

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.90  
10 December 1962  
ENGLISH

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**FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINETIETH MEETING**

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Monday 10 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

U. TUN SHEIN

(Burma)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO

Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Mr. V. ISMIRLIEV

Burma:

U TUN SHEIN

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.E.G. HARDY

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. J. BUCEK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

ATO H. HAMID

ATO M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Mr. E. GONZALES GOMEZ  
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI  
Mr. N.O. OKORIE

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. R. KRZYZANOWSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. H. FLORESCU  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. M. ABAGIU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. M. STAHL  
Mr. P. KELLIN  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV  
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT  
Mr. S. AHMED  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. S. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

Mr. J.M. EDES

Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the ninetieth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

As already agreed at our previous meeting, the first speaker today will be the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Mbu, whom I welcome again to this Committee.

Mr. MBU (Nigeria): Allow me to extend the belated though none the less very warm welcome of my delegation to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Kurka. From your statements we are assured that you will carry on the very valuable and constructive work of your predecessors.

I should also like to express my satisfaction that the Committee reconvened in Geneva as was agreed. It is true, of course, that it did so a fortnight behind schedule, but such delay as there was was necessitated by the fact that the subjects with which we are concerned here were receiving the fullest and most serious consideration in the United Nations General Assembly. Indeed, my delegation attached and still attaches the greatest importance to the wise and varied deliberations which took place in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on the subject of general and complete disarmament, and especially on the urgent need for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, with which I intend to deal today.

My delegation, in its efforts to secure the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, feels fortified by the deliberations at the General Assembly and by resolution 1762 A (XVII) (ENDC/63) which emerged from those discussions and which gave this Committee not only a very clear mandate on the issue but also specific indications of how we should proceed about that task here. It is a matter of regret to my delegation that this most valuable resolution has already been subjected to the most rigorous test of hair-splitting, and, if one might say so, unnecessary diverse interpretations which seem to be the unhappy lot of any valuable document that comes before this Committee. It is irreverent to treat in such a manner an issue about which the majority of world opinion feels so deeply concerned. My delegation intends as far as possible to refrain from interpreting the resolution as it feels it would be presumptuous to do so. Moreover, is it not unnecessary to do so with regard to a document whose provisions are so clear? We would, however, make a few brief comments.

The most important thing about this resolution is that it condemns all nuclear weapon tests. It asks that all such tests should cease immediately and not later

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than 1 January 1963, at the same time admonishing the nuclear Powers to reach an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests by 1 January 1963 on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum. If, however, such an agreement is not possible, and bearing in mind the unequivocal condemnation by humanity of all nuclear testing which finds expression in the demand that all nuclear testing must cease not later than 1 January 1963, then an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space should be entered into. Such a partial test ban is however -- in operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 A (XVII) -- inextricably linked with, and must always be accompanied pari passu by, an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests using as a basis the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28) and including adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission.

We would like to point out that there is absolutely no indication in this paragraph that such an interim arrangement should be limited in point of time. Of course it would be possible to have a more permanent agreement which would replace the interim arrangement. It is possible that in a short space of time a final scientific breakthrough would emerge that would be acceptable to the two nuclear sides and which would make assurance of effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international commission no longer necessary. It is pertinent to note, however, that whatever modalities are agreed upon, utilizing all the valuable suggestions outlined by the resolution, the world, the United Nations and my delegation expect that all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, and for all time, should cease immediately, and in any case not later than 1 January 1963.

The other very significant thing emerging from the deliberations of the United Nations and from resolution 1762 A (XVII) is that the eight-nation memorandum has grown considerably in stature. It was not only loudly acclaimed by almost all speakers in the First Committee but was endorsed as a basis for negotiations. After such unanimous endorsement, with no dissentient voice and only a few abstentions, the joint memorandum is no longer an eight-nation memorandum -- though that appears now to be its semi-official title -- or an eighteen-nation or a seventeen-nation memorandum, but a universal memorandum.

The memorandum provides a just, adequate and equitable basis for negotiations. Above all, it takes account of the positions of the two sides, both political and scientific. It may be true, as the eight sponsors declared, that the memorandum

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is not a blueprint for the treaty as such. It may equally be true that in so far as it tries to bring the two sides closer together it is a political compromise. It may even also be true that it was aimed at getting the two sides to negotiate again. All this may be true, but it would be churlish of my delegation to place only such a value, important though it may be, on the memorandum and no more, especially after its political sagacity and firm scientific basis have been so well acclaimed and vindicated, both within and without the Committee, since its introduction on 16 April this year. While it may be a political compromise, it also takes account of very far-reaching and solid scientific considerations. The results of the United States Project Vela and of our informal discussions with the Western scientists -- for which we are grateful to Mr. Godber and Mr. Dean -- on improvements in detection and identification by the use of distant instrumentation and other seismological progress, have, as it were, added force to our expressed belief that "possibilities exist of establishing by agreement a system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis" (ibid., para. 3) which might be based and built upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions or, if more appropriate, on certain of the existing posts designated by agreement for the purpose together, if necessary, with new posts established by agreement.

It may be recalled that the recent London Pugwash Conference declared:

"In particular, we have used the proposal by the eight neutral countries as a basis upon which to find a compromise solution."

(ENDC/66, p.1)

This distinguished body of Soviet and Western scientists then proceeded to examine various possibilities, and arrived at certain conclusions which somehow confirmed how solidly based scientifically the eight-nation memorandum is. It is still the hope of my delegation that the memorandum will receive the very serious and sincere consideration which it deserves.

Of course it is true that there have been various qualifications of the acceptance of the memorandum, to say the least -- for instance, whether it should be accepted as "a basis", "the basis", or "one of the basis but not the exclusive basis", and so on. Those fine distinctions might perhaps be of some significance, but to my mind the important thing is that after six months of virtual impasse a basis -- the only one, in fact, mutually acceptable to the two sides -- a common platform from which to erect the scaffolding and super-structure of an agreement, has at last emerged.

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Furthermore, we have noted with satisfaction that as a result of the memorandum the gap between the two sides, as they have themselves acknowledged on various occasions, has become considerably narrower. The main obstacle is the question of whether on-site inspection should be obligatory or not. My delegation finds itself ill at ease at the reluctance of the two sides to bridge this narrow gap, and is concerned at the prospect of the widening of this small gap into an enormous chasm which could defy all ingenious efforts to bridge it. We are alarmed at the rigid adherence to and obduracy on principles that are little more than phantoms and at fears which have no relation to reality but which nevertheless keep the two sides so firmly apart. We fear that undue insistence on those so-called principles is fast hardening into a stand on prestige, with all the dangerous consequences which such an evolution would have on our negotiations.

I should like, therefore, on behalf of my delegation, to address a most solemn appeal to the nuclear Powers to come out of the quagmire in which they are standing, before it is too late. I would invite them to go back once more to the eight-nation memorandum and look at it honestly and thoroughly, in the light of its full worth. The memorandum has already achieved the near-miraculous feat of bringing the two sides closer together, making the one accept the concept of an international scientific commission and the other that of national seismic stations. It is capable of eliminating the remaining differences if considered as a whole, dispassionately and divorced from all preconceived notions and ideas and predetermined positions. If such an honest and dispassionate consideration of the memorandum were made, if it were viewed not even solely and necessarily in a spirit of compromise, but objectively, if the two nuclear sides would examine the memorandum as a whole -- and I submit respectfully that it should only be considered as a whole -- then they would find not only that the pieces neatly dovetail into one another but that the total result is a structure which provides the necessary assurances that such an agreement banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments and for all time would have all the necessary and realistic provisions for effective detection and identification, with the necessary guarantees against possible violation.

It is the view of my delegation that the impetus given to our discussions by the deliberations in the United Nations General Assembly and the resolution should not be vitiated by sticking to old positions. We had a right to expect that after the deliberations in the General Assembly there would have been a greater willingness



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to negotiate, more strenuous attempts at accommodation and a relaxation of old and rigid positions. We are distressed to find, however, that there is so far no evidence of this. If it is any consolation to us, we have observed that our distress is shared by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, who, in an honest appraisal of the performance thus far, remarked at the forty-fifth meeting of the Sub-Committee:

"I think it is our duty to consider any proposals that come from other delegations, because in our Sub-Committee here -- I am sure you will agree with this, Mr. Chairman -- we do tend to become wrapped up in our own individual thoughts, particularly after two and a half months. Anybody who reads the reports of the Sub-Committee will admit that our views could do with a little new thought brought into them. Of course, I think that the Western thoughts are very good ones, but possibly you, Mr. Chairman, think the same about those of the Soviet Union."

(ENDC/SC.I/PV.45, pp.19 and 20)

My delegation attaches the utmost importance to that statement by Mr. Godber for it marks, I think, the first time any of the nuclear Powers has sincerely voiced a criticism that embraces itself instead of the usual one directed at the most tarnished rigidity and misdeeds of the other. It is an honest self-examination, the validity of which the other two nuclear Powers, in a similar honest self-examination bred of humility and not of self-righteousness, would no doubt acknowledge. It is a plea we should like to make for a better display of an accommodating spirit and an honest consideration of the new thoughts and proposals coming before us.

My delegation believes that, in the spirit underlined by Mr. Godber's statement, the Sub-Committee should give serious consideration to implementing the General Assembly resolution for cessation of tests by 1 January 1963. As the only mutually and in fact universally acceptable basis at present available for either a permanent test ban or a partial test ban and the interim arrangement envisaged in paragraph 6 of resolution 1762A (XVII), is the eight-nation memorandum this Committee, and in particular its nuclear Sub-Committee, should give urgent consideration to the various and practical aspects of that memorandum. It is for that reason that my delegation fully supports the Swedish proposal (ENDC/PV.77, p.32, ENDC/PV.84, pp.17 and 18) that the international scientific commission, proposed in the memorandum and accepted at least in principle by the two nuclear sides, should be set up now at least on an

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interim basis. There is very great force in the arguments adduced by my Swedish colleague; I will not repeat them, but I cannot help emphasizing the point that the commission must be scientific, and composed of highly qualified scientists, possibly from non-aligned countries. The scientific commission, in the opinion of my delegation, is the pivot around which everything else revolves, because if the scientific commission is set up as envisaged in the memorandum most of the other problems will be resolved or will be found to be not of overriding importance.

