

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.92
14 December 1962
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINETY-SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Friday, 14 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. K. KURKA

(Czechoslovakia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. V. ISMIRLIEV

Burma:

U TUN SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. J. E. G. HARDY
Mr. E. A. GOTLIEB
Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. J. BUCEK
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU
ATO M. HAMID
ATO M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL
Mr. A. S. MEHTA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M. T. MBU

Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Mr. R. KRZYZANOWSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. H. FLORESCU

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Sweden:

Baron C. H. von PLATEN

Mr. P. KELLIN

Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A. A. ROSHCIN

Mr. I. G. USACHEV

Mr. P. F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. M. H. El-ZAYYAT

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J. M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. A. H. DEAN
Mr. C. C. STELLE
Mr. D. E. MARK
Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I declare open the ninety-second meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. My list of speakers includes the representatives of Bulgaria, the United States, Poland and the United Kingdom. I call on the representative of Bulgaria, who was the first to put down his name.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): Items 5 b and 5 c of the agenda drawn up by the co-Chairmen (ENDC/1/Add. 3), and especially those disarmament measures which concern nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and conventional armaments, have already been examined by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament at a first reading during our last session. The chief reason that the Committee has now decided to revert to the examination of these questions is that fresh proposals of great importance, creating new possibilities for finding a general solution and for reaching agreement amongst the parties concerned, have been put forward by the Soviet Union.

The new Soviet proposals, presented by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, at the beginning of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (A/PV-112/ (provisional), p.38), were formulated, as was stated both at the time of their presentation and on subsequent occasions, in a spirit of goodwill and compromise and taking into account certain considerations expressed by the representatives of the western Powers during earlier negotiations in our Committee.

The sense of the Soviet proposals is contained in article 5 paragraph 1 of the Soviet Union's revised draft treaty, which concerns nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. It is there stipulated that all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles will be eliminated:

"... except for an agreed and strictly limited number of inter-continental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground to air" category, to be retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, exclusively in their own territory, until the end of the second stage." (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.5)

These new proposals are in line with the general principles which the Soviet Union adopted in its draft treaty presented on 15 March 1962 (ENDC/2) and with the fundamental idea contained in the earlier Soviet proposals designed to rid humanity of the danger of nuclear war as rapidly as possible at the very outset of the process of general and complete disarmament.

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Guided by the fundamental idea of freeing the world from the danger of nuclear war at the very outset of the disarmament process, and taking into consideration certain suggestions of the non-aligned States, the Soviet Union declared its readiness to begin general and complete disarmament by eliminating nuclear weapons themselves during the first stage, on condition, of course, that the western Powers also declared their readiness to do likewise. Faced with the categorical refusal of the western Powers to undertake the elimination of nuclear weapons during the first stage, the Soviet Union put forward an alternative method for attaining that objective, namely the elimination of delivery vehicles, thus immobilizing nuclear weapons.

The important modification that the Soviet Union has made in its original draft treaty, particularly the stipulation that the Soviet Union and the United States should retain a limited number of missiles until the end of the second stage, take account of the various objections and arguments advanced by the western Powers during previous discussions. These proposals offer wide possibilities of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on this essential question. The proposal to retain a strictly limited number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles demonstrates once more the profound desire of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to secure an agreement with the western Powers so that the danger of a nuclear war may be eliminated in the first stage of disarmament.

These proposals, forming a part of the fundamental principles which are the basis of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament presented by the Soviet Union at the beginning of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, have as their aim the elimination of certain fears and anxieties - unfounded though they are - expressed by the western Powers, particularly fears that the total elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles during the first stage would leave loopholes and permit the concealment of delivery vehicles by an ill-intentioned party.

These proposals aim, at the same time, at allaying the apprehensions of the western representatives concerning the possibility of initiating and conducting a nuclear war by the use of improvised delivery systems during the period immediately following the total elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

It is in the light of developments in recent years, and especially in recent months, that the new Soviet proposals concerning nuclear weapon delivery vehicles

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must be examined. Their importance and the part they are capable of playing are obvious to anyone who genuinely considers and examines them against the background of recent events and of the opinions which have been expressed concerning these events. The desire to free humanity from the danger of nuclear war has become a universal and powerful current of world opinion whose strength increases daily. Not only have the most responsible statesmen of the nuclear Powers expressed their profound conviction that it is dangerous to allow the nuclear threat to continue to weigh upon mankind - and we are sure that they are speaking with a full knowledge of the facts - but this conviction of the necessity of eliminating the grave dangers involved in a nuclear conflict has become the principal preoccupation of the peoples of the whole world. It was also expressed in a striking manner by the representatives of all the Members of the United Nations at the last session of the General Assembly.

In conformity with one of the agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, namely, point 5, which states that:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all."

(ENDC/5 p.2),

military bases on foreign territory must be eliminated simultaneously with the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. It must not be forgotten that the Soviet Union built intercontinental missiles and other nuclear weapon delivery vehicles as an answer to the installation of western military bases all round the territory of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries. These bases represent a source of continually growing international friction and at the same time a means of exerting political pressure and of intervening in the internal affairs of other States.

The recent crisis in the Caribbean which was caused by the intensive preparations for an armed intervention against Cuba, for an invasion pure and simple of this independent State, illustrated in a particularly striking manner the anxiety which any country feels when long-range nuclear weapons are installed close to its frontiers on foreign territory. The President of the United States described the presence of "powerful long-range nuclear weapons with a vast destructive power" - he was referring to the weapons installed in Cuba to allow that country to strengthen its

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defences against the danger represented by the invasion preparations which were being made in the United States and in certain other Caribbean countries - as a threat to the peace and security of the United States.

And yet for several years past nuclear weapons have been installed in United States bases on the territory of numerous countries bordering the Soviet Union and the other socialist States, or not far from their frontiers. These bases represent a real danger to peace. They constitute a major obstacle to the establishment of good neighbourly relations between the countries on whose territory they are situated and the countries against which they are directed. Their elimination simultaneously with the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would not only be perfectly justified, but is an absolute necessity.

In view of these conditions and of the nervousness shown by the United States during the crisis in the Caribbean, one cannot but be astonished at the intransigent attitude adopted by the United States representative in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The United States representative maintained that the elimination of bases on foreign territory as proposed by the Soviet Union for the first stage would create "grave imbalances and jeopardize most seriously the security of the United States and its allies, and is therefore unacceptable". (ENDC/PV.90, p.33) To judge from this strange statement, it would seem that the security of the United States and of its allies is chiefly based upon the insecurity and the threat which the military bases of the western Powers represent for peace-loving countries and for the whole world. This is certainly a curious way to envisage the security and equilibrium which should exist during the process of general and complete disarmament.

Military bases on foreign territory are a matter of concern to every country. It is not by mere chance that their elimination has for a long time been demanded, not only by the socialist States but by almost all the non-aligned countries. In September 1961, the Declaration of the Conference of Heads of State or of Government of non-aligned countries at Belgrade contained the following passage:

"The participating countries consider the establishment and maintenance of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries, particularly against their express will, a gross violation of the sovereignty of such States. They declare their full support to countries who are endeavouring to secure the vacation of these bases. They call upon those countries maintaining foreign bases to consider seriously their abolition as a contribution to world peace".

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Since then there have been many fresh demonstrations of the desire of the peoples of the world that all bases on foreign territory should be eliminated. We need not repeat here the manifestations of this wish during the seventeenth session of the General Assembly or the passages dealing with this subject in the resolutions of the General Assembly.

It is discouraging to note that the new Soviet proposals have not been received by the Western Powers as constructive concessions intended to remove their apprehensions but have been made the object of a general, though ill-disguised, attack against the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament and against the essential principles on which it is based. While describing the Soviet proposals as interesting and worthy of special study, the western Powers do nothing but re-affirm the positions which they have already taken up in the American draft treaty (ENDC/30 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1 and 2). This treaty does not allow of the elimination of the nuclear danger even at the end of the disarmament process. In other words, the western Powers, while professing interest in the Soviet proposals, tend to reject their substance.

We have already had occasion to express the apprehensions we feel at the fact that the western Powers, instead of making a constructive approach to the Soviet proposals and thus facilitating the reaching of an agreement on the basis of the serious concessions made by the Soviet Union, are trying to prepare public opinion for their rejection in one form or another.

