gradual measures over a period of ten years, will preserve this instability and the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war. This is the essential difference in our approaches.

These are the remarks which I wished to make today. I shall leave everything else to be answered later in the course of our further discussion.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): In the thirty-sixth plenary meeting of 14 May 1962 many delegations took up the discussion of the organization of our future work. I should like in my turn now to pick up the same thread in relation to one particular point not mentioned at that meeting. Members of the Committee are no doubt aware that the last meeting of the Committee of the Whole took place on 27 April. During that meeting we heard our co-Chairmen explain their reasons for

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

asking that priority be given to the consideration of certain of their proposals. Unfortunately, no progress has been recorded since then, and our two co-Chairmen have not agreed on the next item on the Committee's agenda.

It had been previously hoped that the discussion and the resolution of these questions, which have now proved to be bones of contention, would have helped to ease international tension, strengthen confidence among States, and contribute to general and complete disarmament. It is, however, a source of encouragement that some of the very same bones of contention should actually be under discussion outside the sphere of this Conference; this fact alone, in my opinion, should have made agreement on their discussion within this Conference easier to attain, and more logical.

I submit that, although much valuable time has passed, and although our target date is imminently in sight, there is still something that we can do: some achievement, modest as it may seem, ought to be recorded and reflected in our progress report. That report, in spite of the scarcity of time left, should at least say that the Committee of the Whole has given full discussion to the item entitled "Cessation of War Propaganda" and that the Committee has reviewed all of the six other items proposed by the members of the Committee. My humble submission is that it will not be particularly difficult to achieve that end, given the expected co-operation and ingenuity of all the members, especially of our two co-Chairmen, and their goodwill.

Might not a way out of this deadlock be achieved by arranging that our Committee allocate two successive meetings to the review of the remaining six measures which appear in the two columns in document ENDC/C.I/2? Might not our Committee ask each of our co-Chairmen kindly to present to the Committee and review before us three measures of his choice?

Needless to say, a mere review of these measures naturally does not mean or entail the Committee's adoption of any or all of the said items. If it were considered useful, a third meeting might be devoted to discussion of the considerations presented at the two meetings. But might not that procedure help break the log jam and familiarize at least some of the new members of the Committee -- such as my delegation, which cannot claim any detailed knowledge of those items -- more with those subject, while at the same time allowing us to record greater effects in the consideration of possibilities of progress on initial measures in the work of the Committee of the Whole?

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

Accordingly I would request that the co-Chairmen give consideration to this suggestion, and I am confident that their usual resourcefulness will overcome this hurdle. I hope that their traditional goodwill and sincerity of purpose will guide their steps in this matter.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I think that in spite of the promises Mr. Zorin so kindly gave us, (ENDC/PV.36, p.37) he has not left us much time to reply. I can assure him that I shall study the statement he made today most carefully. I wish to make only two very brief comments. The first concerns control over the destruction of delivery vehicles. At the meeting on Monday I asked Mr. Zorin some precise questions about the text proposed by the Soviet delegation; in particular, I asked to what extent article 38 of the Soviet draft treaty could be applied to the destruction of nuclear weapon vehicles in stage I (ibid., p.6-7). Yesterday Mr. Zorin very kindly replied to the statement I made on Monday, but he made no reference whatever to this question of control or to that of the application of article 38. I hope that at the private meeting tomorrow he will be able to give us a full and clear explanation on this point.

Next, I should like to add that for several meetings now the Soviet delegation seems to have been trying to insinuate that the Western delegations do not wish -- or might not wish -- to implement the treaty in full. They say that the application of the treaty would certainly be interrupted ... it would be suspended ...

As far as I am concerned, I do not believe this is true. What we want is to be sure that both parties carry out the provisions of the treaty honestly and completely. Obviously, if one of the parties did not implement the treaty exactly according to its provisions the other party -- and I think the Soviet delegation will agree on this point -- could resume its full freedom of action.

Those are the two brief comments I wished to make on Mr. Zorin's statement. In conclusion, I would like to say that I greatly appreciated the statement made by the representative of the United Arab Republic concerning the work of the Committee of the Whole, and I hope it will be possible to discuss this question at tomorrow's informal meeting, so that the Committee of the Whole can resume its work as effectively as possible.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its thirty-eighth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Sahlou, the representative of Ethiopia.

"The representatives of Sweden, Poland, the United States, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Republic and Italy made statements.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 18 May 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.