My delegation believes that instead of spending valuable time in wrangling over obligatory or non-obligatory on-site inspection, the Sub-Committee should spend its time more profitably by considering the other modalities required. For instance, it is necessary to determine what is a significant and suspicious event and the criteria necessary to qualify such a phenomenon for additional clarification. Practical consideration should also be given to the most effective means of transmitting data from the national seismic stations to the international scientific commission and of processing by the latter. Let us talk of such practical things which would lead us to agreement. Let us use the suggestions and ideas put forward by the eight non-aligned nations in their memorandum, which has been endorsed by scientists and the General Assembly as a suitable basis for agreement. Let us also call upon the scientists from the three nuclear Powers to intensify their research into the "black box" theory and other theories that will contribute substantially to the reaching of an early agreement.

We understand that the reason for the actions of the two nuclear sides so far is their preoccupation with their national security. Far be it from me to make light of this, but I should like to submit most respectfully that such undue preoccupation which eschews everything else ill serves the cause of humanity and even does not serve their cause much better.

Speaking on 2 December in Baltimore, the newly-elected Secretary-General, U Thant, declared:

"There may be many who may wish for a more complete and comprehensive solution of the Cuban crisis, but in this imperfect world we have, at least for the moment, to accept less than perfect solutions."

These wise words apply with equal force to our work here. We cannot be too perfectionist in our search for a suitable plan, for no plan on a nuclear test ban can either be perfect or fully eliminate all risk of violation or threats to national

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security. Afterwards, what real sanctions can there be against a possible violator in a world where there is as yet no world authority capable of enforcing order, even in the most watertight and foolproof agreement, except the right to resume testing by the offended party and the obloquy of world opinion for the violator?

What real guarantees have we that any nuclear Power on the threshold of what it might consider to be the most decisive and ultimate military breakthrough would do more than hesitate to violate the agreement, even with all the pre-conditions and so-called deterrents against possible violation? But, taking full cognizance of the ancient maxim "pacta sunt servanda" we are willing to believe that if an agreement is reached in good faith there is a reasonable chance that it will be complied with. Moreover, over and above the immediate relief which would result to humanity from a comprehensive agreement, is the fact that such an agreement would be essentially an expression of good will on the part of those particularly concerned, which would facilitate the overall progress towards achieving our main goal of general and complete disarmament.

We should also realize the fact that there can never be a watertight treaty. For instance, the United States-United Kingdom partial test ban draft treaty (ENDC/59) makes provision for withdrawal from the treaty in article III. There is a similar provision in article XIII of their comprehensive draft treaty (ENDC/58). I will read article III of the United Kingdom-United States draft treaty:

"1. If any Party to this Treaty determines

- (a) that any other Party has not fulfilled its obligations under this Treaty,
- (b) that nuclear explosions have been conducted by a State not a Party to this Treaty under circumstances which might jeopardize the determining Party's national security, or
- (c) that nuclear explosions have occurred under circumstances in which it is not possible to identify the State conducting the explosions and that such explosions, if conducted by a Party to this Treaty, would violate the Treaty or, if not conducted by a Party, might jeopardize the determining Party's national security,

it may submit to the Depositary Government a request for the convening of a conference to which all the Parties to this Treaty shall be invited, and the

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Depositary Government shall convene such a conference as soon after its receipt of the request as may be practicable. The request from the determining Party to the Depositary Government shall be accompanied by a statement of the evidence on which the determination was based ..." (ENDC/59,p.2)

I should like to make it very clear that I am neither discussing nor criticizing the two drafts. I am merely using the article on withdrawal to show that any party that is itching to denounce the treaty in order to resume testing can do so, even legally, under any conceivable treaty. For instance, what would prevent any dastardly country, such as we hope does not exist, from itself causing a clandestine nuclear explosion -- behind Venus, let us say, if that were practicable -- and remaining undiscovered by the international scientific commission? What I mean is that there is nothing to prevent a country wishing to do such things from declaring that its own national security is threatened by its own clandestine tests, thus absolving itself from its treaty obligations in the most legal manner by invoking paragraph 1(c) of the article I have read out.

As I said earlier, that is by no means a criticism of the two drafts; in fact, we doubt seriously that they could be improved upon. I only wish to use them to illustrate the fact that even in such carefully prepared drafts, which two of the three nuclear Powers consider provide adequate assurances for them, there are possible loopholes which could be exploited by any determined violator. But my delegation feels that there is reason to hope that such great Powers -- which, although they not only have mastered the secrets of the atom and outer space but have had such tremendous capabilities for mutual destruction, have nevertheless acted so far very responsibly and with commendable restraint -- would not trifle with an agreement such as this if it were entered into with the reasonable assurance offered by the eight-nation memorandum.

It is the view of my delegation that it is not a search for national security that is preventing the nuclear Powers from reaching an agreement, for the leaders of the two sides have recognized that the present so-called security is precarious and that there can be no real security until we stop amassing, and perfecting by testing, and start eliminating deadly weapons of mass destruction. My delegation believes indeed that the obstacle to agreement is no longer purely scientific but largely political. As we declared on 12 April here --

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"Although science and scientists have been quoted lavishly by both sides, it is our view that the issue with which we are concerned is essentially political; the aid of science is merely required to give the arguments added faith." (ENDC/PV.19, p.16)

What is required on the part of the nuclear Powers is a slight, though in the circumstances supreme, political act of good will. I hope that they will not be found wanting in that regard. It is our hope that this Committee will successfully plead with the nuclear Powers to discover their real interest and that of humanity, which pleads for the cessation of all tests in all environments, as eloquently expressed in United Nations resolution 1762 A (XVII).

Is it too much to expect President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev to bestow a Christmas present upon the world by reaching agreement on banning nuclear weapon tests? Is it demanding too much of "the two K's" if we call upon them to use the Cuban formula to reach agreement on nuclear weapon tests? If they can do this supreme service to humanity, we shall all join in sponsoring their candidatures for the Nobel Peace prize for 1963.

The CHAIRMAN, (Burma); In accordance with the decision of this Committee at its previous meeting (ENDC/PV.89, p.26 ), if the representative of Nigeria will submit a summary of his views it will be included in the report of the Committee to the General Assembly together with the summaries submitted by the other non-aligned countries.

We shall now take up the subject of general and complete disarmament, with specific reference to items 5(b) and 5(c) of our procedure of work (ENDC/1/Add.3).

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

In connexion with the statement of the representative of Nigeria on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the Soviet delegation would like to make a few remarks by way of reply. I take it, Mr. Chairman, that you have no objection.

The representative of Nigeria referred to the recent Pugwash Conference of scientists from the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. He also spoke about "black boxes" and so on. In this connexion, I should like to make a few comments and put forward some considerations.

First, it must be noted once again that on the question of the cessation of

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nuclear weapon tests there is a considerable measure of agreement between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the Western Powers, on the other. Now, after many years of stubborn opposition, the United States and the United Kingdom have finally acknowledged that control in regard to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space can be exercised by national means of detection and that there is no need for the establishment of an international control system and international inspection for such control. The differences which now separate us and prevent us from reaching agreement relate to questions of control only over underground nuclear weapon tests. It should be noted, however, that control in regard to underground nuclear tests can also be exercised through the use of national means of detection. But, the Western Powers remain adamant on this question, seeing in it a loophole which would enable them in the future to go on testing nuclear weapons. This is the only way in which we can interpret the persistent unwillingness of the United States and the United Kingdom to agree to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the underground environment on the basis of the use of national means of control over such an agreement. In order to prevent agreement on this question, the Western Powers continue to insist stubbornly on international control and compulsory international inspection in regard to underground nuclear explosions.

The position of the Soviet Union on this question is well known. We have repeatedly stated that there is no need for international inspection and international control in regard to underground nuclear explosions.

There can be no justification for the position of the Western Powers, which by their persistent demand for international control and compulsory inspection in regard to underground nuclear explosions are blocking agreement on the question of prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests. We believe that the existing differences can be overcome if we seek for a compromise on a mutually acceptable basis.

We have already pointed out that, in this respect, the conclusions reached by the Soviet, United States and United Kingdom scientists at the Pugwash Conference in London last September (ENDC/66) are of definite interest: they proposed the use of unmanned automatic seismic stations, in order to facilitate agreement on the question of control over underground explosions.

The Soviet delegation has already pointed out that we are prepared to agree that in a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, including underground

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tests, provision should be made for the setting up of automatic seismic stations both on the territory of the nuclear Powers themselves and near the frontiers of the nuclear Powers, with the agreement, of course, of the States on whose territory it is proposed to locate such stations.

The Soviet Union is prepared to agree that two or three such stations should be set up on the territory of States possessing nuclear weapons, including the territory of the Soviet Union. These stations could be located in the zones that are most subject to earthquakes. There are three such zones in the Soviet Union - the Far Eastern zone, the Central Asian zone and the Altai zone. Soviet scientists consider that the most suitable sites for automatic seismic stations would be near the town of Yakutsk for the Far Eastern zone, near the town of Kokchetav for the Central Asian Zone and near the town of Bodaibo for the Altai zone. Further, we base ourselves on the assumption that delivery of the appropriate sealed apparatus for periodic replacement in the automatic seismic stations in the USSR from the international centre and its return to the international centre should be carried out by Soviet personnel in Soviet aircraft.

The Soviet Union is sincerely striving to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable basis. If the participation of foreign personnel is required for the delivery of this apparatus to automatic seismic stations from the international centre and for its return from the stations to the international centre, the Soviet Union would be prepared to agree to this.

It is understood that, if necessary, we would take appropriate precautionary measures in connexion with such trips by foreign personnel.