The somewhat negative attitude of the western Powers towards the new Soviet proposals has found expression in their latest statements. In his speech of 10 December the United States representative, speaking of the latest Soviet proposals, called on the Soviet Union to adopt "the method of a gradual percentage reduction" and to extend this method to all the principal types of armament (ENDC/PV.90 p.34). At the same meeting the United Kingdom representative, while noting the concessions made by the Soviet Union, showed the intransigence of the western Powers by calling upon the Soviet Union to go still further (ibid. p.44). He declared that the Soviet proposal was more applicable to the third stage, thus inviting us to adopt the western proposals for the first and second stages, which would amount to nothing less than giving up the attempt to eliminate the danger of nuclear war at the end of the first stage. This unconstructive attitude on the part of the Western delegations towards the new Soviet proposals - proposals which were made in order to allay

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the baseless anxieties of the western delegations - can only create serious disquiet amongst all those who are concerned to reach an agreement which would eliminate the nuclear danger as soon as possible.

This disquiet can only be enhanced by the rapid submission at the meeting on 10 December of the new text of article V of the United States draft treaty (ibid. pp. 36 and 37). This draft, which was introduced before the new Soviet proposals had even been discussed, takes little or no account of those proposals. On the contrary, this text envisages measures which constitute in practice a complete negation of the Soviet proposals. Thus, paragraph 3 e provides that:

"Each Party to this Treaty shall, after the beginning of Stage I,
limit flight testing of missiles" (ENDC/69, p. 3)

This refers, of course, to missiles carrying nuclear warheads. It amounts to saying that the United States is not only not prepared to accept the Soviet proposals, but envisages the continuation of production and flight testing of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles throughout the process of disarmament.

Further examples could be quoted to show that the modified text of article V presented by the United States is, in fact, only a simplified version of its earlier rigid positions, without any substantial change in those positions. Consequently in this case, as in the case of the simplified but unmodified versions of the western draft treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the western Powers require concessions only from the other side, and what is more, having obtained such concessions, they do not budge an inch from their old positions. This is certainly a strange and unconstructive way of "negotiating", while claiming afterwards that the western Powers "keep an open mind", as they are so fond of saying.

We do not think that there can now be a consideration of the question by the co-Chairmen, still less of the drawing up of any kind of text, until there has been a sufficient clarification of the attitude of the western Powers towards the new and important concessions made by the Soviet Union in its proposals concerning nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

What is the solution which the western Powers seem to be offering in view of the new Soviet proposals? They propose a percentage reduction of armaments, which would maintain unchanged the relationship existing between the armed forces of the different States. But to accept such a position - which brings us back to the old western proposals - leaving unchanged the existing relationships between the armed forces or, to

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use the perhaps better English expression, the existing pattern of inter-relationship of the armed forces of States, when concluding a treaty for general and complete disarmament, would mean speeding up the nuclear arms race to the utmost, since all the Powers would like to conclude a treaty providing for a relationship of armed forces in their favour. The nuclear arms race would continue with giant strides and at an appalling speed. That is why the United States, for example, have just set up their first solid fuel missiles, the Titan and the Minuteman. Scarcely a month ago, the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. McNamara, stated in an interview with the journalist Stewart Alsop that, by the end of 1964, the United States would have more than 800 missiles of this type, whereas at present they have only 20 or so. The same percentages and figures would perhaps apply to all the other types of armament.

Thus the solutions which the Western Powers offer in answer to the Soviet Union's proposals represent simply an open invitation to continue the armaments race. By offering a premium to whoever has the largest quantity of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles at the time when the treaty is concluded, they are only aggravating the race between the contestants to reach the deadline for signing a treaty on general and complete disarmament with a quantity of arms which would give them an advantage during the process of disarmament. However, such proposals would be disastrous for humanity and diametrically opposed to the principles agreed in the Joint Statement (ENDC/5).

It would indeed be a bad omen for the work of our Conference and for disarmament in general if the western Powers continued, in the face of the new Soviet proposals, to make preparations for their rejection. The important concessions made by the Soviet Union should, on the contrary, encourage the western Powers to adopt a constructive attitude. By accepting, in principle, the necessity for eliminating all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles by the end of the first stage of general and complete disarmament, while maintaining a strictly limited and agreed number of missiles, the western Powers could help to free humanity from the nightmare of a nuclear war. At the same time, this would create tremendous opportunities for the speedy conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Today we are again considering items 5b and 5c of our agenda. Most delegations, including the United States delegation, have spoken at length on both the political and technical problems involved in

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reducing and ultimately liquidating armaments of all types, including those armaments which are capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

I do not propose today to review all these matters again in detail. However, I do want to spend a few minutes talking about fundamentals, that is, about the considerations which go to the very heart of our disarmament negotiations.

The United States is now deeply and completely committed to worldwide arrangements for the co-operative defence of the free world. These defensive arrangements were brought about by Soviet threats. The United States sees these co-operative worldwide arrangements as a shield to prevent any other nation from using its military strength, either directly or indirectly, through threats and intimidation, or threats of destruction, to frustrate the freedom and independence which we share with all the free peoples of the world. The Soviet Union and its allies may look upon these arrangements as they will, and they can characterize this co-operative defensive system in the free world as they see fit, but their characterizations cannot change the fact of the present total commitment of the United States to these worldwide arrangements in the absence of total disarmament in a peaceful world, for which we are striving at this Conference table.

The United States firmly believes that these combined military and political undertakings provide a substantial degree of security for the free world against the possibility of attack. At the same time, as has been said by many United States spokesmen, beginning with President Kennedy, the United States also recognizes that, in this era of nuclear weapons, supersonic aircraft and ballistic missiles, even a successful military defence could bring untold suffering and misery to the successful defenders as well as to the unsuccessful attacker. Therefore, the United States earnestly seeks, with full effort of heart and mind, and without any reservations whatsoever, to eliminate the scourge of war. For this reason we have proposed our treaty for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world (ENDC/30). We believe this treaty to be sound, objective, unselfish and fair to all.

In accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles on disarmament, the key to our position is that we will agree to adopt only those measures which preserve the safety of the United States and its associates while we are carrying out these very measures of disarmament. We are in favour of complete and total disarmament in a peaceful world, but we will not accept obligations in the disarmament field which diminish total free world security or, in the process, give to the Soviet Union or to

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its allies, greater military power. By this we do not wish by any means to imply that we will participate in agreements only when our own immediate interests are served and when those of the other nuclear side are injured. That would be a most short-sighted and, indeed, a futile policy which would doom our work here to failure. On the contrary, the United States seeks agreements which are honest and beneficial to both sides at the same time, which are in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, and which allow everyone to breathe a little more easily because all States have new grounds for assurance that the general peace of the world rests on a sounder basis and because both the causes and the means of conflict have been cut back. We believe that mutually beneficial agreements on disarmament can and will be reached, and we are convinced that the general approach spelled out in our outline of basic provisions of a draft treaty is objective, sound, fair and reasonable.

In approaching the whole disarmament problem, we believe that there is only one sound rule: start from the world as it is now, in a political and a military sense, whether one likes it or not - and there are features of it that we also do not like - and then go on from there with realistic disarmament plans. My government is solemnly pledged to work for the implementation of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. The United States would welcome the type of changed world political order that would emerge with the realization of total disarmament in a peaceful world, with the disappearance of great military powers. However, as long as armed forces and weapons remain a crucial factor in world affairs, as unfortunately they do now, and as they will continue to do until the final part of the disarmament process, the United States will not be prepared to accept a major qualitative -- as distinct from quantitative -- reduction which would reshuffle the existing political-military balance under the guise of disarmament.

The United States Government is composed of realistic and determined officials, devoted to democratic ideals, whose oaths of office oblige them to keep the security of their country ever in the forefront. Those men will not be led astray by any amount of propaganda, any combination of slogans, or any amount of mislabelling. They will not be deceived by plans designed to dismember NATO and other alliances, while disarmament is being carried out, no matter what high-sounding names may be given to such plans.

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United States officials will not be impressed by exhortations, such as those from the Soviet bloc delegations here, that the highest norm or standard for disarmament negotiations must be the elimination of the risk of nuclear war in the first stage. Eliminate it we intend to do in our overall disarmament programme, in our three stages, in harmony with the objectives set forth in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles, but of this you may be sure: we shall not be led into palpably one-sided moves at the beginning of the disarmament process which would clearly favour the Soviet bloc and jeopardize the security of the free world.

The first stage is not our ultimate goal: our goal is rather a complete programme of total and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. There is nothing sacrosanct about either the measures of the first stage or its duration. That is a portion of a total programme, to be executed in a time-period subject to negotiation, and proposals regarding its length have already been subject to change in some instances as a result of our deliberations in this Eighteen-Nation Committee.

The real world of today sees the strength of the Soviet bloc in one compact land mass stretching for more than 7,000 miles from the Elbe river in Germany to the shores of the Pacific Ocean, from the Arctic Circle to the southernmost ranges of the Himalayan mountains. The rest of us sit on the outside perimeter of that huge compact land mass, the whole of which is under communist domination. We must be alert at all points around that perimeter, because the states of this central mass have the complete option of moving from the centre of the huge land mass in a number of diverse directions.

It so happens currently that the strongest perimeter Power -- the United States -- is in most respects not on the perimeter at all, but far away on the huge continental island of North America. In addition, the free world is composed of a number of individual States of varying capabilities. Only when welded together in a strong alliance, where the forces of one become the forces of all, is the free world able to defend itself against this great central communist power. The only cure for these geographical and political circumstances is the deployment of elements of the strength of the United States and the rest of the free world in areas closer to the perimeter, where such elements can bolster the forces locally available. That, essentially, is the system of allied military bases to which the socialist camp so strongly objects and which the Soviet world, by reason of its great geographical size, does not need. The Soviet attitude towards those foreign bases is something like that of the well-fed man who says to the poverty-stricken man "I just can't understand why you think so much about food".

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In all fairness, I must say that if this were not a disarmament conference I would not blame my Soviet colleagues for declaiming against the very factors that make the western Powers in their alliances a formidable military force with which the Soviet bloc governments must carefully reckon. Naturally the world would be an easier and pleasanter place for the Communist leaders to pursue their foreign policy and their ideological objective of a communist world if the free world were a lot weaker than it now is. However, I cannot see how the Communist leaders expect any such arguments on their part to advance us towards real disarmament. I just cannot understand how they think that they can induce governments in the West to adopt Soviet-sponsored disarmament schemes which would radically alter the world balance of military power in favour of the Soviet bloc during the very course -- and indeed, rather close to the outset -- of the disarmament process. Indeed, if the west ever agreed to such a plan, the military advantages gained by the Soviet bloc in the first stage could be so great that we would never go on to the implementation of stages two and three.

It should by now be clear to one and all that no amount of debate and casuistry will be able to convince the United States to abandon its allies in the west and elsewhere to the mercies of the Soviet military machine. Let me be very clear: we will not allow NATO to be fragmented, as would be the case under the Soviet proposals, into fifteen isolated military compartments, forbidden from joint activity and co-operation and separated into split North American and European districts. We shall not permit that situation to arise while the mighty Soviet military machine remains essentially intact in its own part of eastern Europe under a single and unified command. That is especially true when, whatever may be the approximate nominal equality in manpower when totals are cumulated in eastern and western Europe, the clear superiority of the Soviet Union alone in tanks, artillery and other armoured vehicles over combined NATO forces is quite substantial -- I repeat, quite substantial.

We hear many complaints about so-called foreign bases but, as I have said, they are an essential component of the present day free world military arrangements built up to safeguard the West from any military threat that might emanate from the great communist compact land mass. Those so-called foreign bases will be eliminated, together with all other bases -- foreign or domestic -- at the end of the disarmament process; of that there can be no question, but we will not agree to eliminate them all in the first stage, as is now proposed by the Soviet Union, or even in the first and second stages.

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If, for the sake of argument, the Soviet plan for the almost total elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage were adopted, then the so-called foreign bases would also be deprived of those same means of delivery, and they would then become instrumentalities for supporting the conventional forces of various free world countries. But these so-called foreign bases would then pose no military threat to the Soviet bloc, since the Soviet Union would retain its well-known preponderance of conventional strength, compactly located in a geographical sense. Without such bases, the Soviet superiority in conventional strength would become overwhelmingly great.

If, on the other hand, something like the United States proposal for the steady but gradual elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles over three stages were adopted, then there would be a reduction in the numbers of weapons available for installation at all types of bases as soon as the reduction of armaments began in the first stage. Moreover, the correct implementation of the first stage would create a good prospect for moving forward successfully with the implementation of stages two and three, which would lead to the liquidation of all bases, whether foreign or domestic.

What I am saying is that the Soviet Union has learnt to tolerate, as have we all, the existing world military balance with all its components, including those so-called foreign bases. The Soviet Union will just have to reconcile itself to living with that same balance during most of the disarmament process. Things will be getting no worse, but steadily better and better, both for the Soviet Union and for us all, as the end goal of total disarmament draws near.

The Soviet Union and its allies must now decide whether they want actual disarmament or mere propaganda about disarmament. The Soviet Union will not get true disarmament, which we all want, by offering completely unfair schemes -- no matter how they are labelled -- because we are intelligent enough not to buy such schemes. Nor will the Soviet Union get true disarmament by resorting to propaganda clichés, because we shall be unmoved by such entreaties which bear no relation to reality. The Soviet Union will not get true disarmament by refusing to discuss the actual details of disarmament and control measures and by refusing to let experts get down to work in appropriate cases, because we shall not blindly agree to undertakings "in principle" when we do not know to what we are agreeing. It is somewhat like the man who said that he was not opposed to the institution of marriage in principle, but he would like to see the girl first. All such unrealistic Soviet tactics will only

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delay us for yet more years from even beginning to tackle disarmament measures; they will not lead to an adoption of the Soviet approach when we finally do get down to carrying out disarmament.

The slight encouragement which we in the west received from the introduction of Mr. Gromyko's proposal on nuclear delivery vehicles at the General Assembly last September did not stem from the substance of that proposal, which is still not clear to us. Our encouragement was caused by the fact that this was the first sign that the Soviet Government had begun to face military-strategic realities. We are most anxious to discover how far this evolution in Soviet disarmament policy has gone, what it means in specific terms and how and when it would be carried out.

The United States believes its disarmament proposals to be eminently sound and fair. We did not conceive them or propose them with the idea of injuring any other nation. Let me be clear: we have never presented our disarmament proposals as the last word in negotiations. We have open minds and can listen to honest and reasonable Soviet objections; that is why we are all here. In our deliberations we shall be guided by objective considerations of sound principles, such as can be found in our treaty outline proposals.

I conclude, therefore, on this note: the Soviet Union in effect holds the key which could unlock the gate blocking a start on a programme of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. The Soviet Union alone can renounce its attempts to subvert the military and political position of the free world through its unrealistic disarmament agreement as proposed in document ENDC/2. It is such attempts to prevent -- and I emphasize the word prevent -- disarmament which are the principal obstacles to agreement and to our work here. We cannot force the Soviet Union to change its mind and to stop using disarmament for its military and ideological objectives. I would submit, however, that the Soviet Union must make up its own mind on assessing Soviet world interests in a disarmed and a peaceful world and on whether true and realistic disarmament would or would not serve such interests. We hope to learn of the Soviet decisions in this realm through future expressions of its disarmament policy at this Conference. We hope that we shall not see further attempts to negotiate in clichés.

In the meantime, we continue to hope that the Soviet Union will in the near future begin to give us the detailed and specific clarifications which we have sought in order that other and more promising aspects of Mr. Gromyko's proposal can be given full and careful consideration. In that way we may be able to make real progress.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): Before addressing myself to the subject which I wish to deal with this morning, I should like to welcome the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Mbu, and say how glad we are to have him again in our midst, and how much I enjoyed the statement he made on 10 December (ENDC/PV.90, pp. 5 et seq.)

For some days now we have been discussing the new proposal submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1); and while doing so we have touched upon some important issues concerning the disarmament process as a whole. This being so, I hope the Committee will bear with me while I try to address myself to certain aspects of this problem which may require clarification.

I shall try to deal with some of the fundamentals involved and thus follow Mr. Dean -- perhaps to his surprise -- on this very line. However, I shall not follow Mr. Dean -- and I would refuse to follow him, to the extent of using certain phraseology and terminology which is in contrast with reality. I humbly submit that such language does not help our negotiations and efforts to seek agreement, because if we really want agreement, we must apply the language of negotiation.

Never in the course of history has self-righteousness produced positive results. Listening to Mr. Dean this morning I somehow had the impression that he seemed to be impatient. For instance, he said that the Soviet Union will not get disarmament under certain conditions, which he then enumerated. Disarmament is not a gift offered to anybody. Disarmament is a goal: it is not a goal only of the Soviet Union or of the other socialist States. It is a goal defined and specified by all members of the international community: it is laid down in resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, and it has been expressed in many other documents. I therefore say with all due respect that a phrase saying that one will or will not get disarmament is ill-applied.

As I say, I shall try to deal with some of the fundamentals of the problem. In the course of the speech which he made on 10 December -- a speech to which I listened with very great interest -- Mr. Stelle again gave us an outline of the United States position. He said:

"The United States has believed and continues to believe that the method of progressive across-the-board reductions of armaments is the most realistic one, and is sound and feasible". (ENDC/PV.90, p.34)

He then proceeded to give an enumeration of six reasons which were meant to support that view.