Therefore, in this new position of the Soviet Union it is a question of control by means of automatic stations with certain elements of international control; this, in our view, would provide a good way out of the situation and make it possible to reach agreement rapidly on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests for all time on a mutually acceptable basis. Agreement could, of course, be reached without delay even now, if the Western Powers would show goodwill and not try to avoid taking advantage of the opportunity afforded them by this Soviet proposal.

We believe that this proposal by the Soviet Union introduces a new element into the negotiations on the cessation of tests and that it will be duly appreciated by the neutral States and the Western Powers, and then we would be able to bestow upon mankind, upon all the peoples of the world, the present about which the representative of Nigeria has just spoken

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I shall now turn to the question of general and complete disarmament. Today the Committee is beginning in real earnest the discussion of specific questions of general and complete disarmament. At the first meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee after the resumption of its work, a number of representatives showed definite interest in the proposal submitted on 21 September 1962 at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly on behalf of the Soviet Government by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gromyko (A/PV.1127 (provisional), p.38). This proposal is that until completion of the implementation of the second stage of general and complete disarmament a strictly limited and agreed number of inter-continental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category could remain at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States.

What prompted the Soviet Union to put forward this proposal? What is its point and significance? There can be no doubt that the main danger to general peace and to the security of the peoples is the threat of a nuclear war breaking out. The elimination of this threat is the main and primary task in the general programme of disarmament. It is precisely for this reason that States should work out an agreement which would eliminate in the very first stage of the implementation of the disarmament programme the possibility of a nuclear conflict breaking out. Much has already been said at the meetings of our Committee to the effect that this aim could be achieved in two ways: either by undertaking measures in the first stage of disarmament to destroy the nuclear weapons themselves, which would be a direct way of radically solving this question, or by accomplishing the aim indirectly by measures for the elimination of the means of delivery of these weapons.

The arguments in favour of beginning disarmament with the elimination of the nuclear weapons themselves are widely supported by many countries. This is not surprising since the destruction and prohibition of nuclear weapons would do away with the material basis for unleashing and carrying on nuclear war. The Soviet Union has always advocated the elimination of nuclear weapons from the very outset of the disarmament programme. The Soviet Union is already willing to transfer the implementation of measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the second to the first stage, and several representatives of the non-aligned States have expressed themselves in favour of this. We should be happy to do this if the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western Powers would agree with this proposal. Unfortunately, the position of the Western Powers on this question does not make it possible for us to count on this.



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Having encountered stubborn resistance on the part of the Western Powers to the Soviet proposal that all nuclear weapons should be destroyed in the first stage of disarmament and being anxious to find a mutually acceptable basis for negotiations on general and complete disarmament, we propose in the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Government to the Eighteen-Nation Committee (ENDC/2/Rev.1) that disarmament should start not with the elimination of the nuclear weapons themselves but with the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Such a method could also lead to eliminating as early as in the first stage the danger of a thermonuclear war breaking out, since nuclear weapons without the means of delivering them to their targets would be paralyzed, would, so to speak, be riveted to their storage sites while awaiting destruction in the second stage.

It should be noted that if we begin the implementation of general and complete disarmament by eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, this has also certain advantages. Modern means designed for delivering nuclear weapons to their targets represent a complicated military technique. They include rockets, bombers, surface and underwater vessels of a specific type and large artillery systems. The maintenance and use of these means requires complicated equipment, ancillary services and so on. These special features of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are a factor which will facilitate to a considerable extent the implementation of control.

Obviously, the implementation of disarmament measures must take place in such a way as not to create any military advantage either for any individual State or for any group of States. This principle is laid down in the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5). Accordingly, in the Soviet draft treaty the destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons is organically linked with the elimination of foreign military bases on alien territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops therefrom. We have already pointed out repeatedly the fact, which is well known to all members of the Committee, that the Soviet Union is compelled, for a number of reasons, to base its defence mainly on the means of delivering nuclear weapons. These means have been, in a sense, the Soviet Union's answer to the system of military bases located by the United States and the NATO military bloc along the borders of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In agreeing to the elimination of its main means of defence, the Soviet Union is entitled to demand that the other side should take a step which would reduce the threat to its security. For this purpose the means of delivery and military bases on foreign territories must be eliminated.

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As soon as nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are destroyed, the need for such bases also disappears. There is not and cannot be any justification for their retention, and attempts to retain them under various pretexts are bound to give rise to legitimate suspicions and fears. The Soviet Union is proposing a just and mutually acceptable solution of the question, which takes into account the security interests of both sides and eliminates the danger of nuclear war both for the socialist countries and for the countries in the NATO bloc.

While fulfilling certain military tasks of an aggressive nature, military bases on foreign territories are at the same time a political weapon in the hands of the States that possess or control them. The presence of such bases leads, in one way or another, to interference in the internal affairs of other countries, infringes their sovereign rights and serves as a means of imposing the will of some States on others. Foreign military bases are a source of friction in relations between States. They create a tense and nervous situation in the world, increasing the danger of sharp conflicts which might set in motion the military machines of the opposing blocs, which in these days would mean a universal thermonuclear war.

The elimination of foreign military bases would be a great step towards improving the international situation.

Although the need to begin the implementation of general and complete disarmament by eliminating the threat of nuclear war was clearly realized at the time when we first took our seats at the Conference table, this truth has now become even more obvious in the light of the acute international crisis through which we have recently lived. Those who are seriously concerned about the fate of the world and are anxious to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and to preserve the lives of millions and millions of people as well as vast material and cultural values built up in the course of centuries by the work of many generations, should welcome the proposal of the Soviet Union, which is aimed at the speediest solution of the problem of abolishing the threat of nuclear war. It was no mere chance that the idea which ran through almost all the speeches at the General Assembly of the United Nations was the need to make the most energetic efforts in order to block the way to a nuclear war. In the existing conditions this can be done by destroying the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and foreign military bases.

At one of our meetings, the representative of Poland, Professor Lachs, made a detailed analysis (ENDC/PV.85, pp.26 et seq.) of the course of the debate on general

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and complete disarmament in the United Nations General Assembly. He quoted extremely interesting figures which show clearly and convincingly that at the present time many States consider it necessary to rid the world of foreign military bases as quickly as possible and that this is an essential and urgent task. In this respect the speeches of many representatives at the United Nations General Assembly are extremely significant and instructive. They reflect the demand of the peoples that foreign military bases should be eliminated at the same time as nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. At the present time an awareness of the danger associated with the policy of setting up foreign military bases is beginning to make headway even in those circles that quite recently justified in every possible way the retention of foreign military bases on alien territories.

The proposal of the Soviet Union, aimed at ridding the world of the danger of nuclear war in the very first stages of disarmament, has also been evaluated in a positive manner by a number of the members of our Committee. Nevertheless it has not yet been possible to reach agreement on this vitally important question. The reason for this situation lies in the fact that the Western Powers represented on this Committee are trying to prevent the solution of this question. While it is true that they have not disputed the reasonableness of the Soviet proposal, they have nevertheless asserted that the implementation of our proposal is impossible for a number of reasons.

What were the main objections put forward by the Western Powers to the Soviet proposal for the complete elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament?

Their first objection boiled down to the assertion that the implementation of the Soviet proposals would disturb the military balance between East and West. It was said that the socialist countries, having numerical superiority in armed forces and conventional armaments, would obtain a military advantage. In particular, the Canadian representative, General Burns, in opposing our proposal, stated at the meeting of 22 August:

"... there is the question of the strategical imbalance which would occur in Europe if the nuclear weapon vehicles were abolished and the possibility of using the nuclear weapon in defence were entirely removed" (ENDC/PV.73/pp.10 and 11).

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We do not wish to comment now on General Burns' remarks concerning the use of atomic weapons in Europe, although they deserve some comment. We shall dwell only on the assertion that the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would create an imbalance in conventional armed forces and armaments. It must be said that the talk about the numerical superiority of the socialist countries in comparison with the Western bloc in conventional armaments and armed forces is not new. This is used to justify an increase in military budgets, the accumulation of nuclear weapons and the ceaseless acceleration of the arms race. However, such assertions are a purely propagandistic device used for particular political purposes and bearing no relation to the actual state of affairs. Such arguments are put forward in order to confuse world public opinion and those who put them forward do not themselves believe what they are saying. In an article published in the extremely well informed United States journal "U.S. News and World Report" on 3 December 1962 there are some calculations regarding the total numbers of the armed forces of the socialist countries and the western bloc. What are the conclusions arrived at by this journal? According to its estimate the socialist countries have 7,700,000 men under arms and the western bloc 8,000,000. Therefore, even according to American clearly biased sources, the present balance of armed forces between East and West is roughly equal. However, this does not prevent the representatives of the western Powers at the disarmament negotiations from proclaiming day in and day out the weakness of the West in conventional armaments and armed forces.

As regards the situation that would develop in the course of disarmament, it is precisely in order to prevent imbalance, precisely to ensure balance in the course of disarmament that we propose the establishment of definite levels of armed forces for each stage of disarmament. Therefore, the objections of the western Powers to our proposal on the ground that its implementation would create some imbalance in forces are unfounded. Nevertheless such objections are being put forward by the western Powers.

It is also argued that some party to the treaty might conceal delivery vehicles and later use them for its military and political purposes. At the meeting on 10 August, (ENDC/PV.68, p.44), the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, described this as the main difficulty which prevents the western Powers from accepting the Soviet proposal for the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. One can hardly take seriously the fears of the western Powers about the possibility of

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concealing nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. We have already drawn attention to the technical characteristics of the means of delivering nuclear weapons - their large size, intricate guidance systems and so on. In addition it can be pointed out that the production of delivery vehicles requires a highly organized industrial base. Modern bombers, intercontinental missiles and, especially, the plants for their production are not needles that could easily be hidden in hay stacks. Therefore the position of a country that wished to conceal delivery vehicles would be far more difficult than that of the international controllers entrusted with the task of verifying the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. In this connexion, it can be recalled that the Soviet draft treaty provides for a wide range of control measures over all delivery vehicles and the industry producing them. The control that we propose covers practically everything relating to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles: aerodromes, ports and launching pads, without which it is impossible to use a single one of the means of this type at present known.

Therefore this objection of the western Powers is also, in our view, unconvincing. Nevertheless it is put forward.

It has also been said that in circumvention of an agreement on the elimination of all delivery vehicles in the first stage there might be improvisation and the use of various forms of transport as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. At first the western representatives spoke about this to the point of absurdity. They even listed fishing boats as improvised means of delivery. But later, having realized the absurdity of these arguments, they began to put forward civil aircraft as more probable improvised means. Thus, Mr. Godber declared at the meeting of 31 August, and I quote:

"Furthermore, I would say that the bulk of Russian military transport aircraft, as well as many of the Soviet Union's civil airliners which are adaptations of their bombers, could be used to deliver nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.77, pp. 17 and 18)

It is, of course, possible to imagine various, even highly improbable situations at will. However, if we look at the matter seriously, and examine the Soviet proposal on disarmament attentively it is not difficult to see that it precludes all practical possibility of actions of the kind depicted by Mr. Godber. As a result of implementation of the first stage of disarmament in accordance with the draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Union, plants for the production of nuclear weapon

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delivery vehicles will be liquidated, as will all installations connected with the servicing of these means of delivery. In a word, the material and technical base will be completely eliminated and this, taken in conjunction with control in accordance with the Soviet plan, will eliminate the possibility of creating any type of means of delivery of nuclear weapons, including, of course, improvised means.

Therefore, this conclusion of the western Powers on the Soviet proposals is also unfounded. Nevertheless it is put forward.

The Soviet Union is anxious to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament as quickly as possible. Although we consider that the western objections to the Soviet proposal for the elimination of all means of delivery in the first stage are without foundation, we are prepared to meet them half way. This desire to contribute to successful progress in the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament prompted the Soviet Government to submit to the General Assembly a new proposal under which the United States and the Soviet Union would retain at their disposal until the end of the second stage of general and complete disarmament a strictly limited and agreed number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category. Accordingly, the relevant changes were made in our draft treaty.

Thus, paragraph 1 of Article 5 submitted by us for the consideration of the Eighteen-Nation Committee reads:

"1. All rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons of any calibre and range, whether strategic, operational or tactical, and pilotless aircraft of all types shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed, except for an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category, to be retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, exclusively in their own territory, until the end of the second stage. A strictly limited number of rockets to be converted to peaceful uses under the provisions of article 15 of the present Treaty shall also be retained." (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.5)

We have also added to the section of the Treaty relating to the second stage of disarmament an article laying down the procedure for the destruction of the missiles remaining in the Soviet Union and the United States after the need for

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them has disappeared. This is article 23a, the relevant paragraph of which we also deem it necessary to read out here in the Committee:

"1. All intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category, retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America under paragraph 1 of article 5 shall be destroyed, together with their launching installations and guidance systems." (ibid, p.18)

It is obvious that, in such a situation, no State would be in a position to count on being able with success and impunity to use concealed means of delivery for its military and political purposes. This being so, why engage in such a dangerous venture and place oneself in the position of a violator of the Treaty, with all the very dangerous and serious consequences that would ensue?

Thus, the retention by the United States of an agreed number of intercontinental missiles during the second stage would do away with the objections raised by the western Powers to the Soviet proposal for elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament. Of course, an agreed number of such missiles would also be retained by the Soviet Union.

What I have said in the foregoing fully applies also to the talk about the danger of so-called improvisation of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons to which the western representatives have referred.

At the end of the second stage, when nuclear weapons will be completely eliminated, the missiles remaining at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States will also be eliminated, since all need for them will have disappeared.

We are heartened by the fact that the new Soviet proposal has been received with interest by many States and that the members of our Committee have expressed their readiness to consider it carefully. Speaking in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 30 November the representative of India, Mr. Lall, said that:

"..... the suggestion was widely welcomed at the General Assembly by countries from all over the world. It was referred to as a suggestion which might open the door for negotiation on this issue." (ENDC/PV.85, p.21)

Mr. Lall was referring to the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage of disarmament. We would also recall that a certain interest was also shown in our proposal by the western nuclear Powers - the United States and the United Kingdom - on which depends, essentially, the achievement of an agreed solution

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to the question of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Moreover, we consider that consideration of our proposal in the Eighteen-Nation Committee will result in a business-like discussion, which will help to advance the negotiations and will speed up agreement on the text of a treaty. For our part we are prepared to do everything in our power to help this process forward.

In preparing its proposal the Soviet Government was guided by the desire to create the most favourable possibilities for the speediest achievement of agreement with the western Powers on this question. The texts of the corrections and additions to our draft treaty speak for themselves. They give a complete and clear idea of the meaning and significance of our proposal.

At previous meetings certain questions were asked by the western representatives. We get the impression that these questions are due to the fact that the western delegations have not properly understood the purport of our proposal.

For instance, the question was put as to what types of missiles, in our opinion, could remain at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States. It was said that an answer to this question would help the western Powers to determine their attitude to our proposal. In this connexion I should like to draw the attention of the representatives of the western Powers to the fact that Article 5 enumerates all types of rockets which we consider could be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States during the second stage, namely: inter-continental missiles which, as is known, are a separate type of rockets; further, anti-missile missiles and finally, anti-aircraft defence missiles of the "ground-to-air" category. As far as we are aware, this classification of types of missiles has been accepted, not only in the Soviet Union, but also in the United States. It is therefore quite clear as to what types of missiles specifically can be retained.

Another question was asked, namely, where the missiles retained by the Soviet Union and by the United States would be located? Here again a quite definite and clear answer to this question is given in the text of the Soviet proposal. These missiles should be located respectively only on the territory of the Soviet Union and only on the territory proper of the United States, and nowhere else. This definition of the sphere of location of the missiles retained by the Soviet Union and by the United States is quite sufficient for the purpose of taking a decision in principle. Exact geographical co-ordinates of the sites where any particular missiles would be located are irrelevant to the western Powers' determination of their attitude.



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We were also asked the question as to the number of missiles we envisage should be retained by the Soviet Union and by the United States. First of all, I must say that in our proposal a definite principle is laid down, namely, that the missiles retained by the Soviet Union and by the United States are intended exclusively for those purposes which have been already mentioned, and not at all in order to retain for these States the possibility of waging a nuclear war. There must be no retreat from the main, decisive task of our time, namely, the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war from the very inception of disarmament.

Any departure from this idea would be tantamount to agreeing to let the world remain permanently under the threat of a nuclear war. After all, the unacceptability of the United States proposal for a percentage reduction of the means of delivering nuclear missiles is explained by the fact that this proposal retains wide possibilities of starting and waging a nuclear war right up to the end of disarmament. We cannot adopt a position which would tolerate a nuclear war and would sanction it by an international agreement. Our proposal therefore stipulates that the agreed number of missiles retained by the Soviet Union and by the United States must be strictly limited. We do not at all envisage that the Soviet Union and the United States would retain many hundreds of inter-continental missiles capable of carrying nuclear war-heads. The quantity - and I stress this - must be strictly limited and in strict accordance with the purposes for which they are retained, namely, as a means of defence in the event that someone should decide to violate the treaty and conceal missiles or military aircraft, as some western statesmen seem to fear.

We deem it necessary to stress once again that our proposal has been put forward with a view to negotiating a treaty with the western Powers, and it is precisely for this reason that in speaking of a strictly limited number of missiles to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States, we have pointed out that this must be an agreed number. We are prepared to discuss the question of the precise number of missiles with the western Powers after we have found a common platform with them, after we have received a favourable reply from the other side to our proposal. Only then will there be any point in having business-like concrete discussion of the question of the number of missiles that should be retained by the Soviet Union and by the United States.

The question of control was also raised in connexion with our proposal.

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The position of the Soviet Union regarding control over disarmament is well known. All measures provided for in the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Government would be carried out under strict international control. We should like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to article 5 of our draft treaty. We have already quoted the text of paragraph 1 of this article in full (supra. p. 22 ); this provides for the destruction of rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons with the exception of a strictly agreed number of missiles of a definite type which would be retained by the USSR and the United States during the second stage. Paragraph 3 of article 5 stipulates that inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1.

At present, when we are still without the agreement of the western Powers to accept this Soviet proposal in principle, it would be premature to divert the attention of the Committee to the consideration of the various details which might arise in connexion with our proposal. What point would there be in having a discussion on individual details, on individual particular questions, if we have no common agreed platform? The main thing at present is to get a clear reply from our Western partners as to whether they are prepared to accept the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union in a spirit of goodwill inspired by the desire to reach agreement as quickly as possible on the most important issues of the disarmament problem.

We are now waiting for the western Powers to define their attitude to this Soviet proposal which, as the representative of India, Mr. Lall, has rightly pointed out (ENDC/PV.85, p.22), opens the door to solving the problem of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage.

At the first meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee after the recess, namely on 26 November (ENDC/PV.83), both the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, and the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, in referring to the proposal of the Soviet Union submitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, at the General Assembly on 21 September (A/PV.1127 (provisional), p.38) stressed that they were ready to help towards overcoming the obstacles standing in the way of agreement on the main issues of disarmament. Mr. Dean expressed the idea that he would like to show "flexibility based on a desire for mutual understanding" (ENDC/PV.83, p.13).

The Soviet Union has taken a significant step towards meeting western Powers. It is now for the western Powers to speak; it now depends on them whether we shall

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be able to reach agreement on an important question of general and complete disarmament, namely, on the question of eliminating the danger of a nuclear war through the destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

The picture is now so clear, the situation so obvious, that all that is required of the western Powers is to show goodwill. We hope that they will soon give a positive reply to our proposal. If we receive such a reply, wide possibilities will open up for reaching agreement on the basic measures of the first stage of disarmament and on all the details connected with the implementation of our proposal, namely, the retention by the Soviet Union and by the United States, during the second stage, of an agreed and strictly limited number of inter-continental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft defence missiles.