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On the other hand, we have heard the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, elaborating on the schemes submitted by his country and on the plan which draws a very distinct demarcation line between nuclear and conventional disarmament (Ibid. p. 16 et seq.). This has been reflected in several proposals, including the proposal which we are discussing now.

If we approach the problem of disarmament with a real negotiating spirit and try to reach a mutual accommodation, we should address ourselves to the gist of the problem. What is it that we face? I think that we should first of all bear in mind the fact that if we are to embark, as no doubt all of us wish, upon the process of general and complete disarmament and pursue it to its ultimate goal, we are bound to work out a plan for our journey that can and will bring us safely to our destination: for it may easily happen that the world we are anxious to save may be set aflame while we are still on our way. And then -- cui bono disarmament?

Secondly, the present state of the armaments race causes us to face every day -- almost at any time -- the danger of a conflict, whatever its origin. Even those who preach the gospel of the deterrent are bound to confess, in their particular language, that the safeguards it offers are precarious. I submit that this is a typical understatement.

This being so, it will not suffice to say that during our journey towards a disarmed and peaceful world we have to be at least as safe as we are today -- as safe as we are at the time when we embark upon the journey. We need much more security, because we are very unsafe today. We find ourselves in a very unsafe and explosive situation.

How do those two plans -- let me call them time-tables for the journey -- meet this situation? It is important to bear in mind how, by what method and by which means we will be facing the development of the disarmament process during the stages it will be going through.

What is the essential condition of a successful and proper disarmament operation? Is it not that while it goes on the security of no State, great or small, should be endangered, and that neither of the alliances confronting each other should be put in jeopardy? I think that this is the view, taking into account the security of all States, which should be shared by all.

This brings me to the very notion of security. I think that it was thirty-seven years ago when a French statesman defined the concept of national security in the following way: He said:

"What we call national security is the widespread sentiment of public opinion that one should not fear external aggression, or at any rate that such aggression would not have much chance of success".

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I submit that every nation, every State, is the proper and real judge of its own security. We cannot question that. But security is not an absolute notion. One of its essential constituent elements is the relationship to the strength or weakness of other States. In a world like ours the lack of security of one State, or even of a group of States, is bound to reflect on the security of others. Unlike in the past, one's security cannot be built on the weakness of others. Strange as that may sound, that is the lesson to be drawn from history. That is why the ultimate frontiers of one State's security must be so drawn as to meet the security needs of other States. No one should be threatened, or feel in real danger. Those are the real frontiers of security of each of us and of all of us. That, indeed, was reflected in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, which, in paragraph 5 provides "that security is ensured equally for all". (ENDC/5, p.2)

If that is so -- and I hope the Committee will agree with me that it is -- what are the logical conclusions to be drawn from it? To protect security there is no need to maintain excessive quantities of weapons in one's armoury, not even for the shortest possible time, for to protect oneself there is no need to be able to attack, if there is no one else who would be able to do so. That should be the essential criterion of the new situation, once we get out of the vicious circle of the armaments race. As long as the race continues, obviously one is subjected to its rules. Every race has its rules. One is committed to try to overtake one's potential adversary. But once you decide to stop it -- and I think that once you embark upon the disarmament process you sincerely desire to stop it -- what I would call the "race mentality" must be abandoned. The very moment we begin our journey into a disarmed and peaceful world, nations and values are bound to change their meaning, or, if you prefer, their dimensions.

We seem to have agreed upon a percentage cut of conventional arms and armaments, on ceilings for armed forces. Here the question of security is to be solved by a combination of relative and fixed specifically defined reductions. The main difference arises with regard to nuclear arms and armaments. The western Powers have insisted that nuclear weapons be treated in the same way as all other weapons. We have maintained that they constitute a different quality and therefore require a different treatment, that they cannot be assimilated with one another.

In the light of our previous discussions, we have been presented by the Soviet Union with a new proposal providing for the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery

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vehicles with the exception, as we know, of an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category. Those, it is suggested, are to be retained by the United States and the Soviet Union until the end of stage II of the disarmament process. Let me apply now those general considerations to which I referred earlier to the issue and the proposal before us. What are the advantages of that new proposal?

Firstly, I think it fits very well into the pattern of an orderly disarmament process in which the possibility of nuclear attack ought to be eliminated from the very inception.

Secondly, it reduces the nuclear potential of the two great Powers to defensive functions only; in other words, it should be so small as to make the adventure of an attack impossible, but it should be strong enough to constitute an adequate means of defence against the danger of an attack from a potential aggressor -- a potential aggressor shorn of his powers, for he will have at his disposal no more than his potential adversary.

Thirdly, by being thus framed it will constitute no incentive for excessive use, but will ensure that any use is for punishment only.

Fourthly, it will, in itself, exercise a highly stabilizing effect on the world situation.

Fifthly, it will reduce nuclear weapons to a minimum and definitely arrest their further spread.

Sixthly, it is bound to have effects in other fields by increasing confidence, by ensuring that no controversial issue could be solved by resorting to the most dangerous of all weapons.

Those six are only some of the advantages which I could mention today. But it should not be forgotten that it is not meant to be an isolated step. Accompanied by important disarmament measures in other fields, it will constitute a part of a synchronized, well-balanced and co-ordinated programme.

How does the across-the-board reduction approach compare with the new proposal? There seems to be little doubt, and we have said this on several occasions, that even after a 30 per cent, or for that matter even after a 50 per cent, reduction of nuclear weapons a nuclear war could still be launched and a world catastrophe provoked. For, to paraphrase the words of a contemporary writer on the subject, there will be

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"too many missiles, too many buttons, too many people with potential decision," and the prospect of "too many countries with nuclear weapons and missiles." Everyone will agree that that is not a very encouraging prospect.

But, above all, let me now confront those two plans, bearing in mind the paramount consideration to which I made reference earlier, namely, that of security. It is clear that in the field of nuclear weapons reduction by percentage does not increase the security of any of the States concerned. We shall still continue to live in what a United States General so rightly called "an electronic house of cards". For the essence of the matter is not how much we are going to cut, but what is left. That is the essence. One may say, of course, that there is an obvious interrelationship between the two: that what is left is in relation to what has been cut. But, if one takes as a point of departure the present quantity and quality of nuclear weapons, it is that by which one measures one's action and the relationship is therefore guided by the criterion of what exists at present. Would that mean security to all concerned -- that security which demands our primary consideration? We agree, at least I believe that we all agree, that the world of today is highly insecure. Could this percentage cut be prompted by an alleged advantage that may be held at the present moment? That advantage may be very illusory, and whatever it may be, as I said earlier, it would not create security.

In this respect, I cannot but subscribe to the words of a well-known Princeton physicist who said: "... it becomes more and more clear that the pursuit of superiority is incompatible with the pursuit of security." One can therefore say that, in the long run, what may be regarded as the greatest achievement of nuclear weapons is, in fact, their greatest failure.

The Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) -- to refer to them again -- bars any gain of military advantage. Within the proposed scheme there can be no question of gain, of advantage for either side. What is more, no State would expose itself to a disadvantage; and it is that which is decisive -- not to create a disadvantageous situation for any State. The fixed figure of specific nuclear delivery vehicles, by creating equality, would offer security to all. What more can we claim for ourselves, since we maintain that security is our paramount consideration? It would, of course, remain for the Powers concerned to negotiate the modalities of the agreement; for instance, to fix the figure which would correspond to the definition of what is called "a strictly limited number" of vehicles. But

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the concept, I believe, is sound. I will not use the word "principle" since Mr. Godber objected to it the other day (ENDC/PV.85, p.39). I was rather surprised to find him objecting to it, but after having heard him I read a speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in which he said: "... in this country almost everybody agrees to a thing in principle but resists its application in detail." I think Mr. Godber may have had that in mind. But my approach was different. I thought that we could accept a certain idea and then leave the details for negotiation.

Having said that, and having tried to analyse the new Soviet proposal, I should have thought that it would commend itself to the western Powers, all the more so since this, or ideas similar to it, have been advanced by outstanding authorities on the subject on both sides of the Atlantic. It was undoubtedly gratifying to hear the interest the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom displayed in this matter. It should indicate a proper negotiating approach to the vital problems involved.