The General Assembly's resolution 1767 (XVII) on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/64), in favour of which, I may recall, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom voted, calls on us to negotiate in a spirit of constructive compromise. The Soviet Union has agreed to a compromise and has, so to speak, fulfilled its part of the task. What still remains unfulfilled is that part of the task which lies on the United States and the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union is acting in the spirit prescribed by the resolution of the General Assembly. I should like to conclude my statement by expressing the hope that the same spirit of compromise will be shown by our western colleagues, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, which would enable us to reach rapid agreement on this very important part of the problem of disarmament.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): My delegation intends to speak today on the topic which the co-Chairman had recommended should be discussed in the plenary meeting, but before doing so, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to comment briefly on what our Soviet colleague has had to say with respect to a test ban treaty and, specifically, with respect to "black boxes".

I noted with interest Mr. Tsarapkin's statement today about "black boxes". That was not because what he had to say about them was new: Soviet statements about the number and location and the type of personnel that would be needed to introduce and remove the "black boxes" -- which Mr. Tsarapkin may recall were made to us privately some time ago -- have been discussed in the co-Chairman's meetings here in Geneva and have been alluded to in general terms in the test ban Sub Committee. Nevertheless

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I noted Mr. Tsarapkin's statement with interest because the fact that he has made it publicly -- I say "publicly", and I assume that Mr. Tsarapkin would now like Mr. Roschin to give back to the Press what he withdrew from it on Friday -- in a plenary meeting is an indication, I hope, that the Soviet delegation is now ready to negotiate further and in more precise terms about the number, location, specification and capabilities of the automatic unmanned seismic stations.

I sincerely hope that this public statement does not mean that the Soviet Government has now reached the end of what it is willing to discuss on "black boxes". I hope also that Mr. Tsarapkin's statement today means that the Soviet Union has now given up its completely inaccurate claim that the western Powers have rejected the idea of "black boxes". We never rejected the idea of "black boxes"; we have expressed interest in them and we have said that we want to discuss them and explore the idea. What we have rejected is the attempt of the Soviet Union to say that an acceptance in principle or an acceptance of the idea of "black boxes" by the western delegations means that the West will have given up any idea of manned stations with high-calibre equipment and of the necessity for on-site inspections.

Whenever we have said that we should be quite willing to explore how "black boxes" might be used as a supplement to a system of manned detection stations, and how they might be used possibly to reduce the number of on-site inspections required, Mr. Tsarapkin has claimed that because we would not give up the necessity for on-site inspection or the desirability of manned inspection stations, we were rejecting the idea of "black boxes". I now hope the Soviet delegation is ready to go ahead, publicly or privately, with further exploration of this idea in specific terms.

I hope also that the fact that the Soviet Union is now willing to accept the idea of having these automatic stations introduced, checked and removed by international personnel means that the safeguards which the Western Powers have suggested should be imposed on on-site inspection teams, such as their transport in Soviet aeroplanes, the covering of windows, the attendance of Soviet observers, and so on, will -- since the Soviet Union now finds them acceptable in terms of its security in connexion with the "black boxes" -- be acceptable to it also with regard to on-site inspection. I do hope this means that we may have, or hope for, a change from the opposition of the Soviet Union to on-site inspection by international personnel.

If I may now turn to the topic of the day, in his initial statement as representative of the Soviet Union at the opening meeting of our resumed session here

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on 26 November (ENDC/PV.83, pp.17 et seq.), and again today, Mr. Tsarapkin reminded us of the fact that, in the course of the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Union had put forward certain changes in its draft treaty regarding the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of a strictly limited number of missiles or rockets. Accordingly, the Soviet representative proposed that we come back to consideration of point 5 (b) of document ENDC/52 regarding measures of disarmament covering nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and strive, as provided for in the recommendations on procedure adopted by the Conference (ENDC/52, p.1), to overcome any difficulties or differences of views. Mr. Tsarapkin expressed hope that an understanding on this question would prove to be within our reach. In the same statement, he said: "In this regard the Soviet Union has a flexible attitude" (ENDC/PV.83, p.12)

The United States delegation welcomes the proposal of the Soviet Union to continue consideration here in the plenary Committee of the question of armaments. This problem has been among the most acute of all those confronting our negotiations. Any new approach deserves careful explanation, clarification and exploration in depth. The United States expects to participate actively in this aspect of our work, both in the plenary meetings and in talks with our Soviet co-Chairman.

In our discussions, the United States delegation will necessarily be addressing itself to both item 5 (b) of our agenda, which relates to nuclear delivery vehicles, and item 5(c) which relates to conventional armaments. That is necessary for two reasons.

In the first place, the United States approach deals with armaments in all categories and types -- except for certain classes of very small arms -- in an identical manner. The United States approach is to freeze at a given moment in time the existing military situation as it has evolved in response to each country's own assessment of its military requirements and then progressively to shrink it to zero by a process beginning with an across-the-board reduction of 30 per cent in stage I (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2).

In the second place, it is not possible in our view to discuss nuclear and conventional armaments separately in the absence of a clear definition of what types of armaments fall in the two groups. The large number of weapons possessing what is called "dual capability" in both the nuclear and in the conventional fields poses important problems in this connexion. Moreover, many conventional armaments

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not explicitly designed for "dual capability" could undoubtedly be modified quite readily to acquire a nuclear capability which further complicates attempts at definition.

It is against this background and in the light of our convictions on these matters that the United States must examine and consider the latest proposal of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, in my statement today I shall undertake two interrelated tasks. First, I shall indicate in a broad and preliminary way some of the general areas in which clarifications of the Soviet proposal would be most useful in assisting our consideration of the proposal. Second, I shall recapitulate the most relevant features of the United States position and the approach to the questions embraced in items 5b and 5c of our agenda.

In that connexion I shall present for consideration, together with certain preliminary explanations, treaty language concerning the reduction of armaments in stage I.

Turning first to the amendment most recently introduced by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1), I think it is important to stress the method and the spirit in which, in our view, both that proposal and corresponding United States proposals can be most objectively examined. In that regard I hope that questions of what is or what is not a principle, what must or what must not be accepted before clarifications are offered, or what exactly must be clarified and at what level of detail, will not become matters for polemics to such a degree that these arguments tend to obscure, embitter or serve as a substitute for quiet and serious consideration of the enormously important and enormously complex problem of armaments reduction. The working procedures of our Conference (ENDC/1/Add.3), as adopted on 24 July last and reaffirmed by common agreement upon our resumption here last month, are I think well adapted to our constructive purpose. In accordance with them, I propose that after all of us here have had the benefit of a general initial expression of views, we proceed promptly -- without too much repetitious debate -- to solicit any suggestions other delegations may wish to offer in the form of treaty language, and to refer all of these various suggestions to the co-Chairmen for thoughtful consideration and subsequent report.

In the interest of minimizing possibilities for unproductive debate, at this stage the United States delegation expects to go about the task of exchanging views and seeking clarification in specific terms primarily in discussion between the

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co-Chairmen. Accordingly I shall seek at this point to sketch only in general terms the broad areas in which a careful review seems to us to be required. In doing this I am neither presenting Mr. Tsarapkin with a questionnaire nor am I insisting that he address himself here and now to the topics which seem important to us.

The key sentence which appears to summarize the Soviet suggestion appears to us to be the following:

"All rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons of any calibre and range, whether strategic, operational or tactical, and pilotless aircraft of all types shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed, except for an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the 'ground-to-air' category, to be retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, exclusively in their own territory, until the end of the second stage." (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.5)

First of all, of course, if we are to measure and assess the gap between the Soviet position and our own, we need to know how far and in what respects it departs from the 30 per cent across-the-board approach which the United States considers to be the most suitable and realistic basis for reductions. Despite its opposition at the beginning of our Conference, the Soviet Union has now accepted this approach for many categories of armaments. It still wishes to depart from this approach, however, by demanding a much larger reduction in strategic delivery vehicles, which constitute a most important category to the West.

The percentage of reduction which the Soviet Union now proposes in those categories appears to be something more than 30 per cent, and something less than 100 per cent. We need to know what it is.

And, of course, if the Soviet proposal on retaining an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category until the end of stage II implies a cut in United States intercontinental strategic vehicles, such as ICBM's and long range bombers, by a greater percentage than for the Soviet Union, the problem is more complex. We shall need to know the extent and justification of any such proposed disparity.

That, then, is the first dimension of the problem which we must examine: how

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much and in what respects does the Soviet proposal differ from the United States proposal for a 30 per cent across-the-board reduction? What, in short, is the dimension of the gap to be bridged? That might be called the dimension of width. That, in our view, cannot be classified as a matter of detail, or as one unworthy of consideration in reaching understanding on an approach to arms reduction.

A second dimension of the problem before us is that of translation of the Soviet proposal into numbers and categories. That might be called the dimension of depth. The United States has set forth in its treaty outline certain groupings or categories of armaments (ENDC/30, pp. 4 and 5) to clarify its proposal. It has sought to simplify the problem by references to broad and uniform percentages rather than to enter into negotiations on specific numbers involved or on the composition of remaining forces.

The Soviet proposal, however, addresses itself to numbers, and to retained levels, and introduces sharp differentiations between the treatment of various armaments. An assessment of the military import of those quantities and distinctions would seem to require from our Soviet colleagues at least some general indications of the ranges of numbers and of the categories of armaments they are talking about. That dimension of the problem is particularly in need of clarification in view, as I have mentioned earlier, of the lack, so far, of a common understanding about the distinctions envisaged by the Soviet Union even between nuclear and conventional armaments. In short, some armaments are to be reduced by 30 per cent, some by 100 per cent, and some by a percentage or amount in between. We need, quite frankly, to know which is which.

A third dimension of the task of seeking a reconciliation of the Western approach and that of our Soviet colleague involves the question of verification. We do not, of course, expect that our Soviet colleague will table this week a verification annex developing his ideas on this point in detail. Verification is of course an important aspect of all the proposals we have discussed or shall discuss, but in this particular case it is singularly important in assessing the importance and significance of the proposal itself.