We do not expect an immediate verdict, as Mr. Dean seemed to suspect when he quoted "Alice in Wonderland" (ENDC/PV.91, p. 12). But I think Mr. Dean knows very well -- better than I do -- that even without evidence one can sometimes proceed to legal action: one can quash an indictment, even without hearing evidence -- a procedure not unknown under common law. But, having heard the statements of the representatives of the western Powers, and in particular Mr. Dean's statement this morning, I find that they were couched in such special terms, and raised questions concerning such side issues that one had the impression that the western representatives were anxious to discover weakness rather than strength in the new proposal. May I suggest that it would be more helpful for our future work if virtue were sought rather than vice in proposals coming from this side, as it were.

The Soviet proposal was described as "a step in the right direction," (ENDC/PV.90, p.43) and the Soviet Union was invited to go further. No one can deny that the proposal bears evidence of a spirit of compromise and accommodation. Is it a wooden horse? I do not think so. But there is another problem involved. I think that concessions and the making of concessions is not a one-way traffic. Compromises are born by all parties moving closer to one another. Accommodations must be made by all those negotiating an agreement -- in the interests of all, for the security of all. It is on this that the progress of our work depends. The key is not in the hands of any Power. There are many keys and they are in the hands of all of us. Therefore, I

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would say that accommodations should be made by all concerned in a spirit of compromise and negotiation, and I would submit this thought, very humbly to the consideration of the members of this Committee.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): We have this week reverted in our main thoughts to the whole problem of general and complete disarmament. Since we reconvened here on 26 November, and up until this week most of our time, energies and thoughts had been devoted to the particular problem of securing the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. We have not so far succeeded in that task. It is very important that we should go on seeking in every way we can, through the Sub-Committee, through private discussion, and where necessary by coming back to this plenary again, to do all we possibly can to resolve the remaining differences between us in that field.

But, as I say, we have now reverted to the question of general and complete disarmament. We have tried to pick up the threads again after a lapse of some time, and we have had before us one or two new ideas. But it has struck me that in our discussion we have in some senses perhaps overlooked some of the basic problems that confront us here. I thought, therefore, that the statement of our United States colleague this morning was helpful in bringing us back to fundamentals. As I understood his statement, he was really re-emphasizing those basic points on which the United States and the Soviet Union together spent many hours, days, weeks and indeed months in thrashing out the Agreed Principles which are really the basis of our whole discussion around this table. I think it is as well that we should remind ourselves from time to time of the limitations imposed on us by those Agreed Principles. Therefore I thought that the speech by the United States representative this morning, in bringing us back to those basic facts, was valuable in the extreme.

I noted that one particular point he made was taken up by the representative of Poland in the interesting statement he has just made. I think the representative of Poland put it this way: that, after all, security remains our prime consideration. That, I think, is the basis for all of us, and it must be. At present, there is an uneasy security brought about by the efforts of various nations to provide themselves with the means of retaliation against the threat of war, which of course means that for many nations the burden of armaments is heavy, just as the burden of fear is very great for us all. That is the basis of our present security, and it seems to me that

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the Agreed Principles try to set out the way in which that security could be maintained throughout the whole disarmament process. That is the key factor, as I see it, in all our discussions: as the disarmament process proceeds, at no single given moment of time shall any State or group of States have an advantage, in military terms, which could endanger the peace.

As I have said, we live in an uneasy state of security today, in the fear of nuclear war and in the knowledge that nuclear war could have appalling effects on the aggressor just as much as on the State attacked. We here are supposed to be finding the means of eliminating that fear and of putting in its place a security based not on individual armed forces, but on the international rules which have to be implemented, and there has to be a knowledge that they can be implemented in such a way that we are all protected. In my submission, the Agreed Principles do in fact seek to do just that. Therefore the plans which we have before us have to be judged against this basic point.

The representative of Poland not only talked about the Agreed Principles; he talked about the question of principle too. I am sorry if my previous statement in reply to him was not exactly what he had wished for. He was kind enough to quote the United Kingdom Chancellor of the Exchequer to me in this regard. But of course what I was saying was that we should be careful what we elevate into principles in this Conference. What I gently chided the representative of Poland about before was that he seemed to be making principles out of things which in fact are not principles in the sense in which we should consider them in this Conference. I would agree with my own Chancellor of the Exchequer in his definition of principles and the fact that it is easy to agree in principle as long as one does not have to carry the principle into practice.

Nevertheless, in this whole field, the principles on which we have agreed and which are embodied in document ENDC/5 must be our guiding light in regard to the actions we take in this Conference, if we are going to succeed in maintaining throughout the whole process of disarmament that element of security to which I have referred. It is because we and other western nations feel that the Soviet Union's proposals breach the Agreed Principles, and breach in particular this principle that security must be held for all States during the whole disarmament process, that we have felt bound in the past to criticize the proposals which the Soviet Union has put forward. I myself have particularly criticized its proposals in relation to the first stage of

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disarmament. I really feel that too frequently around this table we tend to get things out of proportion in this regard by considering the first stage of disarmament as the be-all and end-all of our efforts. Of course it is not. The disarmament process must be an orderly process, and the element of security must be maintained throughout.

It is purely a matter of reason and commonsense that on both sides we have thought it right to divide the disarmament process into three stages. There is nothing sacrosanct about any of those three stages, but they should constitute a logical progression so that the quantity of arms available on either side -- indeed on every side -- as one proceeds through the process will be gradually and continually reduced and so that, at whatever lower level it may be, at any particular stage of the disarmament process each State will feel that its relative security is the same although its actual total ability to wage war is less. That is what has to happen throughout the whole of the three stages. I really think that our Soviet colleagues have not helped us in this by seeking so deliberately to overload the first stage. In the past I have made the point that their reference to the abolition of all foreign bases in the first stage and their earlier reference to the abolition of all nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage, taken together, make a wholly unreasonable proposal which it would be impossible to implement. When they tell us that the west is seeking to maintain the risk of nuclear war to the very end of the disarmament process, I say in reply that what they are doing is seeking to prevent the actual disarmament process from starting at all, by overloading it in the first stage so that one will fail to reach an agreement. Surely it is better to have an agreement on a more gradual system than on some dramatic proposals relating to the first stage.

Therefore I was very happy when the Soviet Union Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, at the General Assembly in New York, made the proposal to carry on certain nuclear delivery vehicles from the first stage to the second (A/PV.1127 (provisional) p.38). It seemed to me that that was a move in the right direction. However, as Sir Michael Wright pointed out in his statement to this Committee on Monday, from the United Kingdom point of view, although this is a step in the right direction, it does not go far enough. We believe that it would be necessary to retain into the third stage, rather than merely into the second, some measure such as the Soviet Union now proposes. The reason is that we do not see how one is going to have provided by the end of the second stage peace-keeping forces of an international character which will

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carry with them to all nations the conviction of security which is so necessary if nations -- and particularly the nations that are most powerful -- are going to agree to throw away their basic armaments. We have not really heard enough from the Soviet Union and its allies about how they face this problem of the international security which is to replace the national security at present existing in the form in which we all know it. These things are inseparably linked, and we want to know a good deal more about how they would provide us with international security and at what stage the Soviet Union and its allies envisage that that should come about. It was for this reason that the United Kingdom delegation felt and still feels that it is logical and right that some degree of nuclear deterrent should remain in the hands of both sides until the later part of the disarmament process. I do put this to our Soviet colleagues very seriously as a matter of very considerable importance.

That nuclear weapons are a deterrent, can be a deterrent, however horrible they are to contemplate, is recognized, I think, and I was fortified in my views about this when I read in The Times, of the United Kingdom, an important speech made the day before yesterday by Mr. Khrushchev in which he is reported as saying that: "... people who call imperialism a paper tiger should remember that the paper tiger has nuclear teeth. Since imperialism might still use them, it should not be treated lightly". And he drew the conclusion that "therefore, in relations with imperialist countries, compromises are possible". That, I think, is a very interesting illustration of the realism with which Mr. Khrushchev looks at these matters; and I would agree with him that in so far as this balance of deterrent fear exists compromises are possible, should be possible, at the present time. Our duty is to see that this process continues until such time as, resulting from our efforts here, we are able to reduce national weapons, but at the same time increase international capability, with effective control -- over which we must all agree -- to such a degree that international measures for maintaining security will take the place of national measures. This, I think, is a basic fact which we must all keep very much in mind.

I thought the representative of Poland made an interesting point this morning, when he said that in a disarmed world notions and values will be seen to change. I am sure he is right. Throughout all recorded time up to this moment nations have viewed their interests in the light of their own knowledge of world power, and this has conditioned their reactions in so many cases. As we proceed towards a disarmed world we shall have an entirely new set of circumstances, a set of circumstances to

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which none of us has been conditioned, for which none of us has been prepared, and it would be folly to think that we will become angels overnight. That just does not happen, and so what we have to do is to go through the various stages of this process steadily and gradually until we reach the position at which almost imperceptibly the balance changes from a balance maintained by nations to a balance maintained by international ability to deter. That is what we must be working towards the whole time, and I do emphasize it because I believe it to be the key to our progress in these matters.

I want to refer now to what is to me a somewhat disturbing aspect of the attitude of the Soviet Union and other Eastern countries to our negotiations here. I spoke earlier about this question of principle. Too often today we are being confronted with demands from the Soviet side that we should agree to matters in principle before we have any serious discussion of them. Speaking on Monday of this week, Mr. Tsarapkin said:

"At present, when we are still without the agreement of the western Powers to accept this Soviet proposal in principle, it would be premature to divert the attention of the Committee to the consideration of the various details which might arise in connexion with our proposal." (ENDC/PV.90, p. 26)

That attitude is repeated on various occasions. We have it from our Soviet colleague in the nuclear Sub-Committee. We had it only this week in relation to the question of "black boxes". We have it on a whole variety of topics. In all seriousness to our colleague, I say that I do not think that this helps our negotiations forward. I think it is imperative that we should have some means of knowing clearly what is in the mind of the proposer of a particular matter before we can be expected to say that we accept it in principle. This certainly applies to the proposal, to which I referred earlier (supra p. 26), put forward in relation to the retention of a certain measure of nuclear delivery vehicles. In his statement to us on Monday (ENDC/PV.90 pp. 13 et seq.) our Soviet colleague really did not help us very much in that regard. I have read and re-read that statement with the greatest care, and really it does not take us far enough to enable us to judge. In relation to the kind of numbers, the strictly limited numbers, he is thinking of, we and our United States colleagues asked him questions, and the reply we got was:

"We do not at all envisage that the Soviet Union and the United States would retain many hundreds of intercontinental missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The quantity -- and I stress this -- must be strictly limited ..."
(ibid. p.25)

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With great respect to our Soviet colleague, we had heard that before, and we do ask him to be a little more precise.

Again, on the question of control in a matter of this sort, Mr. Tsarapkin in that same statement merely referred us to article 5, paragraph 3, of the Soviet draft treaty in which it was agreed by the Soviet Union that:

"Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above."

(ENDC/2/Rev. 1, p.6)

That really does not help us because it is known to every delegation around this table that the Soviet Union has very definite reservations on verification and particularly on verification of retained armaments. When the Soviet Union proposes the retention of a strictly limited number -- a number which it has not yet defined, but presumably will define at some stage in our negotiations -- it has still to tell us how it proposes effective verification.

I am saying this not just in order to make debating points, but to show that it is not really possible for us to say that we accept something in principle unless we know or can feel reasonably confident that it is realistic and can be useful to further our negotiations.

I do therefore urge our Soviet colleagues to abandon this idea that everything must be accepted in principle before we can have serious discussion and negotiations. I have referred on a number of occasions in the past to what I believe to be a valuable method of proceeding, by means of groups of experts, working parties, on certain matters to thrash out the details of particular proposals in order to clarify them for us and to enable us to take clear political decisions on them. Of course, we have to take those political decisions, and I certainly do not want in any way to minimize the importance of those decisions being taken. But we should take them with a clear knowledge of the facts on which we are expected to take them.

I would point out to our Soviet colleagues that we in the west do not make such reservations in regard to the proposals which we put forward. For instance, when the United States put forward a zonal inspection plan (ENDC/30, p.14) in an effort to help the Soviet Union out of its difficulty about verification, it did not say "The Soviet Union must accept it in principle before we will discuss it in detail". Our United States colleagues and we have said that we would be only too glad to discuss with the Soviet Union the elements of it and how it can be used in order to

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ascertain whether it can help us forward. I do believe that our negotiations here are going to be seriously hampered if we continue to have this charge brought against us that we must accept things in principle before we discuss them in detail.

The same argument applies, of course, in the field of nuclear tests in relation to the suggestion for "black boxes". If ever there was something about which we required detail before we could accept it in principle, it is this enigmatic "black box", which could contain anything or nothing. And so I do say that here it is very important indeed that we should have genuine agreement to discuss matters practically and pragmatically so as to enable us to see to what extent any proposals will help us forward.

I believe we must go forward with our discussion of our agreed agenda (ENDC/1/Add. 3) in these matters relating to general and complete disarmament. We are at present considering items 5b and c, and in this context the United States representative has now put forward a draft article V for incorporation in a treaty (ENDC/69). I thought the representative of Bulgaria, if he will forgive me, was a little brusque this morning in regard to this draft. He did not seem at all happy that such a draft article should have been put forward at this time. I would remind him that in the past we have looked at draft articles, certainly before we have achieved agreement, and it has been our custom, by the convenient method of using brackets, to show points of difference. It has been our custom to seek to embody draft treaty language in a provisional form. I see no difference between this proposal put forward by the United States at this time and the proposals which have been put forward in regard to previous articles by others in the past, and, if my memory serves me right, even by the representative of Bulgaria himself. Therefore, I hope he will look at this a little more favourably and, if we get alternative drafts, as no doubt we will, then we can have them considered together. I think this is the way we have to proceed, and I would point out to the representative of Bulgaria that this sometimes helps to draw together the thoughts in relation to some of these draft articles, and it helps to give our co-Chairmen something specific to discuss at their meetings on these matters. Not, I am sure, that they waste their time at their meetings, but we do think that it helps if they have some specific points to discuss. I welcome this draft article having been put in. By all means let the co-Chairmen discuss it and other drafts which may be submitted to us. Indeed, in so many of these matters, I think the discussions between the co-Chairmen are a very key aspect of our work and I myself want to see as many such discussions taking place as possible.

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Before closing, I should like to refer very briefly to the paper which has been submitted this week by the United States delegation in regard to the reduction of the risk of war through miscalculation and other mishaps (ENDC/70). This paper will no doubt be discussed by us at future meetings at the appropriate time, but I think this is a valuable new move, noting the fact that, of course, our discussions on the wide issues of general and complete disarmament are bound to take us a very considerable measure of time. Certain collateral measures can help us forward, can in themselves help to reduce tension in the world and, what is even more, can help to improve the climate for our discussions here round this table.

I hope that this particular proposal, when it comes to be discussed, will form the basis for an agreement on this very important matter which can lead to reductions of tension, just as I also welcome discussion on some of the other collateral measures which we have down on our agenda for the Committee of the Whole (ENDC/C.1/2). These are matters which we must certainly refer to again and again. But for the moment we will, I hope, go forward with our discussion on this item 5 b and c, finalize it, and then move forward in our document ENDC/1/Add.3 to revert to item 5 d, which we were considering some time ago, and then the subsequent matters there.

Much work lies ahead of us, but if we approach it in a constructive way, bearing in mind all the time the relevance of the Agreed Principles, to which our attention has been called back again this morning both by the United States representative and the representative of Poland, then I think we shall go forward realistically, and that is the way in which I think our work should proceed.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to limit myself now to a few brief remarks. We shall, of course, study with the greatest care all that has been said today by the United States representative, Mr. Dean, and the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, and shall reply later to the ideas that they have advanced and to their comments. But the note alone which sounded in the statements of both the United States representative and the United Kingdom representative causes us serious concern for the prospects of our disarmament negotiations and obliges us to speak today. The picture is rather strange. In taking a step towards meeting the position of the Western Powers, we submitted the proposal that a limited and agreed number of missiles of certain types should remain at the disposal of the United States and the Soviet Union until the end of the second stage. In reply to this proposal of ours, the object of which was to

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avert the threat of a nuclear missile war from the very outset of disarmament, we heard Mr. Dean criticize the Soviet Union's proposal on the ground that it would deprive the United States and its Western allies of the possibility of using nuclear weapons, that is, of the possibility of unleashing and waging a nuclear missile war. This is very strange logic and has a very strange sound, especially in this hall where disarmament negotiations are being conducted. In fact, the United States representative announced to us that the United States wished to retain the possibility of waging a nuclear missile war until the very end of disarmament. We reject this approach and shall fight resolutely against such a policy in our negotiations.

I should like to make a second comment. In making his critical remarks this morning, Mr. Godber threw out the idea that we are not angels, that we cannot become angels overnight and shall not grow wings like angels, but shall long remain bellicose people, jingoists, who wish to impose their will by threatening to use nuclear weapons. That is the gist of the idea so eloquently expressed here today by the United Kingdom representative. We reject this idea as well. We cannot agree with an approach to disarmament negotiations by which we should await a transformation of this bellicose, martian nature of man. We do not tie disarmament to the regeneration of mankind. We have to live in peace, without war, in the society that exists at present in the world with socialist States and capitalist, imperialist States. We have to live in peace, and only disarmament will lead to this. If you raise this psychological problem, we shall certainly have to bury disarmament and repeat the inscription on the gates of Dante's Inferno: "All hope abandon ye who enter here".