For, in the past, we have been told by the Soviet representatives that total elimination required a minimum of verification. Control, they have said, was easy; the existence of one nuclear delivery vehicle would constitute clear proof of violation. Accordingly, the control that the Soviet Union has proposed has been



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generally of the type we have characterized broadly as inspection of bonfires. But if the Soviet Union now proposes a different approach to the largest and most destructive form of armaments, one based on a precise, agreed, retained level, does it propose a correspondingly different approach to verification of fulfilment of the measure? Does it still maintain its previous views forbidding verification of retained levels? Quite apart, therefore, from details and modalities, an indication of the Soviet Union's attitudes on that question would contribute importantly to an assessment of the potential and implications of its new proposal. That, then, might be called the dimension of verification or control.

Those are some of the major areas into which we should like to direct our attention in forthcoming discussions with our co-Chairman. Of course, the Soviet proposal also raises the question of location of the armaments in question. Although I do not intend to initiate a discussion of that problem at this point on our agenda, I wish to reiterate the United States position that the elimination of so-called foreign bases proposed by the Soviet Union for the first stage would create grave imbalances and jeopardize most seriously the security of the United States and its allies, and is therefore unacceptable.

I have made these comments on the Soviet change of position on nuclear delivery vehicles not in order to engage in polemics, or delve into details, but in the hope that clarification and elaboration of the Soviet proposal by the Soviet delegation will help us in our efforts to resolve the existing major differences on this most important question of reduction of armaments. We have, of course, noted that at our plenary meeting on 26 November, and again today, Mr. Tsarapkin emphasized that:

".... the Soviet proposal is in no case a departure from the Soviet Union's fundamental approach to the question of the sequence and order in which measures for general and complete disarmament should be implemented ....."

(ENDC/PV.83, p.22)

In other words, says Mr. Tsarapkin, the Soviet Union still adheres to the position that the liquidation of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be carried out in stage I of disarmament. He appeared to repeat that idea this morning.

These words are not very encouraging. Nevertheless, we hope that in the process of clarifying and elaborating its new proposal the Soviet delegation will be able to indicate that the Soviet Union is now willing to abandon its unrealistic and inequitable concept of carrying out total, or almost total, disarmament

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in stage I with respect to one particular class of armaments, which cannot even be easily defined, and is prepared to move in the direction of progressive across-the-board reduction of all classes of armament through the different stages of the disarmament process.

My delegation welcomed the Soviet decision last July (ENDC/48) to adopt the method of gradual percentage reduction for many categories of armaments, and it would not be unreasonable to hope that the new Soviet proposal concerning nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is an indication that the Soviet Union has drawn the logical conclusion and may be prepared to extend this general method to cover all major armaments.

As to the United States, its position on the question of reduction of armaments is well known. The United States has believed and continues to believe that the method of progressive across-the-board reductions of armaments is the most realistic one, and is sound and feasible. The reasons for our continuing advocacy of this method, as set forth in our proposals, are the following:

First, such a method provides for a continuing and orderly progression, through all the stages of the disarmament process, of disarmament measures until the goal of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world has been reached.

Second, the United States proposals provide for a realistic allocation of disarmament measures among the different stages and would not cause the over-burdening of any of the stages.

Third, the United States proposals make feasible control over disarmament measures in stage I, when the disarmament organization would be in its initial stage of operation, and when all-inclusive control arrangements would be impracticable, and, as it has said on many occasions, unacceptable to the Soviet Union. The control arrangements under the United States proposals for the first stage would be sufficient to provide reasonable assurance against possible violations. They would not necessitate undue disclosures of national security information and would thus avoid any prejudice to the security of some States which are particularly concerned about this problem.

Fourth, the United States proposals do not introduce in a short period radical measures which are inconsistent with the political realities in the world of today. On the contrary, they open the way and lead towards disarmament in a way which takes full account of the existing political relationships, which, just as the armaments situation, cannot be expected to change overnight.

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Fifth, the measures provided for in the first stage under the United States proposals would stop the arms race by significantly reducing the levels of armaments and armed forces, by making it impossible for States to develop significant new weapons and by introducing rigid control over further production of existing armaments.

Sixth, the United States proposals maintain the existing pattern of inter-relationship of the armed forces of States by not calling for significant changes in the "mix" of armaments of each State during the disarmament process. Consequently, those proposals avoid problems of creating strategic imbalance and the very complex and difficult issues which would arise if the composition of forces had to be negotiated in detail.

In accordance with this approach of gradual across-the-board reductions of armaments, the United States draft treaty outline provides in stage I for a 30 per cent reduction by specified parties of all of their major armaments, including nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, existing at an agreed date and listed in an appropriate declaration to be submitted to the international disarmament organization. The reductions would be accomplished in three steps, each consisting of one year.

Each step would be divided into two parts. During the first part, armaments subject to reduction within that step would be deposited with the international disarmament organization, while during the second part the armaments so deposited would be destroyed or converted to peaceful use. These reductions would be subject to agreed verification arrangements by the international disarmament organization, including arrangements providing assurance that the agreed levels on retained armaments were not being exceeded.

The reason why we have included in stage I reduction of only major armaments is that we did not wish to overburden the international disarmament organization with excessive tasks at the outset of its operation. Nor did we want to include in the very first stage of disarmament such measures as would require very extensive verification arrangements. However, as we have said on earlier occasions, we would be prepared to consider inclusion of all types of armaments in stage I reductions if the Soviet Union should insist upon it and would accept the necessary additional measures of verification required.

In order to ensure that States could not compensate for the armaments reduced by producing new, and perhaps even more sophisticated, weapons during the process of

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disarmament, the United States has proposed strict limitations on the production and testing of armaments. According to these restrictions, none of the parties could exceed, through new production, the levels of armaments resulting from a 30 per cent reduction of each type of armament existing at the beginning of stage I. In addition, the parties to the treaty would limit their production of parts and assemblies usable in any type of armament subject to reduction. The parties would also be prohibited, after the beginning of stage I, from expanding their production facilities related to the armaments subject to reduction, and from constructing or equipping new facilities for the production of any type of armament which they had not produced before the beginning of stage I.

Finally, the United States proposals provide for prohibition of the testing or production of new types of armaments, as well as for a limitation of flight testing of missiles. All these measures would of course be subject to agreed verification arrangements by the international disarmament organization.

My delegation is taking this opportunity to submit to the Committee treaty language concerning the reduction of armaments in stage I (ENDC/69). These provisions, for the most part, amplify and make more precise the clauses in section A of stage I of the United States outline treaty which I have just reviewed. In addition, our draft treaty language makes clear the amendments which we introduced on 6 August last (ENDC/30/Add.1) concerning production of armaments. I should also point out that we have benefited considerably from the comments and suggestions made by other delegations in the course of our earlier discussions, and these comments and suggestions have influenced the drafting of our treaty language.

In connexion with our draft treaty language, which we are now submitting, I should like at this time only to point out a few of the features of which I think members of the Committee should take particular note.

First, in paragraph 1 - "Deduction of Armaments" - there is no longer contained a lengthy, illustrative list of categories and types of armaments, such as the list which was contained in our outline treaty (ENDC/30, pp. 4 and 5). The annex on stage I armaments reductions will contain the comprehensive list of types of armaments of each country that will be subject to reduction. Since reductions of particular types, and allowed production within those types, will take place on the basis of the lists set forth in the annex, it will be necessary for countries undertaking reductions in stage I to develop an agreed list of the types of armaments which would be subject to reduction and production limitations.

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Second, I should like to call the Committee's attention to the basic provision on production limitations contained in paragraph 3 a, on page 2 of Document ENDC/69. In this paragraph it is made clear that there will be only an agreed amount of production of armaments within the various types of armaments subject to reduction. Whenever an armament is produced within the agreed allowance, an additional armament of the same type would have to be destroyed. This language reflects the amendments in our treaty outline which we made on 6 August 1962 (ENDC/30/Add.1).

Third, there is another point which should be noted about our paragraph 3a. There would be an agreed production limitation for every State party to the treaty, even if it were not a State required to reduce armaments in stage I. There would again be a requirement that an armament of the same type be destroyed for each armament produced. This is required under our draft so that no State, whether or not its armaments are subject to reduction in stage I, could increase the level of its armaments during that stage.

Fourth, I should like to call the Committee's attention to paragraph 38 of our treaty article. In this clause we provide:

"No Party shall, from the beginning of stage I, test or produce any type of armament which it has not tested and produced prior to the beginning of stage I." (ENDC/69, p.3)

A great deal of concern has been expressed around this table about the insecurity and instability which might be created by competition to develop new types of weapons. We believe that this clause should be an effective dampener on any such competition. If a party had not tested and produced a type of armament prior to the beginning of stage I, it could not test or produce that armament after the beginning of stage I. We think that this clause which I have just quoted represents the most practical way in which we can deal with this problem.

In conclusion, I wish to state that we believe that the treaty language we have now submitted should advance the work of our Conference, since it puts into clearer and more precise terms concepts and procedures for the reduction of armaments, for the method of reduction, for limitations on production and for limitations on the testing of new weapons.

We suggest that, in accordance with our established plan of work and established practice, this draft article and articles 5, 6, 7, 8 and 12 of the Soviet Union's draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1), together with any amendments or suggestions that other

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delegations may make, be referred to the co-Chairmen for further consideration. If plenary discussions of this agenda item are completed this week -- and of course without prejudice to any delegation's desire to speak on this item on our agenda -- we also suggest that any delegation wishing to submit amendments or suggestions do so not later than Friday, 14 December.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): It is my intention this morning to make some remarks on behalf of my government on items 5 b and c of our agreed agenda on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/1/Add.3), but before doing so I should like to make some brief comments in exercise of the right of reply on the statements we have heard this morning on the subject of a nuclear test ban.

First, I am glad to welcome the representative of Nigeria back to our Conference. I listened with interest to his intervention. Next I listened also with interest to the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union, and I should like to make a short preliminary observation upon them.