I think that we shall have to approach this matter quite differently. We cannot accept the approach proposed to us here by Mr. Godber. That approach means that the problem of disarmament will never be solved.

Here is what Mr. Godber said to us: "Why does the Soviet Union require us first to agree in principle on the basic principles of an agreement? We cannot do so. Let us first discuss everything down to the smallest detail, including every technical feature of the agreement. Not until we see clearly in all its details absolutely what the Soviet Union wants can we assent to a treaty, to an agreement." Is this a proper way to state the problem? Does this statement indicate that the Western Powers desire to negotiate and reach an agreement? No, your remarks do not show that they do.

After all, what is the Soviet Union proposing? We propose to leave a limited number of missiles -- inter-continental missiles, anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category, and anti-missile missiles -- in the hands of the Soviet Union and the

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

United States. We speak of a strictly limited number of such weapons, which is necessary in order to prevent the unleashing of a nuclear missile war. In general, the Soviet Union considers that there is no need at all to leave these means of delivery even in the first stage. We consider that they should be destroyed in the first stage. We made this proposal solely in order to take a step towards your position. The Western Powers had stood fast and told us categorically that they would not agree to the destruction of all nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage. Having come up against this wall, we decided to find some way round it and submitted this proposal of ours in order to move the negotiations out of the impasse. All we ask you to do is to answer whether you accept this proposal of the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union and the United States should retain a strictly limited number of missiles. This restricted number should, of course, be a small one, so that it would not provide a possibility of unleashing a nuclear missile war. With this proposal we are taking a step towards meeting the demands of the Western Powers which wish to have at their disposal for a certain length of time a number of missiles for use in any emergency.

That is our way of stating the question. It does not call for the discussion of technical details at present. We say: "Let us agree on this limited number; we do not want to dictate to you what it should be." We will reach agreement on this question, but we can only agree on the number when we have agreed with you that we shall leave only a strictly limited number of missiles at each other's disposal. If we agree with you on this, then we can also agree on the number. We want this to be the subject of negotiations between us; we want the number of rockets on which we shall agree to be really the result of discussion and agreement between us. But you evade giving an answer both in principle and in fact and you start bombarding us with technical questions regarding the number of missiles of this, that or the other category, where these rockets should be situated, what their power should be, what launching installations should be used, where these installations should be situated. That is, you are placing in front of us a heap of technical questions which may or may not arise if we first agree with you on the substance of our proposal. But you do not need these technical details in order to be able to reply to this proposal of the Soviet Union. When you reply that you accept this idea, this proposal of the Soviet Union, we shall sit down at the table with you and start discussing the details. You will then tell us that in your opinion a certain number of missiles should be retained; you will say that the United States must retain so many missiles of this

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category, so many of that, and so on. We shall discuss these questions in a business-like fashion. However, you reject this approach when you insist that all the technical details should first be clarified. That is not necessary at this stage in order to answer the fundamental question of whether you accept this proposal of the Soviet Union or not.

Again, Mr. Godber spoke of "black boxes". He said today that the Soviet Union suggests that we should have black boxes, "which could contain anything or nothing". I do not even know how to describe this strange remark by Mr. Godber. We propose that we should work out with you later the technical details of these "black boxes" and decide how they should be equipped. We shall agree with you on the apparatus to be installed in them, and on the parameters of that instrumentation and apparatus. We say: "Let us discuss this with you and reach agreement later". You, however, reject this out of hand and say: "No, you must first tell us what you mean by "black boxes", what their sizes and dimensions will be, what instruments they will contain, how many there will be, how and where they will be situated, and how much they will weigh."

For all I know, thousands of questions could be raised, but that would only be a retreat from real negotiations.

We are opposed to that approach. We insist that it is first necessary to reach agreement in principle and to receive your answer as to whether you are prepared to agree to this solution of the question or not. We must first agree on the basic principles. You are proposing to us that we should first convene a technical conference of scientific experts -- let them meet and reach agreement. On what are they to agree? If we do not reach agreement with you here on the fundamental principles of a treaty, if we do not together define the framework and nature of the treaty, the technical experts of the United States and Soviet Union will come into collision from the very beginning and an insurmountable obstacle will arise between them. Let us take, for example, the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. If we started to discuss technical details without having first agreed on questions of principle, the United States technicians and specialists would approach the technical requirements from the premise that the control system should be international, not national, and that there should be on-site inspection. Our experts, on the other hand, would start out from the premise that control over an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests should be exercised through the use of national detection systems and that there is no need for any compulsory international inspection, about which the Western Powers keep talking here. It is clear that with such an approach, when we have not one and the same point of

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view on the basic principles of an agreement, no technical conference or discussion would lead to any positive results, only a profound impassable deadlock. Only those who in fact have no desire for the success of our negotiations could try to lead them into that path.

We shall reply in greater detail to the statements of the United States and United Kingdom representatives at a later meeting, when we have studied them in the verbatim record.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I shall be very brief. I listened with the greatest of interest to what our Soviet colleague had to say, as I always do. I still submit that it is not unreasonable to expect to know what one is talking about before one agrees to anything. That is all we are asking.

On that general subject -- and I do not mean to go into any detail or recrimination -- I think the recent Cuban episode showed very clearly and graphically to people that the geographical location of rockets or missiles is very important. As I understand it, the Soviet Union is still insisting on the elimination of all so-called foreign bases in the first stage. That would have a very important effect upon what nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would be left in the first stage -- this would also affect the thrust, range and power of the remaining rockets.

We still wish to proceed according to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), and I am sure that we shall. I think everyone here knows the devotion of the United States to the principles of disarmament and the fact that we want to achieve general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. I am sure we shall be able to carry these negotiations forward in a constructive manner.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, has just told us that the imperialists wish to consider a conflict possible as long as human nature remains unchanged. That is a question which concerns the maintenance of peace in a world without arms. It is a question which particularly interests my delegation. I should like to assure Mr. Tsarapkin that we do not wish to wait until human nature has changed before undertaking disarmament, since we know very well that it is very difficult to change human nature. We do not conceive of human nature as consisting of angels who should begin sprouting wings. But we do not believe either that the world resembles Dante's Inferno. And it is precisely for this reason that we envisage the creation of a concrete and solid international force to maintain peace in a world without arms. I am sure that the United Kingdom

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

representative intended this morning to refer to the necessity -- which is fundamental for all the Western delegations -- to envisage, at the same time as disarmament is carried out, the creation of reliable means for the preservation of peace.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I wanted to come back for one brief moment to the point which has just been referred to by our colleague from Italy. I did want to assure Mr. Tsarapkin that I have no doubts whatever in his own case that his wings are sprouting naturally; there is no feeling in my mind that he is bellicose in the least. But he did talk about my saying that we would remain imperialists; of course, to the extent that we may remain imperialist, I meant to say that the Soviet Union would also remain militantly communist. I think we had better get our phrases right; it is a balanced thing, it is not one side which will remain more militant than the other. One cannot change human nature overnight, it is no good issuing an edict in the Soviet Union saying that everybody shall love everybody else, because it just does not work that way. I do say to him that we have to bring about this process gradually.

I would just point out that the possession of strength through arms -- whether it may be right or wrong -- does in fact have an almost unconscious effect on the attitude of nations. Indeed, sitting round this table, it is quite obvious that those in the possession of the greatest strength in arms speak to some extent with the greatest authority. It is for that reason that they are listened to with the most attention. However, in a completely disarmed world, the word of one nation should not take precedence over the word of another nation; we have to condition ourselves to this change and it is folly to think that it is going to happen abruptly. Therefore, while I shall endeavour, with our Soviet colleague here, to do all I can to bring about the brotherhood of man more quickly, I would remind members of this Conference that many other people have tried it before us and it is folly to think we are going to solve the problem by the waving of a wand. I want to assure Mr. Tsarapkin that I will play my part with him in this regard, but let us be realists and do not let us delude ourselves about the difficulties involved.

The fact that the disarmament process will be gradual and will take time is, as I have said in the past, something which will help us to condition mankind to a happier state of affairs, which Mr. Tsarapkin considers can happen easily, but which I feel -- even in his country as well as in others -- may not be quite so simple as he appears to envisage in the statements which he has made to us at this Conference.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I have no intention of making a speech on the question of human nature which has just been discussed here, If other speakers feel the need to deal with this question they are free to do so, but I should like to answer another question which was also raised today by the United Kingdom representative. Mr. Godber asked why the representative of Bulgaria did not wish the draft article V presented by the United States of America to be examined immediately and discussed by the co-Chairman (supra., p.30). "Why", he asked, "does the representative of Bulgaria not wish us to follow the practice which the Committee has adopted for such matters"? If I understood him correctly, he indicated that we had acted in this way in dealing with other matters, including a proposal put forward by Bulgaria.