In the first place, my colleagues around this table are aware, because they are familiar with the proceedings of the nuclear test ban Sub-Committee, that the United Kingdom and the United States have been anxious ever since the presentation of the eight-Nation memorandum (ENDC/28) to enter into real and substantive negotiation upon it. We recognized of course that there was a difference of view between ourselves and the Soviet Union over on-site inspection and over the meaning of the memorandum in this respect. Accordingly we proposed and we still propose to adopt the same procedure as the Conference agreed upon concerning general and complete disarmament: namely, to take the proposals or topics one by one and seek the widest area of agreement upon them, leaving over for further consideration at a second or third reading those points on which we may not be able to agree immediately. That was the sort of procedure which the representative of Nigeria, if I understood him rightly, commended to us this morning, and I agree with him. We, the United Kingdom and the United States, have never said, and we do not say now that we cannot enter into negotiation until our own view of the points on which we disagree with the Soviet Union is accepted by the other side in advance. We have never said that and we do not say it now. Unfortunately, that is exactly the attitude that on a number of occasions the Soviet Union has adopted.

Today I was glad to hear Mr. Tsarapkin revert to the question of "black boxes"

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and, if I understood him rightly, to hear him respond to the invitation that I extended at our eighty-seventh plenary meeting to discuss this question further with us. This is what I said on that occasion:

"In this matter also my delegation is seeking for common ground and not for points of disagreement. By all means let us discuss the possible use of 'black boxes' and see whether it may help to narrow the gap between the two sides and to reduce the requirements both for the use of conventional detection stations and even, perhaps for the number of on-site inspections. The United Kingdom is ready and indeed anxious to take further part in discussion with the Soviet Union of this proposal. I should like, therefore, formally to propose that a meeting be convened of competent experts from the west, from the Soviet Union and, if desired, from other countries which have such experts to examine where and how far the use of 'black boxes' could be helpful in improving means of detection and identification. If there is a hope of making progress in this way, do not let us throw it away. Even without a meeting of experts, we are prepared to go into this matter with the representative of the Soviet Union as thoroughly as we can do without experts to help us." (ENDC/PV.87, pp.12 and 13).

As in the case of the eight-Nation memorandum, so in the case of "black boxes"; we are willing, and indeed anxious, to explore the matter further with the Soviet Union without any hampering conditions on our side. We ourselves do not believe, from our preliminary studies, that "black boxes" could afford a complete substitute for a measure of on-site inspection. The scientists, Soviet and United States, who put the "black boxes" idea forward in the first place at the Fugwash conference expressed the same view, and we have thought it only right to let our colleagues on the Committee know that this is the view that we have formed from our preliminary studies. I want to repeat to our colleagues, however, that we do not make the acceptance of this view a condition for negotiation about "black boxes".

The Soviet representative, I understand, believes that "black boxes" may be of greater value than we have so far been led by advice to think. I only hope that he, in his turn, is not making it a condition that others should accept that point of view before we embark upon a further exploration of the question of "black boxes", because such a condition would lead us nowhere. Unless I hear from the Soviet representative to the contrary I shall assume that he is not seeking to make any such condition.

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Having said that, I should like, in the light of his statement today, to renew the formal proposal which I made on 5 December (ibid, p.13), the proposal that a meeting be convened of competent experts from the west, from the Soviet Union and, if desired from other countries which have such experts, to examine where and how far the use of "black boxes" could be helpful in improving means of detection and identification. I renew that proposal formally in the light of Mr. Tsarapkin's statement today, but I would also repeat that if that suggestion does not commend itself we are still prepared to go into this matter with the representative of the Soviet Union as thoroughly as we can without experts.

For the rest, I should like to reserve my further comments on Mr. Tsarapkin's statement until I have had time to consider it carefully in the record. I should not like even inadvertently to say anything which might nip in the bud any prospect of making progress. There is to be a further meeting of the nuclear Sub-Committee tomorrow, and that will give the three nuclear delegations the chance of exploring the matter further.

Now let me turn to the question of items 5 b and 5 c of our agreed agenda on general and complete disarmament.

We have heard today two interesting statements by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union and I shall of course study their remarks with the close attention they deserve. I shall also study carefully the document which Mr. Stelle has kindly circulated to the Committee as a Conference document (EMDC/69). I am sure we all hope that this document will help our two co-Chairmen in the difficult task of drafting the next article, article V, of our treaty on general and complete disarmament.

I think we are all agreed that in our negotiations on general and complete disarmament our discussions on items 5 b and 5 c cannot be entirely divorced from each other. As the representative of India pointed out in his speech at our eighty-fifth meeting, a speech to which I listened with particular interest, our task here is surely not only to put an end to nuclear weapons but also to extend disarmament to conventional weapons as well. As Mr. Lall said:

"..... urgent though the need for nuclear disarmament is, it is also essential that due attention be paid to disarmament in its fullest sense." (EMDC/PV.85, p.20)

I wish to emphasize this point because it has been suggested recently in this Committee that the world is richer -- if that is the right word -- by one experience



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during the last few months. I submit that we should do well to remember that the world is in fact richer -- if that is the word -- by not one but two experiences during that period. Moreover, I do not want the Committee to draw any wrong conclusions from the fact that I propose this morning to concentrate on the problem of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles rather than on conventional disarmament.

We have of course already discussed the problem of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles at some length during the first session of this Conference, and we studied it in even greater detail during our second session before we went into recess in September.

I think that the value of our earlier discussions in detail and in depth of this problem has been amply demonstrated by the fact that since those discussions the Soviet Government has decided to modify its position in regard to the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. It is therefore appropriate and timely that we should renew such discussions at an early stage, and I hope that they will be equally fruitful.

We are dealing here with one of the most difficult and sensitive, perhaps the most difficult and sensitive, parts of our task, and I am sure that once we reach agreement on nuclear weapon systems, the weapons which underpin the security of the major Powers, we shall find agreement in other fields relatively easier. Consideration of the new Soviet proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1, pp. 5-7) offers an excellent opportunity for real discussion, discussion which will permit us to work together to solve this extremely complicated and technical problem. I hope my contributions to this discussion will be understood in this light.

My colleagues will recall that the modification of the Soviet position was first announced at the General Assembly on 21 September last by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko. I do not think I need quote his remarks on that occasion since they are familiar to all of us; Mr. Tsarapkin repeated them this morning, and they can be found in the provisional verbatim record (A/PV.1127 (provisional), p.38). My colleagues will also recall that, as Mr. Gromyko promised, the Soviet Government subsequently tabled a revised draft treaty on general and complete disarmament as a First Committee document (A/C.1/867) dated 24 September. This revised draft treaty has also been circulated as a Conference document (ENDC/2/Rev.1) dated 26 November.

The new Soviet position regarding nuclear delivery vehicles originally announced by Mr. Gromyko is reflected in amendments to articles 5 and 21 of the revised Soviet

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draft treaty and in a new article, article 23A. Incidentally, I notice that article 4 has not been amended to take account of Mr. Gromyko's proposal. Logically such an amendment would seem to be required and no doubt our Soviet colleague will be putting this forward in due course.

Since copies of the revised Soviet draft treaty are available to members here I do not need to take up the Committee's time today by examining the texts of the articles to which I have referred. My colleagues will also recall that Mr. Lorin subsequently referred to the modification of his government's position during his speech to the First Committee on 6 November (L/C.1/PV.1267, pp.12-15). Needless to say I listened to his remarks on that occasion with the close attention that they deserved. But on the whole his speech was of a general character and he largely confined himself to repeating Mr. Gromyko's original proposal.

Mr. Tsarapkin and some of his eastern colleagues have sought to anticipate our criticizing the new Soviet proposal as being too vague by saying that it constitutes a principle to which the West must agree before the Committee gets down to detailed discussion. For my part, I would prefer to regard the modification in the Soviet position as regards nuclear delivery vehicles as a proposal towards the solution of a problem on which we are all agreed in principle -- I repeat, a problem on which we are all agreed in principle, namely, the need to negotiate a treaty for general and complete disarmament which, among other things, contains provision for the elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction. In this instance the revised Soviet draft treaty contains some detailed information -- certainly more than in other Soviet proposals -- and this I welcome. Later in my speech today I will deal with some of those technical issues on which my delegation can, I think, make a useful contribution based on our own experience.

Turning to the substance of the new Soviet proposal, I am sure that most of us would entirely agree with the statement made by the representative of the United Arab Republic during his speech to the First Committee on 5 November. Mr. Hassan suggested that it was perhaps too early to pass final judgement on this proposal before much needed clarification and precision had been established. As he said:

"Discussion of this latest development with a view to assessing its fuller meaning and consequences merits the Geneva Conference's utmost attention, and will no doubt occupy a great part of the forthcoming resumed deliberations." (L/C.1/PV.1266, p.28)

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The representatives of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.84, pp.33 and 34) and of India (ENDC/PV.85, pp.20 and 21) made the same point in their statements on 28 and 30 November respectively, and I entirely associate myself with their remarks in this connexion. My request for further detail and elaboration is, I think, also supported by the representative of Bulgaria, who complained on 30 November that the Western Powers had not so far asked for detailed clarification (ENDC/PV.85/p.40). I am always happy when the representative of Bulgaria and myself find ourselves in agreement. I hope, therefore, that my Soviet colleague will now come forward with further contributions to our deliberations in this regard.

Let me say here and now that I welcome the indications of new thinking behind the new Soviet proposal, since it appears to be based on a recognition by the Soviet Government of the difficulties raised by its earlier proposals to eliminate the danger of nuclear war for all time merely by allegedly eliminating nuclear delivery vehicles. I take it that this proposal means, in effect, that the Soviet Government is now offering an alternative to the suggestion put forward by Mr. Kuznetsov on 9 October (ENDC/PV.81, p.9) that all nuclear warheads should be destroyed in the first stage of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. I realize that the Soviet Government has not altogether abandoned this suggestion, but it does seem to me that it is now thinking somewhat more realistically about these matters than before. My delegation certainly regards its new proposal as a step in the right direction, since it implies that both East and West should retain a nuclear umbrella, as yet, of course, undefined, for at least two out of the three stages of the disarmament process.

I have not, of course, forgotten Mr. Zorin's warning to us in the First Committee on 6 November that:

"It would be quite wrong to see in this step that we have taken a mechanical concession made by the Soviet Union in order to bring the position of the Soviet Union closer to that of the United States..."

(A/C.1/PV.1267, p.13-15)

However, I for one am prepared to regard the new Soviet proposal as a potential means of working towards bridging the gap between the former Soviet position and the position which the West has adopted at this Conference. As you know, we have always argued that a disarmament agreement is unlikely to be achieved unless it incorporates provision for the retention by both sides of, at any rate, some nuclear capability

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sufficient to provide security for both sides during the greater part of the disarmament process.

On 26 November Mr. Tsarapkin referred to the new Soviet proposal, which "clearly goes towards meeting the point of view of the western Powers in regard to what is called a nuclear 'protective umbrella' ". (ENDC/PV.83, p.21) I think that is a very good description of the western position in this matter, namely, that disarmament must be carried out under the protection of the respective nuclear umbrellas until such time as alternative and effective security arrangements can be established for all.

As the representative of Romania pointed out on 28 November:

"General and complete disarmament will become possible only if we take into account to an equal extent the right of all States to ensure their security." (ENDC/PV.84, p.8)

We are now all agreed, it seems to me, that we must have the first two stages of the disarmament process under the protection of the nuclear umbrella. My own view and the view of my own delegation is that, while we welcome this change in the Soviet attitude so far as it goes, we would invite the Soviet Union to go further. It seems to us that in so far as this proposal is relevant it would be more fitted to the transition from the second stage to the third stage. As we understand the Soviet position, the Soviet Union is not contemplating the full-scale build-up of the peace-keeping force before the third stage of the disarmament process at the earliest. Therefore it would be logical that the Soviet proposal should be related to the third stage rather than to the second stage.

We have often pointed out that so far as the West is concerned we cannot eliminate the present sources of our security, however unsatisfactory and dangerous they may appear to be, before establishing another equally effective and less dangerous source of security. In our view that new source would have to be a peace-keeping force of sufficient power and under satisfactory political control to deter an aggressor. Until such a force is established it is clearly unrealistic to expect either side to dismantle its present security arrangements. I think my Soviet colleague would agree with that general proposition.

As I have said, I recognize that the Soviet proposal could be of help to our work here. I entirely agree, for example, with Mr. Dean's statement on 6 November in the First Committee that the Soviet proposal might be a good omen and might forecast an attempt to restore credibility to the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. As Mr. Dean pointed out:

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"If the gap which divides us comes down to the question of the percentage of quantitative arms reduction in each stage, we shall have a question with which we can come to grips." (A/C.1/PV.1267, p.53-55)

However, as I said earlier, it is clearly too soon to say whether the new Soviet proposal in its present form will in fact contribute to our discussions here. Naturally I hope it will, and I should therefore like to stress that my following remarks are put forward in an entirely constructive spirit. They are primarily intended to draw the attention of my Soviet colleague to some of the implications of the proposal he is now making. I hope that I have already made it abundantly clear that we are not yet able to assess the full significance of the Soviet proposal as it now stands.

One: as a representative of one of the nuclear Powers represented at this Conference I should perhaps remind the Committee that my country has not been included in the Soviet proposal. I do not propose to say any more than that at the present time, but clearly that is a point which my delegation has to bear in mind and on which we have to reserve our position.

Two: I note that it appears that under its new proposal the Soviet Government is suggesting that only land-based intercontinental missiles should be retained until the end of stage II. That is, the Soviet Government is making here a proposal of detail. I must hope that our Soviet colleague will come forward in due course and give us his Government's reasons for apparently selecting this particular weapon system and for setting aside submarine and aircraft-mounted missiles. Both those latter types of missile platforms would appear to have substantial advantages for both sides from the most important -- indeed vital -- point of view of invulnerability, advantages which I do not think should be entirely overlooked.

Three: I note with interest the proposed retention by both sides of certain surface-to-air missiles. Clearly, as a defence against improvised delivery vehicles, such as civil aircraft, such missiles could well be essential. I myself am glad to note that the Soviet Government is now taking a more realistic view in this matter and that the arguments which we put forward in the earlier stages of the Conference are not quite so "artificial" as Mr. Tsarapkin suggested on 26 November that they were. (ENDC/Pv.83, p.21). At this morning's meeting the representative of the Soviet Union again attacked our concern with improvised delivery vehicles, so I am left in some doubt now about what his position really is. At one stage he apparently

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suggested that all civil airliners should be destroyed also, as being capable of delivering nuclear warheads (supra, pp. 21-22). I shall look at that passage in the verbatim record with particular care, and make a point of taking the matter further in the near future. It is, of course, a matter of a good deal of consequence.

Four: it is generally recognized that two main factors enter into the strategic balance as it now stands: nuclear weapons and conventional forces. The eastern bloc has a superiority in conventional strength, due not only to its larger numbers of heavy weapons but also to interior lines, to speed of reinforcement and further mobilization, to monolithic command and so on. These we have to some extent already discussed. This superiority is counterbalanced by the nuclear weapons in the possession of the west. If the eastern bloc is to expect the West to reduce its nuclear weapons to an agreed low level, does the Soviet Union propose that the East should at the same time reduce its conventional strength so as to assure an effective conventional balance also? Otherwise a new balance, unfavourable to the West, would be arrived at.

Five: then there is the question of verification. The Soviet proposal is for a strictly limited number of nuclear delivery vehicles to be retained by both sides. The wording here is somewhat ambiguous. The proposal is not specifically for an equal number of vehicles or for vehicles of an equal nuclear capacity, as I understand it, but I take it to mean that the deterrent capacity on both sides would be the same. Again I presume that the numbers the Soviet Union has in mind are small. That being so, verification -- which we have always pointed out is an essential aspect in the disarmament process and is, after all, the platform on which confidence must be established and must grow as the disarmament process proceeds -- must assume a vital importance if this proposal of the Soviet Union is to become a matter of serious negotiation.

I say this with great seriousness to our Soviet colleague and I do so because of the previous attitude which his delegation has adopted towards verification. While subscribing to the view put forward so clearly by Mr. Gromyko in one of our earliest meetings (ENDC/PV.2, p.11) -- that the Soviet Union will not trust the West and does not expect the West to trust it -- nevertheless the Soviet representatives at this Conference have repeatedly claimed that the only verification to which they will agree until the very last stage of disarmament is a verification of actual destruction of weapons. The Soviet representatives have repeatedly told us that they will accept verification of destruction but not of weapons remaining, which they describe as control over armaments.

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As other representatives are well aware, we in the West have said that this is not sufficient and that there must be some means of verifying that agreed levels are not exceeded and that there shall be no weapons hidden under the jacket. By its very proposal here the Soviet Union has, it seems to us, high-lighted the unrealistic nature of its own verification so far. If there are to be strictly limited numbers retained, then it is obvious that there must be adequate satisfaction on both sides to ensure that such undertakings are honoured. This must mean some process whereby the other side can assure itself that the numbers retained do conform to the undertakings given and that there shall not be numbers of other nuclear delivery vehicles hidden away in the territory of the other side.

That, as my colleagues know, is not a problem created by the West, although we have always recognized the difficulties inherent in verification in the various stages of disarmament, bearing in mind the Soviet preoccupation with espionage. That particular problem arises directly out of the Soviet Union's own proposal, and I do seriously ask our Soviet colleague to explain to us how he proposes that the necessary verification measures shall be carried out to ensure that undertakings given in respect of this important proposal are in fact being honoured.

In the past the West has tried to meet some of the more general Soviet fears in this field by its proposal for zonal inspection. This has been repudiated by the Soviet Union, but we are still waiting for the Soviet proposals to solve the problem in the general field.

I would now ask our Soviet colleagues to explain to us -- and I ask this in no unfriendly sense -- what their verification proposals are in regard to their new suggestions in this field.

These are the preliminary remarks which my delegation wishes to make this morning on this complex and fundamental problem. I am sure that we shall all have much more to say on this subject and I shall naturally want to study with particular care the remarks our Soviet colleague made this morning.

I should like to conclude by expressing the hope that this discussion will continue in a constructive manner, in a manner which will help us all to get to grips with the problem and ultimately to solve it together.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): It is now thirteen minutes past one o'clock and, according to the agreed procedural arrangements, we have come to the time of day when we should adjourn. We have still one more speaker, the representative of

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Czechoslovakia, and he has agreed to postpone his statement until our next meeting at which, of course, he will be our first speaker.

I wish to inform the Committee that we have now received the summary of the position of the delegation of Nigeria (Addendum 2 to ENDC/68/Add.1) for inclusion in the report to the General Assembly. If there is no objection, this statement will be included as addendum III to the report.

The co-Chairmen recommend that our next meeting on Wednesday should be devoted to general and complete disarmament; if there is no objection I shall regard this as approved.

It was so decided.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Before we adjourn I should like to stress that we have before us a formal proposal by the United Kingdom delegation for the convening of a group of experts to study in particular the question of "black boxes" (supra, p.40). I hope this proposal will be taken into consideration by the Sub-Committee for a Treaty on the Cessation of Nuclear Weapon Tests which I believe is to meet tomorrow.

Mr. SIEDE (United States of America): In connexion with the summary presented by the representative of Nigeria, I understood the Chairman to say that it would be included as addendum III to the report. Would it not be technically possible to include it in addendum II, since there is a mention of addendum II in the covering letter and no mention of addendum III? It might avoid revision of the covering letter.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I am told that it could be done.

Mr. PIZABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I gather from what the Chairman said that the Nigerian representative's actual speech will be included. It will not therefore be a summary but simply the whole of the speech. Would it not be better to include this statement in Addendum 1 which comprises the records of all the meetings at which we have discussed the question of a nuclear tests ban?

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I said a summary of the position of the delegation of Nigeria, but both summary and statement will be included.



(The Chairman, Burma)

With regard to the question raised by the delegation of Italy, all the members of the Sub-Committee are present here and I am sure they will take this matter into consideration when they hold their next discussion.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its ninetieth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of U Tun Shein, representative of Burma.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Nigeria, the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 12 December 1962 at 10.30 a.m."

The Meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.