I agree with Mr. Godber that we have previously followed this practice, and certainly we shall continue to follow it. Allow me today simply to make the following remark.

If we are discussing the question of the elimination of vehicles at this particular meeting of the present session, it is not because we have not discussed it before. We have discussed it in the past. But we were unable to accept a document which would represent a unanimous agreement. To adopt such a document now, just when a new Soviet proposal has been presented and we are just beginning to study it, to begin a discussion now between the co-Chairmen on a document concerning the question of delivery vehicles, would amount to not taking that important proposal into consideration. It is against these tactics that we protested, Mr. Chairman, for you will remember that the other day, when the United States representative introduced this modification of article V, or rather of the whole of this part of the United States draft, he suggested that "any delegation wishing to submit amendments or suggestions should do so not later than Friday, 14 December" (ENDC/PV.90, p. 38)

I consider that before referring these questions to the co-Chairmen, we should first of all discuss, agree on or reject the proposals which have been made and not do so in a roundabout way. We all know that the co-Chairmen are overloaded with work, and it is useless to submit to them problems upon which they would not be able to agree. It is for us first of all to discuss the important questions of principle and then let the co-Chairman agree upon a text, no doubt with alternatives in brackets. I know that we shall not be able to agree immediately upon a text without alternatives.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

Otherwise I am not opposed to the simplification which the United States has introduced into its draft and which is certainly very useful. But should we take up this discussion now, and above all should we invite forthwith the remarks and proposals which the other delegations may wish to submit? To do so at this stage of the discussion, when the Western countries have no clear attitude towards the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union, would be tantamount to not taking into consideration the important proposals which have been put forward here. That is why we think that it would be useless to submit these remarks and proposals while we are still discussing important proposals which might change the whole aspect of the question.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): We had suggested that proposed amendments to our suggestions concerning draft article V might be submitted by Friday if -- and I emphasize if -- the general discussion on items 5 b and 5 c in plenary meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had been concluded. It is our understanding that it has not been concluded; and in fact I have suggested to the Soviet co-Chairman that discussion on those items should be continued on Monday.

I do not know whether or not I am disillusioning the Conference, but I do not want my colleagues to be under any impression that the two co-Chairmen do any work. When I go to see my co-Chairman, we have many interesting discussions on many subjects; but we do not in fact do any work.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I should like to inform the Committee that our co-Chairmen have agreed after consultation to submit to us today their recommendation concerning the date of our recess. I shall now read this recommendation:

"The co-Chairmen recommend to the Conference, after canvassing the views of all delegations, that the Conference shall recess on Friday 21 December and reconvene on Tuesday 15 January 1962".

In my personal opinion this recommendation reflects the consensus of our Committee. I am prepared to call on any member of the Committee wishing to speak on it.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I think that now there is no doubt amongst us concerning the determination of all of us to work hard and unceasingly at the task which has been entrusted to us. By becoming better acquainted with one another and by giving one another mutual assurances we have acquired this certainty which, to my mind, is valuable. That is why I believe that we can now discuss freely and without suspicion on either side the question of suspending the work of the Conference which we are sure will continue as long as its task has not been achieved. What I mean is that the suspension of our work is now a question without political overtones. It is a problem which concerns only the smooth running of our work and the choice of a timetable which suits our requirements.

We know quite well that we are not suspending our meetings next week on account of religious or civil festivals or because we are tired. We should all be ready to work every day without interruption if that were necessary. We are suspending our work for a brief period because at this stage in our discussions we consider that it is useful to give ourselves some time for reflection, a respite in order to allow our further deliberations to mature. We have certain important new documents to study; we have to report to our governments and our parliaments; our governments also perhaps wish to have informal discussions amongst themselves on disarmament. It is solely in the light of these considerations that we must decide the length of the recess.

If we consider that an extra week of recess would be useful because it would allow us to do a certain amount of homework, to undertake deeper and more constructive private studies, we should not hesitate to fix a more distant date than 15 January for the resumption of our work, 21 January for example. For my part I should favour 21 January. Moreover, if we postpone the date for resuming our work from 15 to 21 January we shall lose only two meetings, those on 16 and 18 January. If 21 January were accepted as a date for resumption, it would be possible to hold four meetings a week instead of three during the following two weeks. Thus the Committee would not slow down its work and, at the same time, we should have more time to consider at home what we are going to say to all those who have the right to be informed and also to prepare more rapid and more constructive work for the resumption of the Conference.

Mr. LALL (India): I am sorry to have to disagree with my colleague and neighbour, the representative of Italy. First, I think that, politically, the recess which has been recommended to us by the co-Chairmen and which we will accept because we generally do so, is most untimely. The United Nations General Assembly has asked that all tests should cease from 1 January 1963 (1762A(XVII))(ENDC/63) and it is regrettable, in my view, that we should have to suspend our discussions some ten days before that date, so that the continuous efforts which we should be making to give effect to the General Assembly's resolution will be interrupted. I think that is most unfortunate.

Secondly, it is not possible for anyone here to predict what will be the correct political moment for a sudden step forward in general and complete disarmament. If we were to do so, we might perhaps say that we should postpone our meetings for six months. That would be most regrettable, too, in my view.

I think, according to my concept of the mandate given to us by the General Assembly, that the very nature of this Conference is such that its continued efforts in themselves are expected to have some effect on those high authorities in the governments most concerned who have to take the ultimate decisions to bring about disarmament. If we were to stop meeting, it is quite clear that one of the forms of international pressure to achieve disarmament would cease, and it would be most regrettable therefore to prolong our recess. If we have a recess at all, it should be as short as possible. Indeed, my own feeling about the recess recommended by the co-Chairmen is that it is far too long. However, one bows to all kinds of realities, realities of custom, tradition and so on in these matters, and we are happy to be able to do so. But I think our endeavour must be to be constantly vigilant, to be here and to see what pressures we can exercise and we should come back to this table as early as possible in January to go ahead.

I should like to say in closing that only within the last three days there has seemed to us to have been signs of a possible desire to reach agreement. Important statements have been made in Moscow and in Paris about the need for agreement and it seems to me that these show how untimely our recess is going to be. But we accept the recommendation of the co-Chairmen as being inevitable.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): Apparently no one else wishes to speak. We have before us the recommendation of the co-Chairmen that we should suspend our work on Friday 21 December and resume it on Tuesday 15 January 1963. As far as I know, there are no objections in the Committee. If I have correctly understood the representative of Italy, he is not objecting to the recommendation of the co-Chairmen, but suggesting that the recess should be long. In general, I did not understand him to object to the recommendation. Therefore, if there are no other comments, I shall take it that the Committee adopts the recommendation of the co-Chairmen for the recess.

It was so decided.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Now that we have, as I understand, adopted the recommendation of the co-Chairmen for the recess, I should like in connexion with the statements of the representative of Italy and the representative of India, and in order to remove any misunderstanding of the position of the Soviet delegation in connexion with the recommendation of the co-Chairmen for a recess in our work, to inform the members of the Committee that when the two co-Chairmen discussed the recess, we on the Soviet side stated that the Soviet delegation was prepared to continue our work without a recess. But we were obliged to consider the opinion of other delegations; and as I was informed by Mr. Dean, the Western delegations and a number of the delegations of the non-aligned countries wished for a recess. We therefore agreed to the recess that has been proposed to us this morning by recommendation of the co-Chairmen.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Mr. Chairman, you have interpreted me aright in saying that I was prepared to accept the proposal of the two co-Chairmen. I regret that at this point in the discussion Mr. Tsarapkin should again wish to introduce a political note, whereas the recess should be regarded only as an opportunity for work and, as I have just said, should be determined only by the absolute necessities of our task.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): We can now proceed to close today's meeting. With regard to the meeting on Monday, I wish to inform the Committee that the co-Chairmen recommend that at our next meeting, i.e., on Monday, we should continue to discuss general and complete disarmament, namely paragraphs 5b and 5c. I am bearing in mind that members of the Committee retain the right to speak on other questions.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its ninety-second plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Kurka, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Czechoslovakia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, the United States of America, Poland, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Italy and India.

"The Conference decided to recess on Friday, 21 December 1962 and to reconvene on Tuesday, 15 January 1963.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 17 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.